

January 27, 2022

VIA ELECTRONIC MAIL

**TO: PARTICIPANTS COMMITTEE MEMBERS AND ALTERNATES**

**RE: Supplemental Notice of February 3, 2022 NEPOOL Participants Committee Meeting**

Pursuant to Section 6.6 of the Second Restated New England Power Pool Agreement, supplemental notice is hereby given that the February meeting of the Participants Committee will be held **in person on Thursday, February 3, 2022, at the Seaport Boston Hotel, 1 Seaport Lane, Boston, MA in the Seaport Ballroom** for the purposes set forth on the attached agenda, which has also been posted with the meeting materials at [nepool.com/meetings/](http://nepool.com/meetings/).

For your information, the February 3 Participants Committee meeting will be recorded. NEPOOL meetings, while not public, are open to all NEPOOL Participants, their authorized representatives and, except as otherwise limited for discussions in executive session, consumer advocates that are not members, federal and state officials and guests whose attendance has been cleared with the Committee Chair. All those in attendance or participating, either in person or by phone, are required to identify themselves and their affiliation at the meeting. Official records and minutes of meetings are posted publicly. No statements made in NEPOOL meetings are to be quoted or published publicly.

We have included with this notice the safety protocols that are currently in effect for in-person attendance at NEPOOL meetings. Consistent with the City of Boston's mask mandate, which is still in effect, and its more recent "[B Together](#)" vaccine requirement for certain indoor spaces, only those who are fully vaccinated, and have provided at or in advance of the meeting verification of full vaccination, will be permitted to attend in person. All attendees must wear masks or face coverings at all times during the meeting, except when actively eating, drinking, or presenting from the podium. Additional safety measures are outlined in the protocols.

For those who otherwise attend NEPOOL meetings but plan to participate in the February 3 meeting virtually, please use the following dial-in information: **866-803-2146; Passcode: 7169224**. To join using WebEx, click this [link](#) and enter the event password **nepool**.

There are a limited number of rooms available at the Seaport Boston Hotel for the evening before the February 3 meeting at the rate of \$149.00 per night, on a first-come, first-served basis through **Friday, January 28, 2022**. Please [make your reservation here](#) or contact the hotel directly (1-877-732-7678) and reference the "New England Power Pool" block of rooms.

FOR PARTICIPANTS WHO DO NOT TYPICALLY RECEIVE INVOICES FROM ISO-NE, PLEASE NOTE THAT ISO-NE WILL ISSUE INVOICES FOR 2022 NEPOOL ANNUAL FEES ON FEBRUARY 14, 2022. If you were a NEPOOL Participant on January 1, 2022, you will be assessed that Annual Fee, which must be paid on or before the close of business on Wednesday, February 16, 2022, in order to avoid penalties and interest. Please plan accordingly. If there are questions, you can call ISO-NE or Pat Gerity (860.275.0533).

Respectfully yours,

/s/  
David T. Doot, Secretary

## FINAL AGENDA

1. To approve the draft minutes of the January 6, 2022 Participants Committee meeting. The draft preliminary minutes of that meeting, marked to show changes from the draft circulated with the initial notice, are included with this supplemental notice and posted with the meeting materials.
2. To adopt and approve the actions recommended by the Technical Committees set forth on the Consent Agenda included with this supplemental notice and posted with the meeting materials.
3. To receive an ISO Chief Executive Officer report on the following:
  - The Board and Board Committee meetings that have occurred since the January 6, 2022 meeting. Summaries of those meetings will be circulated and posted in advance of the meeting; and
  - To continue discussion on the topic of current energy adequacy and security and to receive feedback on the exchange of letters on this topic between the ISO and Connecticut's Department of Energy & Environmental Protection, and to the ISO from NESCOE. Those letters have been posted with the composite meeting materials at [nepool.com/meetings/](https://nepool.com/meetings/).
4. To receive a report from the ISO Chief Operating Officer. The February COO report will be circulated and posted in advance of the meeting.
5. To consider and take action, as appropriate, on Tariff revisions recommended by the Markets Committee to remove the Minimum Offer Price Rule (MOPR) from New England's Forward Capacity Market (FCM). Background materials and draft resolutions are included with this supplemental notice.
6. To receive a report on current contested matters before the FERC and the Federal Courts. The litigation report will be circulated and posted in advance of the meeting.
7. To receive reports from Committees, Subcommittees and other working groups:
  - Markets Committee
  - Reliability Committee
  - Transmission Committee
  - Budget & Finance Subcommittee
  - Membership Subcommittee
  - Others
8. Administrative matters.
9. To transact such other business as may properly come before the meeting.



## **Protocols for In-Person Attendance at NEPOOL Meetings During the Covid-19 Pandemic**

*These protocols for return to in-person NEPOOL meetings are effective as of the date above and may be modified from time to time as guidelines from the U.S. Centers for Disease Control (“CDC”), applicable state or local requirements, or circumstances change.*

### **Background**

The Protocols provided herein outline recommended and preventative measures to reduce the COVID-related risks associated with attendance in person at NEPOOL meetings.<sup>1</sup> Measures include safety precautions individuals must take while at in-person meetings. In-person attendance will follow and adhere to the latest CDC guidelines (as well as any additional, applicable state or local requirements that may be in place). As with any in-person meeting, there will be COVID-related risks associated with in-person attendance. **Each in-person attendee should perform their own risk/benefit calculus in deciding whether to participate in-person or remotely.**

### **Safety Precautions**

***Proof of Full Vaccination Required.*** To attend a NEPOOL meeting in person, each attendee must be fully vaccinated.<sup>2</sup> Proof of vaccination (e.g., a copy of a completed COVID-19 Vaccination Record/Card) must be provided to NEPOOL counsel ([pmgerity@daypitney.com](mailto:pmgerity@daypitney.com)) in advance of the meeting.<sup>3</sup> An attendee who is unable to provide a copy of a completed COVID-19 Vaccination Record may sign and provide a COVID-19 Vaccination Status Attestation as an alternate form of proof. All such records will be maintained by NEPOOL Counsel in a confidential file. Those who are not vaccinated, or who have not timely provided proof of vaccination, will not be permitted in the meeting room and will be encouraged to participate by teleconference/WebEx. An individual’s ability to attend a meeting in person will be restored following proof of vaccination.

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<sup>1</sup> NEPOOL meetings, while not public, are open to all NEPOOL Participants, their authorized representatives and, except as otherwise limited for discussions in executive session, consumer advocates that are not members, federal and state officials and guests whose attendance has been cleared with the Committee Chair. All those in attendance or participating, either in person or by phone, are required to identify themselves and their affiliation at the meeting.

<sup>2</sup> A person is considered fully vaccinated: (i) 2 weeks after their second dose in a 2-dose series, such as the Pfizer or Moderna vaccines, or (ii) 2 weeks after a single-dose vaccine, such as Johnson & Johnson’s Janssen vaccine. If you don’t meet either of these criteria, regardless of age, you are NOT fully vaccinated.

<sup>3</sup> Proof of vaccination of ISO employees or representatives, as a condition of their in-person attendance, will be confidentially (i) collected and maintained by the ISO and (ii) verified by an ISO committee officer with NEPOOL counsel in advance of attendance at a meeting.

***Registration Required; Contact Tracing.*** Registration for in-person attendance will be required and the Committee Secretary will keep a separate record of all individuals in attendance in person for the purpose of later contact tracing. Specific contact tracing information is confidential and NEPOOL will not use this information for any other reason. Contact tracing information will be kept for 28 days and destroyed thereafter.

***Attendance In-Person Not Permitted if Experiencing Covid-19 Indicative Symptoms.*** Individuals should not attend an in-person meeting if they are experiencing new or worsening symptoms of any of the following in the last 14 days:

- Fever of 100.4 °F (38.0 °C) or higher
- Chills
- Cough
- Shortness of breath or difficulty breathing
- Fatigue
- Muscle or body aches
- Headache
- New Loss of Taste or Smell
- Sore Throat
- Congestion or runny nose
- Nausea or vomiting
- Diarrhea

***Attendance In-Person Not Permitted if Recent Exposure to Covid-19-Positive Individual.*** Individuals should not attend in-person meetings if they have had a likely exposure to a COVID-19 positive individual in the last 14 days.

***Physical Distancing.*** The opportunity for physical distancing at meeting tables will be provided where and as possible, but will not be enforced. Attendees are encouraged, whenever otherwise possible, to separate themselves by 6 feet of distance. Seating at round tables should be limited to six or fewer.

***Masks.*** If and as required by CDC guidelines or by the requirements of the state or locale in which the meeting is taking place, face coverings (“masks”) shall be worn. Where physical distancing cannot be maintained, it is recommended that attendees wear masks whenever they are not seated, including while in transit to or from their seat and while standing in lines or in the room.

***Sanitizing.*** Hand sanitizer and wipes will be made available at each meeting. Additional arrangements will be implemented to facilitate sanitation measures. (e.g. All microphones will be positioned and sanitized prior to arrival. Microphones will also be sanitized at lunch and at the end of the day. Alcohol sanitizing wipes will be available for attendees to utilize during the meeting to sanitize the microphones between users.)



### **Reporting and Communicating a Positive COVID-19 Result**

In the event of a COVID-19-positive test result, an individual that attended an in-person meeting within 14 days of that result should immediately contact NEPOOL Counsel ([pmgerity@daypitney.com](mailto:pmgerity@daypitney.com)) to report their COVID-19 status. NEPOOL Counsel will maintain the individual's privacy while notifying those that attended the meeting in person of the positive test result. Please be advised that all health information is private and strictly confidential and will only be shared on a need-to-know basis to confirm and trace any contact with the positive tester at a NEPOOL in-person meeting and contact those who may have been exposed. Any notice of a COVID-19-positive test result will be kept for 28 days and destroyed thereafter.

### **Remote Participation**

For those individuals who are otherwise authorized to attend a NEPOOL meeting, but choose not to, or because of safety measures are unable to, attend meetings in person, remote participation (i.e. by teleconference and/or by WebEx) will continue to be made available.

## **PRELIMINARY**

Pursuant to notice duly given, a meeting of the NEPOOL Participants Committee was held beginning at 10:00 a.m. on Wednesday, January 6, 2022, at the Colonnade Hotel, Boston, Massachusetts. A quorum, determined in accordance with the Second Restated NEPOOL Agreement, was present and acting throughout the meeting. Attachment 1 identifies the members, alternates and temporary alternates who participated in the meeting, either in person or by phone.

Mr. David Cavanaugh, Chair, presided, and Mr. David Doot, Secretary, recorded.

## **APPROVAL OF DECEMBER 2, 2021 MEETING MINUTES**

Mr. Cavanaugh referred the Committee to the preliminary minutes of the December 2, 2021 meeting, as circulated and posted in advance of the meeting. Following motion duly made and seconded, the preliminary minutes of that meeting were unanimously approved as circulated, with an abstention by Mr. Michael Kuser's alternate noted.

## **CONSENT AGENDA**

Mr. Cavanaugh referred the Committee to the Consent Agenda that was circulated and posted in advance of the meeting. Following motion duly made and seconded, the Consent Agenda was approved as circulated, with an abstention by Mr. Kuser's alternate noted.

## **CHANGES TO RBA SUBMISSION AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENT PROCEDURES**

Mr. Tom Kaslow, Budget & Finance Subcommittee (B&F) Chair, referred the Committee to the materials circulated and posted in advance of the meeting related to changes to the ISO New England Billing Policy (Billing Policy). The changes revised the Billing Policy to require

the submission of Requested Billing Adjustments (RBA) to Participant Support and Solutions at the ISO via the ISO's support system, AskISO, and the transmission by the ISO to the submitting Participant of an acknowledgement and/or case number assignment. Without discussion, the following motion was then duly made, seconded and unanimously approved, with an abstention noted by Mr. Kuser's alternate:

RESOLVED, that the Participants Committee supports the changes to the procedures for RBA submission and acknowledgement under the ISO New England Billing Policy, as proposed by the ISO and as circulated to this Committee with the supplemental notice of this meeting, together with such non-substantive changes as may be approved by the Chair of the Budget & Finance Subcommittee.

## **REVISIONS TO ACCELERATE FCM SETTLEMENT & BILLING PROCESSES**

Ms. Mariah Winkler, Markets Committee (MC) Chair, summarized the proposal to convert certain credits and charges associated with the Forward Capacity Market (FCM) from a monthly settlement to a daily settlement along with corrections, clarifications, and clean-up revisions to Market Rule 1 and Manual M-28 to remove outdated language and correct inconsistencies (the FCM Settlement/Billing Proposal). She reported that, at its November 10, 2021 meeting, the MC considered the FCM Settlement/Billing Proposal and had unanimously recommended Participants Committee support for the Proposal. She reported also that B&F had considered at its October 2021 meeting related changes to the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy (FAP) and Billing Policy without objections or concerns.

Mr. Cavanaugh suggested that, given the unanimous MC recommendation and the lack of objections or concerns from B&F, the motions on this matter could be acted on in a single vote. There was no opposition to that suggestion. Load-serving Participants expressed appreciation to the ISO and B&F for the work on, and commitment of resources to, this matter, which would

result in reduced financial assurance requirements without appreciably increasing risk to the Pool overall. The following motions were then duly made, seconded, and in a single vote, unanimously approved, with an abstention noted by Mr. Kuser's alternate:

RESOLVED, that the Participants Committee supports the Tariff and Manual M-28 revisions related to converting certain credits and charges associated with the FCM from a monthly settlement to a daily settlement, as recommended by the Markets Committee at its November 9–10 meeting and circulated to this Committee in advance of this meeting, together with such non-substantive changes as may be approved by the Chair and Vice-Chair of the Markets Committee.

RESOLVED, that the Participants Committee supports revisions to Sections III.A, VII.A, VII.C, and VII.F (1)(a) of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy and Sections 1.3 and 2.4(e) of the Billing Policy to implement the changes to convert certain credits and charges associated with the FCM from a monthly settlement to a daily settlement, as circulated to this Committee in advance of this meeting, together with such non-substantive changes as may be approved by the Chair of the Budget & Finance Subcommittee.

## ISO CEO REPORT

Mr. Gordon van Welie, ISO Chief Executive Officer (CEO), referred the Committee to the summaries of the ISO Board and Board Committee meetings that had occurred since the December 2, 2021 Participants Committee meeting, which had been circulated and posted in advance of the meeting. There were no questions or comments on the summaries.

He then highlighted the following items in the 2022 Work Plan, noting the amount of work that was in the queue: (i) finalization of the proposal to eliminate the Minimum Offer Price Rule (MOPR); (ii) progress in the resource capacity accreditation process; (iii) ancillary services improvements; (iv) improved modeling of the impacts of the clean energy transition; (v) completion of the NESCOE-requested 2050 transmission analysis; (vi) response to the FERC's

anticipated rulemaking on transmission planning and cost allocation for public policy transmission; (vii) adjustment to governance arrangements to provide the States more opportunity to control the pace and direction of the transmission investments to integrate renewables for which they are contracting; and (viii) the Future Pathways report, which he expected to be released for feedback within the month and finalized in the second quarter after meetings with NECPUC, NESCOE and NEPOOL.

Mr. van Welie then turned to resource adequacy and energy security, noting ISO concerns and the significant investment required for a reliable and sustainable clean energy transition. He highlighted the need for sufficient clean and renewable resources to ensure the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, the investment in transmission required to ~~integrated~~[integrate](#) these resources, the need for robust wholesale electricity markets which provide the necessary incentives to ensure reliability, and a robust energy supply chain and energy ~~reserve~~[reserves](#). He noted his belief that the planned improvements in resource capacity accreditation and ancillary services would help mitigate some of the energy adequacy/reliability risks, but explained his belief that those wholesale power market improvements would be insufficient to mitigate the risks in the wholesale electricity markets of low probability, high impact weather events. Accordingly, the ISO had initiated a project with [the Electric Power Research Institute \(EPRI\)](#) to build more sophisticated modeling capability in the hopes of better quantifying and supporting discussion of how best to address those risks.

Mr. van Welie then referred to a recent exchange of letters between the ISO and Connecticut's Department of Energy & Environmental Protection Commissioner Katie Dykes on the topic of current energy adequacy and security. He said that those letters had been posted on

the ISO website the day before.\* Given the late posting, Mr. van Welie indicated a willingness to further discuss the letters at a future meeting once members had a chance to review the exchange. The Connecticut representative at the meeting explained that recent discussions with and in the press about reliability risks for this winter did not include sufficient discussion of what the ISO was doing for Winter 2021/22 to mitigate those immediate risks, referencing by way of example [to](#) prior winters where programs had been put in place to provide additional fuel security. Mr. van Welie responded that the prior winter programs supported carbon-emitting resources, which was objectionable to the States, and which the ISO would not renew absent regulatory direction to do so.

Discussion on these topics ensued, including on objectives, the technologies, market mechanisms, resource and infrastructure solutions, and policy support that could be explored and would be needed, as well as on the attendant challenges associated with each of them. In response to a question about the governance changes the ISO was contemplating for the clean energy transition, Mr. van Welie clarified the need for States to provide direction in the region's consideration of the placement, cost and allocation of transmission investments to support public policies being implemented by the New England States. In response to Mr. van Welie's opinion that the competitive markets would be insufficient to ensure reliability during low probability, high impact events, a number of members encouraged the ISO to reconsider, noting that market prices this past winter were resulting in actions being taken to provide additional fuel security for the region.

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\* Following the meeting, the letters were added to the posted composite materials for the meeting.

When asked about the ISO's plans for employees to return to in-person work, he shared that, as of January 4, the ISO instituted safety protocols that included vaccination, masking, and weekly testing requirements. He noted constraints imposed by the availability of testing, which had delayed the return of some employees. He further indicated that employees who had expressed concerns with in-person work arrangements had been allowed, for the time being, to continue to work remotely in a hybrid work structure. Regarding staffing, Dr. Vamsi Chadalavada, ISO Chief Operating Officer (COO), indicated that the ISO was actively recruiting for the eight or nine positions identified in the 2022 budget discussion and core to the 2022 work plan.

## ISO COO REPORT

Dr. ~~Vamsi~~ Chadalavada, ~~ISO Chief Operating Officer (COO)~~, began by referring the Committee to his January report, which had been circulated and posted in advance of the meeting. ~~Dr. Chadalavada~~He noted that the data in the report was through December 27, 2021, unless otherwise noted. The report highlighted: (i) Energy Market value for December 2021 was \$656 million, up \$86 million from the updated November 2021 value and \$206 million from December 2020; (ii) December 2021 average natural gas prices were 60% higher than November average prices; (iii) average Real-Time Hub Locational Marginal Prices (LMPs) for December (\$62.35/MWh) were 6% higher than November averages; (iv) average December 2021 natural gas prices and Real-Time Hub LMPs over the period were up 112% and 50%, respectively, from December 2020 average prices; (v) average Day-Ahead cleared physical energy during peak hours as percent of forecasted load was 97.6% during December (down from the 98.2% reported for November), with the minimum value for the month of 92.1% on December 6; and (vi) Daily

Net Commitment Period Compensation (NCPC) payments for December totaled \$5.3 million, which was up \$2.0 million from November 2021 and \$1.7 million from December 2020. December NCPC payments, which were 0.8% of total Energy Market value, were comprised of \$2.9 million in first contingency payments (up \$0.1 million from November 2021), \$2.3 million in second contingency payments (largely to protect eastern New England load, given in-merit economic generation was largely located in western New England), and voltage payments totaling \$19,000.

Dr. Chadalavada noted that [the](#) sixteenth Forward Capacity Auction (FCA16) would begin on February 7. The ISO was prepared to conduct that auction remotely, with heightened contingency plans given the COVID Omicron variant.

Turning to December weather, he noted that the average temperature was about 5°F warmer than normal, resulting in demand that was 2% - 4% lower than normal. He noted a few days in the second half of December with lower-than-normal temperatures that coincided with higher natural gas prices. As a result, more oil units ran in merit, burning No. 2 fuel oil. In response to a question, Dr. Chadalavada confirmed that oil inventories had been promptly replenished, returning overall inventory to roughly 53% of maximum usable storage.

Looking forward, Dr. Chadalavada commented on the 21-day temperature outlook, noting that the prior forecasts by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration for above-average temperatures had proven to be accurate. He highlighted subregions where more extreme temperatures could be expected. He predicted that, absent an unexpected shift in weather or confluence of cold days in February, the region may well have put the highest risk of reliability events during the current winter period behind it. When asked whether the outlook



provided information that mitigated concerns raised at the beginning of the winter period, Dr. Chadalavada explained that warmer temperatures were the key reason for avoiding reliability challenges so far. Using previous winters as examples, he explained how the timing and duration of cold weather conditions could quickly intensify (or the absence thereof, alleviate) concerns. In light of that possibility, he emphasized the importance of planning for the worst, but acknowledged that, and as the winter period passed without incident, projections could evolve and be more positive. As reflected in the December report, higher temperatures (together with load relief from less holiday lighting and longer daylight hours) and the passage of time had largely tempered reliability concerns for the remainder of the winter. There remained, nonetheless, the possibility that colder than expected weather conditions in February could quickly change conditions.

In response to a question about the financial settlement associated with the termination of the Killingly Energy Center's Capacity Supply Obligation (CSO), he confirmed that, absent a change in regulatory acceptance of that termination, the rebates to load reflecting the forfeit of Killingly's Financial Assurance were planned to be distributed over the next Capacity Commitment Period, beginning in June 2022.

## **ORDER 2222 COMPLIANCE PROPOSAL**

Ms. Winkler referred the Committee to materials circulated in advance of the meeting and provided an overview of the Tariff revisions proposed by the ISO in response to the requirements of the FERC's Final Rule (Order 2222) regarding the participation of distributed energy resource (DER) aggregations (DERAs) in ISO/RTO markets (the Order 2222 Changes).

Ms. Winkler reported that aspects of the Order 2222 Changes were considered separately, over the course of multiple meetings, by each of the Technical Committees, consistent with each Committee's responsibilities under the Participants Agreement. The Reliability Committee (RC) focused on changes related to auditing and the calculation of the Installed Capacity Requirement (ICR). The RC unanimously supported those proposed revisions at its December 14, 2021 meeting, with 10 abstentions noted. The Transmission Committee (TC) focused on changes to interconnection procedures. The TC unanimously supported those changes at its December 13 meeting, with 3 abstentions noted. Finally, the MC vetted proposed changes to the Energy, Ancillary Services and Forward Capacity Markets, metering and telemetry requirements, the DER/DERA registration process, and operational coordination. Before the ISO's final compliance proposal was voted at the December 7–9, 2021 MC meeting, the MC considered six Participant amendments to the ISO-proposed changes, all of which failed to garner sufficient support to pass. She summarized each amendment, noting the voting outcome with respect to each amendment. She concluded her introduction by reporting that the MC recommended Participants Committee support for the ISO's un-amended Order 2222 Changes, with a 71.11% Vote in favor.

***RC-Recommended and TC-Recommended Changes***

Following Ms. Winkler's overview, Mr. Cavanaugh suggested that, given the unanimous RC and TC recommendations, the RC and TC recommendations could be acted on in a single vote. There was no opposition to that suggestion. Without discussion, the following motions were duly made, seconded and approved unanimously in a single vote, with abstentions recorded (*See "RC/TC Recm'd Changes" on Attachment 2.*):

Resolved, that the Participants Committee supports revisions to  
Tariff § I.2.2 and § II, as recommended by the Transmission

Committee and as circulated to this Committee in advance of this meeting, together with such non-substantive changes as may be approved by the Chair and Vice-Chair of the Transmission Committee.

Resolved, that the Participants Committee supports revisions to Tariff §§ I.2.2, III.1.5, III.1.7.13, and III.12, as recommended by the Reliability Committee and as circulated to this Committee in advance of this meeting, together with such non-substantive changes as may be approved by the Chair and Vice-Chair of the Reliability Committee.

### ***MC-Recommended Changes***

Supplementing the stakeholder process information provided earlier by Ms. Winkler, Mr. Sebastian Lombardi, NEPOOL Counsel, noted that, consistent with past practice, no procedural objections would be raised by either NEPOOL or the ISO if proponents did not advance before the Participants Committee amendments that had been offered during MC consideration of the MC-recommended changes but had failed to gain the requisite support for inclusion in the changes recommended to the Participants Committee. He reported that, with that understanding, Advanced Energy Economy had indicated to NEPOOL Counsel that it would not seek a vote on the amendments it offered at the MC. Mr. Lombardi further noted that NEPOOL Counsel would provide for the record in the FERC proceeding a summary of the outcome of the MC consideration of those amendments.

The following motion was then duly made and seconded:

RESOLVED, that the Participants Committee supports revisions to Tariff § I.2.2 and Market Rule 1, as recommended by the Markets Committee and as circulated to this Committee in advance of this meeting, together with such non-substantive changes as may be approved by the Chair and Vice-Chair of the Markets Committee.

On behalf of NECPUC and the state regulatory authorities, the NECPUC representative thanked the ISO and stakeholders for the hard work on the changes and related proposals, and for the time spent talking through questions and concerns. Given expectations of further process in state proceedings related to implementation of Order 2222, NECPUC and its members were unable to take a position on the changes or proposed amendments, but looked forward to further collaboration with the ISO and Participants throughout implementation and any related state proceedings.

Stakeholders provided comments both in support and opposition to the MC-recommended changes. Those supporting the changes expressed their appreciation for the ISO's maintaining reliability criteria, comparability amongst resources and its focus on the specific requirements of Order 2222. Some cautioned that, with the required changes, would come additional risk to the system, risks that would have to be acknowledged and addressed.

Those who opposed or who could not support the changes expressed their concern with the impact on the participation in the New England markets of DERs, noting variously the following opinions and concerns with the changes: they fell short of what was needed by all DERAs, they did not fully unlock the value of DER resources; they might not in some cases be viable for existing DER providers; and they would require additional work to better align with the anticipated growth of DERs in the markets. Opponents summarized some of the perceived shortcomings in the changes, and provided examples of how other regions had addressed those issues.

Following further discussion, the motion to support the MC-Recommended Changes was then voted and passed with a with a 71.1% Vote in favor (Generation Sector – 16.7%;

Transmission Sector – 16.7%; Supplier Sector – 11.69%; AR Sector – 7.22%; Publicly Owned Entity Sector – 16.7%; End User Sector – 2.09%; and Provisional Members – 0%). (See “MC Recm’d Changes” on Attachment 2.)

## LITIGATION REPORT

Mr. Doot referred the Committee to the January 4 Litigation Report that had been circulated and posted the day before the meeting. He highlighted the following:

- (i) The FERC’s order accepting the ICR and related values for the 2025-26 Capacity Commitment Period to be used in FCA16;
- (ii) The FERC’s acceptance of the 2022 ISO and NESCOE budgets;
- (iii) The January 3, 2022 order accepting the ISO’s termination of the CSO held by NTE Connecticut LLC for the Killingly Energy Center;
- (iv) The denial by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit of TransCanada’s petition for review of the FERC’s final order on the 2013/14 Winter Reliability Program; and
- (v) Voltus’ request for a FERC technical conference on Order 2222-related issues.

## COMMITTEE REPORTS

**Markets Committee.** Mr. William Fowler, the MC Vice-Chair, reported that the next MC meeting would take place on January 11-12. The meeting would include votes on the proposal to remove MOPR as well as Participant-proposed retirement reforms and changes to the financial assurance requirements for new FCM resources. Mr. Fowler noted that MC leadership was still evaluating whether there were sufficient registrations to support an in-person meeting, and he encouraged those who may have changed their plans to promptly provide that information and for all interested to monitor their e-mails for any updates on a final meeting venue.

***Reliability Committee.*** Mr. Robert Stein, the RC Vice-Chair, reported that the next regularly-scheduled RC meeting, January 19, would include continued discussion and a presentation by the ISO on the planning criteria for battery charging on the grid. As with the MC, he requested that members advise the RC leadership of plans to participate so that a determination as to arrangements for participation could be finalized.

***Transmission Committee (TC).*** Mr. José Rotger, the TC Vice-Chair, reported that the next TC meeting was scheduled for January 25. He noted the possibility that the meeting would be held virtually, if not cancelled altogether, given a lighter business load. He encouraged members to stay tuned for e-mails confirming or cancelling the January [TC](#) meeting.

***Budget & Finance Subcommittee.*** Mr. Kaslow reported that the next B&F Subcommittee meeting was scheduled for January 26 and would include action on Generation Information System exemption requests and discussion on CPV's proposal to revise non-commercial resource financial assurance requirements.

***Membership Subcommittee.*** Ms. Sarah Bresolin, Subcommittee Chair, noted that the next meeting was scheduled for the following Monday at 10:00 a.m.

## **ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS**

Mr. Doot reported that the next Participants Committee Meeting was scheduled to take place on February 3 at the Seaport Hotel, although a decision may be made to hold the meeting virtually. He indicated that the February [3](#) meeting would include further discussion with Mr. Gordon van Welie on the fuel security issues discussed earlier in the meeting and an anticipated vote on MOPR. If the decision was made to hold that meeting virtually instead of in-person, that decision would be communicated to members via e-mail.

Mr. Cavanaugh reminded members that the next Future Grid Pathways working session, which would include a discussion of an anticipated draft report, was expected to take place in early March, with confirmation of that date to follow shortly. He also reported that the first meeting of the Joint Nominating Committee (JNC) in the process to identify a slate of candidates to be voted in 2022 would take place on January 7. He reminded the Committee of the Participants Agreement waiver that had been approved in 2021 and noted that, while two Board members' final terms were expiring, the plan for the JNC was to recommend a slate with the incumbent Board member who was still eligible for re-election and a single additional candidate in order to restore the composition of the Board to 10 members, as provided in the Participants Agreement.

There being no other business, the meeting adjourned at 12:35 p.m.

Respectfully submitted,

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David Doot, Secretary

**PARTICIPANTS COMMITTEE MEMBERS AND ALTERNATES  
PARTICIPATING IN JAN 6, 2022 MEETING**

PARTICIPANT NAME	SECTOR/ GROUP	MEMBER NAME	ALTERNATE NAME	PROXY
Acadia Center	End User	Melissa Birchard (tel)		
Advanced Energy Economy	Associate Non-Voting	Caitlin Marquis (tel)	Jeff Dennis (tel)	
AR Large Renewable Gen. (RG) Group Member	AR-RG	Alex Worsley (tel)		
AR Small Load Response (LR) Group Member	AR-LR	Brad Swalwell (tel)		
Ashburnham Municipal Light Plant	Publicly Owned Entity		Brian Thomson (tel)	
Associated Industries of Massachusetts (AIM)	End User			Mary Smith (tel)
AVANGRID: CMP/UI	Transmission	Alan Trotta (tel)	Jason Rauch (tel)	
Belmont Municipal Light Department	Publicly Owned Entity		Dave Cavanaugh	
Block Island Utility District	Publicly Owned Entity	Dave Cavanaugh		
Borrego Solar Systems Inc.	AR-DG	Liz Delaney (tel)		
Boylston Municipal Light Department	Publicly Owned Entity		Brian Thomson (tel)	
BP Energy Company	Supplier			José Rotger (tel)
Braintree Electric Light Department	Publicly Owned Entity			Dave Cavanaugh
Brookfield Renewable Trading and Marketing	Supplier	Aleks Mitreski (tel)		
Calpine Energy Services, LP	Supplier	Brett Kruse		Bill Fowler (tel); John Flumerfelt (tel)
Castleton Commodities Merchant Trading	Supplier			Bob Stein (tel)
Central Rivers Power	AR-RG		Dan Allegretti (tel)	
Centrica Business Solutions Optimize, LLC	AR-LR		Aaron Breidenbaugh (tel)	Nancy Chafetz (tel)
Chester Municipal Light Department	Publicly Owned Entity		Dave Cavanaugh	
Chicopee Municipal Lighting Plant	Publicly Owned Entity		Brian Thomson (tel)	
CleaResult Consulting, Inc.	AR-DG	Tamera Oldfield (tel)		
Clearway Power Marketing LLC	Supplier			Pete Fuller (tel)
Concord Municipal Light Plant	Publicly Owned Entity		Dave Cavanaugh	
Connecticut Municipal Electric Energy Coop.	Publicly Owned Entity	Brian Forshaw (tel)		
Conservation Law Foundation (CLF)	End User	Phelps Turner (tel)		
Consolidated Edison Energy, Inc.	Supplier	Grant Flagler (tel)	Matt Napoli (tel)	
CPV Towantic, LLC	Generation	Joel Gordon (tel)		
Cross-Sound Cable Company (CSC)	Supplier		José Rotger (tel)	
Danvers Electric Division	Publicly Owned Entity		Dave Cavanaugh	
DC Energy, LLC	Supplier	Bruce Bleiweis (tel)		
Dominion Energy Generation Marketing	Generation	Mike Purdie (tel)	Weezie Nuara (tel)	
DTE Energy Trading, Inc.	Supplier			José Rotger (tel)
Dynegy Marketing and Trade, LLC	Supplier	Andy Weinstein (tel)		Bill Fowler (tel)
Emera Energy Services	Supplier			Bill Fowler (tel)
Enel X North America, Inc.	AR-LR	Michael Macrae (tel)		
ENGIE Energy Marketing NA, Inc.	AR-RG	Sarah Bresolin		
Environmental Defense Fund (EDF)	End User	Jolette Westbrook (tel)		
Eversource Energy	Transmission	James Daly	Dave Burnham (tel)	Vandan Divatia
Exelon Generation Company	Supplier	Steve Kirk (tel)	Bill Fowler (tel)	
FirstLight Power Management, LLC	Generation	Tom Kaslow		
Galt Power, Inc.	Supplier	José Rotger (tel)		
Generation Group Member	Generation	Dennis Duffy (tel)	Abby Krich (tel)	
Georgetown Municipal Light Department	Publicly Owned Entity		Dave Cavanaugh	
Great River Hydro	AR-RG			Bill Fowler (tel)
Groton Electric Light Department	Publicly Owned Entity		Brian Thomson (tel)	
Groveland Electric Light Department	Publicly Owned Entity		Dave Cavanaugh	
H.Q. Energy Services (U.S.) Inc. (HQUS)	Supplier	Louis Guilbault (tel)	Bob Stein (tel)	
Harvard Dedicated Energy Limited	End User			Jason Frost (tel)
High Liner Foods (USA) Incorporated	End User		William P. Short III (tel)	
Hingham Municipal Lighting Plant	Publicly Owned Entity		Dave Cavanaugh	
Holden Municipal Light Department	Publicly Owned Entity		Brian Thomson (tel)	



**PARTICIPANTS COMMITTEE MEMBERS AND ALTERNATES  
PARTICIPATING IN JAN 6, 2022 MEETING**

PARTICIPANT NAME	SECTOR/ GROUP	MEMBER NAME	ALTERNATE NAME	PROXY
Holyoke Gas & Electric Department	Publicly Owned Entity		Brian Thomson (tel)	
Hull Municipal Lighting Plant	Publicly Owned Entity		Brian Thomson (tel)	
Ipswich Municipal Light Department	Publicly Owned Entity		Brian Thomson (tel)	
Jericho Power LLC (Jericho)	AR-RG		Nancy Chafetz (tel)	Ben Griffiths (tel)
Jupiter Power	Provisional Member			Ron Carrier (tel)
Kuser, Michael	End User		Sam Mintz	Rich Heidorn (tel)
Littleton (MA) Electric Light and Water Department	Publicly Owned Entity		Dave Cavanaugh	
Littleton (NH) Water & Light Department	Publicly Owned Entity		Craig Kieny (tel)	
Long Island Power Authority (LIPA)	Supplier	Bill Kilgoar (tel)		
Maine Power LLC	Supplier	Jeff Jones (tel)		
Maine Public Advocate's Office	End User	Drew Landry (tel)		
Mansfield Municipal Electric Department	Publicly Owned Entity		Brian Thomson (tel)	
Maple Energy LLC	AR-LR			Doug Hurley (tel)
Marblehead Municipal Light Department	Publicly Owned Entity		Brian Thomson (tel)	
Mass. Attorney General's Office (MA AG)	End User	Tina Belew (tel)		
Mass. Bay Transportation Authority	Publicly Owned Entity		Dave Cavanaugh	
Mass. Municipal Wholesale Electric Company	Publicly Owned Entity	Brian Thomson (tel)		
Mercuria Energy America, LLC	Supplier			José Rotger (tel)
Merrimac Municipal Light Department	Publicly Owned Entity		Dave Cavanaugh	
Middleborough Gas & Electric Department	Publicly Owned Entity		Dave Cavanaugh	
Middleton Municipal Electric Department	Publicly Owned Entity		Dave Cavanaugh	
National Grid	Transmission	Tim Brennan (tel)	Tim Martin	
Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC)	End User	Bruce Ho (tel)		
Nautilus Power, LLC	Generation		Bill Fowler (tel)	
New Hampshire Electric Cooperative	Publicly Owned Entity	Steve Kaminski		Brian Forshaw (tel); Dave Cavanaugh; Brian Thomson (tel)
New England Power Generators Assoc. (NEPGA)	Associate Non-Voting	Bruce Anderson (tel)	Dan Dolan (tel)	
NextEra Energy Resources, LLC	Generation	Michelle Gardner		
North Attleborough Electric Department	Publicly Owned Entity		Dave Cavanaugh	
Norwood Municipal Light Department	Publicly Owned Entity		Dave Cavanaugh	
NRG Power Marketing LLC	Supplier		Pete Fuller (tel)	
Pascoag Utility District	Publicly Owned Entity		Dave Cavanaugh	
Paxton Municipal Light Department	Publicly Owned Entity		Brian Thomson (tel)	
Peabody Municipal Light Department	Publicly Owned Entity		Brian Thomson (tel)	
PowerOptions, Inc.	End User			Jason Frost (tel)
Princeton Municipal Light Department	Publicly Owned Entity		Brian Thomson (tel)	
Reading Municipal Light Department	Publicly Owned Entity		Dave Cavanaugh	
Rowley Municipal Lighting Plant	Publicly Owned Entity		Dave Cavanaugh	
Russell Municipal Light Dept.	Publicly Owned Entity		Brian Thomson (tel)	
Shell Energy North America (US), L.P.	Supplier	Jeff Dannels		
Shrewsbury Electric & Cable Operations	Publicly Owned Entity		Brian Thomson (tel)	
South Hadley Electric Light Department	Publicly Owned Entity		Brian Thomson (tel)	
Sterling Municipal Electric Light Department	Publicly Owned Entity		Brian Thomson (tel)	
Stowe Electric Department	Publicly Owned Entity		Dave Cavanaugh	
Sunrun Inc.	AR-DG	Chris Rauscher (tel)		Peter Fuller (tel)
Taunton Municipal Lighting Plant	Publicly Owned Entity		Dave Cavanaugh	
Templeton Municipal Lighting Plant	Publicly Owned Entity		Brian Thomson (tel)	
Tenaska Power Services Co.	Supplier	Brad Cox (tel)		
The Energy Consortium	End User	Bob Espindola (tel)	Mary Smith (tel)	
Vermont Electric Cooperative	Publicly Owned Entity	Craig Kieny (tel)		
Vermont Electric Power Company (VELCO)	Transmission	Frank Ettori		
Vermont Energy Investment Corp (VEIC)	AR-LR		Doug Hurley (tel)	

**PARTICIPANTS COMMITTEE MEMBERS AND ALTERNATES  
PARTICIPATING IN JAN 6, 2022 MEETING**

PARTICIPANT NAME	SECTOR/ GROUP	MEMBER NAME	ALTERNATE NAME	PROXY
Vermont Public Power Supply Authority	Publicly Owned Entity			Brian Forshaw (tel)
Village of Hyde Park (VT) Electric Department	Publicly Owned Entity		Dave Cavanaugh	
Vitol Inc.	Supplier	Joe Wadsworth (tel)		
Voltus, Inc.	AR-LR		Allison Bates Wannop (tel)	Kerinia Cusick (tel)
Wakefield Municipal Gas & Light Department	Publicly Owned Entity		Brian Thomson (tel)	
Wallingford DPU Electric Division	Publicly Owned Entity		Dave Cavanaugh	
Wellesley Municipal Light Plant	Publicly Owned Entity		Dave Cavanaugh	
West Boylston Municipal Lighting Plant	Publicly Owned Entity		Brian Thomson (tel)	
Westfield Gas & Electric Department	Publicly Owned Entity		Dave Cavanaugh	
Wheelabrator North Andover Inc.	AR-RG		Bill Fowler (tel)	

**JANUARY 6, 2022 PARTICIPANTS COMMITTEE MEETING  
VOTES TAKEN ON ORDER 2222 COMPLIANCE PROPOSAL**

**TOTAL**

Sector	RC/TC Recm'd Changes	MC Recm'd Changes
GENERATION	16.70	16.70
TRANSMISSION	16.70	16.70
SUPPLIER	16.50	11.69
ALTERNATIVE RESOURCES	16.70	7.22
PUBLICLY OWNED ENTITY	16.70	16.70
END USER	16.70	2.09
PROVISIONAL MEMBERS	0.00	0.00
<b>% IN FAVOR</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>71.10</b>

**TRANSMISSION SECTOR**

Participant Name	RC/TC Recm'd Changes	MC Recm'd Changes
Avangrid (CMP/UI)	F	F
Eversource Energy	F	F
National Grid	F	F
VELCO	F	F
IN FAVOR (F)	4	4
OPPOSED	0	0
TOTAL VOTES	4	4
ABSTENTIONS (A)	0	0

**GENERATION SECTOR**

Participant Name	RC/TC Recm'd Changes	MC Recm'd Changes
CPV Towantic, LLC	F	F
Dominion Energy Generation Mktg	F	F
FirstLight Power Management, LLC	F	F
Generation Group Member	A	A
Nautilus Power, LLC	F	F
NextEra Energy Resources, LLC	F	F
IN FAVOR (F)	5	5
OPPOSED (O)	0	0
TOTAL VOTES	5	5
ABSTENTIONS (A)	1	1

**SUPPLIER SECTOR**

Participant Name	RC/TC Recm'd Changes	MC Recm'd Changes
BP Energy Company	F	F
Brookfield Renew. Trading & Mktg	F	A
Calpine Energy Services, LP	F	F
Castleton Comm. Merchant Trading	A	O
Clearway Power Marketing LLC	F	A
Consolidated Edison Energy Inc.	F	A
Cross-Sound Cable Company	F	F
DC Energy, LLC	F	A
DTE Energy Trading, Inc.	F	F
Dynegy Marketing and Trade, LLC	F	F
Emera Energy Companies	F	A
Exelon Generation Company	F	A
Galt Power, Inc.	F	A
H.Q. Energy Services (U.S.) Inc.	A	O
LIPA	F	A
Maine Power, LLC	F	F
Mercuria Energy America, Inc.	F	F
NRG Power Marketing, LLC	F	O
Shell Energy North America (US)	A	A
Tenaska Power Services Co.	F	A
Vitol Inc.	--	--
IN FAVOR (F)	17	7
OPPOSED	0	3
TOTAL VOTES	17	10
ABSTENTIONS (A)	3	10

**ALTERNATIVE RESOURCES SECTOR**

Participant Name	RC/TC Recm'd Changes	MC Recm'd Changes
<b>Renewable Generation Sub-Sector</b>		
Central Rivers Power	F	F
ENGIE Energy Marketing NA	F	A
Great River Hydro, LLC	F	F
Jericho Power LLC	A	O
Wheelabrator/Macquarie	F	F
Large RG Group Member	A	A
<b>Distributed Gen. Sub-Sector</b>		
Borrego Solar Systems Inc.	F	A
CLEARResult Consulting, Inc.	F	A
Sunrun Inc.	F	O
<b>Load Response Sub-Sector</b>		
Centrica Bus. Solutions Optimize	F	O
Enel X North America, Inc.	F	O
Maple Energy	F	O
Vermont Energy Investment Corp.	F	O
Voltus, Inc.	A	O
Small LR Group Member	F	O
IN FAVOR (F)	12	3
OPPOSED	0	8
TOTAL VOTES	12	11
ABSTENTIONS (A)	3	4

**JANUARY 6, 2022 PARTICIPANTS COMMITTEE MEETING  
VOTES TAKEN ON ORDER 2222 COMPLIANCE PROPOSAL**

**END USER SECTOR**

Participant Name	RC/TC Recm'd Changes	MC Recm'd Changes
Acadia Center	A	O
Associated Industries of Mass.	F	A
Conservation Law Foundation	A	O
Environmental Defense Fund	A	O
Harvard Dedicated Energy Limited	F	A
High Liner Foods (USA) Inc.	F	F
Kuser, Michael	A	A
Maine Public Advocate Office	F	O
Mass. Attorney General's Office	A	O
Natural Resources Defense Council	A	O
PowerOptions, Inc.	F	O
The Energy Consortium	F	A
IN FAVOR (F)	6	1
OPPOSED	0	7
TOTAL VOTES	6	8
ABSTENTIONS (A)	6	4

**PUBLICLY OWNED ENTITY SECTOR (cont.)**

Participant Name	RC/TC Recm'd Changes	MC Recm'd Changes
Mass. Bay Transportation Authority	F	F
Mass. Mun. Wholesale Electric Co.	F	F
Merrimac Municipal Light Dept.	F	F
Middleborough Gas and Elec. Dept.	F	F
Middleton Municipal Electric Dept.	F	F
New Hampshire Electric Cooperative	F	F
Norwood Municipal Light Dept.	F	F
Pascoag Utility District	F	F
Paxton Municipal Light Dept.	F	F
Peabody Municipal Light Plant	F	F
Princeton Municipal Light Dept.	F	F
Reading Municipal Light Dept.	F	F
Rowley Municipal Lighting Plant	F	F
Russell Municipal Light Dept.	F	F
Shrewsbury's Elec. & Cable Ops.	F	F
South Hadley Electric Light Dept.	F	F
Sterling Municipal Electric Light Dept.	F	F
Stowe (VT) Electric Dept.	F	F
Taunton Municipal Lighting Plant	F	F
Templeton Municipal Lighting Plant	F	F
Village of Hyde Park (VT) Elec. Dept.	F	F
VT Electric Cooperative	F	A
VT Public Power Supply Authority	F	F
VT Public Power Supply Authority	F	F
Wakefield Mun. Gas and Light Dept.	F	F
Wallingford, Town of	F	F
Wellesley Municipal Light Plant	F	F
West Boylston Mun. Lighting Plant	F	F
Westfield Gas & Electric Light Dept.	F	F
IN FAVOR (F)	51	50
OPPOSED	0	0
TOTAL VOTES	51	50
ABSTENTIONS (A)	0	1

**PUBLICLY OWNED ENTITY SECTOR**

Participant Name	RC/TC Recm'd Changes	MC Recm'd Changes
Ashburnham Municipal Light Plant	F	F
Belmont Municipal Light Dept.	F	F
Block Island Utility District	F	F
Boylston Municipal Light Dept.	F	F
Braintree Electric Light Dept.	F	F
Chester Municipal Light Dept.	F	F
Chicopee Municipal Lighting Plant	F	F
Concord Municipal Light Plant	F	F
Conn. Mun. Electric Energy Coop.	F	F
Danvers Electric Division	F	F
Georgetown Municipal Light Dept.	F	F
Groton Electric Light Dept.	F	F
Groveland Electric Light Dept.	F	F
Hingham Municipal Lighting Plant	F	F
Holden Municipal Light Dept.	F	F
Holyoke Gas & Electric Dept.	F	F
Hull Municipal Lighting Plant	F	F
Ipswich Municipal Light Dept.	F	F
Littleton (MA) Electric Light Dept.	F	F
Littleton (NH) Water & Light Dept.	F	F
Mansfield Municipal Electric Dept.	F	F
Marblehead Municipal Light Dept.	F	F

**PROVISIONAL MEMBERS**

Participant Name	RC/TC Recm'd Changes	MC Recm'd Changes
Jupiter Power LLC	A	A
IN FAVOR (F)	0	0
OPPOSED	0	0
TOTAL VOTES	0	0
ABSTENTIONS (A)	1	1

## CONSENT AGENDA

### *Reliability Committee (RC)*

From the previously-circulated notice of actions of the RC's January 19, 2022 meeting, dated January 19, 2022.<sup>1</sup>

#### **1. Revisions to OP-5 Appendices A & B (Biennial Review, Clarifying Updates)**

Support biennial review revisions to ISO New England Operating Procedure (OP) No. 5 (Resource Maintenance and Outage Scheduling) (OP-5) Appendices A (Operable Capacity Calculations) and B (Outage Request Form), which include global replacement of the terms generator, DRRs, DARDs, and ATRRs with Resource, attribution and grammatical updates, and corrections, as recommended by the RC at its January 19, 2022 meeting, together with such further non-material changes as the Chair and Vice-Chair of the RC may approve.

The motion to recommend Participants Committee support was unanimously approved.

#### **2. Revisions to OP-11 Appendix G (Biennial Review Changes)**

Support revisions to Appendix G (Designated Blackstart Resource Commitment) to OP-11 (Blackstart Resource Administration), including updates that rename Blackstart Owner to Proposed Blackstart Owner when appropriate, rename Generating Asset to resource, and implement other grammatical and terminology changes, as recommended by the RC at its January 19, 2022 meeting, together with such further non-material changes as the Chair and Vice-Chair of the RC may approve.

The motion to recommend Participants Committee support was unanimously approved.

### *Markets Committee (MC)*

From the previously-circulated notice of actions of the MC's January 11-12, 2022 meeting, dated January 12, 2022.<sup>2</sup>

#### **3. Retirement Reforms (Retirement Bid Flexibility)**

Support revisions to Sections III.13.1.2.3, III.13.1.2.4 and III.13.8.1 of Market Rule 1, to allow Retirement De-list Bids and Permanent De-list Bids the ability to decrease their originally submitted bid prices by up to 25% during the Static De-List Bid finalization window and to move the Internal Market Monitoring filing of finalized prices and elections to early November, following the bid reduction election, as recommended by the MC at its January 11-12, 2022 meeting, together with such further non-material changes as the Chair and Vice-Chair of the MC may approve.

The motion to recommend Participants Committee support was approved with four oppositions in the End User Sector and one abstention in the Transmission Sector recorded.

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<sup>1</sup> RC Notices of Actions are posted on the ISO-NE website: <https://www.iso-ne.com/committees/reliability/reliability-committee/?document-type=Committee%20Actions>.

<sup>2</sup> MC Notices of Actions are posted on the ISO-NE website at: <https://www.iso-ne.com/committees/markets/markets-committee/?document-type=Committee Actions>.



memo

**To:** NEPOOL Participants Committee  
**Cc:** New England States Committee on Electricity  
**From:** Gordon van Welie, President and Chief Executive Officer  
**Date:** January 31, 2022  
**Subject:** Correspondence Regarding Winter Reliability

I write in advance of the February Participants Committee meeting to share my thoughts about the recent letter exchange with the New England states. This correspondence with the states follows an increase in the ISO's public discussion of winter reliability risks. Although we have been talking about these issues for twenty years, we have stepped up public communications in the last year given events in Texas, the challenging global LNG market, and the increased likelihood of extreme weather. As we noted during our communications on this winter's outlook, we are not trying to alarm the region, but we would not be doing our job if we did not highlight the region's vulnerabilities in certain circumstances. From our perspective, we are having the right conversation, although it's a difficult one.

I am cognizant that the conversation about reliability is occurring as the region takes a big step forward in the clean energy transition by addressing the Minimum Offer Price Rule. I believe that these two efforts must occur simultaneously. Reliability will be critical to achieving the region's clean energy goals.

I would like to build on the momentum created by the recent correspondence. We are meeting with FERC Commissioners and the NESCOE managers to talk about the specific concerns we raised heading into this winter, and to explore a way forward on the energy security issue. We plan to continue talking with the states about this issue, and we've asked FERC to continue to focus on these issues with us until we find a solution. We are hoping that they will utilize their convening power to get all the right parties together later this year.

We think the first step is for the region to agree on the existence and scope of the problem. To that end, I would like to share with you the ISO's understanding of the issue. I will also tell you what we are doing – and not doing – within the limited scope of our authority. Finally, I will start to outline the solution space in order to get us all thinking about it, although we can't make progress in that area until we have reached regional consensus on a problem definition.

### The problem:

*Our goal for the current conversation is to get regional agreement on the existence and scope of the problem. From the ISO's perspective, the problem is our dependence on a resource mix and fuel infrastructure that are insufficient to meet electricity demand under various scenarios that include severe weather and coincident contingencies.*

The region needs to deploy significant quantities of renewables in order to meet its de-carbonization goals. This will allow the region to eventually displace fossil fuels most of the time, but not all of the time. Renewables are weather dependent and intermittent, and therefore the region will need a sustainable solution to withstand wind and solar "droughts" (otherwise known as the "winter doldrums") by the end of this decade. The clean energy transition is a long journey and we cannot escape the reality that the region will be reliant on much of the existing fleet, and the fuels they utilize, for many years to come.<sup>1</sup>

The current fleet and its fuel supply have become increasingly constrained. The fleet has seen significant retirements in recent years, as well as significant delays in the development of new resources. At the same time, the fuel supply that serves the fleet has not adapted to meet the growth in demand.

Fundamentally, the ISO's concern is that the resource mix and fuel infrastructure on which we depend will be insufficient in the face of the wrong combination of severe weather, non-gas generation contingencies, and fuel supply chain issues. In fact, the combination of extended severe weather conditions and a single large contingency could cause us to take emergency actions, including calling for controlled outages. These contingencies include the loss of a large nuclear unit, Canaport losing its sole electric feed, an outage of the HQ Phase 2 HVDC line, the loss of several large units, or the potential loss of imports from New York. These are not hypotheticals, as *all of these situations have occurred this winter, in the January 10 to 22 timeframe.*

Vamsi will unpack these details in his COO report, but my point is that these are many of the major contingencies we worry about, and they all occurred within the span of two weeks. Thankfully, the region did not experience extended severe weather during this timeframe and we have been able to manage through them.

I think it is also worth mentioning the evolving situation in New York. We are facing the potential reductions of imports from New York due to the shutdown of Indian Point and more gas consumption in New York, causing gas constraints in New England to bind earlier than in past years.

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<sup>1</sup> See the November 2020 study prepared by the Energy Futures Initiative and Energy + Environmental Economics and sponsored by Calpine, at [E3 EFI New England Net Zero \(ethree.com\)](https://ethree.com). "This study shows that cost-effectively meeting this dual challenge [growing electricity demand and reducing emissions to nearly zero] will involve the addition of large amounts of wind, solar, and battery storage resources, complemented by firm capacity to provide generation during extended periods of low wind and solar availability. Firm capacity includes natural gas power plants, nuclear, hydrogen generation, or other yet-to-be commercialized options such as long-duration storage."

Finally, this winter has illustrated the risks and costs associated with depending on *spot market* LNG cargoes. This is not a sustainable path. When I explain to state policymakers that the region has to depend on just-in-time imported gas from Trinidad, Qatar, and sometimes Russia, they shake their heads in disbelief.

As indicated in the letter exchange, the states want more studies to better assess the risk. As you know, we have launched a new project with EPRI to produce more sophisticated modeling of the impacts of extreme weather. While we are committed to using this modeling to quantify the nature and impacts of the risks, it is *not needed* to identify the major risks that are already apparent in our day-to-day operations. Moreover, we should not wait for this modeling capability to begin discussing feasible solutions.

### **How the ISO is addressing the problem:**

Regarding the ISO's plans to address the problem, we have put in place some market changes and we have improved our operational procedures to maximize our situational awareness and forecasting ability. We are continuing to work on the Resource Capacity Accreditation and Day-Ahead Ancillary Services Improvements projects to further improve incentives. These projects will incrementally improve price formation in our markets and better optimize the utilization of short-duration energy inputs.

*That said, there is nothing within the scope of the ISO's authority that will result in a comprehensive solution to the problem. From our perspective, such a solution requires actions that are outside of our jurisdiction, such as fuel procurement, construction and siting of transmission, and improvements to the fuel infrastructure. Any of these solutions require the active support of the states.*

There are two actions within our jurisdiction that we would prefer not to take: another short-term financial band-aid, in the form of a winter reliability program, and the retention of resources on an out-of-market basis. The short-term winter reliability programs that largely paid existing resources for oil are of limited utility because they will not fully address the type of event we saw play out in Texas. Moreover, their value is offset by their impact on market signals and their reliance, in contravention of state policy, on the region's most carbon-intensive resources. The same is true of the retention of retiring resources.

These two actions will also suffer from a lack of support. FERC has been clear that they are not supportive of such solutions and we have received the same feedback from the states and NEPOOL, most recently during the contentious proceedings on the Mystic retention. While we may ultimately be forced to propose solutions to FERC that have undesirable tradeoffs, we do not want to start with solutions that lack the support of the states and NEPOOL.

### **The solution space:**

There are two broad categories of solutions: demand-side measures and supply-side measures. On the demand side, the ISO already integrates state-sponsored conservation measures and distributed



resources in the wholesale market and we are planning further enhancements as we comply with Order 2222. Further investment in conservation and demand response programs for retail users of electricity and gas may be useful, and is squarely in the states' jurisdiction. The only other tool we have is public conservation appeals, working closely with the Governors and the local utilities. This is a major reason we were speaking so publicly about the risks leading into the winter – so that the public would know they can help avoid more extreme emergency actions.

On the supply side, we need regional energy storage solutions that have a duration of multiple weeks to substantially mitigate the risks we have today and in the future, when the winter doldrums will become a bigger problem. This will require additional investment in long-duration energy storage technologies. The extent of the additional investment will depend upon the rate of retirements of existing resources that have on-site fuel, the rate of increase in demand on the system due to electrification, and the duration of the event and contingency combinations we are seeking to cover.

I hope for a breakthrough in technology for carbon capture or clean, long-duration energy storage in the form of long-duration batteries, advanced modular nuclear reactors, or clean fuels, such as green hydrogen, but I think these solutions are still years off. As I think about incremental investment in long-duration energy supply or storage for the next 10 to 15 years, there are currently only three technologies practically and economically available:

- *Hydro electricity imports.* This will require more transmission and firm commitments from Hydro Quebec.
- *Imported LNG.* We only have three supply points. One is outside of US jurisdiction, one is economically threatened, and the remaining supply point is an offshore buoy that can only accommodate a very specific type of LNG ship. To assure and/or increase our LNG supply, the region would have to contract with these supply points or invest in in-region liquefaction.
- *Light Oil.* Only 1/3 of the region's oil inventory is No. 2 oil and it is scattered across a portion of the combined-cycle fleet, mostly in small, relatively short-duration tanks that are resupplied by trucks. The region could increase this capacity by requiring resources to significantly increase dual fuel capability.

In sum, we believe that the concerns that we highlighted again this winter will continue until we have a robust, coordinated plan to address the vulnerabilities in New England's energy supply chain and wholesale electricity markets. In addition to the ISO's continuing markets and operational improvements, a robust plan will require coordinated policy action by state and federal agencies – and all of it must occur in conjunction with regional stakeholders, including NEPOOL.

The ISO cannot solve this problem on its own. I look forward to exploring both the nature of the problem and the potential solutions with you.

## **Summary of ISO New England Board and Committee Meetings**

### **February 3, 2022 Participants Committee Meeting**

Since the last update, the Nominating and Governance Committee, and the System Planning and Reliability Committee met on January 19. The Markets Committee, Compensation and Human Resources Committee, and the Board of Directors met on January 20. All of the meetings were held virtually.

**The Nominating and Governance Committee** received a report on Joint Nominating Committee activities, and reviewed the Company's strategic planning process and potential topics for 2022. The Committee received a report on the political and policy trends that may affect energy policy activity during 2022. The Committee also reviewed discussions from the meetings held in November with the NEPOOL sectors and state representatives, including the states' governance recommendations. The Committee continued its discussions on best practices regarding Board diversity and inclusion initiatives.

**The System Planning and Reliability Committee** received an update on the Company's compliance with NERC and NPCC standards. The Committee then discussed activities and events that were a major focus during the late summer and fall of 2021, including regional planning activities, qualifications for Forward Capacity Auction #16, economic study requests, integration of Distributed Energy Resources, and winter preparedness. In addition, the Committee previewed activities anticipated to be a major focus for the first quarter of 2022. The Committee also reviewed a dashboard summary of ongoing projects, and received updates on the 2050 transmission study and other ongoing major transmission studies. The Committee also considered the portion of a recent FERC rulemaking relevant to an Independent Transmission Monitor. Lastly, the Committee held an executive session to assess achievement of 2021 corporate goals.

**The Markets Committee** began its meeting with an executive session to assess achievement of 2021 corporate goals, and to review the scope and coverage of the Internal Market Monitor and External Market Monitor for adequacy. In regular session, the Committee received reports from both the Internal and External Market Monitors on key market issues during the 2021 fall season. The Committee discussed the initiative to eliminate the Minimum Offer Price Rule

(MOPR) in the Forward Capacity Market, including ongoing discussions with stakeholders regarding a proposal to adopt a transition period before the elimination of the MOPR.

**The Compensation and Human Resources Committee** discussed market pressures on compensation and the evolving competitive workforce landscape. The Committee also held a preliminary discussion related to corporate performance and the achievement of corporate goals for 2021, and agreed to recommend to the Board the Company's corporate goals for 2022. In executive session, the Committee reviewed the Company's succession plans for management and held a preliminary discussion related to 2022 officer compensation and, with the Company's outside compensation consultant, considered the reasonableness of that compensation when compared to similarly-situated companies.

**The Board of Directors** received a report from the CEO with updates on winter preparedness, the Pathways Study Report, management's plan for the workforce to return to the office, and recent correspondence with the Connecticut Department of Energy & Environmental Protection and NESCOE. The Board then heard reports from the standing committees outlining highlights from their recent meetings. During the Nominating and Governance Committee report, the Board approved edits to the Committee's charter to specify the Committee's responsibility to ensure a diverse board. The Board then received updates from members of the Board on topics discussed at liaison meetings with state utilities commissions and various communications with stakeholders. While in executive session, the Board approved the Company's corporate goals for 2022.

December 17, 2021

Gordon van Welie  
President and CEO  
ISO-New England Inc.  
One Sullivan Rd  
Holyoke, MA 01040

Re: Fuel Security in New England for Winter 2021-2022

Mr. van Welie:

I am writing to you today to outline my concerns and questions regarding the ISO's handling of this winter's fuel security issues for the winter of 2021-2022. The ISO's primary responsibility is to maintain the reliability of the region's electricity grid. Consistent with that responsibility, the ISO must identify measures or mechanisms, emergency or otherwise, to proactively address foreseeable reliability issues before they occur. To this point, I am unaware of any proactive measures identified by the ISO that will eliminate or substantially reduce the risk outlined by the ISO for this winter. Given your comments about the urgency of this situation, I would appreciate answers to the questions below by December 23, 2021, or as soon as otherwise possible. I look forward to your response and am happy to meet to discuss further following receipt of your response.

In recent weeks, the ISO-NE has engaged with elected officials, the press, and the public warning about an unusually higher risk of the potential for rolling blackouts or other emergency actions if we experience a colder winter than forecasted. I applaud the ISO-NE's efforts to better communicate with the public and share information about reliability risks. I am concerned that thus far the ISO has raised these concerns without clearly indicating to the states or the public what it is doing to proactively address these concerns this winter.

The ISO has indicated that it has concerns about the availability of LNG for the region this winter and the extent to which oil generators have filled up their tanks. Global commodity prices are higher than in years past, and these higher prices could impact the availability of LNG to the region or the incentive to purchase oil without knowing if costs will be recovered. Please answer the following questions regarding the ISO's visibility into this issue in the region:

1. To what extent does the ISO have visibility or information to be able to assess the fuel arrangements of generators in the region on an ongoing basis?

2. Has the ISO examined the LNG arrangements for each of the generators in the ISO that could use that fuel source in a similar way as it looks into the storage levels of oil in tanks on a regular basis, or is the LNG concern expressed by ISO merely based on the higher global prices?
3. If the ISO has examined the LNG arrangements, please describe the level of insight the ISO has into these arrangements.
4. If the ISO has not examined these LNG arrangements, please explain why it has not done so. Please also describe any obstacles that stand in the ISO's way.

Additionally, as you are aware, the ISO had a winter fuel buying program for five consecutive winters from '13-'14 through '17-'18. Further, FERC has approved an interim fuel buying program to cover the winters of '23-'24 and '24-'25. Accordingly, in the near-term we are exposed for this winter and next winter. Please answer the following questions regarding the ISO's consideration of proactive measures to address the fuel security risk:

5. Based on the ISO's level of concern for this winter, and presumably for next year's winter as well, why has the ISO not taken steps to temporarily reinstitute a fuel buying program, which has been successful in the past?
6. Has the ISO identified any other proactive measures—emergency or otherwise—that can be implemented this winter to eliminate or reduce the fuel security risk, even if such steps may be considered out-of-market?
7. If the ISO believes that there are no additional proactive measures capable of implementation for this winter that would eliminate or substantially reduce this winter's risk, please explain why.
8. Should the ISO begin working to propose a fuel buying program for winter '22-'23 now so that if commodity price dynamics continue into next year we do not find ourselves in the same position this time next year?

In conclusion, I am deeply concerned that the ISO appears, at least in its public statements, to be more concerned about our fuel security risks this winter, yet the ISO has done less than in previous years in terms of using the available tools to ensure the region has the fuel supplies we need. I look forward to speaking with you about my questions above, as soon as possible.

Sincerely,

Katie S. Dykes  
Commissioner  
Connecticut Department of Energy and  
Environmental Protection  
79 Elm Street, Hartford, CT 06106-5127  
P: 860.424.3571|M: 860.538.0950|  
E: [katie.dykes@ct.gov](mailto:katie.dykes@ct.gov)



Gordon van Welie  
President and Chief Executive Officer

December 23, 2021

Katie S. Dykes, Commissioner  
Connecticut Department of Energy and Environmental Protection  
79 Elm Street  
Hartford, CT 06106-5127

Dear Commissioner Dykes:

I am writing in response to your letter dated December 17, 2021 concerning energy security in New England for this winter and I appreciate your obvious concern about this matter.

This letter highlights the wide range of actions that ISO New England (ISO) has taken in partnership with regional stakeholders and our regulator, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), to secure resources and enhance operational procedures to address energy security. We are confident that we have exhausted the options that are within our scope of authority.

For the past two decades, the ISO has raised concerns about energy supply issues limiting electricity production during periods of extreme cold weather. During this timeframe, we have worked continuously to deploy actions within our jurisdiction and to encourage the New England states and stakeholders to take regional measures to solve for this risk. The region has yet to reach consensus on an overarching and sustainable solution.

**Extreme Cold Weather in 2013-2014 Focused Attention on New England's Energy Security Challenges**

In December 2013, in the midst of one of the most difficult and expensive winters in recent memory, New England's U.S. Senate delegation called on the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) to hold stakeholder outreach meetings in New England in 2014 as part of DOE's Quadrennial Energy Review effort. Then, on April 21, 2014, U.S. Secretary of Energy Ernie Moniz convened a pair of regional meetings in New England, including a meeting with Connecticut Governor Dannel Malloy and various Connecticut policymakers.

At all of those meetings, there was a clear recognition that the growing demand for natural gas, coupled with impending retirements of non-gas resources had, and would continue to, lead to increasing constraints on the region's natural gas pipelines – impacting both reliability and prices. There was no consensus action plan developed at these meetings, however various regional entities then engaged in a multi-pronged, but relatively uncoordinated, series of efforts to address the issue.

These efforts ranged from an unsuccessful attempt by the states to increase pipeline capacity, to the proposal of various wholesale market design improvements by the ISO (some successfully implemented, others not), and ultimately various state-led strategies to wean the region off fossil fuels, including through development of offshore wind and plans to develop additional transmission connections to Québec. Most of the planned, major infrastructure investments in New England have yet to come to fruition.

In parallel, the region is beginning to transition heating and transportation to the electric grid. Many studies indicate that, in order to achieve decarbonization goals, the New England electric grid will become winter peaking around 2030 and that electricity demand will more than double in the coming decades. Without a mitigation plan, this increased demand, coupled with a dependency on just-in-time energy supplies, will exacerbate reliability risks during extreme weather.

### **ISO's Winter 2021-2022 Outlook Shows Heightened Risk**

Ahead of winter 2021-2022, we have communicated how natural gas pipeline constraints, coupled with global supply chain issues related to deliveries of oil and liquefied natural gas (LNG), are placing New England's power system at heightened risk. In raising these issues, we are trying to raise awareness of this risk so the public is prepared given the supply dynamics this winter.

### **A Range of Actions to Address Energy Security, Though Vulnerabilities Remain**

The ISO has long advocated for states and stakeholders to make energy infrastructure investments to address fuel security risks and we have taken the actions available to us to address these risks through the wholesale electricity market design and operational improvements. As you note, we have also put in place temporary measures to fill short-term reliability gaps. I will expand on those measures below. We have made improvements to situational awareness for ISO system operators to enhance our visibility of the fuel systems on which the electric grid currently relies. We have posted a detailed timeline featuring numerous ways in which ISO New England and the region have sought to address these challenges.<sup>1</sup> In October, the ISO shared a presentation with the New England states highlighting these actions.<sup>2</sup>

While the region has made incremental progress on addressing energy supply risks, the fundamental energy-supply chain vulnerabilities still remain and threaten our collective ability to navigate the clean energy transition successfully. More recently, the events in California and Texas have revealed the vulnerabilities and systemic risks inherent in the energy supply chain.

This has further illuminated the reality that wholesale markets are not designed to allow suppliers to internalize the very high costs associated with fully mitigating the risks associated with low-probability, high-impact, extreme weather events in their offers, and neither are they required to do so. To require this level of hedging from wholesale suppliers would be very expensive.

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<sup>1</sup> Timeline: Historical Efforts to Address Fuel Security Issues in New England, ISO New England; <https://www.iso-ne.com/about/what-we-do/in-depth/efforts-to-address-fuel-security-in-new-england>

<sup>2</sup> ISO New England Energy Security Timeline: 2004–2025, Multiple Approaches Undertaken to Address Region's Energy Security Risks, ISO New England, December 22, 2021; <https://www.iso-ne.com/static-assets/documents/2021/12/new-england-fuel-risk-2021-2022-necpuc-12-22-2021-final.pdf>

### **ISO Action to Increase Visibility into the Regional Energy Supply**

The ISO does not have authority or control over the energy supply chain serving the region or over the fuel-procurement strategies of power plants operating in the wholesale electricity market.<sup>3</sup> However, the ISO has taken action to increase our visibility of the gas supply system and the inventory levels for power plants with on-site fuel storage. Improving situational awareness has become an essential tool for system operators as the region's fuel infrastructure has become increasingly constrained.

As examples:

- *Improved Information Sharing with the Gas Pipelines:* In 2014, the ISO made changes to the Information Policy in our tariff to enable sharing of information on scheduled output of natural gas-fired generators with interstate natural gas pipeline operators. This change provides greater accuracy on unit availability and operational capabilities, improving regional reliability. Enhanced communications allow improved insight and understanding when natural gas supply issues may adversely affect the bulk power system.
- *Rolling 21-Day Forecast Tool:* Since 2018, the ISO has published its 21-Day Energy Assessment Forecast and Report.<sup>4</sup> During the winter, this report is updated weekly or more frequently if necessary. The forecast is based on current system conditions, forecasted weather, load, generators' reports of stored-fuel inventories and emissions limitations, and includes status of fuel delivery systems. As a part of its winter operations, ISO New England routinely monitors weather forecasts and fuel supplies, including the availability of pipeline gas and expected production from wind and behind-the-meter solar resources.

The ISO also surveys generators at a minimum weekly to determine their inventories of stored fuels. These surveys are combined with forecasted consumer demand and published to the ISO website on a rolling 21-day look-ahead aimed at identifying potential energy shortfalls early enough to be addressed. This planning tool is unique among the ISO regions.

- *Data on Fuel Inventories:* Since 2019, the ISO has published regular reports on oil-depletion and usable-oil inventory.<sup>5</sup> This data provides the total amount of usable fuel oil at generating stations in New England that use oil for their primary or secondary fuel. The ISO also tracks LNG shipments to the region to improve its real-time awareness of this fuel.

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<sup>3</sup> The ISO cannot require generators to procure fuel in advance, though resources paid through the Forward Capacity Market to be available during periods of system stress face significant financial penalties if they do not meet their commitments.

<sup>4</sup> 21-Day Energy Assessment Forecast and Report, ISO New England; <https://www.iso-ne.com/isoexpress/web/reports/operations/-/tree/21-Day-Energy-Assessment-Forecast-and-Report-Results>

<sup>5</sup> Oil-Depletion and Usable-Oil Inventory Graphs, ISO New England; <https://www.iso-ne.com/isoexpress/web/reports/operations/-/tree/oil-depletion-graphs>



### **ISO Actions to Mitigate Energy Security Risks and Enhance Situational Awareness**

ISO New England continuously undertakes a variety of short- and long-term projects to enhance the region's competitive wholesale electricity markets and ensure reliable operation of the power grid. For example, this year, to enhance situational awareness entering this winter, the ISO compared expected consumer demand levels and other system conditions for this winter with three historical weather scenarios (2020-2021, 2017-2018, and 2013-2014) as part of the winter 2021-2022 seasonal system outlook.<sup>6</sup>

Additionally, the ISO initiated a project in the fall of 2021 to conduct a probabilistic energy security study for the New England region under extreme weather conditions. This is a pioneering effort by the ISO and the region. The ISO will share this analysis with the states and regional stakeholders for discussion in 2022. Following these assessments, the region will need to discuss what measures it should take to protect against these risks in the future.

The ISO has taken a wide range of actions to secure resources and updated operational procedures to address fuel security concerns. In the absence of investment in fuel supply infrastructure, in 2013 the ISO designed and implemented temporary programs to provide economic incentives for generators to store sufficient quantities of oil prior to the winter. (The ISO subsequently expanded the program to provide incentives for LNG and demand response resources, although the response to these incentives was modest.)

The Winter Reliability Programs ran for five consecutive years from winter 2013-2014 through winter 2017-2018. These programs were only temporary measures, and not sustainable in a market framework given that they were discriminatory – they subsidized the carbon-intensive, oil-fired generators that the region is trying to wean itself from, and had the effect of suppressing wholesale prices for clean energy resources and other existing resources. At this point, short of receiving different direction from the FERC, which voiced its concern about such temporary programs, the ISO has no plans to reinstate them.

Through investments in new resources and the transmission system, the ISO has been able to allow the retirement of many legacy generators with on-site fuel. Since 2014, fuel-secure generators resources that provided approximately 5,080 MW of winter capacity capability have retired (with an additional 460 MW scheduled for retirement by June 2025). The region's energy supply constraints, however, create challenges when resources seek to leave the market, notably those with on-site fuel inventories. The ISO, and the rest of the region, experienced this when, in 2018, the owner of the Mystic Generating Station (the primary customer for the Distrigas LNG facility in Everett, Massachusetts) announced the retirement of units 8 & 9.

The retirement of Mystic will bring the total loss of fuel-secure generating capacity to 6,940 MW. (For comparison, the current generating capability of the ISO New England system is about 31,500 MW). The ISO had to retain the Mystic units for an additional two years in order to ensure fuel security and reliability in the region.

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<sup>6</sup> Seasonal System Outlook, ISO New England; <https://www.iso-ne.com/markets-operations/system-forecast-status/seasonal-system-outlook/>

These actions gave the region additional time to implement reliability solutions before the units' eventual retirement in 2024. This last action led the FERC to direct the ISO to develop a long-term, technology-neutral, and market-based solution to replace the stopgap winter programs.

This triggered the ISO to launch a major market design initiative to address the operational risks associated with the clean energy transition, including an attempt to mitigate the identified energy adequacy risks. In April 2020, the ISO filed its Energy Security Improvements (ESI) proposal. The ESI proposal included new and necessary products in the ancillary services market to incentivize the region's fleet to invest in the energy-supply arrangements and technologies needed to run the grid reliably and efficiently. However, the states were concerned about the costs of the proposal and FERC ultimately rejected it in October 2020, terminating the requirement for the ISO to put forward such a proposal.

Nonetheless, the identified operational uncertainties remain and the ISO is continuing to work on enhancements to day-ahead ancillary services to improve reliable operations. However, as described below, we do not believe that it is realistic, or cost effective, to fully mitigate energy-adequacy risks through the wholesale electricity market. This means that the region needs a strategy for either hedging this risk outside of the wholesale electricity market, or for operating reliably during periods when wholesale electricity supplies are insufficient to meet demand during these events.

### **ISO Continues Work with Stakeholders to Develop Innovative Approaches to Energy Security**

The FERC-approved wholesale market structures, together with planned improvements in ancillary services and resource accreditation, will drive some measure of additional risk mitigation. However, it is unlikely that these measures will suffice to cover the risk of low-probability, high-impact extreme weather events. This is because the FERC has applied a non-discriminatory and consistent standard to all generators (whether they be fossil or renewable), such that, beyond their day-ahead commitment, they are generally only required to procure, or rely on, input energy (or fuel) that is available in real time. This means that generators are generally relying on "just in time" supplies of input energy. The consequence is that there is insufficient incentive for generators to invest in bolstering the supply chain for fossil fuels, particularly as the need (on average) for these fuels declines.

Paradoxically, due to the dynamics of renewable energy production, while the average utilization of fossil fuels will decline, the need for instantaneous, long-duration (e.g., days and weeks) balancing energy sources will increase.

We are concerned that the energy adequacy problem may get worse over time, until policymakers and stakeholders in New England can successfully engineer a clean energy replacement for the current balancing energy source, which is largely natural gas. This is unlikely to occur without policy support, since the available technologies to provide a reliable long-duration balancing energy source are currently expensive. The DOE has recognized this problem and has launched a number of research and development initiatives through ARPA-E, with solutions ranging from advanced modular reactors, to long-duration batteries and green hydrogen.

We believe that the concerns that we highlighted again this winter will continue until we have a robust, coordinated plan to address the vulnerabilities in New England's energy supply chain and wholesale electricity markets. This will require coordinated policy action by the state and federal agencies that have jurisdiction over the electric grid and the energy supply chain, working with the ISO and other regional stakeholders.

Our experience over the past two decades has led to the realization that a sustainable clean energy transition will require investment in all of the following regional measures:


- Clean/renewable resources to ensure that the majority of our energy supply does not emit greenhouse gases,
- Additional transmission to integrate new renewable resources,
- Robust wholesale electricity markets that provide the necessary incentives to balancing resources to ensure reliable grid operations, and
- A robust energy supply chain and/or energy reserve. This can be accomplished through a combination of long-duration stored energy that can be accessed by the region and retail electricity demand that is responsive to wholesale electricity prices.

## Conclusion

To conclude, the actions the ISO has taken over the last two decades, including our preparations for winter 2021-2022, are part of the ISO's continuing commitment to work with the states, other stakeholders, and the FERC to solve for these energy security risks and enable a reliable clean energy transition.

I appreciate your interest and concern in these matters and would be pleased to meet with you and other regional policymakers to discuss how we can work together to achieve these objectives. We will share your letter and our response with our Board and our regulators at the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, and would like to discuss with you a broader publication of these documents, as they raise important issues.

Sincerely,



Gordon van Welie  
President & Chief Executive Officer

January 18, 2022

Gordon van Welie  
President & Chief Executive Officer  
ISO New England Inc.  
One Sullivan Road  
Holyoke, MA 01040

Cheryl LaFleur  
Chair, Board of Directors  
ISO New England Inc.  
One Sullivan Road  
Holyoke, MA 01040

Dear Mr. van Welie and Chair LaFleur:

We write regarding ISO New England's ("ISO-NE") December 23, 2021 reply to Connecticut Department of Energy and Environmental Protection Commissioner Dyke's December 17, 2021 inquiry to ISO-NE regarding power system reliability in New England, which ISO-NE shared publicly on January 5, 2022 ("ISO-NE Letter").<sup>1</sup>

The ISO-NE Letter describes steps ISO-NE has taken over the last decade to execute its core responsibilities of regional grid operation, market administration, and power system planning to address energy supply challenges in the winter months. We appreciate ISO-NE's history of proactive work to develop proposals to address its reliability concerns, including prior temporary programs to protect against winter power disruptions while ISO-NE developed more lasting reforms. The New England states have prioritized work on reliability-related proposals as well, in addition to clean energy and energy efficiency investment that reduces winter demand and diversifies the resource mix.

The ISO-NE Letter raises several issues that warrant more discussion in a different forum. Notably, further discussion about ISO-NE's Energy Security Improvements ("ESI") proposal may be instructive to planned work in 2022-2023 to develop Day-Ahead Ancillary Services Improvements ("DASI"). While the ISO-NE Letter discusses the ESI filing with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC"), it does not make reference to the New England state-initiated, NEPOOL-supported alternative to the ESI proposal that, in our view, would have achieved ISO-NE's core ESI objectives more cost-effectively. With an eye toward DASI taking shape in a way that satisfies ISO-NE's goals and cost consciousness, it would be useful in the near-future to revisit how ISO-NE weighed reliability, market purity, and consumer costs in deciding to reject the ESI alternative that would have addressed winter energy supply concerns.

However, there is one issue that requires immediate consideration: ISO-NE's different, and concerning, approach to current winter challenges. ISO-NE's temporary winter programs have now expired. The next interim program will take effect two years from now for the 2023-2024

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<sup>1</sup> [https://www.iso-ne.com/static-assets/documents/2022/01/isone\\_ct\\_deep\\_combined\\_ltrs.pdf](https://www.iso-ne.com/static-assets/documents/2022/01/isone_ct_deep_combined_ltrs.pdf).

winter. The ISO-NE Letter identifies *immediate* risks of sustained cold weather – an otherwise unremarkable occurrence for New Englanders – without any analysis of the magnitude of risk or any proposed way ISO-NE, the entity responsible for regional planning and system reliability, will act to address them.<sup>2</sup> This leaves a multi-winter gap.

To be clear, the immediate risk ISO-NE is warning about is not the potential “low-probability, high-impact extreme weather events” ISO-NE is beginning to study. It is not the 2030 timeframe, when the ISO-NE Letter notes the heating and transportation transition to the electric grid will cause winter peaking. It is not about bringing online long-duration balancing resources that the ISO-NE Letter states the U.S. Department of Energy is now researching. It is a risk (so far unspecified) here and now, and next winter, if New England has the sustained cold weather we’ve all experienced in the Northeast.

Without timely ISO-NE analysis about the current risks, no one can make a reasoned judgment about whether a winter reliability program, a market mechanism, or some type of state action is necessary or would be effective to fill any reliability gap. Nor could one determine the type, level or duration of incremental investment needed to protect system reliability. It’s like asking homeowners to buy additional flood insurance on the eve of a storm without knowing how intense the storm will be, how long it’s expected to last, and what their current flood insurance covers.

ISO-NE states it is “confident that we have exhausted the options that are within our scope of authority.”<sup>3</sup> This raises a number of serious questions. For example, ISO-NE explains that FERC had expressed concern regarding ISO-NE’s use of temporary winter reliability programs. However, that concern came well before ISO-NE’s recent public warnings about the potential for rolling blackouts<sup>4</sup> that would put public health and the economy at risk, and when FERC understood ISO-NE to be working on sustained market reforms. The ISO-NE Letter states that “short of receiving different direction from the FERC . . . the ISO has no plans to reinitiate” a temporary winter program.<sup>5</sup> This leaves unanswered the important question of how ISO-NE would propose addressing what it has identified as reliability risks associated with sustained New England-style cold winter weather.

We do not share the view that passively waiting for FERC direction amounts to ISO-NE exhausting its options. More fundamentally, ISO-NE’s decision to wait for unsolicited direction from FERC seems to flip the role of the regulated and the regulator. In fact, FERC’s order rejecting ISO-NE’s longer-term energy security proposal (the ESI filing) invited ISO-NE to “propose to the Commission other steps it believes are warranted to address fuel security,” such as short and longer-term programs.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> It would be helpful to see and understand the analysis that led to the following statement in the ISO-NE Letter: “However, as described below, we do not believe that it is realistic, or cost effective, to fully mitigate energy-adequacy risks through the wholesale electricity market.”

<sup>3</sup> ISO-NE Letter at 1.

<sup>4</sup> ISO-NE, *Harsh Weather Conditions Could Pose Challenges to New England’s Power System This Winter: Fuel supply issues may threaten ability to meet consumer demand if the region sees extended periods of extreme cold weather*, Dec. 6, 2021, available at [https://www.iso-ne.com/static-assets/documents/2021/12/20211206\\_pr\\_winteroutlook2122.pdf](https://www.iso-ne.com/static-assets/documents/2021/12/20211206_pr_winteroutlook2122.pdf).

<sup>5</sup> ISO-NE Letter at 4.

<sup>6</sup> *ISO New England Inc.*, 173 FERC ¶ 61,106 at P 63 (2020).

As the ISO-NE Letter notes, the region has made some progress in addressing market transparency and visibility about market risks. We need to build on this work, and as always, we stand ready to prioritize work with ISO-NE to address analysis-based, reliability risks to the regional power grid. The immediacy and seriousness of the asserted risks warrant ISO-NE's prompt attention.

Sincerely,

NESCOE Managers

Katie S. Dykes

Katie S. Dykes

Commissioner, Connecticut Department of Energy and Environmental Protection

Philip L. Bartlett II

Philip L. Bartlett II

Chairman, Maine Public Utilities Commission

Matthew Nelson

Matthew Nelson

Chair, Massachusetts Department of Public Utilities

Patrick Woodcock

Patrick Woodcock

Commissioner, Massachusetts Department of Energy Resources

Jared Chicoine

Jared Chicoine

Commissioner, New Hampshire Department of Energy

Nicholas S. Ucci

Nicholas S. Ucci

Commissioner, Rhode Island Office of Energy Resources

June Tierney

June Tierney

Commissioner, Vermont Department of Public Service

cc: FERC Chairman Richard Glick  
FERC Commissioner Mark C. Christie  
FERC Commissioner Allison Clements  
FERC Commissioner James Danly  
FERC Commissioner Willie L. Phillips  
ISO New England Board of Directors

# NEPOOL Participants Committee Report

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*February 2022*



Vamsi Chadalavada

EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT AND CHIEF OPERATING OFFICER



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# Regular Operations Report - Highlights

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
# Highlights

- Day-Ahead (DA), Real-Time (RT) Prices and Transactions
  - Update: December 2021 Energy Market value totaled \$721M
  - January 2022 Energy market value was \$1.4B, up \$693M from December 2021 and up \$926M from January 2021
    - January 2022 natural gas prices over the period were 127% higher than December 2021 average values
    - Average RT Hub Locational Marginal Prices (\$139/MWh) over the period were 133% higher than December averages
      - DA Hub: \$142/MWh
    - Average January 2022 natural gas prices and RT Hub LMPs over the period were up 283% and 217%, respectively, from January 2021 averages
  - Average DA cleared physical energy during the peak hours as percent of forecasted load was 98.7% during January, up from 98.1% during December\*
    - The minimum value for the month was 92.7% on Friday, January 7<sup>th</sup>

Data through January 26<sup>th</sup>, unless otherwise noted

\*DA Cleared Physical Energy is the sum of Generation and Net Imports cleared in the DA Energy Market

Underlying natural gas data furnished by:



# Highlights, cont.


- Daily Net Commitment Period Compensation (NCPC)
  - January 2022 NCPC payments totaled \$3.7M over the period, down \$1.7M from December 2021 and up \$0.2M from January 2021
    - First Contingency payments totaled \$3.6M, up \$0.6M from December
      - \$3.6M paid to internal resources, up \$0.7M from December
        - » \$690K charged to DALO, \$1.9M to RT Deviations, \$949K to RTLO\*
      - \$77K paid to resources at external locations, down \$112K from December
        - » \$50K charged to DALO at external locations, \$27K to RT Deviations
    - Second Contingency payments totaled \$29K, down \$2.3M from December
  - NCPC payments over the period as percent of Energy Market value were 0.3%

**\* NCPC types reflected in the First Contingency Amount: Dispatch Lost Opportunity Cost (DLOC) - \$515K; Rapid Response Pricing (RRP) Opportunity Cost - \$363K; Posturing - \$70K; Generator Performance Auditing (GPA) - \$0K**




# Price Responsive Demand (PRD) Energy Market Activity by Month

## DA, RT, and RT Dev MWh



## Market Value



Note: DA and RT (deviation) MWh are settlement obligations and reflect appropriate gross-ups for distribution losses.



# Highlights

- Preparations are ongoing for FCA 16, which will commence on February 7
- The final Transmission Planning for the Clean Energy Transition (TPCET) Pilot Study Report was posted to the PAC website on January 14
- ISO expects to provide 2050 Transmission Study initial results at the March 16 PAC meeting
- Final production cost and remaining preliminary ancillary services results for the 2021 Economic Study (Future Grid Reliability Study) were discussed at the January PAC meeting
- Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor (QTPS)
  - 25 companies have achieved QTPS status
  - Annual certification process is in progress



# Forward Capacity Market (FCM) Highlights

- CCP 13 (2022-2023)
  - Third and final annual reconfiguration auction (ARA3) will be held on March 1-3, and results will be posted no later than March 31
- CCP 14 (2023-2024)
  - Second annual reconfiguration auction (ARA2) will be held on August 1-3, and results will be posted no later than August 31
- CCP 15 (2024-2025)
  - First annual reconfiguration auction (ARA1) will be held on June 1-3, and results will be posted no later than July 5

# FCM Highlights, cont.

- CCP 16 (2025-2026)
  - Both the ICR and Informational (qualification) FERC filings were made on November 9, 2021
    - The ICR filing was accepted by FERC on December 21, 2021
    - The informational filing was accepted on January 21
  - Preparations are ongoing for the auction that will commence on February 7



# FCM Highlights, cont.

- CCP 17 (2026-2027)
  - The qualification process has started, and training materials are under development
  - Topology certifications were sent to the TOs on October 2, 2021
    - TOs identified in-service dates for new transmission projects and revisions to previously certified projects
    - Approved projects were shared with the RC at their January meeting
  - Capacity zone development discussions began at the November 17, 2021 PAC meeting
    - All subsequent reconfiguration auctions model the same zones as the FCA
  - ISO to calculate and post the FCA 17 dynamic delist bid threshold price no later than early March





# Load Forecast

- Efforts continue to enhance load forecast models and tools to improve day-ahead and long-term load forecast performance
- Efforts to expand/improve the transportation electrification forecast for CELT 2022 are complete
- Upcoming Meetings
  - Load Forecast Committee Meeting will be held on February 18
  - Both the Energy-Efficiency Forecast Working Group (EEFWG) and Distributed Generation Forecast Working Group (DGFWG) will meet on February 14



# Highlights

- The lowest 50/50 and 90/10 Winter Operable Capacity Margins are projected for week beginning February 12, 2022
- The lowest 50/50 and 90/10 Preliminary Spring Operable Capacity Margins are projected for week beginning May 7, 2022






# New England Winter Outlook

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
# January Weather and Gas Prices

- Average temperature was colder than normal by approximately 2°F, resulting in higher than normal demand
- Colder temperatures and high demand is coincident with natural gas prices remaining near \$20 through most of the month with high LNG sendout and high utilization of oil for power generation; Scheduled LNG sendout was approximately 10 Bcf higher in January than in December



# Fuel Oil Inventory

- Coincident with higher natural gas prices, oil units were in merit on several days in January
- Fuel oil inventories trending down noticeably, even with replenishments in January; The most recent survey shows minimal replenishments and the ISO will switch to twice weekly fuel surveys




ISO Public

ISO-NE PUBLIC

Source: ISO New England

# 21 Day Forecast





# January 11-12, 2022

---

*Brief Summary of Power System Conditions  
on January 11 and 12*



# 1/11 – 09:00 Morning Report

- Weather Conditions

8. WEATHER FORECAST SUMMARY FOR THE PEAK HOUR			
CITY	CONDITIONS	WIND	HIGH TEMP (°F)
Boston	Mostly Cloudy	NW 6	12
Hartford	Mostly Cloudy	NW 6	11

- Expected Imports
  - NY-NE – 1204MW
  - Phase 2 – 1448MW
- Surplus Capacity for HE18 was expected to be 1,278MW
  - Three units, totaling ~1100 MW, either tripped or had to reduce generation heading into the day





# 1/11 Sequence of Events

- 11:00 – NYISO informs ISO-NE that imports from NYISO over the peak will likely be reduced due to constraints on their system
- 12:28 – Pole 2 of Phase 2 tripped and the continued operation of Pole 1 is unknown, along with the cause of the Pole 2 trip
- Between 08:30 and 13:40 – Loss of additional units totaling ~1100 MW
- 13:45 – Discussions with neighboring control areas indicate that deliveries from both NYISO and HQ are questionable
- Expected surplus of ~1278 MW turns into a deficit of ~1200 MW
- 13:50 – Due to the unknown cause of the Phase 2 Pole 2 trip, the uncertainty of imports from NYISO and HQ, and the limited time to start units to make it for the evening peak, the ISO commits additional units



# 1/11 Sequence of Events

- 14:00 – MLCC 2 Declared for New England due to Capacity
- Between 16:00 and 17:00, Phase 2 Pole 2 trip returned to service and NYISO restored schedule to 1100 MW
- LMP's during the day ranged from \$125/MWh to \$230/MWh, with binding ten minute spinning reserve constraints for 20 intervals over a 6 hour period



# 1/12 – Loss of Power Supply to Canaport

- 14:45 – New Brunswick System Operator reported loss of the electric feed to Canaport to the ISO Control Room
- Notifications were made to New England pipelines to anticipate additional demand
- Loss of supply to the M&N pipeline could cause pressure issues
  - Volume of injection determines amount of generation at risk
- 16:24 – New Brunswick System Operator initiated restoration of line and regular operations resume




# JANUARY 29 – WINTER STORM KENAN




# January 29 – Winter Storm Kenan

- A Powerful Blizzard Affected Southern & Eastern New England On the 29<sup>th</sup> of January
  - Visible satellite image of storm shows the location near the time of peak outages in New England Saturday afternoon – January 29<sup>th</sup>
  - The large circulation produced wind gusts with hurricane force, heavy blowing and drifting snow and low visibility across southeast New England
  - Fortunate that Northeast Winds shifted to North



# January 29 – Winter Storm Kenan


- Snowfall Reports
  - Accumulations of 8-30 inches were observed across central and eastern New England



# January 29 – Winter Storm Kenan

- Wind Observations
  - Wind gusts of 70-80+ mph were observed across southeast New England

Peak Wind Gusts Late Saturday Morning Through Saturday Night (mph)



National Weather Service Boston  
813 PM EST Sat Jan 29 2022

...HIGHEST WIND REPORTS...

...Massachusetts...

West Dennis	81 MPH
Hatch Beach	73 MPH
Chatham	72 MPH
Dennis	72 MPH
Taunton AP	71 MPH
Rockport	76 MPH
Nantucket AP	74 MPH

...Rhode Island...

Newport AP	70 MPH
Block Island Jetty	72 MPH

...Maritime Stations...

1 NE Chatham	78 MPH
Point Judith	75 MPH

# Winter Storm Kenan (cont'd)


- Storm Preparations
  - Abnormal Conditions Alert (M/LCC 2) from 15:00 on 1/28 to 09:00 on 1/30
  - Additional System Operators staffed Control Room for support
  - Calls with NPCC areas and Local Control Centers
  - Calls with gas pipeline operators prior to storm
- Outages
  - Transmission outages were minimal for storm conditions
  - Generator outages were minimal






# Winter Storm Kenan (cont'd)

- Outages
  - Customer outages peaked at approximately 125,000 customers



# Actual vs Forecasted Load

- System load ramp was slower in the morning than forecast with a lower overall peak
- Load models expected more load for the first blizzard since January 2018
  - Many businesses decided on Friday to close on Saturday



# SYSTEM OPERATIONS



# System Operations

<u><b>Weather Patterns</b></u>	Boston	Temperature: Below Normal (2.4°F) Max: 52°F, Min: 4°F Precipitation: 2.33" –Below Normal Normal: 3.29" Snow: 36.2"	Hartford	Temperature: Below Normal (2.2°F) Max: 52°F, Min: 0°F Precipitation: 1.83" - Below Normal Normal: 3.18" Snow: 14.2"
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<u><b>Peak Load:</b></u>	19,623 MW	January 11, 2022	18:00 (ending)
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## Emergency Procedure Events (OP-4, M/LCC 2, Minimum Generation Emergency)

Procedure	Declared	Cancelled	Note
M/LCC 2	1/11/2022 14:00	1/11/2022 22:00	Capacity
M/LCC 2	1/28/2022 15:00	1/30/2022 09:00	Severe Weather



# System Operations

## NPCC Simultaneous Activation of Reserve Events

Date	Area	MW Lost
1/2/2022	NYISO	550
1/11/2022	ISO-NE	650
1/11/2022	ISO-NE	550
1/16/2022	NYISO	750
1/19/2022	IESO	870
1/27/2022	ISO-NE	670
1/31/2022	ISO-NE	555




# 2022 System Operations - Load Forecast Accuracy

Dashboard  
Indicator



All Hours  
Monthly Average, Daily Maximum and Minimum,  
Based on forecast published at 1000 on day before Operating Day




Month	J	F	M	A	M	J	J	A	S	O	N	D	
Day Max	3.97												3.97
Day Min	0.69												0.69
MAPE	1.79												1.79
Goal	1.80												

# 2022 System Operations - Load Forecast Accuracy cont.


Dashboard Indicator





Month	J	F	M	A	M	J	J	A	S	O	N	D	
Day Max	6.01												6.01
Day Min	0.02												0.02
MAPE	1.30												1.30
Goal	1.80												


# 2022 System Operations - Load Forecast Accuracy cont.



	J	F	M	A	M	J	J	A	S	O	N	D	Avg
Above %	54.3												54
Below %	45.7												46
Avg Above	218.2												218
Avg Below	-223.1												-223
Avg All	20												20




# 2022 System Operations - Load Forecast Accuracy cont.




# Monthly Recorded Net Energy for Load (NEL) and Weather Normalized NEL

Net Energy for Load (NEL)



Ann Tot (TWh): 119.2 116.9 118.7 9.4

Weather Normalized NEL




Ann Tot (TWh): 118.8 116.3 117.5 0

NEPOOL NEL is the total net revenue quality metered energy required to serve load and is analogous to 'RT system load.' NEL is calculated as: Generation – pumping load + net interchange where imports are positively signed. Current month's data may be preliminary. Weather normalized NEL is typically reported on a one-month lag.




# Monthly Peak Loads and Weather Normalized Seasonal Peak History

System Peak Load



\*Revenue quality metered value

Weather Normalized Seasonal Peaks




Winter beginning in year displayed

F – designates forecasted values, which are typically updated in April/May of the following year; represents “net forecast” (i.e., the gross forecast net of passive demand response and behind-the-meter solar demand)



# Wind Power Forecast Error Statistics: Medium and Long Term Forecasts MAE

Rolling 30-day MAE for ISO Wind Power Forecast, as of January 30, 2022



Dashboard Indicator




Yearly Fleet  
Performance targets

Ideally, MAE and Bias would be both equal to zero. As is typical, MAE increases with the forecast horizon. MAE and Bias for the fleet of wind power resources are less due to offsetting errors. Across all time frames, the ISO-NE/DNV forecast is very good compared to industry standards, and monthly MAE (with the exception of the first hour of look ahead) is within the yearly performance targets.

# Wind Power Forecast Error Statistics: Medium and Long Term Forecasts Bias

Rolling 30-day Bias for ISO Wind Power Forecast, as of January 30, 2022




Dashboard Indicator 

Yearly Fleet  
Performance targets

Ideally, MAE and Bias would be both equal to zero. Positive bias means less windpower was actually available compared to forecast. Negative bias means more windpower was actually available compared to forecast. Across all time frames, the ISO-NE/DNV forecast compares well with industry standards, and monthly Bias is within yearly performance targets.

# Wind Power Forecast Error Statistics: Short Term Forecast MAE

Rolling 30-day MAE for ISO Wind Power Forecast, as of January 30, 2022



Dashboard Indicator




Yearly Fleet  
Performance targets

Ideally, MAE and Bias would be both equal to zero. As is typical, MAE increases with the forecast horizon. MAE and Bias for the fleet of wind power resources are less due to offsetting errors. Across all time frames, the ISO-NE/DNV forecast is very good compared to industry standards, and up to 90 minutes look-ahead monthly MAE is within the yearly performance targets.

# Wind Power Forecast Error Statistics: Short Term Forecast Bias

Rolling 30-day Bias for ISO Wind Power Forecast, as of January 30, 2022



Dashboard Indicator ●

Yearly Fleet  
Performance targets


Ideally, MAE and Bias would be both equal to zero. Positive bias means less windpower was actually available compared to forecast. Negative bias means more windpower was actually available compared to forecast. Across all time frames, the ISO-NE/DNV forecast compares well with industry standards, and monthly Bias is within yearly performance.

# MARKET OPERATIONS





# Daily Average DA and RT ISO-NE Hub Prices and Input Fuel Prices: January 1-26, 2022




Underlying natural gas data furnished by:




Average price difference over this period (DA-RT): \$3.30  
 Average price difference over this period ABS(DA-RT): \$18.13  
 Average percentage difference over this period ABS(DA-RT)/RT Average LMP: 13%  
 Gas price is average of Massachusetts delivery points

# DA LMPs Average by Zone & Hub, January 2022



# RT LMPs Average by Zone & Hub, January 2022





# Definitions

Day-Ahead Concept	Definition
Day-Ahead Load Obligation ( <b>DALO</b> )	The sum of day-ahead cleared load (including asset load, pump load, exports, and virtual purchases and excluding modeled transmission losses)
Day-Ahead Cleared Physical Energy	The sum of day-ahead cleared generation and cleared net imports



# Components of Cleared DA Supply and Demand

## – Last Three Months





Gen – Generation  
 Incs – Increment Offers  
 DA Fcst Load – Day-Ahead Forecast Load  
 DRR – Demand Response Resource



Fixed Dem – Fixed Demand  
 PrSens Dem – Price Sensitive Demand  
 Decs – Decrement Bids  
 Act Load – Actual Load



# Components of RT Supply and Demand – Last Three Months




# DAM Volumes as % of RT Actual Load (Forecasted Peak Hour)




Note: Forecasted peak hour for each day is reflected in the above values. Shown for each day (chart on right) and then averaged for each month (chart on left). 'DA Bid' categories reflect load assets only (Virtual and export bids not reflected.)

# DA vs. RT Load Obligation: January, This Year vs. Last Year

Monthly, Last 13 Months



Daily, This Year vs. Last Year




\*Hourly average values






# DA Volumes as % of Forecast in Peak Hour

Monthly, Last 13 Months




Daily: This Month



Note: There were **no** system-level manual supplemental commitments for capacity required during the Reserve Adequacy Assessment (RAA) during the month.

# DA Cleared Physical Energy Difference from RT System Load at Forecasted Peak Hour\*




\*Negative values indicate DA Cleared Physical Energy value below its RT counterpart. Forecast peak hour reflected.




# DA vs. RT Net Interchange

## January 2021 vs. January 2022

Hourly Average by Day, Last Year




Hourly Average by Day, This Year



Net Interchange is the sum of daily imports minus the sum of daily exports  
Positive values are net imports

# Variable Production Cost of Natural Gas: Monthly




**Note:** Assumes proxy heat rate of 7,800,000 Btu/MWh for natural gas units.

Underlying natural gas data furnished by:



# Variable Production Cost of Natural Gas: Daily




**Note:** Assumes proxy heat rate of 7,800,000 Btu/MWh for natural gas units.

Underlying natural gas data furnished by:




# Hourly DA LMPs, January 1-26, 2022

Hourly Day-Ahead LMPs




# Hourly RT LMPs, January 1-26, 2022

Hourly Real-Time LMPs



# System Unit Availability



	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	YTD
<b>2022</b>	95												95
<b>2021</b>	94	94	90	81	84	92	93	96	90	71	83	91	88
<b>2020</b>	95	96	93	85	86	91	95	97	91	74	80	89	89

Data as of 1/24/2022



# BACK-UP DETAIL



# DEMAND RESPONSE



# Capacity Supply Obligation (CSO) MW by Demand Resource Type for February 2022

Load Zone	ADCR*	On Peak	Seasonal Peak	Total
ME	96.4	157.5	0.0	253.9
NH	41.0	148.9	0.0	189.9
VT	45.5	161.9	0.0	207.4
CT	102.4	113.6	630.9	846.9
RI	32.6	319.7	0.0	352.3
SEMA	38.6	508.5	0.0	547.1
WCMA	77.8	553.3	18.0	649.1
NEMA	50.5	866.2	0.0	916.6
<b>Total</b>	<b>484.8</b>	<b>2,829.5</b>	<b>648.9</b>	<b>3,963.2</b>

\* Active Demand Capacity Resources

NOTE: CSO values include T&D loss factor (8%).

# NEW GENERATION



# New Generation Update


## *Based on Queue as of 01/28/22*

- Seventeen projects totaling 1,823 MW were added to the interconnection queue since the last update
  - They consist of two wind projects, five battery projects and ten solar with battery projects, with in-service dates of 2022 through 2026
- One project was withdrawn and none went commercial
- In total, 319 generation projects are currently being tracked by the ISO, totaling approximately 33,119 MW



# Actual and Projected Annual Capacity Additions

## *By Supply Fuel Type and Demand Resource Type*



	2022	2023	2024	2025	2026	2027	2028	Total MW	% of Total <sup>1</sup>
Other Renewables	166	0	0	0	0	0	0	166	0.5
Battery	342	2,277	2,019	2,710	0	242	0	7,590	22.7
Solar <sup>2</sup>	2,679	699	1,321	316	83	0	0	5,098	15.3
Wind	24	1,818	1,556	4,707	4,298	6,972	0	19,375	58.0
Natural Gas/Oil <sup>3</sup>	151	0	672	0	0	0	0	823	2.5
Natural Gas	67	0	0	0	0	0	0	67	0.2
Demand Response - Passive	380	-28	-114	0	0	0	0	238	0.7
Demand Response - Active	62	-94	86	0	0	0	0	54	0.2
<b>Totals</b>	<b>3,871</b>	<b>4,672</b>	<b>5,540</b>	<b>7,733</b>	<b>4,381</b>	<b>7,214</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>33,411</b>	<b>100.0</b>


<sup>1</sup> Sum may not equal 100% due to rounding

<sup>2</sup> This category includes both solar-only, and co-located solar and battery projects

<sup>3</sup> The projects in this category are dual fuel, with either gas or oil as the primary fuel

- DR reflects changes from the initial FCM Capacity Supply Obligations in 2010-11

# Actual and Projected Annual Generator Capacity Additions By State



	2022	2023	2024	2025	2026	2027	2028	Total MW	% of Total <sup>1</sup>
Vermont	55	0	50	0	0	0	0	105	0.3
Rhode Island	556	240	704	170	0	0	0	1,670	5.0
New Hampshire	261	164	20	272	0	0	0	717	2.2
Maine	943	774	654	664	600	0	0	3,635	11.0
Massachusetts	1,242	3,096	2,691	6,262	2,498	4,814	0	20,603	62.2
Connecticut	372	520	1,449	365	1,283	2,400	0	6,389	19.3
Totals	3,429	4,794	5,568	7,733	4,381	7,214	0	33,119	100.0

<sup>1</sup> Sum may not equal 100% due to rounding

# New Generation Projection

## *By Fuel Type*

Unit Type	Total		Green		Yellow	
	No. of Projects	Capacity (MW)	No. of Projects	Capacity (MW)	No. of Projects	Capacity (MW)
Biomass/Wood Waste	0	0	0	0	0	0
Battery Storage	48	7,590	0	0	48	7,590
Fuel Cell	2	30	0	0	2	30
Hydro	3	99	2	71	1	28
Natural Gas	7	67	0	0	7	67
Natural Gas/Oil	5	823	1	62	4	761
Nuclear	1	37	0	0	1	37
Solar	223	5,098	26	309	197	4,789
Wind	30	19,375	1	20	29	19,355
Total	319	33,119	30	462	289	32,657

- Projects in the Natural Gas/Oil category may have either gas or oil as the primary fuel
- Green denotes projects with a high probability of going into service
- Yellow denotes projects with a lower probability of going into service or new applications



# New Generation Projection

## *By Operating Type*

Operating Type	Total		Green		Yellow	
	No. of Projects	Capacity (MW)	No. of Projects	Capacity (MW)	No. of Projects	Capacity (MW)
Baseload	6	107	1	5	5	102
Intermediate	7	804	0	0	7	804
Peaker	276	12,833	28	437	248	12,396
Wind Turbine	30	19,375	1	20	29	19,355
Total	319	33,119	30	462	289	32,657

- Green denotes projects with a high probability of going into service
- Yellow denotes projects with a lower probability of going into service or new applications

# New Generation Projection

## *By Operating Type and Fuel Type*

Unit Type	Total		Baseload		Intermediate		Peaker		Wind Turbine	
	No. of Projects	Capacity (MW)	No. of Projects	Capacity (MW)	No. of Projects	Capacity (MW)	No. of Projects	Capacity (MW)	No. of Projects	Capacity (MW)
Biomass/Wood Waste	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Battery Storage	48	7,590	0	0	0	0	48	7,590	0	0
Fuel Cell	2	30	2	30	0	0	0	0	0	0
Hydro	3	99	2	33	0	0	1	66	0	0
Natural Gas	7	67	1	7	3	43	3	17	0	0
Natural Gas/Oil	5	823	0	0	4	761	1	62	0	0
Nuclear	1	37	1	37	0	0	0	0	0	0
Solar	223	5,098	0	0	0	0	223	5,098	0	0
Wind	30	19,375	0	0	0	0	0	0	30	19,375
Total	319	33,119	6	107	7	804	276	12,833	30	19,375

- Projects in the Natural Gas/Oil category may have either gas or oil as the primary fuel

# FORWARD CAPACITY MARKET



# Capacity Supply Obligation (CSO) FCA 12

Resource Type	Resource Type	FCA	ARA 1		ARA 2		ARA 3	
		CSO	CSO	Change	CSO	Change	CSO	Change
		MW	MW	MW	MW	MW	MW	MW
Demand	Active Demand	624.445	659.137	34.692	603.776	-55.361	587.270	-16.506
	Passive Demand	2,975.36	3,045.073	69.713	3,123.232	78.159	3,322.722	199.490
Demand Total		3,599.81	3,704.21	104.4	3,727.008	22.798	3,909.992	182.984
Generator	Non-Intermittent	29,130.75	29,244.404	113.654	28,620.245	-624.159	28,941.276	321.031
	Intermittent	880.317	806.609	-73.708	660.932	-145.677	663.179	2.247
Generator Total		30,011.07	30,051.013	39.943	29,281.177	-769.836	29,604.455	323.278
Import Total		1,217	1,305.487	88.487	1,307.587	2.10	1207.78	-99.807
Grand Total*		34,827.88	35,060.710	232.83	34,315.772	-744.94	34,722.227	406.455
Net ICR (NICR)		33,725	33,550	-175	32,230	-1,320	32,925	695

\* Grand Total reflects both CSO Grand Total and the net total of the Change Column

Note: A resource's CSO may change for a variety of reasons outside ISO-NE administered trading windows. Reasons for CSO changes beyond bilaterals and reconfiguration auction may include terminations or recent declaration of commercial operation. Details of the changes that occurred due to non-annual event purposes are contained in the 2015-2020 CCP Monthly Capacity Supply Obligation Changes report on the ISO New England website.

ARA – Annual Reconfiguration Auction

FCA – Forward Capacity Auction

ICR – Installed Capacity Requirement

# Capacity Supply Obligation FCA 13

Resource Type	Resource Type	FCA	ARA 1		ARA 2		ARA 3	
		CSO	CSO	Change	CSO	Change	CSO	Change
		MW	MW	MW	MW	MW	MW	MW
Demand	Active Demand	685.554	683.116	-2.438	658.659	-24.457		
	Passive Demand	3,354.69	3,407.507	52.817	3,450.899	43.392		
Demand Total		4,040.244	4,090.623	50.38	4,109.558	18.935		
Generator	Non-Intermittent	28,586.498	27,868.341	-718.157	28,105.411	237.07		
	Intermittent	1,024.792	901.672	-123.12	896.285	-5.387		
Generator Total		2,9611.29	28,770.013	-841.28	29,001.696	231.683		
Import Total		1,187.69	1,292.41	104.72	1,292.41	0		
Grand Total*		34,839.224	34,153.046	-686.18	34,403.664	250.618		
Net ICR (NICR)		33,750	32,465	-1,285	32,765	300		

\* Grand Total reflects both CSO Grand Total and the net total of the Change Column

Note: A resource's CSO may change for a variety of reasons outside ISO-NE administered trading windows. Reasons for CSO changes beyond bilaterals and reconfiguration auction may include terminations or recent declaration of commercial operation. Details of the changes that occurred due to non-annual event purposes are contained in the 2015-2020 CCP Monthly Capacity Supply Obligation Changes report on the ISO New England website.

# Capacity Supply Obligation FCA 14

Resource Type	Resource Type	FCA	ARA 1		ARA 2		ARA 3	
		CSO	CSO	Change	CSO	Change	CSO	Change
		MW	MW	MW	MW	MW	MW	MW
Demand	Active Demand	592.043	688.07	96.027				
	Passive Demand	3,327.071	3,327.932	0.861				
Demand Total		3,919.114	4,016.002	96.888				
Generator	Non-Intermittent	27,816.902	28,275.143	458.241				
	Intermittent	1,160.916	1,128.446	-32.47				
Generator Total		28,977.818	29,403.589	425.771				
Import Total		1,058.72	1,058.72	0				
Grand Total*		33,955.652	34,478.311	522.661				
Net ICR (NICR)		32,490	32,980	490				

\* Grand Total reflects both CSO Grand Total and the net total of the Change Column

Note: A resource's CSO may change for a variety of reasons outside ISO-NE administered trading windows. Reasons for CSO changes beyond bilaterals and reconfiguration auction may include terminations or recent declaration of commercial operation. Details of the changes that occurred due to non-annual event purposes are contained in the 2015-2020 CCP Monthly Capacity Supply Obligation Changes report on the ISO New England website.

# Capacity Supply Obligation FCA 15

Resource Type	Resource Type	FCA	ARA 1		ARA 2		ARA 3	
		CSO	CSO	Change	CSO	Change	CSO	Change
		MW	MW	MW	MW	MW	MW	MW
Demand	Active Demand	677.673						
	Passive Demand	3,212.865						
Demand Total		3,890.538						
Generator	Non-Intermittent	28,154.203						
	Intermittent	1,089.265						
Generator Total		29,243.468						
Import Total		1,487.059						
Grand Total*		34,621.065						
Net ICR (NICR)		33,270						

\* Grand Total reflects both CSO Grand Total and the net total of the Change Column

Note: A resource's CSO may change for a variety of reasons outside ISO-NE administered trading windows. Reasons for CSO changes beyond bilaterals and reconfiguration auction may include terminations or recent declaration of commercial operation. Details of the changes that occurred due to non-annual event purposes are contained in the 2015-2020 CCP Monthly Capacity Supply Obligation Changes report on the ISO New England website.

# Active/Passive Demand Response

## *CSO Totals by Commitment Period*

Commitment Period	Active/Passive	Existing	New	Grand Total
2019-20	Active	357.221	20.304	377.525
	Passive	2,018.20	350.43	2,368.63
	<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>2375.422</b>	<b>370.734</b>	<b>2746.156</b>
2020-21	Active	334.634	85.294	419.928
	Passive	2,236.73	554.292	2,791.02
	<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>2571.361</b>	<b>639.586</b>	<b>3210.947</b>
2021-22	Active	480.941	143.504	624.445
	Passive	2,604.79	370.568	2,975.36
	<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>3085.734</b>	<b>514.072</b>	<b>3599.806</b>
2022-23	Active	598.376	87.178	685.554
	Passive	2,788.33	566.363	3,354.69
	<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>3386.703</b>	<b>653.541</b>	<b>4040.244</b>
2023-24	Active	560.55	31.493	592.043
	Passive	3,035.51	291.565	3,327.07
	<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>3596.056</b>	<b>323.058</b>	<b>3919.114</b>
2024-25	Active	674.153	3.520	677.673
	Passive	3,046.064	166.801	3,212.865
	<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>3,720.217</b>	<b>170.321</b>	<b>3,890.538</b>



# RELIABILITY COSTS – NET COMMITMENT PERIOD COMPENSATION (NCPC) OPERATING COSTS



# What are Daily NCPC Payments?

- Payments made to resources whose commitment and dispatch by ISO-NE resulted in a shortfall between the resource's offered value in the Energy and Regulation Markets and the revenue earned from output during the day
- Typically, this is the result of some out-of-merit operation of resources occurring in order to protect the overall resource adequacy and transmission security of specific locations or of the entire control area
- NCPC payments are intended to make a resource that follows the ISO's operating instructions "no worse off" financially than the best alternative generation schedule



# Definitions


1 <sup>st</sup> Contingency NCPC Payments	Reliability costs paid to eligible resources that are providing first contingency (1stC) protection (including low voltage, system operating reserve, and load serving) either system-wide or locally
2 <sup>nd</sup> Contingency NCPC Payments	Reliability costs paid to resources providing capacity in constrained areas to respond to a local second contingency. They are committed based on 2 <sup>nd</sup> Contingency (2ndC) protocols, and are also known as Local Second Contingency Protection Resources (LSCPR)
Voltage NCPC Payments	Reliability costs paid to resources operated by ISO-NE to provide voltage support or control in specific locations
Distribution NCPC Payments	Reliability costs paid to units dispatched at the request of local transmission providers for purpose of managing constraints on the low voltage (distribution) system. These requirements are not modeled in the DA Market software
OATT	Open Access Transmission Tariff

# Charge Allocation Key


Allocation Category	Market / OATT	Allocation
System 1 <sup>st</sup> Contingency	Market	DA 1 <sup>st</sup> C (excluding at external nodes) is allocated to system DALO. RT 1 <sup>st</sup> C (at all locations) is allocated to System 'Daily Deviations'. Daily Deviations = sum of(generator deviations, load deviations, generation obligation deviations at external nodes, increment offer deviations)
External DA 1 <sup>st</sup> Contingency	Market	DA 1 <sup>st</sup> C at external nodes (from imports, exports, Incs and Decs) are allocated to activity at the specific external node or interface involved
Zonal 2 <sup>nd</sup> Contingency	Market	DA and RT 2 <sup>nd</sup> C NCPC are allocated to load obligation in the Reliability Region (zone) served
System Low Voltage	OATT	(Low) Voltage Support NCPC is allocated to system Regional Network Load and Open Access Same-Time Information Service (OASIS) reservations
Zonal High Voltage	OATT	High Voltage Control NCPC is allocated to zonal Regional Network Load
Distribution - PTO	OATT	Distribution NCPC is allocated to the specific Participant Transmission Owner (PTO) requesting the service
System – Other	Market	Includes GPA, Economic Generator/DARD Posturing, Dispatch Lost Opportunity Cost (DLOC), and Rapid Response Pricing (RRP) Opportunity Cost NCPC (allocated to RTLO); and Min Generation Emergency NCPC (allocated to RTGO).

# Year-Over-Year Total NCPC Dollars and Energy

NCPC Dollars





NCPC Energy\*



\* NCPC Energy GWh reflect the DA and/or RT economic minimum loadings of all units receiving DA or RT NCPC credits (except for DLOC, RRP, or posturing NCPC), assessed during hours in which they are NCPC-eligible. Scheduled MW for external transactions receiving NCPC are also reflected. All NCPC components (1<sup>st</sup> Contingency, 2<sup>nd</sup> Contingency, Voltage, and RT Distribution) are reflected.




# DA and RT NCPC Charges




# NCPC Charges by Type

Jan-22 Total = \$3.66 M




Last 13 Months



1<sup>st</sup> C – First Contingency  
2<sup>nd</sup> C – Second Contingency  
Distrib – Distribution  
Voltage – Voltage





# Daily NCPC Charges by Type







# NCPC Charges by Allocation



Note: 'System Other' includes, as applicable: Resource Economic Posturing, GPA, Min Gen Emergency, Dispatch Lost Opportunity Cost (DLOC), and Rapid Response Pricing (RRP) Opportunity Cost credits.


# RT First Contingency Charges by Deviation Type




DRR – Demand Response Resource deviations  
Gen – Generator deviations  
Inc – Increment Offer deviations  
Import – Import deviations  
Load – Load obligation deviations




# LSCPR Charges by Reliability Region




# NCPC Charges for Voltage Support and High Voltage Control




# NCPC Charges by Type



# NCPC Charges as Percent of Energy Market




# First Contingency NCPC Charges



**Note: Energy Market value is the hourly locational product of load obligation and price in the DA Market plus the hourly locational product of price and RT Load Obligation Deviation in the RT Market**



# Second Contingency NCPC Charges




**Note:** Energy Market value is the hourly locational product of load obligation and price in the DA Market plus the hourly locational product of price and RT Load Obligation Deviation in the RT Market





# Voltage and Distribution NCPC Charges



**Note:** Energy Market value is the hourly locational product of load obligation and price in the DA Market plus the hourly locational product of price and RT Load Obligation Deviation in the RT Market



# DA vs. RT Pricing

## The following slides outline:

- This month vs. prior year's average LMPs and fuel costs
- Reserve Market results
- DA cleared load vs. RT load
- Zonal and total incs and decs
- Self-schedules
- DA vs. RT net interchange




# DA vs. RT LMPs (\$/MWh)

## Arithmetic Average

Year 2020	NEMA	CT	ME	NH	VT	RI	SEMA	WCMA	Hub
Day-Ahead	\$23.62	\$22.59	\$23.27	\$23.50	\$22.76	\$23.27	\$23.57	\$23.30	\$23.32
Real-Time	\$23.62	\$22.91	\$23.23	\$23.54	\$22.90	\$23.29	\$23.56	\$23.37	\$23.38
RT Delta %	0.0%	1.4%	-0.2%	0.2%	0.6%	0.1%	-0.1%	0.3%	0.3%
Year 2021	NEMA	CT	ME	NH	VT	RI	SEMA	WCMA	Hub
Day-Ahead	\$46.54	\$44.60	\$45.52	\$46.27	\$45.05	\$45.88	\$46.38	\$45.91	\$45.92
Real-Time	\$45.25	\$43.97	\$44.28	\$45.10	\$44.15	\$44.61	\$45.09	\$44.85	\$44.84
RT Delta %	-2.8%	-1.4%	-2.7%	-2.5%	-2.0%	-2.8%	-2.8%	-2.3%	-2.3%

January-21	NEMA	CT	ME	NH	VT	RI	SEMA	WCMA	Hub
Day-Ahead	\$42.83	\$41.48	\$42.58	\$42.80	\$41.99	\$42.75	\$42.95	\$42.75	\$42.73
Real-Time	\$43.83	\$42.82	\$43.20	\$43.74	\$42.99	\$43.78	\$43.73	\$43.72	\$43.75
RT Delta %	2.3%	3.2%	1.5%	2.2%	2.4%	2.4%	1.8%	2.3%	2.4%
January-22	NEMA	CT	ME	NH	VT	RI	SEMA	WCMA	Hub
Day-Ahead	\$142.21	\$139.19	\$139.57	\$141.57	\$140.93	\$141.78	\$142.21	\$142.09	\$141.96
Real-Time	\$139.01	\$136.46	\$135.75	\$138.72	\$137.26	\$138.65	\$139.10	\$138.77	\$138.66
RT Delta %	-2.3%	-2.0%	-2.7%	-2.0%	-2.6%	-2.2%	-2.2%	-2.3%	-2.3%
Annual Diff.	NEMA	CT	ME	NH	VT	RI	SEMA	WCMA	Hub
Yr over Yr DA	232.0%	235.6%	227.8%	230.7%	235.6%	231.6%	231.1%	232.4%	232.2%
Yr over Yr RT	217.1%	218.7%	214.2%	217.2%	219.3%	216.7%	218.1%	217.4%	216.9%


# Monthly Average Fuel Price and RT Hub LMP Indexes



Underlying natural gas data furnished by:



# Monthly Average Fuel Price and RT Hub LMP




Underlying natural gas data furnished by:




# New England, NY, and PJM Hourly Average Real Time Prices by Month

Monthly, Last 13 Months



\*Note: Hourly average prices are shown.


Daily: This Month




\*Note: Hourly average prices are shown.

# New England, NY, and PJM Average Peak Hour Real Time Prices

Monthly, Last 13 Months



Daily: This Month



\*Forecasted New England daily peak hours reflected

# Reserve Market Results – January 2022


- Maximum potential Forward Reserve Market payments of \$1.2M were reduced by credit reductions of \$39K, failure-to-reserve penalties of \$58K and no failure-to-activate penalties, resulting in a net payout of \$1.1M or 92% of maximum
  - Rest of System: \$0.8M/0.89M (90%)
  - Southwest Connecticut: \$0.02M/0.03M (78%)
  - Connecticut: \$0.28M/0.29M (98%)
  - NEMA: \$3.8K/4.3K (90%)
- \$589K total Real-Time credits were not reduced by any Forward Reserve Energy Obligation Charges for a net of \$589K in Real-Time Reserve payments
  - Rest of System: 171 hours, \$420K
  - Southwest Connecticut: 171 hours, \$83K
  - Connecticut: 171 hours, \$52K
  - NEMA: 171 hours, \$35K

**Note:** “Failure to reserve” results in both credit reductions and penalties in the Locational Forward Reserve Market. While this summary reports performance by location, there were no locational requirements in effect for the current Forward Reserve auction period.







# LFRM Charges to Load by Load Zone (\$)




# Zonal Increment Offers and Cleared Amounts



# Zonal Decrement Bids and Cleared Amounts




# Total Increment Offers and Decrement Bids



Data excludes nodal offers and bids

# Dispatchable vs. Non-Dispatchable Generation



\* Dispatchable MWh here are defined to be all generation output that is not self-committed ('must run') by the customer.



# REGIONAL SYSTEM PLAN (RSP)



# Planning Advisory Committee (PAC)

- February 11 PAC Meeting Agenda Topics\*
  - 2021 Economic Study: Future Grid Reliability Study
    - Resource Adequacy Screen & Probabilistic Resource Availability Analysis - Preliminary Observations and Recommendations - Part 2
    - Production Cost and Ancillary Services - Part 5
  - 2022 Economic Study: Process Update
  - Transmission Planning Technical Guide Update
  - Asset Condition Project
    - 1428 Structure Replacement and Optical Ground Wire Project (Eversource)

\* Agenda topics are subject to change. Visit <https://www.iso-ne.com/committees/planning/planning-advisory> for the latest PAC agendas.



# Transmission Planning for the Clean Energy Transition (TPCET)

- On 9/24/20 the ISO initiated discussions with the PAC about proposed refinements to transmission planning study assumptions that better reflect long-term trends, such as increased amounts of distributed-energy resources (primarily solar PV), offshore wind generation, and battery energy storage
- A follow-up presentation at the 11/19/20 PAC meeting outlined a proposal for a pilot study, with the following goals:
  - Explore transmission reliability concerns that may result from various system conditions possible by 2030
  - Quantify trade-offs necessary between transmission system reliability/flexibility and transmission investment cost
  - Inform future discussions on transmission planning study assumptions
- An overview of the system conditions and dispatch assumptions for the pilot study was discussed at the 12/16/20 and 1/21/21 PAC meetings
- Results were discussed at the 6/16/21, 7/22/21, and 8/18/21 PAC meetings
- The ISO published final revisions to the Transmission Planning Technical Guide reflecting these changes on 9/30/21
- CEII supplement to the PAC presentations was released on 10/5/21
- The final TPCET Pilot Study Report was posted to the PAC website on 1/14/22
- Future testing will focus on transient stability modeling and performance criteria





# 2050 Transmission Study

- A meeting with the states was held on 10/15/21 to review the draft study scope
- The draft study scope was discussed with the PAC on 11/17/21
- Written stakeholder comments were due on 12/2/21
- ISO worked with NESCOE to address the comments and finalized the scope on 12/22/21
- ISO expects to provide initial results at the 3/16/22 PAC meeting



# Economic Studies

- 2020 Economic Study Request
  - Study proponent is National Grid
  - Study simulations are complete, and results have been presented to PAC
    - Draft report expected in early 2022
- 2021 Economic Study Request
  - Also known as Future Grid Reliability Study – Phase 1 (FGRS)
  - Study proponent is NEPOOL
  - Final production cost and remaining preliminary ancillary services results were discussed at the January 20 PAC meeting
  - Remaining preliminary resource adequacy screen and probabilistic resource adequacy analysis results to be discussed at the February 11 PAC meeting



# Future Grid Reliability Study (FGRS)


- Phase 1
  - Studies include: Production Cost Simulations; Ancillary Services Simulations; Resource Adequacy Screen; and Probabilistic Resource Availability Analysis
  - Framework Document and supporting assumptions table, which describe study scenarios and objectives, have been developed by stakeholders
  - Phase 1 work was submitted as the only 2021 economic study
- Phase 2
  - Studies include: Revenue Sufficiency Analysis and Transmission Security
  - Studies will be delayed as the Pathways and 2050 Transmission studies are further defined



# New England Power System Carbon Emissions

*Long-term declines in direct carbon emissions, variability in recent year-to-year trends*


## 2021 New England Power System Estimated Low & High Range Carbon Dioxide Emissions



- 2021 estimated system CO<sub>2</sub> emissions range between **23.6 – 30.9** million metric tons (MMT), 9% to 11% > than 2020
- 2021 estimated CO<sub>2</sub> emissions from natural gas generation range between **21.3 – 21.8** MMT, 7.7% to 8.2% > than 2020

2021 CO<sub>2</sub> estimated emissions with EPA (eGrid2019) balancing area fuel specific emission factors (2021 low), with adjustments by ISO-NE for data gaps (2021 high)

## New England Power System Direct Generation & CO<sub>2</sub> Emissions Near Historic Lows




- CO<sub>2</sub> system emissions peaked at **54.9** MMT in 2005, with total system generation reaching **131,874** GWh
- 2005 annual estimated system CO<sub>2</sub> emissions from fossil fuel generation ranged between:
  - **19.0-20.9** MMT for coal generation
  - **15.1 – 15.5** MMT for natural gas generation
  - **4.9 – 6.5** MMT for oil generation

# Massachusetts CO<sub>2</sub> Generator Emissions Cap

## Electric Generation CO<sub>2</sub> Cap Estimated Emissions for 2021 following 2019-2020 Trends

- In 2021, estimated GWSA CO<sub>2</sub> emissions ranged between 5.3 and 6.5 MMT
  - 64% to 79% of the 8.23 MMT 2021 cap
- Available GWSA allowances exceed estimated 2021 emissions range
- Latest GWSA auction cleared at \$9.75 per metric ton of CO<sub>2</sub> for 2022 vintage GWSA allowances
- IMM estimated 2021 compliance costs by fuel type (based average GWSA emission/heat rates):
  - No. 2 fuel oil - \$8.54/MWh
  - No. 6 fuel oil - \$8.29/MWh
  - Natural gas - \$2.39/MWh

## 2019-2021 Estimated Past Monthly Emissions (Thousand Metric tons)



GWSA - Global Warming Solutions Act

Sources: ISO-NE (estimated emissions); EPA (actual emissions)

# RSP Project Stage Descriptions

Stage	Description
1	Planning and Preparation of Project Configuration
2	Pre-construction (e.g., material ordering, project scheduling)
3	Construction in Progress
4	In Service

Note: The listings in this section focus on major transmission line construction and rebuilding.



# Greater Boston Projects

*Status as of 1/24/2022*

*Plan Benefit: Addresses long-term system needs in the Greater Boston area and improves system reliability*

RSP Project List ID	Upgrade	Expected/ Actual In-Service	Present Stage
1213, 1220, 1365	Install new 345 kV line from Scobie to Tewksbury	Dec-17	4
1527, 1528	Reconductor the Y-151 115 kV line from Dracut Junction to Power Street	Apr-17	4
1212, 1549	Reconductor the M-139 115 kV line from Tewksbury to Pinehurst and associated work at Tewksbury	May-17	4
1549	Reconductor the N-140 115 kV line from Tewksbury to Pinehurst and associated work at Tewksbury	May-17	4
1260	Reconductor the F-158N 115 kV line from Wakefield Junction to Maplewood and associated work at Maplewood	Dec-15	4
1550	Reconductor the F-158S 115 kV line from Maplewood to Everett	Jun-19	4
1551, 1552	Install new 345 kV cable from Woburn to Wakefield Junction, install two new 160 MVAR variable shunt reactors and associated work at Wakefield Junction and Woburn*	May-23	3*
1329	Refurbish X-24 69 kV line from Millbury to Northboro Road	Dec-15	4
1327	Reconductor W-23W 69 kV line from Woodside to Northboro Road	Jun-19	4

\* Substation portion of the project is a Present Stage status 4

# Greater Boston Projects, cont.

## *Status as of 1/24/2022*

*Plan Benefit: Addresses long-term system needs in the Greater Boston area and improves system reliability*

RSP Project List ID	Upgrade	Expected/ Actual In-Service	Present Stage
1330	Separate X-24 and E-157W DCT	Dec-18	4
1363	Separate Q-169 and F-158N DCT	Dec-15	4
1637, 1640	Reconductor M-139/211-503 and N-140/211-504 115 kV lines from Pinehurst to North Woburn tap	May-17	4
1516	Install new 115 kV station at Sharon to segment three 115 kV lines from West Walpole to Holbrook	Sep-20	4
965	Install third 115 kV line from West Walpole to Holbrook	Sep-20	4
1558	Install new 345 kV breaker in series with the 104 breaker at Stoughton	May-16	4
1199	Install new 230/115 kV autotransformer at Sudbury and loop the 282-602 230 kV line in and out of the new 230 kV switchyard at Sudbury	Dec-17	4
1335	Install a new 115 kV line from Sudbury to Hudson	Dec-23	2



# Greater Boston Projects, cont.

*Status as of 1/24/2022*

*Plan Benefit: Addresses long-term system needs in the Greater Boston area and improves system reliability*

RSP Project List ID	Upgrade	Expected/ Actual In-Service	Present Stage
1336	Replace 345/115 kV autotransformer, 345 kV breakers, and 115 kV switchgear at Woburn	Dec-19	4
1553	Install a 345 kV breaker in series with breaker 104 at Woburn	Jun-17	4
1337	Reconfigure Waltham by relocating PARs, 282-507 line, and a breaker	Dec-17	4
1339	Upgrade 533-508 115 kV line from Lexington to Hartwell and associated work at the stations	Aug-16	4
1521	Install a new 115 kV 54 MVAR capacitor bank at Newton	Dec-16	4
1522	Install a new 115 kV 36.7 MVAR capacitor bank at Sudbury	May-17	4
1352	Install a second Mystic 345/115 kV autotransformer and reconfigure the bus	May-19	4
1353	Install a 115 kV breaker on the East bus at K Street	Jun-16	4
1354, 1738	Install 115 kV cable from Mystic to Chelsea and upgrade Chelsea 115 kV station to BPS standards	Jul-21	4
1355	Split 110-522 and 240-510 DCT from Baker Street to Needham for a portion of the way and install a 115 kV cable for the rest of the way	Mar-21	4

# Greater Boston Projects, cont.

*Status as of 1/24/2022*

*Plan Benefit: Addresses long-term system needs in the Greater Boston area and improves system reliability*

RSP Project List ID	Upgrade	Expected/ Actual In-Service	Present Stage
1356	Install a second 115 kV cable from Mystic to Woburn to create a bifurcated 211-514 line	Dec-22	3
1357	Open lines 329-510/511 and 250-516/517 at Mystic and Chatham, respectively. Operate K Street as a normally closed station.	May-19	4
1518	Upgrade Kingston to create a second normally closed 115 kV bus tie and reconfigure the 345 kV switchyard	Mar-19	4
1519	Relocate the Chelsea capacitor bank to the 128-518 termination postion	Dec-16	4



# Greater Boston Projects, cont.

*Status as of 1/24/2022*

*Plan Benefit: Addresses long-term system needs in the Greater Boston area and improves system reliability*

RSP Project List ID	Upgrade	Expected/ Actual In-Service	Present Stage
1520	Upgrade North Cambridge to mitigate 115 kV 5 and 10 stuck breaker contingencies	Dec-17	4
1643	Install a 200 MVAR STATCOM at Coopers Mills	Nov-18	4
1341, 1645	Install a 115 kV 36.7 MVAR capacitor bank at Hartwell	May-17	4
1646	Install a 345 kV 160 MVAR shunt reactor at K Street	Dec-19	4
1647	Install a 115 kV breaker in series with the 5 breaker at Framingham	Mar-17	4
1554	Install a 115 kV breaker in series with the 29 breaker at K Street	Apr-17	4

# SEMA/RI Reliability Projects

*Status as of 1/24/2022*

*Project Benefit: Addresses system needs in the Southeast Massachusetts/Rhode Island area*

RSP Project List ID	Upgrade	Expected/Actual In-Service	Present Stage
1714	Construct a new 115 kV GIS switching station (Grand Army) which includes remote terminal station work at Brayton Point and Somerset substations, and the looping in of the E-183E, F-184, X3, and W4 lines	Oct-20	4
1742	Conduct remote terminal station work at the Wampanoag and Pawtucket substations for the new Grand Army GIS switching station	Oct-20	4
1715	Install upgrades at Brayton Point substation which include a new 115 kV breaker, new 345/115 kV transformer, and upgrades to E183E, F184 station equipment	Oct-20	4
1716	Increase clearances on E-183E & F-184 lines between Brayton Point and Grand Army substations	Nov-19	4
1717	Separate the X3/W4 DCT and reconductor the X3 and W4 lines between Somerset and Grand Army substations; reconfigure Y2 and Z1 lines	Nov-19	4

# SEMA/RI Reliability Projects, cont.

*Status as of 1/24/2022*

*Project Benefit: Addresses system needs in the Southeast Massachusetts/Rhode Island area*

RSP Project List ID	Upgrade	Expected/ Actual In-Service	Present Stage
1718	Add 115 kV circuit breaker at Robinson Ave substation and re-terminate the Q10 line	Sep-22	3
1719	Install 45.0 MVAR capacitor bank at Berry Street substation	Cancelled*	N/A
1720	Separate the N12/M13 DCT and reconductor the N12 and M13 between Somerset and Bell Rock substations	May-25	2
1721	Reconfigure Bell Rock to breaker-and-a-half station, split the M13 line at Bell Rock substation, and terminate 114 line at Bell Rock; install a new breaker in series with N12/D21 tie breaker, upgrade D21 line switch, and install a 37.5 MVAR capacitor	Dec-23	3
1722	Extend the Line 114 from the Dartmouth town line (Eversource-National Grid border) to Bell Rock substation	Dec-24	2
1723	Reconductor L14 and M13 lines from Bell Rock substation to Bates Tap	Cancelled*	N/A

\*Cancelled per ISO-NE PAC presentation on August 27, 2020

# SEMA/RI Reliability Projects, cont.

*Status as of 1/24/2022*

*Project Benefit: Addresses system needs in the Southeast Massachusetts/Rhode Island area*

RSP Project List ID	Upgrade	Expected/ Actual In-Service	Present Stage
1725	Build a new 115 kV line from Bourne to West Barnstable substations which includes associated terminal work	Dec-23	1
1726	Separate the 135/122 DCT from West Barnstable to Barnstable substations	Dec-21	4
1727	Retire the Barnstable SPS	Nov-21	4
1728	Build a new 115 kV line from Carver to Kingston substations and add a new Carver terminal	Dec-22	1
1729	Install a new bay position at Kingston substation to accommodate new 115 kV line	Dec-22	1
1730	Extend the 114 line from the Eversource/National Grid border to the Industrial Park Tap	Dec-23	1



# SEMA/RI Reliability Projects, cont.

*Status as of 1/24/2022*

*Project Benefit: Addresses system needs in the Southeast Massachusetts/Rhode Island area*

RSP Project List ID	Upgrade	Expected/Actual In-Service	Present Stage
1731	Install 35.3 MVAR capacitors at High Hill and Wing Lane substations	Dec-21	4
1732	Loop the 201-502 line into the Medway substation to form the 201-502N and 201-502S lines	Jan-23	3
1733	Separate the 325/344 DCT lines from West Medway to West Walpole substations	Cancelled**	N/A
1734	Reconductor and upgrade the 112 Line from the Tremont substation to the Industrial Tap	Jun-18	4
1736	Reconductor the 108 line from Bourne substation to Horse Pond Tap*	Oct-18	4
1737	Replace disconnect switches on 323 line at West Medway substation and replace 8 line structures	Aug-20	4

\* Does not include the reconductoring work over the Cape Cod canal

\*\* Cancelled per ISO-NE PAC presentation on August 27, 2020

# SEMA/RI Reliability Projects, cont.

*Status as of 1/24/2022*

*Project Benefit: Addresses system needs in the Southeast Massachusetts/Rhode Island area*

RSP Project List ID	Upgrade	Expected/ Actual In-Service	Present Stage
1741	Rebuild the Middleborough Gas and Electric portion of the E1 line from Bridgewater to Middleborough	Apr-19	4
1782	Reconductor the J16S line	Jun-22	2
1724	Replace the Kent County 345/115 kV transformer	Mar-22	3
1789	West Medway 345 kV circuit breaker upgrades	Apr-21	4
1790	Medway 115 kV circuit breaker replacements	Nov-20	4



# Eastern CT Reliability Projects

*Status as of 1/24/2022*

*Project Benefit: Addresses system needs in the Eastern Connecticut area*

RSP Project List ID	Upgrade	Expected/ Actual In-Service	Present Stage
1815	Reconductor the L190-4 and L190-5 line sections	Dec-24	2
1850	Install a second 345/115 kV autotransformer (4X) and one 345 kV breaker at Card substation	Mar-23	2
1851	Upgrade Card 115 kV to BPS standards	Mar-23	2
1852	Install one 115 kV circuit breaker in series with Card substation 4T	Mar-23	2
1853	Convert Gales Ferry substation from 69 kV to 115 kV	Dec-23	1
1854	Rebuild the 100 Line from Montville to Gales Ferry to allow operation at 115 kV	Dec-22	1



# Eastern CT Reliability Projects, cont.

*Status as of 1/24/2022*

*Project Benefit: Addresses system needs in the Eastern Connecticut area*

RSP Project List ID	Upgrade	Expected/ Actual In-Service	Present Stage
1855	Re-terminate the 100 Line at Montville station and associated work. Energize the 100 Line at 115 kV	Dec-23	1
1856	Rebuild 400-1 Line section to allow operation at 115 kV (Tunnel to Ledyard Jct.)	Dec-22	1
1857	Add one 115 kV circuit breaker and re-terminate the 400-1 line section into Tunnel substation. Energize 400 Line at 115 kV	Dec-23	1
1858	Rebuild 400-2 Line section to allow operation at 115 kV (Ledyard Jct. to Border Bus with CMEEC)	Mar-22	3
1859	Rebuild the 400-3 Line Section to allow operation at 115 kV (Gales Ferry to Ledyard Jct.)	Dec-22	1
1860	Install a 25.2 MVAR 115 kV capacitor and one capacitor breaker at Killingly	Dec-21	4

# Eastern CT Reliability Projects, cont.

*Status as of 1/24/2022*

*Project Benefit: Addresses system needs in the Eastern Connecticut area*

RSP Project List ID	Upgrade	Expected/ Actual In-Service	Present Stage
1861	Install one 345 kV series breaker with the Montville 1T	Nov-21	4
1862	Install a 50 MVAR synchronous condenser with two 115 kV breakers at Shunock	Dec-24	3
1863	Install a 1% series reactor with bypass switch at Mystic, CT on the 1465 Line	Dec-22	3
1864	Convert the 400-2 Line Section to 115 kV (Border Bus to Buddington), convert Buddington to 115 kV	Dec-23	1



# Boston Area Optimized Solution Projects

*Status as of 1/24/2022*

*Project Benefit: Addresses system needs in the Boston area*

RSP Project List ID	Upgrade	Expected/ Actual In-Service	Present Stage
1874	Install two 11.9 ohm series reactors at North Cambridge Station on Lines 346 and 365	Dec 21	4
1875	Install a direct transfer trip (DTT) scheme between Ward Hill and West Amesbury Substations for Line 394	Jan-23	2
1876	Install one +/- 167 MVAR STATCOM at Tewksbury 345 kV Substation	Oct-23	2



# New Hampshire Solution Projects

*Status as of 1/24/2022*

*Project Benefit: Addresses system needs in the New Hampshire area*

RSP Project List ID	Upgrade	Expected/ Actual In-Service	Present Stage
1878	Install a +50/-25 MVAR synchronous condenser at N. Keene 115 kV Substation with a 115 kV breaker	Aug-23	2
1879	Install a +50/-25 MVAR synchronous condenser at Huckins Hill 115 kV Substation with a 115 kV breaker	Aug-23	2
1880	Install a +100/-50 MVAR synchronous condenser at Amherst 345 kV Substation with two 345 kV breakers	Dec-23	2
1881	Install two 50 MVAR capacitors on Line 363 near Seabrook Station with three 345 kV breakers	Nov-23	1



# Upper Maine Solution Projects

*Status as of 1/24/2022*

*Project Benefit: Addresses system needs in the Upper Maine area*

RSP Project List ID	Upgrade	Expected/ Actual In-Service	Present Stage
1882	Rebuild 21.7 miles of the existing 115 kV line Section 80 Highland – Coopers Mills 115 kV line	Dec-27	1
1883	Convert the Highland 115 kV substation to an eight breaker, breaker-and-a-half configuration with a bus connected 115/34.5 kV transformer	Dec-27	1
1884	Install a 15 MVAR capacitor at Belfast 115 kV substation	Dec-27	1
1885	Install a +50/-25 MVAR synchronous condenser at Highland 115 kV substation	Dec-27	1
1886	Install +50/-25 MVAR synchronous condenser at Boggy Brook 115 kV substation, and install a new 115 kV breaker to separate Line 67 from the proposed solution elements	Dec-25	1



# Upper Maine Solution Projects, cont.


*Status as of 1/24/2022*

*Project Benefit: Addresses system needs in the Upper Maine area*

RSP Project List ID	Upgrade	Expected/ Actual In-Service	Present Stage
1887	Install 25 MVAR reactor at Boggy Brook 115 kV substation	Dec-25	1
1888	Install 10 MVAR reactor at Keene Road 115 kV substation	Dec-23	1
1889	Install three remotely monitored and controlled switches to split the existing Orrington reactors between the two Orrington 345/115 kV autotransformers	Dec-23	1



# Status of Tariff Studies



## Generator Project Status

Note: January 2022 is based on partial data.

As of January 2022: 1 ETU in Scoping, 2 in FS, 1 in SIS, 0 in OIS, 0 in FAC, 2 Negotiating IA, and 2 with Executed IA


Transmission Service Requests needing study: 1 in Scoping

<https://irtt.iso-ne.com/external.aspx>



# What is in the Queue (as of January 24, 2022)

Storage Projects are proposed as stand-alone storage or as co-located with wind or solar projects



# OPERABLE CAPACITY ANALYSIS

*Winter 2022 Analysis*



# Winter 2022 Operable Capacity Analysis

50/50 Load Forecast (Reference)	February - 2022 <sup>2</sup> CSO (MW)	February - 2022 <sup>2</sup> SCC (MW)
Operable Capacity MW <sup>1</sup>	29,737	32,090
Active Demand Capacity Resource (+) <sup>5</sup>	449	424
External Node Available Net Capacity, CSO imports minus firm capacity exports (+)	1,126	1,126
Non Commercial Capacity (+)	11	11
Non Gas-fired Planned Outage MW (-)	81	500
Gas Generator Outages MW (-)	0	0
Allowance for Unplanned Outages (-) <sup>4</sup>	3,100	3,100
Generation at Risk Due to Gas Supply (-) <sup>3</sup>	2,244	2,575
Net Capacity (NET OPCAP SUPPLY MW)	25,898	27,476
Peak Load Forecast MW (adjusted for Other Demand Resources) <sup>2</sup>	19,193	19,193
Operating Reserve Requirement MW	2,305	2,305
Operable Capacity Required (NET LOAD OBLIGATION MW)	21,498	21,498
Operable Capacity Margin	4,400	5,978

<sup>1</sup>Operable Capacity is based on data as of **January 25, 2022** and does not include Capacity associated with Settlement Only Generators, Passive and Active Demand Response, and external capacity. The Capacity Supply Obligation (CSO) and Seasonal Claim Capability (SCC) values are based on data as of **January 25, 2022**.

<sup>2</sup> Load forecast that is based on the 2021 CELT report and represents the week with the lowest Operable Capacity Margin, week beginning **February 12, 2022**.

<sup>3</sup> Total of (Gas at Risk MW) – (Gas Gen Outages MW).

<sup>4</sup> Allowance For Unplanned Outage MW is based on the month corresponding to the day with the lowest Operable Capacity Margin for the week.

<sup>5</sup> Active Demand Capacity Resources (ADCRs) can participate in the Forward Capacity Market (FCM), have the ability to obtain a CSO and also participate in the Day-Ahead and Real-Time Energy Markets.

# Winter 2022 Operable Capacity Analysis

90/10 Load Forecast	February - 2022 <sup>2</sup> CSO (MW)	February - 2022 <sup>2</sup> SCC (MW)
Operable Capacity MW <sup>1</sup>	29,737	32,090
Active Demand Capacity Resource (+) <sup>5</sup>	449	424
External Node Available Net Capacity, CSO imports minus firm capacity exports (+)	1,126	1,126
Non Commercial Capacity (+)	11	11
Non Gas-fired Planned Outage MW (-)	81	500
Gas Generator Outages MW (-)	0	0
Allowance for Unplanned Outages (-) <sup>4</sup>	3,100	3,100
Generation at Risk Due to Gas Supply (-) <sup>3</sup>	3,291	3,777
Net Capacity (NET OPCAP SUPPLY MW)	24,851	26,274
Peak Load Forecast MW(adjusted for Other Demand Resources) <sup>2</sup>	19,817	19,817
Operating Reserve Requirement MW	2,305	2,305
Operable Capacity Required (NET LOAD OBLIGATION MW)	22,122	22,122
Operable Capacity Margin	2,729	4,152

<sup>1</sup>Operable Capacity is based on data as of **January 25, 2022** and does not include Capacity associated with Settlement Only Generators, Passive and Active Demand Response, and external capacity. The Capacity Supply Obligation (CSO) and Seasonal Claim Capability (SCC) values are based on data as of **January 25, 2022**.

<sup>2</sup> Load forecast that is based on the 2021 CELT report and represents the week with the lowest Operable Capacity Margin, week beginning **February 12, 2022**.

<sup>3</sup> Total of (Gas at Risk MW) – (Gas Gen Outages MW).

<sup>4</sup> Allowance For Unplanned Outage MW is based on the month corresponding to the day with the lowest Operable Capacity Margin for the week.

<sup>5</sup> Active Demand Capacity Resources (ADCRs) can participate in the Forward Capacity Market (FCM), have the ability to obtain a CSO and also participate in the Day-Ahead and Real-Time Energy Markets.

# Winter 2022 Operable Capacity Analysis

## 50/50 Forecast (Reference)

### ISO-NE OPERABLE CAPACITY ANALYSIS

#### January 28, 2022 - 50-50 FORECAST using CSO MW

This analysis is a tabulation of weekly assessments shown in one single table. The information shows the operable capacity situation under assumed conditions for each week. It is not expected that the system peak will occur every week during February and March.

Report created: 1/25/2022

Study Week (Week Beginning , Saturday)	CSO Supply Resource Capacity MW	CSO Demand Resource Capacity MW	External Node Capacity MW	Non-Commercial Capacity MW	CSO Non-Gas- Only Generator Planned Outages MW	CSO Gas-Only Generator Planned Outages MW	Unplanned Outages Allowance MW	CSO Generation at Risk Due to Gas Supply 50- 50PLE MW	CSO Net Available Capacity MW	Peak Load Forecast 50- 50PLE MW	Operating Reserve Requirement MW	CSO Net Required Capacity MW	CSO Operable Capacity Margin MW	Season Min Opcap Margin Flag	Season_Label
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15
2/12/2022	29737	449	1126	11	81	0	3100	2244	25898	19193	2305	21498	4400	Y	Winter 2021/2022
2/19/2022	29737	449	1126	11	95	0	3100	1795	26333	18931	2305	21236	5097	N	Winter 2021/2022
2/26/2022	29737	449	1126	11	134	0	3100	1496	26593	17944	2305	20249	6344	N	Winter 2021/2022
3/5/2022	29787	541	1135	37	537	0	2200	1197	27566	17596	2305	19901	7665	N	Winter 2021/2022
3/12/2022	29787	541	1135	37	774	500	2200	98	27928	17400	2305	19705	8223	N	Winter 2021/2022
3/19/2022	29787	541	1135	37	1382	696	2200	0	27222	17036	2305	19341	7881	N	Winter 2021/2022
3/26/2022	29763	540	1135	37	1788	1007	2700	0	25980	16472	2305	18777	7203	N	Winter 2021/2022

#### Column Definitions

- CSO Supply Resource Capacity MW:** Summation of all resource Capacity supply Obligations (CSO). Does not include Settlement Only Generators (SOG).
- CSO Demand Resource Capacity MW:** Demand resources known as Real-Time Demand Response (RTDR) will become Active Demand Capacity Resources (ADCRs) and can participate in the Forward Capacity market (FCM). These resources will have the ability to obtain a CSO and also participate in the Day-Ahead and Real-Time Energy Markets.
- External Node Capacity MW:** Sum of external Capacity Supply Obligations (CSO) imports and exports.
- Non-Commercial capacity MW:** New resources and generator improvements that have acquired a CSO but have not become commercial.
- CSO Non Gas-Only Generator Planned Outages MW:** All Non-Gas Planned Outages is the total of Non Gas-fired Generator/DARD Outages for the period. This value would also include any known long-term Non Gas-fired Forced Outages.
- CSO Gas-Only Generator Planned Outages MW:** All Planned Gas-fired generation outage for the period. This value would also include any known long-term Gas-fired Forced Outages.
- Unplanned Outage Allowance MW:** Forced Outages and Maintenance Outages scheduled less than 14 days in advance per ISO New England Operating Procedure No. 5 Appendix A.
- CSO Generation at Risk Due to Gas Supply Mw:** Gas fired capacity expected to be at risk during cold weather conditions or gas pipeline maintenance outages.
- CSO Net Available Capacity MW:** the summation of columns (1+2+3+4-5-6-7-8-9)
- Peak Load Forecast MW:** Provided in the annual 2021 CELT Report and adjusted for Passive Demand Resources assumes Peak Load Exposure (PLE) and does include credit of Passive Demand Response (PDR) and behind-the-meter PV (BTM PV).
- Operating Reserve Requirement MW:** 120% of first largest contingency plus 50% of the second largest contingency.
- CSO Net Required Capacity MW:** (Net Load Obligation) (10+11-12)
- CSO Operable Capacity Margin MW:** CSO Net Available Capacity MW minus CSO Net Required Capacity MW (9-12=13)
- Operable Capacity Season Label:** Applicable season and year.
- Season Minimum Operable Capacity Flag:** this column indicates whether or not a week has the lowest capacity margin for its applicable season.

# Winter 2022 Operable Capacity Analysis

## 90/10 Forecast

### ISO-NE OPERABLE CAPACITY ANALYSIS

January 28, 2022 - 90/10 FORECAST using CSO MW

This analysis is a tabulation of weekly assessments shown in one single table. The information shows the operable capacity situation under assumed conditions for each week. It is not expected that the system peak will occur every week during February and March.

Report created: 1/25/2022

Study Week (Week Beginning , Saturday)	CSO Supply Resource Capacity MW	CSO Demand Resource Capacity MW	External Node Capacity MW	Non-Commercial Capacity MW	CSO Non Gas- Only Generator Planned Outages MW	CSO Gas-Only Generator Planned Outages MW	Unplanned Outages Allowance MW	CSO Generation at Risk Due to Gas Supply 90- 10PLE MW	CSO Net Available Capacity MW	Peak Load Forecast 90- 10PLE MW	Operating Reserve Requirement MW	CSO Net Required Capacity MW	CSO Operable Capacity Margin MW	Season Min Opcap Margin Flag	Season_Label
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15
2/12/2022	29737	449	1126	11	81	0	3100	3291	24851	19817	2305	22122	2729	Y	Winter 2021/2022
2/19/2022	29737	449	1126	11	95	0	3100	2693	25435	19547	2305	21852	3583	N	Winter 2021/2022
2/26/2022	29737	449	1126	11	134	0	3100	2244	25845	18533	2305	20838	5007	N	Winter 2021/2022
3/5/2022	29787	541	1135	37	537	0	2200	2094	26669	18174	2305	20479	6190	N	Winter 2021/2022
3/12/2022	29787	541	1135	37	774	500	2200	996	27030	17973	2305	20278	6752	N	Winter 2021/2022
3/19/2022	29787	541	1135	37	1382	696	2200	351	26871	17598	2305	19903	6968	N	Winter 2021/2022
3/26/2022	29763	540	1135	37	1788	1007	2700	0	25980	17017	2305	19322	6658	N	Winter 2021/2022


### Column Definitions

- 1. CSO Supply Resource Capacity MW:** Summation of all resource Capacity supply Obligations (CSO). Does not include Settlement Only Generators (SOG).
- 2. CSO Demand Resource Capacity MW:** Demand resources known as Real-Time Demand Response (RTDR) will become Active Demand Capacity Resources (ADCRs) and can participate in the Forward Capacity market (FCM). These resources will have the ability to obtain a CSO and also participate in the Day-Ahead and Real-Time Energy Markets.
- 3. External Node Capacity MW:** Sum of external Capacity Supply Obligations (CSO) imports and exports.
- 4. Non-Commercial capacity MW:** New resources and generator improvements that have acquired a CSO but have not become commercial.
- 5. CSO Non Gas-Only Generator Planned Outages MW:** All Non-Gas Planned Outages is the total of Non Gas-fired Generator/DARD Outages for the period. This value would also include any known long-term Non Gas-fired Forced Outages.Outages.
- 6. CSO Gas-Only Generator Planned Outages MW:** All Planned Gas-fired generation outage for the period. This value would also include any known long-term Gas-fired Forced Outages.
- 7. Unplanned Outage Allowance MW:** Forced Outages and Maintenance Outages scheduled less than 14 days in advance per ISO New England Operating Procedure No. 5 Appendix A.
- 8. CSO Generation at Risk Due to Gas Supply MW:** Gas fired capacity expected to be at risk during cold weather conditions or gas pipeline maintenance outages.
- 9. CSO Net Available Capacity MW:** the summation of columns (1+2+3+4-5-6-7-8=9)
- 10. Peak Load Forecast MW:** Provided in the annual 2021 CELT Report and adjusted for Passive Demand Resources assumes Peak Load Exposure (PLE) and does include credit of Passive Demand Response (PDR) and behind-the-meter PV (BTM PV).
- 11. Operating Reserve Requirement MW:** 120% of first largest contingency plus 50% of the second largest contingency.
- 12. CSO Net Required Capacity MW:** (Net Load Obligation) (10+11=12)
- 13. CSO Operable Capacity Margin MW:** CSO Net Available Capacity MW minus CSO Net Required Capacity MW (9-12=13)
- 14. Operable Capacity Season Label:** Applicable season and year.
- 15. Season Minimum Operable Capacity Flag:** this column indicates whether or not a week has the lowest capacity margin for its applicable season.

\*Highlighted week is based on the week determined by the 50/50 Load Forecast Reference week


# Winter 2022 Operable Capacity Analysis

## 50/50 Forecast (Reference)



# Winter 2022 Operable Capacity Analysis

## 90/10 Forecast





# OPERABLE CAPACITY ANALYSIS

*Preliminary Spring 2022 Analysis*



# Preliminary Spring 2022 Operable Capacity Analysis

50/50 Load Forecast (Reference)	May - 2022 <sup>2</sup> CSO (MW)	May - 2022 <sup>2</sup> SCC (MW)
Operable Capacity MW <sup>1</sup>	29,763	32,090
Active Demand Capacity Resource (+) <sup>5</sup>	540	424
External Node Available Net Capacity, CSO imports minus firm capacity exports (+)	1,135	1,135
Non Commercial Capacity (+)	37	37
Non Gas-fired Planned Outage MW (-)	5,205	5,723
Gas Generator Outages MW (-)	2,421	2,720
Allowance for Unplanned Outages (-) <sup>4</sup>	3,400	3,400
Generation at Risk Due to Gas Supply (-) <sup>3</sup>	0	0
Net Capacity (NET OPCAP SUPPLY MW)	20,449	21,843
Peak Load Forecast MW (adjusted for Other Demand Resources) <sup>2</sup>	18,001	18,001
Operating Reserve Requirement MW	2,305	2,305
Operable Capacity Required (NET LOAD OBLIGATION MW)	20,306	20,306
Operable Capacity Margin	143	1,537

<sup>1</sup>Operable Capacity is based on data as of **January 25, 2022** and does not include Capacity associated with Settlement Only Generators, Passive and Active Demand Response, and external capacity. The Capacity Supply Obligation (CSO) and Seasonal Claim Capability (SCC) values are based on data as of **January 25, 2022**.

<sup>2</sup> Load forecast that is based on the 2021 CELT report and represents the week with the lowest Operable Capacity Margin, week beginning **May 7, 2022**.

<sup>3</sup> Total of (Gas at Risk MW) – (Gas Gen Outages MW).

<sup>4</sup> Allowance For Unplanned Outage MW is based on the month corresponding to the day with the lowest Operable Capacity Margin for the week.

<sup>5</sup> Active Demand Capacity Resources (ADCRs) can participate in the Forward Capacity Market (FCM), have the ability to obtain a CSO and also participate in the Day-Ahead and Real-Time Energy Markets.

# Preliminary Spring 2022 Operable Capacity Analysis

90/10 Load Forecast	May - 2022 <sup>2</sup> CSO (MW)	May - 2022 <sup>2</sup> SCC (MW)
Operable Capacity MW <sup>1</sup>	29,763	32,090
Active Demand Capacity Resource (+) <sup>5</sup>	540	424
External Node Available Net Capacity, CSO imports minus firm capacity exports (+)	1,135	1,135
Non Commercial Capacity (+)	37	37
Non Gas-fired Planned Outage MW (-)	5,205	5,723
Gas Generator Outages MW (-)	2,421	2,720
Allowance for Unplanned Outages (-) <sup>4</sup>	3,400	3,400
Generation at Risk Due to Gas Supply (-) <sup>3</sup>	0	0
Net Capacity (NET OPCAP SUPPLY MW)	20,449	21,843
Peak Load Forecast MW(adjusted for Other Demand Resources) <sup>2</sup>	19,451	19,451
Operating Reserve Requirement MW	2,305	2,305
Operable Capacity Required (NET LOAD OBLIGATION MW)	21,756	21,756
Operable Capacity Margin	-1,307	87

<sup>1</sup>Operable Capacity is based on data as of **January 25, 2022** and does not include Capacity associated with Settlement Only Generators, Passive and Active Demand Response, and external capacity. The Capacity Supply Obligation (CSO) and Seasonal Claim Capability (SCC) values are based on data as of **January 25, 2022**.

<sup>2</sup> Load forecast that is based on the 2021 CELT report and represents the week with the lowest Operable Capacity Margin, week beginning **May 7, 2022**.

<sup>3</sup> Total of (Gas at Risk MW) – (Gas Gen Outages MW).

<sup>4</sup> Allowance For Unplanned Outage MW is based on the month corresponding to the day with the lowest Operable Capacity Margin for the week.

<sup>5</sup> Active Demand Capacity Resources (ADCRs) can participate in the Forward Capacity Market (FCM), have the ability to obtain a CSO and also participate in the Day-Ahead and Real-Time Energy Markets.

# Preliminary Spring 2022 Operable Capacity Analysis

## 50/50 Forecast (Reference)

### ISO-NE OPERABLE CAPACITY ANALYSIS

January 28, 2022 - 50-50 FORECAST using CSO MW

This analysis is a tabulation of weekly assessments shown in one single table. The information shows the operable capacity situation under assumed conditions for each week. It is not expected that the system peak will occur every week during April and May.

Report created: 1/25/2022

Study Week (Week Beginning , Saturday)	CSO Supply Resource Capacity MW	CSO Demand Resource Capacity MW	External Node Capacity MW	Non-Commercial Capacity MW	CSO Non-Gas- Only Generator Planned Outages MW	CSO Gas-Only Generator Planned Outages MW	Unplanned Outages Allowance MW	CSO Generation at Risk Due to Gas Supply 50- 50PLE MW	CSO Net Available Capacity MW	Peak Load Forecast 50- 50PLE MW	Operating Reserve Requirement MW	CSO Net Required Capacity MW	CSO Operable Capacity Margin MW	Season Min Opcap Margin Flag	Season_Label
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15
4/2/2022	29763	540	1135	37	3390	3336	2700	0	22049	15804	2305	18109	3940	N	Spring 2022
4/9/2022	29763	540	1135	37	3458	3214	2700	0	22103	15553	2305	17858	4245	N	Spring 2022
4/16/2022	29763	540	1135	37	3312	3042	2700	0	22421	15045	2305	17350	5071	N	Spring 2022
4/23/2022	29763	540	1135	37	3873	3541	2700	0	21361	14780	2305	17085	4276	N	Spring 2022
4/30/2022	29763	540	1135	37	5129	3961	3400	0	18985	14754	2305	17059	1926	N	Spring 2022
5/7/2022	29763	540	1135	37	5205	2421	3400	0	20449	18001	2305	20306	143	Y	Spring 2022
5/14/2022	29763	540	1135	37	5562	581	3400	0	21932	19001	2305	21306	626	N	Spring 2022
5/21/2022	29763	540	1078	37	4317	581	3400	0	23120	19930	2305	22235	885	N	Spring 2022

### Column Definitions

- CSO Supply Resource Capacity MW:** Summation of all resource Capacity supply Obligations (CSO). Does not include Settlement Only Generators (SOG).
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- Non-Commercial capacity MW:** New resources and generator improvements that have acquired a CSO but have not become commercial.
- CSO Non Gas-Only Generator Planned Outages MW:** All Non-Gas Planned Outages is the total of Non Gas-fired Generator/DARD Outages for the period. This value would also include any known long-term Non Gas-fired Forced Outages.
- CSO Gas-Only Generator Planned Outages MW:** All Planned Gas-fired generation outage for the period. This value would also include any known long-term Gas-fired Forced Outages.
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- CSO Generation at Risk Due to Gas Supply MW:** Gas fired capacity expected to be at risk during cold weather conditions or gas pipeline maintenance outages.
- CSO Net Available Capacity MW:** the summation of columns (1+2+3+4-5-6-7-8=9)
- Peak Load Forecast MW:** Provided in the annual 2021 CELT Report and adjusted for Passive Demand Resources assumes Peak Load Exposure (PLE) and does include credit of Passive Demand Response (PDR) and behind-the-meter PV (BTM PV).
- Operating Reserve Requirement MW:** 120% of first largest contingency plus 50% of the second largest contingency.
- CSO Net Required Capacity MW:** (Net Load Obligation) (10+11=12)
- CSO Operable Capacity Margin MW:** CSO Net Available Capacity MW minus CSO Net Required Capacity MW (9-12=13)
- Operable Capacity Season Label:** Applicable season and year.
- Season Minimum Operable Capacity Flag:** this column indicates whether or not a week has the lowest capacity margin for its applicable season.

# Preliminary Spring 2022 Operable Capacity Analysis

## 90/10 Forecast

### ISO-NE OPERABLE CAPACITY ANALYSIS

January 28, 2022 - 90/10 FORECAST using CSO MW

This analysis is a tabulation of weekly assessments shown in one single table. The information shows the operable capacity situation under assumed conditions for each week. It is not expected that the system peak will occur every week during April and May.

Report created: 1/25/2022

Study Week (Week Beginning , Saturday)	CSO Supply Resource Capacity MW	CSO Demand Resource Capacity MW	External Node Capacity MW	Non-Commercial Capacity MW	CSO Non Gas- Only Generator Planned Outages MW	CSO Gas-Only Generator Planned Outages MW	Unplanned Outages Allowance MW	CSO Generation at Risk Due to Gas Supply 90- 10PLE MW	CSO Net Available Capacity MW	Peak Load Forecast 90- 10PLE MW	Operating Reserve Requirement MW	CSO Net Required Capacity MW	CSO Operable Capacity Margin MW	Season Min Opcap Margin Flag	Season_Label
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	
4/2/2022	29763	540	1135	37	3390	3336	2700	0	22049	16336	2305	18641	3408	N	Spring 2022
4/9/2022	29763	540	1135	37	3458	3214	2700	0	22103	16078	2305	18383	3720	N	Spring 2022
4/16/2022	29763	540	1135	37	3312	3042	2700	0	22421	15554	2305	17859	4562	N	Spring 2022
4/23/2022	29763	540	1135	37	3873	3541	2700	0	21361	15283	2305	17588	3773	N	Spring 2022
4/30/2022	29763	540	1135	37	5129	3961	3400	0	18985	15255	2305	17560	1425	N	Spring 2022
5/7/2022	29763	540	1135	37	5205	2421	3400	0	20449	19451	2305	21756	-1307	Y	Spring 2022
5/14/2022	29763	540	1135	37	5562	581	3400	0	21932	20519	2305	22824	-892	N	Spring 2022
5/21/2022	29763	540	1078	37	4317	581	3400	0	23120	21510	2305	23815	-695	N	Spring 2022


### Column Definitions

- CSO Supply Resource Capacity MW:** Summation of all resource Capacity supply Obligations (CSO). Does not include Settlement Only Generators (SOG).
- CSO Demand Resource Capacity MW:** Demand resources known as Real-Time Demand Response (RTDR) will become Active Demand Capacity Resources (ADCRs) and can participate in the Forward Capacity market (FCM). These resources will have the ability to obtain a CSO and also participate in the Day-Ahead and Real-Time Energy Markets.
- External Node Capacity MW:** Sum of external Capacity Supply Obligations (CSO) imports and exports.
- Non-Commercial capacity MW:** New resources and generator improvements that have acquired a CSO but have not become commercial.
- CSO Non Gas-Only Generator Planned Outages MW:** All Non-Gas Planned Outages is the total of Non Gas-fired Generator/DARD Outages for the period. This value would also include any known long-term Non Gas-fired Forced Outages.
- CSO Gas-Only Generator Planned Outages MW:** All Planned Gas-fired generation outage for the period. This value would also include any known long-term Gas-fired Forced Outages.
- Unplanned Outage Allowance MW:** Forced Outages and Maintenance Outages scheduled less than 14 days in advance per ISO New England Operating Procedure No. 5 Appendix A.
- CSO Generation at Risk Due to Gas Supply Mw:** Gas fired capacity expected to be at risk during cold weather conditions or gas pipeline maintenance outages.
- CSO Net Available Capacity MW:** the summation of columns (1+2+3+4-5-6-7-8=9)
- Peak Load Forecast MW:** Provided in the annual 2021 CELT Report and adjusted for Passive Demand Resources assumes Peak Load Exposure (PLE) and does include credit of Passive Demand Response (PDR) and behind-the-meter PV (BTM PV).
- Operating Reserve Requirement MW:** 120% of first largest contingency plus 50% of the second largest contingency.
- CSO Net Required Capacity MW:** (Net Load Obligation) (10+11=12)
- CSO Operable Capacity Margin MW:** CSO Net Available Capacity MW minus CSO Net Required Capacity MW (9-12=13)
- Operable Capacity Season Label:** Applicable season and year.
- Season Minimum Operable Capacity Flag:** this column indicates whether or not a week has the lowest capacity margin for its applicable season.

\*Highlighted week is based on the week determined by the 50/50 Load Forecast Reference week


# Preliminary Spring 2022 Operable Capacity Analysis

## 50/50 Forecast (Reference)



# Preliminary Spring 2022 Operable Capacity Analysis

## 90/10 Forecast



# OPERABLE CAPACITY ANALYSIS

## *Appendix*





# Possible Relief Under OP4: Appendix A

OP 4 Action Number	Page 1 of 2 Action Description	Amount Assumed Obtainable Under OP 4 (MW)
1	Implement Power Caution and advise Resources with a CSO to prepare to provide capacity and notify “Settlement Only” generators with a CSO to monitor reserve pricing to meet those obligations. Begin to allow the depletion of 30-minute reserve.	0 <sup>1</sup>  600
2	Declare Energy Emergency Alert (EEA) Level 1 <sup>4</sup>	0
3	Voluntary Load Curtailment of Market Participants’ facilities.	40 <sup>2</sup>
4	Implement Power Watch	0
5	Schedule Emergency Energy Transactions and arrange to purchase Control Area-to-Control Area Emergency	1,000
6	Voltage Reduction requiring > 10 minutes	125 <sup>3</sup>

## NOTES:

1. Based on Summer Ratings. Assumes 25% of total MW Settlement Only units <5 MW will be available and respond.
2. The actual load relief obtained is highly dependent on circumstances surrounding the appeals, including timing and the amount of advanced notice that can be given.
3. The MW values are based on a 25,000 MW system load and verified by the most recent voltage reduction test.
4. EEA Levels are described in Attachment 1 to NERC Reliability Standard EOP-011 - Emergency Operations

# Possible Relief Under OP4: Appendix A

OP 4 Action Number	Page 2 of 2 Action Description	Amount Assumed Obtainable Under OP 4 (MW)
7	Request generating resources not subject to a Capacity Supply Obligation to voluntary provide energy for reliability purposes	0
8	5% Voltage Reduction requiring 10 minutes or less	250 <sup>3</sup>
9	Transmission Customer Generation Not Contractually Available to Market Participants during a Capacity Deficiency.  Voluntary Load Curtailment by Large Industrial and Commercial Customers.	5  200 <sup>2</sup>
10	Radio and TV Appeals for Voluntary Load Curtailment Implement Power Warning	200 <sup>2</sup>
11	Request State Governors to Reinforce Power Warning Appeals.	100 <sup>2</sup>
Total		<b>2,520</b>

## NOTES:

1. Based on Summer Ratings. Assumes 25% of total MW Settlement Only units <5 MW will be available and respond.
2. The actual load relief obtained is highly dependent on circumstances surrounding the appeals, including timing and the amount of advanced notice that can be given.
3. The MW values are based on a 25,000 MW system load and verified by the most recent voltage reduction test.
4. EEA Levels are described in Attachment 1 to NERC Reliability Standard EOP-011 - Emergency Operations

## MEMORANDUM

**TO:** NEPOOL Participants Committee Members and Alternates

**FROM:** NEPOOL Counsel

**DATE:** January 27, 2022

**RE:** ISO-NE's Proposal to Remove the Minimum Offer Price Rule from the Forward Capacity Market

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At its February 3, 2022 meeting, the Participants Committee will be asked to consider supporting a package of Tariff revisions to change the buyer-side market mitigation provisions that apply to the Forward Capacity Market (FCM), generally referred to as the Minimum Offer Price Rule (MOPR), and other associated revisions, as explained further herein.

This memorandum provides an overview of the MOPR-related proposal(s), the stakeholder process, and includes the following attachments:

- Attachment A: ISO-NE's Jan. 26 memorandum (subject: "*ISO's Support and Preference of Transition to MOPR Elimination*")
- Attachment B: Markets Committee-recommended Tariff redlines
- Attachment C1: PowerPoint presentation concerning the Dynegy/Calpine/Nautilus proposed MOPR Transition Amendment (Transition Proposal)
- Attachment C2: PowerPoint presentation describing updates to the Transition Proposal
- Attachment D1: Proposed Tariff sheets for proposed transition period (FCAs 17 and 18)
- Attachment D2: Proposed Transition Proposal Tariff sheets to be implemented beginning with FCA 19

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### BACKGROUND ON MOPR REFORM EFFORT

In response to guidance from FERC Commissioners, in May 2021, the ISO issued a memorandum stating its intention to remove the MOPR from the FCM.<sup>1</sup> Acknowledging that eliminating the MOPR would create "greater uncertainty with regard to future capacity market prices" and thus "greater financial risk" for merchant resources that rely principally on capacity revenues for financial sustainability,<sup>2</sup> the ISO asked the External Market Monitor (EMM) to

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<sup>1</sup> Memorandum of Vamsi Chadalavada to NECPUC, NESCOE, NEPOOL, subject: Elimination of MOPR and Maintaining Competitive Pricing, at 1 (May 17, 2021), [https://www.iso-ne.com/static-assets/documents/2021/05/a0\\_memo\\_on\\_elimination\\_of\\_mopr.pdf](https://www.iso-ne.com/static-assets/documents/2021/05/a0_memo_on_elimination_of_mopr.pdf).

<sup>2</sup> See *id.* (discussing that a "direct consequence" of removing the MOPR is greater "uncertainty with regard to future capacity market prices," which "translates into greater financial risk").

evaluate the risk and to suggest how the increased risk could “be accounted for in the market.”<sup>3</sup> Informed by the EMM’s assessment and stakeholder input, the ISO developed a three-component proposal to eliminate the MOPR. As discussed below, this MOPR elimination proposal and a Participant-sponsored alternative proposal were considered through a fulsome process at the NEPOOL Markets Committee.

## SUMMARY OF STAKEHOLDER PROCESS & MOPR PROPOSALS

Throughout the second half of 2021, progressive iterations of the ISO’s proposal to remove the MOPR, along with various Participant-sponsored ideas and proposals, were discussed and vetted by the Markets Committee. At its January 11 teleconference meeting, the Markets Committee voted on the ISO’s proposal and on one suggested amendment to that proposal.<sup>4</sup> The lone Participant-sponsored amendment offered for a vote, which is summarized below, failed with a 23.79% Vote in favor (i.e., the Transition Proposal).<sup>5</sup> The ISO’s un-amended MOPR elimination proposal was recommended for Participants Committee approval by a 74.04% Vote in favor,<sup>6</sup> referred to here as the MC-Recommended MOPR Proposal.

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<sup>3</sup> Potomac Economics, *Evaluation of Changes in the Minimum Offer Price Rules on Financial Risk in New England*, at 7 (Nov. 2021), [https://www.iso-ne.com/static-assets/documents/2021/11/a03a\\_mc\\_2021\\_11\\_09\\_10\\_ccm\\_without\\_mopr\\_emm\\_presentation.docx](https://www.iso-ne.com/static-assets/documents/2021/11/a03a_mc_2021_11_09_10_ccm_without_mopr_emm_presentation.docx). Based on its assessment, the EMM concluded that the after-tax Weighted Average Cost of Capital (ATWACC) should be increased, increasing the Net Cost of New Entry (CONE). *Id.* at 50 (concluding that increasing the ATWACC to 10.51 percent increases the Net CONE to \$8.66/kW-month, which is 16 percent higher than the FERC-approved Net CONE value). The increased Net CONE value also increases the Performance Payment Rate (PPR) from \$9,337/MWh to \$10,846/MWh. *Id.*; see also Attachment B, Revised Tariff § III.13.7.2.5. In developing its proposal, the ISO adopted the EMM’s recommended adjustments. Attachment B, Revised Tariff § III.13.2.4.2(b).

<sup>4</sup> Note that one additional amendment was noticed but not voted by the Markets Committee. That amendment was withdrawn in advance of the meeting. In addition, throughout the stakeholder process, various Participants introduced proposals to reform, in one aspect or another, different components of the FCM. Ultimately, these proposals either remained at the conceptual stage and/or were not offered for stakeholder consideration at the time of the Markets Committee vote. Please click on the entity’s name to review that Participant or group of Participants’ final presentation to the Markets Committee: [FirstLight Power Inc.](#), [CMECC](#), [NRDC/CLF](#), and [LS Power/Jericho Power](#).

<sup>5</sup> The individual Sector vote breakdown at the Markets Committee on the Transition Proposal was as follows: Generation – 8.33% in favor, 8.33% opposed, 2 abstentions; Transmission – 0% in favor, 16.65% opposed, 3 abstentions; Supplier – 11.10% in favor, 5.55% opposed, 6 abstentions; Publicly Owned Entity – 0% in favor, 16.65% opposed, 25 abstentions; Alternative Resources – 4.36% in favor, 12.14% opposed, 1 abstention; and End User – 0% in favor, 16.65% opposed, 3 abstentions. In addition, the votes from Provisional Members were 0% in favor, 0.23% opposed, and 0 abstentions.

<sup>6</sup> For the ISO’s MOPR Reform Proposal, the individual Sector votes were as follows: Generation – 6.25% in favor, 10.41% opposed, 0 abstentions; Transmission – 16.65% in favor, 0% opposed, 0 abstentions; Supplier – 6.06% in favor, 10.60% opposed, 8 abstentions; Publicly Owned Entity – 16.65% in favor, 0% opposed, 2 abstentions; Alternative Resources – 11.55% in favor, 4.95% opposed, 0 abstentions; and End User – 16.65% in favor, 0% opposed, 0 abstentions. Also, the votes from Provisional Members were 0.23% in favor, 0% opposed, and 0 abstentions.

Provided below is a summary overview of the two proposals that were considered by the Markets Committee, which the Participants Committee will also consider at its February 3 meeting:

**Overview of the MC-Recommended MOPR Proposal**

As indicated, the MC-Recommended MOPR Proposal, as developed by the ISO, has three key components. The first component eliminates the MOPR construct from the FCM rules.<sup>7</sup> The second component incorporates adjustments to the financial inputs to calculate Cost of New Entry (CONE) and Net CONE, which the EMM had identified.<sup>8</sup> The third component of the proposal includes a limited buyer-side market power review for certain new capacity resources that is narrower than the currently effective MOPR review process.

Under this revised market power review construct, new capacity resources would follow one of the following three “lanes,” which would determine the extent of review, if any, by the Internal Market Monitor (IMM) of a new capacity resource’s offer during the FCA qualification process.

- Lane One: New capacity resources with a capacity equal to or less than 5 MW, as well as seasonal peak and on peak demand resources, would not be subject to any review and, consequently, would have no risk of mitigation.<sup>9</sup>
- Lane Two: New capacity resources that certify that they meet one of the two following criteria would not be subject to any buyer-side market power review by the IMM and, accordingly, would have no risk of mitigation.
  - Criterion 1: An absence of any load serving entity relationship or arrangement; or
  - Criterion 2: The new capacity resource falls within the definition of a Sponsored Policy Resource (SPR).<sup>10</sup>
- Lane Three: If a new capacity resource does not qualify for Lane 1 or Lane 2, then the resource would be subject to a Conduct Test by the IMM, as described in Sections III.13.1.1.2.2.3(a) and III.13.1.4.1.1.2.8(a), which the ISO has indicated checks for the

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<sup>7</sup> E.g., Attachment B, Revised Tariff §§ III.13.1.1.2.1(a), III.13.1.3.5.1(a) (revising ORTP-related language); Attachment B, Revised Tariff §§ III.A.21.1 – III.A.21.1.2 (deleting the ORTP provisions).

<sup>8</sup> Attachment B, Proposed Tariff § III.13.2.4.2(b).

<sup>9</sup> Attachment B, Proposed §§ III.A.21.1.1–III.A.21.1.2.

<sup>10</sup> Attachment B, Proposed § III.A.21.1.3. The MC-Recommended MOPR Proposal also revises the existing definition of SPR to read as follows: “a New Capacity Resource that: receives a revenue source, other than revenues from ISO-administered markets, that is supported by a government-regulated rate, charge, or other regulated cost recovery mechanism, and; qualifies as a renewable, clean, zero carbon, or alternative energy resource under a renewable energy portfolio standard, clean energy standard, decarbonization or net-zero carbon standard, alternative energy portfolio standard, renewable energy goal, clean energy goal, or decarbonization or net-zero carbon goal enacted by federal or New England state statute, regulation, or executive or administrative order and as a result of which the resource receives the revenue source.” Attachment B, Revised Tariff § I.2.2.

potential exercise of buyer-side market power.<sup>11</sup> Based on the IMM's assessment, the resource's offer may be mitigated to an IMM-determined offer floor price.<sup>12</sup> The new capacity resource, however, would have an opportunity to rebut the IMM's conclusion.<sup>13</sup>

More detailed information on the proposal to remove the MOPR from the FCM beginning with FCA 17 is provided in the ISO-NE voting memorandum previously circulated to the Markets Committee.<sup>14</sup>

### **Overview of Dynegy/Calpine/Nautilus Transition Proposal**

The Dynegy/Calpine/Nautilus Transition Proposal, which, as noted above, was considered at the Markets Committee, would establish a two-year transition period before the MOPR is removed. Under this proposed approach, the Substitution Auction Test Price would be eliminated and, for two years (i.e., FCAs 17 and 18), the existing MOPR would be augmented with the restoration of the Renewable Technology Resource (RTR) exemption<sup>15</sup> that would afford a certain number of MW of state-sponsored policy resources to participate in the FCA without being subject to the MOPR.<sup>16</sup> The Dynegy/Calpine/ Nautilus Transition Proposal does *not* include the CONE and Net CONE adjustments that are part of the MC-Recommended MOPR Proposal.<sup>17</sup>

Since the Markets Committee's consideration, the Participant-sponsors have updated the Transition Proposal to effectuate the following two material modifications:

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<sup>11</sup> Attachment B, Proposed Tariff §§ III.A.21.2–III.A.21.2.1.

<sup>12</sup> See Attachment B, Proposed Tariff § III.A.21.3.

<sup>13</sup> Attachment B, Proposed Tariff §§ III.A.21.2.2.

<sup>14</sup> Memorandum of Market Development to NEPOOL Markets Committee, subject: Competitive Capacity Markets without a Minimum Offer Price Rule (WMPP ID: 159) (Jan. 5, 2022), [https://www.iso-ne.com/static-assets/documents/2022/01/a02a\\_mc\\_2022\\_01\\_11-12\\_mopr\\_removal\\_iso\\_voting\\_memo.pdf](https://www.iso-ne.com/static-assets/documents/2022/01/a02a_mc_2022_01_11-12_mopr_removal_iso_voting_memo.pdf). In addition, ISO-NE's presentation materials can be accessed via hyperlinks included in the voting memorandum.

<sup>15</sup> The currently effective Tariff provides that “[a] Project Sponsor or Market Participant may not elect Renewable Technology Resource treatment for the FCA associated with a Capacity Commitment Period beginning on or after June 1, 2025.” Tariff § III.13.1.1.2.9.

<sup>16</sup> Specifically, the RTR exemption would be for 300 MW in FCA 17 and 400 MW in FCA 18. See Attachment D1, Revised Tariff § III.13.1.1.2.10. But the 400 MWs for FCA 18 would be netted against any renewable resources that clear the FCA through the Competitive Auctions with Sponsored Policy Resources mechanism. See Attachment D1, Revised Tariff § III.13.1.1.2.10(c).

<sup>17</sup> Compare Attachment D1, Tariff § III.13.2.4 with Attachment B, Proposed Tariff § III.13.2.4.2(b) (showing that the Transition Proposal does not include the financial adjustments to CONE and Net CONE); see also Attachment C1, Vistra, *MOPR Transition Proposal*, at 4 (Jan. 11, 2022) (stating that there will be “[n]o Net CONE adder during transition period”). Because the Transition Proposal does not include the financial adjustments, it also does not include an increase to the PPR. Compare Attachment D1, Tariff § III.13.7.2.5 with Attachment B, Revised Tariff § III.13.7.2.5 (showing that the Transition Proposal does not include an increase to the PPR).

- Removing the netting of RTR exemption for FCA 17;<sup>18</sup> and
- Revisions to the definition of “Sponsored Policy Resource,” to adopt/reflect the definitional language changes included in the MC-Recommended MOPR Proposal.<sup>19</sup>

These additional modifications, as well as further background information on the underlying Transition Proposal, are described in presentation materials included with this memorandum (*see Attachment C1 and Attachment C2*).

#### **PLANNED PROCESS FOR PARTICIPANTS COMMITTEE ACTION**

Consistent with NEPOOL’s usual practice and procedures, since the ISO’s MOPR elimination proposal is the only proposal recommended by the Markets Committee, the Participants Committee will begin its consideration of this matter with a motion to approve the MC-Recommended MOPR Proposal. We provide below a proposed form of resolution to initiate this Committee action. After this main motion is moved and seconded, proponents of the Transition Proposal will have the opportunity to offer that Proposal as a motion to amend the MC-Recommended MOPR Proposal. Once this amendment is voted (along with any other motions to amend that might be offered), the Participants Committee will then be asked to consider taking an affirmative institutional position on either an amended main motion (if one or more amendment passes) or the un-amended MC-Recommended Proposal. In either case, NEPOOL approval requires a Participants Committee vote of 60% or greater.

As indicated in the ISO’s January 26 memorandum to NEPOOL (included as Attachment A), if the Transition Proposal is supported by the Participants Committee, the ISO “plans to adopt the amended proposal and file it at FERC.”

If any other Participant wishes to offer any other amendment(s) for consideration by the Participants Committee, please provide a copy of any such amendment to NEPOOL Counsel ([slombardi@daypitney.com](mailto:slombardi@daypitney.com) or [rgarza@daypitney.com](mailto:rgarza@daypitney.com)) as soon as possible to allow us to circulate them in time for member review and consideration before the February 3 meeting.

The following form of resolution may be used to initiate Participants Committee action:

RESOLVED, that the Participants Committee supports revisions to the Tariff to implement reforms to the MOPR construct, as proposed by the ISO and recommended by the Markets Committee at its January 11, 2022 meeting, and as circulated to this Committee in advance of this meeting, together with [any changes agreed to by the Participants Committee at this meeting and] such non-substantive changes as may be approved by the Chair and Vice-Chair of the Markets Committee.

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<sup>18</sup> Attachment C2, Vistra, *MOPR Transition Proposal UPDATE*, at 2 (Jan. 26, 2022).

<sup>19</sup> *Id.* at 3.



memo

**To:** NEPOOL Participants Committee Members and Alternates

**From:** Vamsi Chadalavada, Executive Vice President and Chief Operating Officer

**Date:** January 26, 2022

**Subject:** ISO Support and Preference of Transition to Minimum Offer Price Rule (MOPR) Elimination

The ISO appreciates the feedback and discussions with stakeholders over the last several months as it worked to effectively remove the MOPR. These changes will expand opportunities for state-sponsored resources to participate in the wholesale markets as part of the transformation to a clean-energy future in New England.

While the ISO developed a proposal that would be effective for Forward Capacity Auction (FCA) 17, a number of stakeholders suggested that the ISO could implement the changes in a more gradual way. A clear and predictable transition proposal has been put forward that will allow 700 megawatts (MW)<sup>1</sup> of capacity from sponsored resources to enter the capacity market through a renewed renewables exemption in FCA 17 and FCA 18 while also ensuring that the MOPR would be fully replaced by FCA 19. The ISO wholly supports and prefers such a transition approach as it will logically create less risk than an immediate market change could evoke.

The ISO has often held the view that major changes to the Forward Capacity Market (FCM) are best implemented in a phased, transitioned manner.<sup>2</sup> Moreover, the ISO understands that representatives of the states contracting for these renewable resources, and many of the generating companies that rely on wholesale markets and deploy private capital affected by the entry of these resources, have generally agreed with the proposed quantity of resources in the renewed renewables exemption during the two years until the MOPR changes are effective. Notably, five of six New England states do not oppose a transition approach to eliminating the MOPR if it is the ISO's preferred path of reform.<sup>3</sup> The ISO has carefully listened to stakeholder and state discussions on a transition and determined that it will adopt and file the transition proposal if there is regional consensus among the participants for such an approach.

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<sup>1</sup> 700 MW of capacity reflects a larger nameplate rating for most sponsored resources.

<sup>2</sup> For example, the ISO previously supported transitioned implementation of the Marginal Reliability Impact (MRI) demand curve and a six-year, phased transition of the Performance Payment Rate in the FCM.

<sup>3</sup> As NESCOE expressed at the Markets Committee, the states' views are of course subject to a final review of the proposal after it completes the NEPOOL process.



The ISO believes regional consensus for a transition to the removal of the MOPR is both achievable and advantageous. It will smooth the regulatory path we all will travel by demonstrating to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) that the region can productively work together to find practical solutions that concurrently balance **reliability** concerns, **market-pricing** improvements, **cost risks** to consumers, and regional **clean-energy** goals.

The ISO anticipates the transition approach would minimize the **reliability** risks to the region. The proposed MOPR transition sets a steady pace for new, sponsored technologies to displace existing resources over two auction cycles. More certainty around the quantity of sponsored resources entering the market should attenuate the potential for inefficient retirements and the ensuing reliability risk.

Throughout the stakeholder process, the ISO has discussed the risk of inefficient retirements with the MOPR elimination.<sup>4</sup> Moreover, stakeholders are generally aware that contributions to resource adequacy from new and existing resources will need more precise measurement (i.e., resources may have actual reliability benefits below their nominal qualified capacity). The reliability risk lays in the intersection of these two conditions. With or without the MOPR, the Forward Capacity Auctions – by design – will continue to clear where supply intersects demand, and thereby nominally satisfy the region’s resource adequacy goals. However, the two-year, 700-MW transition should help quell a sudden, voluminous, and permanent shift that could otherwise occur between entering and exiting resources that may not equivalently contribute to reliability in the commitment period. The ISO understands stakeholders’ desires to quantify this risk, and for that reason properly measuring resources’ reliability benefits is one of the ISO’s continuing anchor projects that it plans to file for FCA 19.<sup>5</sup>

Even without quantitative measures currently in hand, however, it is clear that the adverse reliability consequences of the inefficient retirement problem are not hypothetical – they are already occurring in other regions with rapid shutdowns of existing resources displaced by state-sponsored resources. For example, in California, insufficient dispatchable (natural gas-fired) generation contributed to that region’s inability to serve load during August 2020, and it continues to pose challenging summer operating conditions in that region.<sup>6</sup> As the MOPR is eliminated in New England, stakeholders should seek to avoid similar reliability consequences as the region’s growing sponsored resources prompt accelerated resource retirements. The proposed MOPR transition provides a more deliberate pace, with better known amounts of sponsored policy resource entry in FCA 17 and FCA 18, thereby limiting the potential for the inefficient displacement of existing dispatchable generation and its resulting reliability risk.

A second adverse reliability consequence of inefficient retirements is the challenge of maintaining reliability in extended cold-weather conditions. The ISO’s concerns about serving load in New England on extreme, cold days are well documented. If a rapid entry of sponsored policy resources displaces existing generation that is able to operate in extended cold conditions, and at the same time, weather is uncooperative and renewable resources cannot run, then the region’s winter reliability risks will be

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<sup>4</sup> See ISO’s May 17<sup>th</sup> [memo](#) and ISO’s July MC [presentation](#) (Slides 6-7).

<sup>5</sup> See ISO’s 2022 [Annual Work Plan](#) (slide 5).

<sup>6</sup> See CAISO’s report, [Root Cause Analysis: Mid-August 2020 Extreme Heat Wave](#).

compounded. In essence, inefficient retirements, even if they achieve nominal resource adequacy goals, can still exacerbate energy security reliability risks.

Furthermore, it is important to recognize the potential reliability risks arising due to delays in the development of the new resources. The challenges of building new infrastructure in the region are real, and it is now well-recognized that major new sponsored policy resources can encounter significant delays in their commercial development. When existing resources are displaced in the FCM by new sponsored resources, the existing resource retirements will occur by a date certain – but development delays in major new resources replacing them can create ‘gaps’ in the region’s resource adequacy in the capacity commitment period. While the gaps due to development delays can be difficult to predict in advance, they are a growing concern and their increasing commercial delay risk could adversely impact reliability as the system becomes tighter with more retirements. The proposed MOPR transition during FCA 17 and 18 offers a measured way to reduce the potential future reliability risk from new sponsored resource development delays, by reducing the pace of existing resource displacement for two years as the major resources that states are sponsoring reach commercial operation.

Cognizant of these risks, the ISO anticipates the transition approach will allow the region to further refine its markets and improve **price signals** as the resource mix significantly changes.

From a market efficiency standpoint, and addressing both price-formation concerns and retirement-related reliability risks, the transition proposal will provide the region with time to focus on completing the resource capacity accreditation and the day-ahead ancillary service improvements designs. The capacity accreditation reforms, which will better align resources’ capacity ratings with their actual contributions to reliability in New England’s evolving power system, will effectively adjust the FCA’s supply curve and better align its price signals with individual resources’ reliability value. The result is that the entry of new sponsored resources will then displace the existing resources with the lowest reliability value to the system (relative to their costs) rather than inefficiently displacing resources with high reliability value – directly addressing the inefficient retirement concerns that underlie the ISO’s support for the transition proposal. While the ISO’s filing will make clear that its commitment to the full removal of the MOPR in FCA 19 under the transition proposal is not conditional on this reform or the day-ahead ancillary services changes, the ISO is confident that it will be able to file both of these designs for FCA 19.

Notably, stakeholders have registered concerns over the ISO’s plans to improve resource capacity accreditation in two stages. The ISO has heard this feedback and agrees with it. Given the interdependency between the reliability contribution of an individual resource and the composition of the resource mix, the capacity accreditation framework necessitates accrediting each resource appropriately. This challenging and complex effort will be critically important to the clean energy transition, and its broad implications to the system merits both a sound design and a fulsome stakeholder process. With a MOPR transition proposal in effect, the ISO commits to developing a more holistic capacity accreditation design for all resources for FCA 19.

The ISO believes that the proposed transition will also moderate **cost risks** to consumers.

While it is widely expected that the elimination of the MOPR will reduce capacity clearing prices and total capacity market costs to consumers, it is not the only possible outcome. Depending on the size and

geographic pattern of sponsored policy resources that could enter with a more abrupt MOPR elimination, and the size and location of resulting retirements and/or delists, it could potentially increase the clearing price in certain or all capacity zones – with attendant increased costs to consumers. That is because the steepness of the demand curve in (certain) capacity zones may make clearing prices sensitive to potential retirements that may follow the MOPR’s elimination. In contrast, the MOPR transition will temper the potential displacement of existing resources and limit the likelihood of abruptly increasing capacity costs in such a zone by providing a less-volatile, more measured adjustment of capacity cost to consumers over time, as the clean-energy transition proceeds.

As a separate consumer-cost risk, the External Market Monitor, Potomac Economics, has highlighted that the MOPR’s elimination creates greater risks for merchant resource owners, which will be reflected in their market offers and resulting wholesale prices.<sup>7</sup> This is true not only for new merchant resources, but for existing resource owners that must regularly turn to the capital markets to fund their capital expenditures for major maintenance, refinancing, and other costs of continuing operation. Any increase in existing resources’ capital costs will tend to increase existing resources’ offers in the FCA and, therefore, consumers’ capacity costs. The proposed MOPR transition creates more certainty about the pace of new sponsored resource entry, through a clear limit on the maximum quantity of sponsored resources that may bypass the MOPR. That, in turn, should reduce the risk facing investors funding existing merchant resources’ capital expenditures – relative to an immediate MOPR elimination (in FCA 17). Reducing that capital cost risk will attenuate the potential increase in existing resources’ offers, and its near-term impact on consumers’ capacity costs.

In sum, the ISO recognizes that for a number of stakeholders, more certainty in expected market outcomes can create opportunities for reduced consumer costs. For example, when load-serving entities and publicly-owned entities with Capacity Load Obligations can better anticipate and project capacity market outcomes, they can offer contract terms and/or hedging mechanisms to their customers with lower risk premiums. For merchant generators, they may obtain more favorable financing terms when the markets revenues are more predictable, which in turn allows them to offer more competitively in the markets. Conversely, if markets are perceived as too unstable and resources abruptly exit the market, resulting high prices can have notable impacts on end users.

Finally, similar to the MOPR elimination proposal, the ISO anticipates the transition approach would also continue to promote **clean-energy** goals in the region. In particular, the transition proposal provides a mechanism for another 700 MW of Renewable Technology Resources (“RTR”) to enter the capacity market over the two auctions. As important, the transition proposal will not impede the ability of the sponsored resources under long-term contracts to continue their path towards commercial deployment. Additional eligible clean-energy resources also may enter under existing market provisions.

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<sup>7</sup> While the MOPR-related adjustment to Net CONE is not included in the *transition Tariff language*, the ISO would include in the filing letter its intention to file an updated adjustment in late 2023/early 2024 such that it is in effect for FCA 19. As noted at the MC, we are currently evaluating if we should pursue a deferral of the full net CONE reset by two years in light of the other market changes discussed. If so, we would plan to bring that discussion to stakeholders in early summer.

Furthermore, after stakeholder feedback, the transition proposal is being refined to use the proposed definition change to Sponsored Policy Resource during FCA 17 and FCA 18 rather than waiting to institute that change in FCA 19 when the MOPR is eliminated. This will allow more robust competition and access to the markets by more diverse resources during the transition years.

**In conclusion**, while the MOPR elimination for FCA 17 is feasible, the ISO believes following a more measured approach over FCA 17 and FCA 18 will fulfill the region's clean energy goals with the potential for less volatile prices and less risk to reliability. The ISO urges all stakeholders to support the transition as it is presented to the Participants Committee given that the next few years are particularly important in ensuring a reliable transition to the future grid.

With the majority of states not opposing, if there is support from the Committee, the ISO plans to adopt the amended proposal and file it at FERC.

## **MC-Recommended Tariff Sheets**

### **I.2 Rules of Construction; Definitions**

#### **I.2.1. Rules of Construction:**

In this Tariff, unless otherwise provided herein:

- (a) words denoting the singular include the plural and vice versa;
- (b) words denoting a gender include all genders;
- (c) references to a particular part, clause, section, paragraph, article, exhibit, schedule, appendix or other attachment shall be a reference to a part, clause, section, paragraph, or article of, or an exhibit, schedule, appendix or other attachment to, this Tariff;
- (d) the exhibits, schedules and appendices attached hereto are incorporated herein by reference and shall be construed with an as an integral part of this Tariff to the same extent as if they were set forth verbatim herein;
- (e) a reference to any statute, regulation, proclamation, ordinance or law includes all statutes, regulations, proclamations, amendments, ordinances or laws varying, consolidating or replacing the same from time to time, and a reference to a statute includes all regulations, policies, protocols, codes, proclamations and ordinances issued or otherwise applicable under that statute unless, in any such case, otherwise expressly provided in any such statute or in this Tariff;
- (f) a reference to a particular section, paragraph or other part of a particular statute shall be deemed to be a reference to any other section, paragraph or other part substituted therefor from time to time;
- (g) a definition of or reference to any document, instrument or agreement includes any amendment or supplement to, or restatement, replacement, modification or novation of, any such document, instrument or agreement unless otherwise specified in such definition or in the context in which such reference is used;
- (h) a reference to any person (as hereinafter defined) includes such person's successors and permitted assigns in that designated capacity;
- (i) any reference to "days" shall mean calendar days unless "Business Days" (as hereinafter defined) are expressly specified;
- (j) if the date as of which any right, option or election is exercisable, or the date upon which any amount is due and payable, is stated to be on a date or day that is not a Business Day, such right, option or election may be exercised, and such amount shall be deemed due and payable, on the

next succeeding Business Day with the same effect as if the same was exercised or made on such date or day (without, in the case of any such payment, the payment or accrual of any interest or other late payment or charge, provided such payment is made on such next succeeding Business Day);

- (k) words such as “hereunder,” “hereto,” “hereof” and “herein” and other words of similar import shall, unless the context requires otherwise, refer to this Tariff as a whole and not to any particular article, section, subsection, paragraph or clause hereof; and a reference to “include” or “including” means including without limiting the generality of any description preceding such term, and for purposes hereof the rule of *ejusdem generis* shall not be applicable to limit a general statement, followed by or referable to an enumeration of specific matters, to matters similar to those specifically mentioned.

#### **I.2.2. Definitions:**

In this Tariff, the terms listed in this section shall be defined as described below:

**Active Demand Capacity Resource** is one or more Demand Response Resources located within the same Dispatch Zone, that is registered with the ISO, assigned a unique resource identification number by the ISO, and participates in the Forward Capacity Market to fulfill a Market Participant’s Capacity Supply Obligation pursuant to Section III.13 of Market Rule 1.

**Actual Capacity Provided** is the measure of capacity provided during a Capacity Scarcity Condition, as described in Section III.13.7.2.2 of Market Rule 1.

**Actual Load** is the consumption at the Retail Delivery Point for the hour.

**Additional Resource Blackstart O&M Payment** is defined and calculated as specified in Section 5.1.2 of Schedule 16 to the OATT.

**Additional Resource Specified-Term Blackstart Capital Payment** is defined and calculated as specified in Section 5.1.2 of Schedule 16 to the OATT.

**Additional Resource Standard Blackstart Capital Payment** is defined and calculated as specified in Section 5.1.2 of Schedule 16 to the OATT.

**Administrative Costs** are those costs incurred in connection with the review of Applications for transmission service and the carrying out of System Impact Studies and Facilities Studies.

**Administrative Export De-List Bid** is a bid that may be submitted in a Forward Capacity Auction by certain Existing Generating Capacity Resources subject to a multi-year contract to sell capacity outside of the New England Control Area during the associated Capacity Commitment Period, as described in Section III.13.1.2.3.1.4 of Market Rule 1.

**ADR Neutrals** are one or more firms or individuals identified by the ISO with the advice and consent of the Participants Committee that are prepared to act as neutrals in ADR proceedings under Appendix D to Market Rule 1.

**Advance** is defined in Section IV.A.3.2 of the Tariff.

**Affected Party**, for purposes of the ISO New England Billing Policy, is defined in Section 6.3.5 of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

**Affiliate** is any person or entity that controls, is controlled by, or is under common control by another person or entity. For purposes of this definition, "control" means the possession, directly or indirectly, of the authority to direct the management or policies of an entity. A voting interest of ten percent or more shall create a rebuttable presumption of control.

**AGC** is automatic generation control.

**AGC SetPoint** is the desired output signal for a Resource providing Regulation that is produced by the AGC system as frequently as every four seconds.

**AGC SetPoint Deadband** is a deadband expressed in megawatts that is applied to changing values of the AGC SetPoint for generating units.

**Allocated Assessment** is a Covered Entity's right to seek and obtain payment and recovery of its share in any shortfall payments under Section 3.3 or Section 3.4 of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

**Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR)** is the procedure set forth in Appendix D to Market Rule 1.

**Alternative Technology Regulation Resource (ATRR)** is one or more facilities capable of providing Regulation that have been registered in accordance with the Asset Registration Process. An Alternative Technology Regulation Resource is eligible to participate in the Regulation Market.

**Ancillary Services** are those services that are necessary to support the transmission of electric capacity and energy from resources to loads while maintaining reliable operation of the New England Transmission System in accordance with Good Utility Practice.

**Announced Schedule 1 EA Amount, Announced Schedule 2 EA Amount, Announced Schedule 3 EA Amount** are defined in Section IV.B.2.2 of the Tariff.

**Annual Transmission Revenue Requirements** are the annual revenue requirements of a PTO's PTF or of all PTOs' PTF for purposes of the OATT shall be the amount determined in accordance with Attachment F to the OATT.

**Annual Reconfiguration Transaction** is a bilateral transaction that may be used in accordance with Section III.13.5.4 of Market Rule 1 to specify a price when a Capacity Supply Obligation is transferred using supply offers and demand bids in Annual Reconfiguration Auctions.

**Applicants**, for the purposes of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy, are entities applying for Market Participant status or for transmission service from the ISO.

**Application** is a written request by an Eligible Customer for transmission service pursuant to the provisions of the OATT.

**Asset** is a Generator Asset, a Demand Response Asset, a component of an On-Peak Demand Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource, a Load Asset (including an Asset Related Demand), an Alternative Technology Regulation Resource, or a Tie-Line Asset.

**Asset Registration Process** is the ISO business process for registering an Asset.



**Asset Related Demand** is a Load Asset that has been discretely modeled within the ISO's dispatch and settlement systems, settles at a Node, has been registered in accordance with the Asset Registration Process, and is made up of either: (1) one or more individual end-use metered customers receiving service from the same point or points of electrical supply with an aggregate average hourly load of 1 MW or greater during the 12 months preceding its registration or (2) one or more storage facilities with an aggregate consumption capability of at least 1 MW.

**Asset Related Demand Bid Block-Hours** are Block-Hours assigned to the Lead Market Participant for each Asset Related Demand bid. Blocks of the bid in effect for each hour will be totaled to determine the daily quantity of Asset Related Demand Bid Block-Hours. In the case that a Resource has a Real-Time unit status of "unavailable" for an entire day, that day will not contribute to the quantity of Asset Related Demand Bid Block-Hours. However, if the Resource has at least one hour of the day with a unit status of "available," the entire day will contribute to the quantity of Asset Related Demand Bid Block-Hours.

**Asset-Specific Going Forward Costs** are the net costs of an asset that is part of an Existing Generating Capacity Resource, calculated for the asset in the same manner as the net costs of Existing Generating Capacity Resources as described in Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.1.1 (for an asset with a Static De-List Bid or an Export Bid) or Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.1.2 (for an asset with a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid).

**Assigned Meter Reader** reports to the ISO the hourly and monthly MWh associated with the Asset. These MWh are used for settlement. The Assigned Meter Reader may designate an agent to help fulfill its Assigned Meter Reader responsibilities; however, the Assigned Meter Reader remains functionally responsible to the ISO.

**Auction Revenue Right (ARR)** is a right to receive FTR Auction Revenues in accordance with Appendix C of Market Rule 1.

**Auction Revenue Right Allocation (ARR Allocation)** is defined in Section 1 of Appendix C of Market Rule 1.

**Auction Revenue Right Holder (ARR Holder)** is an entity which is the record holder of an Auction Revenue Right (excluding an Incremental ARR) in the register maintained by the ISO.

**Authorized Commission** is defined in Section 3.3 of the ISO New England Information Policy.

**Authorized Person** is defined in Section 3.3 of the ISO New England Information Policy.

**Automatic Response Rate** is the response rate, in MW/Minute, at which a Market Participant is willing to have a Regulation Resource change its output or consumption while providing Regulation between the Regulation High Limit and Regulation Low Limit.

**Average Hourly Load Reduction** is either: (i) the sum of the On-Peak Demand Resource's electrical energy reduction during Demand Resource On-Peak Hours in the month divided by the number of Demand Resource On-Peak Hours in the month; or (ii) the sum of the Seasonal Peak Demand Resource's electrical energy reduction during Demand Resource Seasonal Peak Hours in the month divided by the number of Demand Resource Seasonal Peak Hours in the month. The On-Peak Demand Resource's or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource's electrical energy reduction and Average Hourly Load Reduction shall be determined consistent with the resource's Measurement and Verification Plan, which shall be reviewed by the ISO to ensure consistency with the measurement and verification requirements, as described in Section III.13.1.4.3 of Market Rule 1 and the ISO New England Manuals.

**Average Hourly Output** is either: (i) the sum of the On-Peak Demand Resource's electrical energy output during Demand Resource On-Peak Hours in the month divided by the number of Demand Resource On-Peak Hours in the month; or (ii) the sum of the Seasonal Peak Demand Resource's electrical energy output during Demand Resource Seasonal Peak Hours in the month divided by the number of Demand Resource Seasonal Peak Hours in the month. Electrical energy output and Average Hourly Output shall be determined consistent with the resource's Measurement and Verification Plan, which shall be reviewed by the ISO to ensure consistency with the measurement and verification requirements, as described in Section III.13.1.4.3 of Market Rule 1 and the ISO New England Manuals.

**Average Monthly PER** is calculated in accordance with Section III.13.7.1.2.2 of Market Rule 1.

**Backstop Transmission Solution** is a solution proposed: (i) to address a reliability or market efficiency need identified by the ISO in a Needs Assessment reported by the ISO pursuant to Section 4.1(i) of Attachment K to the ISO OATT, (ii) by the PTO or PTOs with an obligation under Schedule 3.09(a) of the TOA to address the identified need; and (iii) in circumstances in which the competitive solution process specified in Section 4.3 of Attachment K to the ISO OATT will be utilized.

**Bankruptcy Code** is the United States Bankruptcy Code.

**Bankruptcy Event** occurs when a Covered Entity files a voluntary or involuntary petition in bankruptcy or commences a proceeding under the United States Bankruptcy Code or any other applicable law concerning insolvency, reorganization or bankruptcy by or against such Covered Entity as debtor.

**Bilateral Contract (BC)** is any of the following types of contracts: Internal Bilateral for Load, Internal Bilateral for Market for Energy, and External Transactions.

**Bilateral Contract Block-Hours** are Block-Hours assigned to the seller and purchaser of an Internal Bilateral for Load, Internal Bilateral for Market for Energy and External Transactions; provided, however, that only those contracts which apply to the Real-Time Energy Market will accrue Block-Hours.

**Binary Storage DARD** is a DARD that participates in the New England Markets as part of a Binary Storage Facility, as described in Section III.1.10.6 of Market Rule 1.

**Binary Storage Facility** is a type of Electric Storage Facility, as described in Section III.1.10.6 of Market Rule 1.

**Blackstart Capability Test** is the test, required by ISO New England Operating Documents, of a resource's capability to provide Blackstart Service.

**Blackstart Capital Payment** is the annual compensation, as calculated pursuant to Section 5.1, or as referred to in Section 5.2, of Schedule 16 to the OATT, for a Designated Blackstart Resource's Blackstart Equipment capital costs associated with the provision of Blackstart Service (excluding the capital costs associated with compliance with NERC Critical Infrastructure Protection Reliability Standards as part of Blackstart Service).

**Blackstart Equipment** is any equipment that is solely necessary to enable the Designated Blackstart Resource to provide Blackstart Service and is not required to provide other products or services under the Tariff.

**Blackstart O&M Payment** is the annual Blackstart O&M compensation calculated under either Section 5.1 or 5.2 of Schedule 16 of the OATT, as applicable.

**Blackstart Owner** is the Market Participant who is authorized on behalf of the Generator Owner(s) to offer or operate the resource as a Designated Blackstart Resource and is authorized to commit the resource to provide Blackstart Service.

**Blackstart Service** is the Ancillary Service described in Section II.47 of the Tariff and Schedule 16 of the OATT.

**Blackstart Service Commitment** is the commitment by a Blackstart Owner for its resource to provide Blackstart Service and the acceptance of that commitment by the ISO, in the manner detailed in ISO New England Operating Procedure No. 11 – Designated Blackstart Resource Administration (OP 11), and which includes a commitment to provide Blackstart Service established under Operating Procedure 11 – Designated Blackstart Resource Administration (OP11).

**Blackstart Service Minimum Criteria** are the minimum criteria that a Blackstart Owner and its resource must meet in order to establish and maintain a resource as a Designated Blackstart Resource.

**Blackstart Standard Rate Payment** is the formulaic rate of monthly compensation, as calculated pursuant to Section 5 of Schedule 16 to the OATT, paid to a Blackstart Owner for the provision of Blackstart Service from a Designated Blackstart Resource.

**Blackstart Station** is comprised of (i) a single Designated Blackstart Resource or (ii) two or more Designated Blackstart Resources that share Blackstart Equipment.

**Blackstart Station-specific Rate Payment** is the Commission-approved compensation, as calculated pursuant to Section 5.2 of Schedule 16 to the OATT, paid to a Blackstart Owner on a monthly basis for

the provision of Blackstart Service by Designated Blackstart Resources located at a specific Blackstart Station.

**Blackstart Station-specific Rate Capital Payment** is a component of the Blackstart Station-specific Rate Payment that reflects a Blackstart Station's capital Blackstart Equipment costs associated with the provision of Blackstart Service (excluding the capital costs associated with compliance with NERC Critical Infrastructure Protection Reliability Standards as part of Blackstart Service).

**Block** is defined as follows: (1) With respect to Bilateral Contracts, a Bilateral Contract administered by the ISO for an hour; (2) with respect to Supply Offers administered by the ISO, a quantity with a related price for Energy (Supply Offers for Energy may contain multiple sets of quantity and price pairs for each hour); (3) with respect to Demand Bids administered by the ISO, a quantity with a related price for Energy (Demand Bids for Energy may contain multiple sets of quantity and price pairs for each hour); (4) with respect to Increment Offers administered by the ISO, a quantity with a related price for Energy (Increment Offers for Energy may contain multiple sets of quantity and price pairs for each hour); (5) with respect to Decrement Bids administered by the ISO, a quantity with a related price for Energy (Decrement Bids for Energy may contain multiple sets of quantity and price pairs for each hour); (6) with respect to Asset Related Demand bids administered by the ISO, a quantity with a related price for Energy (Asset Related Demand bids may contain multiple sets of quantity and price pairs for each hour); and (7) with respect to Demand Reduction Offers administered by the ISO, a quantity of reduced demand with a related price (Demand Reduction Offers may contain multiple sets of quantity and price pairs for the day).

**Block-Hours** are the number of Blocks administered for a particular hour.

**Budget and Finance Subcommittee** is a subcommittee of the Participants Committee, the responsibilities of which are specified in Section 8.4 of the Participants Agreement.

**Business Day** is any day other than a Saturday or Sunday or ISO holidays as posted by the ISO on its website.

**Cancelled Start NCPC Credit** is an NCPC Credit calculated pursuant to Appendix F to Market Rule 1.

**Capability Demonstration Year** is the one year period from September 1 through August 31.

**Capacity Acquiring Resource** is a resource that is seeking to acquire a Capacity Supply Obligation through: (1) a Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral, as described in Section III.13.5.1, or; (2) an annual or monthly reconfiguration auction, as described in Section III.13.4.

**Capacity Balancing Ratio** is a ratio used in calculating the Capacity Performance Payment in the Forward Capacity Market, as described in Section III.13.7.2.3 of Market Rule 1.

**Capacity Base Payment** is the portion of revenue received in the Forward Capacity Market as described in Section III.13.7.1 of Market Rule 1.

**Capacity Capability Interconnection Standard** has the meaning specified in Schedule 22, Schedule 23, and Schedule 25 of the OATT.

**Capacity Clearing Price** is the clearing price for a Capacity Zone for a Capacity Commitment Period resulting from the Forward Capacity Auction conducted for that Capacity Commitment Period, as determined in accordance with Section III.13.2.7 of Market Rule 1.

**Capacity Commitment Period** is the one-year period from June 1 through May 31 for which obligations are assumed and payments are made in the Forward Capacity Market.

**Capacity Cost (CC)** is one of four forms of compensation that may be paid to resources providing VAR Service under Schedule 2 of the OATT.

**Capacity Export Through Import Constrained Zone Transaction** is defined in Section III.1.10.7(f)(i) of Market Rule 1.

**Capacity Load Obligation** is the quantity of capacity for which a Market Participant is financially responsible as described in Section III.13.7.5.2 of Market Rule 1.

**Capacity Load Obligation Acquiring Participant** is a load serving entity or any other Market Participant seeking to acquire a Capacity Load Obligation through a Capacity Load Obligation Bilateral, as described in Section III.13.5.2 of Market Rule 1.

**Capacity Network Import Capability (CNI Capability)** is as defined in Section I of Schedule 25 of the OATT.

**Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service (CNI Interconnection Service)** is as defined in Section I of Schedule 25 of the OATT.

**Capacity Load Obligation Bilateral** is a bilateral contract through which a Market Participant may transfer all or a portion of its Capacity Load Obligation to another entity, as described in Section III.13.5 of Market Rule 1.

**Capacity Load Obligation Transferring Participant** is an entity that has a Capacity Load Obligation and is seeking to shed such obligation through a Capacity Load Obligation Bilateral, as described in Section III.13.5.2 of Market Rule 1.

**Capacity Network Resource (CNR)** is defined in Section I of Schedule 22 and Attachment 1 to Schedule 23 of the OATT.

**Capacity Network Resource Interconnection Service (CNR Interconnection Service)** is defined in Section I of Schedule 22 and Attachment 1 to Schedule 23 of the OATT.

**Capacity Performance Bilateral** is a transaction for transferring Capacity Performance Score, as described in Section III.13.5.3 of Market Rule 1.

**Capacity Performance Payment** is the performance-dependent portion of revenue received in the Forward Capacity Market, as described in Section III.13.7.2 of Market Rule 1.

**Capacity Performance Payment Rate** is a rate used in calculating Capacity Performance Payments, as described in Section III.13.7.2.5 of Market Rule 1.

**Capacity Performance Score** is a figure used in determining Capacity Performance Payments, as described in Section III.13.7.2.4 of Market Rule 1.

**Capacity Rationing Rule** addresses whether offers and bids in a Forward Capacity Auction may be rationed, as described in Section III.13.2.6 of Market Rule 1.

**Capacity Scarcity Condition** is a period during which performance is measured in the Forward Capacity Market, as described in Section III.13.7.2.1 of Market Rule 1.

**Capacity Scarcity Condition** is a period during which performance is measured in the Forward Capacity Market, as described in Section III.13.7.2.1 of Market Rule 1.

**Capacity Supply Obligation** is an obligation to provide capacity from a resource, or a portion thereof, to satisfy a portion of the Installed Capacity Requirement that is acquired through a Forward Capacity Auction in accordance with Section III.13.2, a reconfiguration auction in accordance with Section III.13.4, or a Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral in accordance with Section III.13.5.1 of Market Rule 1.

**Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral** is a bilateral contract through which a Market Participant may transfer all or a part of its Capacity Supply Obligation to another entity, as described in Section III.13.5.1 of Market Rule 1.

**Capacity Transfer Rights (CTRs)** are calculated in accordance with Section III.13.7.5.4.

**Capacity Transferring Resource** is a resource that has a Capacity Supply Obligation and is seeking to shed such obligation, or a portion thereof, through: (1) a Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral, as described in Section III.13.5.1, or; (2) an annual or monthly reconfiguration auction, as described in Section III.13.4.

**Capacity Zone** is a geographic sub-region of the New England Control Area as determined in accordance with Section III.12.4 of Market Rule 1.

**Capacity Zone Demand Curves** are the demand curves used in the Forward Capacity Market for a Capacity Zone as specified in Sections III.13.2.2.2 and III.13.2.2.3.

**Capital Funding Charge (CFC)** is defined in Section IV.B.2 of the Tariff.



**CARL Data** is Control Area reliability data submitted to the ISO to permit an assessment of the ability of an external Control Area to provide energy to the New England Control Area in support of capacity offered to the New England Control Area by that external Control Area.

**Category B Designated Blackstart Resource** has the same meaning as Designated Blackstart Resource.

**Charge** is a sum of money due from a Covered Entity to the ISO, either in its individual capacity or as billing and collection agent for NEPOOL pursuant to the Participants Agreement.

**CLAIM10** is the value, expressed in megawatts, calculated pursuant to Section III.9.5.3 of the Tariff.

**CLAIM30** is the value, expressed in megawatts, calculated pursuant to Section III.9.5.3 of the Tariff.

**Claimed Capability Audit** is performed to determine the real power output capability of a Generator Asset or the demand reduction capability of a Demand Response Resource.

**Cluster Enabling Transmission Upgrade (CETU)** has the meaning specified in Section I of Schedule 22, Attachment 1 to Schedule 23, and Section I of Schedule 25 of the OATT.

**Cluster Enabling Transmission Upgrade Regional Planning Study (CRPS)** has the meaning specified in Section I of Schedule 22, Attachment 1 to Schedule 23, and Section I of Schedule 25 of the OATT.

**Cluster Entry Deadline** has the meaning specified in Section I of Schedule 22, Attachment 1 to Schedule 23, and Section I of Schedule 25 of the OATT.

**Cluster Interconnection System Impact Study (CSIS)** has the meaning specified in Section I of Schedule 22, Attachment 1 to Schedule 23, and Section I of Schedule 25 of the OATT.

**Clustering** has the meaning specified in Section I of Schedule 22, Attachment 1 to Schedule 23, and Section I of Schedule 25 of the OATT.

**CNR Capability** is defined in Section I of Schedule 22 and Attachment 1 to Schedule 23 of the OATT.

**Coincident Peak Contribution** is a Market Participant's share of the New England Control Area coincident peak demand for the prior calendar year as determined prior to the start of each Capacity Commitment Period, which reflects the sum of the prior year's annual coincident peak contributions of the customers served by the Market Participant at each Load Asset. Daily Coincident Peak Contribution values shall be submitted by the Assigned Meter Reader or Host Participant by the meter reading deadline to the ISO.

**Commercial Capacity** is capacity that has achieved FCM Commercial Operation.

**Commission** is the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.

**Commitment Period** is (i) for a Day-Ahead Energy Market commitment, a period of one or more contiguous hours for which a Resource is cleared in the Day-Ahead Energy Market, and (ii) for a Real-Time Energy Market commitment, the period of time for which the ISO indicates the Resource is being committed when it issues the Dispatch Instruction. If the ISO does not indicate the period of time for which the Resource is being committed in the Real-Time Energy Market, then the Commitment Period is the Minimum Run Time for an offline Resource and one hour for an online Resource.

**Common Costs** are those costs associated with a Station that are avoided only by the clearing of the Static De-List Bids, the Permanent De-List Bids, or the Retirement De-List Bids of all the Existing Generating Capacity Resources comprising the Station.

**Completed Application** is an Application that satisfies all of the information and other requirements of the OATT, including any required deposit.

**Compliance Effective Date** is the date upon which the changes in the predecessor NEPOOL Open Access Transmission Tariff which have been reflected herein to comply with the Commission's Order of April 20, 1998 became effective.

**Composite FCM Transaction** is a transaction for separate resources seeking to participate as a single composite resource in a Forward Capacity Auction in which multiple Designated FCM Participants provide capacity, as described in Section III.13.1.5 of Market Rule 1.

**Conditional Qualified New Resource** is defined in Section III.13.1.1.2.3(f) of Market Rule 1.

**Confidential Information** is defined in Section 2.1 of the ISO New England Information Policy, which is Attachment D to the Tariff.

**Confidentiality Agreement** is Attachment 1 to the ISO New England Billing Policy.

**Congestion** is a condition of the New England Transmission System in which transmission limitations prevent unconstrained regional economic dispatch of the power system. Congestion is the condition that results in the Congestion Component of the Locational Marginal Price at one Location being different from the Congestion Component of the Locational Marginal Price at another Location during any given hour of the dispatch day in the Day-Ahead Energy Market or Real-Time Energy Market.

**Congestion Component** is the component of the nodal price that reflects the marginal cost of congestion at a given Node or External Node relative to the reference point. When used in connection with Zonal Price and Hub Price, the term Congestion Component refers to the Congestion Components of the nodal prices that comprise the Zonal Price and Hub Price weighted and averaged in the same way that nodal prices are weighted to determine Zonal Price and averaged to determine the Hub Price.

**Congestion Cost** is the cost of congestion as measured by the difference between the Congestion Components of the Locational Marginal Prices at different Locations and/or Reliability Regions on the New England Transmission System.

**Congestion Paying LSE** is, for the purpose of the allocation of FTR Auction Revenues to ARR Holders as provided for in Appendix C of Market Rule 1, a Market Participant or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer that is responsible for paying for Congestion Costs as a Transmission Customer paying for Regional Network Service under the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff, unless such Transmission Customer has transferred its obligation to supply load in accordance with ISO New England System Rules, in which case the Congestion Paying LSE shall be the Market Participant supplying the transferred load obligation. The term Congestion Paying LSE shall be deemed to include, but not be limited to, the seller of internal bilateral transactions that transfer Real-Time Load Obligations under the ISO New England System Rules.

**Congestion Revenue Fund** is the amount available for payment of target allocations to FTR Holders from the collection of Congestion Cost.

**Congestion Shortfall** means congestion payments exceed congestion charges during the billing process in any billing period.

**Continuous Storage ATRR** is an ATRR that participates in the New England Markets as part of a Continuous Storage Facility, as described in Section III.1.10.6 of Market Rule 1.

**Continuous Storage DARD** is a DARD that participates in the New England Markets as part of a Continuous Storage Facility, as described in Section III.1.10.6 of Market Rule 1.

**Continuous Storage Generator Asset** is a Generator Asset that participates in the New England Markets as part of a Continuous Storage Facility, as described in Section III.1.10.6 of Market Rule 1.

**Continuous Storage Facility** is a type of Electric Storage Facility, as described in Section III.1.10.6 of Market Rule 1.

**Control Agreement** is the document posted on the ISO website that is required if a Market Participant's cash collateral is to be invested in BlackRock funds.

**Control Area** is an electric power system or combination of electric power systems to which a common automatic generation control scheme is applied in order to:

- (1) match, at all times, the power output of the generators within the electric power system(s) and capacity and energy purchased from entities outside the electric power system(s), with the load within the electric power system(s);
- (2) maintain scheduled interchange with other Control Areas, within the limits of Good Utility Practice;
- (3) maintain the frequency of the electric power system(s) within reasonable limits in accordance with Good Utility Practice and the criteria of the applicable regional reliability council or the North American Electric Reliability Corporation; and

(4) provide sufficient generating capacity to maintain operating reserves in accordance with Good Utility Practice.

**Controllable Behind-the-Meter Generation** means generation whose output can be controlled located at the same facility as a DARD or a Demand Response Asset, excluding: (1) generators whose output is separately metered and reported and (2) generators that cannot operate electrically synchronized to, and that are operated only when the facility loses its supply of power from, the New England Transmission System, or when undergoing related testing.

**Coordinated External Transaction** is an External Transaction at an external interface for which the enhanced scheduling procedures in Section III.1.10.7.A are implemented. A transaction to wheel energy into, out of or through the New England Control Area is not a Coordinated External Transaction.

**Coordinated Transaction Scheduling** means the enhanced scheduling procedures set forth in Section III.1.10.7.A.

**Correction Limit** means the date that is one hundred and one (101) calendar days from the last Operating Day of the month to which the data applied. As described in Section III.3.6.1 of Market Rule 1, this will be the period during which meter data corrections must be submitted unless they qualify for submission as a Requested Billing Adjustment under Section III.3.7 of Market Rule 1.

**Cost of Energy Consumed (CEC)** is one of four forms of compensation that may be paid to resources providing VAR Service under Schedule 2 of the OATT.

**Cost of Energy Produced (CEP)** is one of four forms of compensation that may be paid to resources providing VAR Service under Schedule 2 of the OATT.

**Cost of New Entry (CONE)** is the estimated cost of new entry (\$/kW-month) for a capacity resource that is determined by the ISO for each Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to Section III.13.2.4.

**Counterparty** means the status in which the ISO acts as the contracting party, in its name and own right and not as an agent, to an agreement or transaction with a Customer (including assignments involving Customers) involving sale to the ISO, and/or purchase from the ISO, of Regional Transmission Service

and market and other products and services, and other transactions and assignments involving Customers, all as described in the Tariff.

**Covered Entity** is defined in the ISO New England Billing Policy.

**Credit Coverage** is third-party credit protection obtained by the ISO in the form of credit insurance coverage.

**Credit Qualifying** means a Rated Market Participant that has an Investment Grade Rating and an Unrated Market Participant that satisfies the Credit Threshold.

**Credit Threshold** consists of the conditions for Unrated Market Participants outlined in Section II.B.2 of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**Critical Energy Infrastructure Information (CEII)** is defined in Section 3.0(j) of the ISO New England Information Policy, which is Attachment D to the Tariff.

**Current Ratio** is, on any date, all of a Market Participant's or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer's current assets divided by all of its current liabilities, in each case as shown on the most recent financial statements provided by such Market Participant or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer to the ISO.

**Curtailment** is a reduction in the dispatch of a transaction that was scheduled, using transmission service, in response to a transfer capability shortage as a result of system reliability conditions.

**Customer** is a Market Participant, a Transmission Customer or another customer of the ISO.

**Data Reconciliation Process** means the process by which meter reconciliation and data corrections that are discovered by Governance Participants after the Invoice has been issued for a particular month or that are discovered prior to the issuance of the Invoice for the relevant month but not included in that Invoice or in the other Invoices for that month and are reconciled by the ISO on an hourly basis based on data submitted to the ISO by the Host Participant Assigned Meter Reader or Assigned Meter Reader.

**Day-Ahead** is the calendar day immediately preceding the Operating Day.

**Day-Ahead Adjusted Load Obligation** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(a) of Market Rule 1.

**Day-Ahead Congestion Revenue** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(i) of Market Rule 1.

**Day-Ahead Demand Reduction Obligation** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(a) of Market Rule 1.

**Day-Ahead Energy Market** means the schedule of commitments for the purchase or sale of energy, purchase of demand reductions, payment of Congestion Costs, payment for losses developed by the ISO as a result of the offers and specifications submitted in accordance with Section III.1.10 of Market Rule 1.

**Day-Ahead Energy Market Congestion Charge/Credit** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(f) of Market Rule 1.

**Day-Ahead Energy Market Energy Charge/Credit** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(f) of Market Rule 1.

**Day-Ahead Energy Market Loss Charge/Credit** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(f) of Market Rule 1.

**Day-Ahead Energy Market NCPC Credit** is an NCPC Credit calculated pursuant to Appendix F to Market Rule 1.

**Day-Ahead External Transaction Export and Decrement Bid NCPC Credit** is an NCPC Credit calculated pursuant to Appendix F to Market Rule 1.

**Day-Ahead External Transaction Import and Increment Offer NCPC Credit** is an NCPC Credit calculated pursuant to Appendix F to Market Rule 1.

**Day-Ahead Generation Obligation** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(a) of Market Rule 1.

**Day-Ahead Load Obligation** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(a) of Market Rule 1.

**Day-Ahead Locational Adjusted Net Interchange** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(a) of Market Rule 1.

**Day-Ahead Loss Charges or Credits** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(k) of Market Rule 1.

**Day-Ahead Loss Revenue** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(j) of Market Rule 1.

**Day-Ahead Prices** means the Locational Marginal Prices resulting from the Day-Ahead Energy Market.

**DDP Dispatchable Resource** is any Dispatchable Resource that the ISO dispatches using Desired Dispatch Points in the Resource's Dispatch Instructions.

**Debt-to-Total Capitalization Ratio** is, on any date, a Market Participant's or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer's total debt (including all current borrowings) divided by its total shareholders' equity plus total debt, in each case as shown on the most recent financial statements provided by such Market Participant or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer to the ISO.

**Decrement Bid** means a bid to purchase energy at a specified Location in the Day-Ahead Energy Market which is not associated with a physical load. An accepted Decrement Bid results in scheduled load at the specified Location in the Day-Ahead Energy Market.

**Default Amount** is all or any part of any amount due to be paid by any Covered Entity that the ISO, in its reasonable opinion, believes will not or has not been paid when due (other than in the case of a payment dispute for any amount due for transmission service under the OATT).

**Default Period** is defined in Section 3.3.h(i) of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

**Delivering Party** is the entity supplying capacity and/or energy to be transmitted at Point(s) of Receipt under the OATT.

**Demand Bid** means a request to purchase an amount of energy, at a specified Location, or an amount of energy at a specified price, that is associated with a physical load. A cleared Demand Bid in the Day-Ahead Energy Market results in scheduled load at the specified Location. Demand Bids submitted for use in the Real-Time Energy Market are specific to Dispatchable Asset Related Demands only.



**Demand Bid Block-Hours** are the Block-Hours assigned to the submitting Customer for each Demand Bid.

**Demand Bid Cap** is \$2,000/MWh.

**Demand Capacity Resource** means an Existing Demand Capacity Resource or a New Demand Capacity Resource. There are three Demand Capacity Resource types: Active Demand Capacity Resources, On-Peak Demand Resources, and Seasonal Peak Demand Resources.

**Demand Designated Entity** is the entity designated by a Market Participant to receive Dispatch Instructions for Demand Response Resources in accordance with the provisions set forth in ISO New England Operating Procedure No. 14.

**Demand Reduction Offer** is an offer by a Market Participant with a Demand Response Resource to reduce demand.

**Demand Reduction Offer Block-Hours** are Block-Hours assigned to the Lead Market Participant for each Demand Reduction Offer. Blocks of the Demand Reduction Offer in effect for each hour will be totaled to determine the quantity of Demand Reduction Offer Block-Hours for a given day. In the case that a Resource has a Real-Time unit status of “unavailable” for the entire day, that day will not contribute to the quantity of Demand Reduction Offer Block-Hours. However, if the Resource has at least one hour of the day with a unit status of “available,” the entire day will contribute to the quantity of Demand Reduction Offer Block-Hours.

**Demand Reduction Threshold Price** is a minimum offer price calculated pursuant to Section III.1.10.1A(f).

**Demand Resource On-Peak Hours** are hours ending 1400 through 1700, Monday through Friday on non-Demand Response Holidays during the months of June, July, and August and hours ending 1800 through 1900, Monday through Friday on non-Demand Response Holidays during the months of December and January.

**Demand Resource Seasonal Peak Hours** are those hours in which the actual, real-time hourly load, as measured using real-time telemetry (adjusted for transmission and distribution losses, and excluding load associated with Exports and Storage DARDs) for Monday through Friday on non-Demand Response Holidays, during the months of June, July, August, December, and January, as determined by the ISO, is equal to or greater than 90% of the most recent 50/50 system peak load forecast, as determined by the ISO, for the applicable summer or winter season.

**Demand Response Asset** is an asset comprising the demand reduction capability of an individual end-use customer at a Retail Delivery Point or the aggregated demand reduction capability of multiple end-use customers from multiple delivery points (as described in Section III.8.1.1(f)) that has been registered in accordance with III.8.1.1.

**Demand Response Available** is the capability of the Demand Response Resource, in whole or in part, at any given time, to reduce demand in response to a Dispatch Instruction.

**Demand Response Baseline** is the expected baseline demand of an individual end-use metered customer or group of end-use metered customers as determined pursuant to Section III.8.2.

**Demand Response Holiday** is New Year's Day, Memorial Day, Independence Day, Labor Day, Veterans Day, Thanksgiving Day, and Christmas Day. If the holiday falls on a Saturday, the holiday will be observed on the preceding Friday; if the holiday falls on a Sunday, the holiday will be observed on the following Monday.

**Demand Response Resource** is an individual Demand Response Asset or aggregation of Demand Response Assets within a DRR Aggregation Zone that has been registered in accordance with Section III.8.1.2.

**Demand Response Resource Notification Time** is the period of time between the receipt of a startup Dispatch Instruction and the time the Demand Response Resource starts reducing demand.

**Demand Response Resource Ramp Rate** is the average rate, expressed in MW per minute, at which the Demand Response Resource can reduce demand.

**Demand Response Resource Start-Up Time** is the period of time between the time a Demand Response Resource starts reducing demand at the conclusion of the Demand Response Resource Notification Time and the time the resource can reach its Minimum Reduction and be ready for further dispatch by the ISO.

**Designated Agent** is any entity that performs actions or functions required under the OATT on behalf of the ISO, a Transmission Owner, a Schedule 20A Service Provider, an Eligible Customer, or a Transmission Customer.

**Designated Blackstart Resource** is a resource that meets the eligibility requirements specified in Schedule 16 of the OATT, which includes any resource referred to previously as a Category B Designated Blackstart Resource.

**Designated Entity** is the entity designated by a Market Participant to receive Dispatch Instructions for a Generator Asset and/or Dispatchable Asset Related Demand in accordance with the provisions set forth in ISO New England Operating Procedure No. 14.

**Designated FCM Participant** is any Lead Market Participant, including any Provisional Member that is a Lead Market Participant, transacting in any Forward Capacity Auction, reconfiguration auctions or Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral for capacity that is otherwise required to provide additional financial assurance under the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**Designated FTR Participant** is a Market Participant, including FTR-Only Customers, transacting in the FTR Auction that is otherwise required to provide additional financial assurance under the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**Desired Dispatch Point (DDP)** means the control signal, expressed in megawatts, transmitted to direct the output, consumption, or demand reduction level of each Generator Asset, Dispatchable Asset Related Demand, or Demand Response Resource dispatched by the ISO in accordance with the asset's Offer Data.

**Direct Assignment Facilities** are facilities or portions of facilities that are constructed for the sole use/benefit of a particular Transmission Customer requesting service under the OATT or a Generator Owner requesting an interconnection. Direct Assignment Facilities shall be specified in a separate agreement among the ISO, Interconnection Customer and Transmission Customer, as applicable, and the

Transmission Owner whose transmission system is to be modified to include and/or interconnect with the Direct Assignment Facilities, shall be subject to applicable Commission requirements, and shall be paid for by the Customer in accordance with the applicable agreement and the Tariff.

**Directly Metered Assets** are specifically measured by OP-18 compliant metering as currently described in Section IV (Metering and Recording for Settlements) of OP-18. Directly Metered Assets include all Tie-Line Assets, all Generator Assets, as well as some Load Assets. Load Assets for which the Host Participant is not the Assigned Meter Reader are considered Directly Metered Assets. In addition, the Host Participant Assigned Meter Reader determines which additional Load Assets are considered Directly Metered Assets and which ones are considered Profiled Load Assets based upon the Host Participant Assigned Meter Reader reporting systems and process by which the Host Participant Assigned Meter Reader allocates non-PTF losses.

**Disbursement Agreement** is the Rate Design and Funds Disbursement Agreement among the PTOs, as amended and restated from time to time.

**Dispatch Instruction** means directions given by the ISO to Market Participants, which may include instructions to start up, shut down, raise or lower generation, curtail or restore loads from Demand Response Resources, change External Transactions, or change the status or consumption of a Dispatchable Asset Related Demand in accordance with the Supply Offer, Demand Bid, or Demand Reduction Offer parameters. Such instructions may also require a change to the operation of a Pool Transmission Facility. Such instructions are given through either electronic or verbal means.

**Dispatch Zone** means a subset of Nodes located within a Load Zone established by the ISO for each Capacity Commitment Period pursuant to Section III.12.4A.

**Dispatchable Asset Related Demand (DARD)** is an Asset Related Demand that is capable of having its energy consumption modified in Real-Time in response to Dispatch Instructions. A DARD must be capable of receiving and responding to electronic Dispatch Instructions, must be able to increase or decrease energy consumption between its Minimum Consumption Limit and Maximum Consumption Limit in accordance with Dispatch Instructions, and must meet the technical requirements specified in the ISO New England Operating Procedures and Manuals.

**Dispatchable Resource** is any Generator Asset, Dispatchable Asset Related Demand, Demand Response Resource, or, with respect to the Regulation Market only, Alternative Technology Regulation Resource, that, during the course of normal operation, is capable of receiving and responding to electronic Dispatch Instructions in accordance with the parameters contained in the Resource's Supply Offer, Demand Bid, Demand Reduction Offer or Regulation Service Offer. A Resource that is normally classified as a Dispatchable Resource remains a Dispatchable Resource when it is temporarily not capable of receiving and responding to electronic Dispatch Instructions.

**Dispute Representatives** are defined in 6.5.c of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

**Disputed Amount** is a Covered Entity's disputed amount due on any fully paid monthly Invoice and/or any amount believed to be due or owed on a Remittance Advice, as defined in Section 6 of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

**Disputing Party**, for the purposes of the ISO New England Billing Policy, is any Covered Entity seeking to recover a Disputed Amount.

**Distributed Generation** means generation directly connected to end-use customer load and located behind the end-use customer's Retail Delivery Point that reduces the amount of energy that would otherwise have been produced on the electricity network in the New England Control Area, provided that the facility's Net Supply Capability is (i) less than 5 MW or (ii) less than or equal to the Maximum Facility Load, whichever is greater.

**DRR Aggregation Zone** is a Dispatch Zone entirely within a single Reserve Zone or Rest of System or, where a Dispatch Zone is not entirely within a single Reserve Zone or Rest of System, each portion of the Dispatch Zone demarcated by the Reserve Zone boundary.

**Do Not Exceed (DNE) Dispatchable Generator** is any Generator Asset that is dispatched using Do Not Exceed Dispatch Points in its Dispatch Instructions and meets the criteria specified in Section III.1.11.3(e). Do Not Exceed Dispatchable Generators are Dispatchable Resources.

**Do Not Exceed Dispatch Point** is a Dispatch Instruction indicating a maximum output level that a DNE Dispatchable Generator must not exceed.

**Dynamic De-List Bid** is a bid that may be submitted by Existing Generating Capacity Resources, Existing Import Capacity Resources, and Existing Demand Capacity Resources in the Forward Capacity Auction below the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold, as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(d) of Market Rule 1.

**Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold** is the price specified in Section III.13.1.2.3.1.A of Market Rule 1 associated with the submission of Dynamic De-List Bids in the Forward Capacity Auction.

**EA Amount** is defined in Section IV.B.2.2 of the Tariff.

**Early Amortization Charge (EAC)** is defined in Section IV.B.2 of the Tariff.

**Early Amortization Working Capital Charge (EAWCC)** is defined in Section IV.B.2 of the Tariff.

**Early Payment Shortfall Funding Amount (EPSF Amount)** is defined in Section IV.B.2.4 of the Tariff.

**Early Payment Shortfall Funding Charge (EPSFC)** is defined in Section IV.B.2 of the Tariff.

**EAWW Amount** is defined in Section IV.B.2.3 of the Tariff.

**EBITDA-to-Interest Expense Ratio** is, on any date, a Market Participant's or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer's earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization in the most recent fiscal quarter divided by that Market Participant's or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer's expense for interest in that fiscal quarter, in each case as shown on the most recent financial statements provided by such Market Participant or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer to the ISO.

**Economic Dispatch Point** is the output, reduction, or consumption level to which a Resource would have been dispatched, based on the Resource's Supply Offer, Demand Reduction Offer, or Demand Bid and the Real-Time Price, and taking account of any operating limits, had the ISO not dispatched the Resource to another Desired Dispatch Point.

**Economic Maximum Limit or Economic Max** is the maximum available output, in MW, of a Generator Asset that a Market Participant offers to supply in the Day-Ahead Energy Market or Real-Time Energy Market, as reflected in the Generator Asset's Offer Data. This represents the highest MW output a Market Participant has offered for a Generator Asset for economic dispatch. A Market Participant must maintain an up-to-date Economic Maximum Limit (and where applicable, must provide the ISO with any telemetry required by ISO New England Operating Procedure No. 18 to allow the ISO to maintain an updated Economic Maximum Limit) for all hours in which a Generator Asset has been offered into the Day-Ahead Energy Market or Real-Time Energy Market.

**Economic Minimum Limit or Economic Min** is (a) for a Generator Asset with an incremental heat rate, the maximum of: (i) the lowest sustainable output level as specified by physical design characteristics, environmental regulations or licensing limits; and (ii) the lowest sustainable output level at which a one MW increment increase in the output level would not decrease the incremental cost, calculated based on the incremental heat rate, of providing an additional MW of output, and (b) for a Generator Asset without an incremental heat rate, the lowest sustainable output level that is consistent with the physical design characteristics of the Generator Asset and with meeting all environmental regulations and licensing limits, and (c) for a Generator Asset undergoing Facility and Equipment Testing or auditing, the level to which the Generator Asset requests and is approved to operate or is directed to operate for purposes of completing the Facility and Equipment Testing or auditing, and (d) for Non-Dispatchable Resources the output level at which a Market Participant anticipates its Non-Dispatchable Resource will be available to operate based on fuel limitations, physical design characteristics, environmental regulations or licensing limits.

**Economic Study** is defined in Section 4.1(b) of Attachment K to the OATT.

**Effective Offer** is the Supply Offer, Demand Reduction Offer, or Demand Bid that is used for NCPC calculation purposes as specified in Section III.F.1(a).

**EFT** is electronic funds transfer.

**Elective Transmission Upgrade** is defined in Section I of Schedule 25 of the OATT.

**Elective Transmission Upgrade Interconnection Customer** is defined in Schedule 25 of the OATT.

**Electric Reliability Organization (ERO)** is defined in 18 C.F.R. § 39.1.

**Electric Storage Facility** is a storage facility that participates in the New England Markets as described in Section III.1.10.6 of Market Rule 1.

**Eligible Customer** is: (i) Any entity that is engaged, or proposes to engage, in the wholesale or retail electric power business is an Eligible Customer under the OATT. (ii) Any electric utility (including any power marketer), Federal power marketing agency, or any other entity generating electric energy for sale or for resale is an Eligible Customer under the OATT. Electric energy sold or produced by such entity may be electric energy produced in the United States, Canada or Mexico. However, with respect to transmission service that the Commission is prohibited from ordering by Section 212(h) of the Federal Power Act, such entity is eligible only if the service is provided pursuant to a state requirement that the Transmission Owner with which that entity is directly interconnected or the distribution company having the service territory in which that entity is located (if that entity is a retail customer) offer the unbundled transmission service or Local Delivery Service, or pursuant to a voluntary offer of such service by the Transmission Owner with which that entity is directly interconnected or the distribution company having the service territory in which that entity is located (if that entity is a retail customer). (iii) Any end user taking or eligible to take unbundled transmission service or Local Delivery Service pursuant to a state requirement that the Transmission Owner with which that end user is directly interconnected or the distribution company having the service territory in which that entity is located (if that entity is a retail customer) offer the transmission service or Local Delivery Service, or pursuant to a voluntary offer of such service by the Transmission Owner with which that end user is directly interconnected, or the distribution company having the service territory in which that entity is located (if that entity is a retail customer) is an Eligible Customer under the OATT.

**Eligible FTR Bidder** is an entity that has satisfied applicable financial assurance criteria, and shall not include the auctioneer, its Affiliates, and their officers, directors, employees, consultants and other representatives.

**Emergency** is an abnormal system condition on the bulk power systems of New England or neighboring Control Areas requiring manual or automatic action to maintain system frequency, or to prevent the involuntary loss of load, equipment damage, or tripping of system elements that could adversely affect the



reliability of an electric system or the safety of persons or property; or a fuel shortage requiring departure from normal operating procedures in order to minimize the use of such scarce fuel; or a condition that requires implementation of Emergency procedures as defined in the ISO New England Manuals.

**Emergency Condition** means an Emergency has been declared by the ISO in accordance with the procedures set forth in the ISO New England Manuals and ISO New England Administrative Procedures.

**Emergency Energy** is energy transferred from one control area operator to another in an Emergency.

**Emergency Minimum Limit or Emergency Min** means the minimum output, in MWs, that a Generator Asset can deliver for a limited period of time without exceeding specified limits of equipment stability and operating permits.

**EMS** is energy management system.

**End-of-Round Price** is the lowest price associated with a round of a Forward Capacity Auction, as described in Section III.13.2.3.1 of Market Rule 1.

**End User Participant** is defined in Section 1 of the Participants Agreement.

**Energy** is power produced in the form of electricity, measured in kilowatthours or megawatthours.

**Energy Administration Service (EAS)** is the service provided by the ISO, as described in Schedule 2 of Section IV.A of the Tariff.

**Energy Component** means the Locational Marginal Price at the reference point.

**Energy Efficiency** is installed measures (e.g., products, equipment, systems, services, practices and/or strategies) on end-use customer facilities that reduce the total amount of electrical energy needed, while delivering a comparable or improved level of end-use service. Such measures include, but are not limited to, the installation of more energy efficient lighting, motors, refrigeration, HVAC equipment and control systems, envelope measures, operations and maintenance procedures, and industrial process equipment.

**Energy Imbalance Service** is the form of Ancillary Service described in Schedule 4 of the OATT.

**Energy Market** is, collectively, the Day-Ahead Energy Market and the Real-Time Energy Market.

**Energy Non-Zero Spot Market Settlement Hours** are the sum of the hours for which the Customer has a positive or negative Real-Time System Adjusted Net Interchange or for which the Customer has a positive or negative Real-Time Demand Reduction Obligation as determined by the ISO settlement process for the Energy Market.

**Energy Offer Floor** is negative \$150/MWh.

**Energy Transaction Units (Energy TUs)** are the sum for the month for a Customer of Bilateral Contract Block-Hours, Demand Bid Block-Hours, Asset Related Demand Bid Block-Hours, Supply Offer Block-Hours, Demand Reduction Offer Block-Hours, and Energy Non-Zero Spot Market Settlement Hours.

**Equipment Damage Reimbursement** is the compensation paid to the owner of a Designated Blackstart Resource as specified in Section 5.5 of Schedule 16 to the OATT.

**Equivalent Demand Forced Outage Rate (EFORD)** means the portion of time a unit is in demand, but is unavailable due to forced outages.

**Estimated Capacity Load Obligation** is, for the purposes of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy, a Market Participant's share of Zonal Capacity Obligation from the latest available month, adjusted as appropriate to account for any relevant Capacity Load Obligation Bilaterals, HQICCs, and Self-Supplied FCA Resource designations for the applicable month.

**Establish Claimed Capability Audit** is the audit performed pursuant to Section III.1.5.1.2.

**Excepted Transaction** is a transaction specified in Section II.40 of the Tariff for the applicable period specified in that Section.

**Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline** is a deadline, specified in Section III.13.1.10 of Market Rule 1, for submission of certain qualification materials for the Forward Capacity Auction, as discussed in Section III.13.1 of Market Rule 1.

**Existing Capacity Qualification Package** is information submitted for certain existing resources prior to participation in the Forward Capacity Auction, as described in Section III.13.1 of Market Rule 1.

**Existing Capacity Resource** is any resource that does not meet any of the eligibility criteria to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Capacity Resource.

**Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline** is a deadline, specified in Section III.13.1.10 of Market Rule 1, for submission of certain qualification materials for the Forward Capacity Auction, as discussed in Section III.13.1 of Market Rule 1.

**Existing Capacity Retirement Package** is information submitted for certain existing resources prior to participation in the Forward Capacity Auction, as described in Section III.13.1 of Market Rule 1.

**Existing Demand Capacity Resource** is a type of Demand Capacity Resource participating in the Forward Capacity Market, as defined in Section III.13.1.4.2 of Market Rule 1.

**Existing Generating Capacity Resource** is a type of resource participating in the Forward Capacity Market, as defined in Section III.13.1.2.1 of Market Rule 1.

**Existing Import Capacity Resource** is a type of resource participating in the Forward Capacity Market, as defined in Section III.13.1.3.1 of Market Rule 1.

**Expedited Study Request** is defined in Section II.34.7 of the OATT.

**Export-Adjusted LSR** is as defined in Section III.12.4(b)(ii).

**Export Bid** is a bid that may be submitted by certain resources in the Forward Capacity Auction to export capacity to an external Control Area, as described in Section III.13.1.2.3.1.3 of Market Rule 1.

**Exports** are Real-Time External Transactions, which are limited to sales from the New England Control Area, for exporting energy out of the New England Control Area.

**External Elective Transmission Upgrade (External ETU)** is defined in Section I of Schedule 25 of the OATT.

**External Market Monitor** means the person or entity appointed by the ISO Board of Directors pursuant to Section III.A.1.2 of Appendix A of Market Rule 1 to carry out the market monitoring and mitigation functions specified in Appendix A and elsewhere in Market Rule 1.

**External Node** is a proxy bus or buses used for establishing a Locational Marginal Price for energy received by Market Participants from, or delivered by Market Participants to, a neighboring Control Area or for establishing Locational Marginal Prices associated with energy delivered through the New England Control Area by Non-Market Participants for use in calculating Non-Market Participant Congestion Costs and loss costs.

**External Resource** means a generation resource located outside the metered boundaries of the New England Control Area.

**External Transaction** is the import of external energy into the New England Control Area by a Market Participant or the export of internal energy out of the New England Control Area by a Market Participant in the Day-Ahead Energy Market and/or Real-Time Energy Market, or the wheeling of external energy through the New England Control Area by a Market Participant or a Non-Market Participant in the Real-Time Energy Market.

**External Transaction Cap** is \$2,000/MWh for External Transactions other than Coordinated External Transactions and \$1,000/MWh for Coordinated External Transactions.

**External Transaction Floor** is the Energy Offer Floor for External Transactions other than Coordinated External Transactions and negative \$1,000/MWh for Coordinated External Transactions.

**External Transmission Project** is a transmission project comprising facilities located wholly outside the New England Control Area and regarding which an agreement has been reached whereby New England ratepayers will support all or a portion of the cost of the facilities.

**Facilities Study** is an engineering study conducted pursuant to the OATT by the ISO (or, in the case of Local Service or interconnections to Local Area Facilities as defined in the TOA, by one or more affected PTOs) or some other entity designated by the ISO in consultation with any affected Transmission Owner(s), to determine the required modifications to the PTF and Non-PTF, including the cost and scheduled completion date for such modifications, that will be required to provide a requested transmission service or interconnection on the PTF and Non-PTF.

**Facility and Equipment Testing** means operation of a Resource to evaluate the functionality of the facility or equipment utilized in the operation of the facility.

**Failure to Maintain Blackstart Capability** is a failure of a Blackstart Owner or Designated Blackstart Resource to meet the Blackstart Service Minimum Criteria or Blackstart Service obligations, but does not include a Failure to Perform During a System Restoration event.

**Failure to Perform During a System Restoration** is a failure of a Blackstart Owner or Designated Blackstart Resource to follow ISO or Local Control Center dispatch instructions or perform in accordance with the dispatch instructions or the Blackstart Service Minimum Criteria and Blackstart Service obligations, described within the ISO New England Operating Documents, during a restoration of the New England Transmission System.

**Fast Start Demand Response Resource** is a Demand Response Resource that meets the following criteria: (i) Minimum Reduction Time does not exceed one hour; (ii) Minimum Time Between Reductions does not exceed one hour; (iii) Demand Response Resource Start-Up Time plus Demand Response Resource Notification Time does not exceed 30 minutes; (iv) has personnel available to respond to Dispatch Instructions or has automatic remote response capability; and (v) is capable of receiving and acknowledging a Dispatch Instruction electronically.

**Fast Start Generator** means a Generator Asset that the ISO can dispatch to an on-line or off-line state through electronic dispatch and that meets the following criteria: (i) Minimum Run Time does not exceed

one hour; (ii) Minimum Down Time does not exceed one hour; (iii) cold Notification Time plus cold Start-Up Time does not exceed 30 minutes; (iv) available for dispatch (when it is either in an on-line or off-line state) and manned or has automatic remote dispatch capability; and (v) capable of receiving and acknowledging a start-up or shut-down Dispatch Instruction electronically.

**FCA Cleared Export Transaction** is defined in Section III.1.10.7(f)(ii) of Market Rule 1.

**FCA Qualified Capacity** is the Qualified Capacity that is used in a Forward Capacity Auction.

**FCM Capacity Charge Requirements** are calculated in accordance with Section VII.C of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**FCM Charge Rate** is calculated in accordance with Section VII.C of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**FCM Commercial Operation** is defined in Section III.13.3.8 of Market Rule 1.

**FCM Deposit** is calculated in accordance with Section VII.B.1 of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**FCM Financial Assurance Requirements** are described in Section VII of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**Final Forward Reserve Obligation** is calculated in accordance with Section III.9.8(a) of Market Rule 1.

**Financial Assurance Default** results from a Market Participant or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer's failure to comply with the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**Financial Assurance Obligations** relative to the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy are determined in accordance with Section III.A(v) of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**Financial Transmission Right (FTR)** is a financial instrument that evidences the rights and obligations specified in Sections III.5.2.2 and III.7 of the Tariff.

**Firm Point-To-Point Service** is service which is arranged for and administered between specified Points of Receipt and Delivery in accordance with Part II.C of the OATT.

**Firm Transmission Service** is Regional Network Service, Through or Out Service, service for Excepted Transactions, firm MTF Service, firm OTF Service, and firm Local Service.

**Flexible DNE Dispatchable Generator** is any DNE Dispatchable Generator that meets the following criteria: (i) Minimum Run Time does not exceed one hour; (ii) Minimum Down Time does not exceed one hour; and (iii) cold Notification Time plus cold Start-Up Time does not exceed 30 minutes.

**Force Majeure** - An event of Force Majeure means any act of God, labor disturbance, act of the public enemy or terrorists, war, invasion, insurrection, riot, fire, storm or flood, ice, explosion, breakage or accident to machinery or equipment, any curtailment, order, regulation or restriction imposed by governmental military or lawfully established civilian authorities, or any other cause beyond the control of the ISO, a Transmission Owner, a Schedule 20A Service Provider, or a Customer, including without limitation, in the case of the ISO, any action or inaction by a Customer, a Schedule 20A Service Provider, or a Transmission Owner, in the case of a Transmission Owner, any action or inaction by the ISO, any Customer, a Schedule 20A Service Provider, or any other Transmission Owner, in the case of a Schedule 20A Service Provider, any action or inaction by the ISO, any Customer, a Transmission Owner, or any other Schedule 20A Service Provider, and, in the case of a Transmission Customer, any action or inaction by the ISO, a Schedule 20A Service Provider, or any Transmission Owner.

**Forward Capacity Auction (FCA)** is the annual Forward Capacity Market auction process described in Section III.13.2 of Market Rule 1.

**Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price** is calculated in accordance with Section III.13.2.4 of Market Rule 1.

**Forward Capacity Market (FCM)** is the forward market for procuring capacity in the New England Control Area, as described in Section III.13 of Market Rule 1.

**Forward Energy Inventory Election** is the total MWh value for which a Market Participant elects to be compensated at the forward rate in the inventoried energy program as described in Section III.K.1(d) of Market Rule 1.

**Forward LNG Inventory Election** is the portion of a Market Participant's Forward Energy Inventory Election attributed to liquefied natural gas in the inventoried energy program as described in Section III.K.1(d) of Market Rule 1.

**Forward Reserve** means TMNSR and TMOR purchased by the ISO on a forward basis on behalf of Market Participants as provided for in Section III.9 of Market Rule 1.

**Forward Reserve Assigned Megawatts** is the amount of Forward Reserve, in megawatts, that a Market Participant assigns to eligible Forward Reserve Resources to meet its Forward Reserve Obligation as defined in Section III.9.4.1 of Market Rule 1.

**Forward Reserve Auction** is the periodic auction conducted by the ISO in accordance with Section III.9 of Market Rule 1 to procure Forward Reserve.

**Forward Reserve Auction Offers** are offers to provide Forward Reserve to meet system and Reserve Zone requirements as submitted by a Market Participant in accordance with Section III.9.3 of Market Rule 1.

**Forward Reserve Charge** is a Market Participant's share of applicable system and Reserve Zone Forward Reserve costs attributable to meeting the Forward Reserve requirement as calculated in accordance with Section III.9.9 of Market Rule 1.

**Forward Reserve Clearing Price** is the clearing price for TMNSR or TMOR, as applicable, for the system and each Reserve Zone resulting from the Forward Reserve Auction as defined in Section III.9.4 of Market Rule 1.

**Forward Reserve Credit** is the credit received by a Market Participant that is associated with that Market Participant's Final Forward Reserve Obligation as calculated in accordance with Section III.9.8 of Market Rule 1.



**Forward Reserve Delivered Megawatts** are calculated in accordance with Section III.9.6.5 of Market Rule 1.

**Forward Reserve Delivery Period** is defined in Section III.9.1 of Market Rule 1.

**Forward Reserve Failure-to-Activate Megawatts** are calculated in accordance with Section III.9.7.2(a) of Market Rule 1.

**Forward Reserve Failure-to-Activate Penalty** is the penalty associated with a Market Participant's failure to activate Forward Reserve when requested to do so by the ISO and is defined in Section III.9.7.2 of Market Rule 1.

**Forward Reserve Failure-to-Activate Penalty Rate** is specified in Section III.9.7.2 of Market Rule 1.

**Forward Reserve Failure-to-Reserve**, as specified in Section III.9.7.1 of Market Rule 1, occurs when a Market Participant's Forward Reserve Delivered Megawatts for a Reserve Zone in an hour is less than that Market Participant's Forward Reserve Obligation for that Reserve Zone in that hour. Under these circumstances the Market Participant pays a penalty based upon the Forward Reserve Failure-to-Reserve Penalty Rate and that Market Participant's Forward Reserve Failure-to-Reserve Megawatts.

**Forward Reserve Failure-to-Reserve Megawatts** are calculated in accordance with Section III.9.7.1(a) of Market Rule 1.

**Forward Reserve Failure-to-Reserve Penalty** is the penalty associated with a Market Participant's failure to reserve Forward Reserve and is defined in Section III.9.7.1 of Market Rule 1.

**Forward Reserve Failure-to-Reserve Penalty Rate** is specified in Section III.9.7.1(b)(ii) of Market Rule 1.

**Forward Reserve Fuel Index** is the index or set of indices used to calculate the Forward Reserve Threshold Price as defined in Section III.9.6.2 of Market Rule 1.

**Forward Reserve Heat Rate** is the heat rate as defined in Section III.9.6.2 of Market Rule 1 that is used to calculate the Forward Reserve Threshold Price.

**Forward Reserve Market** is a market for forward procurement of two reserve products, Ten-Minute Non-Spinning Reserve (TMNSR) and Thirty-Minute Operating Reserve (TMOR).

**Forward Reserve MWs** are those megawatts assigned to specific eligible Forward Reserve Resources which convert a Forward Reserve Obligation into a Resource-specific obligation.

**Forward Reserve Obligation** is a Market Participant's amount, in megawatts, of Forward Reserve that cleared in the Forward Reserve Auction and adjusted, as applicable, to account for bilateral transactions that transfer Forward Reserve Obligations.

**Forward Reserve Obligation Charge** is defined in Section III.10.4 of Market Rule 1.

**Forward Reserve Offer Cap** is \$9,000/megawatt-month.

**Forward Reserve Payment Rate** is defined in Section III.9.8 of Market Rule 1.

**Forward Reserve Procurement Period** is defined in Section III.9.1 of Market Rule 1.

**Forward Reserve Qualifying Megawatts** refer to all or a portion of a Forward Reserve Resource's capability offered into the Real-Time Energy Market at energy offer prices above the applicable Forward Reserve Threshold Price that are calculated in accordance with Section III.9.6.4 of Market Rule 1.

**Forward Reserve Resource** is a Resource that meets the eligibility requirements defined in Section III.9.5.2 of Market Rule 1 that has been assigned Forward Reserve Obligation by a Market Participant.

**Forward Reserve Threshold Price** is the minimum price at which assigned Forward Reserve Megawatts are required to be offered into the Real-Time Energy Market as calculated in Section III.9.6.2 of Market Rule 1.

**FTR Auction** is the periodic auction of FTRs conducted by the ISO in accordance with Section III.7 of Market Rule 1.

**FTR Auction Revenue** is the revenue collected from the sale of FTRs in FTR Auctions. FTR Auction Revenue is payable to FTR Holders who submit their FTRs for sale in the FTR Auction in accordance with Section III.7 of Market Rule 1 and to ARR Holders and Incremental ARR Holders in accordance with Appendix C of Market Rule 1.

**FTR Credit Test Percentage** is calculated in accordance with Section III.B.1(b) of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**FTR Financial Assurance Requirements** are described in Section VI of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**FTR Holder** is an entity that acquires an FTR through the FTR Auction to Section III.7 of Market Rule 1 and registers with the ISO as the holder of the FTR in accordance with Section III.7 of Market Rule 1 and applicable ISO New England Manuals.

**FTR-Only Customer** is a Market Participant that transacts in the FTR Auction and that does not participate in other markets or programs of the New England Markets. References in this Tariff to a “Non-Market Participant FTR Customers” and similar phrases shall be deemed references to an FTR-Only Customer.

**FTR Settlement Risk Financial Assurance** is an amount of financial assurance required by a Designated FTR Participant for each bid submission into an FTR Auction and for each bid awarded to the individual participant in an FTR Auction. This amount is calculated pursuant to Section VI.A of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**GADS Data** means data submitted to the NERC for collection into the NERC’s Generating Availability Data System (GADS).

**Gap Request for Proposals (Gap RFP)** is defined in Section III.11 of Market Rule 1.

**Gas Day** means a period of 24 consecutive hours beginning at 0900 hrs Central Time.

**Generating Capacity Resource** means a New Generating Capacity Resource or an Existing Generating Capacity Resource.

**Generator Asset** is a device (or a collection of devices) that is capable of injecting real power onto the grid that has been registered as a Generator Asset in accordance with the Asset Registration Process.

**Generator Imbalance Service** is the form of Ancillary Service described in Schedule 10 of the OATT.

**Generator Interconnection Related Upgrade** is an addition to or modification of the New England Transmission System (pursuant to Section II.47.1, Schedule 22 or Schedule 23 of the OATT) to effect the interconnection of a new generating unit or an existing generating unit whose energy capability or capacity capability is being materially changed and increased whether or not the interconnection is being effected to meet the Capacity Capability Interconnection Standard or the Network Capability Interconnection Standard. As to Category A Projects (as defined in Schedule 11 of the OATT), a Generator Interconnection Related Upgrade also includes an upgrade beyond that required to satisfy the Network Capability Interconnection Standard (or its predecessor) for which the Generator Owner has committed to pay prior to October 29, 1998.

**Generator Owner** is the owner, in whole or part, of a generating unit whether located within or outside the New England Control Area.

**Good Utility Practice** means any of the practices, methods and acts engaged in or approved by a significant portion of the electric utility industry during the relevant time period, or any of the practices, methods and acts which, in the exercise of reasonable judgment in light of the facts known at the time the decision was made, could have been expected to accomplish the desired result at a reasonable cost consistent with good business practices, reliability, safety and expedition. Good Utility Practice is not intended to be limited to the optimum practice, method, or act to the exclusion of all others, but rather includes all acceptable practices, methods, or acts generally accepted in the region, including those practices required by Federal Power Act Section 215(a)(4).

**Governance Only Member** is defined in Section 1 of the Participants Agreement.

**Governance Participant** is defined in the Participants Agreement.

**Governing Documents**, for the purposes of the ISO New England Billing Policy, are the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff and ISO Participants Agreement.

**Governing Rating** is the lowest corporate rating from any Rating Agency for that Market Participant, or, if the Market Participant has no corporate rating, then the lowest rating from any Rating Agency for that Market Participant's senior unsecured debt.

**Grandfathered Agreements (GAs)** is a transaction specified in Section II.45 for the applicable period specified in that Section.

**Grandfathered Intertie Agreement (GIA)** is defined pursuant to the TOA.

**Handy-Whitman Index of Public Utility Construction Costs** is the Total Other Production Plant index shown in the Cost Trends of Electric Utility Construction for the North Atlantic Region as published in the Handy-Whitman Index of Public Utility Construction Costs.

**Highgate Transmission Facilities (HTF)** are existing U. S.-based transmission facilities covered under the Agreement for Joint Ownership, Construction and Operation of the Highgate Transmission Interconnection dated as of August 1, 1984 including (1) the whole of a 200 megawatt high-voltage, back-to-back, direct-current converter facility located in Highgate, Vermont and (2) a 345 kilovolt transmission line within Highgate and Franklin, Vermont (which connects the converter facility at the U.S.-Canadian border to a Hydro-Quebec 120 kilovolt line in Bedford, Quebec). The HTF include any upgrades associated with increasing the capacity or changing the physical characteristics of these facilities as defined in the above stated agreement dated August 1, 1984 until the Operations Date, as defined in the TOA. The current HTF rating is a nominal 225 MW. The HTF are not defined as PTF. Coincident with the Operations Date and except as stipulated in Schedules, 9, 12, and Attachment F to the OATT, HTF shall be treated in the same manner as PTF for purposes of the OATT and all references to PTF in the OATT shall be deemed to apply to HTF as well. The treatment of the HTF is not intended to establish any binding precedent or presumption with regard to the treatment for other transmission facilities within

the New England Transmission System (including HVDC, MTF, or Control Area Interties) for purposes of the OATT.

**Host Participant or Host Utility** is a Market Participant or a Governance Participant transmission or distribution provider that reconciles the loads within the metering domain with OP-18 compliant metering.

**Hourly Charges** are defined in Section 1.3 of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

**Hourly PER** is calculated in accordance with Section III.13.7.1.2.1 of Market Rule 1.

**Hourly Requirements** are determined in accordance with Section III.A(i) of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**Hourly Shortfall NCPC Credit** is an NCPC Credit calculated pursuant to Appendix F to Market Rule 1.

**Hub** is a specific set of pre-defined Nodes for which a Locational Marginal Price will be calculated for the Day-Ahead Energy Market and Real-Time Energy Market and which can be used to establish a reference price for energy purchases and the transfer of Day-Ahead Adjusted Load Obligations and Real-Time Adjusted Load Obligations and for the designation of FTRs.

**Hub Price** is calculated in accordance with Section III.2.8 of Market Rule 1.

**HQ Interconnection Capability Credit (HQICC)** is a monthly value reflective of the annual installed capacity benefits of the Phase I/II HVDC-TF, as determined by the ISO, using a standard methodology on file with the Commission, in conjunction with the setting of the Installed Capacity Requirement. An appropriate share of the HQICC shall be assigned to an IRH if the Phase I/II HVDC-TF support costs are paid by that IRH and such costs are not included in the calculation of the Regional Network Service rate. The share of HQICC allocated to such an eligible IRH for a month is the sum in kilowatts of (1)(a) the IRH's percentage share, if any, of the Phase I Transfer Capability times (b) the Phase I Transfer Credit, plus (2)(a) the IRH's percentage share, if any, of the Phase II Transfer Capability, times (b) the Phase II Transfer Credit. The ISO shall establish appropriate HQICCs to apply for an IRH which has such a percentage share.

**Import Capacity Resource** means an Existing Import Capacity Resource or a New Import Capacity Resource offered to provide capacity in the New England Control Area from an external Control Area.

**Inadvertent Energy Revenue** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(o) of Market Rule 1.

**Inadvertent Energy Revenue Charges or Credits** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(p) of Market Rule 1.

**Inadvertent Interchange** means the difference between net actual energy flow and net scheduled energy flow into or out of the New England Control Area.

**Increment Offer** means an offer to sell energy at a specified Location in the Day-Ahead Energy Market which is not associated with a physical supply. An accepted Increment Offer results in scheduled supply at the specified Location in the Day-Ahead Energy Market.

**Incremental ARR** is an ARR provided in recognition of a participant-funded transmission system upgrade pursuant to Appendix C of this Market Rule.

**Incremental ARR Holder** is an entity which is the record holder of an Incremental Auction Revenue Right in the register maintained by the ISO.

**Incremental Cost of Reliability Service** is described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5.2 of Market Rule 1.

**Independent Transmission Company (ITC)** is a transmission entity that assumes certain responsibilities in accordance with Section 10.05 of the Transmission Operating Agreement and Attachment M to the OATT, subject to the acceptance or approval of the Commission and a finding of the Commission that the transmission entity satisfies applicable independence requirements.

**Information Request** is a request from a potential Disputing Party submitted in writing to the ISO for access to Confidential Information.

**Initial Market Participant Financial Assurance Requirement** is calculated for new Market Participants and Returning Market Participants, other than an FTR-Only Customer or a Governance Only Member, according to Section IV of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**Installed Capacity Requirement** means the level of capacity required to meet the reliability requirements defined for the New England Control Area, as described in Section III.12 of Market Rule 1.

**Interchange Transactions** are transactions deemed to be effected under Market Rule 1.

**Interconnecting Transmission Owner** has the meaning specified in Section I of Schedule 22, Attachment 1 to Schedule 23, and Section I of Schedule 25 of the OATT.

**Interconnection Agreement** is the “Large Generator Interconnection Agreement”, the “Small Generator Interconnection Agreement”, or the “Elective Transmission Upgrade Interconnection Agreement” pursuant to Schedules 22, 23 or 25 of the ISO OATT or an interconnection agreement approved by the Commission prior to the adoption of the Interconnection Procedures.

**Interconnection Customer** has the meaning specified in Section I of Schedule 22, Attachment 1 to Schedule 23, and Section I of Schedule 25 of the OATT.

**Interconnection Feasibility Study Agreement** has the meaning specified in Section I of Schedule 22, Attachment 1 to Schedule 23, or Section I of Schedule 25 of the OATT.

**Interconnection Procedure** is the “Large Generator Interconnection Procedures”, the “Small Generator Interconnection Procedures”, or the “Elective Transmission Upgrade Interconnection Procedures” pursuant to Schedules 22, 23, and 25 of the ISO OATT.

**Interconnection Reliability Operating Limit (IROL)** has the meaning specified in the Glossary of Terms Used in NERC Reliability Standards.

**Interconnection Request** has the meaning specified in Section I of Schedule 22, Attachment 1 to Schedule 23, or Section I of Schedule 25 of the OATT.



**Interconnection Rights Holder(s) (IRH)** has the meaning given to it in Schedule 20A to Section II of this Tariff.

**Interconnection System Impact Study Agreement** has the meaning specified in Section I of Schedule 22, Attachment 1 to Schedule 23 and Section I of Schedule 25 of the OATT.

**Interest** is interest calculated in the manner specified in Section II.8.3.

**Interface Bid** is a unified real-time bid to simultaneously purchase and sell energy on each side of an external interface for which the enhanced scheduling procedures in Section III.1.10.7.A are implemented.

**Intermittent Power Resource** is a wind, solar, run of river hydro or other renewable resource that does not have control over its net power output.

**Internal Bilateral for Load** is an internal bilateral transaction under which the buyer receives a reduction in Real-Time Load Obligation and the seller receives a corresponding increase in Real-Time Load Obligation in the amount of the sale, in MWs. An Internal Bilateral for Load transaction is only applicable in the Real-Time Energy Market.

**Internal Bilateral for Market for Energy** is an internal bilateral transaction for Energy which applies in the Day-Ahead Energy Market and Real-Time Energy Market or just the Real-Time Energy Market under which the buyer receives a reduction in Day-Ahead Adjusted Load Obligation and Real-Time Adjusted Load Obligation and the seller receives a corresponding increase in Day-Ahead Adjusted Load Obligation and Real-Time Adjusted Load Obligation in the amount of the sale, in MWs.

**Internal Elective Transmission Upgrade (Internal ETU)** is defined in Section I of Schedule 25 of the OATT.

**Internal Market Monitor** means the department of the ISO responsible for carrying out the market monitoring and mitigation functions specified in Appendix A and elsewhere in Market Rule 1.

**Interregional Planning Stakeholder Advisory Committee (IPSAC)** is the committee described as such in the Northeast Planning Protocol.

**Interregional Transmission Project** is a transmission project located within the New England Control Area and one or more of the neighboring transmission planning regions.

**Interruption Cost** is the amount, in dollars, that must be paid to a Market Participant each time the Market Participant's Demand Response Resource is scheduled or dispatched in the New England Markets to reduce demand.

**Inventoried Energy Day** is an Operating Day that occurs in the months of December, January, or February during the winters of 2023-2024 and 2024-2025 (inventoried energy program) and for which the average of the high temperature and the low temperature on that Operating Day, as measured and reported by the National Weather Service at Bradley International Airport in Windsor Locks, Connecticut, is less than or equal to 17 degrees Fahrenheit, as described in Section III.K.3.1 of Market Rule 1.

**Investment Grade Rating**, for a Market (other than an FTR-Only Customer) or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer, is either (a) a corporate investment grade rating from one or more of the Rating Agencies, or (b) if the Market Participant or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer does not have a corporate rating from one of the Rating Agencies, then an investment grade rating for the Market Participant's or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer's senior unsecured debt from one or more of the Rating Agencies.

**Invoice** is a statement issued by the ISO for the net Charge owed by a Covered Entity pursuant to the ISO New England Billing Policy.

**Invoice Date** is the day on which the ISO issues an Invoice.

**ISO** means ISO New England Inc.

**ISO Charges**, for the purposes of the ISO New England Billing Policy, are both Non-Hourly Charges and Hourly Charges.

**ISO Control Center** is the primary control center established by the ISO for the exercise of its Operating Authority and the performance of functions as an RTO.

**ISO-Initiated Claimed Capability Audit** is the audit performed pursuant to Section III.1.5.1.4.

**ISO New England Administrative Procedures** means procedures adopted by the ISO to fulfill its responsibilities to apply and implement ISO New England System Rules.

**ISO New England Billing Policy** is Exhibit ID to Section I of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff.

**ISO New England Filed Documents** means the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff, including but not limited to Market Rule 1, the Participants Agreement, the Transmission Operating Agreement or other documents that affect the rates, terms and conditions of service.

**ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy** is Exhibit IA to Section I of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff.

**ISO New England Information Policy** is the policy establishing guidelines regarding the information received, created and distributed by Market Participants and the ISO in connection with the settlement, operation and planning of the System, as the same may be amended from time to time in accordance with the provisions of this Tariff. The ISO New England Information Policy is Attachment D to the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff.

**ISO New England Manuals** are the manuals implementing Market Rule 1, as amended from time to time in accordance with the Participants Agreement. Any elements of the ISO New England Manuals that substantially affect rates, terms, and/or conditions of service shall be filed with the Commission under Section 205 of the Federal Power Act.

**ISO New England Operating Documents** are the Tariff and the ISO New England Operating Procedures.

**ISO New England Operating Procedures (OPs)** are the ISO New England Planning Procedures and the operating guides, manuals, procedures and protocols developed and utilized by the ISO for operating the ISO bulk power system and the New England Markets.

**ISO New England Planning Procedures** are the procedures developed and utilized by the ISO for planning the ISO bulk power system.

**ISO New England System Rules** are Market Rule 1, the ISO New England Information Policy, the ISO New England Administrative Procedures, the ISO New England Manuals and any other system rules, procedures or criteria for the operation of the New England Transmission System and administration of the New England Markets and the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff.

**ITC Agreement** is defined in Attachment M to the OATT.

**ITC Rate Schedule** is defined in Section 3.1 of Attachment M to the OATT.

**ITC System** is defined in Section 2.2 of Attachment M to the OATT.

**ITC System Planning Procedures** is defined in Section 15.4 of Attachment M to the OATT.

**Joint ISO/RTO Planning Committee (JIPC)** is the committee described as such in the Northeastern Planning Protocol.

**Late Payment Account** is a segregated interest-bearing account into which the ISO deposits Late Payment Charges due from ISO Charges and interest owed from participants for late payments that are collected and not distributed to the Covered Entities, until the Late Payment Account Limit is reached, under the ISO New England Billing Policy and penalties collected under the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**Late Payment Account Limit** is defined in Section 4.2 of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

**Late Payment Charge** is defined in Section 4.1 of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

**Lead Market Participant**, for purposes other than the Forward Capacity Market, is the entity authorized to submit Supply Offers, Demand Bids or Demand Reduction Offers for a Resource and to whom certain Energy TUs are assessed under Schedule 2 of Section IV.A of the Tariff. For purposes of the Forward

Capacity Market, the Lead Market Participant is the entity designated to participate in that market on behalf of an Existing Capacity Resource or a New Capacity Resource.

**Limited Energy Resource** means a Generator Asset that, due to design considerations, environmental restriction on operations, cyclical requirements, such as the need to recharge or refill or manage water flow, or fuel limitations, are unable to operate continuously at full output on a daily basis.

**Load Asset** means a physical load that has been registered in accordance with the Asset Registration Process. A Load Asset can be an Asset Related Demand, including a Dispatchable Asset Related Demand.

**Load Management** means measures (e.g., products, equipment, systems, services, practices and/or strategies) on end-use customer facilities that curtail electrical usage or shift electrical usage while delivering a comparable or acceptable level of end-use service. Such measures include, but are not limited to, energy management systems, load control end-use cycling, load curtailment strategies, and energy storage that curtails or shifts electrical usage by means other than generating electricity.

**Load Shedding** is the systematic reduction of system demand by temporarily decreasing load.

**Load-Side Relationship Certification** is a certification described in Section III.A.21.1.3 that a Project Sponsor submits as part of the New Capacity Qualification Package or New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package to demonstrate that the New Capacity Resource should not be subject to buyer-side market power review.

**Load Zone** is a Reliability Region, except as otherwise provided for in Section III.2.7 of Market Rule 1.

**Local Area Facilities** are defined in the TOA.

**Local Benefit Upgrade(s) (LBU)** is an upgrade, modification or addition to the transmission system that is: (i) rated below 115kV or (ii) rated 115kV or above and does not meet all of the non-voltage criteria for PTF classification specified in the OATT.

**Local Control Centers** are those control centers in existence as of the effective date of the OATT (including the CONVEX, REMVEC, Maine and New Hampshire control centers) or established by the PTOs in accordance with the TOA that are separate from the ISO Control Center and perform certain functions in accordance with the OATT and the TOA.

**Local Delivery Service** is the service of delivering electric energy to end users. This service is subject to state jurisdiction regardless of whether such service is provided over local distribution or transmission facilities. An entity that is an Eligible Customer under the OATT is not excused from any requirements of state law, or any order or regulation issued pursuant to state law, to arrange for Local Delivery Service with the Participating Transmission Owner and/or distribution company providing such service and to pay all applicable charges associated with such service, including charges for stranded costs and benefits.

**Local Network** is defined as the transmission facilities constituting a local network as identified in Attachment E, as such Attachment may be modified from time to time in accordance with the Transmission Operating Agreement.

**Local Network Load** is the load that a Network Customer designates for Local Network Service under Schedule 21 to the OATT.

**Local Network RNS Rate** is the rate applicable to Regional Network Service to effect a delivery to load in a particular Local Network, as determined in accordance with Schedule 9 to the OATT.

**Local Network Service (LNS)** is the network service provided under Schedule 21 and the Local Service Schedules to permit the Transmission Customer to efficiently and economically utilize its resources to serve its load.

**Local Point-To-Point Service (LPTP)** is Point-to-Point Service provided under Schedule 21 of the OATT and the Local Service Schedules to permit deliveries to or from an interconnection point on the PTF.

**Local Public Policy Transmission Upgrade** is any addition and/or upgrade to the New England Transmission System with a voltage level below 115kV that is required in connection with the construction of a Public Policy Transmission Upgrade approved for inclusion in the Regional System

Plan pursuant to Attachment K to the ISO OATT or included in a Local System Plan in accordance with Appendix 1 to Attachment K.

**Local Resource Adequacy Requirement** is calculated pursuant to Section III.12.2.1.1.

**Local Second Contingency Protection Resources** are those Resources identified by the ISO on a daily basis as necessary for the provision of Operating Reserve requirements and adherence to NERC, NPCC and ISO reliability criteria over and above those Resources required to meet first contingency reliability criteria within a Reliability Region.

**Local Service** is transmission service provided under Schedule 21 and the Local Service Schedules thereto.

**Local Service Schedule** is a PTO-specific schedule to the OATT setting forth the rates, charges, terms and conditions applicable to Local Service.

**Local Sourcing Requirement (LSR)** is a value calculated as described in Section III.12.2.1 of Market Rule 1.

**Local System Planning (LSP)** is the process defined in Appendix 1 of Attachment K to the OATT.

**Localized Costs** are costs that the ISO, with advisory input from the Reliability Committee, determines in accordance with Schedule 12C of the OATT shall not be included in the Pool-Supported PTF costs recoverable under this OATT, or in costs allocated to Regional Network Load according to Section 6 of Schedule 12. If there are any Localized Costs, the ISO shall identify them in the Regional System Plan.

**Location** is a Node, External Node, Load Zone, DRR Aggregation Zone, or Hub.

**Locational Marginal Price (LMP)** is defined in Section III.2 of Market Rule 1. The Locational Marginal Price for a Node is the nodal price at that Node; the Locational Marginal Price for an External Node is the nodal price at that External Node; the Locational Marginal Price for a Load Zone, DRR Aggregation Zone or Reliability Region is the Zonal Price for that Load Zone, DRR Aggregation Zone or

Reliability Region, respectively; and the Locational Marginal Price for a Hub is the Hub Price for that Hub.

**Long Lead Time Facility (Long Lead Facility)** has the meaning specified in Section I of Schedule 22 and Schedule 25 of the OATT.

**Long-Term** is a term of one year or more.

**Long-Term Transmission Outage** is a long-term transmission outage scheduled in accordance with ISO New England Operating Procedure No. 3.

**Loss Component** is the component of the nodal LMP at a given Node or External Node on the PTF that reflects the cost of losses at that Node or External Node relative to the reference point. The Loss Component of the nodal LMP at a given Node on the non-PTF system reflects the relative cost of losses at that Node adjusted as required to account for losses on the non-PTF system already accounted for through tariffs associated with the non-PTF. When used in connection with Hub Price or Zonal Price, the term Loss Component refers to the Loss Components of the nodal LMPs that comprise the Hub Price or Zonal Price, which Loss Components are averaged or weighted in the same way that nodal LMPs are averaged to determine Hub Price or weighted to determine Zonal Price.

**Loss of Load Expectation (LOLE)** is the probability of disconnecting non-interruptible customers due to a resource deficiency.

**Lost Opportunity Cost (LOC)** is one of four forms of compensation that may be paid to resources providing VAR Service under Schedule 2 of the OATT.

**LSE** means load serving entity.

**Lump Sum Blackstart Payment** is defined and calculated as specified in Section 5.4 of Schedule 16 to the OATT.

**Lump Sum Blackstart Capital Payment** is defined and calculated as specified in Section 5.4 of Schedule 16 to the OATT.



**Manual Response Rate** is the rate, in MW/Minute, at which the output of a Generator Asset, or the consumption of a Dispatchable Asset Related Demand, is capable of changing.

**Marginal Loss Revenue Load Obligation** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(b) of Market Rule 1.

**Marginal Reliability Impact** is the change, with respect to an increment of capacity supply, in expected unserved energy due to resource deficiency, as measured in hours per year.

**Market Credit Limit** is a credit limit for a Market Participant's Financial Assurance Obligations (except FTR Financial Assurance Requirements) established for each Market Participant in accordance with Section II.C of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**Market Credit Test Percentage** is calculated in accordance with Section III.B.1(a) of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**Market Efficiency Transmission Upgrade** is defined as those additions and upgrades that are not related to the interconnection of a generator, and, in the ISO's determination, are designed to reduce bulk power system costs to load system-wide, where the net present value of the reduction in bulk power system costs to load system-wide exceeds the net present value of the cost of the transmission addition or upgrade. For purposes of this definition, the term "bulk power system costs to load system-wide" includes, but is not limited to, the costs of energy, capacity, reserves, losses and impacts on bilateral prices for electricity.

**Market Participant** is a participant in the New England Markets (including a FTR-Only Customer) that has executed a Market Participant Service Agreement, or on whose behalf an unexecuted Market Participant Service Agreement has been filed with the Commission.

**Market Participant Financial Assurance Requirement** is defined in Section III of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**Market Participant Service Agreement (MPSA)** is an agreement between the ISO and a Market Participant, in the form specified in Attachment A or Attachment A-1 to the Tariff, as applicable.

**Market Rule 1** is ISO Market Rule 1 and appendices set forth in Section III of this ISO New England Inc. Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff, as it may be amended from time to time.

**Market Violation** is a tariff violation, violation of a Commission-approved order, rule or regulation, market manipulation, or inappropriate dispatch that creates substantial concerns regarding unnecessary market inefficiencies.

**Material Adverse Change** is any change in financial status including, but not limited to a downgrade to below an Investment Grade Rating by any Rating Agency, being placed on credit watch with negative implication by any Rating Agency if the Market Participant or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer does not have an Investment Grade Rating, a bankruptcy filing or other insolvency, a report of a significant quarterly loss or decline of earnings, the resignation of key officer(s), the sanctioning of the Market Participant or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer or any of its Principles imposed by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, the Securities Exchange Commission, any exchange monitored by the National Futures Association, or any state entity responsible for regulating activity in energy markets; the filing of a material lawsuit that could materially adversely impact current or future financial results; a significant change in the Market Participant's or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer's credit default spreads; or a significant change in market capitalization.

**Material Adverse Impact** is defined, for purposes of review of ITC-proposed plans, as a proposed facility or project will be deemed to cause a "material adverse impact" on facilities outside of the ITC System if: (i) the proposed facility or project causes non-ITC facilities to exceed their capabilities or exceed their thermal, voltage or stability limits, consistent with all applicable reliability criteria, or (ii) the proposed facility or project would not satisfy the standards set forth in Section I.3.9 of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff. This standard is intended to assure the continued service of all non-ITC firm load customers and the ability of the non-ITC systems to meet outstanding transmission service obligations.

**Maximum Capacity Limit** is a value calculated as described in Section III.12.2.2 of Market Rule 1.

**Maximum Consumption Limit** is the maximum amount, in MW, available for economic dispatch from a DARD and is based on the physical characteristics as submitted as part of the DARD's Offer Data. A

Market Participant must maintain an up-to-date Maximum Consumption Limit (and where applicable, must provide the ISO with any telemetry required by ISO New England Operating Procedure No. 18 to allow the ISO to maintain an updated Maximum Consumption Limit) for all hours in which a DARD has been offered into the Day-Ahead Energy Market or Real-Time Energy Market.

**Maximum Daily Consumption Limit** is the maximum amount of megawatt-hours that a Storage DARD expects to be able to consume in the next Operating Day.

**Maximum Facility Load** is the highest demand of an end-use customer facility since the start of the prior calendar year (or, if unavailable, an estimate thereof), where the demand evaluated is established by adding metered demand measured at the Retail Delivery Point and the output of all generators located behind the Retail Delivery Point in the same time intervals.

**Maximum Interruptible Capacity** is an estimate of the maximum demand reduction and Net Supply that a Demand Response Asset can deliver, as measured at the Retail Delivery Point.

**Maximum Load** is the highest demand since the start of the prior calendar year (or, if unavailable, an estimate thereof), as measured at the Retail Delivery Point.

**Maximum Number of Daily Starts** is the maximum number of times that a Binary Storage DARD or a Generator Asset can be started or that a Demand Response Resource can be interrupted in the next Operating Day under normal operating conditions.

**Maximum Reduction** is the maximum available demand reduction, in MW, of a Demand Response Resource that a Market Participant offers to deliver in the Day-Ahead Energy Market or Real-Time Energy Market, as reflected in the Demand Response Resource's Demand Reduction Offer.

**Measure Life** is the estimated time an On-Peak Demand Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource measure will remain in place, or the estimated time period over which the facility, structure, equipment or system in which a measure is installed continues to exist, whichever is shorter. Suppliers of On-Peak Demand Resources or Seasonal Peak Demand Resources comprised of an aggregation of measures with varied Measures Lives shall determine and document the Measure Life either: (i) for each type of measure with a different Measure Life and adjust the aggregate performance based on the individual measure life

calculation in the portfolio; or (ii) as the average Measure Life for the aggregated measures as long as the demand reduction capability of the resource is greater than or equal to the amount that cleared in the Forward Capacity Auction or reconfiguration auction for the entire Capacity Commitment Period, and the demand reduction capability for an Existing On-Peak Demand Resource or Existing Seasonal Peak Demand Resource is not over-stated in a subsequent Capacity Commitment Period. Measure Life shall be determined consistent with the resource's Measurement and Verification Plan, which shall be reviewed by the ISO to ensure consistency with the measurement and verification requirements of Market Rule 1 and the ISO New England Manuals.

**Measurement and Verification Documents** mean the measurement and verification documents described in Section 13.1.4.3.1 of Market Rule 1 that are submitted by On-Peak Demand Resources and Seasonal Peak Demand Resources, which include Measurement and Verification Plans, Updated Measurement and Verification Plans, Measurement and Verification Summary Reports, and Measurement and Verification Reference Reports.

**Measurement and Verification Plan** means the measurement and verification plan submitted by an On-Peak Demand Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource as part of the qualification process for the Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to the requirements of Section III.13.1.4.3 of Market Rule 1 and the ISO New England Manuals.

**Measurement and Verification Reference Reports** are optional reports submitted by On-Peak Demand Resources or Seasonal Peak Demand Resources during the Capacity Commitment Period subject to the schedule in the Measurement and Verification Plan and consistent with the schedule and reporting standards set forth in the ISO New England Manuals. Measurement and Verification Reference Reports update the prospective demand reduction capability of the On-Peak Demand Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource project based on measurement and verification studies performed during the Capacity Commitment Period.

**Measurement and Verification Summary Report** is the monthly report submitted by an On-Peak Demand Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource with the monthly settlement report for the Forward Capacity Market, which documents the total demand reduction capability for all On-Peak Demand Resources and Seasonal Peak Demand Resources in operation as of the end of the previous month.

**MEPCO Grandfathered Transmission Service Agreement (MG TSA)** is a MEPCO long-term firm point-to-point transmission service agreement with a POR or POD at the New Brunswick border and a start date prior to June 1, 2007 where the holder has elected, by written notice delivered to MEPCO within five (5) days following the filing of the settlement agreement in Docket Nos. ER07-1289 and EL08-56 or by September 1, 2008 (whichever is later), MG TSA treatment as further described in Section II.45.1.

**Merchant Transmission Facilities (MTF)** are the transmission facilities owned by MTOs, defined and classified as MTF pursuant to Schedule 18 of the OATT, over which the ISO shall exercise Operating Authority in accordance with the terms set forth in a MTOA or Attachment K to the OATT, rated 69 kV or above and required to allow energy from significant power sources to move freely on the New England Transmission System.

**Merchant Transmission Facilities Provider (MTF Provider)** is an entity as defined in Schedule 18 of the OATT.

**Merchant Transmission Facilities Service (MTF Service)** is transmission service over MTF as provided for in Schedule 18 of the OATT.

**Merchant Transmission Operating Agreement (MTOA)** is an agreement between the ISO and an MTO with respect to its MTF.

**Merchant Transmission Owner (MTO)** is an owner of MTF.

**Meter Data Error** means an error in meter data, including an error in Coincident Peak Contribution values, on an Invoice issued by the ISO after the completion of the Data Reconciliation Process as described in the ISO New England Manuals and in Section III.3.8 of Market Rule 1.

**Meter Data Error RBA Submission Limit** means the date thirty 30 calendar days after the issuance of the Invoice containing the results of the Data Reconciliation Process as described in the ISO New England Manuals and in Section III.3.6 of Market Rule 1.

**Metered Quantity For Settlement** is defined in Section III.3.2.1.1 of Market Rule 1.

**Minimum Consumption Limit** is (a) the lowest consumption level, in MW, available for economic dispatch from a DARD and is based on the physical characteristics as submitted as part of the DARD's Offer Data, and (b) for a DARD undergoing Facility and Equipment Testing or auditing, the level to which the DARD requests and is approved to operate or is directed to operate for purposes of completing the Facility and Equipment Testing or auditing.

**Minimum Down Time** is the number of hours that must elapse after a Generator Asset or Storage DARD has been released for shutdown at or below its Economic Minimum Limit or Minimum Consumption Limit before the Generator Asset or Storage DARD can be brought online and be released for dispatch at its Economic Minimum Limit or Minimum Consumption Limit.

**Minimum Generation Emergency** means an Emergency declared by the ISO in which the ISO anticipates requesting one or more Generator Assets to operate at or below Economic Minimum Limit in order to manage, alleviate, or end the Emergency.

**Minimum Generation Emergency Credits** are those Real-Time Dispatch NCPC Credits calculated pursuant to Appendix F of Market Rule 1 for resources within a reliability region that are dispatched during a period for which a Minimum Generation Emergency has been declared.

**Minimum Reduction** is the minimum available demand reduction, in MW, of a Demand Response Resource that a Market Participant offers to deliver in the Day-Ahead Energy Market or Real-Time Energy Market, as reflected in the Demand Response Resource's Demand Reduction Offer.

**Minimum Reduction Time** is the minimum number of hours of demand reduction at or above the Minimum Reduction for which the ISO must dispatch a Demand Response Resource to reduce demand.

**Minimum Run Time** is the number of hours that a Generator Asset must remain online after it has been scheduled to reach its Economic Minimum Limit before it can be released for shutdown from its Economic Minimum Limit or the number of hours that must elapse after a Storage DARD has been scheduled to consume at its Minimum Consumption Limit before it can be released for shutdown.

**Minimum Time Between Reductions** is the number of hours that must elapse after a Demand Response Resource has received a Dispatch Instruction to stop reducing demand before the Demand Response Resource can achieve its Minimum Reduction after receiving a Dispatch Instruction to start reducing demand.

**Minimum Total Reserve Requirement**, which does not include Replacement Reserve, is the combined amount of TMSR, TMNSR, and TMOR required system-wide as described in Section III.2.7A and ISO New England Operating Procedure No. 8.

**Monthly Blackstart Service Charge** is the charge made to Transmission Customers pursuant to Section 6 of Schedule 16 to the OATT.

**Monthly Capacity Payment** is the Forward Capacity Market payment described in Section III.13.7.3 of Market Rule 1.

**Monthly Peak** is defined in Section II.21.2 of the OATT.

**Monthly PER** is calculated in accordance with Section III.13.7.1.2.2 of Market Rule 1.

**Monthly Real-Time Demand Reduction Obligation** is the absolute value of a Customer's hourly Real-Time Demand Reduction Obligation summed for all hours in a month, in MWs.

**Monthly Real-Time Generation Obligation** is the sum, for all hours in a month, at all Locations, of a Customer's Real-Time Generation Obligation, in MWs.

**Monthly Real-Time Load Obligation** is the absolute value of a Customer's hourly Real-Time Load Obligation summed for all hours in a month, in MWs.

**Monthly Regional Network Load** is defined in Section II.21.2 of the OATT.

**Monthly Statement** is the first weekly Statement issued on a Monday after the tenth of a calendar month that includes both the Hourly Charges for the relevant billing period and Non-Hourly Charges for the immediately preceding calendar month.

**MRI Transition Period** is the period specified in Section III.13.2.2.1.

**MUI** is the market user interface.

**Municipal Market Participant** is defined in Section II of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**MW** is megawatt.

**MWh** is megawatt-hour.

**Native Load Customers** are the wholesale and retail power customers of a Transmission Owner on whose behalf the Transmission Owner, by statute, franchise, regulatory requirement, or contract, has undertaken an obligation to construct and operate its system to meet the reliable electric needs of such customers.

**NCPC Charge** means the charges to Market Participants calculated pursuant to Appendix F to Market Rule 1.

**NCPC Credit** means the credits to Market Participants calculated pursuant to Appendix F to Market Rule 1.

**Needs Assessment** is defined in Section 4.1 of Attachment K to the OATT.

**NEMA**, for purposes of Section III of the Tariff, is the Northeast Massachusetts Reliability Region.

**NEMA Contract** is a contract described in Appendix C of Market Rule 1 and listed in Exhibit 1 of Appendix C of Market Rule 1.

**NEMA Load Serving Entity (NEMA LSE)** is a Transmission Customer or Congestion Paying LSE Entity that serves load within NEMA.



**NEMA or Northeast Massachusetts Upgrade**, for purposes of Section II of the Tariff, is an addition to or modification of the PTF into or within the Northeast Massachusetts Reliability Region that was not, as of December 31, 1999, the subject of a System Impact Study or application filed pursuant to Section I.3.9 of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff; that is not related to generation interconnections; and that will be completed and placed in service by June 30, 2004. Such upgrades include, but are not limited to, new transmission facilities and related equipment and/or modifications to existing transmission facilities and related equipment. The list of NEMA Upgrades is contained in Schedule 12A of the OATT.

**NEPOOL** is the New England Power Pool, and the entities that collectively participated in the New England Power Pool.

**NEPOOL Agreement** is the agreement among the participants in NEPOOL.

**NEPOOL GIS** is the generation information system.

**NEPOOL GIS Administrator** is the entity or entities that develop, administer, operate and maintain the NEPOOL GIS.

**NEPOOL GIS API Fees** are the one-time on-boarding fees and annual maintenance fees charged to NEPOOL by the NEPOOL GIS Administrator for each NEPOOL Participant or Market Participant that accesses the NEPOOL GIS through an application programming interface pursuant to Rule 3.9(b) of the operating rules of the NEPOOL GIS.

**NEPOOL Participant** is a party to the NEPOOL Agreement.

**NERC** is the North American Electric Reliability Corporation or its successor organization.

**NESCOE** is the New England States Committee on Electricity, recognized by the Commission as the regional state committee for the New England Control Area.

**Net Commitment Period Compensation (NCPC)** is the compensation methodology for Resources that is described in Appendix F to Market Rule 1.

**Net CONE** is an estimate of the Cost of New Entry, net of non-capacity market revenues, for a reference technology resource type and is intended to equal the amount of capacity revenue the reference technology resource would require to be economically viable given reasonable expectations of the energy and ancillary services revenues under long-term equilibrium conditions.

**Net Regional Clearing Price** is described in Section III.13.7.5 of Market Rule 1.

**Net Supply** is energy injected into the transmission or distribution system at a Retail Delivery Point.

**Net Supply Capability** is the maximum Net Supply a facility is physically and contractually able to inject into the transmission or distribution system at its Retail Delivery Point.

**Network Capability Interconnection Standard** has the meaning specified in Section I of Schedule 22, Attachment 1 to Schedule 23, and Section I of Schedule 25 of the OATT.

**Network Customer** is a Transmission Customer receiving RNS or LNS.

**Network Import Capability (NI Capability)** is defined in Section I of Schedule 25 of the OATT.

**Network Import Interconnection Service (NI Interconnection Service)** is defined in Section I of Schedule 25 of the OATT.

**Network Resource** is defined as follows: (1) With respect to Market Participants, (a) any generating resource located in the New England Control Area which has been placed in service prior to the Compliance Effective Date (including a unit that has lost its capacity value when its capacity value is restored and a deactivated unit which may be reactivated without satisfying the requirements of Section II.46 of the OATT in accordance with the provisions thereof) until retired; (b) any generating resource located in the New England Control Area which is placed in service after the Compliance Effective Date until retired, provided that (i) the Generator Owner has complied with the requirements of Sections II.46 and II.47 and Schedules 22 and 23 of the OATT, and (ii) the output of the unit shall be limited in accordance with Sections II.46 and II.47 and Schedules 22 and 23, if required; and (c) any generating resource or combination of resources (including bilateral purchases) located outside the New England Control Area for so long as any Market Participant has an Ownership Share in the resource or resources

which is being delivered to it in the New England Control Area to serve Regional Network Load located in the New England Control Area or other designated Regional Network Loads contemplated by Section II.18.3 of the OATT taking Regional Network Service. (2) With respect to Non-Market Participant Transmission Customers, any generating resource owned, purchased or leased by the Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer which it designates to serve Regional Network Load.

**New Brunswick Security Energy** is defined in Section III.3.2.6A of Market Rule 1.

**New Capacity Offer** is an offer in the Forward Capacity Auction to provide capacity from a New Generating Capacity Resource, New Import Capacity Resource or New Demand Capacity Resource.

**New Capacity Qualification Deadline** is a deadline, specified in Section III.13.1.10 of Market Rule 1, for submission of certain qualification materials for the Forward Capacity Auction, as discussed in Section III.13.1 of Market Rule 1.

**New Capacity Qualification Package** is information submitted by certain new resources prior to participation in the Forward Capacity Auction, as described in Section III.13.1 of Market Rule 1.

**New Capacity Resource** is a resource (i) that never previously received any payment as a capacity resource including any capacity payment pursuant to the market rules in effect prior to June 1, 2010 and that has not cleared in any previous Forward Capacity Auction; or (ii) that is otherwise eligible to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Capacity Resource.

**New Capacity Show of Interest Form** is described in Section III.13.1.1.2.1 of Market Rule 1.

**New Capacity Show of Interest Submission Window** is the period of time during which a Project Sponsor may submit a New Capacity Show of Interest Form or a New Demand Capacity Resource Show of Interest Form, as described in Section III.13.1.10 of Market Rule 1.

**New Demand Capacity Resource** is a type of Demand Capacity Resource participating in the Forward Capacity Market, as defined in Section III.13.1.4.1 of Market Rule 1.

**New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package** is the information that a Project Sponsor must submit, in accordance with Section III.13.1.4.1.1.2 of Market Rule 1, for each resource that it seeks to offer in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Demand Capacity Resource.

**New Demand Capacity Resource Show of Interest Form** is described in Section III.13.1.4.1.1.1 of Market Rule 1.

**New England Control Area** is the Control Area for New England, which includes PTF, Non-PTF, MTF and OTF. The New England Control Area covers Connecticut, Rhode Island, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Vermont, and part of Maine (i.e., excluding the portions of Northern Maine and the northern portion of Eastern Maine which are in the Maritimes Control Area).

**New England Markets** are markets or programs for the purchase of energy, capacity, ancillary services, demand response services or other related products or services (including Financial Transmission Rights) that are delivered through or useful to the operation of the New England Transmission System and that are administered by the ISO pursuant to rules, rates, or agreements on file from time to time with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.

**New England System Restoration Plan** is the plan that is developed by ISO, in accordance with NERC Reliability Standards, NPCC regional criteria and standards, ISO New England Operating Documents and ISO operating agreements, to facilitate the restoration of the New England Transmission System following a partial or complete shutdown of the New England Transmission System.

**New England Transmission System** is the system of transmission facilities, including PTF, Non-PTF, OTF and MTF, within the New England Control Area under the ISO's operational jurisdiction.

**New Generating Capacity Resource** is a type of resource participating in the Forward Capacity Market, as described in Section III.13.1.1.1 of Market Rule 1.

**New Import Capacity Resource** is a type of resource participating in the Forward Capacity Market, as defined in Section III.13.1.3.4 of Market Rule 1.

**New Resource Offer Floor Price** is defined in Section III.A.21.~~32~~.

**NMPTC** means Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer.

**NMPTC Credit Threshold** is described in Section V.A.2 of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**NMPTC Financial Assurance Requirement** is an amount of additional financial assurance for Non-Market Participant Transmission Customers described in Section V.D of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**Node** is a point on the New England Transmission System at which LMPs are calculated.

**No-Load Fee** is the amount, in dollars per hour, for a Generator Asset that must be paid to Market Participants with an Ownership Share in the Generator Asset for being scheduled in the New England Markets, in addition to the Start-Up Fee and price offered to supply energy, for each hour that the Generator Asset is scheduled in the New England Markets.

**Nominated Consumption Limit** is the consumption level specified by the Market Participant for a Dispatchable Asset Related Demand as adjusted in accordance with the provisions of Section III.13.7.5.1.3.

**Non-Commercial Capacity** is the capacity of a New Capacity Resource or an Existing Capacity Resource, or portion thereof, that has not achieved FCM Commercial Operation.

**Non-Commercial Capacity Cure Period** is the time period described in Section VII.D of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**Non-Commercial Capacity Financial Assurance Amount (Non-Commercial Capacity FA Amount)** is the financial assurance amount held on Non-Commercial Capacity cleared in a Forward Capacity Auction as calculated in accordance with Section VII.B.2 of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**Non-Designated Blackstart Resource Study Cost Payments** are the study costs reimbursed under Section 5.3 of Schedule 16 of the OATT.

**Non-Dispatchable Resource** is any Resource that does not meet the requirements to be a Dispatchable Resource.

**Non-Hourly Charges** are defined in Section 1.3 of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

**Non-Hourly Requirements** are determined in accordance with Section III.A(ii) of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy, which is Exhibit 1A of Section I of the Tariff.

**Non-Incumbent Transmission Developer** is a Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor that: (i) is not currently a PTO; (ii) has a transmission project listed in the RSP Project List; and (iii) has executed a Non-Incumbent Transmission Developer Operating Agreement. “Non-Incumbent Transmission Developer” also includes a PTO that proposes the development of a transmission facility not located within or connected to its existing electric system; however, because such a PTO is a party to the TOA, it is not required to enter into a Non-Incumbent Transmission Developer Operating Agreement.

**Non-Incumbent Transmission Developer Operating Agreement (or NTDOA)** is an agreement between the ISO and a Non-Incumbent Transmission Developer in the form specified in Attachment O to the OATT that sets forth their respective rights and responsibilities to each other with regard to proposals for and construction of certain transmission facilities.

**Non-Market Participant** is any entity that is not a Market Participant.

**Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer** is any entity which is not a Market Participant but is a Transmission Customer.

**Non-Municipal Market Participant** is defined in Section II of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**Non-PTF Transmission Facilities (Non-PTF)** are the transmission facilities owned by the PTOs that do not constitute PTF, OTF or MTF.

**Non-Qualifying** means a Market Participant that is not a Credit Qualifying Market Participant.

**Notice of RBA** is defined in Section 6.3.2 of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

**Notification Time** is the time required for a Generator Asset to synchronize to the system from the time a startup Dispatch Instruction is received from the ISO.

**Northeastern Planning Protocol** is the Amended and Restated Northeastern ISO/RTO Planning Coordination Protocol on file with the Commission and posted on the ISO website at the following URL:  
[www.iso-ne.com/static-assets/documents/2015/07/northeastern\\_protocol\\_dmeast.doc](http://www.iso-ne.com/static-assets/documents/2015/07/northeastern_protocol_dmeast.doc).

**NPCC** is the Northeast Power Coordinating Council.

**Obligation Month** means a time period of one calendar month for which capacity payments are issued and the costs associated with capacity payments are allocated.

**Offer Data** means the scheduling, operations planning, dispatch, new Resource, and other data, including Generator Asset, Dispatchable Asset Related Demand, and Demand Response Resource operating limits based on physical characteristics, and information necessary to schedule and dispatch Generator Assets, Dispatchable Asset Related Demands, and Demand Response Resources for the provision or consumption of energy, the provision of other services, and the maintenance of the reliability and security of the transmission system in the New England Control Area, and specified for submission to the New England Markets for such purposes by the ISO.

~~**Offer Review Trigger Prices** are the prices specified in Section III.A.21.1 of Market Rule 1 associated with the submission of New Capacity Offers in the Forward Capacity Auction.~~

**Offered CLAIM10** is a Supply Offer value or a Demand Reduction Offer value between 0 and the CLAIM10 of the resource that represents the amount of TMNSR available either from an off-line Fast Start Generator or from a Fast Start Demand Response Resource that has not been dispatched.

**Offered CLAIM30** is a Supply Offer value or a Demand Reduction Offer value between 0 and the CLAIM30 of the resource that represents the amount of TMOR available either from an off-line Fast Start Generator or from a Fast Start Demand Response Resource that has not been dispatched.

**On-Peak Demand Resource** is a type of Demand Capacity Resource and means installed measures (e.g., products, equipment, systems, services, practices and/or strategies) on end-use customer facilities that reduce the total amount of electrical energy consumed during Demand Resource On-Peak Hours, while delivering a comparable or acceptable level of end-use service. Such measures include Energy Efficiency, Load Management, and Distributed Generation.

**Open Access Same-Time Information System (OASIS)** is the ISO information system and standards of conduct responding to requirements of 18 C.F.R. §37 of the Commission's regulations and all additional requirements implemented by subsequent Commission orders dealing with OASIS.

**Open Access Transmission Tariff (OATT)** is Section II of the ISO New England Inc. Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff.

**Operating Authority** is defined pursuant to a MTOA, an OTOA, the TOA or the OATT, as applicable.

**Operating Data** means GADS Data, data equivalent to GADS Data, CARL Data, metered load data, or actual system failure occurrences data, all as described in the ISO New England Operating Procedures.

**Operating Day** means the calendar day period beginning at midnight for which transactions on the New England Markets are scheduled.

**Operating Reserve** means Ten-Minute Spinning Reserve (TMSR), Ten-Minute Non-Spinning Reserve (TMNSR) and Thirty-Minute Operating Reserve (TMOR).

**Operations Date** is February 1, 2005.

**OTF Service** is transmission service over OTF as provided for in Schedule 20.



**Other Transmission Facility (OTF)** are the transmission facilities owned by Transmission Owners, defined and classified as OTF pursuant to Schedule 20, over which the ISO shall exercise Operating Authority in accordance with the terms set forth in the OTOA, rated 69 kV or above, and required to allow energy from significant power sources to move freely on the New England Transmission System. OTF classification shall be limited to the Phase I/II HVDC-TF.

**Other Transmission Operating Agreements (OTOA)** is the agreement(s) between the ISO, an OTO and/or the associated service provider(s) with respect to an OTF, which includes the HVDC Transmission Operating Agreement and the Phase I/II HVDC-TF Transmission Service Administration Agreement. With respect to the Phase I/II HVDC-TF, the HVDC Transmission Operating Agreement covers the rights and responsibilities for the operation of the facility and the Phase I/II HVDC-TF Transmission Service Administration Agreement covers the rights and responsibilities for the administration of transmission service.

**Other Transmission Owner (OTO)** is an owner of OTF.

**Ownership Share** is a right or obligation, for purposes of settlement, to a percentage share of all credits or charges associated with a Generator Asset or a Load Asset, where such facility is interconnected to the New England Transmission System.

**Participant Expenses** are defined in Section 1 of the Participants Agreement.

**Participant Required Balance** is defined in Section 5.3 of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

**Participant Vote** is defined in Section 1 of the Participants Agreement.

**Participants Agreement** is the agreement among the ISO, the New England Power Pool and Individual Participants, as amended from time to time, on file with the Commission.

**Participants Committee** is the principal committee referred to in the Participants Agreement.

**Participating Transmission Owner (PTO)** is a transmission owner that is a party to the TOA.

**Passive DR Audit** is the audit performed pursuant to Section III.13.6.1.5.4.

**Passive DR Auditing Period** is the summer Passive DR Auditing Period (June 1 to August 31) or winter Passive DR Auditing Period (December 1 to January 31) applicable to On-Peak Demand Resources and Seasonal Peak Demand Resources.

**Payment** is a sum of money due to a Covered Entity from the ISO.

**Payment Default Shortfall Fund** is defined in Section 5.1 of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

**Peak Energy Rent (PER)** is described in Section III.13.7.1.2 of Market Rule 1.

**PER Proxy Unit** is described in Section III.13.7.1.2.1 of Market Rule 1.

**Permanent De-list Bid** is a bid that may be submitted by an Existing Generating Capacity Resource, Existing Import Capacity Resource, or Existing Demand Capacity Resource in the Forward Capacity Auction to permanently remove itself from the capacity market, as described in Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5 of Market Rule 1.

**Phase I Transfer Credit** is 40% of the HQICC, or such other fraction of the HQICC as the ISO may establish.

**Phase I/II HVDC-TF** is defined in Schedule 20A to Section II of this Tariff.

**Phase I/II HVDC-TF Transfer Capability** is the transfer capacity of the Phase I/II HVDC-TF under normal operating conditions, as determined in accordance with Good Utility Practice. The “Phase I Transfer Capability” is the transfer capacity under normal operating conditions, as determined in accordance with Good Utility Practice, of the Phase I terminal facilities as determined initially as of the time immediately prior to Phase II of the Phase I/II HVDC-TF first being placed in service, and as adjusted thereafter only to take into account changes in the transfer capacity which are independent of any effect of Phase II on the operation of Phase I. The “Phase II Transfer Capability” is the difference between the Phase I/II HVDC-TF Transfer Capability and the Phase I Transfer Capability.

Determinations of, and any adjustment in, Phase I/II HVDC-TF Transfer Capability shall be made by the ISO, and the basis for any such adjustment shall be explained in writing and posted on the ISO website.

**Phase One Proposal** is a first round submission, as defined in Section 4.3 of Attachment K of the OATT, of a proposal for a Reliability Transmission Upgrade or Market Efficiency Transmission Upgrade, as applicable, by a Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor.

**Phase II Transfer Credit** is 60% of the HQICC, or such other fraction of the HQICC as the ISO may establish.

**Phase Two Solution** is a second round submission, as defined in Section 4.3 of Attachment K of the OATT, of a proposal for a Reliability Transmission Upgrade or Market Efficiency Transmission Upgrade by a Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor.

**Planning Advisory Committee** is the committee described in Attachment K of the OATT.

**Planning and Reliability Criteria** is defined in Section 3.3 of Attachment K to the OATT.

**Planning Authority** is an entity defined as such by the North American Electric Reliability Corporation.

**Point(s) of Delivery (POD)** is point(s) of interconnection where capacity and/or energy transmitted by a Transmission Customer will be made available to the Receiving Party under the OATT.

**Point of Interconnection** shall have the same meaning as that used for purposes of Schedules 22, 23 and 25 of the OATT.

**Point(s) of Receipt (POR)** is point(s) of interconnection where capacity and/or energy transmitted by a Transmission Customer will be made available by the Delivering Party under the OATT.

**Point-To-Point Service** is the transmission of capacity and/or energy on either a firm or non-firm basis from the Point(s) of Receipt to the Point(s) of Delivery under the OATT pursuant to Local Point-To-Point Service or OTF Service or MTF Service; and the transmission of capacity and/or energy from the Point(s) of Receipt to the Point(s) of Delivery under the OATT pursuant to Through or Out Service.

**Pool-Planned Unit** is one of the following units: New Haven Harbor Unit 1 (Coke Works), Mystic Unit 7, Canal Unit 2, Potter Unit 2, Wyman Unit 4, Stony Brook Units 1, 1A, 1B, 1C, 2A and 2B, Millstone Unit 3, Seabrook Unit 1 and Waters River Unit 2 (to the extent of 7 megawatts of its Summer capability and 12 megawatts of its Winter capability).

**Pool PTF Rate** is the transmission rate determined in accordance with Schedule 8 to the OATT.

**Pool RNS Rate** is the transmission rate determined in accordance with paragraph (2) of Schedule 9 of Section II of the Tariff.

**Pool-Scheduled Resources** are described in Section III.1.10.2 of Market Rule 1.

**Pool Supported PTF** is defined as: (i) PTF first placed in service prior to January 1, 2000; (ii) Generator Interconnection Related Upgrades with respect to Category A and B projects (as defined in Schedule 11), but only to the extent not paid for by the interconnecting Generator Owner; and (iii) other PTF upgrades, but only to the extent the costs therefore are determined to be Pool Supported PTF in accordance with Schedule 12.

**Pool Transmission Facility (PTF)** means the transmission facilities owned by PTOs which meet the criteria specified in Section II.49 of the OATT.

**Posting Entity** is any Market Participant or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer providing financial security under the provisions of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**Posture** means an action of the ISO to deviate from the jointly optimized security constrained economic dispatch for Energy and Operating Reserves solution for a Resource produced by the ISO's technical software for the purpose of maintaining sufficient Operating Reserve (both online and off-line) or for the provision of voltage or VAR support.

**Posturing Credits** are the Real-Time Posturing NCPC Credits for Generators (Other Than Limited Energy Resources) Postured for Reliability and the Real-Time Posturing NCPC Credit for Limited Energy Resources Postured for Reliability.

**Power Purchaser** is the entity that is purchasing the capacity and/or energy to be transmitted under the OATT.

**Principal** is (i) the sole proprietor of a sole proprietorship; (ii) a general partner of a partnership; (iii) a president, chief executive officer, chief operating officer or chief financial officer (or equivalent position) of an organization; (iv) a manager, managing member or a member vested with the management authority for a limited liability company or limited liability partnership; (v) any person or entity that has the power to exercise a controlling influence over an organization's activities that are subject to regulation by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, any exchange monitored by the National Futures Association, or any state entity responsible for regulating activity in energy markets; or (vi) any person or entity that: (a) is the direct owner of 10% or more of any class of an organization's equity securities; or (b) has directly contributed 10% or more of an organization's capital.

**Profiled Load Assets** include all Load Assets that are not directly metered by OP-18 compliant metering as currently described in Section IV (Metering and Recording for Settlements) of OP18, and some Load Assets that are measured by OP-18 compliant metering (as currently described in Section IV of OP-18) to which the Host Participant Assigned Meter Reader allocates non-PTF losses.

**Project Sponsor** is an entity seeking to have a New Generating Capacity Resource, New Import Capacity Resource or New Demand Capacity Resource participate in the Forward Capacity Market, as described in Section III.13.

**Proxy De-List Bid** is a type of bid used in the Forward Capacity Market.

**Provisional Member** is defined in Section I.68A of the Restated NEPOOL Agreement.

**PTO Administrative Committee** is the committee referred to in Section 11.04 of the TOA.

**Public Policy Requirement** is a requirement reflected in a statute enacted by, or a regulation promulgated by, the federal government or a state or local (e.g., municipal or county) government.

**Public Policy Transmission Study** is a study conducted by the ISO pursuant to the process set out in Section 4A.3 of Attachment K of the OATT, and consists of two phases: (i) an initial phase to produce a rough estimate of the costs and benefits of concepts that could meet transmission needs driven by public policy requirements; and (ii) a follow-on phase designed to produce more detailed analysis and engineering work on transmission concepts identified in the first phase.

**Public Policy Local Transmission Study** is a study conducted by a PTO pursuant to the process set out in Section 1.6 of Attachment K Appendix 1 of the OATT, and consists of two phases: (i) an initial phase to produce an estimate of the costs and benefits of concepts that could meet transmission needs driven by public policy requirements; and (ii) a follow-on phase designed to produce more detailed analysis and engineering work on transmission concepts identified in the first phase.

**Public Policy Transmission Upgrade** is an addition and/or upgrade to the New England Transmission System that meets the voltage and non-voltage criteria for Public Policy Transmission Upgrade PTF classification specified in the OATT, and has been included in the Regional System Plan and RSP Project List as a Public Policy Transmission Upgrade pursuant to the procedures described in Section 4A of Attachment K of the OATT.

**Publicly Owned Entity** is defined in Section I of the Restated NEPOOL Agreement.

**Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit** is described in Section III.13.1.9.3 of Market Rule 1.

**Qualified Capacity** is the amount of capacity a resource may provide in the summer or winter in a Capacity Commitment Period, as determined in the Forward Capacity Market qualification processes.

**Qualified Generator Reactive Resource(s)** is any generator source of dynamic reactive power that meets the criteria specified in Schedule 2 of the OATT.

**Qualified Non-Generator Reactive Resource(s)** is any non-generator source of dynamic reactive power that meets the criteria specified in Schedule 2 of the OATT.

**Qualified Reactive Resource(s)** is any Qualified Generator Reactive Resource and/or Qualified Non-Generator Reactive Resource that meets the criteria specified in Schedule 2 of the OATT.

**Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor** is defined in Sections 4B.2 and 4B.3 of Attachment K of the OATT.

**Queue Position** has the meaning specified in Section I of Schedule 22, Attachment 1 to Schedule 23, and Section I of Schedule 25 of the OATT.

**Rapid Response Pricing Asset** is: (i) a Fast Start Generator; (ii) a Flexible DNE Dispatchable Generator; or (iii) a Binary Storage DARD with Offer Data specifying a Minimum Run Time and a Minimum Down Time not exceeding one hour each. A Rapid Response Pricing Asset shall also include a Fast Start Demand Response Resource for which the Market Participant's Offer Data meets the following criteria: (i) Minimum Reduction Time does not exceed one hour; and (ii) Demand Response Resource Notification Time plus Demand Response Resource Start-Up Time does not exceed 30 minutes.

**Rapid Response Pricing Opportunity Cost** is the NCPC Credit described in Section III.F.2.3.10.

**Rated** means a Market Participant that receives a credit rating from one or more of the Rating Agencies, or, if such Market Participant is not rated by one of the Rating Agencies, then a Market Participant that has outstanding unsecured debt rated by one or more of the Rating Agencies.

**Rating Agencies** are Standard and Poor's (S&P), Moody's, and Fitch.

**Rationing Minimum Limit** is the MW quantity for a New Generating Capacity Resource or Existing Generating Capacity Resource below which an offer or bid may not be rationed in the Forward Capacity Auction, but shall not apply to supply offers or demand bids in a substitution auction as specified in Section III.13.2.8.2 and Section III.13.2.8.3.

**RBA Decision** is a written decision provided by the ISO to a Disputing Party and to the Chair of the NEPOOL Budget and Finance Subcommittee accepting or denying a Requested Billing Adjustment within twenty Business Days of the date the ISO distributes a Notice of RBA, unless some later date is agreed upon by the Disputing Party and the ISO.

**Reactive Capability Audit** is an audit that measures the ability of a Reactive Resource to provide or absorb reactive power to or from the transmission system at a specified real power output or consumption.

**Reactive Resource** is a device that dynamically adjusts reactive power output automatically in Real-Time over a continuous range, taking into account control system response bandwidth, within a specified voltage bandwidth in response to grid voltage changes. These resources operate to maintain a set-point voltage and include, but are not limited to, Generator Assets, Dispatchable Asset Related Demands that are part of an Electric Storage Facility, and dynamic transmission devices.

**Reactive Supply and Voltage Control Service** is the form of Ancillary Service described in Schedule 2 of the OATT.

**Real-Time** is a period in the current Operating Day for which the ISO dispatches Resources for energy and Regulation, designates Resources for Regulation and Operating Reserve and, if necessary, commits additional Resources.

**Real-Time Adjusted Load Obligation** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(b) of Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time Adjusted Load Obligation Deviation** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(d) of Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time Commitment NCPC Credit** is an NCPC Credit calculated pursuant to Appendix F to Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time Congestion Revenue** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(i) of Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time Demand Reduction Obligation** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(c) of Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time Demand Reduction Obligation Deviation** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(e) of Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time Dispatch NCPC Credit** is an NCPC Credit calculated pursuant to Appendix F to Market Rule 1.



**Real-Time Energy Inventory** is a component of the spot payment that a Market Participant may receive through the inventoried energy program, as described in Section III.K.3.2.1 of Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time Energy Market** means the purchase or sale of energy, purchase of demand reductions, payment of Congestion Costs, and payment for losses for quantity deviations from the Day-Ahead Energy Market in the Operating Day and designation of and payment for provision of Operating Reserve in Real-Time.

**Real-Time Energy Market Deviation Congestion Charge/Credit** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(g) of Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time Energy Market Deviation Energy Charge/Credit** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(g) of Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time Energy Market Deviation Loss Charge/Credit** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(g) of Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time Energy Market NCPC Credits** are the Real-Time Commitment NCPC Credit and the Real-Time Dispatch NCPC Credit.

**Real-Time External Transaction NCPC Credit** is an NCPC Credit calculated pursuant to Appendix F to Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time Generation Obligation** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(b) of Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time Generation Obligation Deviation** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(d) of Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time High Operating Limit** is the maximum output, in MW, of a Generator Asset that could be achieved, consistent with Good Utility Practice, in response to an ISO request for Energy (including pursuant to Section III.13.6.4 of Market Rule 1), for each hour of the Operating Day, as reflected in the Generator Asset's Offer Data. This value is based on real-time operating conditions and the physical

operating characteristics and operating permits of the facility and must be submitted for all Generator Assets (other than Settlement Only Resources).

**Real-Time Load Obligation** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(b) of Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time Load Obligation Deviation** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(d) of Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time Locational Adjusted Net Interchange** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(b) of Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time Locational Adjusted Net Interchange Deviation** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(d) of Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time Loss Revenue** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(l) of Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time Loss Revenue Charges or Credits** are defined in Section III.3.2.1(m) of Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time NCP Load Obligation** is the maximum hourly value, during a month, of a Market Participant's Real-Time Load Obligation summed over all Locations, excluding exports, in kilowatts.

**Real-Time Offer Change** is a modification to a Supply Offer pursuant to Section III.1.10.9(b).

**Real-Time Posturing NCPC Credit for Generators (Other Than Limited Energy Resources) Postured for Reliability** is an NCPC Credit calculated pursuant to Appendix F to Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time Posturing NCPC Credit for Limited Energy Resources Postured for Reliability** is an NCPC Credit calculated pursuant to Appendix F to Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time Prices** means the Locational Marginal Prices resulting from the ISO's dispatch of the New England Markets in the Operating Day.

**Real-Time Reserve Charge** is a Market Participant's share of applicable system and Reserve Zone Real-Time Operating Reserve costs attributable to meeting the Real-Time Operating Reserve requirement as calculated in accordance with Section III.10 of Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time Reserve Clearing Price** is the Real-Time TMSR, TMNSR or TMOR clearing price, as applicable, for the system and each Reserve Zone that is calculated in accordance with Section III.2.7A of Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time Reserve Credit** is a Market Participant's compensation associated with that Market Participant's Resources' Reserve Quantity For Settlement as calculated in accordance with Section III.10 of Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time Reserve Designation** is the amount, in MW, of Operating Reserve designated to a Resource in Real-Time by the ISO as described in Section III.1.7.19 of Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time Reserve Opportunity Cost** is defined in Section III.2.7A(b) of Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time Synchronous Condensing NCPC Credit** is an NCPC Credit calculated pursuant to Appendix F to Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time System Adjusted Net Interchange** means, for each hour, the sum of Real-Time Locational Adjusted Net Interchange for a Market Participant over all Locations, in kilowatts.

**Receiving Party** is the entity receiving the capacity and/or energy transmitted to Point(s) of Delivery under the OATT.

**Reference Level** is defined in Section III.A.5.7 of Appendix A of Market Rule 1.

**Regional Benefit Upgrade(s) (RBU)** means a Transmission Upgrade that: (i) is rated 115kV or above; (ii) meets all of the non-voltage criteria for PTF classification specified in the OATT; and (iii) is included in the Regional System Plan as either a Reliability Transmission Upgrade or a Market Efficiency Transmission Upgrade identified as needed pursuant to Attachment K of the OATT. The category of RBU shall not include any Transmission Upgrade that has been categorized under any of the other categories specified in Schedule 12 of the OATT (e.g., an Elective Transmission Upgrade shall not also be categorized as an RBU). Any upgrades to transmission facilities rated below 115kV that were

PTF prior to January 1, 2004 shall remain classified as PTF and be categorized as an RBU if, and for so long as, such upgrades meet the criteria for PTF specified in the OATT.

**Regional Network Load** is the load that a Network Customer designates for Regional Network Service under Part II.B of the OATT. The Network Customer's Regional Network Load shall include all load designated by the Network Customer (including losses). A Network Customer may elect to designate less than its total load as Regional Network Load but may not designate only part of the load at a discrete Point of Delivery. Where a Transmission Customer has elected not to designate a particular load at discrete Points of Delivery as Regional Network Load, the Transmission Customer is responsible for making separate arrangements under Part II.C of the OATT for any Point-To-Point Service that may be necessary for such non-designated load. A Network Customer's Monthly Regional Network Load shall be calculated in accordance with Section II.21.2 of the OATT.

**Regional Network Service (RNS)** is the transmission service over the PTF described in Part II.B of the OATT, including such service which is used with respect to Network Resources or Regional Network Load that is not physically interconnected with the PTF.

**Regional Planning Dispute Resolution Process** is described in Section 12 of Attachment K to the OATT.

**Regional System Plan (RSP)** is the plan developed under the process specified in Attachment K of the OATT.

**Regional Transmission Service (RTS)** is Regional Network Service and Through or Out Service as provided over the PTF in accordance with Section II.B, Section II.C, Schedule 8 and Schedule 9 of the OATT.

**Regulation** is the capability of a specific Resource with appropriate telecommunications, control and response capability to respond to an AGC SetPoint.

**Regulation and Frequency Response Service** is the form of Ancillary Service described in Schedule 3 of the OATT. The capability of performing Regulation and Frequency Response Service is referred to as automatic generation control (AGC).

**Regulation Capacity** is the lesser of five times the Automatic Response Rate and one-half of the difference between the Regulation High Limit and the Regulation Low Limit of a Resource capable of providing Regulation.

**Regulation Capacity Requirement** is the amount of Regulation Capacity required to maintain system control and reliability in the New England Control Area as calculated and posted on the ISO website.

**Regulation Capacity Offer** is an offer by a Market Participant to provide Regulation Capacity.

**Regulation High Limit** is an offer parameter that establishes the upper bound for AGC SetPoints and is used in the determination of a Resource's Regulation Capacity.

**Regulation Low Limit** is an offer parameter that establishes the lower bound for AGC SetPoints and is used in the determination of a Resource's Regulation Capacity.

**Regulation Market** is the market described in Section III.14 of Market Rule 1.

**Regulation Resources** are those Alternative Technology Regulation Resources, Generator Assets, and Dispatchable Asset Related Demands that satisfy the requirements of Section III.14.2. Regulation Resources are eligible to participate in the Regulation Market.

**Regulation Service** is the change in output or consumption made in response to changing AGC SetPoints.

**Regulation Service Requirement** is the estimated amount of Regulation Service required to maintain system control and reliability in the New England Control Area as calculated and posted on the ISO website.

**Regulation Service Offer** is an offer by a Market Participant to provide Regulation Service.

**Related Person** is defined pursuant to Section 1.1 of the Participants Agreement.

**Related Transaction** is defined in Section III.1.4.3 of Market Rule 1.

**Reliability Administration Service (RAS)** is the service provided by the ISO, as described in Schedule 3 of Section IV.A of the Tariff, in order to administer the Reliability Markets and provide other reliability-related and informational functions.

**Reliability Committee** is the committee whose responsibilities are specified in Section 8.2.3 of the Participants Agreement.

**Reliability Markets** are, collectively, the ISO's administration of Regulation, the Forward Capacity Market, and Operating Reserve.

**Reliability Region** means any one of the regions identified on the ISO's website. Reliability Regions are intended to reflect the operating characteristics of, and the major transmission constraints on, the New England Transmission System.

**Reliability Transmission Upgrade** means those additions and upgrades not required by the interconnection of a generator that are nonetheless necessary to ensure the continued reliability of the New England Transmission System, taking into account load growth and known resource changes, and include those upgrades necessary to provide acceptable stability response, short circuit capability and system voltage levels, and those facilities required to provide adequate thermal capability and local voltage levels that cannot otherwise be achieved with reasonable assumptions for certain amounts of generation being unavailable (due to maintenance or forced outages) for purposes of long-term planning studies. Good Utility Practice, applicable reliability principles, guidelines, criteria, rules, procedures and standards of ERO and NPCC and any of their successors, applicable publicly available local reliability criteria, and the ISO System Rules, as they may be amended from time to time, will be used to define the system facilities required to maintain reliability in evaluating proposed Reliability Transmission Upgrades. A Reliability Transmission Upgrade may provide market efficiency benefits as well as reliability benefits to the New England Transmission System.

**Remittance Advice** is an issuance from the ISO for the net Payment owed to a Covered Entity where a Covered Entity's total Payments exceed its total Charges in a billing period.

**Remittance Advice Date** is the day on which the ISO issues a Remittance Advice.

**Renewable Technology Resource** is a Generating Capacity Resource or an On-Peak Demand Resource that satisfies the requirements specified in Section III.13.1.1.1.7.

**Re-Offer Period** is the period that normally occurs between the posting of the of the Day-Ahead Energy Market results and 2:00 p.m. on the day before the Operating Day during which a Market Participant may submit revised Supply Offers, revised External Transactions, or revised Demand Bids associated with Dispatchable Asset Related Demands or, revised Demand Reduction Offers associated with Demand Response Resources.

**Replacement Reserve** is described in Part III, Section VII of ISO New England Operating Procedure No. 8.

**Request for Alternative Proposals (RFAP)** is the request described in Attachment K of the OATT.

**Requested Billing Adjustment (RBA)** is defined in Section 6.1 of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

**Required Balance** is an amount as defined in Section 5.3 of the Billing Policy.

**Reseller** is a MGTSA holder that sells, assigns or transfers its rights under its MGTSA, as described in Section II.45.1(a) of the OATT.

**Reserve Adequacy Analysis** is the analysis performed by the ISO to determine if adequate Resources are committed to meet forecasted load, Operating Reserve, and security constraint requirements for the current and next Operating Day.

**Reserve Constraint Penalty Factors (RCPFs)** are rates, in \$/MWh, that are used within the Real-Time dispatch and pricing algorithm to reflect the value of Operating Reserve shortages and are defined in Section III.2.7A(c) of Market Rule 1.

**Reserve Quantity For Settlement** is defined in Section III.10.1 of Market Rule 1.

**Reserve Zone** is defined in Section III.2.7 of Market Rule 1.

**Reserved Capacity** is the maximum amount of capacity and energy that is committed to the Transmission Customer for transmission over the New England Transmission System between the Point(s) of Receipt and the Point(s) of Delivery under Part II.C or Schedule 18, 20 or 21 of the OATT, as applicable. Reserved Capacity shall be expressed in terms of whole kilowatts on a sixty-minute interval (commencing on the clock hour) basis, or, in the case of Reserved Capacity for Local Point-to-Point Service, in terms of whole megawatts on a sixty-minute interval basis.

**Resource** means a Generator Asset, a Dispatchable Asset Related Demand, an External Resource, an External Transaction, or a Demand Response Resource.

**Restated New England Power Pool Agreement (RNA)** is the Second Restated New England Power Pool Agreement, which restated for a second time by an amendment dated as of August 16, 2004 the New England Power Pool Agreement dated September 1, 1971, as the same may be amended and restated from time to time, governing the relationship among the NEPOOL members.

**Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone** is a single Capacity Zone made up of the adjacent Load Zones that are neither export-constrained nor import-constrained.

**Rest of System** is an area established under Section III.2.7(d) of Market Rule 1.

**Retail Delivery Point** is the point on the transmission or distribution system at which the load of an end-use facility, which is metered and assigned a unique account number by the Host Participant, is measured to determine the amount of energy delivered to the facility from the transmission and distribution system. If an end-use facility is connected to the transmission or distribution system at more than one location, the Retail Delivery Point shall consist of the metered load at each connection point, summed to measure the net energy delivered to the facility in each interval.

**Retirement De-List Bid** is a bid to retire an Existing Generating Capacity Resource, Existing Import Capacity Resource, or Existing Demand Capacity Resource from all New England Markets, as described in Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.



**Returning Market Participant** is a Market Participant, other than an FTR-Only Customer or a Governance Only Member, whose previous membership as a Market Participant was involuntarily terminated due to a Financial Assurance Default or a payment default and, since returning, has been a Market Participant for less than six consecutive months.

**Revenue Requirement** is defined in Section IV.A.2.1 of the Tariff.

**Reviewable Action** is defined in Section III.D.1.1 of Appendix D of Market Rule 1.

**Reviewable Determination** is defined in Section 12.4(a) of Attachment K to the OATT.

**RSP Project List** is defined in Section 1 of Attachment K to the OATT.

**RTEP02 Upgrade(s)** means a Transmission Upgrade that was included in the annual NEPOOL Transmission Plan (also known as the “Regional Transmission Expansion Plan” or “RTEP”) for the year 2002, as approved by ISO New England Inc.’s Board of Directors, or the functional equivalent of such Transmission Upgrade, as determined by ISO New England Inc. The RTEP02 Upgrades are listed in Schedule 12B of the OATT.

**RTO** is a regional transmission organization or comparable independent transmission organization that complies with Order No. 2000 and the Commission’s corresponding regulation.

**Same Reserve Zone Export Transaction** is defined in Section III.1.10.7(f)(iii) of Market Rule 1.

**Schedule, Schedules, Schedule 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5** are references to the individual or collective schedules to Section IV.A. of the Tariff.

**Schedule 20A Service Provider (SSP)** is defined in Schedule 20A to Section II of this Tariff.

**Scheduling Service**, for purposes of Section IV.A and Section IV.B of the Tariff, is the service described in Schedule 1 to Section IV.A of the Tariff.

**Scheduling, System Control and Dispatch Service**, for purposes of Section II of the Tariff, is the form of Ancillary Service described in Schedule 1 of the OATT.

**Seasonal Claimed Capability** is the summer or winter claimed capability of a Generator Asset or Generating Capacity Resource, and represents the maximum dependable load carrying ability of the asset or resource, excluding capacity required for station use.

**Seasonal Claimed Capability Audit** is the Generator Asset audit performed pursuant to Section III.1.5.1.3.

**Seasonal DR Audit** is the Demand Response Resource audit performed pursuant to Section III.1.5.1.3.1.

**Seasonal Peak Demand Resource** is a type of Demand Capacity Resource and shall mean installed measures (e.g., products, equipment, systems, services, practices and/or strategies) on end-use customer facilities that reduce the total amount of electrical energy consumed during Demand Resource Seasonal Peak Hours, while delivering a comparable or acceptable level of end-use service. Such measures include Energy Efficiency, Load Management, and Distributed Generation.

**Section III.1.4 Transactions** are defined in Section III.1.4.2 of Market Rule 1.

**Section III.1.4 Conforming Transactions** are defined in Section III.1.4.2 of Market Rule 1.

**Security Agreement** is Attachment 1 to the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**Selected Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor** is the Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor that proposed the Phase Two or Stage Two Solution that has been identified by the ISO as the preferred Phase Two or Stage Two Solution.

**Selected Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor Agreement** is the agreement between the ISO and a Selected Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor. The Selected Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor Agreement is provided in Attachment P to the OATT.

**Self-Schedule** is the action of a Market Participant in committing its Generator Asset or DARD, in accordance with applicable ISO New England Manuals, to provide service in an hour, whether or not in the absence of that action the Generator Asset or DARD would have been committed by the ISO to provide the service. For a Generator Asset, Self-Schedule is the action of a Market Participant in committing a Generator Asset to provide Energy in an hour at its Economic Minimum Limit, whether or not in the absence of that action the Generator Asset would have been committed by the ISO to provide the Energy. For a DARD, Self-Schedule is the action of a Market Participant in committing a DARD to consume Energy in an hour at its Minimum Consumption Limit, whether or not in the absence of that action the DARD would have been committed by the ISO to consume Energy. For an External Transaction, a Self-Schedule is a request by a Market Participant for the ISO to select the External Transaction regardless of the LMP. Demand Response Resources are not permitted to Self-Schedule.

**Self-Supplied FCA Resource** is described in Section III.13.1.6 of Market Rule 1.

**Senior Officer** means an officer of the subject entity with the title of vice president (or similar office) or higher, or another officer designated in writing to the ISO by that officer.

**Service Agreement** is a Transmission Service Agreement or an MPSA.

**Service Commencement Date** is the date service is to begin pursuant to the terms of an executed Service Agreement, or the date service begins in accordance with the sections of the OATT addressing the filing of unexecuted Service Agreements.

**Services** means, collectively, the Scheduling Service, EAS and RAS; individually, a Service.

**Settlement Financial Assurance** is an amount of financial assurance required from a Designated FTR Participant awarded a bid in an FTR Auction. This amount is calculated pursuant to Section VI.C of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**Settlement Only Resources** are generators of less than 5 MW of maximum net output when operating at any temperature at or above zero degrees Fahrenheit, that meet the metering, interconnection and other requirements in ISO New England Operating Procedure No. 14 and that have elected Settlement Only

Resource treatment as described in the ISO New England Manual for Registration and Performance Auditing.

**Shortfall Funding Arrangement**, as specified in Section 5.1 of the ISO New England Billing Policy, is a separate financing arrangement that can be used to make up any non-congestion related differences between amounts received on Invoices and amounts due for ISO Charges in any bill issued.

**Short-Term** is a period of less than one year.

**Significantly Reduced Congestion Costs** are defined in Section III.G.2.2 of Appendix G to Market Rule 1.

**SMD Effective Date** is March 1, 2003.

**Solar High Limit** is the estimated power output (MW) of a solar Generator Asset given the Real-Time solar and weather conditions, taking into account equipment outages, and absent any self-imposed reductions in power output or any reduction in power output as a result of a Dispatch Instruction, calculated in the manner described in the ISO Operating Documents.

**Solar Plant Future Availability** is the forecasted Real-Time High Operating Limit of a solar Generator Asset, calculated in the manner described in the ISO Operating Documents.

**Solutions Study** is described in Section 4.2(b) of Attachment K to the OATT.

**Special Constraint Resource (SCR)** is a Resource that provides Special Constraint Resource Service under Schedule 19 of the OATT.

**Special Constraint Resource Service** is the form of Ancillary Service described in Schedule 19 of the OATT.

**Specified-Term Blackstart Capital Payment** is the annual compensation level, as calculated pursuant to Section 5.1 of Schedule 16 of the OATT, for a Designated Blackstart Resource's capital Blackstart Equipment costs associated with the provision of Blackstart Service (except for capital costs associated

with adhering to NERC Critical Infrastructure Protection Reliability Standards as part of Blackstart Service).

**Sponsored Policy Resource** is a New Capacity Resource that: receives ~~an out-of-market~~ revenue source, other than revenues from ISO-administered markets, that is supported by a government-regulated rate, charge, or other regulated cost recovery mechanism, and; qualifies as a renewable, clean, zero carbon, or alternative energy resource under a renewable energy portfolio standard, clean energy standard, decarbonization or net-zero carbon standard, alternative energy portfolio standard, renewable energy goal, ~~or~~ clean energy goal, or decarbonization or net-zero carbon goal enacted ~~(either~~ by federal or New England state statute, ~~or~~ regulation, or executive or administrative order) ~~in the New England state from and as a result of~~ which the resource receives the ~~out-of-market~~ revenue source ~~and that is in effect on January 1, 2018~~.

**Stage One Proposal** is a first round submission, as defined in Sections 4A.5 of Attachment K of the OATT, of a proposal for a Public Policy Transmission Upgrade by a Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor.

**Stage Two Solution** is a second round submission, as defined in Section 4A.5 of Attachment K of the OATT, of a proposal for a Public Policy Transmission Upgrade by a Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor.

**Standard Blackstart Capital Payment** is the annual compensation level, as calculated pursuant to Section 5.1 of Schedule 16 of the OATT, for a Designated Blackstart Resource's capital Blackstart Equipment costs associated with the provision of Blackstart Service (except for capital costs associated with adhering to NERC Critical Infrastructure Protection Reliability Standards as part of Blackstart Service).

**Start-of-Round Price** is the highest price associated with a round of a Forward Capacity Auction as described in Section III.13.2.3.1 of Market Rule 1.

**Start-Up Fee** is the amount, in dollars, that must be paid for a Generator Asset to Market Participants with an Ownership Share in the Generator Asset each time the Generator Asset is scheduled in the New England Markets to start-up.

**Start-Up Time** is the time it takes the Generator Asset, after synchronizing to the system, to reach its Economic Minimum Limit and, for dispatchable Generator Assets, be ready for further dispatch by the ISO.

**State Estimator** means the computer model of power flows specified in Section III.2.3 of Market Rule 1.

**Statements**, for the purpose of the ISO New England Billing Policy, refer to both Invoices and Remittance Advices.

**Static De-List Bid** is a bid that may be submitted by an Existing Generating Capacity Resource, Existing Import Capacity Resource, or Existing Demand Capacity Resource in the Forward Capacity Auction to remove itself from the capacity market for a one year period, as described in Section III.13.1.2.3.1.1 of Market Rule 1.

**Station** is one or more Existing Generating Capacity Resources consisting of one or more assets located within a common property boundary.

**Station Going Forward Common Costs** are the net costs associated with a Station that are avoided only by the clearing of the Static De-List Bids, the Permanent De-List Bids or the Retirement De-List Bids of all the Existing Generating Capacity Resources comprising the Station.

**Station-level Blackstart O&M Payment** is defined and calculated as specified in Section 5.1.2 of Schedule 16 to the OATT.

**Station-level Specified-Term Blackstart Capital Payment** is defined and calculated as specified in Section 5.1.2 of Schedule 16 to the OATT.

**Station-level Standard Blackstart Capital Payment** is defined and calculated as specified in Section 5.1.2 of Schedule 16 to the OATT.

**Storage DARD** is a DARD that participates in the New England Markets as part of an Electric Storage Facility, as described in Section III.1.10.6 of Market Rule 1.

**Summer ARA Qualified Capacity** is described in Section III.13.4.2.1.2.1.1.1 of Market Rule 1.

**Summer Capability Period** means one of two time periods defined by the ISO for the purposes of rating and auditing resources pursuant to Section III.9. The time period associated with the Summer Capability Period is the period of June 1 through September 30.

**Summer Intermittent Reliability Hours** are defined in Section III.13.1.2.2.2.1(c) of Market Rule 1.

**Supply Offer** is a proposal to furnish energy at a Node or Regulation from a Resource that meets the applicable requirements set forth in the ISO New England Manuals submitted to the ISO by a Market Participant with authority to submit a Supply Offer for the Resource. The Supply Offer will be submitted pursuant to Market Rule 1 and applicable ISO New England Manuals, and include a price and information with respect to the quantity proposed to be furnished, technical parameters for the Resource, timing and other matters. A Supply Offer is a subset of the information required in a Market Participant's Offer Data.

**Supply Offer Block-Hours** are Block-Hours assigned to the Lead Market Participant for each Supply Offer. Blocks of the Supply Offer in effect for each hour will be totaled to determine the quantity of Supply Offer Block-Hours for a given day. In the case that a Resource has a Real-Time unit status of "unavailable" for the entire day, that day will not contribute to the quantity of Supply Offer Block-Hours. However, if the Resource has at least one hour of the day with a unit status of "available," the entire day will contribute to the quantity of Supply Offer Block-Hours.

**Synchronous Condenser** is a generator that is synchronized to the grid but supplying no energy for the purpose of providing Operating Reserve or VAR or voltage support.

**System Condition** is a specified condition on the New England Transmission System or on a neighboring system, such as a constrained transmission element or flowgate, that may trigger Curtailment of Long-Term Firm MTF or OTF Service on the MTF or the OTF using the curtailment priority pursuant to Section II.44 of the Tariff or Curtailment of Local Long-Term Firm Point-to-Point Transmission Service on the non-PTF using the curtailment priority pursuant to Schedule 21 of the Tariff. Such conditions must be identified in the Transmission Customer's Service Agreement.

**System Impact Study** is an assessment pursuant to Part II.B, II.C, II.G, Schedule 21, Schedule 22, Schedule 23, or Schedule 25 of the OATT of (i) the adequacy of the PTF or Non-PTF to accommodate a request for the interconnection of a new or materially changed generating unit or a new or materially changed interconnection to another Control Area or new Regional Network Service or new Local Service or an Elective Transmission Upgrade, and (ii) whether any additional costs may be required to be incurred in order to provide the interconnection or transmission service.

**System Operator** shall mean ISO New England Inc. or a successor organization.

**System Operating Limit (SOL)** has the meaning specified in the Glossary of Terms Used in NERC Reliability Standards.

**System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve** is the demand curve used in the Forward Capacity Market as specified in Section III.13.2.2.

**TADO** is the total amount due and owing (not including any amounts due under Section 14.1 of the RNA) at such time to the ISO, NEPOOL, the PTOs, the Market Participants and the Non-Market Participant Transmission Customers, by all PTOs, Market Participants and Non-Market Participant Transmission Customers.

**Tangible Net Worth** is the value, determined in accordance with international accounting standards or generally accepted accounting principles in the United States, of all of that entity's assets less the following: (i) assets the ISO reasonably believes to be restricted or potentially unavailable to settle a claim in the event of a default (e.g., regulatory assets, restricted assets, and Affiliate assets), net of any matching liabilities, to the extent that the result of that netting is a positive value; (ii) derivative assets, net of any matching liabilities, to the extent that the result of that netting is a positive value; (iii) the amount at which the liabilities of the entity would be shown on a balance sheet in accordance with international accounting standards or generally accepted accounting principles in the United States; (iv) preferred stock; (v) non-controlling interest; and (vi) all of that entity's intangible assets (e.g., patents, trademarks, franchises, intellectual property, goodwill and any other assets not having a physical existence), in each case as shown on the most recent financial statements provided by such entity to the ISO.



**Technical Committee** is defined in Section 8.2 of the Participants Agreement.

**Ten-Minute Non-Spinning Reserve (TMNSR)** is a form of ten-minute reserve capability, determined pursuant to Section III.1.7.19.2.

**Ten-Minute Non-Spinning Reserve Service** is the form of Ancillary Service described in Schedule 6 of the OATT.

**Ten-Minute Reserve Requirement** is the combined amount of TMSR and TMNSR required system-wide as described in Section III.2.7A and ISO New England Operating Procedure No. 8.

**Ten-Minute Spinning Reserve (TMSR)** is a form of ten-minute reserve capability, determined pursuant to Section III.1.7.19.2.

**Ten-Minute Spinning Reserve Requirement** is the amount of TMSR required system-wide as described in Section III.2.7A and ISO New England Operating Procedure No. 8.

**Ten-Minute Spinning Reserve Service** is the form of Ancillary Service described in Schedule 5 of the OATT.

**Third-Party Sale** is any sale for resale in interstate commerce to a Power Purchaser that is not designated as part of Regional Network Load or Local Network Load under the Regional Network Service or Local Network Service, as applicable.

**Thirty-Minute Operating Reserve (TMOR)** is a form of thirty-minute reserve capability, determined pursuant to Section III.1.7.19.2.

**Thirty-Minute Operating Reserve Service** is the form of Ancillary Service described in Schedule 7 of the OATT.

**Through or Out Rate (TOUT Rate)** is the rate per hour for Through or Out Service, as defined in Section II.25.2 of the OATT.

**Through or Out Service (TOUT Service)** means Point-To-Point Service over the PTF provided by the ISO with respect to a transaction that goes through the New England Control Area, as, for example, a single transaction where energy or capacity is transmitted into the New England Control Area from New Brunswick and subsequently out of the New England Control Area to New York, or a single transaction where energy or capacity is transmitted into the New England Control Area from New York through one point on the PTF and subsequently flows over the PTF prior to passing out of the New England Control Area to New York, or with respect to a transaction which originates at a point on the PTF and flows over the PTF prior to passing out of the New England Control Area, as, for example, from Boston to New York.

**Tie-Line Asset** is a physical transmission tie-line, or an inter-state or intra-state border arrangement created according to the ISO New England Manuals and registered in accordance with the Asset Registration Process.

**Total Available Amount** is the sum of the available amount of the Shortfall Funding Arrangement and the balance in the Payment Default Shortfall Fund.

**Total Blackstart Capital Payment** is the annual compensation calculated under either Section 5.1 or Section 5.2 of Schedule 16 of the OATT, as applicable.

**Total Blackstart Service Payments** is monthly compensation to Blackstart Owners or Market Participants, as applicable, and as calculated pursuant to Section 5.6 of Schedule 16 to the OATT.

**Total Reserve Requirement**, which includes Replacement Reserve, is the combined amount of TMSR, TMNSR, and TMOR required system-wide as described in Section III.2.7A and ISO New England Operating Procedure No. 8.

**Total System Capacity** is the aggregate capacity supply curve for the New England Control Area as determined in accordance with Section III.13.2.3.3 of Market Rule 1.

**Transaction Unit (TU)** is a type of billing determinant under Schedule 2 of Section IV.A of the Tariff used to assess charges to Customers.

**Transition Period:** The six-year period commencing on March 1, 1997.

**Transmission Charges**, for the purposes of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy and the ISO New England Billing Policy, are all charges and payments under Schedules 1, 8 and 9 of the OATT.

**Transmission Congestion Credit** means the allocated share of total Transmission Congestion Revenue credited to each holder of Financial Transmission Rights, calculated and allocated as specified in Section III.5.2 of Market Rule 1.

**Transmission Congestion Revenue** is defined in Section III.5.2.5(a) of Market Rule 1.

**Transmission Constraint Penalty Factors** are described in Section III.1.7.5 of Market Rule 1.

**Transmission Credit Limit** is a credit limit, not to be used to meet FTR Requirements, established for each Market Participant in accordance with Section II.D and each Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer in accordance with Section V.B.2 of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**Transmission Credit Test Percentage** is calculated in accordance with Section III.B.1(c) of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**Transmission Customer** is any Eligible Customer that (i) executes, on its own behalf or through its Designated Agent, an MPSA or TSA, or (ii) requests in writing, on its own behalf or through its Designated Agent, that the ISO, the Transmission Owner, or the Schedule 20A Service Provider, as applicable, file with the Commission, a proposed unexecuted MPSA or TSA containing terms and conditions deemed appropriate by the ISO (in consultation with the applicable PTO, OTO or Schedule 20A Service Provider) in order that the Eligible Customer may receive transmission service under Section II of this Tariff. A Transmission Customer under Section II of this Tariff includes a Market Participant or a Non-Market Participant taking Regional Network Service, Through or Out Service, MTF Service, OTF Service, Ancillary Services, or Local Service.

**Transmission Default Amount** is all or any part of any amount of Transmission Charges due to be paid by any Covered Entity that the ISO, in its reasonable opinion, believes will not or has not been paid when due.

**Transmission Default Period** is defined in Section 3.4.f of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

**Transmission Late Payment Account** is defined in Section 4.2 of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

**Transmission Late Payment Account Limit** is defined in Section 4.2 of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

**Transmission Late Payment Charge** is defined in Section 4.1 of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

**Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff (Tariff)** is the ISO New England Inc. Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff, as amended from time to time.

**Transmission Obligations** are determined in accordance with Section III.A(vi) of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**Transmission Operating Agreement (TOA)** is the Transmission Operating Agreement between and among the ISO and the PTOs, as amended and restated from time to time.

**Transmission Owner** means a PTO, MTO or OTO.

**Transmission Provider** is the ISO for Regional Network Service and Through or Out Service as provided under Section II.B and II.C of the OATT; Cross-Sound Cable, LLC for Merchant Transmission Service as provided under Schedule 18 of the OATT; the Schedule 20A Service Providers for Phase I/II HVDC-TF Service as provided under Schedule 20A of the OATT; and the Participating Transmission Owners for Local Service as provided under Schedule 21 of the OATT.

**Transmission Requirements** are determined in accordance with Section III.A(iii) of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**Transmission Security Analysis Requirement** shall be determined pursuant to Section III.12.2.1.2.

**Transmission Service Agreement (TSA)** is the initial agreement and any amendments or supplements thereto: (A) in the form specified in either Attachment A or B to the OATT, entered into by the Transmission Customer and the ISO for Regional Network Service or Through or Out Service; (B) entered into by the Transmission Customer with the ISO and PTO in the form specified in Attachment A to Schedule 21 of the OATT; (C) entered into by the Transmission Customer with an OTO or Schedule 20A Service Provider in the appropriate form specified under Schedule 20 of the OATT; or (D) entered into by the Transmission Customer with a MTO in the appropriate form specified under Schedule 18 of the OATT. A Transmission Service Agreement shall be required for Local Service, MTF Service and OTF Service, and shall be required for Regional Network Service and Through or Out Service if the Transmission Customer has not executed a MPSA.

**Transmission Upgrade(s)** means an upgrade, modification or addition to the PTF that becomes subject to the terms and conditions of the OATT governing rates and service on the PTF on or after January 1, 2004. This categorization and cost allocation of Transmission Upgrades shall be as provided for in Schedule 12 of the OATT.

**UDS** is unit dispatch system software.

**Unconstrained Export Transaction** is defined in Section III.1.10.7(f)(iv) of Market Rule 1.

**Uncovered Default Amount** is defined in Section 3.3(i) of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

**Uncovered Transmission Default Amounts** are defined in Section 3.4.f of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

**Unrated** means a Market Participant that is not a Rated Market Participant.

**Unsecured Covered Entity** is, collectively, an Unsecured Municipal Market Participant and an Unsecured Non-Municipal Covered Entity.

**Unsecured Municipal Default Amount** is defined in Section 3.3(i) of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

**Unsecured Municipal Market Participant** is defined in Section 3.3(h) of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

**Unsecured Municipal Transmission Default Amount** is defined in Section 3.4.f of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

**Unsecured Non-Municipal Covered Entity** is a Covered Entity that is not a Municipal Market Participant or a Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer and has a Market Credit Limit or Transmission Credit Limit of greater than \$0 under the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**Unsecured Non-Municipal Default Amount** is defined in Section 3.3(i) of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

**Unsecured Non-Municipal Transmission Default Amount** is defined in Section 3.3(i) of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

**Unsecured Transmission Default Amounts** are, collectively, the Unsecured Municipal Transmission Default Amount and the Unsecured Non-Municipal Transmission Default Amount.

**Unsettled FTR Financial Assurance** is an amount of financial assurance required from a Designated FTR Participant as calculated pursuant to Section VI.B of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**Updated Measurement and Verification Plan** is an optional Measurement and Verification Plan that may be submitted as part of a subsequent qualification process for a Forward Capacity Auction prior to the beginning of the Capacity Commitment Period of the On-Peak Demand Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Response project. The Updated Measurement and Verification Plan may include updated project specifications, measurement and verification protocols, and performance data as described in Section III.13.1.4.3.1.2 of Market Rule 1 and the ISO New England Manuals.

**VAR CC Rate** is the CC rate paid to Qualified Reactive Resources for VAR Service capability under Section IV.A of Schedule 2 of the OATT.

**VAR Payment** is the payment made to Qualified Reactive Resources for VAR Service capability under Section IV.A of Schedule 2 of the OATT.

**VAR Service** is the provision of reactive power voltage support to the New England Transmission System by a Qualified Reactive Resource or by other generators that are dispatched by the ISO to provide dynamic reactive power as described in Schedule 2 of the OATT.

**Virtual Cap** is \$2,000/MWh.

**Virtual Requirements** are determined in accordance with Section III.A(iv) of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**Volt Ampere Reactive (VAR)** is a measurement of reactive power.

**Volumetric Measure (VM)** is a type of billing determinant under Schedule 2 of Section IV.A of the Tariff used to assess charges to Customers under Section IV.A of the Tariff.

**Wind High Limit** is the estimated power output (MW) of a wind Generator Asset given the Real-Time weather conditions, taking into account equipment outages, and absent any self-imposed reductions in power output or any reduction in power output as a result of a Dispatch Instruction, calculated in the manner described in the ISO Operating Documents.

**Wind Plant Future Availability** is the forecasted Real-Time High Operating Limit of a wind Generator Asset, calculated in the manner described in the ISO Operating Documents.

**Winter ARA Qualified Capacity** is described in Section III.13.4.2.1.2.1.1.2 of Market Rule 1.

**Winter Capability Period** means one of two time periods defined by the ISO for the purposes of rating and auditing resources pursuant to Section III.9. The time period associated with the Winter Capability Period is the period October 1 through May 31.

**Winter Intermittent Reliability Hours** are defined in Section III.13.1.2.2.2.2(c) of Market Rule 1.

**Year** means a period of 365 or 366 days, whichever is appropriate, commencing on, or on the anniversary of March 1, 1997. Year One is the Year commencing on March 1, 1997, and Years Two and higher follow it in sequence.

**Zonal Price** is calculated in accordance with Section III.2.7 of Market Rule 1.

**Zonal Capacity Obligation** is calculated in accordance with Section III.13.7.5.2 of Market Rule 1.

**Zonal Reserve Requirement** is the combined amount of TMSR, TMNSR, and TMOR required for a Reserve Zone as described in Section III.2.7A and ISO New England Operating Procedure No. 8.



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      - III.13.6.1.1.3 [Reserved.]
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### **III.13. Forward Capacity Market.**

The ISO shall administer a forward market for capacity ("Forward Capacity Market") in accordance with the provisions of this Section III.13. For each one-year period from June 1 through May 31, starting with the period June 1, 2010 to May 31, 2011, for which Capacity Supply Obligations are assumed and payments are made in the Forward Capacity Market ("Capacity Commitment Period"), the ISO shall conduct a Forward Capacity Auction in accordance with the provisions of Section III.13.2 to procure the amount of capacity needed in the New England Control Area and in each modeled Capacity Zone during the Capacity Commitment Period, as determined in accordance with the provisions of Section III.12. To be eligible to assume a Capacity Supply Obligation for a Capacity Commitment Period through the Forward Capacity Auction, a resource must be accepted in the Forward Capacity Auction qualification process in accordance with the provisions of Section III.13.1.

~~Special Retirement De-List Bid, Permanent De-List Bid and Substitution Auction Demand Bid Modification and Withdrawal Provisions for the sixteenth Forward Capacity Auction (associated with the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2025). For the sixteenth Forward Capacity Auction (associated with the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2025), on or before June 3, 2021, the Internal Market Monitor will modify any submitted Permanent De-List Bids, Retirement De-List Bids and substitution auction test prices (whether or not associated with a Retirement De-List Bid) submitted for the sixteenth Forward Capacity Auction to reflect the impact of updated CONE, Net CONE and Capacity Performance Payment Rate values accepted by the Commission in Docket No. ER21-787.~~

~~The Internal Market Monitor will provide Lead Market Participants with updated Permanent De-List Bids, Retirement De-List Bids and substitution auction test prices in the retirement determination notifications that it issues on June 3, 2021. Within 5 Business Days of the issuance of the retirement determination notifications, a Lead Market Participant may withdraw its Retirement De-List Bid, Permanent De-List Bid, or substitution auction demand bid, and the attendant substitution auction test price, by written notification to the Internal Market Monitor. The election to withdraw a Retirement De-List Bid will also withdraw the associated substitution auction demand bid.~~

~~Special Dynamic De-List Threshold and Certain Information Publications for the sixteenth Forward Capacity Auction (associated with the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2025). For the sixteenth Forward Capacity Auction (associated with the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2025), on or before June 3, 2021, the ISO will recalculate and re-post the Dynamic~~

~~De List Bid Threshold pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.A to reflect the impact of updated CONE and Net CONE values accepted by the Commission for use in the sixteenth Forward Capacity Auction in Docket No. ER21-787.~~

~~In addition, the ISO will, on or before June 11, 2021, repost information concerning Permanent De List Bids and Retirement De List Bids pursuant to Section III.13.1.8(e) and will repost information about the aggregate quantity of supply offers and demand bids that have elected to participate in the substitution auction pursuant to Section III.13.1.8(g).~~

### **III.13.1. Forward Capacity Auction Qualification.**

Each resource, or portion thereof, must qualify as a New Generating Capacity Resource (Section III.13.1.1), an Existing Generating Capacity Resource (Section III.13.1.2), a New Import Capacity Resource or Existing Import Capacity Resource (Section III.13.1.3), or a New Demand Capacity Resource or Existing Demand Capacity Resource (Section III.13.1.4). Each resource must be at least 100 kW in size to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction, except for resources registered with the ISO prior to the earliest date that any portion of this Section III.13 becomes effective. An offer may be composed of separate resources, pursuant to the provisions of Section III.13.1.5. Pursuant to the provisions of this Section III.13.1, the ISO shall determine a summer Qualified Capacity and a winter Qualified Capacity for each resource, and an FCA Qualified Capacity for each Existing Generating Capacity Resource, Existing Import Capacity Resource, Existing Demand Capacity Resource, New Generating Capacity Resource, New Import Capacity Resource, and New Demand Capacity Resource.

All Project Sponsors must be Market Participants no later than 30 days prior to the deadline for submitting the FCM Deposit. The Lead Market Participant for a resource participating in a Forward Capacity Auction may not change in the 15 Business Days prior to, or during, that Forward Capacity Auction.

#### **III.13.1.1. New Generating Capacity Resources.**

To participate in a Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource, a resource or proposed resource must meet the requirements of this Section III.13.1.1.

##### **III.13.1.1.1. Definition of New Generating Capacity Resource.**

A resource or a portion of a resource that is not a New Import Capacity Resource or Existing Import Capacity Resource (as defined in Section III.13.1.3), or a New Demand Capacity Resource or Existing Demand Capacity Resource (as discussed in Section III.13.1.4) shall be considered a New Generating Capacity Resource for participation in a Forward Capacity Auction if either: (i) the resource has never previously been counted as a capacity resource as described in Section III.13.1.1.1.1; or (ii) the resource, or a portion thereof, meets one of the criteria in Section III.13.1.1.1.2.

##### **III.13.1.1.1.1. Resources Never Previously Counted as Capacity.**

(a) A resource, or a portion thereof, will be considered to have never been counted as a capacity resource if it has not cleared in any previous Forward Capacity Auction.

(b) [Reserved.]

(c) Where a New Capacity Generating Resource was accepted for participation in the qualification process for a previous Forward Capacity Auction, but cleared less than its summer Qualified Capacity in that previous Forward Capacity Auction and is having its critical path schedule monitored by the ISO in accordance with Section III.13.3, the portion of the resource that did not clear in the previous Forward Capacity Auction shall be a New Generating Capacity Resource in the subsequent Forward Capacity Auction. Such a New Generating Capacity Resource must satisfy all of the qualification process requirements applicable to a New Generating Capacity Resource as described in Section III.13.1.1.2, except that the Project Sponsor is not required to resubmit documentation demonstrating site control (Section III.13.1.1.2.2.1) or to resubmit a critical path schedule (Section III.13.1.1.2.2.2) or to provide a new Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit (Section III.13.1.1.2.1(e)).

**III.13.1.1.1.2. Resources Previously Counted as Capacity.**

A resource that has previously been counted as a capacity resource, including a deactivated or retired capacity resource, may elect to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource, as described in this Section III.13.1.1.1.2. The incremental expenditure required to reactivate a resource that previously has been deactivated or retired pursuant to Section I.3.9 of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff (or its predecessor provisions) may be included in the calculation of the dollar per kilowatt thresholds in this Section III.13.1.1.1.2. A resource accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to this Section III.13.1.1.1.2 shall participate in the Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.2(e). A Market Participant that elects to have a resource that has previously been counted as a capacity resource participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource, must notify the ISO when the existing resource ceases to operate and the New Generating Capacity Resource commences operation. If a Market Participant with a resource that has previously been counted as a capacity resource elects, pursuant to Section III.13.3.4(a)(iii), to have the resource that has previously been counted as a capacity resource cover the Capacity Supply Obligation of a New Generating Capacity Resource and the resource that has previously been counted as a capacity resource must take an outage in order for the New Generating Capacity Resource to commence Commercial Operation (as defined in Schedule 22, 23, or 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff), then the Market Participant must notify the ISO that the outage is for the purpose of the New Generating Capacity

Resource commencing Commercial Operation (as defined in Schedule 22, 23, or 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff). A resource shall be accepted for participation as a new resource if it complies with one of the following three subsections:

- (a) Where investment in the resource will result, by the commencement of the Capacity Commitment Period, in an increase in output by an amount exceeding the greater of: (i) 20 percent of the summer Qualified Capacity of the resource at the time of the qualification process for the Forward Capacity Auction; or (ii) 40 MW above the summer Qualified Capacity of the resource at the time of the qualification process for the Forward Capacity Auction, the whole resource shall participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource; or
- (b) Where investment in the resource subsequent to January 1, 2007 and prior to the conclusion of the first Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Capacity Supply Obligation for which treatment as a new resource may be applied, for the purposes of re-powering will be equal to or greater than \$200 per kilowatt of the whole resource's summer Qualified Capacity after re-powering, the owner of the resource may elect that the whole resource participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource. The \$200 threshold (in base year 2008 dollars) shall be adjusted annually in accordance with the Handy-Whitman Index of Public Utility Construction Costs reflecting data for the period ending January 1 of the year preceding the start of the qualification process for the relevant Forward Capacity Auction; or
- (c) Where investment in the resource subsequent to January 1, 2007 and prior to the conclusion of the first Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Capacity Supply Obligation for which treatment as a new resource may be applied, for the purpose of compliance with environmental regulations or permits will be equal to or greater than \$100 per kilowatt of the whole resource's summer Qualified Capacity after the investment, the owner of the resource may elect that the whole resource participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource. The \$100 threshold (in base year 2008 dollars) shall be adjusted annually in accordance with the Handy-Whitman Index of Public Utility Construction Costs reflecting data for the period ending January 1 of the year preceding the start of the qualification process for the relevant Forward Capacity Auction.

**III.13.1.1.1.3. Incremental Capacity of Resources Previously Counted as Capacity.**



The owner of a resource previously counted as a capacity resource may elect to have the incremental amount of capacity above the summer Qualified Capacity of the resource at the time of the qualification process participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource, where investment in the resource:

(a) will result, by the start of the Capacity Commitment Period, in an increase in output less than or equal to the greater of: (i) 20 percent of the summer Qualified Capacity of the resource at the time of the qualification process for the Forward Capacity Auction; or (ii) 40 MW; and

(b) will be equal to or greater than \$200 per kilowatt of the amount of the increase in summer Qualified Capacity resulting from the investment. The \$200 threshold (in base year 2008 dollars) shall be adjusted annually in accordance with the Handy-Whitman Index of Public Utility Construction Costs reflecting data for the period ending January 1 of the year preceding the start of the qualification process for the relevant Forward Capacity Auction. These investment costs may include the costs associated with reactivating a resource that was previously deactivated pursuant to Section I.3.9 of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff (or its predecessor provisions) and in which investment in the resource was undertaken prior to reactivation.

(c) A Project Sponsor or Lead Market Participant making an election pursuant to this Section III.13.1.1.1.3 must submit a New Capacity Show of Interest Form pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.1 and a New Capacity Qualification Package pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2 for the incremental amount.

**III.13.1.1.1.3.A. Treatment of New Incremental Capacity and Existing Generating Capacity at the Same Generating Resource.**

For incremental summer capacity seeking to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.1.3 or incremental winter capacity that meets the investment thresholds in Section III.13.1.1.1.3 as applied to the resource's winter Qualified Capacity, if the incremental summer or winter capacity does not span the entire Capacity Commitment Period, then the ISO shall match the incremental summer or winter capacity with excess existing winter or summer Qualified Capacity at that same resource, as appropriate, not to exceed the Qualified Capacity of the existing portion of the resource, in order to cover the entire Capacity Commitment Period. This provision shall not apply to Intermittent Power Resources.

**III.13.1.1.1.4. De-rated Capacity of Resources Previously Counted as Capacity.**

For purposes of the Forward Capacity Market, de-rated capacity of a resource shall be measured by the difference between the summer Qualified Capacity prior to the de-rating of the resource and the most recent summer demonstration of Seasonal Claimed Capability of a resource, as of the fifth Business Day of October. The owner of a resource previously counted as a capacity resource that has been de-rated by at least 2 percent of its summer Qualified Capacity (as an Existing Generating Capacity Resource) but by no more than the lesser of 20 percent of its summer Qualified Capacity (as an Existing Generating Capacity Resource) or 40 MW for three or more years at the time of the Forward Capacity Auction may elect to have the incremental amount of capacity above the capacity level established while de-rated treated as a New Generating Capacity Resource if it demonstrates that it will be reestablished prior to the start of the Capacity Commitment Period and that the investment in the resource for such purposes shall be equal to or greater than \$200 per kilowatt of the amount of the increase in summer Qualified Capacity resulting from the investment. The Project Sponsor must submit a New Capacity Show of Interest Form pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.1 and a New Capacity Qualification Package pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.2 for the incremental amount of capacity for the relevant Forward Capacity Auction. The \$200 threshold (in base year 2008 dollars) shall be adjusted annually in accordance with the Handy-Whitman Index of Public Utility Construction Costs reflecting data for the period ending January 1 of the year preceding the start of the qualification process for the relevant Forward Capacity Auction. The owner of a resource seeking to have the incremental amount of capacity counted as a New Generating Capacity Resource as provided in this Section, must demonstrate based on historical data that the resource previously operated at a level at least 2 percent above the de-rated amount.

**III.13.1.1.1.5. Treatment of Resources that are Partially New and Partially Existing.**

For purposes of this Section III.13.1, where only a portion of a single resource is treated as a New Generating Capacity Resource, either as a result of partial clearing in a previous Forward Capacity Auction or pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.1.3 or Section III.13.1.1.1.4, then except as otherwise indicated in this Section III.13.1, that portion of the resource shall be treated as a New Generating Capacity Resource, and the remainder of the resource shall be treated as an Existing Generating Capacity Resource.

**III.13.1.1.1.6. Treatment of Deactivated and Retired Units.**

(a) [Reserved.]

(b) A resource that previously has been deactivated or retired pursuant to Section I.3.9 of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff (or its predecessor provisions), as applicable, that submits to the ISO a reactivation plan demonstrating that the resource shall return to operation shall, subject to ISO review and acceptance of that reactivation plan, be treated as an Existing Generating Capacity Resource unless that resource satisfies the criteria under Section III.13.1.1.1.2 as a New Generating Capacity Resource. Such reactivation plans must be received by the ISO no later than 10 Business Days before the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline. A resource that previously has been deactivated or retired pursuant to Section I.3.9 of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff (or its predecessor provisions), as applicable, that submits to the ISO a reactivation plan demonstrating that the resource shall return to operation and having a material modification as described in Section I.3.9 of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff (or its predecessor provisions), as applicable, shall be subject to Section III.13.1.1.2.3 (Initial Interconnection Analysis).

#### **III.13.1.1.1.7 Renewable Technology Resources.**

To participate in the Forward Capacity Market as a Renewable Technology Resource, a Generating Capacity Resource or an On-Peak Demand Resource (including every Asset that is part of the On-Peak Demand Resource) must satisfy the following requirements:

- (a) receive an out-of-market revenue source supported by a state- or federally-regulated rate, charge or other regulated cost recovery mechanism;
- (b) qualify as a renewable or alternative energy generating resource under any New England state's mandated (either by statute or regulation) renewable or alternative energy portfolio standards as in effect on January 1, 2014, or, in states without a standard, qualify under that state's renewable energy goals as a renewable resource (either by statute or regulation) as in effect on January 1, 2014. The resource must qualify as a renewable or alternative energy generating resource in the New England state in which it is geographically located. A resource physically located in United States federal waters directly adjacent to New England state maritime boundaries and directly interconnecting to the New England system is considered to be geographically located in the state where its Point of Interconnection is located;

(c) participate in a Forward Capacity Auction for a Capacity Commitment Period beginning on or after June 1, 2018 as a New Generating Capacity Resource or New Demand Capacity Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1, and;

(d) has been designated for treatment as a Renewable Technology Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.9.

An Export Bid or Administrative Export De-List Bid may not be submitted for Generating Capacity Resources that assumed a Capacity Supply Obligation by participating in a Forward Capacity Auction as a Renewable Technology Resource.

#### **III.13.1.1.2. Qualification Process for New Generating Capacity Resources.**

For a resource to qualify as a New Generating Capacity Resource, the resource's Project Sponsor must make two separate submissions to the ISO: First, the Project Sponsor must submit a New Capacity Show of Interest Form during the New Capacity Show of Interest Submission Window. Second, the Project Sponsor must submit a New Capacity Qualification Package no later than the New Capacity Qualification Deadline. Each of these submissions is described in more detail in this Section III.13.1.1.2. The Project Sponsor must also have, or in the case of an Import Capacity Resource seeking to qualify with an Elective Transmission Upgrade be associated with, a valid Interconnection Request under Schedules 22, 23 or 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff prior to submitting a New Capacity Show of Interest Form during the New Capacity Show of Interest Submission Window. Both the New Capacity Show of Interest Form and the New Capacity Qualification Package are required regardless of the status of the project under the interconnection procedures described in Schedules 22, 23 and 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff. Neither the New Capacity Show of Interest Form nor the New Capacity Qualification Package constitutes an Interconnection Request. A Project Sponsor may withdraw from the qualification process at any time prior to three Business Days before the submission of the FCM Deposit pursuant to Section III.13.1.9.1 by providing written notification of such withdrawal to the ISO. Any withdrawal, whether pursuant to this provision or as determined by the ISO (for example as described in Section III.13.1.1.2.1 or Section III.13.1.9.3), shall be irrevocable. The Project Sponsor of a withdrawn application is subject to reconciliation of its Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit described in Section III.13.1.9.3. None of the provisions of this Section III.13.1, including the initial interconnection analysis and the analysis of overlapping interconnection impacts, supersedes, replaces, or satisfies any of the requirements of Schedules 22, 23 and 25 of Section II of the

Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff, except as specifically provided thereunder. Determinations by the ISO pursuant to this Section III.13.1.1.2, including the initial interconnection analysis and the analysis of overlapping interconnection impacts, are for purposes of qualification for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction only, and do not constitute a right or approval to interconnect, and do not guarantee the ability to interconnect.

#### **III.13.1.1.2.1. New Capacity Show of Interest Form.**

Except as otherwise provided in this Section III.13.1.1.2.1, for each resource that a Project Sponsor seeks to offer in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource, the Project Sponsor must submit to the ISO a New Capacity Show of Interest Form as described in this Section III.13.1.1.2.1 during the New Capacity Show of Interest Submission Window. After submission of a New Capacity Show of Interest Form, Material Modification (as defined in Section 4.4 of Schedule 22, Section 1.5 of Schedule 23, or Section 4.4 of Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff) may not be made to the information contained therein or the New Capacity Show of Interest Form shall be considered withdrawn. No change that may result in a reduction in capacity may be made to a project described in a New Capacity Show of Interest Form or New Capacity Qualification Package between the date that is 150 days before the start of the Forward Capacity Auction and the deadline for qualification determination notifications described in Section III.13.1.1.2.8.

(a) A completed New Capacity Show of Interest Form shall include the following information, to the extent the information is not already provided under an active Interconnection Request under Schedules 22, 23 and 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff, and other such information necessary to evaluate a project: the project name; the Project Sponsor's contact information; the Project Sponsor's ISO customer status; the date by which the project is expected to achieve Commercial Operation (as defined in Schedule 22, 23, or 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff); the project address or location, and if relevant, asset identification number; the status of the project under the interconnection procedures described in Schedules 22, 23 and 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff; whether the resource has ever previously had a Capacity Supply Obligation or previously received payment as a capacity resource pursuant to the market rules in effect prior to June 1, 2010; the capacity (in MW) of the New Generating Capacity Resource; a general description of the project's equipment configuration, including a description of the resource technology type ~~(such as those listed in the table in Section III.A.21 or some other type)~~; a simple location plan and a one-line diagram of the plant and station facilities, including any known transmission facilities; the

location of the proposed interconnection; and other specific project data as set forth in the New Capacity Show of Interest Form. The ISO may waive the submission of any information not required for evaluation of a project. A completed New Capacity Show of Interest Form shall also specify the Queue Position associated with the project pursuant to Section 4.1 of Schedule 22, Section 1.5 of Schedule 23 or Section 4.1 of Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff. In the case of a resource that a Project Sponsor seeks to offer in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource that is supported by an Internal Elective Transmission Upgrade, all Queue Positions associated with the project must be submitted in the New Capacity Show of Interest Form. Submittal of the Interconnection Request may take place prior to the qualification process described here, but no later than the date on which the New Capacity Show of Interest Form is submitted to the ISO; however, the Interconnection Customer Interconnection Request must still be active and consistent with the project described in the New Capacity Show of Interest Form as well as the New Capacity Qualification Package to be submitted as described in Section III.13.1.1.2.2.

(b) The Project Sponsor must submit with the New Capacity Show of Interest Form, documentation demonstrating that the Project Sponsor has already achieved control of the project site for the duration of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.2.1.

(c) In the New Capacity Show of Interest Form, the Project Sponsor must indicate if the New Generating Capacity Resource is incremental capacity associated with a resource that previously had a Capacity Supply Obligation or previously received payment as a capacity resource pursuant to the market rules in effect prior to June 1, 2010 as discussed in Section III.13.1.1.1.3, or if the New Generating Capacity Resource is incremental capacity associated with a resource previously listed as a capacity resource that has been de-rated for three or more years at the time of the Forward Capacity Auction, as discussed in Section III.13.1.1.1.4.

(d) [Reserved.]

(e) With the New Capacity Show of Interest Form, the Project Sponsor must submit the Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit, as described in Section III.13.1.9.3.

**III.13.1.1.2.2. New Capacity Qualification Package.**

For each resource that a Project Sponsor seeks to offer in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource, the Project Sponsor must submit a New Capacity Qualification Package no later than the New Capacity Qualification Deadline, described in Section III.13.1.10. Except as otherwise provided in this Section III.13.1, the New Capacity Qualification Package shall conform to the requirements of this Section III.13.1.1.2.2. The ISO may waive the submission of any information not required for evaluation of a project. No change that may result in a reduction in capacity may be made to a project described in a New Capacity Show of Interest Form or New Capacity Qualification Package between the date that is 150 days before the start of the Forward Capacity Auction and the deadline for qualification determination notifications described in Section III.13.1.1.2.8.

**III.13.1.1.2.2.1. Site Control.**

For all Forward Capacity Auctions and reconfiguration auctions, the Project Sponsor must achieve, prior to the close of the New Capacity Show of Interest Submission Window, control of the project site for the duration of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period, which shall be as defined in Section 4.1 of Schedule 22, Section 1.5 of Schedule 23 or Section 4.1 of Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff.

**III.13.1.1.2.2.2. Critical Path Schedule.**

In the New Capacity Qualification Package, the Project Sponsor must provide a critical path schedule for the project with sufficient detail to allow the ISO to evaluate the feasibility of the project being built and the feasibility that the project will meet the requirement that the project achieve all its critical path schedule milestones no later than the start of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period. The critical path schedule shall include, at a minimum, the dates on which the following milestones have or are expected to occur:

(a) **Major Permits.** In the New Capacity Qualification Package, the Project Sponsor must list all major permits required for the project, and for each major permit, the Project Sponsor must list the agency requiring the permit, the date on which application for the permit is expected to be made, and the expected date of approval. Major permits shall include, but are not limited to: (i) all federal and state permits; and (ii) local, regional, and town permits. The permitting and installation process associated with any major ancillary infrastructure (such as new gas pipelines, new water supply systems, or large storage tanks) should be included in this portion of the New Capacity Qualification Package.

(b) **Project Financing Closing.** In the New Capacity Qualification Package, the Project Sponsor shall provide (i) the estimated dollar amount of required project financing; (ii) the expected sources of that financing; and (iii) the expected closing date(s) for the project financing.

(c) **Major Equipment Orders.** In the New Capacity Qualification Package, the Project Sponsor must provide a list of all of the major components necessary for the project, and the date or dates on which all major components necessary for the project have been or are expected to be ordered. Although the specific technology will determine the list of major components to be included, the list shall include, to the extent applicable: (i) electric generators which may include equipment such as fuel cells or solar photovoltaic equipment; (ii) turbines; (iii) step-up transformers; (iv) relay panels (v) distributed control systems; and (vi) any other single piece of equipment or system such as a cooling water system, steam generation, steam handling system, water treatment system, fuel handling system or emissions control system that is not included as a sub-component of other equipment listed in this Section III.13.1.1.2.2.2(c) and that accounts for more than five percent of the total project cost. For an Import Capacity Resource associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade that has not yet achieved Commercial Operation as defined in Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff, major components shall also include, to the extent applicable, transmission facilities and associated substation equipment.

(d) **Substantial Site Construction.** In the New Capacity Qualification Package, the Project Sponsor must provide the approximate date on which the amount of money expended on construction activities occurring on the project site is expected to exceed 20 percent of construction financing costs.

(e) **Major Equipment Delivery.** In the New Capacity Qualification Package, the Project Sponsor must provide the dates on which the major equipment described in subsection (d) above has been or is scheduled to be delivered to the project site.

(f) **Major Equipment Testing.** In the New Capacity Qualification Package, the Project Sponsor must provide the date or dates on which each piece of major equipment described in subsection (c) above is scheduled to undergo testing, including major systems testing, as appropriate for the specific technology to establish its suitability to allow, in conjunction with other major equipment, subsequent operation of the project in accordance with the design capacity of the resource and in accordance with Good Utility Practice. The test(s) shall include those conducted at the point at which the operation of the



major equipment will be determined to be in compliance with the requirements of the engineering or purchase specifications.

(g) **Commissioning.** In the New Capacity Qualification Package, the Project Sponsor must provide the date on which the project is expected to have demonstrated the level of performance specified in the New Capacity Show of Interest Form and in the New Capacity Qualification Package.

(h) **Commercial Operation.** In the New Capacity Qualification Package, the Project Sponsor must provide the date by which the project is expected to achieve Commercial Operation (as defined in Schedule 22, 23, or 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff) and/or the date by which the Project Sponsor expects to be ready to demonstrate to the ISO that the Demand Capacity Resource described in the New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package has achieved its full demand reduction value. This date must be no later than the start of the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction.

### **III.13.1.1.2.2.3. Offer Information.**

(a) ~~For a All~~ New Generating Capacity Resources that ~~might submit offers in the Forward Capacity Auction at prices below the relevant Offer Review Trigger Price does not satisfy the conditions described in Section III.A.21.1.1 based on the information submitted at the time of the New Capacity Qualification Package, and for which the Project Sponsor does not provide a Load-Side Relationship Certification described in Section III.A.21.1.3, the Project Sponsor~~ must include in the New Capacity Qualification Package the lowest price at which the resource requests to offer capacity in the Forward Capacity Auction and ~~supporting documentation justifying that price as competitive in light of the resource's costs (as described in Section III.A.21)~~ sufficient documentation and information for a buyer-side market power review pursuant to Section III.A.21.2. Such documentation and information includes all financial estimates, projected revenues, and cost projections for the project, including the project's pro-forma financing support data and anticipated out-of-market revenues (as defined in Section III.A.21.3(b)(i)). For a New Generating Capacity Resource that has achieved commercial operation prior to the New Capacity Qualification Deadline, such documentation should also include all financial data of actual incurred capital costs, actual operating costs, and actual revenues since the date of commercial operation. ~~This price is subject to review by the Internal Market Monitor pursuant to Section III.A.21.2 and must include the additional documentation described in that Section.~~

A Project Sponsor that submits a Load-Side Relationship Certification as part of the New Capacity Qualification Package pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.2.7 must be prepared to provide both (1) the lowest price at which the resource requests to offer capacity in the Forward Capacity Auction and (2) the documentation and information described in this subsection (a), in the event that the ISO determines that the Load-Side Relationship Certification does not meet the requirements of Section III.A.21.1.3.

(b) The Project Sponsor for a New Generating Capacity Resource must indicate in the New Capacity Qualification Package if an offer from the New Generating Capacity Resource may be rationed. A Project Sponsor may specify a Rationing Minimum Limit to which offers may be rationed. Without such indication, offers will only be accepted or rejected in whole. This rationing election shall apply for the entire Forward Capacity Auction.

(c) By submitting a New Capacity Qualification Package, the Project Sponsor certifies that an offer from the New Generating Capacity Resource will not include any anticipated revenues the resource is expected to receive for its capacity cost as a Qualified Generator Reactive Resource pursuant to Schedule 2 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff.

#### **III.13.1.1.2.2.4. Capacity Commitment Period Election.**

Project Sponsors shall be required to specify whether they are making the election set forth in this Section III.13.1.1.2.2.4 for each Forward Capacity Auction up to and including the auction held in February 2021 for the June 1, 2024 through May 31, 2025 Capacity Commitment Period, and no election shall be permitted thereafter.

For each Forward Capacity Auction occurring up to and including the February 2021 auction, in the New Capacity Qualification Package, the Project Sponsor must specify whether, if its New Capacity Offer clears in the Forward Capacity Auction, the associated Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price (indexed for inflation) shall continue to apply after the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction in which the offer clears, for up to six additional and consecutive Capacity Commitment Periods, in whole Capacity Commitment Period increments only. For incremental capacity qualified pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.1.3.A, this election shall apply to both the incremental amount of capacity and the existing Qualified Capacity matched to the incremental capacity at the same generating resource. If no such election is made in the New Capacity Qualification Package, the Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price associated with the New Capacity Offer shall apply only for the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction in which the New

Capacity Offer clears. If a New Capacity Offer clears in the Forward Capacity Auction, the capacity associated with the resulting Capacity Supply Obligation may not be subject to any type of de-list or export bid in subsequent Forward Capacity Auctions for Capacity Commitment Periods for which the Project Sponsor elected to have the Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price continue to apply pursuant to this Section III.13.1.1.2.2.4.

**III.13.1.1.2.2.5. Additional Requirements for Resources Previously Counted As Capacity.**

In addition to the information described elsewhere in this Section III.13.1.1.2.2:

- (a) For each resource seeking to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.1.2 (re-powering), Section III.13.1.1.1.3 (incremental capacity), or Section III.13.1.1.1.4 (de-rated capacity), the Project Sponsor must include in the New Capacity Qualification Package documentation of the costs associated with the project in sufficient detail to allow the ISO to determine that the relevant cost threshold (described in Sections III.13.1.1.1.2(b), III.13.1.1.1.3(b), and III.13.1.1.1.4) will be met.
- (b) For each resource seeking to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.1.2(c) (environmental compliance), the Project Sponsor must include in the New Capacity Qualification Package: (i) a detailed description of the specific regulations that it is seeking to comply with and the permits that it must obtain; and (ii) documentation of the costs associated with the project in sufficient detail to allow the ISO to determine that the relevant cost threshold (described in Section III.13.1.1.1.2(c)) will be met.
- (c) For each resource seeking to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to Sections III.13.1.1.1.2, III.13.1.1.1.3, or III.13.1.1.1.4, the Project Sponsor must include in the New Capacity Qualification Package detailed information showing how and when the resource will shed its Capacity Supply Obligation to accommodate necessary work on the facility, if necessary. The Project Sponsor must also include the shedding of its Capacity Supply Obligation as an additional milestone in the critical path schedule described in Section III.13.1.1.2.2.2.

**III.13.1.1.2.2.6. Additional Requirements for New Generating Capacity Resources that are Intermittent Power Resources.**

In addition to the information described elsewhere in this Section III.13.1.1.2.2, for each Intermittent Power Resource that a Project Sponsor seeks to offer in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource, the Project Sponsor must include in the New Capacity Qualification Package:

- (a) a claimed summer Qualified Capacity and a claimed winter Qualified Capacity based on the data described in Section III.13.1.1.2.2.6(b);
- (b) measured and recorded site-specific summer and winter data relevant to the expected performance of the Intermittent Power Resource (including wind speed data for wind resources, water flow data for run-of-river hydropower resources, and irradiance data for solar resources) that, with the other information provided in the New Capacity Qualification Package, will enable the ISO to confirm the summer and winter Qualified Capacity that the Project Sponsor claims for the Intermittent Power Resource.

**III.13.1.1.2.2.7. Load-Side Interests.**

If the Project Sponsor seeks to demonstrate one of the qualifying circumstances described in Section III.A.21.1.3 with regard to its New Generating Capacity Resource, the Project Sponsor must provide the Load-Side Relationship Certification in the New Capacity Qualification Package.

**III.13.1.1.2.3. Initial Interconnection Analysis.**

- (a) For each New Generating Capacity Resource, the ISO shall perform an initial interconnection analysis, including an analysis of overlapping interconnection impacts, based on the information provided in the New Capacity Show of Interest Form and shall determine the amount of capacity that the resource could provide by the start of the associated Capacity Commitment Period. The initial interconnection analysis shall be performed consistent with the criteria and conditions described in ISO New England Planning Procedures, and will include, but will not be limited to, a power flow analysis and a short circuit analysis. No initial interconnection analysis is required where the total requested Qualified Capacity of a New Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to Sections III.13.1.1.2, III.13.1.1.3, III.13.1.1.4, or III.13.1.1.6 can be realized without a Material Modification (as defined in Section 4.4 of Schedule 22, Section 1.5 of Schedule 23 and Section 4.4 of Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff). The ISO will perform the initial interconnection analysis in the form of a group study that will (i) include all the projects that have submitted a New Capacity Show of Interest Form to

participate in the same Capacity Commitment Period (as described in Section 4.1 of Schedule 22 and Section 1.5 of Schedule 23 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff) and (ii) exclude any existing capacity that will be retired as of the start of the same Capacity Commitment Period. Participation in an initial interconnection analysis is a requirement for obtaining Capacity Network Resource Interconnection Service or Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service in a manner that meets the Capacity Capability Interconnection Standard in accordance with the provisions in Schedules 22, 23 and 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff.

(b) If as a result of the initial interconnection analysis, the ISO determines that the interconnection facilities and upgrades identified in the qualification process that are necessary to enable the New Generating Capacity Resource to provide the entire amount of capacity indicated in the New Capacity Show of Interest Form can not be implemented before the start of the Capacity Commitment Period, the New Generating Capacity Resource's Qualified Capacity values may be adjusted accordingly, as described in Section III.13.1.1.2.5.

(c) If as a result of the initial interconnection analysis, the ISO determines that the interconnection facilities and upgrades identified in the qualification process that are necessary to enable the New Generating Capacity Resource to provide capacity indicated in the New Capacity Show of Interest Form can not be implemented before the start of the Capacity Commitment Period and the New Generating Capacity Resource can not provide any capacity without those facilities and upgrades, the resource shall not be accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction. In this case, the ISO will provide an explanation of its determination in the qualification determination notification, discussed in Section III.13.1.1.2.8.

(d) If as a result of the initial interconnection analysis, the ISO determines that the New Generating Capacity Resource can provide all or some of the capacity indicated in the New Capacity Show of Interest Form by the start of the Capacity Commitment Period, and if the New Generating Capacity Resource is accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction in accordance with the other provisions and requirements of this Section III.13.1, then in the qualification determination notification, discussed in Section III.13.1.1.2.8, the ISO, after consultation with the applicable Transmission Owner(s) or Elective Transmission Upgrade Interconnection Customer as appropriate, shall include a list of the facilities that may be required to complete the interconnection and time required to construct those facilities by the start of the associated Capacity Commitment Period.

(e) Where, as a result of the initial interconnection analysis, the ISO concludes, after consultation with the Project Sponsor and the applicable Transmission Owner(s) or Elective Transmission Upgrade Interconnection Customer, as appropriate, that the capacity indicated in the New Capacity Show of Interest Form can not be interconnected by the commencement of the Capacity Commitment Period, the Forward Capacity Market qualification process for that resource shall be terminated and the ISO will notify the Project Sponsor of such termination.

(f) Where, as a result of the initial interconnection analysis, the ISO determines that because of overlapping interconnection impacts, New Generating Capacity Resources that are otherwise accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction in accordance with the other provisions and requirements of this Section III.13.1 cannot provide the full amount of capacity that they each would otherwise be able to provide (in the absence of the other relevant Existing Generating Capacity Resources and New Generating Capacity Resources seeking to qualify for the Forward Capacity Auction), those New Generating Capacity Resources will be accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction on the basis of their Queue Position, as described in Schedules 22, 23 and 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff, with priority given to resources that entered the queue earlier. Resources with lower priority in the queue may be accepted partially. Starting with the fourth auction, a New Generating Capacity Resource that meets the requirements of this Section III.13.1, but that would not be accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction as a result of overlapping interconnection impacts with another resource having a higher priority in the queue may be accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction as a Conditional Qualified New Resource, as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(f), provided that the resource having a higher priority in the queue is not a resource offering capacity into the Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.2(e).

#### **III.13.1.1.2.4. Evaluation of New Capacity Qualification Package.**

The ISO shall review a New Generating Capacity Resource's New Capacity Qualification Package consistent with the dates set forth in Section III.13.1.10, and shall determine whether the package is complete and whether, based on the information provided, the New Generating Capacity Resource is accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction. In making these determinations, the ISO may consider, but is not limited to considering, the following:

(a) whether the New Capacity Qualification Package contains all of the elements required by this Section III.13.1.1.2;

- (b) whether the critical path schedule includes all necessary elements and is sufficiently developed;
- (c) whether the milestones in the critical path schedule are reasonable and likely to be met;
- (d) whether, in the case of a resource previously counted as a capacity resource, the requirements for treatment as a New Generating Capacity Resource are satisfied; and
- (e) whether, in the case of an Intermittent Power Resource, sufficient data for confirming the resource's claimed summer and winter Qualified Capacity is provided, and whether the data provided reasonably supports the claimed summer and winter Qualified Capacity.

**III.13.1.1.2.5. Qualified Capacity for New Generating Capacity Resources.**

**III.13.1.1.2.5.1. New Generating Capacity Resources Other Than Intermittent Power Resources.**

The summer Qualified Capacity and winter Qualified Capacity of a New Generating Capacity Resource that is not an Intermittent Power Resource that has cleared in the Forward Capacity Auction shall be based on the data provided to the ISO during the qualification process, subject to ISO review and verification, and possibly as modified pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.3(b). The FCA Qualified Capacity for such a resource shall be the lesser of the resource's summer Qualified Capacity and winter Qualified Capacity, as adjusted to account for applicable offers composed of separate resources.

**III.13.1.1.2.5.2. [Reserved]**

**III.13.1.1.2.5.3. New Generating Capacity Resources that are Intermittent Power Resources.**

The summer Qualified Capacity and winter Qualified Capacity of a New Generating Capacity Resource that is an Intermittent Power Resource shall be the summer Qualified Capacity and winter Qualified Capacity claimed by the Project Sponsor pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.2.6, as confirmed by the ISO pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.4(e). The FCA Qualified Capacity for such a resource shall be equal to the resource's summer Qualified Capacity, as adjusted to account for applicable offers composed of separate resources.

**III.13.1.1.2.5.4. New Generating Capacity Resources Partially Clearing in a Previous Forward Capacity Auction.**

Where, as discussed in Section III.13.1.1.1(c), a New Generating Capacity Resource was accepted for participation in a previous Forward Capacity Auction, but cleared less than its summer or winter Qualified Capacity in that previous Forward Capacity Auction and is having its critical path schedule monitored by the ISO as described in Section III.13.3, its summer and winter Qualified Capacity as a New Generating Capacity Resource in the instant Forward Capacity Auction shall be the summer and winter Qualified Capacity from the previous Forward Capacity Auction minus the amount of capacity clearing from the New Generating Capacity Resource in the previous Forward Capacity Auction. The FCA Qualified Capacity for such a resource shall be the lesser of the resource's summer Qualified Capacity and winter Qualified Capacity, as adjusted to account for applicable offers composed of separate resources. The amount of capacity clearing in a Forward Capacity Auction from a New Generating Capacity Resource shall be treated as an Existing Generating Capacity Resource in subsequent Forward Capacity Auctions.

**III.13.1.1.2.6. [Reserved.]**

**III.13.1.1.2.7. Opportunity to Consult with Project Sponsor.**

In its review of a New Capacity Show of Interest Form or a New Capacity Qualification Package, the ISO may consult with the Project Sponsor to seek clarification, to gather additional necessary information, or to address questions or concerns arising from the materials submitted. At the discretion of the ISO, the ISO may consider revisions or additions to the qualification materials resulting from such consultation; provided, however, that in no case shall the ISO consider revisions or additions to the qualification materials if the ISO believes that such consideration cannot be properly accomplished within the time periods established for the qualification process. In addition, the ISO or the Project Sponsor may confer to seek clarification, to gather additional necessary information, or to address questions or concerns prior to the ISO's final determination and notification of qualification.

**III.13.1.1.2.8. Qualification Determination Notification for New Generating Capacity Resources.**

No later than 127 days before the Forward Capacity Auction, the ISO shall send notification to Project Sponsors or Market Participants, as applicable, for each New Generating Capacity Resource indicating:



- (a) whether the New Generating Capacity Resource has been accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction as a result of the initial interconnection analysis made pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.3, and if not accepted, an explanation of the reasons the New Generating Capacity Resource was not accepted in the initial interconnection analysis;
- (b) whether the New Generating Capacity Resource has been accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction as a result of the New Capacity Qualification Package evaluation made pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.4, and if not accepted, an explanation of the reasons the New Generating Capacity Resource's New Capacity Qualification Package was not accepted;
- (c) if accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction, a list of the facilities that may be required to complete the interconnection for purposes of providing capacity and time required to construct those facilities by the start of the associated Capacity Commitment Period, as discussed in Section III.13.1.1.2.3(d);
- (d) if accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction, the New Generating Capacity Resource's summer Qualified Capacity and winter Qualified Capacity, as determined pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.5;
- (e) if accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction, but subject to the provisions of Section III.13.1.1.2.3(f) (where not all New Generating Capacity Resources can be interconnected due to their combined effects on the New England Transmission System), a description of how the New Generating Capacity Resource shall participate in the Forward Capacity Auction, including, for the fourth and future auctions: (i) whether the resource shall participate as a Conditional Qualified New Resource; (ii) for the notification to a Conditional Qualified New Resource, the Queue Position of the associated resource with higher queue priority; and (iii) for the notification to a resource with higher queue priority than a Conditional Qualified New Resource, the Queue Position of the Conditional Qualified New Resource;~~and~~
- (f) if accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction, the ISO's determination as to whether the New Generating Capacity Resource satisfies any of the conditions described in Section III.A.21.1 and the basis for such determination; and

(gf) if accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction and ~~requesting to submit offers at prices below the relevant Offer Review Trigger Price pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.2.3~~ subject to buyer-side market power review pursuant to Section III.A.21.2, the Internal Market Monitor's determinations regarding whether the New Generating Capacity Resource's requested lowest offer price, submitted pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.2.3(a), ~~is consistent with the long-run average costs of that New Generating Capacity Resource~~ must be mitigated, as described in Section III.A.21.2.3. The ISO shall not disclose to the Project Sponsor any information regarding the potential impact of any offer from the Project Sponsor on Capacity Clearing Prices.

### **III.13.1.1.2.9 Renewable Technology Resource Election.**

A Project Sponsor or Market Participant may not elect Renewable Technology Resource treatment for the FCA associated with a Capacity Commitment Period beginning on or after June 1, 2025.

A Project Sponsor or Market Participant electing Renewable Technology Resource treatment for the FCA Qualified Capacity of a New Generating Capacity Resource or New Demand Capacity Resource shall submit a Renewable Technology Resource election form no later than two Business Days after the date on which the ISO provides qualification determination notifications pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.8 or Section III.13.1.4.1.1.6. Only the portion of the FCA Qualified Capacity of the resource that meets the requirements of Section III.13.1.1.1.7 is eligible for treatment as a Renewable Technology Resource.

Renewable Technology Resource elections may not be modified or withdrawn after the deadline for submission of the Renewable Technology Resource election form.

The submission of a Renewable Technology Resource election that satisfies the requirements of Section III.13.1.1.1.7 will invalidate a prior multi-year Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price election for the same resource made pursuant to Section III.13.1.4.1.1.2.7 or Section III.13.1.1.2.2.4 for a Forward Capacity Auction.

### **III.13.1.1.2.10 Determination of Renewable Technology Resource Qualified Capacity.**

- (a) If the total FCA Qualified Capacity of Renewable Technology Resources exceeds the cap specified in subsections (b), (c), (d) and (e) the qualified capacity value of each resource shall be prorated by the ratio of the cap divided by the total FCA Qualified Capacity. The ISO

- shall notify the Project Sponsor or Market Participant, as applicable, of the Qualified Capacity value of its resource no more than five Business Days after the deadline for submitting Renewable Technology Resource elections.
- (b) The cap for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2018 is 200 MW.
  - (c) The cap for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2019 is 400 MW minus the amount of Capacity Supply Obligations acquired by Renewable Technology Resources that are New Capacity Resources pursuant to Section III.13.2 in the prior Capacity Commitment Period.
  - (d) The cap for each Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2020 or June 1, 2021 is 600 MW minus the amount of Capacity Supply Obligations acquired by Renewable Technology Resources that are New Capacity Resources pursuant to Section III.13.2 in the prior two Capacity Commitment Periods.
  - (e) The cap for each Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2022 or June 1, 2023 or June 1, 2024 is 514 MW minus the cumulative amount of Capacity Supply Obligations acquired by Renewable Technology Resources that are New Capacity Resources in the first or second run of the primary auction-clearing process pursuant to Section III.13.2 for each Capacity Commitment Period that begins on or after June 1, 2021.

### **III.13.1.2. Existing Generating Capacity Resources.**

An Existing Generating Capacity Resource, as defined in Section III.13.1.2.1, may participate in the Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to the provisions of this Section III.13.1.2.

#### **III.13.1.2.1. Definition of Existing Generating Capacity Resource.**

Any resource that does not satisfy the criteria for participating in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource (Section III.13.1.1), as an Existing Import Capacity Resource or New Import Capacity Resource (Section III.13.1.3), or as a New Demand Capacity Resource or Existing Demand Capacity Resource (Section III.13.1.4) shall be an Existing Generating Capacity Resource.

##### **III.13.1.2.1.1. Attributes of Existing Generating Capacity Resources.**

For purposes of Forward Capacity Auction qualification, a Market Participant may not change any Existing Generating Capacity Resource attribute (including but not limited to the resource's status as an Intermittent Power Resource) in the period beginning 20 Business Days prior to the Existing Capacity

Retirement Deadline and ending with the conclusion of the Forward Capacity Auction. Outside of this period, any such change must be accompanied by documentation justifying the change.

**III.13.1.2.1.2                    Rationing Minimum Limit.**

No later than 120 days before the Forward Capacity Auction Market Participants may specify a Rationing Minimum Limit for an Existing Generating Capacity Resource.

**III.13.1.2.2.                    Qualified Capacity for Existing Generating Capacity Resources.**

**III.13.1.2.2.1.                    Existing Generating Capacity Resources Other Than Intermittent Power Resources.**

**III.13.1.2.2.1.1.                    Summer Qualified Capacity.**

The summer Qualified Capacity of an Existing Generating Capacity Resource that is not an Intermittent Power Resource shall be equal to the median of that Existing Generating Capacity Resource's summer Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings from the most recent five years, as of the fifth Business Day in October of each year, with only positive summer ratings included in the median calculation. For the first Forward Capacity Auction, the summer Qualified Capacity of an Existing Generating Capacity Resource shall be equal to the median of that Existing Generating Capacity Resource's summer Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings from the most recent four years, as of the fifth Business Day in October of each year, with only positive summer ratings included in the median calculation. Where an Existing Generating Capacity Resource has fewer than five summer Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings, or in the case of the first Forward Capacity Auction, fewer than four summer Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings, then the summer Qualified Capacity for that Existing Generating Capacity Resource shall be equal to the median of all of that Existing Generating Capacity Resource's previous summer Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings, as of the fifth Business Day in October of each year, with only positive summer ratings included in the median calculation. If for an Existing Generating Capacity Resource there are no previous positive summer Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings because the Existing Generating Capacity Resource had not yet achieved FCM Commercial Operation, then the Existing Generating Capacity Resource's summer Qualified Capacity shall be equal to the amount of capacity clearing from the resource as a New Generating Capacity Resource in previous Forward Capacity Auctions.

**III.13.1.2.2.1.2.                    Winter Qualified Capacity.**

The winter Qualified Capacity of an Existing Generating Capacity Resource that is not an Intermittent Power Resource shall be equal to the median of that Existing Generating Capacity Resource's winter Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings from the most recent five years, as of the fifth Business Day in June of each year, with only positive winter ratings included in the median calculation. For the first Forward Capacity Auction, the winter Qualified Capacity of an Existing Generating Capacity Resource shall be equal to the median of that Existing Generating Capacity Resource's winter Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings from the most recent four years, as of the fifth Business Day in June of each year, with only positive winter ratings included in the median calculation. Where an Existing Generating Capacity Resource has fewer than five winter Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings, or in the case of the first Forward Capacity Auction, fewer than four winter Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings, then the winter Qualified Capacity for that Existing Generating Capacity Resource shall be equal to the median of all of that Existing Generating Capacity Resource's previous winter Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings, as of the fifth Business Day in June of each year, with only positive winter ratings included in the median calculation. If for an Existing Generating Capacity Resource there are no previous positive winter Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings because the Existing Generating Capacity Resource had not yet achieved FCM Commercial Operation, then the Existing Generating Capacity Resource's winter Qualified Capacity shall be equal to the amount of capacity clearing from the resource as a New Generating Capacity Resource in previous Forward Capacity Auctions.

**III.13.1.2.2.2. Existing Generating Capacity Resources that are Intermittent Power Resources.**

The summer and winter Qualified Capacity for an Existing Generating Capacity Resource that is an Intermittent Power Resource shall be calculated as follows:

**III.13.1.2.2.2.1. Summer Qualified Capacity for an Intermittent Power Resource.**

(a) With regard to any Forward Capacity Auction qualification process, for each of the previous five summer periods, the ISO shall determine the median of the Intermittent Power Resource's net output in the Summer Intermittent Reliability Hours. If there are less than five full summer periods since the Intermittent Power Resource achieved FCM Commercial Operation, the ISO shall determine the median of the Intermittent Power Resource's net output in each of the previous summer periods, or portion thereof, since the Intermittent Power Resource achieved FCM Commercial Operation.

(b) The Intermittent Power Resource's summer Qualified Capacity shall be the average of the median numbers determined in Section III.13.1.2.2.2.1(a).

(c) The Summer Intermittent Reliability Hours shall be hours ending 1400 through 1800 each day of the summer period (June through September) and all summer period hours in which there was a system-wide Capacity Scarcity Condition and if the Intermittent Power Resource was in an import-constrained Capacity Zone, all Capacity Scarcity Conditions in that Capacity Zone.

(d) If for an Existing Generating Capacity Resource that is an Intermittent Power Resource there are no previous positive summer Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings because the Existing Generating Capacity Resource had not yet achieved FCM Commercial Operation, then the Existing Generating Capacity Resource's summer Qualified Capacity shall be equal to the amount of capacity clearing from the resource as a New Generating Capacity Resource in previous Forward Capacity Auctions.

**III.13.1.2.2.2. Winter Qualified Capacity for an Intermittent Power Resource.**

(a) With regard to any Forward Capacity Auction qualification process, for each of the previous five winter periods, the ISO shall determine the median of the Intermittent Power Resource's net output in the Winter Intermittent Reliability Hours. If there are less than five full winter periods since the Intermittent Power Resource achieved FCM Commercial Operation, the ISO shall determine the median of the Intermittent Power Resource's net output in each of the previous winter periods, or portion thereof, since the Intermittent Power Resource achieved FCM Commercial Operation.

(b) The Intermittent Power Resource's winter Qualified Capacity shall be the average of the median numbers determined in Section III.13.1.2.2.2.2(a).

(c) The Winter Intermittent Reliability Hours shall be hours ending 1800 and 1900 each day of the winter period (October through May) and all winter period hours in which there was a system-wide Capacity Scarcity Condition and if the Intermittent Power Resource was in an import-constrained Capacity Zone, all Capacity Scarcity Conditions in that Capacity Zone.

(d) If for an Existing Generating Capacity Resource that is an Intermittent Power Resource there are no previous positive winter Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings because the Existing Generating Capacity Resource had not yet achieved FCM Commercial Operation, then the Existing Generating

Capacity Resource's winter Qualified Capacity shall be equal to the amount of capacity clearing from the resource as a New Generating Capacity Resource in previous Forward Capacity Auctions.

**III.13.1.2.2.3. Qualified Capacity Adjustment for Partially New and Partially Existing Resources.**

(a) Where an Existing Generating Capacity Resource is associated with a New Generating Capacity Resource that was accepted for participation in a previous Forward Capacity Auction qualification process and that cleared in a previous Forward Capacity Auction, then in each subsequent Forward Capacity Auction until the New Generating Capacity Resource achieves FCM Commercial Operation the summer Qualified Capacity of that Existing Generating Capacity Resource shall be the sum of [the median of that Existing Generating Capacity Resource's positive summer Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings from the most recent five years, as of the fifth Business Day of October of each year, calculated in a manner consistent with Section III.13.1.2.2.1.1] plus [the amount of the New Generating Capacity Resource's capacity clearing in previous Forward Capacity Auctions]. After the New Generating Capacity Resource achieves FCM Commercial Operation, the Existing Generating Capacity Resource's summer Qualified Capacity shall be calculated as described in Section III.13.1.2.2.1.1, except that no data from the time period prior to the New Generating Capacity Resource's FCM Commercial Operation date shall be used to determine the summer Qualified Capacity associated with the Existing Generating Capacity Resource.

(b) Where an Existing Generating Capacity Resource is associated with a New Generating Capacity Resource that was accepted for participation in a previous Forward Capacity Auction qualification process and that cleared in a previous Forward Capacity Auction, then in each subsequent Forward Capacity Auction until the New Generating Capacity Resource achieves FCM Commercial Operation the winter Qualified Capacity of that Existing Generating Capacity Resource shall be the sum of [the median of that Existing Generating Capacity Resource's positive winter Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings from the most recent five years, as of the fifth Business Day of June of each year, calculated in a manner consistent with Section III.13.1.2.2.1.2] plus [the amount of the New Generating Capacity Resource's capacity clearing in previous Forward Capacity Auctions]. After the New Generating Capacity Resource achieves FCM Commercial Operation, the Existing Generating Capacity Resource's winter Qualified Capacity shall be calculated as described in Section III.13.1.2.2.1.2, except that no data from the time period prior to the New Generating Capacity Resource's FCM Commercial Operation date shall be used to determine the winter Qualified Capacity associated with the Existing Generating Capacity Resource.

**III.13.1.2.2.4. Adjustment for Significant Decreases in Capacity Prior to the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline.**

Where the most recent summer Seasonal Claimed Capability, as of the fifth Business Day in October, of an Existing Generating Capacity Resource (other than a Settlement Only Resource or an Intermittent Power Resource) is below its summer Qualified Capacity, as determined pursuant to Section

III.13.1.2.2.1.1, by:

- (1) for Capacity Commitment Periods beginning prior to June 1, 2023, more than the lesser of 20 percent of that summer Qualified Capacity or 40 MW;
- (2) for Capacity Commitment Periods beginning on or after June 1, 2023, more than the lesser of:
  - (i) the greater of 10 percent of that summer Qualified Capacity or two MW, or;
  - (ii) 10 MW;

then the Lead Market Participant must elect one of the two treatments described in this Section III.13.1.2.2.4 by the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline. If the Lead Market Participant makes no election, or elects treatment pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.2.4(c) and fails to meet the associated requirements, then the treatment described in Section III.13.1.2.2.4(a) shall apply.

(a) A Lead Market Participant may elect, for the purposes of the Forward Capacity Auction only, to have the Existing Generating Capacity Resource's summer Qualified Capacity set to the most recent summer Seasonal Claimed Capability as of the fifth Business Day in October, provided that the Lead Market Participant has furnished evidence regarding the cause of the de-rating.

(b) [Reserved.]

(c) A Lead Market Participant may elect: (i) to submit a critical path schedule as described in Section III.13.1.1.2.2.2, modified as appropriate, describing the measures that will be taken and showing that the Existing Generating Capacity Resource will be able to provide an amount of capacity consistent with the summer Qualified Capacity as calculated pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.2.1.1 by the start of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period; and (ii) to have the Existing Generating Capacity Resource's summer Qualified Capacity remain as calculated pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.2.1.1 for the Forward Capacity Auction. For an Existing Generating Capacity Resource subject to this election, the critical path schedule monitoring provisions of Section III.13.3 shall apply.



**III.13.1.2.2.5. Adjustment for Certain Significant Increases in Capacity.**

Where an Existing Generating Capacity Resource (other than a Settlement Only Resource) meets the requirements of Section III.13.1.1.1.3(a) but not the requirements of Section III.13.1.1.1.3(b), the Lead Market Participant may elect to have the Existing Generating Capacity Resource's summer Qualified Capacity be the sum of [the median of that Existing Generating Capacity Resource's positive summer Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings from the most recent five years, as of the fifth Business Day in October of each year, calculated in a manner consistent with Section III.13.1.2.2.1.1] plus [the amount of incremental capacity as described in Section III.13.1.1.1.3(a)]; provided, however, that the Lead Market Participant must abide by all other provisions of this Section III.13 applicable to a resource that is a New Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.1.3. Such an election must be made in writing and must be received by the ISO no later than the close of the New Capacity Show of Interest Submission Window. If the incremental amount of capacity seeking to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction meets the requirements of this Section, but the incremental amount of capacity does not span the entire Capacity Commitment Period, then the ISO shall match the incremental amount of capacity with excess Qualified Capacity at that same resource, not to exceed the Qualified Capacity of the existing portion of the resource, in order to cover the entire Capacity Commitment Period. This provision shall not apply to Intermittent Power Resources.

**III.13.1.2.2.5.1. [Reserved.]**

**III.13.1.2.2.5.2. Requirements for an Existing Generating Capacity Resource, Existing Demand Capacity Resource or Existing Import Capacity Resource Having a Higher Summer Qualified Capacity than Winter Qualified Capacity.**

Where an Existing Generating Capacity Resource, Existing Demand Capacity Resource, or Existing Import Capacity Resource (other than an Intermittent Power Resource) has a summer Qualified Capacity that exceeds its winter Qualified Capacity, both as calculated pursuant to this Section III.13.1.2.2, then that resource must either: (i) offer its summer Qualified Capacity as part of an offer composed of separate resources, as discussed in Section III.13.1.5; or (ii) have its FCA Qualified Capacity administratively set by the ISO to the lesser of its summer Qualified Capacity and winter Qualified Capacity.

**III.13.1.2.3. Qualification Process for Existing Generating Capacity Resources.**

(a) For each Existing Generating Capacity Resource, no later than 15 Business Days before the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline, the ISO will notify the resource's Lead Market Participant of the

resource's summer Qualified Capacity and winter Qualified Capacity and the Load Zone in which the Existing Generating Capacity Resource is located.

(b) If the Lead Market Participant believes that the ISO has made a mathematical error in calculating the summer Qualified Capacity or winter Qualified Capacity for an Existing Generating Capacity Resource as described in Section III.13.1.2.2, then the Lead Market Participant must notify the ISO within five Business Days of receipt of the Qualified Capacity notification.

(c) The ISO shall notify the Lead Market Participant of the outcome of any such challenge no later than five Business Days before the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline. If an Existing Generating Capacity Resource does not submit a Static De-List Bid, an Export Bid, an Administrative Export De-List Bid, a Permanent De-List Bid, or a Retirement De-List Bid in the Forward Capacity Auction qualification process, then the resource shall be entered into the Forward Capacity Auction as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(c).

**III.13.1.2.3.1. Existing Capacity Retirement Package and Existing Capacity Qualification Package.**

A resource that previously has been deactivated pursuant to Section I.3.9 of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff (or its predecessor provisions) and seeks to reactivate and participate in the Forward Capacity Market as an Existing Generating Capacity Resource must submit a reactivation plan no later than 10 Business Days before the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline, as described in Section III.13.1.1.1.6(b). All Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids in the Forward Capacity Auction must be detailed in an Existing Capacity Retirement Package submitted to the ISO no later than the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline. All Static De-List Bids, Export Bids and Administrative Export De-List Bids in the Forward Capacity Auction must be detailed in an Existing Capacity Qualification Package submitted to the ISO no later than the Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline. Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids may not be modified or withdrawn after the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline, except as provided for in Section III.13.1.2.4.1. All Static De-List Bids, Export Bids, and Administrative Export De-List Bids submitted in the qualification process may not be modified or withdrawn after the Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline, except as provided for in Section III.13.1.2.3.1.1. An Existing Generating Capacity Resource may not submit a Static De-List Bid, Export Bid, Administrative Export De-List Bid, Permanent De-List Bid, or Retirement De-List Bid for an amount of capacity greater than its summer Qualified Capacity, unless the submittal is for the entire

resource. Where a resource elected pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.2.4 or Section III.13.1.4.1.1.2.7 to have the Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price continue to apply after the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction in which the offer clears, the capacity associated with any resulting Capacity Supply Obligation may not be subject to any type of de-list or export bid in subsequent Forward Capacity Auctions for Capacity Commitment Periods for which the Project Sponsor elected to have the Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price continue to apply. For a single resource, a Lead Market Participant may combine a Static De-List Bid, an Export Bid, and an Administrative Export De-List Bid; neither a Permanent De-List Bid nor a Retirement De-List Bid may be combined with any other type of de-list or export bid.

Static De-List Bids and Export Bids may elect to be rationed (as described in Section III.13.2.6, however, an Export Bid is always subject to potential rationing where the associated external interface binds). Where a Lead Market Participant submits any combination of Static De-List Bid and Export Bid for a single resource, each of those bids must have the same rationing election. Where a Lead Market Participant submits any combination of Static De-List Bid, Export Bid, and Administrative Export De-List Bid for a single resource, none of the prices in a set of price-quantity pairs associated with a bid may be the same as any price in any other set of price-quantity pairs associated with another bid for the same resource.

#### **III.13.1.2.3.1.A            Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold.**

For the fifteenth Forward Capacity Auction (for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning June 1, 2024), the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold is \$4.30/kW-month. For each Forward Capacity Auction thereafter, the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold shall be calculated as described below in this Section III.13.1.2.3.1.A, and shall be published to the ISO's website no later than 5 Business Days before the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline. This publication shall include the preliminary value calculated pursuant to subsection (a) below, whether the preliminary value was constrained by either of the limitations described in subsection (b) below, the margin value as calculated pursuant to subsection (c) below, and the final value as calculated pursuant to subsection (d) below.

(a) Subject to the limitations described in subsection (b) below, a preliminary value of the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold shall be calculated as the average of: (i) the Capacity Clearing Price for the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone from the immediately preceding Forward Capacity Auction (provided, however, that if there is a second run of the primary auction-clearing process pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.1(d), the resulting Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone clearing price from that run shall be used instead); and (ii) the

price at which the total amount of capacity clearing in the immediately preceding Forward Capacity Auction intersects the estimated System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve for the upcoming Forward Capacity Auction. For this purpose, the estimated System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve shall be constructed, in the same manner as described in Section III.13.2.2.1, using the system-wide Marginal Reliability Impact values from the immediately preceding Forward Capacity Auction, the most recent estimate of the Installed Capacity Requirement (net of HQICCs) for the upcoming Forward Capacity Auction, and the Net CONE and Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price for the upcoming Forward Capacity Auction.

(b) The preliminary value of the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold shall not be higher than 75 percent of the Net CONE value for the upcoming Forward Capacity Auction. The preliminary value of the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold shall not be lower than 75 percent of the clearing price applicable pursuant to (a)(i) of this Section III.13.1.2.3.1.A, except as needed to ensure that it is not higher than 75 percent of the Net CONE value for the upcoming Forward Capacity Auction.

(c) A margin value shall be calculated using the following formula:

$$Margin = \$1/kW-month \times \left[ \frac{(75\% \times Net\ CONE_{upcoming\ FCA}) - DDBT_{preliminary}}{(75\% \times Net\ CONE_{upcoming\ FCA})} \right]$$

(d) The final value of the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold for the upcoming Forward Capacity Auction shall be equal to the preliminary value of the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold calculated pursuant to Sections III.13.1.2.3.1.A(a) and III.13.1.2.3.1.A(b) plus the margin value calculated pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.A(c).

#### **III.13.1.2.3.1.1. Static De-List Bids.**

A Lead Market Participant with an Existing Capacity Resource, or a portion thereof, seeking to specify a price below which it would not accept a Capacity Supply Obligation for that resource, or a portion thereof, at prices at or above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold during a single Capacity Commitment Period may submit a Static De-List Bid in the associated Forward Capacity Auction qualification process. A Static De-List Bid may not result in a resource's Capacity Supply Obligation being less than its Rationing Minimum Limit except where the resource submits de-list and export bids totaling the resource's full summer Qualified Capacity. Each Static De-List Bid must be detailed in an Existing Capacity Qualification Package submitted to the ISO no later than the Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline, and must be in the form of a curve (up to five price-quantity pairs). The curve may in no case

increase the quantity offered as the price decreases. All Static De-List Bids are subject to a reliability review as described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5. Static De-List Bids are subject to review by the Internal Market Monitor pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2 and must include the additional documentation described in that section. With the submission of a Static De-List Bid, the Lead Market Participant must notify the ISO if the Existing Capacity Resource will not be participating in the energy and ancillary services markets during the Capacity Commitment Period (except for necessary audits or tests).

No later than seven days after the issuance by the ISO of the qualification determination notification described in Section III.13.1.2.4(b), a Lead Market Participant that submitted a Static De-List Bid may: (a) lower the price of any price-quantity pair of a Static De-List Bid, provided that the revised price is greater than or equal to the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold, or; (b) withdraw any price-quantity pair of a Static De-List Bid.

**III.13.1.2.3.1.2. [Reserved.]**

**III.13.1.2.3.1.3. Export Bids.**

An Existing Generating Capacity Resource within the New England Control Area, other than an Intermittent Power Resource or a Renewable Technology Resource, seeking to export all or part of its capacity during a Capacity Commitment Period may submit an Export Bid in the associated Forward Capacity Auction qualification process. An Export Bid may not result in a resource's Capacity Supply Obligation being less than its Rationing Minimum Limit except where the resource submits de-list and export bids totaling the resource's full summer Qualified Capacity. All Export Bids are subject to a reliability review as described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5. Export Bids at or above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold are subject to review by the Internal Market Monitor pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2 and must include the additional information described in that Section. Each Export Bid must be detailed in an Existing Capacity Qualification Package submitted to the ISO no later than the Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline, and must be in the form of a curve (up to five price-quantity pairs) associated with a specific Existing Generating Capacity Resource. The curve may in no case increase the quantity offered as the price decreases. Each price-quantity pair must be less than the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price. The Existing Capacity Qualification Package for each Export Bid must also specify the interface over which the capacity will be exported. Export Bids shall be entered into the Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.2(b).

#### **III.13.1.2.3.1.4. Administrative Export De-List Bids.**

An Existing Generating Capacity Resource other than an Intermittent Power Resource or a Renewable Technology Resource subject to a multiyear contract to sell capacity outside of the New England Control Area during the Capacity Commitment Period that either: (i) cleared as an Export Bid in a previous Forward Capacity Auction for a Capacity Commitment Period within the duration of the contract; or (ii) entered into a contract prior to April 30, 2007 to sell capacity outside of the New England Control Area during the Capacity Commitment Period, may submit an Administrative Export De-List Bid in the associated Forward Capacity Auction qualification process. An Administrative Export De-List Bid may not result in a resource's Capacity Supply Obligation being less than its Rationing Minimum Limit except where the resource submits de-list and export bids totaling the resource's full summer Qualified Capacity. Unless reviewed as an Export Bid in a previous Forward Capacity Auction, an Administrative Export De-List Bid is subject to a reliability review prior to clearing in a Forward Capacity Auction, as described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5, and is subject to review by the Internal Market Monitor in the first Forward Capacity Auction in which it participates, pursuant to Section III.13.1.7. Both the reliability review and the review by the Internal Market Monitor shall be conducted once and shall remain valid for the multiyear contract period. Each Administrative Export De-List Bid must be detailed in an Existing Capacity Qualification Package submitted to the ISO no later than the Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline, must be associated with a specific Existing Generating Capacity Resource, and must indicate the quantity of capacity subject to the bid. The Existing Capacity Qualification Package for each Administrative Export De-List Bid must also specify the interface over which the capacity will be exported, and must include documentation demonstrating a contractual obligation to sell capacity outside of the New England Control Area during the whole Capacity Commitment Period. Administrative Export De-List Bids shall be entered into the Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.4.

#### **III.13.1.2.3.1.5. Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids.**

- (a) A Lead Market Participant with an Existing Capacity Resource seeking to specify a price at or below which it would not accept a Capacity Supply Obligation permanently for all or part of a Generating Capacity Resource beginning at the start of a particular Capacity Commitment Period may submit a Permanent De-List Bid in the associated Forward Capacity Auction qualification process.
- (b) A Lead Market Participant with an Existing Capacity Resource seeking to specify a price at or below which it would retire all or part of a Generating Capacity Resource from all New England Markets

beginning at the start of a particular Capacity Commitment Period may submit a Retirement De-List Bid in the associated Forward Capacity Auction qualification process.

(c) No Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid may result in a resource's Capacity Supply Obligation being less than its Rationing Minimum Limit unless the Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid is for the entire resource. Each Permanent De-List Bid and Retirement De-List Bid must be detailed in an Existing Capacity Retirement Package submitted to the ISO no later than the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline, and must be in the form of a curve (up to five price-quantity pairs) associated with a specific Existing Capacity Resource. The curve may in no case increase the quantity offered as the price decreases. Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids are subject to review by the Internal Market Monitor pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1 and must include the additional documentation described in that section. Once submitted, no Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid may be withdrawn, except as provided in Section III.13.1.2.4.1.

**III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1. Reliability Review of Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids During the Qualification Process.**

During the qualification process, the ISO will review the following de-list bids to determine if the resource is needed for reliability: (1) Internal Market Monitor-accepted Permanent De-List Bids and Internal Market Monitor-accepted Retirement De-List Bids that are at or above the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price; and (2) Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids for which the Lead Market Participant has opted to have the resource reviewed for reliability as described in Section III.13.1.2.4.1(a) or Section III.13.1.2.4.1(b). The reliability review will be conducted according to Section III.13.2.5.2.5, except as follows:

(a) Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids that cannot be priced (for example, due to the expiration of an operating license) will be reviewed first.

(b) System needs associated with Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids for resources found needed for reliability reasons pursuant to this Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1 will be reviewed with the Reliability Committee during the month of August following the issuance of retirement determination notifications pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4(a). The Lead Market Participant shall be notified as soon as practicable following the ISO's consultation with the Reliability Committee that the capacity associated with a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid is needed for reliability reasons.

(c) If the capacity associated with a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid is needed for reliability reasons pursuant to this Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1, the de-list bid shall be rejected and the resource shall be entered into the Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.2(c) and compensated according to Section III.13.2.5.2.5, unless the resource declines to be retained for reliability, as provided in Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1(d).

(d) No later than the fifth Business Day in the month of September following the review of system needs with the Reliability Committee per (b) above, a Lead Market Participant may notify the ISO that it declines to provide the associated capacity for reliability. Such an election will be binding. A resource for which a Lead Market Participant has made such an election will not be eligible for compensation pursuant to Sections III.13.2.5.2.5.1 or III.13.2.5.2.5.2.

(e) Where a resource is determined not to be needed for reliability or where a Lead Market Participant notifies the ISO that it declines to provide capacity for reliability pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1(d), the capacity associated with the Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid will be treated as follows:

(i) For a Retirement De-List Bid at or above the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price, or a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid for which a Lead Market Participant has elected to retire the resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(a), the portion of the resource subject to the de-list bid will be retired as permitted by applicable law coincident with the commencement of the Capacity Commitment Period for which the de-list bid was submitted, as described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3(a).

(ii) For a Permanent De-List Bid at or above the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price for which a Lead Market Participant has not elected to retire the resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(a), the portion of the resource subject to the de-list bid will be permanently de-listed coincident with the commencement of the Capacity Commitment Period for which the de-list bid was submitted, as described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3(b).

(iii) For a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid for which a Lead Market Participant has elected conditional treatment pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(b), the de-list bid



will continue to receive conditional treatment as described in Section III.13.1.2.4.1(b), Section III.13.2.3.2(b)(ii), and Section III.13.2.5.2.1.

**III.13.1.2.3.1.6. Static De-List Bids, Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids for Existing Generating Capacity Resources at Stations having Common Costs.**

Where Existing Generating Capacity Resources at a Station having Common Costs elect to submit Static De-List Bids, Permanent De-List Bids, or Retirement De-List Bids, the provisions of this Section III.13.1.2.3.1.6 shall apply.

**III.13.1.2.3.1.6.1. Submission of Cost Data.**

In addition to the information required elsewhere in this Section III.13.1.2.3, Static De-List Bids, Permanent De-List Bids, or Retirement De-List Bids submitted by an Existing Generating Capacity Resource that is associated with a Station having Common Costs and seeking to delist must include detailed cost data to allow the ISO to determine the Asset-Specific Going Forward Costs for each asset associated with the Station and the Station Going Forward Common Costs.

**III.13.1.2.3.1.6.2. [Reserved.]**

**III.13.1.2.3.1.6.3. Internal Market Monitor Review of Stations having Common Costs.**

The Internal Market Monitor will review each Static De-List Bid, Permanent De-List Bid and Retirement De-List Bids from an Existing Generating Capacity Resource that is associated with a Station having Common Costs pursuant to the following methodology:

- (i) Calculate the average Asset-Specific Going Forward Costs of each asset at the Station.
- (ii) Order the assets from highest average Asset-Specific Going Forward Costs to lowest average Asset-Specific Going Forward Costs; this is the preferred de-list order.
- (iii) Calculate and assign to each asset a station cost that is equal to the average cost of the assets remaining at the Station, including Station Going Forward Common Costs, assuming the successive de-listing of each individual asset in preferred de-list order.

(iv) Calculate a set of composite costs that is equal to the maximum of the cost associated with each asset as calculated in (i) and (iii) above.

The Internal Market Monitor will adjust the set of composite costs to ensure a monotonically non-increasing set of bids as follows: any asset with a composite cost that is greater than the composite cost of the asset with the lowest composite cost and that has average Asset-Specific Going Forward Costs that are less than its composite costs will have its composite cost set equal to that of the asset with the lowest composite cost. The bids of the asset with the lowest composite cost and of any assets whose composite costs are so adjusted will be considered a single non-rationable bid for use in the Forward Capacity Auction.

The Internal Market Monitor will compare a de-list bid developed using the adjusted composite costs to the de-list bid submitted by the Existing Generating Capacity Resource that is associated with a Station having Common Costs. If the Internal Market Monitor determines that the submitted de-list bid is less than or equal to the bid developed using the adjusted composite costs, then the bid shall be entered into the Forward Capacity Auction as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(b). If the Internal Market Monitor determines that the submitted de-list bid is greater than the bid developed using the adjusted composite costs or is not consistent with the submitted supporting cost data, then the Internal Market Monitor will establish an Internal Market Monitor-determined or Internal Market Monitor-accepted price for the bid as described in Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.

**III.13.1.2.3.2. Review by Internal Market Monitor of Bids from Existing Capacity Resources.**

The Internal Market Monitor shall review bids for Existing Capacity Resources as follows.

**III.13.1.2.3.2.1. Static De-List Bids and Export Bids, Permanent De-List Bids, and Retirement De-List Bids at or Above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold.**

The Internal Market Monitor shall review each Static De-List Bid and each Export Bid at or above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold to determine whether the bid is consistent with: (1) the Existing Capacity Resource's net going forward costs (as determined pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.2.A); (2) reasonable expectations about the resource's Capacity Performance Payments (as determined pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.3); (3) reasonable risk premium assumptions (as determined pursuant to Section

III.13.1.2.3.2.1.4); and (4) the resource's reasonable opportunity costs (as determined pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.5).

The Internal Market Monitor shall review each Permanent De-List Bid greater than 20 MW that is at or above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold and each Retirement De-List Bid greater than 20 MW that is at or above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold to determine whether the bid is consistent with: (1) the net present value of the resource's expected cash flows (as determined pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.2.B); (2) reasonable expectations about the resource's Capacity Performance Payments (as determined pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.3); and (3) the resource's reasonable opportunity costs (as determined pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.5). If more than one Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid is submitted by a single Lead Market Participant or its Affiliates (as used in Section III.A.24), the Internal Market Monitor shall review each such bid at or above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold if the sum of all such bids at or above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold is greater than 20 MW. The Internal Market Monitor shall review each Permanent De-List Bid and each Retirement De-List Bid submitted at any price pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.1(b) if the sum of the Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids submitted by the Lead Market Participant or its Affiliates (as used in Section III.A.24) is greater than 20 MW. Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids that are not reviewed by the Internal Market Monitor shall be included in the retirement determination notification described in Section III.13.1.2.4(a) and in the filing made to the Commission as described in Section III.13.8.1(a).

Sufficient documentation and information about each bid component must be included in the Existing Capacity Retirement Package or the Existing Capacity Qualification Package to allow the Internal Market Monitor to make the requisite determinations. If a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid is submitted pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.1(b), all relevant updates to previously submitted documentation and information must be provided to support the newly submitted price and allow the Internal Market Monitor to make updated determinations. The updated information may include a request to discontinue the Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid such that it will not be entered into the Forward Capacity Auction, in which case the update must include sufficient supporting information on the nature of resource investments that were undertaken, or other materially changed circumstances, to allow the Internal Market Monitor to determine whether discontinuation is appropriate.

The entire de-list submittal shall be accompanied by an affidavit executed by a corporate officer attesting to the accuracy of its content, including reported costs, the reasonableness of the estimates and adjustments of costs that would otherwise be avoided if the resource were not required to meet the obligations of a listed resource, and the reasonableness of the expectations and assumptions regarding Capacity Performance Payments, cash flows, opportunity costs, and risk premiums, and shall be subject to audit upon request by the ISO.

**III.13.1.2.3.2.1.1. Internal Market Monitor Review of De-List Bids.**

The Internal Market Monitor may seek additional information from the Lead Market Participant (including information about the other existing or potential new resources controlled by the Lead Market Participant) after the qualification deadline to address any questions or concerns regarding the data submitted, as appropriate. The Internal Market Monitor shall review all relevant information (including data, studies, and assumptions) to determine whether the bid is consistent with the resource's net going forward costs, reasonable expectations about the resource's Capacity Performance Payments, reasonable risk premium assumptions, and reasonable opportunity costs. In making this determination, the Internal Market Monitor shall consider, among other things, industry standards, market conditions (including published indices and projections), resource-specific characteristics and conditions, portfolio size, and consistency of assumptions across that portfolio.

**III.13.1.2.3.2.1.1.1. Review of Static De-List Bids and Export Bids.**

The Internal Market Monitor shall review Static De-List Bids and Export Bids and, after due consideration and consultation with the Lead Market Participant, as appropriate, shall develop an Internal Market Monitor-accepted Static De-List Bid or an Internal Market Monitor-accepted Export Bid. The Internal Market Monitor-accepted Static De-List Bid and Internal Market Monitor-accepted Export Bid shall be equal to the Static De-List Bid or Export Bid submitted by the Lead Market Participant unless the de-list bid price(s) submitted by the Lead Market Participant are more than 10% greater than the Internal Market Monitor-accepted de-list bid price(s) for the same de-list bid. If the de-list bid price(s) submitted by the Lead Market Participant are more than 10% greater than the Internal Market Monitor-accepted de-list bid price(s), the Internal Market Monitor shall calculate an Internal Market Monitor-accepted Static De-List Bid or Internal Market-Monitor-accepted Export Bid that is consistent with the sum of the resource's net going forward costs plus reasonable expectations about the resource's Capacity Performance Payments plus reasonable risk premium assumptions plus reasonable opportunity costs.

If an Internal Market Monitor-determined price is established for a Static De-List Bid or an Export Bid, both the qualification determination notification described in Section III.13.1.2.4 and the informational filing made to the Commission as described in Section III.13.8.1(c) shall include an explanation of the Internal Market Monitor-determined price based on the Internal Market Monitor review and the resource's net going forward costs, reasonable expectations about the resource's Capacity Performance Payments, reasonable risk premium assumptions, and reasonable opportunity costs as determined by the Internal Market Monitor.

**III.13.1.2.3.2.1.1.2. Review of Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids.**

The Internal Market Monitor shall review those Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids identified in Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1 and, after due consideration and consultation with the Lead Market Participant, as appropriate, shall develop an Internal Market Monitor-accepted Permanent De-List Bid or an Internal Market Monitor-accepted Retirement De-List Bid. The Internal Market Monitor-accepted Permanent De-List Bid and Internal Market Monitor-accepted Retirement De-List Bid shall be equal to the Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid submitted by the Lead Market Participant unless the de-list bid price(s) submitted by the Lead Market Participant are more than 10% greater than the Internal Market Monitor-accepted de-list bid price(s) for the same de-list bid. If the de-list bid price(s) submitted by the Lead Market Participant are more than 10% greater than the Internal Market Monitor-accepted de-list bid price(s), the Internal Market Monitor shall calculate an Internal Market Monitor-accepted Permanent De-List Bid or Internal Market-Monitor-accepted Retirement De-List Bid that is consistent with the sum of the net present value of the resource's expected cash flows plus reasonable expectations about the resource's Capacity Performance Payments plus reasonable opportunity costs.

The retirement determination notification described in Section III.13.1.2.4(a) and the filing made to the Commission as described in Section III.13.8.1(a) shall include an explanation of the Internal Market Monitor-accepted price and the Internal Market Monitor determination on any request to discontinue the Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid.

**III.13.1.2.3.2.1.2.A. Static De-List Bid and Export Bid Net Going Forward Costs.**

The Lead Market Participant for an Existing Capacity Resource that submits a Static De-List Bid or an Export Bid at or above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold that is to be reviewed by the Internal Market Monitor shall report expected net going forward costs for the applicable Capacity Commitment Period in a manner and format specified by the Internal Market Monitor, and may supplement this information with

other evidence. A Static De-List Bid or Export Bid at or above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold shall be considered consistent with the Existing Capacity Resource's net going forward costs based on a review of the data submitted in the following formula.

*Net Going Forward Costs =*

$$\frac{(GFC - IMR) \times InfIndex}{(CQ_{Summer, kW}) \times (12 months)}$$

Where:

GFC = annual going forward costs, in dollars. These are the expected costs and capital expenditures that might otherwise be avoided or not incurred if the resource were not subject to the obligations of a resource with a Capacity Supply Obligation during the Capacity Commitment Period (i.e., maintaining a constant condition of being ready to respond to commitment and dispatch orders). Costs that are not avoidable in a single Capacity Commitment Period and costs associated with the production of energy are not to be included. Service of debt is not a going forward cost. Staffing, maintenance, capital expenses, and other normal expenses that would be avoided only in the absence of a Capacity Supply Obligation may be included. Staffing, maintenance, capital expenses, and other normal expenses that would be avoided only if the resource were not participating in the energy and ancillary services markets may not be included, except in the case of a resource that has indicated in the submission of a Static De-List Bid that the resource will not be participating in the energy and ancillary services markets during the Capacity Commitment Period.

$CQ_{Summer, kW}$  = capacity seeking to de-list in kW. In no case shall this value exceed the resource's summer Qualified Capacity.

IMR = expected annual infra-marginal rents, in dollars. In the case of a resource that has indicated in the submission of a Static De-List Bid that the resource will not be participating in the energy and ancillary services markets during the Capacity Commitment Period, this value shall be calculated by subtracting all submitted cost data representing the cumulative expected cost of production (total expenses related to the production of energy, e.g. fuel, actual consumables such as chemicals and water, and, if quantified, incremental labor and maintenance) from the Existing Generating Capacity Resource's total ISO market revenues. In the case of a resource that has indicated in the submission of a Static De-List Bid that the

resource will be participating in the energy and ancillary services markets during the Capacity Commitment Period, this value shall be \$0.00.

InfIndex = inflation index.  $\text{infIndex} = (1 + i)^4$

Where: “i” is the most recent reported 4- Year expected inflation number published by the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland at the beginning of the qualification period. The specific value to be used shall be specified by the ISO and available to the Lead Market Participant.

### **III.13.1.2.3.2.1.2.B Permanent De-List Bid and Retirement De-List Bid Net Present Value of Expected Cash Flows.**

The Lead Market Participant for an Existing Capacity Resource that submits a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid that is to be reviewed by the Internal Market Monitor shall report all expected costs, revenues, prices, discount rates and capital expenditures in a manner and format specified by the Internal Market Monitor, and may supplement this information with other evidence. The Internal Market Monitor will review the Lead Market Participant’s submitted data to ensure that it is consistent with overall market conditions and reflects expected values.

The Internal Market Monitor will adjust any data that are inconsistent with overall market conditions or do not reflect expected values. The Internal Market Monitor shall enter all relevant expected costs, revenues, prices, discount rates and capital expenditures into a capital budgeting model and shall determine the net present value of the Existing Capacity Resource’s expected cash flows as follows:

The net present value of the Existing Capacity Resource’s expected cash flows is equal to (i) the net present value of the Existing Capacity Resource’s net annual expected cash flows over the resource’s remaining economic life (as determined pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.2.C) plus the net present value of the resource’s expected terminal value, using the resource’s discount rate, divided by (ii) the product of the resource’s Qualified Capacity (in kilowatts) and 12 months.

The Existing Capacity Resource’s net annual expected cash flow for the first Capacity Commitment Period of the resource’s remaining economic life is the resource’s expected annual net operating profit excluding expected capacity revenues less its expected capital expenditures in the Capacity Commitment Period.

The Existing Capacity Resource's net annual expected cash flow for each of the subsequent Capacity Commitment Periods of the resource's remaining economic life is the resource's expected annual net operating profit less its expected capital expenditures in the Capacity Commitment Period.

Where:

**Expected net operating profit**, in dollars, is the Lead Market Participant's expected annual profit that might otherwise be avoided or not accrued if the resource were not subject to the obligations of a listed capacity resource during the Capacity Commitment Period. Expected labor, maintenance, taxes, insurance, administrative and other normal expenses that can be avoided or not incurred if the resource is retired or permanently de-listed may be included. Service of debt is not an avoidable cost and may not be included.

**Expected capacity revenues**, in dollars, are the forecasted annual expected capacity revenues based on the Lead Market Participant's forecasted expected capacity prices for each of the subsequent Capacity Commitment Periods of the resource's remaining economic life. The Lead Market Participant shall provide the Internal Market Monitor with documentation supporting the forecasted expected capacity prices. The supporting documentation must include a detailed description and sources of the Lead Market Participant's assumptions about expected resource additions, resource retirements, estimated Installed Capacity Requirements, estimated Local Sourcing Requirements, expected market conditions, and any other assumptions used to develop the forecasted expected capacity price in each Capacity Commitment Period.

If the Internal Market Monitor determines the Lead Market Participant has not provided adequate supporting documentation for the forecasted expected capacity prices, the Internal Market Monitor will replace the Lead Market Participant's forecasted expected capacity prices with the Internal Market Monitor's estimate thereof in each of the subsequent Capacity Commitment Periods of the resource's remaining economic life.

**Expected capital expenditures**, in dollars, are the Lead Market Participant's expected capital investments that might otherwise be avoided or not incurred if the resource were not subject to the obligations of a listed capacity resource during the Capacity Commitment Periods.



**Expected terminal value**, in dollars, for resources with five years or less of remaining economic life, is the Lead Market Participant's expected revenue less expected costs associated with retiring or permanently de-listing the resource. For resources with more than five years of remaining economic life, the expected terminal value in the fifth year of the evaluation period is the Lead Market Participant's expected revenue less expected costs associated with retiring or permanently de-listing the resource at the end of the resource's economic life plus the net present value of the Existing Capacity Resource's net annual expected cash flows from the sixth year of the evaluation period through the end of the resource's remaining economic life, using the resource's discount rate.

**Discount rate** is a value reflecting the Lead Market Participant's weighted average cost of capital for the Existing Capacity Resource adjusted to reflect the risk to cash flows calculated pursuant to the net present value of expected cash flows analysis in this Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.2.B.

The Lead Market Participant shall provide the Internal Market Monitor with documentation supporting the weighted average cost of capital for the Existing Capacity Resource adjusted for risk.

The supporting documentation must include a detailed description and sources of the Lead Market Participant's assumptions associated with the cost of capital, risks and any other assumptions used to develop the weighted average cost of capital for the Existing Capacity Resource adjusted for risk.

If the Internal Market Monitor determines the Lead Market Participant has not provided adequate supporting documentation for the weighted average cost of capital for the Existing Capacity Resource adjusted for risk, the Lead Market Participant has included risks not associated with cash flows calculated pursuant to the net present value of expected cash flows analysis in this Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.2.B or the Lead Market Participant has submitted costs, revenues, capital expenditures or prices that are not reflective of expected values, the Internal Market Monitor will replace the Lead Market Participant's discount rate with a value determined by the Internal Market Monitor.

#### **III.13.1.2.3.2.1.2.C      Permanent De-List Bid and Retirement De-List Bid Calculation of Remaining Economic Life.**

The Internal Market Monitor shall calculate the Existing Capacity Resource's remaining economic life, using evaluation periods ranging from one to five years. For each evaluation period, the Internal Market Monitor will calculate the net present value of (a) the annual expected net operating profit minus annual expected capital expenditures assuming the Capacity Clearing Price for the first year is equal to the

Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price and (b) the expected terminal value of the resource at the end of the given evaluation period. The economic life is the maximum evaluation period in which a resource's net present value is non-negative. However, effective April 9, 2020, beginning with the sixteenth Forward Capacity Auction, the economic life is the evaluation period in which a resource's net present value is maximized.

**III.13.1.2.3.2.1.3. Expected Capacity Performance Payments.**

The Lead Market Participant for an Existing Capacity Resource that submits a Static De-List Bid or an Export Bid, Permanent De-List Bid, or Retirement De-List Bid at or above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold that is to be reviewed by the Internal Market Monitor shall also provide documentation separately detailing the expected Capacity Performance Payments for the resource. This documentation must include expectations regarding the applicable Capacity Balancing Ratio, the number of hours of reserve deficiency, and the resource's performance during reserve deficiencies.

**III.13.1.2.3.2.1.4. Risk Premium.**

The Lead Market Participant for an Existing Capacity Resource that submits a Static De-List Bid, or an Export Bid at or above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold that is to be reviewed by the Internal Market Monitor shall also provide documentation separately detailing any risk premium included in the bid. This documentation should address all components of physical and financial risk reflected in the bid, including, for example, catastrophic events, a higher than expected amount of reserve deficiencies, and performing scheduled maintenance during reserve deficiencies. Any risk that can be quantified and analytically supported and that is not already reflected in the formula for net going forward costs described in Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.2.A may be included in this risk premium component. In support of the resource's risk premium, the Lead Market Participant may also submit an affidavit from a corporate officer attesting that the risk premium submitted is the minimum necessary to ensure that the overall level of risk associated with the resource's participation in the Forward Capacity Market is consistent with the participant's corporate risk management practices.

**III.13.1.2.3.2.1.5. Opportunity Costs.**

To the extent that an Existing Capacity Resource submitting a Static De-List Bid or an Export Bid, Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid at or above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold has additional opportunity costs that are not reflected in the net going forward costs, net present value of

expected cash flows, expected Capacity Performance Payments, discount rate, or risk premium components of the bid, the Lead Market Participant must include in the Existing Capacity Qualification Package evidence supporting such costs. Opportunity costs associated with major repairs necessary to restore decreases in capacity as described in Section III.13.1.2.2.4, capital projects required to operate the plant as a capacity resource or other uses of the resource shall be considered, provided such costs are substantiated by evidence of a repair plan, documented business plan and fundamental market analysis, or other independent and transparent trading index or indices as applicable. Substantiation of opportunity costs relying on sales in reconfiguration auctions or risk aversion premiums shall not be considered sufficient justification.

**III.13.1.2.3.2.2. [Reserved.]**

**III.13.1.2.3.2.3. Administrative Export De-List Bids.**

The Internal Market Monitor shall review each Administrative Export De-List Bid associated with a multi-year contract entered into prior to April 30, 2007 in the first Forward Capacity Auction in which it clears. An Administrative Export De-List Bid shall be rejected if the Internal Market Monitor determines that the bid may be an attempt to manipulate the Forward Capacity Auction, and the matter will be referred to the Commission in accordance with the protocols set forth in Appendix A to the Commission's Market Monitoring Policy Statement (111 FERC ¶ 61,267 (2005)).

**III.13.1.2.3.2.4. Static De-List Bids for Reductions in Ratings Due to Ambient Air Conditions.**

A Lead Market Participant may submit a Static De-List Bid for up to the megawatt amount that the Lead Market Participant expects will not be physically available due to the difference between the summer Qualified Capacity at 90 degrees and the expected rating of the resource at 100 degrees. The ISO shall verify during the qualification process that the rating is accurate. Such Static De-List Bids may be entered into the Forward Capacity Market at prices up to and including the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price, subject to validation of the physical limit. Static De-List Bids for reductions in ratings due to ambient air conditions shall not be subject to the review described in Section III.13.1.2.3.2 and need not include documentation for that purpose.

**III.13.1.2.3.2.5. Static De-List Bid Incremental Capital Expenditure Recovery Schedule.**

Except as described below, the Internal Market Monitor shall review all Static De-List Bids using the following cost recovery schedule for incremental capital expenditures, which assumes an annual pre-tax weighted average cost of capital of 10 percent.

<b>Age of Existing Resource (years)</b>	<b>Remaining Life (years)</b>	<b>Annual Rate of Capital Cost Recovery</b>
1 to 5	30	0.106
6 to 10	25	0.110
11 to 15	20	0.117
16 to 20	15	0.131
21 to 25	10	0.163
25 plus	5	0.264

A Market Participant may request that a different pre-tax weighted average cost of capital be used to determine the resource's annual rate of capital cost recovery by submitting the request, along with supporting documentation, in the Existing Capacity Qualification Package. The Internal Market Monitor shall review the request and supporting documentation and may, at its sole discretion, replace the annual rate of capital cost recovery from the table above with a resource-specific value based on an adjusted pre-tax weighted average cost of capital. If the Internal Market Monitor uses an adjusted pre-tax weighted average cost of capital for the resource, then the resource's annual rate of capital cost recovery will be determined according to the following formula:

$$\frac{\text{Cost Of Capital}}{(1 - (1 + \text{CostOfCapital})^{-\text{RemainingLife}})}$$

Where:

Cost Of Capital = the adjusted pre-tax weighted average cost of capital.

Remaining Life = the remaining life of the existing resource, based on the age of the resource, as indicated in the table above.

#### **III.13.1.2.4. Retirement Determination Notification for Existing Capacity and Qualification Determination Notification for Existing Capacity; Right to**

**Increase Retirement De-List Bid or Permanent De-List Bid up to IMM-determined substitution auction test price.**

(a) No later than five Business Days before the Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline, the ISO shall send notification to the Lead Market Participant that submitted each Permanent De-List Bid, Retirement De-List Bid and substitution auction test price concerning the result of the Internal Market Monitor's review conducted pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2 and Section III.13.2.8.3.1A. This retirement determination notification shall not include the results of the reliability review pursuant to Sections III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1 or III.13.2.5.2.5. For auctions associated with a Capacity Commitment Period that begins on or after June 1, 2023, within five Business Days of the issuance of the retirement determination notification, a Lead Market Participant that submitted a Retirement De-List Bid or a Permanent De-List Bid and a substitution auction demand bid for the resource associated with the de-list bid, may make the following adjustments:

(i) for a Retirement De-List Bid, if, but for the limits in Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.1.2 on adjusting a Market Participant-submitted Retirement De-List Bid, the Internal Market Monitor would have calculated a Retirement De-List Bid price that is higher than the Market Participant-submitted de-list bid price and the Market Participant-submitted de-list bid is less than the Internal Market Monitor-determined substitution auction test price multiplied by 0.9, the Market Participant may increase the de-list bid price up to the minimum of (x) the Internal Market Monitor-determined substitution auction test price multiplied by 0.9 and (y) the higher Retirement De-List Bid price that the Internal Market Monitor would have calculated;

(ii) for a Permanent De-List Bid, if, but for the limits in Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.1.2 on adjusting a Market Participant-submitted Permanent De-List Bid, the Internal Market Monitor would have calculated a Permanent De-List Bid price that is higher than the Market Participant-submitted de-list bid price and the Market Participant-submitted de-list bid is less than the Internal Market Monitor-determined substitution auction test price multiplied by 0.9, the Market Participant may increase the de-list bid price up to the minimum of (x) the Internal Market Monitor-determined substitution auction test price multiplied by 0.9 and (y) the higher Permanent De-List Bid price that the Internal Market Monitor would have calculated.

(b) No later than 127 days before the Forward Capacity Auction, the ISO shall send notification to the Lead Market Participant that submitted each Static De-List Bid and Export Bid concerning the result of the Internal Market Monitor's de-list bid review conducted pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2. The qualification determination shall not include the results of the reliability review pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5.

**III.13.1.2.4.1. Participant-Elected Retirement or Conditional Treatment.**

No later than five Business Days after the issuance by the ISO of the retirement determination notification described in Section III.13.1.2.4(a), a Lead Market Participant that submitted a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid may make an election pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(a) or Section III.13.1.2.4.1(b). If the Lead Market Participant does not make an election pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(a) or Section III.13.1.2.4.1(b), the prices provided by the Internal Market Monitor in the retirement determination notifications shall be the finalized prices used in the Forward Capacity Auction as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(b) (unless otherwise directed by the Commission).

(a) A Lead Market Participant may elect to retire the resource, or portion thereof, for which it has submitted a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid. The capacity associated with a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid subject to this election will not be subject to reliability review and will be retired pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3(a); provided, however, that when making the retirement election pursuant to this Section III.13.1.2.4.1(a) the Lead Market Participant may opt to have the resource reviewed for reliability pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1, in which case the Lead Market Participant may have the opportunity (but will not be obligated) to provide capacity from the resource if the ISO determines that the resource is needed for reliability reasons, as described in Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1(d).

(b) A Lead Market Participant may elect conditional treatment for the Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid. The capacity associated with a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid subject to this election will be treated as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(b)(ii), Section III.13.2.5.2.1, and Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3; provided, however, that in making this election the Lead Market Participant may opt to have the resource reviewed for reliability pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1, in which case the Lead Market Participant may have the opportunity (but will not be obligated) to provide capacity from the resource if the ISO determines that the resource is needed for reliability reasons, as described in Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1(d).

**III.13.1.2.5. Optional Existing Capacity Qualification Package for New Generating Capacity Resources Previously Counted as Capacity.**

A resource seeking to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.1.2 (resources previously counted as capacity resources) may

elect to submit an Existing Capacity Qualification Package in addition to the New Capacity Show of Interest Form and New Capacity Qualification Package that it is required to submit pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2. The bids contained in an Existing Capacity Qualification Package submitted pursuant to this Section III.13.1.2.5 must clearly indicate which New Generating Capacity Resource the Existing Capacity Qualification Package is associated with, and if accepted in accordance with Section III.13.1.2.3, would only be entered into the Forward Capacity Auction where: (i) the new resource is not accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2; or (ii) no offer from that New Generating Capacity Resource clears in the Forward Capacity Auction, as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(e). An Existing Capacity Qualification Package submitted pursuant to this Section III.13.1.2.5 must conform in all other respects to the requirements of this Section III.13.1.2.

#### **III.13.1.3. Import Capacity.**

The qualification requirements for import capacity shall depend on whether the import capacity is an Existing Import Capacity Resource or a New Import Capacity Resource. Both Existing Import Capacity Resources and New Import Capacity Resources clearing in the Forward Capacity Auction must be backed by one or more External Resources or by an external Control Area throughout the relevant Capacity Commitment Period. An external demand resource may not be an Existing Import Capacity Resource or a New Import Capacity Resource. External nodes shall be established and mapped to Capacity Zones pursuant to the provisions in Attachment K to Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff.

An Elective Transmission Upgrade with an Interconnection Request for Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service under Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff shall be included in the FCM (1) after it has established a contractual association with an Import Capacity Resource and that Import Capacity Resource has met the Forward Capacity Market qualification requirements or (2) after it has met the requirements of an Elective Transmission Upgrade with Long Lead Time Facility treatment pursuant to Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff. An external node for such an Elective Transmission Upgrade will be modeled for participation in the Forward Capacity Market after the Import Capacity Resource meets the requirements to participate in the FCA. The Qualified Capacity of an Import Capacity Resource associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade shall not exceed the Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service Interconnection Request. In order for an Elective Transmission Upgrade to maintain its Capacity Network

Import Interconnection Service, an associated Import Capacity Resource must meet the Forward Capacity Market qualification requirements and offer into each Forward Capacity Auction. Otherwise, the Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service will revert to Network Import Interconnection Service for the portion of the Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service for which no Import Capacity Resource is offered into the Forward Capacity Auction and the Elective Transmission Upgrade's Interconnection Agreement will be revised. The provisions in Sections III.13.1.3.5.4, permitting a Capacity Commitment Period Election, and in Section III.13.1.3.5.8, permitting a rationing election, shall apply to a New Import Capacity Resource associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade seeking to reestablish Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service if the threshold to be treated as a new resource in Section III.13.1.1.1.4 is met. If the threshold to be treated as a new increment in Section III.13.1.1.1.3 is met, only the increment will be eligible for the provisions in Sections III.13.1.3.5.4, permitting a Capacity Commitment Period Election, and in Section III.13.1.3.5.8, permitting a rationing election.

**III.13.1.3.1. Definition of Existing Import Capacity Resource.**

Capacity associated with a multi-year contract entered into before the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline to provide capacity in the New England Control Area from outside of the New England Control Area for a period including the whole Capacity Commitment Period, or capacity from an External Resource that is owned or directly controlled by the Lead Market Participant and which is committed for at least two whole consecutive Capacity Commitment Periods by the Lead Market Participant in the New Capacity Qualification Package, shall participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as an Existing Import Capacity Resource, except that if that Existing Import Capacity Resource has not cleared in a previous Forward Capacity Auction, then the import capacity shall participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Import Capacity Resource.

**III.13.1.3.2. Qualified Capacity for Existing Import Capacity Resources.**

The summer Qualified Capacity and winter Qualified Capacity of an Existing Import Capacity Resource shall be based on the data provided to the ISO during the qualification process, subject to ISO review and verification.

The qualified capacity for the Existing Import Capacity Resources associated with the VJO and NYPA contracts listed in Section III.13.1.3.3.A(c) as of the Capacity Commitment Period beginning June 1, 2014 shall be equal to the lesser of the stated amount in Section III.13.1.3.3.A(c) or the median amount of



the energy delivered from the Existing Import Capacity Resource during the New England system coincident peak over the previous five Capacity Commitment Periods at the time of qualification.

**III.13.1.3.3.A Qualification Process for Existing Import Capacity Resources that are not associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade with Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service.**

Existing Import Capacity Resources shall be subject to the same qualification process as Existing Generating Capacity Resources, as described in Section III.13.1.2.3, except as follows:

- (a) The Qualified Capacity shall be the lesser of the multi-year contract values as documented in the new resource qualification determination notification and the capacity clearing in the Forward Capacity Auction to which the new resource qualification determination notification applied.
- (b) The rationing election described in Section III.13.1.2.3.1 shall not apply.
- (c) The Existing Import Capacity Resources associated with contracts listed in the table below may qualify to receive the treatment described in Section III.13.2.7.3A for the duration of the contracts as listed. For each Forward Capacity Auction after the first Forward Capacity Auction, in order for an Existing Import Capacity Resource associated with a contract listed below to qualify for the treatment described in Section III.13.2.7.3A, no later than 10 Business Days prior to the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline, the Market Participant submitting the Existing Import Capacity Resource must also submit to the ISO documentation verifying that the contract will remain in effect throughout the Capacity Commitment Period and that it has not been amended. For the first Forward Capacity Auction, Existing Import Capacity Resources associated with contracts listed in the table below are qualified to receive the treatment described in Section III.13.2.7.3A.

<b>Contract Description</b>	<b>MW</b>	<b>Contract End Date</b>
NYPA: NY — NE: CMEEC	13.2	8/31/2025
NYPA: NY — NE: MMWEC	53.3	8/31/2025
NYPA: NY — NE: Pascoag	2.3	8/31/2025
NYPA: NY— NE: VELCO	15.3	8/31/2025
	84.1	
VJO: Highgate — NE	Up to 225	10/31/2016
VJO: Highgate — NE (extension)	Up to 6	October 2020

(beginning 11/01/2016)

VJO: Phase I/II — NE

Up to 110

10/31/2016

(d) In addition to the review described in Section III.13.1.2.3.2, the Internal Market Monitor shall review each bid from Existing Import Capacity Resources. A bid from an Existing Import Capacity Resource shall be rejected if the Internal Market Monitor determines that the bid may be an attempt to manipulate the Forward Capacity Auction, and the matter will be referred to the Commission in accordance with the protocols set forth in Appendix A to the Commission's Market Monitoring Policy Statement (111 FERC ¶ 61,267 (2005)).

**III.13.1.3.3.B. Qualification Process for Existing Import Capacity Resources that are associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade with Capacity Import Interconnection Service.**

Existing Import Capacity Resources associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade with Capacity Import Interconnection Service pursuant to Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff shall be subject to the same qualification process as Existing Generating Capacity Resources as described in Section III.13.1.2.3, except the Qualified Capacity shall be the lesser of the multi-year contract values as documented in the new resource qualification determination notification and the capacity clearing in the Forward Capacity Auction to which the new resource qualification determination notification applied.

**III.13.1.3.4. Definition of New Import Capacity Resource.**

Capacity not associated with a multi-year contract entered into before the New Capacity Qualification Deadline to provide capacity in the New England Control Area from outside the New England Control Area for the whole Capacity Commitment Period, but that meets the requirements of Section III.13.1.3.5.1, shall participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Import Capacity Resource. For capacity associated with a multi-year contract entered into before the New Capacity Qualification Deadline to provide capacity in the New England Control Area from outside the New England Control Area for a period including the whole Capacity Commitment Period, or capacity from an External Resource that is owned or directly controlled by the Lead Market Participant and which is committed for at least two whole consecutive Capacity Commitment Periods by the Lead Market Participant in the New Capacity Qualification Package, if the import capacity has not cleared in a previous Forward Capacity Auction, then the import capacity shall participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Import Capacity Resource.

### **III.13.1.3.5. Qualification Process for New Import Capacity Resources.**

The qualification process for a New Import Capacity Resource, whether backed by a new External Resource, by one or more existing External Resources, or by an external Control Area, shall be the same as the qualification process for a New Generating Capacity Resource, as described in Section III.13.1.1.2, except as follows:

#### **III.13.1.3.5.1. Documentation of Import.**

(a) For each New Import Capacity Resource, the Project Sponsor submitting the import capacity must also submit: (i) documentation of a one-year contract entered into before the New Capacity Qualification Deadline to provide capacity in the New England Control Area from outside of the New England Control Area for the entire Capacity Commitment Period, including documentation of the MW value of the contract; (ii) documentation of a multi-year contract entered into before the New Capacity Qualification Deadline to provide capacity in the New England Control Area from outside of the New England Control Area for the contract period including the entire Capacity Commitment Period, including documentation of the MW value of the contract; (iii) proof of ownership or direct control over one or more External Resources that will be used to back the New Import Capacity Resource during the Capacity Commitment Period, including information to establish the summer and winter ratings of the resource(s) backing the import; or (iv) documentation for system-backed import capacity that the import capacity will be supported by the Control Area and that the energy associated with that system-backed import capacity will be afforded the same curtailment priority as that Control Area's native load. For each New Import Capacity Resource, the Project Sponsor must specify the interface over which the capacity will be imported. The Project Sponsor must indicate whether the import is associated with any investment in transmission that increases New England's import capability or is associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade with an Interconnection Request for Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service pursuant to Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff that has not yet achieved Commercial Operation as defined in Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff. The Project Sponsor must submit a contract confirming its association with the Elective Transmission Upgrade Interconnection Customer and the ISO will confirm that relationship. If the import will be backed by a single new External Resource, the Project Sponsor submitting the import capacity must also submit a general description of the project's equipment configuration, including a description of the resource technology type ~~(such as those listed in the table in Section III.A.21.1 or some other type)~~.

(b) To qualify for Capacity Commitment Periods prior to the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction for which the import capacity is qualifying, the Project Sponsor must submit documentation of one or more one-year contracts for each prior Capacity Commitment Period, entered into before the New Capacity Qualification Deadline to provide capacity in the New England Control Area from outside of the New England Control Area for the entire Capacity Commitment Period, including documentation of the MW value of the contract(s); the Project Sponsor must also satisfy the relevant requirements of Sections III.13.1.3.5.1(a) , III.13.1.3.5.2, III.13.1.9, and III.13.3.1.1.

**III.13.1.3.5.2. Import Backed by Existing External Resources.**

If the New Import Capacity Resource will be backed by one or more External Resources existing at the time of the Forward Capacity Auction and the capacity will be imported over an interface that has achieved Commercial Operation as defined in Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff, the provisions regarding site control (Section III.13.1.1.2.2.1) and critical path schedule (Section III.13.1.1.2.2.2) shall not apply, and the Project Sponsor shall instead submit a description of how the New Import Capacity Resource will meet its Capacity Supply Obligation in the Capacity Commitment Period(s) for which it seeks to qualify.

If the New Import Capacity Resource will be backed by one or more External Resources existing at the time of the Forward Capacity Auction and the capacity will be imported over an interface that has not achieved Commercial Operation as defined in Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets, the provisions regarding site control (Section III.13.1.1.2.2.1) and critical path schedule (Section III.13.1.1.2.2.2) shall apply in addition to the requirement that the Project Sponsor submit a description of how the New Import Capacity Resource will meet its Capacity Supply Obligation in the Capacity Commitment Period(s) for which it seeks to qualify.

The description must indicate specifically which External Resources will back the New Import Capacity Resource during the Capacity Commitment Period, and if those External Resources are not owned or controlled directly by the Project Sponsor, the description must include a commitment that the External Resources will have sufficient capacity that is not obligated outside the New England Control Area to fully satisfy the New Import Capacity Resource's potential Capacity Supply Obligation during the Capacity Commitment Period and demonstrate how that commitment will be met.

### **III.13.1.3.5.3. Imports Backed by an External Control Area.**

If the New Import Capacity Resource will be backed by an external Control Area and the capacity will be imported over an interface that has achieved Commercial Operation as defined in Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff, the provisions regarding site control (Section III.13.1.1.2.2.1) and critical path schedule (Section III.13.1.1.2.2.2) shall not apply, and the Project Sponsor shall instead submit system load and capacity projections for the external Control Area showing sufficient excess capacity during the Capacity Commitment Period to back the New Import Capacity Resource.

If the New Import Capacity Resource will be backed by an external Control Area and the capacity will be imported over an Elective Transmission Upgrade and the capacity will be imported over an interface that has not achieved Commercial Operation as defined in Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff, the provisions regarding site control (Section III.13.1.1.2.2.1) and critical path schedule (Section III.13.1.1.2.2.2) shall apply in addition to the requirement that the Project Sponsor submit system load and capacity projections for the external Control Area showing sufficient excess capacity during the Capacity Commitment Period to back the New Import Capacity Resource for the length of the multi-year contract.

### **III.13.1.3.5.3.1. Imports Crossing Intervening Control Areas.**

The preceding rules define requirements associated with the import of capacity from a Control Area, or resources located in a Control Area, directly adjacent to the New England Control Area. Imports of capacity from a Control Area or resources located in a Control Area where such import crosses an intervening Control Area or Control Areas shall comply with the following additional requirements: (1) For imports crossing a single intervening Control Area, the Project Sponsor entering the import contract shall demonstrate, as detailed in the ISO New England Manuals, that the remote Control Area will afford the energy export to the adjacent intervening Control Area the same curtailment priority as its native load, that the adjacent intervening Control Area has procedures in place to explicitly recognize the linkage between the import and re-export of energy in support of the import contract, and that the energy export to the ISO will not be curtailed (except pro-rata with a curtailment of native load) so long as the linked import is flowing. (2) For imports crossing more than one intervening Control Area, in addition to the requirements above, the Project Sponsor entering the import contract shall demonstrate, as detailed in the ISO New England Manuals, by the New Capacity Qualification Deadline, that explicit market and

operating procedures exist among the intervening Control Areas to ensure that the energy required to be delivered to the New England Control Area will be guaranteed the same curtailment priority as the intervening native loads, and that none of the intervening Control Areas will curtail the transaction except in conjunction with a curtailment of native load. (3) The Project Sponsor entering the import contract shall demonstrate that capacity it supplies to the New England Control Area will not be recalled or curtailed to satisfy the load of the external Control Area, or that the external Control Area in which it is located will afford New England Control Area load the same curtailment priority that it affords its own Control Area native load.

#### **III.13.1.3.5.4. Capacity Commitment Period Election.**

The provisions regarding Capacity Commitment Period election (Section III.13.1.1.2.2.4) shall only apply to a New Import Capacity Resource associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade with a Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service Interconnection Request. All other New Import Capacity Resources clearing in the Forward Capacity Auction shall have a Capacity Supply Obligation and shall receive payments only for the one-year Capacity Commitment Period associated with that Forward Capacity Auction.

#### **III.13.1.3.5.5. Initial Interconnection Analysis.**

The provisions regarding initial interconnection analysis (Section III.13.1.1.2.3) shall not apply unless the capacity will be imported over an Elective Transmission Upgrade pursuing Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service pursuant to Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff that has not achieved Commercial Operation as defined in Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff.

#### **III.13.1.3.5.5.A. ~~Cost Offer~~ Information.**

(a) A New Import Capacity Resource that is not subject to the pivotal supplier test in Section III.A.23 is subject to the same offer information submission requirements for a New Generating Capacity Resource that are described in Section III.13.1.1.2.2.3.

(b) A New Import Capacity Resource that is subject to the pivotal supplier test in Section III.A.23 and seeks to specify a price below which it would not accept a Capacity Supply Obligation for that resource, or a portion thereof, that is at or above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold must submit the lowest price at which the resource requests to offer capacity in the Forward Capacity Auction and

documentation and information supporting such lowest price, which should include the documentation and information listed in Section III.13.1.1.2.2.3(a) and the expected costs of purchasing power outside the New England Control Area (including transaction costs and supported by forward power price index values or a power price forecast for the applicable Capacity Commitment Period), expected transmission costs outside the New England Control Area, and expected transmission costs associated with importing to the New England Control Area, and may also include reasonable opportunity costs and risk adjustments. The offer information ~~described in Section III.13.1.1.2.2.3 and Section III.A.21.2~~ may be submitted in the form of a curve (up to five price-quantity pairs) associated with a specific New Import Capacity Resource. The curve may in no case increase the quantity offered as the price decreases. Each price is subject to review by the Internal Market Monitor pursuant to Section III.A.21.2-43 and must include the additional documentation described in that Section.

#### **III.13.1.3.5.6. Review by Internal Market Monitor of Offers from New Import Capacity Resources.**

In addition to the review described in ~~Section III.13.1.1.2.2.3 and~~ Section III.A.21, the Internal Market Monitor shall review each offer from New Import Capacity Resources. An offer from a New Import Capacity Resource shall be rejected if the Internal Market Monitor determines that the bid may be an attempt to manipulate the Forward Capacity Auction, and the matter will be referred to the Commission in accordance with the protocols set forth in ~~Appendix Section III.A.19 of Market Rule 1 to the Commission's Market Monitoring Policy Statement (111 FERC ¶ 61,267 (2005)).~~

#### **III.13.1.3.5.7. Qualification Determination Notification for New Import Capacity Resources.**

For New Import Capacity Resources, the qualification determination notification described in Section III.13.1.1.2.8 shall be modified to reflect the differences in the qualification process described in this Section III.13.1.3.5.

No later than seven days after the issuance by the ISO of the qualification determination notification described in Section III.13.1.1.2.8, a Lead Market Participant with a New Import Capacity Resource that is subject to the pivotal supplier test in Section III.A.23 ~~(other than a New Import Capacity Resource that is (i) backed by a single new External Resource and associated with an investment in transmission that~~

~~increases New England's import capability, or (ii) associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade) and~~  
that submitted a request to submit offers in the Forward Capacity Auction ~~at prices that are below the~~  
~~relevant Offer Review Trigger Price as described in Sections III.13.1.1.2.2.3 and III.13.1.3.5 may~~  
~~pursuant to Section III.13.1.3.5.5.A(b) may~~: (a) lower the requested offer price of any price-quantity pair  
submitted to the ISO ~~pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.2.33.5.1(e)~~, provided that the revised price is greater  
than or equal to the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold, or (b) withdraw any price-quantity pair of a  
requested offer price.

#### **III.13.1.3.5.8.            Rationing Election.**

New Import Capacity Resources are subject to rationing except New Import Capacity Resource associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade with a Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service Interconnection Request, which are eligible for the rationing election described in Section III.13.1.1.2.2.3(b).

#### **III.13.1.4.                Demand Capacity Resources.**

To participate in a Forward Capacity Auction as a Demand Capacity Resource, a resource must meet the requirements of this Section III.13.1.4. Each Demand Capacity Resource shall be a minimum of 100 kW. An Active Demand Capacity Resource comprises one or more Demand Response Resources located in a single Dispatch Zone. An On-Peak Demand Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource comprises one or more Assets located in a single Load Zone. An On-Peak Demand Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource may consist of Load Management measures, Distributed Generation measures, or a combination thereof, or may consist solely of Energy Efficiency measures. A Demand Capacity Resource may include an end-use customer facility with a Net Supply Capability of 5 MW or more only if the facility's Net Supply Capability does not exceed its Maximum Facility Load. Demand Capacity Resources must comply with all applicable federal, state, and local regulatory, siting, and tariff requirements, including interconnection tariff requirements related to siting, interconnection, and operation of the Demand Capacity Resource. Demand Capacity Resources are not permitted to submit import or export bids or Administrative Export De-List Bids.

#### **III.13.1.4.1.            Definition of New Demand Capacity Resource.**

A New Demand Capacity Resource is an Active Demand Capacity Resource that has not cleared in a previous Forward Capacity Auction, and On-Peak Demand Resource consisting of measures that have not been in service prior to the Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline of the applicable Forward Capacity



Auction, or a Seasonal Peak Demand Resource consisting of measures that have not been in service prior to the Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline of the applicable Forward Capacity Auction. A Demand Capacity Resource that has previously been defined as an Existing Demand Capacity Resource shall be considered a New Demand Capacity Resource if it meets one of the conditions listed in Section III.13.1.1.1.2.

#### **III.13.1.4.1.1. Qualification Process for New Demand Capacity Resources.**

For Forward Capacity Auctions a New Demand Capacity Resource shall have a summer Qualified Capacity and winter Qualified Capacity based on the resource's estimated demand reduction value as submitted and reviewed pursuant to this Section III.13.1.4. The FCA Qualified Capacity for a New Demand Capacity Resource shall be the lesser of the resource's summer Qualified Capacity and winter Qualified Capacity, as adjusted to account for applicable offers composed of separate resources.

(a) For a resource to qualify as a New Demand Capacity Resource, the resource's Project Sponsor must make two separate submissions to the ISO: First, the Project Sponsor must submit estimated demand reduction values and supporting information in the New Demand Capacity Resource Show of Interest Form as described in Section III.13.1.4.1.1.1. Second, the Project Sponsor must submit a New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package as described in Section III.13.1.4.1.1.2.

(b) For a resource to qualify as a New Demand Capacity Resource that is an On-Peak Demand Resource or a Seasonal Peak Demand Resource, the Project Sponsor must in addition submit, as part of the New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package, a Measurement and Verification Plan providing the documentation, analysis, studies and methodologies used to support the estimates described in this Section III.13.1.4.1.1, which shall be reviewed by the ISO to ensure consistency with the measurement and verification requirements pursuant to Section III.13.1.4.3 and the ISO New England Manuals.

#### **III.13.1.4.1.1.1. New Demand Capacity Resource Show of Interest Form.**

For each resource that a Project Sponsor seeks to offer in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Demand Capacity Resource, the Project Sponsor must submit to the ISO a New Demand Capacity Resource Show of Interest Form as described in this Section III.13.1.4.1.1.1 during the New Capacity Show of Interest Submission Window, as described in Section III.13.1.10. A New Demand Capacity Resource Show of Interest Form for a resource composed of Energy Efficiency measures must represent a

resource with a new and unique resource identification number. The ISO may waive the submission of any information not required for evaluation of a project.

A completed New Demand Capacity Resource Show of Interest Form shall include, but is not limited to, the following information: project name; Load Zone within which the Demand Capacity Resource will be located; the Dispatch Zone within which an Active Demand Capacity Resource will be located; estimated summer and winter demand reduction values (MW) per measure and/or per customer facility (measured at the customer meter and not including losses); estimated total summer and winter demand reduction value of the Demand Capacity Resource (for an Active Demand Capacity Resource, this estimate must be consistent with the baseline calculation methodology in Section III.8.2); supporting documentation (e.g., engineering estimates or documentation of verified savings from comparable projects) to substantiate the reasonableness of the estimated demand reduction values; Demand Capacity Resource type (Active Demand Capacity Resource, On-Peak Demand Resource, or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource); brief Demand Capacity Resource project description including measure type (i.e., Energy Efficiency, Load Management, and/or Distributed Generation); types of facilities at which the measures will be implemented; customer classes and end-uses served; the date by which the Project Sponsor expects to be ready to demonstrate to the ISO that the Demand Capacity Resource described in the Project Sponsor's New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package has achieved its full demand reduction value; ISO Market Participant status and ISO customer identification (if applicable); status under Schedules 22 or 23 of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff (if applicable); project/technical and credit/financial contacts; for individual Distributed Generation projects and Demand Capacity Resource projects from a single facility with a demand reduction value equal to or greater than 5 MW, the Pnode and service address at which the end-use facility is located; capability and experience of the Project Sponsor.

#### **III.13.1.4.1.1.2. New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package.**

For each resource that a Project Sponsor seeks to offer in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Demand Capacity Resource, the Project Sponsor must submit a New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package no later than the New Capacity Qualification Deadline. The New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package shall conform to the requirements of this Section

III.13.1.4.1.1.2. The ISO may waive the submission of any information not required for evaluation of a project.

**III.13.1.4.1.1.2.1. Source of Funding.**

The Project Sponsor must provide in the New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package the source of funding, which includes, but is not limited to, the following: the source(s) of public benefits funding or private financing, or a funding plan supplemented by information on how previous projects were funded; and a completed ISO credit application.

**III.13.1.4.1.1.2.2. Measurement and Verification Plan.**

For On-Peak Demand Resources and Seasonal Peak Demand Resources, the Project Sponsor must provide in the New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package a Measurement and Verification Plan that complies with the ISO's measurement and verification requirements pursuant to Section III.13.1.4.3 and the ISO New England Manuals.

**III.13.1.4.1.1.2.3. Customer Acquisition Plan.**

(a) A Project Sponsor with more than a single customer must include in the New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package a description of its plan to acquire customers that includes, but is not limited to, the following information: a description of proposed customer market; the estimated size of target market and supporting documentation; a marketing plan with supporting documentation describing the manner in which customers will be recruited; and evidence supporting the viability of the marketing plan.

(b) A Project Sponsor for a New Demand Capacity Resource that includes one or more end-use customer facilities with behind-the-meter generation must include in the New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package information demonstrating that each facility's Net Supply Capability will be less than 5 MW or less than or equal to the facility's Maximum Facility Load.

**III.13.1.4.1.1.2.4. Critical Path Schedule for a Demand Capacity Resource with a Demand Reduction Value of at Least 5 MW at a Single Retail Delivery Point.**

The Project Sponsor of a Demand Capacity Resource with a demand reduction value of at least 5 MW at a single Retail Delivery Point shall provide in the New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package a critical path schedule as set forth in Section III.13.1.1.2.2.2.

**III.13.1.4.1.1.2.5. Critical Path Schedule for a Demand Capacity Resource with All Retail Delivery Points Having a Demand Reduction Value of Less Than 5 MW.**

The Project Sponsor of a Demand Capacity Resource with all Retail Delivery Points having a demand reduction value of less than 5 MW shall provide in the New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package a critical path schedule comprised of a delivery schedule of the share of total offered demand reduction value achieved as of target dates, as follows: (i) the cumulative percentage of total demand reduction value achieved on target date 1 occurring five weeks prior to the first annual Forward Capacity Auction after the Forward Capacity Auction in which the Project Sponsor's capacity award was made; (ii) the cumulative percentage of total demand reduction value achieved on target date 2 occurring five weeks prior to the second annual Forward Capacity Auction after the Forward Capacity Auction in which the Project Sponsor's capacity award was made; and (iii) target date 3 which is the date by which the Project Sponsor expects to be ready to demonstrate to the ISO that the Demand Capacity Resource described in the Project Sponsor's New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package has achieved its full demand reduction value, which must be on or before the first day of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period and by which date 100% of total demand reduction value must be complete.

**III.13.1.4.1.1.2.6. [Reserved.]**

**III.13.1.4.1.1.2.7. Capacity Commitment Period Election.**

Project Sponsors shall be required to specify whether they are making the election set forth in this Section III.13.1.4.1.1.2.7 for each Forward Capacity Auction up to and including the auction held in February 2021 for the June 1, 2024 through May 31, 2025 Capacity Commitment Period, and no election shall be permitted thereafter.

For each Forward Capacity Auction occurring up to and including the February 2021 auction, in the New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package, the Project Sponsor must specify whether, if its New Demand Capacity Resource offer clears in the Forward Capacity Auction, the associated Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price (indexed for inflation) shall continue to apply after the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction in which the offer clears, for up to six additional and consecutive Capacity Commitment Periods, in whole Capacity Commitment Period increments only. If no such election is made in the New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package, the Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price associated with the New Demand Capacity Resource offer shall apply only for the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction in which the New Demand Capacity Resource offer clears. If the Project Sponsor elects to have the Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price continue to apply after the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction in which the offer

clears, then the Project Sponsor may not change the Demand Capacity Resource type as long as that Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price continue to apply. If an offer from a New Demand Capacity Resource clears in the Forward Capacity Auction, the capacity associated with the resulting Capacity Supply Obligation may not be subject to any type of de-list or export bid in subsequent Forward Capacity Auctions for Capacity Commitment Periods for which the Project Sponsor elected to have the Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price continue to apply pursuant to this Section III.13.1.4.1.1.2.7.

**III.13.1.4.1.1.2.8. Offer Information ~~f~~From New Demand Capacity Resources.**

(a) ~~For a All~~ New Demand Capacity Resources that ~~might submit offers in the Forward Capacity Auction at prices below the relevant Offer Review Trigger Price~~ does not satisfy any of the conditions described in Sections III.A.21.1.1 or III.A.21.1.2 based on the information submitted at the time of the New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package, and for which the Project Sponsor does not provide a Load-Side Relationship Certification described in Section III.A.21.1.3, the Project Sponsor must include in the New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package the lowest price at which the resource requests to offer capacity in the Forward Capacity Auction and ~~supporting documentation justifying that price as competitive in light of the resource's costs (as described in Section III.A.21) sufficient documentation and information for a buyer-sider market power review pursuant to Section III.A.21.2. Such documentation and information includes all financial estimates, projected revenues, and cost projections for the project, including the project's pro-forma financing support data and anticipated out-of-market revenues (as defined in Section III.A.21.3(b)(i)). For a New Demand Capacity Resource that has achieved commercial operation prior to the New Capacity Qualification Deadline, such documentation should also include all financial data of actual incurred capital costs, actual operating costs, and actual revenues since the date of commercial operation. This price is subject to review by the Internal Market Monitor pursuant to Section III.A.21.2 and must include the additional documentation described in that section.~~

A Project Sponsor that submits a Load-Side Relationship Certification as part of the New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package pursuant to Section III.13.1.4.1.1.2.9 must be prepared to provide both (1) the lowest price at which the resource requests to offer capacity in the Forward Capacity Auction and (2) the documentation and information described in this subsection (a), in the event that the ISO determines that the Load-Side Relationship Certification does not meet the requirements of Section III.A.21.1.3.

(b) The Project Sponsor for a New Demand Capacity Resource must indicate in the New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package if an offer from the New Demand Capacity Resource may be rationed. A Project Sponsor may specify a single MW quantity to which offers may be rationed. Without such indication, offers will only be accepted or rejected in whole. This rationing election shall apply for the entire Forward Capacity Auction.

**III.13.1.4.1.1.2.9. Load-Side Interests.**

If the Project Sponsor seeks to demonstrate one of the qualifying circumstances described in Section III.A.21.1.3 with regard to its New Demand Capacity Resource, the Project Sponsor must provide the Load-Side Relationship Certification in the New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package.

**III.13.1.4.1.1.3. Initial Analysis for Active Demand Capacity Resources.**

For each New Demand Capacity Resource that is an Active Demand Capacity Resource, the ISO shall perform an analysis based on the information provided in the New Demand Capacity Resource Show of Interest Form to determine the amount of capacity that the resource could provide by the start of the associated Capacity Commitment Period. This analysis shall be performed consistent with the criteria and conditions described in ISO New England Planning Procedures. Where, as a result of this analysis, the ISO determines that because of overlapping interconnection impacts, such a New Demand Capacity Resource that is otherwise accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction in accordance with the other provisions and requirements of this Section III.13.1 cannot deliver any of the capacity that it would otherwise be able to provide (in the absence of the other relevant Existing Capacity Resources), then that New Demand Capacity Resource will not be accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction.

**III.13.1.4.1.1.4. Consistency of the New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package and New Demand Capacity Resource Show of Interest Form.**

The ISO shall review the Project Sponsor's New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package for consistency with its New Demand Capacity Resource Show of Interest Form. The New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package may not contain material changes relative to the New Demand Capacity Resource Show of Interest Form. A material change may include, but is not limited to the following: (i) a change in the designation of the Demand Capacity Resource type; (ii) a change in the Project Sponsor, subject to review by the ISO of the capability and experience of the new Project

Sponsor; (iii) a change in the Load Zone within which the project is located, and a change in the Dispatch Zone within which the Active Demand Capacity Resource is located; (iv) a change in the total summer or winter demand reduction value of the project by more than 30 percent; (v) a change in the general type of measure being implemented (e.g., Energy Efficiency, Load Management, Distributed Generation); or (vi) a misrepresentation of the interconnection status of a Distributed Generation project.

**III.13.1.4.1.1.5. Evaluation of New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Materials.**

The ISO shall review the information submitted by New Demand Capacity Resources and shall determine whether the information submitted complies with the requirements set forth in this Section III.13.1.4 and whether, based on the information provided, the Demand Capacity Resource is accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction. In making these determinations, the ISO may consider, but is not limited to consideration of, the following:

- (a) whether the information submitted by New Demand Capacity Resources is accurate and contains all of the elements required by this Section III.13.1.4;
- (b) whether the critical path schedule submitted by New Demand Capacity Resources includes all necessary elements and is sufficiently developed;
- (c) whether the milestones in the critical path schedule submitted by New Demand Capacity Resources are reasonable and likely to be met;
- (d) whether, in the case of a resource previously counted as a capacity resource, the requirements for treatment as a New Demand Capacity Resource are satisfied; and
- (e) whether, in the case of a New Demand Capacity Resource that is an On-Peak Demand Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource, the Measurement and Verification Plan complies with the ISO's measurement and verification requirements pursuant to Section III.13.1.4.3 and the ISO New England Manuals.

**III.13.1.4.1.1.6. Qualification Determination Notification for New Demand Capacity Resources.**

No later than 127 days prior to the relevant Forward Capacity Auction, the ISO shall send notification to Project Sponsors for each New Demand Capacity Resource indicating whether the New Demand Capacity Resource has been accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction.

(a) For a New Demand Capacity Resource accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction, the notification will specify the Demand Capacity Resource type and the Demand Capacity Resource's summer and winter Qualified Capacity, which shall be the ISO-determined summer and winter demand reduction value increased by average avoided peak transmission and distribution losses (that is, eight percent).

(b) For a New Demand Capacity Resource accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction, the notification will provide the ISO's determination as to whether the New Demand Capacity Resource satisfies any of the conditions described in Section III.A.21.1 and the basis for such determination.

(c) For a New Demand Capacity Resource accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction and subject to buyer-side market power review pursuant to Section III.A.21.2, the notification will provide the Internal Market Monitor's determinations regarding whether the New Demand Capacity Resource's requested lowest offer price, submitted pursuant to Section III.13.1.4.1.1.2.8(a), must be mitigated, as described in Section III.A.21.2.3.- The ISO shall not disclose to the Project Sponsor any information regarding the potential impact of any offer from the Project Sponsor on Capacity Clearing Prices.

~~(d)~~ For a New Demand Capacity Resource not accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction, the notification will provide an explanation as to why the resource did not meet the requirements set forth in this Section III.13.1.4 and was not accepted.

#### **III.13.1.4.2. Definition of Existing Demand Capacity Resources.**

Demand Capacity Resources that previously have been in service and registered with the ISO, and which are not otherwise New Demand Capacity Resources, shall be Existing Demand Capacity Resources. Existing Demand Capacity Resources shall include and are limited to Demand Capacity Resources that have been in service and registered with the ISO to fulfill a Capacity Supply Obligation created by clearing in a past Forward Capacity Auction before the Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline of the



applicable Forward Capacity Auction. Except as specified in this Section III.13.1.4, Existing Demand Capacity Resources shall be subject to the same qualification process as Existing Generating Capacity Resources, as described in Section III.13.1.2.3. Existing Demand Capacity Resources shall be subject to Section III.13.1.2.2.5.2. An On-Peak Demand Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource may not include in its summer or winter demand reduction value an Energy Efficiency measure whose Measure Life will expire before the beginning of the applicable season of the associated Capacity Commitment Period.

**III.13.1.4.2.A                      Qualified Capacity for Existing Demand Capacity Resources.**

(a) For Existing Demand Capacity Resources composed of Energy Efficiency measures, the summer (or winter, as applicable) Qualified Capacity shall equal the lesser of: (i) the sum of the summer (or winter, as applicable) demand reduction values of the installed Energy Efficiency measures as of the Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline (excluding any capacity that will retire or permanently de-list, or whose Measure Life will expire, prior to start of the applicable season of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period, and increased by average avoided peak transmission and distribution losses) and any summer (or winter, as applicable) capacity that has cleared in a Forward Capacity Auction and has not yet achieved FCM Commercial Operation (provided that such capacity is being monitored by the ISO pursuant to the provisions of Section III.13.3, is expected to achieve all its critical path schedule milestones prior to the start of the applicable season of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period, and for which the Lead Market Participant or Project Sponsor has met all relevant financial assurance requirements as described in Section III.13.1.9 and in the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy) and (ii) the amount of summer (or winter, as applicable) capacity that cleared in a Forward Capacity Auction as a New Demand Capacity Resource.

(b) For Existing Demand Capacity Resources other than those composed of Energy Efficiency measures, the summer and winter Qualified Capacity shall equal the summer and winter demand reduction value, respectively, increased by average avoided peak transmission and distribution losses.

**III.13.1.4.2.1.                      Qualified Capacity Notification for Existing Demand Capacity Resources.**

(a) For each Existing Demand Capacity Resource, the ISO will notify the Resource's Lead Market Participant no later than 15 Business Days before the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline of: the Demand Capacity Resource type; summer and winter Qualified Capacity; the Load Zone in which the

Demand Capacity Resource is located; and, for Active Demand Capacity Resources, the Dispatch Zone in which the resource is located.

(b) If the Lead Market Participant believes that the ISO's assessment of the Qualified Capacity is inaccurate, the Market Participant must notify the ISO within five Business Days of receipt of the Qualified Capacity notification.

(c) If a Market Participant with an Existing On-Peak Demand Resource or Existing Seasonal Peak Demand Resource wishes to change its Demand Capacity Resource type, the Market Participant must submit an Updated Measurement and Verification Plan to reflect the change in its resource type. Updated Measurement and Verification Plans must be received by the ISO no later than five Business Days after receipt of the Qualified Capacity notification. Designation of the Demand Capacity Resource type may not be changed during the Capacity Commitment Period.

(d) A Market Participant with an Existing On-Peak Demand Resource or Existing Seasonal Peak Demand Resource may provide an Updated Measurement and Verification Plan as described in Section III.13.1.4.3.1.2 that complies with the ISO's measurement and verification requirements pursuant to Section III.13.1.4.3 and the ISO New England Manuals. Updated Measurement and Verification Plans must be received by the ISO no later than five Business Days after receipt of the Qualified Capacity notification.

(e) If an Existing Demand Capacity Resource is not submitting a Static De-List Bid, Permanent De-List Bid, or Retirement De-List Bid for the Forward Capacity Auction, then no further submissions or actions for that resource are necessary, and the resource shall participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(c) with Qualified Capacity as indicated in the ISO's notification.

#### **III.13.1.4.2.2. Existing Demand Capacity Resource De-List Bids.**

An Existing Demand Capacity Resource may submit a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid pursuant to the provisions of Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5 no later than the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline or a Static De-List Bid pursuant to the provisions of Section III.13.1.2.3.1.1 no later than the Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline, provided, however, that no de-list bid shall be used as a mechanism to inappropriately qualify Assets associated with Existing Demand Capacity Resources as New Demand Capacity Resources.

**III.13.1.4.3. Measurement and Verification Applicable to On-Peak Demand Resources and Seasonal Peak Demand Resources.**

To demonstrate the demand reduction value of an On-Peak Demand Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource, the Project Sponsor or Market Participant of such a resource participating in the Forward Capacity Auction, Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals, or reconfiguration auctions shall submit to the ISO the Measurement and Verification Documents in accordance with this Section III.13.1.4.3 and the ISO New England Manuals. The ISO shall review such Measurement and Verification Documents to determine whether they are consistent with the measurement and verification requirements set forth in this Section III.13.1.4.3 and the ISO New England Manuals.

**III.13.1.4.3.1. Measurement and Verification Documents.**

Measurement and Verification Documents must demonstrate both availability and performance of an On-Peak Demand Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource in reducing demand coincident with Demand Resource On-Peak Hours or Demand Resource Seasonal Peak Hours such that the reported monthly demand reduction value shall achieve at least a ten percent relative precision and an eighty percent confidence interval as described and applied in the ISO New England Manuals and ISO New England Operating Procedures. The Measurement and Verification Documents shall serve as the basis for the claimed demand reduction value of an On-Peak Demand Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource. The Measurement and Verification Documents shall document the measurement and verification performed to verify the achieved demand reduction value of the On-Peak Demand Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource. The Measurement and Verification Documents shall contain a projection of the On-Peak Demand Resource's or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource's demand reduction value for each month of the Capacity Commitment Period and over the expected Measure Lives associated with the Demand Capacity Resources. An On-Peak Demand Resource's or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource's Measurement and Verification Documents must describe the methodology used to calculate electrical energy load reduction or output during Demand Resource On-Peak Hours, or Demand Resource Seasonal Peak Hours. If an On-Peak Demand Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource includes Distributed Generation, the Measurement and Verification Documents must describe the individual metering or metering protocol used to monitor and verify the output of the Distributed Generation, consistent with the measurement and verification requirements set forth in Market Rule 1 and the ISO New England Manuals.

The Measurement and Verification Documents shall include a Measurement and Verification Plan submitted in the Forward Capacity Auction Qualification, as described in Section III.13.1.4.3 and a monthly Measurement and Verification Summary Report during the Capacity Commitment Period. The monthly Measurement and Verification Summary Reports shall reference the measurement and verification protocols and performance data documented in the Measurement and Verification Plan or the Measurement and Verification Reference Report(s). Such monthly Measurement and Verification Summary Reports will document the Project Sponsor's total demand reduction value from eligible pre-existing measures and new measures, and the Project Sponsor's total demand reduction value from both eligible pre-existing measures and new measures, for all measures it had in operation as of the end of the previous month. The monthly Measurement and Verification Summary Reports shall be based on Measurement and Verification Documents determined in accordance with Market Rule 1 and the ISO New England Manuals, and shall be the basis for monthly settlement with Project Sponsors. All Measurement and Verification Documents shall conform to the ISO's specifications with respect to content, format and delivery methodology, and shall be submitted in accordance with the timelines and deadlines set forth in Market Rule 1 and the ISO New England Manuals.

**III.13.1.4.3.1.1. Optional Measurement and Verification Reference Reports.**

At the option of the Project Sponsor, the Measurement and Verification Documents for an On-Peak Demand Resource or a Seasonal Peak Demand Resource may also include one or more Measurement and Verification Reference Report(s) submitted during the Capacity Commitment Period subject to the schedule in the Measurement and Verification Plan and consistent with the schedule and reporting standards set forth in the ISO New England Manuals. Measurement and Verification Reference Reports shall update the prospective demand reduction value of the On-Peak Demand Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource based on measurement and verification studies performed during the Capacity Commitment Period.

**III.13.1.4.3.1.2. Updated Measurement and Verification Documents.**

At the option of the Project Sponsor, an Updated Measurement and Verification Plan for an On-Peak Demand Resource or a Seasonal Peak Demand Resource may be submitted during a subsequent Forward Capacity Auction qualification process prior to the beginning of the Capacity Commitment Period of the Demand Capacity Resource project. The Updated Measurement and Verification Plan may include updated project specifications, measurement and verification protocols, and performance data. However, the Updated Measurement and Verification Plan shall not modify for the duration of the Capacity

Commitment Period the total claimed demand reduction value or the Demand Capacity Resource type from the applicable Forward Capacity Auction in which the Project Sponsor's offer cleared. Additionally, the Updated Measurement and Verification Plan shall provide measurement and verification consistent with the requirements specified in the ISO New England Manuals, and shall be comparable to the quality of the original Measurement and Verification Plan accepted during the Forward Capacity Auction qualification process in which the Demand Capacity Resource project cleared the Forward Capacity Auction.

**III.13.1.4.3.1.3. Annual Certification of Accuracy of Measurement and Verification Documents.**

Project Sponsors for On-Peak Demand Resources and Seasonal Peak Demand Resources shall submit no less frequently than once per year, a statement certifying that the Demand Capacity Resource projects for which the Project Sponsor is requesting compensation continue to perform in accordance with the submitted Measurement and Verification Documents reviewed by the ISO. One such statement must be received by the ISO no later than 10 Business Days before the Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline.

**III.13.1.4.3.1.4. Record Requirement of Retail Customers Served.**

For On-Peak Demand Resources and Seasonal Peak Demand Resources targeting customer facilities with greater than or equal to 10 kW of demand reduction value per facility, Project Sponsors shall maintain records of retail customers served including, at a minimum, the retail customer's address, the customer's utility distribution company, utility distribution company account identifier, measures installed, and corresponding monthly demand reduction values. For On-Peak Demand Resources and Seasonal Peak Demand Resources targeting customer facilities with under 10 kW of demand reduction value per facility, the Project Sponsor shall maintain records as described above for customer facilities with greater than or equal to 10 kW of demand reduction value per facility, or shall maintain records of aggregated demand reduction value and measures installed by Load Zone and meter domain. Project Sponsors shall maintain such records until the end of the Measure Life, or until the Demand Capacity Resource is permanently delisted from the Forward Capacity Market, and shall submit such records to the ISO upon request in a readable electronic format.

**III.13.1.4.3.2. ISO Review of Measurement and Verification Documents.**

The ISO shall review the Measurement and Verification Documents and complete such review and identify any necessary modifications in accordance with the Forward Capacity Auction qualification

process as described in Section III.13.1 and pursuant to the ISO New England Manuals. In its review of the Measurement and Verification Documents, the ISO may consult with the Project Sponsor or Lead Market Participant to seek clarification, to gather additional necessary information, or to address questions or concerns arising from the materials submitted. At the discretion of the ISO, the ISO may consider revisions or additions to the Measurement and Verification Documents resulting from such consultation; provided, however, that in no case shall the ISO consider revisions or additions to the Measurement and Verification Documents if the ISO believes that such consideration cannot be properly accomplished within the time periods established for the qualification process.

#### **III.13.1.5. Offers Composed of Separate Resources.**

Separate resources seeking to participate together in a Forward Capacity Auction shall submit a composite offer form no later than 10 Business Days after the date on which the ISO provides qualification determination notifications, as described in Section III.13.1.1.2.8, Section III.13.1.2.4, and Section III.13.1.4.1.1.6. Offers composed of separate resources may not be modified or withdrawn after the deadline for submission of the composite offer form. Separate resources may together participate in a Forward Capacity Auction as a single resource if the following conditions are met:

(a) In all months of the summer period (June through September where the summer resource is not a Demand Capacity Resource, April through November where the summer resource is a Demand Capacity Resource) of the Capacity Commitment Period, only one resource may be used to supply the amount of capacity offered during the entire summer period. In all months of the winter period (October through May where the summer resource is not a Demand Capacity Resource, December through March where the summer resource is a Demand Capacity Resource) of the Capacity Commitment Period, multiple resources may be combined to supply the amount of capacity offered, provided that: (i) the resources together meet the amount of the offer in all months of the winter period; and (ii) to combine for a month, that month must be considered a winter month for both the summer resource and the resource combining with that summer resource in that month.

(b) Each resource that is part of an offer composed of separate resources must qualify in accordance with all of the provisions of this Section III.13.1.5 applicable to that resource type. An offer composed of separate resources participates in the Forward Capacity Auction in accordance with the resource type of the resource providing capacity in the summer period. A resource electing (pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.2.4 or Section III.13.1.4.1.1.2.7) to have the Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity

Clearing Price continue to apply after the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction in which its New Capacity Offer clears shall not be eligible to participate in an offer composed of separate resources as the resource providing capacity in the summer period in the Forward Capacity Auction in which the resource is a New Generating Capacity Resource or New Demand Capacity Resource.

(c) The summer Qualified Capacity of an offer composed of separate resources shall be the summer Qualified Capacity of the single resource that will provide the Capacity Supply Obligation during the summer period. If the summer Qualified Capacity of an offer composed of separate resources is greater than the winter capacity for any month, then the provisions of Section III.13.1.2.2.5.2 shall apply, even where any of the resources comprising the offer composed of separate resources is an Intermittent Power Resource. If the winter capacity of the offer composed of separate resources in any month is higher than the summer Qualified Capacity, then the capacity offered from the winter resources will be reduced pro-rata to equal the summer Qualified Capacity.

(d) Offers composed of separate resources are subject to the locational restrictions specified in the following table:

		Location of Summer Resource			
		Import-Constrained Capacity Zone	Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone	Export-Constrained Capacity Zone	Nested Export-Constrained Capacity Zone
Location of Winter Resource	Import-Constrained Capacity Zone	Eligible (within same Capacity Zone)	Eligible	Eligible	Eligible
	Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone	Ineligible	Eligible	Eligible	Eligible
	Export-Constrained Capacity Zone	Ineligible	Ineligible	Eligible (within same Capacity Zone)	Eligible (within same Capacity Zone where nested export-constrained Capacity Zone is located)

	Nested Export- Constrained Capacity Zone	Ineligible	Ineligible	Ineligible	Eligible (within same Capacity Zone)
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(e) A Renewable Technology Resource may only participate in an offer composed of separate resources if its FCA Qualified Capacity has not been prorated pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.10.

#### **III.13.1.5.A. Notification of FCA Qualified Capacity.**

No later than five Business Days after the deadline for submission of offers composed of separate resources, the ISO shall notify the Project Sponsor or Lead Market Participant for each New Generating Capacity Resource, New Import Capacity Resource, and New Demand Capacity Resource of the resource's final FCA Qualified Capacity for the Forward Capacity Auction. Such notification will detail the resource's financial assurance requirements in accordance with Section III.13.1.9.

#### **III.13.1.6. Self-Supplied FCA Resources.**

Where a Project Sponsor elects to designate all or a portion of a New Generating Capacity Resource or an Existing Generating Capacity Resource as a Self-Supplied FCA Resource, the Project Sponsor must make such designation in writing to the ISO no later than the date by which the Project Sponsor is required to submit the FCM Deposit and, if the Project Sponsor is not also the associated load serving entity, the Project Sponsor must at that time provide written confirmation from the load serving entity regarding the Self-Supplied FCA Resource designation. A New Import Capacity Resource or Existing Import Capacity Resource may be designated as a Self-Supplied FCA Resource. All Self-Supplied FCA Resources shall be subject to the eligibility and locational requirements in this Section III.13.1.6. If designated as a Self-Supplied FCA Resource and otherwise accepted in the qualification process, the resource will clear in the Forward Capacity Auction as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(c) and, with the exception of demand programs for Self-Supplied FCA Resources, shall offset an equal amount of the load serving entity's Capacity Load Obligation in the Capacity Commitment Period. A load serving entity seeking to self-supply using a Demand Capacity Resource shall realize the benefit through the actual reduction in its annual system coincident peak load, shall not receive credit for a resource and, therefore, is not required to participate in the qualification process described in this Section III.13.1. All designations as a Self-Supplied FCA Resource in the Forward Capacity Auction qualification process are binding.

#### **III.13.1.6.1. Self-Supplied FCA Resource Eligibility.**



Where all or a portion of a resource is designated as a Self-Supplied FCA Resource, it shall also maintain its status as a New Generating Capacity Resource, Existing Generating Capacity Resource, New Import Capacity Resource or Existing Import Capacity Resource, and must satisfy the Forward Capacity Auction qualification process requirements set forth in the remainder of Section III.13.1 applicable to that resource type, in addition to the requirements of this Section III.13.1.6. Where an offer composed of separate resources is designated as a Self-Supplied FCA Resource, all of the requirements and deadlines specified in Section III.13.1.5 shall apply to that offer, in addition to the requirements of this Section III.13.1.6. The total quantity of capacity that an load serving entity designates as Self-Supplied FCA Resources may not exceed the load serving entity's projected share of the Installed Capacity Requirement during the Capacity Commitment Period which shall be calculated by determining the load serving entity's most recent percentage share of the Installed Capacity Requirement multiplied by the projected Installed Capacity Requirement for the commitment year. No resource may be designated as a Self-Supplied FCA Resource for more MW than the lesser of that resource's summer Qualified Capacity and winter Qualified Capacity.

**III.13.1.6.2. Locational Requirements for Self-Supplied FCA Resources.**

In order to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a Self-Supplied FCA Resource for a load in an import-constrained Capacity Zone, the Self-Supplied FCA Resource must be located in the same Capacity Zone as the associated load, unless the Self-Supplied FCA Resource is a pool-planned unit or other unit with a special allocation of Capacity Transfer Rights. In order to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a Self-Supplied FCA Resource in an export-constrained Capacity Zone for a load outside that export-constrained Capacity Zone, the Self-Supplied FCA Resource must be a pool-planned unit or other unit with a special allocation of Capacity Transfer Rights.

**III.13.1.7. Internal Market Monitor Review of Offers and Bids.**

In addition to the other provisions of this Section III.13.1, the Internal Market Monitor shall have the authority to review in the qualification process each resource's summer and winter Seasonal Claimed Capability if it is significantly lower than historical values, and if the Internal Market Monitor determines that it may be an attempt to exercise physical withholding, the matter will be referred to the Commission in accordance with the protocols set forth in Appendix A to the Commission's Market Monitoring Policy Statement (111 FERC ¶ 61,267 (2005)). Where an entity submits: (i) an offer as a New Generating Capacity Resource, a New Import Capacity Resource or a New Demand Capacity Resource; and (ii) a Static De-List Bid, a Permanent De-List Bid, a Retirement De-List Bid, an Export Bid or an

Administrative Export De-List Bid in the same Forward Capacity Auction, the Internal Market Monitor shall take appropriate steps to ensure that the resource bid to de-list, retire or export in the Forward Capacity Auction is not inappropriately replaced by that new capacity in a subsequent reconfiguration auction or Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral. In its review of any offer or bid pursuant to this Section III.13.1.7, the Internal Market Monitor may consult with the Project Sponsor or Market Participant, as appropriate, to seek clarification, or to address questions or concerns regarding the materials submitted.

**III.13.1.8. Publication of Offer and Bid Information.**

- (a) Resource name, quantity and Load Zone (or interface, as applicable) in which the resource is located about each Permanent De-list Bid and Retirement De-List Bid will be posted no later than 15 days after the Forward Capacity Auction is conducted.
- (b) The quantity and Load Zone (or interface, as applicable) in which the resource is located of each Static De-List Bid will be posted no later than 15 days after the Forward Capacity Auction is conducted.
- (c) Name of submitter, quantity, and interface of Export Bids and Administrative Export Bids shall be published no later than 15 days after the Forward Capacity Auction is conducted.
- (d) Name of submitter, quantity, and interface about offers from New Import Capacity Resources shall be published no later than 15 days after the Forward Capacity Auction is conducted.
- (e) No later than three Business Days after the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline, the ISO shall post on its website information concerning Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids.
- (f) The name of each Lead Market Participant submitting Static De-List Bids, Export Bids, and Administrative Export De-List Bids, as well as the number and type of such de-list bids submitted by each Lead Market Participant, shall be published no later than three Business Days after the ISO issues the qualification determination notifications described in Sections III.13.1.1.2.8, III.13.1.2.4(b), and III.13.1.3.5.7. Authorized Persons of Authorized Commissions will be provided confidential access to full information about posted Static De-list Bids, Permanent De-List Bids, and Retirement De-List Bids upon request pursuant to Section 3.3 of the ISO New England Information Policy.

(g) No later than five Business Days after the close of the New Capacity Show of Interest Submission Window, the ISO shall post on its website the aggregate quantity of supply offers and demand bids that have been elected to participate in the substitution auction by Capacity Zone (where the zones used are those being studied for inclusion in the associated Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to Section III.12.4).

**III.13.1.9. Financial Assurance.**

Except as noted in this Section III.13.1.9, all financial assurance requirements associated with Forward Capacity Auctions and annual reconfiguration auctions and other payments and charges resulting from the Forward Capacity Market shall be governed by the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**III.13.1.9.1. Financial Assurance for New Generating Capacity Resources and New Demand Capacity Resources Participating in the Forward Capacity Auction.**

In order to participate in any Forward Capacity Auction, New Generating Capacity Resources (including Conditional Qualified New Resources) and New Demand Capacity Resources shall be required to meet the financial assurance requirements as described in the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy. Timely payment of the FCM Deposit by the Project Sponsor for a New Generating Capacity Resource or New Demand Capacity Resource accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction constitutes a commitment to offer the full FCA Qualified Capacity of that New Generating Capacity Resource or New Demand Capacity Resource in the Forward Capacity Auction at the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price. If the FCM Deposit is not received within the timeframe specified in the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy, the New Generating Capacity Resource or New Demand Capacity Resource shall not be permitted to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction. If capacity offered by the New Generating Capacity Resource or New Demand Capacity Resource clears in the Forward Capacity Auction, financial assurance required prior to the auction pursuant to FAP shall be applied toward the resource's financial assurance obligation, as described in the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy. If no capacity offered by that New Generating Capacity Resource or New Demand Capacity Resource clears in the Forward Capacity Auction, the financial assurance required prior to the auction pursuant to FAP will be released pursuant to the terms of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**III.13.1.9.2. Financial Assurance for New Generating Capacity Resources and New Demand Capacity Resources Clearing in a Forward Capacity Auction.**

Where a New Generating Capacity Resource's offer or a New Demand Capacity Resource's offer is accepted in a Forward Capacity Auction, that resource must provide financial assurance as described in the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**III.13.1.9.2.1. Failure to Provide Financial Assurance or to Meet Milestone.**

If a New Generating Capacity Resource or New Demand Capacity Resource: (i) fails to provide the required financial assurance as described in the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy or (ii) has its Capacity Supply Obligation terminated by the ISO pursuant to Section III.13.3.4A, it shall lose its Capacity Supply Obligation and its right to any payments associated with that Capacity Supply Obligation, and it shall forfeit any financial assurance provided with respect to that Capacity Supply Obligation.

**III.13.1.9.2.2. Release of Financial Assurance.**

Once a New Generating Capacity Resource or New Demand Capacity Resource achieves FCM Commercial Operation, its financial assurance obligation shall be released pursuant to the terms of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy and it shall have the same financial assurance requirements as an Existing Generating Capacity Resource, as governed by the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy. If a New Generating Capacity Resource or New Demand Capacity Resource is only capable of delivering less than the amount of capacity that cleared in the Forward Capacity Auction, then the portion of its financial assurance associated with the shortfall shall be forfeited.

**III.13.1.9.2.2.1. [Reserved.]**

**III.13.1.9.2.3. Forfeit of Financial Assurance.**

Where any financial assurance is forfeited pursuant to the provisions of Section III.13, there shall be no further coverage for such forfeit under the ISO New England Billing Policy. Any financial assurance that is forfeited pursuant to Section III.13 shall be used to reduce charges incurred by load in the relevant Capacity Zone.

**III.13.1.9.2.4. Financial Assurance for New Import Capacity Resources.**

A New Import Capacity Resource that is backed by a new External Resource or will be delivered over an Elective Transmission Upgrade with a Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service Interconnection Request pursuant to Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff shall be subject to the same financial assurance requirements as a New Generating Capacity Resource, as described in Section III.13.1.9.1 and Section III.13.1.9.2. Once the new External Resource or the Elective Transmission Upgrade achieves FCM Commercial Operation, the New Import Capacity Resource shall be subject to the same financial assurance requirements as an Existing Generating Capacity Resource, as described in Section III.13.1.9. A New Import Capacity Resource that is backed by one or more existing External Resources or by an external Control Area shall be subject to the same financial assurance requirements as an Existing Generating Capacity Resource, as governed by the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

#### **III.13.1.9.3. Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit.**

For each New Capacity Show of Interest Form and New Demand Capacity Resource Show of Interest Form submitted for the purposes of qualifying for either a Forward Capacity Auction or reconfiguration auction, the Project Sponsor must submit to the ISO a refundable deposit in the amount shown in the table below (“Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit”). The Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit must be received in accordance with the ISO New England Billing Policy. Such deposit shall be used for costs incurred by the ISO and its consultants, including the documented and reasonably-incurred costs of the affected Transmission Owners, associated with the qualification process described in Section III.13.1 and with the critical path schedule monitoring described in Section III.13.3. An additional Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit is not required if: (i) the Project Sponsor is actively seeking qualification for another Forward Capacity Auction or annual reconfiguration auction, or is having the project’s critical path schedule monitored pursuant to Section III.13.3; and (ii) the costs already incurred in the qualification process and critical path schedule monitoring do not equal or exceed 90 percent of the amount of the previously-submitted Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit(s). The ISO shall provide the Project Sponsor with an annual statement in writing of the costs incurred by the ISO and its consultants, including the documented and reasonably-incurred costs of the affected Transmission Owner(s), associated with the qualification process and critical path schedule monitoring. In any case where resources are aggregated or disaggregated, the associated Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposits will be adjusted as appropriate. After aggregation or disaggregation of resources, historical data regarding the costs already incurred in the qualification process of the original resources will no longer be provided. Coincident with the issuance of

the annual statement, where incurred costs are equal to or greater than 90 percent of the Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit(s) previously submitted, the ISO will issue an invoice in the amount determined pursuant to the Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit table contained in Section III.13.1.9.3.1 plus any excess of costs incurred to date by the ISO and its consultants, including the documented and reasonably-incurred costs of the affected Transmission Owners, associated with the qualification process described in Section III.13.1 and with the critical path schedule monitoring described in Section III.13.3. Any refunds that may result from aggregation of resources will be issued coincident with the annual statement. Payment on the invoice must be received in accordance with the ISO New England Billing Policy. If the Project Sponsor fails to pay the amount due by the stated due date, the ISO will consider the resources that were invoiced withdrawn by the Project Sponsor. Such a withdrawal shall be irrevocable, and payment on the invoice after the due date will not remedy the failure to pay or the withdrawal.

#### **III.13.1.9.3.1. Partial Waiver Of Deposit.**

A portion of the deposit shall be waived when there is an active Interconnection Request and an executed Interconnection Feasibility Study Agreement or Interconnection System Impact Study Agreement under Schedule 22, 23 or 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff or where a resource modification does not require a revision to the Interconnection Agreement.

<b>New Generating Capacity Resources <math>\geq</math> 20 MW or an Import Capacity Resource associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade that has not achieved Commercial Operation as defined in Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff</b>	<b>New Generating Capacity Resources <math>&lt;</math> 20 MW and <math>\geq</math> 2 MW</b>	<b>Imports and New Demand Capacity Resources</b>		<b>New Generating Capacity Resources <math>&lt;</math> 2 MW</b>
<i>Including Up-rates, Re-powering, Environmental Compliance &amp;</i>	<i>Including Up-rates, Re-powering, Environmental Compliance &amp;</i>			

<i>Intermittent Power Resources</i>	<i>Intermittent Power Resources</i>			
\$25,000	\$7,500	\$1,000		\$500
<i>With Executed Interconnection Feasibility Study Agreement or System Impact Study Agreement</i>	<i>With Executed Interconnection Feasibility Study Agreement or System Impact Study Agreement</i>			
\$15,000	\$6,500	n/a		n/a

### **III.13.1.9.3.2. Settlement of Costs.**

#### **III.13.1.9.3.2.1. Settlement Of Costs Associated With Resources Participating In A Forward Capacity Auction Or Reconfiguration Auction.**

Upon the latter of: (i) the first day of the Capacity Commitment Period for which a resource offers into the Forward Capacity Market or (ii) the date on which the entire resource is accepted by the ISO for FCM Commercial Operation, the ISO shall provide the Project Sponsor with a statement in writing of the costs incurred by the ISO and its consultants, including the documented and reasonably-incurred costs of the affected Transmission Owner(s), associated with the qualification process and critical path schedule monitoring. If any portion of the Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit exceeds the costs incurred by the ISO and its consultants, including the documented and reasonably-incurred costs of the affected Transmission Owner(s) associated with the qualification process and critical path schedule monitoring, the ISO shall refund to the Project Sponsor the excess including interest calculated in accordance with 18 CFR § 35.19a(a)(2). If the costs incurred by the ISO and its consultants, including the documented and reasonably-incurred costs of the affected Transmission Owner(s), associated with the qualification process and critical path schedule monitoring exceed the Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit, the Project Sponsor shall pay such excess, including interest calculated in accordance with 18 CFR § 35.19a(a)(2) – For Demand Capacity Resources, the ISO shall provide all of the above concurrently with the annual statement required under Section III.13.1.9.3.

#### **III.13.1.9.3.2.2. Settlement Of Costs Associated With Resources That Withdraw From A Forward Capacity Auction Or Reconfiguration Auction.**

Upon the withdrawal or failure to meet the requirements of the qualification process set forth in Section III.13.1, the ISO shall provide the Project Sponsor with a statement in writing of the costs incurred by the ISO and its consultants, including the documented and reasonably-incurred costs of affected Transmission Owner(s), associated with the qualification process and critical path schedule monitoring. A Project Sponsor that withdraws or is deemed to have withdrawn its request for qualification shall pay to the ISO all costs prudently incurred by the ISO and its consultants, including the documented and reasonably-incurred costs of affected Transmission Owner(s), associated with the qualification process and critical path schedule monitoring. The ISO shall refund to the Project Sponsor any portion of the Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit that exceeds the costs associated with the qualification process and critical path schedule monitoring incurred by the ISO and its consultants, including the documented and reasonably-incurred costs of affected Transmission Owner(s), including interest calculated in accordance with 18 CFR § 35.19a(a)(2). The ISO shall charge the Project Sponsor the amount of such costs incurred by the ISO and its consultants, including the documented and reasonably-incurred costs of affected Transmission Owner(s), that exceeds the Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit, including interest calculated in accordance with 18 CFR § 35.19a(a)(2). For Demand Capacity Resources, the ISO shall provide all of the above concurrently with the annual statement required under Section III.13.1.9.3.

**III.13.1.9.3.2.3.                      Crediting Of Reimbursements.**

Cost reimbursements received (excluding amounts passed through to the ISO's consultants and to affected Transmission Owner(s)) by the ISO pursuant to this Section III.13.1.9.3.2 shall be credited against revenues received by the ISO pursuant to Section IV.A.6.1 of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff.

**III.13.1.10.                      Forward Capacity Auction Qualification Schedule.**

Beginning with the timeline for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2017 (the eighth Forward Capacity Auction), and for each Capacity Commitment Period thereafter, the deadlines will be consistent for each Capacity Commitment Period, as follows:

- (a) each Capacity Commitment Period shall begin in June;
- (b) the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline will be in March, approximately four years and three months before the beginning of the Capacity Commitment Period;



- (c) the New Capacity Show of Interest Submission Window will be in April, approximately four years and two months before the beginning of the Capacity Commitment Period;
- (d) the Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline will be 90 days after the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline, approximately four years before the beginning of the Capacity Commitment Period;
- (e) the New Capacity Qualification Deadline will be in June or July that is just under four years before the beginning of the Capacity Commitment Period; and
- (f) the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period will begin in February approximately three years and four months before the beginning of the Capacity Commitment Period.

#### **III.13.1.11 Opt-Out for Resources Electing Multiple-Year Treatment.**

Beginning in the qualification process for the ninth Forward Capacity Auction (for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning June 1, 2018), any resource that had elected in a Forward Capacity Auction prior to the ninth Forward Capacity Auction (pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.2.4 or Section III.13.1.4.1.1.2.7) to have the Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price continue to apply after the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction in which its New Capacity Offer cleared may, by submitting a written notification to the ISO no later than the Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline (or, in the case of the ninth Forward Capacity Auction, no later than September 19, 2014), opt-out of the remaining years of the resource's multiple-year election. A decision to so opt-out shall be irrevocable. A resource choosing to so opt-out will participate in subsequent Forward Capacity Auctions in the same manner as other Existing Capacity Resources.

### **III.13.2. Annual Forward Capacity Auction.**

#### **III.13.2.1. Timing of Annual Forward Capacity Auctions.**

Each Forward Capacity Auction will be conducted beginning on the first Monday in the February that is approximately three years and four months before the beginning of the associated Capacity Commitment Period (unless, no later than the immediately preceding December 1, an alternative date is announced by the ISO), or, where exigent circumstances prevent the start of the Forward Capacity Auction at that time, as soon as possible thereafter.

#### **III.13.2.2. Amount of Capacity Cleared in Each Forward Capacity Auction.**

The total amount of capacity cleared in each Forward Capacity Auction shall be determined using the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve and the Capacity Zone Demand Curves for the modeled Capacity Zones pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.3.

##### **III.13.2.2.1. System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve.**

The MRI Transition Period is the period from the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning June 1, 2020 through the earlier of:

- (i) the Forward Capacity Auction for which the amount of the Installed Capacity Requirement (net of HQICCs) that is filed by the ISO with the Commission pursuant to Section III.12.3 for the upcoming Forward Capacity Auction is greater than or equal to the sum of: 34,151 MW, and: (a) 722 MW (for the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning June 1, 2020); (b) 375 MW (for the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning June 1, 2021), or; (c) 150 MW (for the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning June 1, 2022);
- (ii) the Forward Capacity Auction for which the product of the system-wide Marginal Reliability Impact value, calculated pursuant to Section III.12.1.1, and the scaling factor specified in Section III.13.2.2.4, specifies a quantity at \$7.03/kW-month in excess of the MW value determined under the applicable subsection (2)(b), (2)(c), or (2)(d), below, or;

- (iii) the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning June 1, 2022.

During the MRI Transition Period, the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve shall consist of the following three segments:

- (1) at prices above \$7.03/kW-month and below the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price, the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve shall specify a price for system capacity quantities based on the product of the system-wide Marginal Reliability Impact value, calculated pursuant to Section III.12.1.1, and the scaling factor specified in Section III.13.2.2.4;
- (2) at prices below \$7.03/kW-month, the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve shall be linear between \$7.03/kW-month and \$0.00/kW-month and determined by the following quantities:
  - (a) At the price of \$0.00/kW-month, the quantity specified by the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve shall be 1616 MW plus the MW value determined under the applicable provision in (b), (c), or (d) of this subsection.
  - (b) for the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning June 1, 2020, at \$7.03/kW-month, the quantity shall be the lesser of:
    - 1. 35,437 MW; and
    - 2. 722 MW plus the quantity at which the product of the system-wide Marginal Reliability Impact value and the scaling factor yield a price of \$7.03/kW-month;
  - (c) for the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning June 1, 2021, at \$7.03/kW-month, the quantity shall be the lesser of:
    - 1. 35,090 MW; and
    - 2. 375 MW plus the quantity at which the product of the system-wide Marginal Reliability Impact value and the scaling factor yield a price of \$7.03/kW-month;
  - (d) for the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning June 1, 2022, at \$7.03/kW-month, the quantity shall be the lesser of:
    - 1. 34,865 MW; and
    - 2. 150 MW plus the quantity at which the product of the system-wide Marginal Reliability Impact value and the scaling factor yield a price of \$7.03/kW-month

(3) a price of \$7.03/kW-month for all quantities between those curves segments.

In addition to the foregoing, the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve shall not specify a price in excess of the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price.

Following the MRI Transition Period, the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve shall specify a price for system capacity quantities based on the product of the system-wide Marginal Reliability Impact value, calculated pursuant to Section III.12.1.1, and the scaling factor specified in Section III.13.2.2.4. For any system capacity quantity greater than 110% of the Installed Capacity Requirement (net of HQICCs), the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve shall specify a price of zero. The System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve shall not specify a price in excess of the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price.

#### **III.13.2.2.2. Import-Constrained Capacity Zone Demand Curves.**

For each import-constrained Capacity Zone, the Capacity Zone Demand Curve shall specify a price for all Capacity Zone quantities based on the product of the import-constrained Capacity Zone's Marginal Reliability Impact value, calculated pursuant to Section III.12.2.1.3, and the scaling factor specified in Section III.13.2.2.4. The prices specified by an import-constrained Capacity Zone Demand Curve shall be non-negative. At all quantities greater than the truncation point, which is the amount of capacity for which the Capacity Zone Demand Curve specifies a price of \$0.01/kW-month, the Capacity Zone Demand Curve shall specify a price of zero. The Capacity Zone Demand Curve shall not specify a price in excess of the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price.

#### **III.13.2.2.3. Export-Constrained Capacity Zone Demand Curves.**

For each export-constrained Capacity Zone, the Capacity Zone Demand Curve shall specify a price for all Capacity Zone quantities based on the product of the export-constrained Capacity Zone's Marginal Reliability Impact value, calculated pursuant to Section III.12.2.2.1, and the scaling factor specified in Section III.13.2.2.4. The prices specified by an export-constrained Capacity Zone Demand Curve shall be non-positive. At all quantities less than the truncation point, which is the amount of capacity for which the Capacity Zone Demand Curve specifies a price of negative \$0.01/kW-month, the Capacity Zone Demand Curve shall specify a price of zero.

#### **III.13.2.2.4. Capacity Demand Curve Scaling Factor.**

The demand curve scaling factor shall be set at the value such that, at the quantity specified by the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve at a price of Net CONE, the Loss of Load Expectation is 0.1 days per year.

**III.13.2.3. Conduct of the Forward Capacity Auction.**

The Forward Capacity Auction shall include a descending clock auction, which will determine, subject to the provisions of Section III.13.2.7, the Capacity Clearing Price for each Capacity Zone modeled in that Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to Section III.12.4, and the Capacity Clearing Price for certain offers from New Import Capacity Resources and Existing Import Capacity Resources pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.3(d). The Forward Capacity Auction shall determine the outcome of all offers and bids accepted during the qualification process and submitted during the auction. The descending clock auction shall be conducted as a series of rounds, which shall continue (for up to five consecutive Business Days, with up to eight rounds per day, absent extraordinary circumstances) until the Forward Capacity Auction is concluded for all modeled Capacity Zones in accordance with the provisions of Section III.13.2.3.3. Each round of the Forward Capacity Auction shall consist of the following steps, which shall be completed simultaneously for each Capacity Zone included in the round:

**III.13.2.3.1. Step 1: Announcement of Start-of-Round Price and End-of-Round Price.**

For each round, the auctioneer shall announce a single Start-of-Round Price (the highest price associated with a round of the Forward Capacity Auction) and a single (lower) End-of-Round Price (the lowest price associated with a round of the Forward Capacity Auction). In the first round, the Start-of-Round Price shall equal the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price for all modeled Capacity Zones. In each round after the first round, the Start-of-Round Price shall equal the End-of-Round Price from the previous round.

**III.13.2.3.2. Step 2: Compilation of Offers and Bids.**

The auctioneer shall compile all of the offers and bids for that round, as follows:

**(a) Offers from New Generating Capacity Resources, New Import Capacity Resources, and New Demand Capacity Resources.**

- (i) The Project Sponsor for any New Generating Capacity Resource, New Import Capacity Resource that is backed by a single new External Resource and that is associated with an investment in transmission that increases New England's import capability, New Import Capacity

Resource that is associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade, or New Demand Capacity Resource accepted in the qualification process for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction may submit a New Capacity Offer indicating the quantity of capacity that the Project Sponsor would commit to provide from the resource during the Capacity Commitment Period at that round's prices. A New Capacity Offer shall be defined by the submission of one to five prices, each strictly less than the Start-of-Round Price but greater than or equal to the End-of-Round Price, and an associated quantity in the applicable Capacity Zone. Each price shall be expressed in units of dollars per kilowatt-month to an accuracy of at most three digits to the right of the decimal point, and each quantity shall be expressed in units of MWs to an accuracy of at most three digits to the right of the decimal point. A New Capacity Offer shall imply a supply curve indicating quantities offered at all of that round's prices, pursuant to the convention of Section III.13.2.3.2(a)(iii).

(ii) If the Project Sponsor of a New Generating Capacity Resource, New Import Capacity Resource that is backed by a single new External Resource and that is associated with an investment in transmission that increases New England's import capability, New Import Capacity Resource that is associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade, or New Demand Capacity Resource elects to offer in a Forward Capacity Auction, the Project Sponsor must offer the resource's full FCA Qualified Capacity at the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price in the first round of the auction. A New Capacity Offer for a resource may in no event be for greater capacity than the resource's full FCA Qualified Capacity at any price. A New Capacity Offer for a resource may not be for less capacity than the resource's Rationing Minimum Limit at any price, except where the New Capacity Offer is for a capacity quantity of zero.

(iii) Let the Start-of-Round Price and End-of-Round Price for a given round be  $P_S$  and  $P_E$ , respectively. Let the  $m$  prices ( $1 \leq m \leq 5$ ) submitted by a Project Sponsor for a modeled Capacity Zone be  $p_1, p_2, \dots, p_m$ , where  $P_S > p_1 > p_2 > \dots > p_m \geq P_E$ , and let the associated quantities submitted for a New Capacity Resource be  $q_1, q_2, \dots, q_m$ . Then the Project Sponsor's supply curve, for all prices strictly less than  $P_S$  but greater than or equal to  $P_E$ , shall be taken to be:

$$S(p) = \begin{cases} q_0, & \text{if } p > p_1, \\ q_1, & \text{if } p_2 < p \leq p_1, \\ q_2, & \text{if } p_3 < p \leq p_2, \\ \dots & \dots, \\ q_m, & \text{if } p \leq p_m. \end{cases}$$

where, in the first round,  $q_0$  is the resource's full FCA Qualified Capacity and, in subsequent rounds,  $q_0$  is the resource's quantity offered at the lowest price of the previous round.

(iv)- ~~Except for Renewable Technology Resources and except as provided in Section III.13.2.3.2(a)(v)–The amount of capacity included in each New Capacity Offer at each price shall be included in the aggregate supply curves at that price as described in Section III.13.2.3.3. If the Internal Market Monitor has determined that a New Capacity Resource must use a New Resource Offer Floor Price pursuant to Section III.A.21.2.3; such a~~ New Capacity Resource may not include any capacity in a New Capacity Offer during the Forward Capacity Auction at any price below the resource's New Resource Offer Floor Price. ~~The amount of capacity included in each New Capacity Offer at each price shall be included in the aggregate supply curves at that price as described in Section III.13.2.3.3.~~

(v) Capacity associated with a New Import Capacity Resource (other than a New Import Capacity Resource that is backed by a single new External Resource and that is associated with an investment in transmission that increases New England's import capability or a New Import Capacity Resource that is associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade) shall be automatically included in the aggregate supply curves as described in Section III.13.2.3.3 at prices at or above the resource's offer prices (as ~~they may be established or~~ modified pursuant to Section III.A.21.42) and shall be automatically removed from the aggregate supply curves at prices below the resource's offer prices (as ~~they may be established or~~ modified pursuant to Section III.A.21.42), except under the following circumstances:

In any round of the Forward Capacity Auction in which prices are below the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold, the Project Sponsor for a New Import Capacity Resource (other than a New Import Capacity Resource that is backed by a single new External Resource and that is associated with an investment in transmission that increases New England's import capability or a New Import Capacity Resource that is associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade) with offer

prices (as ~~they may be established or~~ modified pursuant to Section III.A.21.42) that are less than the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold may submit a New Capacity Offer indicating the quantity of capacity that the Project Sponsor would commit to provide from the resource during the Capacity Commitment Period at that round's prices. Such an offer shall be defined by the submission of one to five prices, each less than the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold (or the Start-of-Round Price, if lower than the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold) but greater than or equal to the End-of-Round Price, and a single quantity associated with each price. Such an offer shall be expressed in the same form as specified in Section III.13.2.3.2(a)(i) and shall imply a curve indicating quantities at all of that round's relevant prices, pursuant to the convention of Section III.13.2.3.2(a)(iii). The curve may not increase the quantity offered as the price decreases.

(b) **Bids from Existing Capacity Resources**

(i) Static De-List Bids, Permanent De-List Bids, Retirement De-List Bids, and Export Bids from Existing Generating Capacity Resources, Existing Import Capacity Resources, and Existing Demand Capacity Resources, as finalized in the qualification process or as otherwise directed by the Commission shall be automatically bid into the appropriate rounds of the Forward Capacity Auction, such that each such resource's FCA Qualified Capacity will be included in the aggregate supply curves as described in Section III.13.2.3.3 until any Static De-List Bid, Permanent De-List Bid, Retirement D-List Bid, or Export Bid clears in the Forward Capacity Auction, as described in Section III.13.2.5.2, and is removed from the aggregate supply curves. In the case of a Commission-approved Permanent De-List Bid or Commission-approved Retirement De-List Bid at or above the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price, or where a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid is subject to an election under Section III.13.1.2.4.1(a), the resource's FCA Qualified Capacity will be reduced by the quantity of the de-list bid (unless the resource was retained for reliability pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1) and the Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid shall not be included in the Forward Capacity Auction. Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids subject to an election under Section III.13.1.2.4.1(a) or Section III.13.1.2.4.1(b) shall not be included in the Forward Capacity Auction and shall be treated according to Section III.13.2.3.2(b)(ii). In the case of a Static De-List Bid, if the Market Participant revised the bid pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.1, then the revised bid shall be used in place of the submitted bid; if the Market Participant withdrew the bid pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.1, then the capacity associated with the withdrawn bid shall be entered into the auction pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.2(c). If the amount of capacity associated with Export Bids



for an interface exceeds the transfer limit of that interface (minus any accepted Administrative De-List Bids over that interface), then the set of Export Bids associated with that interface equal to the interface's transfer limit (minus any accepted Administrative De-List Bids over that interface) having the highest bid prices shall be included in the auction as described above; capacity for which Export Bids are not included in the auction as a result of this provision shall be entered into the auction pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.2(c).

(ii) For Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids, the ISO will enter a Proxy De-List Bid into the appropriate rounds of the Forward Capacity Auction in the following circumstances: (1) if the Lead Market Participant has elected pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(a) to retire the resource or portion thereof, the resource has not been retained for reliability pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1, the price specified in the Commission-approved de-list bid is less than the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price, and the Internal Market Monitor has found a portfolio benefit pursuant to Section III.A.24; or (2) if the Lead Market Participant has elected conditional treatment pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(b), the resource has not been retained for reliability pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1, and the price specified in the Commission-approved de-list bid is less than the price specified in the de-list bid submitted by the Lead Market Participant and less than the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price. The Proxy De-List Bid shall be non-rationable and shall be equal in price and quantity to, and located in the same Capacity Zone as, the Commission-approved Permanent De-List Bid or Commission-approved Retirement De-List Bid, and shall be entered into the appropriate rounds of the Forward Capacity Auction such that the capacity associated with the Proxy De-List Bid will be included in the aggregate supply curves as described in Section III.13.2.3.3 until the Proxy De-List Bid clears in the Forward Capacity Auction, as described in Section III.13.2.5.2, and is removed from the aggregate supply curves. If the Lead Market Participant has elected conditional treatment pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(b), the resource has not been retained for reliability pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1, and the Commission-approved Permanent De-List Bid or Commission-approved Retirement De-List Bid is equal to or greater than the de-list bid submitted by the Lead Market Participant, no Proxy De-List Bid shall be used and the Commission-approved de-list bid shall be entered in the Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.2(b)(i).

(iii) For purposes of this subsection (b), if an Internal Market Monitor-determined price has been established for a Static De-List Bid and the associated resource's capacity is pivotal pursuant to Sections III.A.23.1 and III.A.23.2, then (unless otherwise directed by the

Commission) the lower of the Internal Market Monitor-determined price and any revised bid that is submitted pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.1 will be used in place of the initially submitted bid; provided, however, that if the bid was withdrawn pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.1, then the capacity associated with the withdrawn bid shall be entered into the auction pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.2(c). If an Internal Market Monitor-determined price has been established for an Export Bid and the associated resource's capacity is pivotal pursuant to Sections III.A.23.1 and III.A.23.2, then the Internal Market Monitor-determined price (or price directed by the Commission) will be used in place of the submitted bid.

Any Static De-List Bid for ambient air conditions that has not been verified pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2.4 shall not be subject to the provisions of this subsection (b).

(c) **Existing Capacity Resources Without De-List or Export Bids and Self-Supplied FCA Resources.** Each Existing Generating Capacity Resource, Existing Import Capacity Resource, and Existing Demand Capacity Resource without a Static De-List Bid, a Permanent De-List Bid, a Retirement De-List Bid, an Export Bid or an Administrative Export De-List Bid in its Existing Capacity Qualification Package, and each existing Self-Supplied FCA Resource shall be automatically entered into each round of the Forward Capacity Auction at its FCA Qualified Capacity, such that the resource's FCA Qualified Capacity will be included in the aggregate supply curves as described in Section III.13.2.3.3, except where such resource, if permitted, submits an appropriate Dynamic De-List Bid, as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(d). Each new Self-Supplied FCA Resource shall be automatically entered into each round of the Forward Capacity Auction at its designated self-supplied quantity, such that the resource's designated self-supply quantity will be included in the aggregate supply curves as described in Section III.13.2.3.3. If the Internal Market Monitor has determined that a new Self-Supplied FCA Resource must use a New Resource Offer Floor Price pursuant to Section III.A.21.2.3, the new resource's self-supplied quantity shall be entered into each round of the Forward Capacity Auction at prices at or above the ~~resource's~~ New Resource Offer Floor Price, ~~such that the resource's designated self-supply quantity will be included in the aggregate supply curves as described in Section III.13.2.3.3.~~

(d) **Dynamic De-List Bids.** In any round of the Forward Capacity Auction in which prices are below the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold, any Existing Generating Capacity Resource, Existing Import Capacity Resource, or Existing Demand Capacity Resource (but not any Self-Supplied FCA Resources) may submit a Dynamic De-List Bid at prices below the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold. Such a bid shall be defined by the submission of one to five prices, each less than the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold (or

the Start-of-Round Price, if lower than the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold) but greater than or equal to the End-of-Round Price, and a single quantity associated with each price. Such a bid shall be expressed in the same form as specified in Section III.13.2.3.2(a)(i) and shall imply a curve indicating quantities at all of that round's relevant prices, pursuant to the convention of Section III.13.2.3.2(a)(iii). The curve may in no case increase the quantity offered as the price decreases. A dynamic De-List Bid may not offer less capacity than the resource's Rationing Minimum Limit at any price, except where the amount of capacity offered is zero. All Dynamic De-List Bids are subject to a reliability review as described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5, and if not rejected for reliability reasons, shall be included in the round in the same manner as Static De-List Bids as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(b). Where a resource elected pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.2.4 or Section III.13.1.4.1.1.2.7 to have the Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price continue to apply after the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction in which the offer clears, the capacity associated with any resulting Capacity Supply Obligation may not be subject to a Dynamic De-List Bid in subsequent Forward Capacity Auctions for Capacity Commitment Periods for which the Project Sponsor elected to have the Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price continue to apply. Where a Lead Market Participant submits any combination of Dynamic De-List Bid, Static De-List Bid, Export Bid, and Administrative Export De-List Bid for a single resource, none of the prices in a set of price-quantity pairs associated with a bid may be the same as any price in any other set of price-quantity pairs associated with another bid for the same resource.

(e) **Repowering.** Offers and bids associated with a resource participating in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.1.2 (resources previously counted as capacity resources) shall be addressed in the Forward Capacity Auction in accordance with the provisions of this Section III.13.2.3.2(e). The Project Sponsor shall offer such a New Generating Capacity Resource into the Forward Capacity Auction in the same manner and pursuant to the same rules as other New Generating Capacity Resources, as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(a). As long as any capacity is offered from the New Generating Capacity Resource, the amount of capacity offered is the amount that the auctioneer shall include in the aggregate supply curve at the relevant prices, and the quantity of capacity offered from the associated Existing Generating Capacity Resource shall not be included in the aggregate supply curve. If any portion of the New Generating Capacity Resource clears in the Forward Capacity Auction, the associated Existing Generating Capacity Resource shall be permanently de-listed as of the start of the associated Capacity Commitment Period. If at any price, no capacity is offered from the New Generating Capacity Resource, then the auctioneer shall include capacity from the associated Existing Generating Capacity Resource at that price, subject to any bids submitted and accepted in the

qualification process for that Existing Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.5. Bids submitted and accepted in the qualification process for an Existing Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.5 shall only be entered into the Forward Capacity Auction after the associated New Generating Capacity Resource is fully withdrawn (that is, the Forward Capacity Auction reaches a price at which the resource's New Capacity Offer is zero capacity), and shall only then be subject to the reliability review described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5.

(f) **Conditional Qualified New Resources.** Offers associated with a resource participating in the Forward Capacity Auction as a Conditional Qualified New Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.3(f) shall be addressed in the Forward Capacity Auction in accordance with the provisions of this Section III.13.2.3.2(f). The Project Sponsor shall offer such a Conditional Qualified New Resource into the Forward Capacity Auction in the same manner and pursuant to the same rules as other New Generating Capacity Resources, as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(a). An offer from at most one resource at a Conditional Qualified New Resource's location will be permitted to clear (receive a Capacity Supply Obligation for the associated Capacity Commitment Period) in the Forward Capacity Auction. As long as a positive quantity is offered at the End-of-Round Price in the final round of the Forward Capacity Auction by the resource having a higher queue priority at the Conditional Qualified New Resource's location, as described in Section III.13.1.1.2.3(f), then no capacity from the Conditional Qualified New Resource shall clear. If at any price greater than or equal to the End-of-Round Price in the final round of the Forward Capacity Auction, zero quantity is offered from the resource having higher queue priority at the Conditional Qualified New Resource's location, as described in Section III.13.1.1.2.3(f), then the auctioneer shall consider capacity offered from the Conditional Qualified New Resource in the determination of clearing, including the application of Section III.13.2.7.

(g) **Mechanics.** Offers and bids that may be submitted during a round of the Forward Capacity Auction must be received between the starting time and ending time of the round, as announced by the auctioneer in advance. The ISO at its sole discretion may authorize a participant in the auction to complete or correct its submission after the ending time of a round, but only if the participant can demonstrate to the ISO's satisfaction that the participant was making reasonable efforts to complete a valid offer submission before the ending time of the round, and only if the ISO determines that allowing the completion or correction will not unreasonably disrupt the auction process. All decisions by the ISO concerning whether or not a participant may complete or correct a submission after the ending time of a round are final.

**III.13.2.3.3. Step 3: Determination of the Outcome of Each Round.**

The auctioneer shall use the offers and bids for the round as described in Section III.13.2.3.2 to determine the aggregate supply curves for the New England Control Area and for each modeled Capacity Zone included in the round.

The aggregate supply curve for the New England Control Area, the Total System Capacity, shall reflect at each price the sum of the following:

- (1) the amount of capacity offered in all Capacity Zones modeled as import-constrained Capacity Zones at that price (excluding capacity offered from New Import Capacity Resources and Existing Import Capacity Resources);
- (2) the amount of capacity offered in the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone at that price (excluding capacity offered from New Import Capacity Resources and Existing Import Capacity Resources);
- (3) for each Capacity Zone modeled as an export-constrained Capacity Zone, the lesser of:
  - (i) the amount of capacity offered in the Capacity Zone at that price (including the amount of capacity offered from New Import Capacity Resources and Existing Import Capacity Resources for each interface between the New England Control Area and an external Control Area mapped to the export-constrained Capacity Zone up to that interface's approved capacity transfer limit (net of tie benefits)), or;
  - (ii) the amount of capacity determined by the Capacity Zone Demand Curve at zero minus that price, and;
- (4) for each interface between the New England Control Area and an external Control Area mapped to an import-constrained Capacity Zone or the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone, the lesser of:
  - (i) that interface's approved capacity transfer limit (net of tie benefits), or;
  - (ii) the amount of capacity offered from New Import Capacity Resources and Existing Import Capacity Resources.

In computing the Total System Capacity, capacity associated with any New Capacity Offer at any price greater than the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price will not be included in the tally of total capacity at the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price for that Capacity Zone. On the basis of these aggregate supply curves, the auctioneer shall determine the outcome of the round for each modeled Capacity Zone as follows:

(a) **Import-Constrained Capacity Zones.**

For a Capacity Zone modeled as an import-constrained Capacity Zone, if either of the following two conditions is met during the round:

- (1) the aggregate supply curve for the import-constrained Capacity Zone, adjusted as necessary in accordance with Section III.13.2.6 (Capacity Rationing Rule), equals or is less than the quantity determined by the Capacity Zone Demand Curve at the difference between the End-of-Round Price and the price specified by the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve (at a quantity no less than Total System Capacity at the Start-of-Round Price), or;
- (2) the Forward Capacity Auction is concluded for the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone;

then the Forward Capacity Auction for that Capacity Zone is concluded and such Capacity Zone will not be included in further rounds of the Forward Capacity Auction.

The Capacity Clearing Price for that Capacity Zone shall be set at the greater of: (1) the sum of the price specified by the Capacity Zone Demand Curve at the amount of capacity equal to the total amount that is awarded a Capacity Supply Obligation in the import-constrained Capacity Zone, and the Capacity Clearing Price for the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone, or; (2) the highest price of any offer or bid for a resource in the Capacity Zone that is awarded a Capacity Supply Obligation, subject to the other provisions of this Section III.13.2.

If neither of the two conditions above are met in the round, then that Capacity Zone will be included in the next round of the Forward Capacity Auction.

(b) **Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone.**

If the Total System Capacity at the End-of-Round Price, adjusted as necessary in accordance with Section III.13.2.6 (Capacity Rationing Rule), and adjusted to include the additional supply in the import-constrained Capacity Zone that may be cleared at a higher price, equals or is less than the amount of capacity determined by the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve, then the Forward Capacity Auction

for the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone is concluded and the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone will not be included in further rounds of the Forward Capacity Auction.

The Capacity Clearing Price for the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone shall be set at the highest price at which the Total System Capacity is less than or equal to the amount of capacity determined by the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve, subject to the other provisions of this Section III.13.2.

If the Forward Capacity Auction for the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone is not concluded then the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone will be included in the next round of the Forward Capacity Auction, and the auctioneer shall publish the Total System Capacity at the End-of-Round Price, adjusted to include the additional supply in the import-constrained Capacity Zone that may be cleared at a higher price, less the amount of capacity determined by the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve at the End-of-Round Price.

(c) **Export-Constrained Capacity Zones.**

For a Capacity Zone modeled as an export-constrained Capacity Zone, if all of the following conditions are met during the round:

- (1) the aggregate supply curve for the export-constrained Capacity Zone, adjusted as necessary in accordance with Section III.13.2.6 (Capacity Rationing Rule), is equal to or less than the maximum amount of capacity determined by the Capacity Zone Demand Curve at a price of zero;
- (2) in the case of a nested Capacity Zone, the Forward Capacity Auction is concluded for the Capacity Zone within which the nested Capacity Zone is located, and;
- (3) the Forward Capacity Auction is concluded for the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone;

then the Forward Capacity Auction for that Capacity Zone is concluded and such Capacity Zone will not be included in further rounds of the Forward Capacity Auction.

The Capacity Clearing Price for an export-constrained Capacity Zone that is not a nested export-constrained Capacity Zone shall be set at the greater of:

- (1) the sum of:
    - (i) the price specified by the Capacity Zone Demand Curve at the amount of capacity equal to the total amount that is awarded a Capacity Supply Obligation in that Capacity Zone; and
    - (ii) the Capacity Clearing Price for the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone.
- or;

- (2) the highest price of any offer or bid for a resource in the Capacity Zone that is awarded a Capacity Supply Obligation, and subject to the other provisions of this Section III.13.2.

The Capacity Clearing Price for a nested export-constrained Capacity Zone shall be set at the greater of:

- (1) the sum of:
  - (i) the price specified by the Capacity Zone Demand Curve at the amount of capacity equal to the total amount that is awarded a Capacity Supply Obligation in that Capacity Zone; and
  - (ii) the Capacity Clearing Price for the Capacity Zone in which the nested Capacity Zone is located,
- or;
- (2) the highest price of any offer or bid for a resource in the Capacity Zone that is awarded a Capacity Supply Obligation, subject to the other provisions of this Section III.13.2.

If all of the conditions above are not satisfied in the round, then the auctioneer shall publish the quantity of excess supply in the export-constrained Capacity Zone at the End-of-Round Price (the amount of capacity offered at the End-of-Round Price in the export-constrained Capacity Zone minus the maximum amount of capacity determined by the Capacity Zone Demand Curve at a price of zero) and that Capacity Zone will be included in the next round of the Forward Capacity Auction.

(d) **Treatment of Import Capacity.** Where the amount of capacity offered from New Import Capacity Resources and Existing Import Capacity Resources over an interface between the New England Control Area and an external Control Area is less than or equal to that interface's approved capacity transfer limit (net of tie benefits, or net of HQICC in the case of the Phase I/II HVDC-TF), then the capacity offers from those resources shall be treated as capacity offers in the modeled Capacity Zone associated with that interface. Where the amount of capacity offered from New Import Capacity Resources and Existing Import Capacity Resources over an interface between the New England Control Area and an external Control Area is greater than that interface's approved capacity transfer limit (net of tie benefits, or net of HQICC in the case of the Phase I/II HVDC-TF), then the following provisions shall apply (separately for each such interface):

- (i) For purposes of determining which capacity offers from the New Import Capacity Resources and Existing Import Capacity Resources over the interface shall clear and at what price, the offers over the interface shall be treated in the descending-clock auction as if they comprised a separately-modeled export-constrained capacity zone, with an aggregate supply



curve consisting of the offers from the New Import Capacity Resources and Existing Import Capacity Resources over the interface.

(ii) The amount of capacity offered over the interface that will be included in the aggregate supply curve of the modeled Capacity Zone associated with the interface shall be the lesser of the following two quantities: the amount of capacity offered from New Import Capacity Resources and Existing Import Capacity Resources over the interface; and the interface's approved capacity transfer limit (net of tie benefits, or net of HQICC in the case of the Phase I/II HVDC-TF).

(iii) The Forward Capacity Auction for New Import Capacity Resources and Existing Import Capacity Resources over the interface is concluded when the following two conditions are both satisfied: the amount of capacity offered from New Import Capacity Resource and Existing Import Capacity Resources over the interface is less than or equal to the interface's approved capacity transfer limit (net of tie benefits, or net of HQICC in the case of the Phase I/II HVDC-TF); and the Forward Capacity Auction is concluded in the modeled Capacity Zone associated with the interface.

(e) **Treatment of Export Capacity.** Any Export Bid or any Administrative Export De-List Bid that is used to export capacity through an export interface connected to an import-constrained Capacity Zone from another Capacity Zone, or through an export interface connected to the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone from an export-constrained Capacity Zone in the Forward Capacity Auction will be modeled in the Capacity Zone where the export interface that is identified in the Existing Capacity Qualification Package is located. The Export Bid or Administrative Export De-List Bid clears in the Capacity Zone where the Export Bid or Administrative Export De-List Bid is modeled.

(i) Then the MW quantity equal to the relevant Export Bid or Administrative Export De-List Bid from the resource associated with the Export Bid or Administrative Export De-List Bid will be de-listed in the Capacity Zone where the resource is located. If the export interface is connected to an import-constrained Capacity Zone, the MW quantity procured will be in addition to the amount of capacity determined by the Capacity Zone Demand Curve for the import-constrained Capacity Zone.

- (ii) If the Export Bid or Administrative Export De-List Bid does not clear, then the resource associated with the Export Bid or Administrative Export De-List Bid will not be de-listed in the Capacity Zone where the resource is located.

#### **III.13.2.3.4. Determination of Final Capacity Zones.**

(a) For all Forward Capacity Auctions up to and including the sixth Forward Capacity Auction (for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning June 1, 2015), after the Forward Capacity Auction is concluded for all modeled Capacity Zones, the final set of distinct Capacity Zones that will be used for all purposes associated with the relevant Capacity Commitment Period, including for the purposes of reconfiguration auctions and Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals, shall be those having distinct Capacity Clearing Prices as a result of constraints between modeled Capacity Zones binding in the running of the Forward Capacity Auction. Where a modeled constraint does not bind in the Forward Capacity Auction, and as a result adjacent modeled Capacity Zones clear at the same Capacity Clearing Price, those modeled Capacity Zones shall be a single Capacity Zone used for all purposes of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period, including for the purposes of reconfiguration auctions and Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals.

(b) For all Forward Capacity Auctions beginning with the seventh Forward Capacity Auction (for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning June 1, 2016) the final set of distinct Capacity Zones that will be used for all purposes associated with the relevant Capacity Commitment Period, including for the purposes of reconfiguration auctions and Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals, shall be those described in Section III.12.4.

#### **III.13.2.4. ~~Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price and the Cost of New Entry.~~**

##### **III.13.2.4.1 Calculation of Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price, CONE, and Net CONE.**

The Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price is max [1.6 multiplied by Net CONE, CONE]. References in this Section III.13 to the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price shall mean the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price for the Forward Capacity Auction associated with the relevant Capacity Commitment Period.

CONE for the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2025 is \$12.400/kW-month.

Net CONE for the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2025 is \$7.468/kW-month.

CONE and Net CONE shall be recalculated no less often than once every three years. Whenever these values are recalculated, the ISO will review the results of the recalculation with stakeholders and the new values will be filed with the Commission prior to the Forward Capacity Auction in which the new value is to apply.

#### **III.13.2.4.2 Interim Year Adjustments to CONE and Net CONE.**

~~Between recalculations, CONE and Net CONE will be adjusted for each Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to Section III.A.21.1.2(e) (except that the bonus tax depreciation adjustment described in Section III.A.21.1.2(e)(5) shall not apply).~~

~~(a) For years in which no full recalculation is performed pursuant to Section III.13.2.4.1, CONE and Net CONE will be adjusted for each Forward Capacity Auction with the following updates to the capital budgeting model used to calculate the CONE and Net CONE values set forth above in this Section III.13.2.4. Prior to applying the annual adjustment for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2019, Net CONE will be reduced by \$0.43/kW-month to reflect the elimination of the PER adjustment. The adjusted CONE and Net CONE values will be published on the ISO's web site.~~

~~(1) Each line item associated with capital costs that is included in the capital budgeting model will be updated to reflect changes in the Bureau of Labor Statistics Producer Price Index for Machinery and Equipment: General Purpose Machinery and Equipment (WPU114).~~

~~(2) For each line item in (1) above, the ISO shall calculate a multiplier that is equal to the average of values published during the most recent 12 month period available at the time of making the adjustment divided by the average of the most recent 12 month period available at the time of establishing the CONE and Net CONE values set forth in Section III.13.2.4.1. The value of each line item associated with capital costs in the capital budgeting model will be adjusted by the relevant multiplier.~~

~~(3) The energy and ancillary services offset values in the capital budgeting model shall be adjusted by inputting to the capital budgeting model the Henry Hub natural gas futures prices, the~~

Algonquin Citygates Basis natural gas futures prices and the Massachusetts Hub Day-Ahead Peak electricity prices, as published by ICE for the first five trading days in February, for each month of the Capacity Commitment Period to which the updated value will apply.

(4) The CONE and Net CONE values adjusted pursuant to this Section III.13.2.4.2 will be published on the ISO's web site.

(5) If any of the values required for the calculations described in this Section III.13.2.4.2 are unavailable, then comparable values, prices or sources shall be used.

(b) Prior to applying the annual adjustment described in this Section III.13.2.4.2 for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2026, CONE will be increased by \$1.391/kW-month and Net CONE will be increased by \$1.197/kW-month to reflect the elimination of the Offer Review Trigger Price mechanism applicable to New Capacity Resources in the Forward Capacity Market.

### **III.13.2.5. Treatment of Specific Offer and Bid Types in the Forward Capacity Auction.**

#### **III.13.2.5.1. Offers from New Generating Capacity Resources, New Import Capacity Resources, and New Demand Capacity Resources.**

A New Capacity Offer (other than one from a Conditional Qualified New Resource) clears (receives a Capacity Supply Obligation for the associated Capacity Commitment Period) in the Forward Capacity Auction if the Capacity Clearing Price is greater than or equal to the price specified in the offer, except possibly as a result of the Capacity Rationing Rule described in Section III.13.2.6. An offer from a Conditional Qualified New Resource clears (receives a Capacity Supply Obligation for the associated Capacity Commitment Period) in the Forward Capacity Auction, except possibly as a result of the Capacity Rationing Rule described in Section III.13.2.6, if all of the following conditions are met: (i) the Capacity Clearing Price is greater than or equal to the price specified in the offer; (ii) capacity from that resource is considered in the determination of clearing as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(f); and (iii) such offer minimizes the costs for the associated Capacity Commitment Period, subject to Section III.13.2.7.7(c).

The amount of capacity that receives a Capacity Supply Obligation through the Forward Capacity Auction shall not exceed the quantity of capacity offered from the New Generating Capacity Resource, New Import Capacity Resource, or New Demand Capacity Resource at the Capacity Clearing Price.

**III.13.2.5.2. Bids and Offers from Existing Generating Capacity Resources, Existing Import Capacity Resources, and Existing Demand Capacity Resources.**

**III.13.2.5.2.1. Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids.**

(a) Except as provided in Section III.13.2.5.2.5, a Permanent De-List Bid, Retirement De-List Bid or Proxy De-List Bid clears in the Forward Capacity Auction (does not receive a Capacity Supply Obligation) if the Capacity Clearing Price is less than or equal to the price specified in the bid, except possibly as a result of the Capacity Rationing Rule described in Section III.13.2.6.

(b) Unless the capacity has been retained for reliability pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5, if all or part of a resource with a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid does not clear in the Forward Capacity Auction (receives a Capacity Supply Obligation), the Lead Market Participant shall enter the uncleared portion of the bid into the qualification process for the following Forward Capacity Auction as described in Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.

(c) If the Capacity Clearing Price is greater than the price specified in a de-list bid submitted by a Lead Market Participant that elected conditional treatment for the de-list bid pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(b), and there is an associated Proxy De-List Bid that does not clear (receives a Capacity Supply Obligation), the resource will receive a Capacity Supply Obligation at the Capacity Clearing Price.

(d) The process by which the primary auction is cleared (but not the compilation of offers and bids pursuant to Sections III.13.2.3.1 and III.13.2.3.2) will be repeated after the substitution auction is completed if one of the following conditions is met: (1) if any Proxy De-List Bid entered as a result of a Lead Market Participant electing to retire pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(a) does not clear (receives a Capacity Supply Obligation) in the first run of the primary auction-clearing process and retains some portion of its Capacity Supply Obligation in the substitution auction; or (2) if any Proxy De-List Bid entered as a result of a Lead Market Participant electing conditional treatment pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(b) does not clear (receives a Capacity Supply Obligation) in the first run of the primary auction-clearing process, the de-list bid submitted by the Lead Market Participant is at or above the

Capacity Clearing Price, and the Proxy De-List Bid retains some portion of its Capacity Supply Obligation in the substitution auction. The second run of the primary auction-clearing process: (i) excludes all Proxy De-List Bids, (ii) includes the offers and bids of resources compiled pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.2 that did not receive a Capacity Supply Obligation in the first run of the primary auction-clearing process, excluding the offers, or portion thereof, associated with resources that acquired a Capacity Supply Obligation in the substitution auction, and (iii) includes the capacity of resources, or portion thereof, that retain a Capacity Supply Obligation after the first run of the primary auction-clearing process and the substitution auction. The second run of the primary auction-clearing process shall not affect the Capacity Clearing Price of the Forward Capacity Auction (which is established by the first run of the primary auction-clearing process).

(e) Resources (other than those still subject to a multi-year Capacity Commitment Period election as described in Sections III.13.1.1.2.2.4 and III.13.1.4.1.1.2.7) that receive a Capacity Supply Obligation as a result of the first run of the primary auction-clearing process shall be paid the Capacity Clearing Price during the associated Capacity Commitment Period. Where the second run of the primary auction-clearing process procures additional capacity, the resulting price, paid during the associated Capacity Commitment Period (and subsequent Capacity Commitment Periods, as elected pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.2.4 or Section III.13.1.4.1.1.2.7) to the additionally procured capacity, shall be equal to or greater than the adjusted price resulting from the first run of the primary auction-clearing process for that Capacity Zone.

#### **III.13.2.5.2.2. Static De-List Bids and Export Bids.**

Except as provided in Section III.13.2.5.2.5, a Static De-List Bid or an Export Bid clears in the Forward Capacity Auction (does not receive a Capacity Supply Obligation for the associated Capacity Commitment Period) if the Capacity Clearing Price is less than or equal to the price specified in the bid, except possibly as a result of the Capacity Rationing Rule described in Section III.13.2.6.

#### **III.13.2.5.2.3. Dynamic De-List Bids.**

A Dynamic De-List Bid clears in the Forward Capacity Auction (does not receive a Capacity Supply Obligation for the associated Capacity Commitment Period) if the Capacity Clearing Price is less than or equal to the price specified in the bid, except possibly as a result of the Capacity Rationing Rule described in Section III.13.2.6. If more Dynamic De-List Bids are submitted at a price than are needed to clear the market, such Dynamic De-List Bids shall be cleared pro-rata, but in no case less than a resource's Rationing Minimum Limit.

#### **III.13.2.5.2.4. Administrative Export De-List Bids.**

An Administrative Export De-List Bid clears in the Forward Capacity Auction (does not receive a Capacity Supply Obligation for the associated Capacity Commitment Period) regardless of the Capacity Clearing Price.

#### **III.13.2.5.2.5. Reliability Review.**

The ISO shall review each Retirement De-List Bid, Permanent De-List Bid, Static De-List Bid, Export Bid, Administrative Export De-List Bid, Dynamic De-List Bid, and substitution auction demand bid to determine whether the capacity associated with that bid is needed for reliability reasons during the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction; Proxy De-List Bids shall not be reviewed.

(a) The reliability review of de-list bids will be conducted in descending price order using the price as finalized during qualification or as otherwise directed by the Commission. De-list bids with the same price will be reviewed in the order that produces the least negative impact to reliability; where bids are the same price and provide the same impact to reliability, they will be reviewed based on their submission time. If de-list bids with the same price are from a single generating station, they will be reviewed in an order that seeks to provide (1) the least-cost solution under Section III.13.2.5.2.5.1(d) and (2) the minimum aggregate quantity required for reliability from the generating station. The reliability review of substitution auction demand bids that would otherwise clear will be conducted in order beginning with the resource whose cleared bids contribute the greatest amount to social surplus. The capacity associated with a bid shall be deemed needed for reliability reasons if the absence of the capacity would result in the violation of any NERC or NPCC criteria, or ISO New England System Rules. Bids shall only be rejected pursuant to this Section III.13.2.5.2.5 for the sole purpose of addressing a local reliability issue, and shall not be rejected solely on the basis that acceptance of the bid may result in the procurement of less capacity than the Installed Capacity Requirement (net of HQICCs) or the Local Sourcing Requirement for a Capacity Zone.

(b) If a Retirement De-List Bid, Permanent De-List Bid, Static De-List Bid, Export Bid, Administrative Export De-List Bid, or Dynamic De-List Bid would otherwise clear in the Forward Capacity Auction, but the ISO has determined that some or all of the capacity associated with the de-list bid is needed for reliability reasons, then the de-list bid having capacity needed for reliability will not clear in the Forward Capacity Auction. If the ISO has determined that some or all of the capacity

associated with a substitution auction demand bid that would otherwise clear is needed for reliability reasons, then the entire demand bid will not be further included in the substitution auction.

(c) The Lead Market Participant shall be notified that its bid did not clear for reliability reasons at the later of: (i) immediately after the end of the Forward Capacity Auction round in which the auction price reaches the price of the de-list bid; or (ii) as soon as practicable after the time at which the ISO has determined that the bid must be rejected for reliability reasons. In no event, however, shall a Lead Market Participant be notified that a bid submitted pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.5 and accepted in the qualification process for an Existing Generating Capacity Resource did not clear for reliability reasons if the associated New Generating Capacity Resource remains in the Forward Capacity Auction. In such a case, the Lead Market Participant shall be notified that its bid did not clear for reliability reasons at the later of: (i) immediately after the end of the Forward Capacity Auction round in which the auction price reaches the price of the bid; (ii) immediately after the end of the Forward Capacity Auction round in which the associated New Generating Capacity Resource is fully withdrawn (that is, the Forward Capacity Auction reaches a price at which the resource's New Capacity Offer is zero capacity); or (iii) as soon as practicable after the time at which the ISO has determined that the bid must be rejected for reliability reasons.

(d) A resource that has a de-list bid rejected for reliability reasons shall be compensated pursuant to the terms set out in Section III.13.2.5.2.5.1 and shall have a Capacity Supply Obligation as described in Section III.13.6.1.

(e) The ISO shall review the results of each annual reconfiguration auction and determine whether the reliability need which caused the ISO to reject the de-list bid has been met through the annual reconfiguration auction. The ISO may also attempt to address the reliability concern through other reasonable means (including transmission enhancements).

(f) If the reliability need that caused the ISO to reject a de-list bid is met through a reconfiguration auction or other means, the resource shall retain its Capacity Supply Obligation through the end of the Capacity Commitment Period for which it was retained for reliability (provided that resources that have Permanent De-List Bids or Retirement De-List Bids rejected for reliability shall be permanently de-listed or retired as of the first day of the subsequent Capacity Commitment Period (or earlier if the resource sheds the entirety of the Capacity Supply Obligation as described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3(a)(ii) or Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3(b)(ii))).



(g) If a Permanent De-List Bid or a Retirement De-List Bid is rejected for reliability reasons, and the reliability need is not met through a reconfiguration auction or other means, that resource, or portion thereof, as applicable, is no longer eligible to participate as an Existing Capacity Resource in any reconfiguration auction, Forward Capacity Auction or Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral for that and subsequent Capacity Commitment Periods. If the resource, or portion thereof, continues to be needed for reliability reasons, it shall be counted as capacity in the Forward Capacity Auction and shall be compensated as described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5.1.

(h) The ISO shall review with the Reliability Committee (i) the status of any prior rejected de-list bids reported to the Commission in an FCA results filing pursuant to Section 13.8.2, and (ii) the status of any Retirement De-List Bid or Permanent De-List Bid that has been rejected for reliability reasons and has elected to continue to operate, prior to the New Capacity Qualification Deadline in accordance with Section 4.1(c) of Attachment K of the ISO OATT.

If an identified reliability need results in the rejection of a Retirement De-List Bid, Permanent De-List Bid, Export Bid, Administrative Export De-List Bid, Static De-List Bid, or Dynamic De-List Bid while executing an FCA, the ISO shall (i) review each specific reliability need with the Reliability Committee in accordance with the timing provided for in the ISO New England Operating Documents and, (ii) update the current system Needs Assessments pursuant to Section 4.1(c) of Attachment K of the ISO OATT. This review and update will follow ISO's filing of the FCA results with the Commission pursuant to Section 13.8.2.

#### **III.13.2.5.2.5A Fuel Security Reliability Review**

(a) This Section III.13.2.5.2.5A will remain in effect for the 2022/23, 2023/24 and 2024/25 Capacity Commitment Period, after which this Section III.13.2.5.2.5A will sunset.

(b) This Section III.13.2.5.2.5A will apply to (i) Retirement De-List Bids, (ii) substitution auction demand bids, and (iii) bilateral transactions and reconfiguration auctions demand bids submitted by an Existing Generating Capacity Resource that has been identified as being needed for fuel security during a Forward Capacity Auction. Terms set out in this Section III.13.2.5.2.5A will apply only for the period and resources described within this Section III.13.2.5.2.5A. Where the terms and conditions in this Section

III.13.2.5.2.5A differ from terms otherwise set out in Section III.13, the terms of this Section III.13.2.5.2.5A will control for the period and circumstances described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5A.

(c) A fuel security reliability review for the Forward Capacity Market will be performed pursuant to Appendix L to Section III of the Tariff, and in accordance with the inputs and methodology set out to establish the fuel security reliability standard in Appendix I of Planning Procedure No. 10.

(d) For fuel security reliability reviews performed for the primary Forward Capacity Auction, the fuel security reliability review will be performed after the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline and conducted in descending price order using the price as submitted in the Retirement De-List Bids. Bids with the same price will be reviewed in the order that produces the least negative impact to reliability. Where multiple bids have the same price and the retirement of the Existing Generating Capacity Resources would have the same impact to reliability, they will be reviewed based on their submission time. If bids with the same price are from a single generating station, they will be reviewed in an order that seeks to provide (1) the least-cost solution under Section III.13.2.5.2.5.1(d), and (2) the minimum aggregate quantity required for reliability from the generating station. An Existing Generating Capacity Resource may be needed for both fuel security and for transmission security pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5. The fuel security reliability review will be performed in advance of the reliability review for transmission security. Where an Existing Generating Capacity Resource is needed for both fuel security reasons pursuant to this Section III.13.2.5.2.5A, and transmission security reliability reasons pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5, the generator will be retained for fuel security for purposes of cost allocation.

(e) If an Existing Generating Capacity Resource is identified as being needed for fuel security reasons, and the reliability need is not met through a reconfiguration auction or other means, that resource, or portion thereof, as applicable may not participate in Annual Reconfiguration Auctions for the Capacity Commitment Period(s) for which it is needed for fuel security, or earlier 2022/23, 2023/24 and 2024/25 Capacity Commitment Periods. Such an Existing Generating Capacity Resource that is identified as being needed for fuel security may participate in monthly bilateral transactions and monthly reconfiguration auctions, but may not submit monthly bilateral transactions for December, January or February, or demand bids for the December, January, or February monthly reconfiguration auctions for any period for which they have been identified as being needed for fuel security.

(f) Participants that have submitted a Retirement De-List Bid will be notified by ISO New England if their resource is needed for fuel security reliability reasons no later than 90 days after the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline. Participants that have submitted a substitution auction demand bid, and where the demand bid has been rejected for reliability reasons, will be notified after the relevant Forward Capacity Auction has been completed.

(g) Where a Retirement De-List Bid would otherwise clear in the Forward Capacity Auction, but the ISO has determined that some or all of the capacity associated with the de-list bid is needed for fuel security reliability reasons, the provisions of III.13.2.5.2.5(b) shall apply.

(h) Existing Generating Capacity Resources that have had their Retirement De-list Bid rejected for fuel security reliability reasons and that do not elect to unconditionally or conditionally retire shall be eligible for compensation pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5.1, except that the difference between payments based on resource de-list bids or cost-of-service compensation as detailed in Section III.13.2.5.2.5.1 and payments based on the Capacity Clearing Price for the Forward Capacity Market under this Section III.13.2.5.2.5.1 shall be allocated on a regional basis to Real Time Load Obligation, excluding Real-Time Load Obligation associated with Dispatchable Asset Related Demand Resources (DARD Pumps and other electric storage based DARDs) and Real-Time Load Obligation associated with Coordinated External Transactions, allocated and collected over a 12 month period. Resources that that are identified as needed for fuel security reliability reasons will have their capacity entered into the Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to III.13.2.5.2.5(g) and III.13.2.3.2(b).

(i) Where an Existing Generating Capacity Resource elects a cost-of-service agreement pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5.1 to address a fuel security reliability need, the term of such a cost-of-service agreement may not exceed two years, including renewal through evergreen provisions. A cost-of-service agreement entered into for the 2024/2025 Capacity Commitment Period shall be limited to a total duration of one year.

(j) The ISO shall perform an annual reevaluation of any Existing Generating Capacity Resources retained for reliability under this provision. If a resource associated with a Retirement De-List Bid that was rejected for reliability reasons pursuant to this section, is found to no longer be needed for fuel security, and is not needed for another reliability reason pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5, the resource will be retired from the system as described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3(a)(1). In no case will a resource retained for fuel security be retained for fuel security beyond June 1, 2025.

(k) The ISO will review Retirement De-List Bids rejected for fuel security reliability reasons with the Reliability Committee in the same manner as described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5(h).

**III.13.2.5.2.5.1. Compensation for Bids Rejected for Reliability Reasons.**

(a) In cases where a Static De-List Bid, Export Bid, Administrative Export De-List Bid, Dynamic De-List Bid, partial Permanent De-List Bid, or partial Retirement De-List Bid has been rejected for reliability reasons pursuant to Sections III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1 or III.13.2.5.2.5, the resource will be paid by the ISO in the same manner as all other capacity resources, except that payment shall be made on the basis of its de-list bid as accepted for the Forward Capacity Auction for the relevant Capacity Commitment Period instead of the Forward Capacity Market Clearing Price. Under this Section, accepted Dynamic De-List Bids filed with the Commission as part of the FCA results filing are subject to review and approval by the Commission pursuant to the “just and reasonable” standard of Section 205 of the Federal Power Act. If a resource with a partial Permanent De-List Bid or partial Retirement De-List Bid continues to be needed for reliability in Capacity Commitment Periods following the Capacity Commitment Period for which the partial Permanent De-List Bid or partial Retirement De-List Bid was rejected, payment will continue to be pursuant to this Section III.13.2.5.2.5.1(a).

(b) In cases where a Permanent De-List Bid or a Retirement De-List Bid for the capacity of an entire resource has been rejected for reliability reasons pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1 or III.13.2.5.2.5, the resource will be paid either (i) in the same manner as all other capacity resources, except that payment shall be made on the basis of its Commission-approved Permanent De-List Bid or Commission-approved Retirement De-List Bid for the relevant Capacity Commitment Period instead of the Forward Capacity Market Clearing Price or (ii) under the terms of a cost-of-service agreement pursuant to Section III, Appendix I. Resources must notify the ISO of their election within six months after the ISO files the results of the relevant Forward Capacity Auction with the Commission. A resource that has had a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid rejected for reliability reasons and does not notify the ISO of its election as described in this paragraph will be paid on the basis of the resource’s Commission-approved Permanent De-List Bid or Commission-approved Retirement De-List Bid. Cost-of-service agreements must be filed with and approved by the Commission, and cost-of-service compensation may not commence until the Commission has approved the use of cost-of-service rates for the unit in question or has accepted the use of the cost-of-service rates subject to refund while the rate is reviewed. In no event will payment under the cost-of-service agreement start prior to the start of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period for which the Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid was submitted. If a

resource continues to be needed for reliability in Capacity Commitment Periods following the Capacity Commitment Period for which the Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid was rejected, payment will continue to be pursuant to this Section III.13.2.5.2.5.1(b). Resources that elect payment based on the Commission-approved Permanent De-List Bid or Commission-approved Retirement De-List Bid may file with the Commission pursuant to Section 205 of the Federal Power Act to update its Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid if the unit is retained for reliability for a period longer than the Capacity Commitment Period for which the Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid was originally submitted.

(c) The difference between payments based on resource de-list bids or cost-of-service compensation as detailed in this Section III.13.2.5.2.5.1 and payments based on the market clearing price for the Forward Capacity Market under this Section III.13.2.5.2.5.1 shall be allocated to Regional Network Load within the affected Reliability Region.

(d) **Compensation for Existing Generating Capacity Resources at Stations with Common Costs that are Retained for Reliability.** If a Static De-List Bid, Permanent De-List Bid, or Retirement De-List Bid from an Existing Generating Capacity Resource that is associated with a Station having Common Costs is rejected for reliability reasons, the Existing Generating Capacity Resource will be paid as follows: (i) if one or more Existing Generating Capacity Resources at the Station assume a Capacity Supply Obligation through the normal clearing of the Forward Capacity Auction and one or more Existing Generating Capacity Resources are retained for reliability, then the Existing Generating Capacity Resources retained for reliability will be paid the sum of the Asset-Specific Going Forward Costs for the assets comprising that Existing Generating Capacity Resource; or (ii) if no Existing Generating Capacity Resources at the Station assumes a Capacity Supply Obligation through the normal clearing of the Forward Capacity Auction and one or more Existing Generating Capacity Resources are retained for reliability, then each Existing Generating Capacity Resource retained for reliability will be paid the sum of the Asset-Specific Going Forward Costs for the assets associated with that Existing Generating Capacity Resource plus a portion of the Station Going Forward Common Costs (such that the full amount of Station Going Forward Common Costs are allocated to the Existing Generating Capacity Resources retained for reliability).

(e) If ISO-NE is a party to a cost-of-service agreement filed after January 1, 2019 that changes any resource performance-related obligations contained in Section III, Appendix I (provided that those obligations are different than the obligations of an Existing Generating Capacity Resource with a

Capacity Supply Obligation), no later than 30 days after such agreement is filed with the Commission, ISO-NE shall provide to stakeholders quantitative and qualitative information on the need for, and the impacts of, the proposed changes.

**III.13.2.5.2.5.2. Incremental Cost of Reliability Service From Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid Resources.**

In cases where an Existing Generating Capacity Resource or Existing Demand Capacity Resource has had a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid for the entire resource rejected for reliability reasons pursuant to Sections III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1 or III.13.2.5.2.5, does not elect to retire pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1(d), and must make a capital improvement to the unit to remain in operation in order to continue to operate to meet the reliability need identified by the ISO, the resource may make application to the Commission pursuant to Section 205 of the Federal Power Act to receive just and reasonable compensation of the capital investment pursuant to the following:

- (a) **Notice to State Utility Commissions, the ISO and Stakeholder Committees of Expectation that a Capital Expense will be Necessary to Meet the Reliability Need Identified by the ISO:** A resource seeking to avail itself of the recovery mechanism provided in this Section must notify the state utility commissions in the states where rate payers will fund the capital improvement, the ISO, and the Participants Committee of its intent to make the capital expenditure and the need for the expenditure. This notification must be made at least 120 days prior to the resource making the capital expenditure.
- (b) **Required Showing Made to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission:** In order to receive just and reasonable compensation for a capital expenditure under this Section, a resource must file an explanation of need with the Commission that explains why the capital expenditure is necessary in order to meet the reliability need identified by the ISO. This showing must demonstrate that the expenditure is reasonably determined to be the least-cost commercially reasonable option consistent with Good Utility Practice to meet the reliability need identified by the ISO. If the resource elects cost-of-service treatment pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5.1(b), the Incremental Cost of Reliability Service filing described in this Section must be made separately from and may be made in advance of the resource's cost-of-service filing.
- (c) **Allocation:** Costs of capital expenditures approved by the Commission under this provision shall be allocated to Regional Network Load within the affected Reliability Region.

**III.13.2.5.2.5.3. Retirement and Permanent De-Listing of Resources.**

(a)(i) A resource, or portion thereof, will be retired coincident with the commencement of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period, or earlier as described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3(a)(ii), if the resource: (1) submitted a Retirement De-List Bid at or above the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price and was not retained for reliability pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1; (2) submitted a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid, elected to retire pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(a), and was not retained for reliability pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1; (3) elected conditional treatment pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(b) for a Retirement De-List Bid with a submitted price at or above the Capacity Clearing Price and was not retained for reliability pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1; or (4) had a Commission-approved Retirement De-List Bid clear in the Forward Capacity Auction. In the case of a Retirement De-List Bid rejected for reliability, if the reliability need that resulted in the rejection for reliability is met, the resource, or portion thereof, will be retired coincident with the end of Capacity Supply Obligation (or earlier as described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3(a)(ii)) unless the Commission directs that the obligation to retire be removed or the retirement date extended as part of an Incremental Cost of Reliability Service filing made pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5.2. The interconnection rights, or relevant portion thereof, for the resource will terminate and the status of the resource, or portion thereof, will be converted to retired on the date of retirement, consistent with the provisions of Schedules 22 and 23 of the OATT.

(a)(ii) A resource, or portion thereof, that is to be retired pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3(a)(i) may retire the resource, or portion thereof, earlier than the Capacity Commitment Period for which its Retirement De-List Bid was submitted if it is able to transfer the relevant Capacity Supply Obligation of the resource to another resource through one or more approved Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral transactions as described in Section III.13.5.1 or reconfiguration auctions as described in Section III.13.4.1. A resource, or portion thereof, electing to retire pursuant to this provision must notify the ISO in writing of its election to retire and the date of retirement. The interconnection rights, or relevant portion thereof, for the resource will terminate and the status of the resource, or portion thereof, will be converted to retired on the date of retirement, consistent with the provisions of Schedules 22 and 23 of the OATT.

(b)(i) A resource, or portion thereof, will be permanently de-listed from the Forward Capacity Market as of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period, or earlier as described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3(b)(ii), if the resource: (1) submitted an Internal Market Monitor-approved Permanent De-List Bid at or above the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price and was not retained for reliability pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1; (2) elected conditional treatment pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(b) for a Permanent De-List Bid with a submitted price at or above the Capacity Clearing Price and was not retained for

reliability pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1; or (3) had a Commission-approved Permanent De-List Bid clear in the Forward Capacity Auction. The CNR Capability interconnection rights, or relevant portion thereof, for the resource will be adjusted downward to reflect the Permanent De-List Bid, consistent with the provisions of Schedules 22 and 23 of the OATT. A resource that permanently de-lists pursuant to this Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3(b)(i) is precluded from subsequent participation in the Forward Capacity Market unless it qualifies as a New Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.1.2.

(b)(ii) A resource, or portion thereof, that is to be permanently de-listed pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3(b)(i) may be permanently de-listed earlier than the Capacity Commitment Period for which its Permanent De-List Bid was submitted if it is able to transfer the entire Capacity Supply Obligation of the resource to another resource through one or more approved Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral transactions as described in Section III.13.5.1 or reconfiguration auctions as described in Section III.13.4.

(c) A resource that has never been counted as a capacity resource may retire the asset by notifying the ISO in writing of its election to retire and the date of retirement. The date specified for retirement is subject to the limit for resource inactivity set out in Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3(d). The interconnection rights for the resource will terminate and the status of the resource will be converted to retired on the date of retirement.

(d) A resource that does not operate commercially for a period of three calendar years will be deemed by the ISO to be retired. The interconnection rights for the unit will terminate and the status of the unit will be converted to retired on the date of retirement. Where a generator has submitted an application to repower under Schedule 22 or 23 of the OATT, the current interconnection space will be maintained beyond the three years unless the application under Schedule 22 or 23 is withdrawn voluntarily or by the operation of those provisions. Where an application is withdrawn under Schedule 22 or 23, the three year period will be calculated from the last day of commercial operation of the resource.

#### **III.13.2.6. Capacity Rationing Rule.**

Except for Dynamic De-List Bids, Export Bids, and offers from New Import Capacity Resources that are subject to rationing pursuant to Section III.13.1.3.5.8 and Existing Import Capacity Resources that are subject to rationing pursuant to Section III.13.1.3.3.A, offers and bids in the Forward Capacity Auction must clear or not clear in whole, unless the offer or bid specifically indicates that it may be rationed. A



resource may elect to be rationed to its Rationing Minimum Limit pursuant to Sections III.13.1.1.2.2.3 and III.13.1.2.1.2. Offers from New Import Capacity Resources and Existing Import Capacity Resources will not be rationed where such rationing would violate any applicable physical minimum flow requirements on the associated interface. Export Bids may elect to be rationed generally, but regardless of such election will always be subject to potential rationing where the associated external interface binds. If more Dynamic De-List Bids are submitted at a price than are needed to clear the market, the bids shall be cleared pro-rata, subject to honoring the Rationing Minimum Limit of the resources. Where an offer or bid may be rationed, such rationing may not result in procuring an amount of capacity that is below the associated resource's Rationing Minimum Limit.

### **III.13.2.7. Determination of Capacity Clearing Prices.**

The Capacity Clearing Price in each Capacity Zone shall be the price established by the descending clock auction as described in Section III.13.2.3, subject to the other provisions of this Section III.13.2.7. The Capacity Clearing Price for the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone and the Capacity Clearing Price for each import-constrained Capacity Zone shall not exceed the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price. The Capacity Clearing Price for an export-constrained Capacity Zone shall not be less than zero.

#### **III.13.2.7.1. Import-Constrained Capacity Zone Capacity Clearing Price Floor.**

The Capacity Clearing Price in an import-constrained Capacity Zone shall not be lower than the Capacity Clearing Price in the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone. If after the Forward Capacity Auction is conducted, the Capacity Clearing Price in an import-constrained Capacity Zone is less than the Capacity Clearing Price in the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone, all resources clearing in the import-constrained Capacity Zone shall be paid based on the Capacity Clearing Price in the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone during the associated Capacity Commitment Period.

#### **III.13.2.7.2. Export-Constrained Capacity Zone Capacity Clearing Price Ceiling.**

The Capacity Clearing Price in an export-constrained Capacity Zone shall not be higher than the Capacity Clearing Price in the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone.

The Capacity Clearing Price in a nested Capacity Zone shall not be higher than the Capacity Clearing Price in the Capacity Zone within which it is located.

#### **III.13.2.7.3. [Reserved.]**

#### **III.13.2.7.3A. Treatment of Imports.**

At the Capacity Clearing Price, if the amount of capacity offered from New Import Capacity Resources and Existing Import Capacity Resources over an interface between an external Control Area and the New England Control Area is greater than that interface's approved capacity transfer limit (net of tie benefits, or net of HQICC in the case of the Phase I/II HVDC-TF):

- (a) the full amount of capacity offered at that price from Existing Import Capacity Resources associated with contracts listed in Section III.13.1.3.3.A(c) shall clear, unless that amount of capacity is greater than the interface's approved capacity transfer limit (net of tie benefits, or net of HQICC in the case of the Phase I/II HVDC-TF), in which case the capacity offered at that price from Existing Import Capacity Resources associated with contracts listed in Section III.13.1.3.3.A(c) shall be rationed such that the interface's approved capacity transfer limit (net of tie benefits, or net of HQICC in the case of the Phase I/II HVDC-TF) is not exceeded; and
- (b) if there is space remaining over the interface after the allocation described in subsection (a) above, then the capacity offered at that price from New Import Capacity Resources and Existing Import Capacity Resources other than Existing Import Capacity Resources associated with the contracts listed in Section III.13.1.3.3.A(c) will be rationed such that the interface's approved capacity transfer limit (net of tie benefits, or net of HQICC in the case of the Phase I/II HVDC-TF) is not exceeded. If the capacity offered at that price by any single New Import Capacity Resource or Existing Import Capacity Resource that is not associated with the contracts listed in Section III.13.1.3.3.A(c) is greater than the interface's approved capacity transfer limit (net of tie benefits, or net of HQICC in the case of the Phase I/II HVDC-TF), then the capacity offered by that resource that is above the interface's approved capacity transfer limit (net of tie benefits, or net of HQICC in the case of the Phase I/II HVDC-TF) shall not be included in the rationing.

#### **III.13.2.7.4. Effect of Capacity Rationing Rule on Capacity Clearing Price.**

Where the requirement that offers and bids clear or not clear in whole (Section III.13.2.6) prohibits the descending clock auction in its normal progression from clearing one or more Capacity Zones at the precise amount of capacity determined by the Capacity Zone Demand Curves specified in Section III.13.2.2, then the auctioneer shall analyze the aggregate supply curve to determine cleared capacity offers and Capacity Clearing Prices that seek to maximize social surplus for the associated Capacity

Commitment Period. The clearing algorithm may result in offers below the Capacity Clearing Price not clearing, and in de-list bids below the Capacity Clearing Price clearing.

**III.13.2.7.5. Effect of Decremental Repowerings on the Capacity Clearing Price.**

Where the effect of accounting for certain repowering offers and bids (as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(e)) results in the auction not clearing at the lowest price for the required quantity of capacity, then the auctioneer will conduct additional auction rounds of the Forward Capacity Auction as necessary to minimize capacity costs.

**III.13.2.7.6. Minimum Capacity Award.**

Each offer (excluding offers from Conditional Qualified New Resources that do not satisfy the conditions specified in Sections III.13.2.5.1(i)-(iii)) clearing in the Forward Capacity Auction shall be awarded a Capacity Supply Obligation at least as great as the amount of capacity offered at the End-of-Round Price in the final round of the Forward Capacity Auction. For Intermittent Power Resources, the Capacity Supply Obligation for months in the winter period (as described in Section III.13.1.5) shall be adjusted based on its winter Qualified Capacity as determined pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.2.6 and Section III.13.1.2.2.2.

**III.13.2.7.7. Tie-Breaking Rules.**

Where the provisions in this Section III.13.2 for clearing the Forward Capacity Auction (system-wide or in a single Capacity Zone) result in a tie – that is, where two or more resources offer sufficient capacity at prices that would clear the auction at the same minimum costs – the auctioneer shall apply the following rules (in sequence, as necessary) to determine clearing:

- (a) [Reserved.]
- (b) If multiple projects may be rationed, they will be rationed proportionately.
- (c) Where clearing either the offer associated with a resource with a higher queue priority at a Conditional Qualified New Resource's location or the offer associated with the Conditional Qualified New Resource would result in equal costs, the offer associated with the resource with the higher queue priority shall clear.

(d) The offer associated with the Project Sponsor having the lower market share in the capacity auction (including Existing Generating Capacity Resources, Existing Import Capacity Resources, and Existing Demand Capacity Resources) shall be cleared.

### **III.13.2.8. Capacity Substitution Auctions.**

The final substitution auction shall take place for the Forward Capacity Auction associated with the June 1, 2025 to May 31, 2026 Capacity Commitment Period, and no substitution auctions shall be conducted thereafter. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the provisions of Section III.12 of Market Rule 1 and Attachment K to the OATT addressing the manner in which Capacity Supply Obligations acquired or shed through the substitution auction are accounted for in the calculation of the Installed Capacity Requirement and related values and in carrying out the regional system planning process shall continue to have full force and effect.

#### **III.13.2.8.1. Administration of Substitution Auctions.**

Following the completion of the primary auction-clearing process of the Forward Capacity Auction as provided for in Section III.13.2, the ISO shall conduct a substitution auction, using a static double auction to clear supply offers (offers to assume a Capacity Supply Obligation) and demand bids (bids to shed a Capacity Supply Obligation). Supply offers and demand bids will be modeled in the Capacity Zone where the associated resources are electrically interconnected.

##### **III.13.2.8.1.1. Substitution Auction Clearing and Awards.**

The substitution auction shall maximize total social surplus as specified by the demand bids and supply offers used in the auction. The maximization is constrained as follows:

- (i) By the external interface limits modeled in the primary auction-clearing process.
- (ii) Such that the net cleared Capacity Supply Obligations (total acquired less total shed) in the substitution auction is equal to zero.
- (iii) Such that, for each import-constrained Capacity Zone, if the zone's total Capacity Supply Obligations awarded in the primary auction-clearing process of the Forward Capacity Auction is less than the zone threshold quantity specified below, then the zone's net cleared Capacity Supply Obligations (total acquired less total shed) in the substitution auction is equal to zero; otherwise, the sum of the zone's total Capacity Supply Obligations awarded in the primary auction-clearing process and the zone's net cleared Capacity Supply Obligations

- (total acquired less total shed) in the substitution auction is greater than or equal to the zone threshold quantity specified below.
- (iv) Such that, for each export-constrained Capacity Zone, if the zone's total Capacity Supply Obligations awarded in the primary auction-clearing process of the Forward Capacity Auction is greater than the zone threshold quantity specified below, then the zone's net cleared Capacity Supply Obligations (total acquired less total shed) in the substitution auction is equal to zero; otherwise, the sum of the zone's total Capacity Supply Obligations awarded in the primary auction-clearing process and the zone's net cleared Capacity Supply Obligations (total acquired less total shed) in the substitution auction is less than or equal to the zone threshold quantity specified below.

In applying constraint (iii), the zone threshold quantity for an import-constrained Capacity Zone shall be equal to the sum of its Capacity Zone Demand Curve truncation point quantity specified in Section III.13.2.2.2 and the total quantity of any Export Bids and any Administrative Export De-List Bids for which the exporting resource is located outside the import-constrained Capacity Zone, that are used to export capacity across an external interface connected to the import-constrained Capacity Zone, and that cleared in the primary auction-clearing process of the Forward Capacity Auction.

In applying constraint (iv), the zone threshold quantity for an export-constrained Capacity Zone shall be equal to its Capacity Zone Demand Curve truncation point quantity specified in Section III.13.2.2.3 less the total quantity of any Export Bids and any Administrative Export De-List Bids for which the exporting resource is located in the export-constrained Capacity Zone, including any Export Bids and any Administrative Export De-List Bids in an associated nested export-constrained Capacity Zone, that are used to export capacity across an external interface connected to another Capacity Zone, and that cleared in the primary auction-clearing process of the Forward Capacity Auction.

In applying constraints (iii) and (iv), a zone's total Capacity Supply Obligations awarded in the primary auction-clearing process of the Forward Capacity Auction and net cleared Capacity Supply Obligations (total acquired less total shed) in the substitution auction shall include the Capacity Supply Obligations of Import Capacity Resources at each external interface connected to the Capacity Zone.

In applying constraints (iii) and (iv), a zone's total Capacity Supply Obligations awarded in the primary auction-clearing process of the Forward Capacity Auction shall include the Capacity Supply Obligations awarded to Proxy De-List Bids within the zone, and the zone's net cleared Capacity Supply Obligations

(total acquired less total shed) in the substitution auction shall include the Capacity Supply Obligations shed from demand bids associated with Proxy De-List Bids within the zone.

In cases in which there are multiple clearing outcomes that would each maximize the substitution auction's objective, the following tie-breaking rules will apply in the following sequence: (i) non-rationable demand bids associated with Lead Market Participants having the largest total FCA Qualified Capacity of Existing Capacity Resources will be cleared first; and (ii) rationable supply offers will be cleared in proportion to their offer quantity.

For Intermittent Power Resources, other than those participating as the summer resource in a Composite FCM Transaction, the cleared award for supply offers and demand bids shall be adjusted for the months in the winter period (as described in Section III.13.1.5) using the ratio of the resource's cleared offer or bid amount divided by its FCA Qualified Capacity multiplied by its winter Qualified Capacity as determined pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.2.6 and Section III.13.1.1.2.2.2 after removing any portion of the resource's winter Qualified Capacity that is participating in a Composite FCM Transaction.

The cleared offer amount awarded to a Composite FCM Transaction in the substitution auction will be assigned to the summer and winter resources for their respective obligation months during the Capacity Commitment Period as described in Section III.13.1.5.

If, after the substitution auction, a resource has a Capacity Supply Obligation below its Economic Minimum Limit, it must meet the requirements of Section III.13.6.1.1.1.

#### **III.13.2.8.1.2. Substitution Auction Pricing.**

The substitution auction will specify clearing prices for Capacity Zones and external interfaces as follows.

For each import-constrained Capacity Zone, if the sum of the zone's total Capacity Supply Obligations awarded in the primary auction-clearing process of the Forward Capacity Auction and the zone's net cleared Capacity Supply Obligations (total acquired less total shed) in the substitution auction is greater than its zone threshold quantity specified in Section III.13.2.8.1.1, then supply offers and demand bids in the substitution auction in the import-constrained Capacity Zone shall be treated as offers and bids in the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone for purposes of determining substitution auction clearing prices.

For each export-constrained Capacity Zone,

- (i) if the sum of the zone's total Capacity Supply Obligations, including Capacity Supply Obligations in a nested Capacity Zone, awarded in the primary auction-clearing process of the Forward Capacity Auction and the zone's net cleared Capacity Supply Obligations (total acquired less total shed) in the substitution auction including net cleared Capacity Supply Obligations in the nested Capacity Zone is less than its zone threshold quantity specified in Section III.13.2.8.1.1, then supply offers and demand bids in the substitution auction in the export-constrained Capacity Zone (excluding supply offers and demand bids in the nested Capacity Zone that are not treated as offers and bids in the export-constrained Capacity Zone pursuant to Section III.13.2.8.1.2(ii)) shall be treated as offers and bids in the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone for purposes of determining substitution auction clearing prices.
- (ii) if the sum of a nested Capacity Zone's Capacity Supply Obligations awarded in the primary auction-clearing process of the Forward Capacity Auction and the nested Capacity Zone's net cleared Capacity Supply Obligations (total acquired less total shed) in the substitution auction is less than its zone threshold quantity specified in Section III.13.2.8.1.1, then supply offers and demand bids in the substitution auction in the nested Capacity Zone shall be treated as offers and bids in the export-constrained Capacity Zone within which the nested Capacity Zone is located, for purposes of determining substitution auction clearing prices.

The substitution auction clearing prices for the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone and for any constrained zones pooled with the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone for pricing purposes shall be determined by the price of the demand bid or supply offer that is marginal. If a demand bid associated with a Proxy De-List Bid is marginal, then the substitution auction clearing prices shall be set equal to the Capacity Clearing Prices.

The substitution auction clearing price for a constrained Capacity Zone that is not pooled with the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone for pricing purposes shall be determined by the price of the demand bid or supply offer associated with the separately-priced constrained Capacity Zone that is marginal. If a demand bid associated with a Proxy De-List Bid is marginal, then the substitution auction clearing price shall be set equal to the Capacity Clearing Price for the constrained Capacity Zone.

The substitution auction clearing price for a nested export-constrained Capacity Zone that is not pooled with the export-constrained Capacity Zone in which it is located for pricing purposes shall be determined by the price of the demand bid or supply offer that is marginal in the nested export-constrained Capacity

Zone. If a demand bid associated with a Proxy De-List Bid is marginal, then the substitution auction clearing price for the nested export-constrained Capacity Zone shall be equal to the Capacity Clearing Price for that nested export-constrained Capacity Zone.

If the net quantity of Capacity Supply Obligations awarded in the primary Forward Capacity Auction and substitution auction over an interface between the New England Control Area and an external Control Area is less than that interface's approved capacity transfer limit (net of tie benefits, or net of HQICC in the case of the Phase I/II HVDC-TF), then supply offers and demand bids in the substitution auction at the interface shall be treated as offers and bids in the modeled Capacity Zone associated with that interface for purposes of determining substitution auction clearing prices.

If the net quantity of Capacity Supply Obligations awarded in the primary Forward Capacity Auction and substitution auction over an interface between the New England Control Area and an external Control Area is equal to that interface's approved capacity transfer limit (net of tie benefits, or net of HQICC in the case of the Phase I/II HVDC-TF), then the substitution auction clearing price for that interface will be determined by the demand bid or supply offer that is marginal at that interface. If a cleared demand bid associated with a Proxy De-List Bid is marginal at the external interface, then the substitution auction clearing price for that interface shall be set equal to the Capacity Clearing Price for that interface.

The substitution auction clearing price for an import-constrained Capacity Zone where the total Capacity Supply Obligations awarded in the primary action-clearing process of the Forward Capacity Auction are greater than or equal to the zone's threshold quantity specified in Section III.13.2.8.1.1 shall not be lower than the substitution auction clearing price for the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone.

The substitution auction clearing price for an export-constrained Capacity Zone that is not a nested export-constrained Capacity Zone, where the total Capacity Supply Obligations awarded in the primary auction-clearing process of the Forward Capacity Auction are less than or equal to the zone's threshold quantity specified in Section III.13.2.8.1.1 shall not exceed the substitution auction clearing price for the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone.

The substitution auction clearing price for a nested export-constrained Capacity Zone where the total Capacity Supply Obligations awarded in the primary auction-clearing process of the Forward Capacity Auction are less than or equal to the zone's threshold quantity specified in Section III.13.2.8.1.1 shall not exceed the substitution auction clearing price for the Capacity Zone within which it is located.



The substitution auction clearing price at an external interface shall not exceed the substitution auction clearing price in the Capacity Zone connected to the external interface.

If, pursuant to the rules specified above, the substitution auction clearing price for any Capacity Zone or external interface would exceed the Capacity Clearing Price for that location, the substitution auction clearing price for that location only is set equal to its Capacity Clearing Price.

The substitution auction clearing price for any Capacity Zone or external interface cannot be less than negative one multiplied by the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price.

#### **III.13.2.8.2. Supply Offers in the Substitution Auction.**

##### **III.13.2.8.2.1. Supply Offers.**

To participate as supply in the substitution auction, a Project Sponsor for a New Capacity Resource must meet the following criteria:

- (a) The Project Sponsor and the New Capacity Resource must meet all the requirements for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction specified in Section III.13.1.
- (b) The Project Sponsor must elect to have the resource participate in the substitution auction during the New Capacity Show of Interest Window. Pursuant to an election, the resource's total amount of FCA Qualified Capacity that qualifies as a New Capacity Resource will be obligated to participate in the substitution auction, including any capacity of a Renewable Technology Resource that was not qualified due to proration pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.10(a), and subject to the other provisions of this Section III.13.2.8.2.
- (c) The Project Sponsor must certify that the New Capacity Resource is a Sponsored Policy Resource as part of the submission of the New Capacity Qualification Package.

Substitution auction supply offers are rationable.

A resource participating in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.1.2 (resources previously counted as capacity resources) is not eligible to

participate as supply in the substitution auction. A resource is not eligible to participate as supply in the substitution auction if it has submitted a demand bid for the substitution auction.

A Composite FCM Transaction comprised of a summer resource that is a Sponsored Policy Resource is eligible to participate as supply in the substitution auction.

A Conditional Qualified New Resource may participate in the substitution auction provided that the resource with which it has overlapping interconnection impacts: (i) did not receive a Capacity Supply Obligation, fully or partially, in the primary auction-clearing process, and: (ii) is not eligible to participate in the substitution auction. A resource having a higher priority in the queue than a Conditional Qualified New Resource with which it has overlapping interconnection impact may participate in the substitution auction provided that the Conditional Qualified New Resource did not receive a Capacity Supply Obligation, fully or partially, in the primary auction-clearing process.

#### **III.13.2.8.2.2. Supply Offer Prices.**

Project Sponsors must submit substitution auction supply offer prices no later than five Business Days after the deadline for submission of offers composed of separate resources.

A substitution auction supply offer must be in the form of a curve (with up to five price-quantity pairs). The curve may not decrease in quantity as the price increases. A supply offer price for the substitution auction may not be greater than the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price or lower than negative one multiplied by the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price.

If the offer quantity does not equal the resource's FCA Qualified Capacity, the quantity for which no offer price was submitted will be assigned a price equal to the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price.

#### **III.13.2.8.2.3. Supply Offers Entered into the Substitution Auction**

Supply offers for resources that satisfy all of the criteria in Section III.13.2.8.2.1 to participate in the substitution auction may be adjusted prior to conducting the substitution auction-clearing process using the following adjustments:

- (a) Any portion of a resource's FCA Qualified Capacity that was cleared (received a Capacity Supply Obligation) in the primary auction-clearing process will be removed from the resource's substitution auction supply offer beginning with the lowest priced price-quantity pairs.

(b) After performing the adjustment specified in Section III.13.2.8.2.3(a), any price-quantity pairs in a resource's substitution auction supply offer with a price greater than the Capacity Clearing Price for the resource's Capacity Zone or external interface are removed from the offer.

### **III.13.2.8.3. Demand Bids in the Substitution Auction.**

#### **III.13.2.8.3.1. Demand Bids.**

Market Participants with Existing Generating Capacity Resources or Existing Import Capacity Resources associated with External Elective Transmission Upgrades may elect to submit demand bids for the substitution auction for those resources by the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline. The election must specify the total amount of the resource's Qualified Capacity that will be associated with its demand bid.

A resource, including any portion of an existing resource that qualifies as a New Capacity Resource, must have achieved FCM Commercial Operation no later than seven days after the issuance by the ISO of the qualification determination notification described in Section III.13.1.2.4(b) in order to participate as demand in the substitution auction.

Regardless of whether an election is made, a demand bid is required for any portion of a resource that is associated with a Retirement De-List Bid, provided that the entire resource has achieved FCM Commercial Operation no later than seven days after the issuance by the ISO of the qualification determination notification described in Section III.13.1.2.4(b).

A resource for which a demand bid election has been made cannot participate in a Composite FCM Transaction, cannot be designated as a Self-Supplied FCA Resource, and will not have incremental summer or winter capacity that does not span the entire Capacity Commitment Period subjected to the treatment specified in Section III.13.1.1.1.3.A.

Demand bids are non-rationable.

A demand bid will be entered into the substitution auction for the portion of the resource that receives a Capacity Supply Obligation in the primary auction-clearing process, subject to the other provisions of this Section III.13.2.8.3. A resource, or portion thereof, associated with a cleared demand bid shall be retired

from all New England Markets at the start of the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction.

### **III.13.2.8.3.1A Substitution Auction Test Prices.**

(a) **Participant-Submitted Test Price.** For auctions associated with a Capacity Commitment Period that begins on or after June 1, 2023, Market Participants that submit a substitution auction demand bid must submit a test price, calculated using the method described below, by the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline.

The test price for the capacity associated with a resource's demand bid must be calculated using the same methodology as a Retirement De-List Bid, except that a Market Participant may not submit test prices for multiple price-quantity segments but must submit a single test price using, as necessary, aggregated cost and revenue data. The test price must be accompanied by the same documentation required for Retirement De-List Bids above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1. A Market Participant must submit a test price regardless of whether the price is below the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold.

A Market Participant is not required to submit a test price for any resource for which the demand bid is less than 3 MW. The applicable test price for any such resource is \$0.00/kW-month.

(b) **IMM-Determined Test Price.** The Internal Market Monitor shall review each test price submission using the methodology specified in Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1 for evaluating Retirement De-List Bids, regardless of whether the submitted test price is below the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold. For purposes of this review, the expected revenues for a cleared substitution auction demand bid shall not be included as a component of opportunity costs. After due consideration and consultation with the Market Participant, as appropriate, the Internal Market Monitor shall replace the submitted test price with an IMM-determined test price if the submitted test price is not consistent with the sum of the net present value of the resource's expected cash flows plus reasonable expectations about the resource's Capacity Performance Payments plus reasonable opportunity costs.

The Internal Market Monitor's determination regarding a Market Participant-submitted test price shall be included in the retirement determination notification described in Section III.13.1.2.4(a) and in the filing made to the Commission as described in Section III.13.8.1(a).

The test price used for purposes of the substitution auction shall be the Market Participant-submitted test price, as adjusted by the Internal Market Monitor pursuant to this Section III.13.2.8.3.1A(b), and as further adjusted by the Commission in response to the Internal Market Monitor's filing pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4(a).

#### **III.13.2.8.3.2. Demand Bid Prices.**

Market Participants must submit substitution auction demand bid prices no later than five Business Days after the deadline for submission of offers composed of separate resources.

A substitution auction demand bid must be in the form of a curve (with up to five price-quantity pairs). The curve may not decrease in quantity as the price decreases. A demand bid price for the substitution auction may not be greater than the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price or lower than negative one multiplied by the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price.

If the bid quantity does not equal the total bid amount submitted by the Market Participant or required for a Retirement De-List Bid pursuant to Section III.13.2.8.3.1, the quantity for which no bid price was specified will be assigned a price equal to negative one multiplied by the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price.

For auctions associated with a Capacity Commitment Period that begins on or after June 1, 2023, Market Participants may elect either of the demand bid adjustment methods specified in Section III.13.2.8.3.3(b) for the resource by no later than five Business Days after the deadline for submission of offers composed of separate resources. If no such election is made, the adjustment applied shall be the method specified in Section III.13.2.8.3.3(b)(i).

#### **III.13.2.8.3.3. Demand Bids Entered into the Substitution Auction.**

If a resource is determined to be needed for reliability pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5, then any demand bid associated with the resource will not be further included in the substitution auction. If a resource is awarded a Capacity Supply Obligation in the primary auction-clearing process and the Capacity Clearing Price is less than ninety percent of the resource's test price as established pursuant to Section III.13.2.8.3.1A, then the resource's demand bid will not be included in the substitution auction.

Demand bids for resources that satisfy all of the criteria in Section III.13.2.8.3.1 to participate in the substitution auction will be adjusted prior to conducting the substitution auction-clearing process using the following adjustments:

- (a) For the substitution auction associated with the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2022, any portion of a resource's demand bid that exceeds its Capacity Supply Obligation awarded in the primary auction-clearing process will be removed from the substitution auction demand bid beginning with the highest priced price-quantity pairs.
- (b) For substitution auctions associated with a Capacity Commitment Period that begins on or after June 1, 2023, a resource's demand bid will be adjusted using one of the following methods as elected pursuant to Section III.13.2.8.3.2:
  - (i) The portion of a resource's capacity that did not receive a Capacity Supply Obligation in the primary auction-clearing process will be removed from the substitution auction demand bid beginning with the highest priced price-quantity pair.
  - (ii) Any portion of a resource's demand bid that exceeds its Capacity Supply Obligation awarded in the primary auction-clearing process will be removed from the substitution auction demand bid beginning with the lowest priced price-quantity pair.
- (c) After performing the modification specified in Sections III.13.2.8.3.3(a) or III.13.2.8.3.3(b), any price-quantity pairs in a resource's substitution auction demand bid with a price greater than the Capacity Clearing Price for the resource's Capacity Zone or external interface will have its price reduced to the Capacity Clearing Price for the resource's Capacity Zone or external interface.

Except as provided in Section III.13.2.5.2.1(c), a rationable demand bid will be entered into the substitution auction on behalf of any Proxy De-List Bid associated with a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid. The demand bid quantity will equal the portion of the Proxy De-List Bid that was not cleared (received a Capacity Supply Obligation) in the first run of the primary auction-clearing process. The demand bid will have priority to clear before non-rationable demand bids.

### **III.13.3. Critical Path Schedule Monitoring.**

#### **III.13.3.1. Resources Subject to Critical Path Schedule Monitoring.**

##### **III.13.3.1.1. New Resources Electing Critical Path Schedule Monitoring.**

A Project Sponsor that submits a critical path schedule for a New Capacity Resource in the qualification process may request that the ISO monitor that resource's compliance with its critical path schedule in accordance with the provisions of this Section III.13.3. The ISO will monitor the New Capacity Resource's compliance from the time the ISO approves the request until the resource achieves FCM Commercial Operation, loses its Capacity Supply Obligation pursuant to Section III.13.3.4A, or withdraws from critical path schedule monitoring pursuant to Section III.13.3.6.

In addition, a Lead Market Participant with a New Import Capacity Resource backed by one or more existing External Resources seeking to qualify for Capacity Commitment Period(s) prior to the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction for which it is qualifying must request monitoring under this Section III.13.3.1.1.

A request under this Section III.13.3.1.1 must be made in writing no later than five Business Days after the deadline for submission of the FCM Deposit pursuant to Section III.13.1.9.1.

##### **III.13.3.1.2. New Resources Clearing in the Forward Capacity Auction.**

For each new resource required to submit a critical path schedule in the qualification process, including but not limited to a New Generating Capacity Resource (pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.2), a New Import Capacity Resource backed by a new External Resource (pursuant to Section III.13.1.3.5), or a New Demand Capacity Resource (pursuant to Section III.13.1.4), if capacity from that resource clears in the Forward Capacity Auction, then the ISO shall monitor that resource's compliance with its critical path schedule in accordance with the provisions of this Section III.13.3 (regardless of whether the Project Sponsor requested monitoring pursuant to Section III.13.3.1.1) from the time that the Forward Capacity Auction is conducted until the resource achieves FCM Commercial Operation, loses its Capacity Supply Obligation pursuant to Section III.13.3.4A, or withdraws from critical path schedule monitoring pursuant to Section III.13.3.6.

**III.13.3.1.3. New Resources Not Offering or Not Clearing in the Forward Capacity Auction.**

If no capacity from a new resource that was required to submit a critical path schedule in the qualification process clears in the Forward Capacity Auction, or if such a resource does not submit an offer in the Forward Capacity Auction, then the ISO shall not monitor that resource's compliance with its critical path schedule after the Forward Capacity Auction unless the Project Sponsor previously requested pursuant to Section III.13.3.1.1 that the ISO continue to monitor that resource's compliance with its critical path schedule. However, if a New Generating Capacity Resource participated but did not clear in the Forward Capacity Auction either as: (i) a Conditional Qualified New Resource, or (ii) a New Generating Capacity Resource with a higher priority in the queue and overlapping interconnection impacts with a Conditional Qualified New Resource, the ISO will not continue to monitor that resource's compliance with its critical path schedule even if that resource requested critical path schedule monitoring pursuant to Section III.13.3.1.1.

**III.13.3.2. Quarterly Critical Path Schedule Reports.**

For each new resource that is being monitored for compliance with its critical path schedule, the Project Sponsor for that resource must provide a written critical path schedule report to the ISO no later than five Business Days after the end of each calendar quarter. If the Project Sponsor does not provide a written critical path schedule report to the ISO by the fifth Business Day after the end of the calendar quarter, then the ISO shall issue a notice thereof to the Project Sponsor. If the Project Sponsor fails to provide the critical path schedule report within five Business Days of issuance of that notice, then the resource will be subject to termination pursuant to Section III.13.3.4A. Each critical path schedule report shall include the following:

**III.13.3.2.1. Updated Critical Path Schedule.**

The critical path schedule report must include a complete updated version of the critical path schedule as described in Section III.13.1.1.2.2.2, dated contemporaneously with the submission of the critical path schedule report. The updated critical path schedule should clearly indicate if the Project Sponsor is proposing to change any of the milestones or dates from the previously submitted version of the critical path schedule, and must include an explanation of any such proposed changes. In the critical path schedule report, the Project Sponsor should also explain in detail any proposed changes to the project design and the potential impact of such changes on the amount of capacity the resource will be able to provide.



### **III.13.3.2.2. Documentation of Milestones Achieved.**

(a) For all new resources except for Demand Capacity Resources installed at multiple facilities and Demand Capacity Resources from a single facility with a demand reduction value of less than 5 MW (discussed in Section III.13.3.2.2(b)), for each critical path schedule milestone achieved since the submission of the previous critical path schedule report, the Project Sponsor must include in the critical path schedule report documentation demonstrating that the milestone has been achieved by the date indicated and as otherwise described in the critical path schedule, as follows:

(i) **Major Permits.** For each major permit described in the critical path schedule, the Project Sponsor shall provide documentation showing that the permit was applied for and obtained as described in the critical path schedule. For permit applications, this documentation could include a dated copy of the permit application or cover letter requesting the permit. For approved permits, this documentation could include a dated copy of the approved permit or letter granting the permit from the permitting authority.

(ii) **Project Financing Closing.** The Project Sponsor shall provide documentation showing that the sources of financing identified in the critical path schedule have committed to provide the amount of financing described in the critical path schedule. This documentation could include copies of commitment letters from the sources of financing.

(iii) **Major Equipment Orders.** For each major component described in the critical path schedule, the Project Sponsor shall provide documentation showing that the equipment was ordered as described in the critical path schedule. This documentation should include a copy of a dated confirmation of the order from the manufacturer or supplier. This documentation should confirm scheduled delivery dates consistent with milestone Section III.13.3.2.2(a)(vi).

(iv) **Substantial Site Construction.** The Project Sponsor shall provide documentation showing that the amount of money expended on construction activities occurring on the project site has exceeded 20 percent of the construction financing costs.

(v) **Major Equipment Delivery.** For each major component described in the critical path schedule, the Project Sponsor shall provide documentation showing that the equipment was delivered to the project site and received as preliminarily acceptable as described in the critical

path schedule. This documentation should include a copy of a dated confirmation of delivery to the project site.

(vi) **Major Equipment Testing.** For each major component described in the critical path schedule, the Project Sponsor shall provide documentation showing that the component was tested, including major systems testing as appropriate for the specific technology as described in the critical path schedule, and that the test results demonstrate the equipment's suitability to allow, in conjunction with other major components, subsequent operation of the project in accordance with the amount of capacity obligated from the resource in the Capacity Commitment Period in accordance with Good Utility Practice. This documentation could include a dated copy of the satisfactory test results.

(vii) **Commissioning.** The Project Sponsor shall provide documentation showing that the resource has demonstrated a level of performance equal to or greater than the amount of capacity obligated from the resource in the Capacity Commitment Period. This documentation should include a copy of a dated letter of confirmation from the applicable manufacturer, contractor, or installer.

(viii) **Commercial Operation.** The Project Sponsor is not required to provide documentation of Commercial Operation (as defined in Schedule 22, 23, or 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff) to the ISO as part of the ISO's critical path schedule monitoring. The ISO shall confirm that the resource has achieved Commercial Operation (as defined in Schedule 22, 23, or 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff) as described in the critical path schedule through the resource's compliance with the other relevant requirements of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff and the ISO New England System Rules.

(ix) **Transmission Upgrades.** If during the qualification process it was determined that transmission upgrades (including any upgrades identified in a re-study pursuant to Section 3.2.1.3 of Schedule 22, Section 1.7.1.3 of Schedule 23, or Section 3.2.1.3 of Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff) are needed for the new resource to complete its interconnection, then the Project Sponsor shall provide documentation showing that the transmission upgrades have been completed.

(b) For Demand Capacity Resources installed at multiple facilities and Demand Capacity Resources from a single facility with a demand reduction value of less than 5 MW, for each critical path schedule milestone achieved since the submission of the previous critical path schedule report, the Project Sponsor must include in the critical path schedule report documentation demonstrating that the milestone has been achieved by the date indicated and as otherwise described in the critical path schedule, as follows:

(i) **Substantial Project Completion.** The Project Sponsor shall provide documentation showing the total offered demand reduction value achieved as of target dates which are: (a) the cumulative percentage of total demand reduction value achieved on target date 1 occurring five weeks prior to the first Forward Capacity Auction after the Forward Capacity Auction in which the Demand Capacity Resource supplier's capacity award was made; (b) the cumulative percentage of total demand reduction value achieved on target date 2 occurring five weeks prior to the second Forward Capacity Auction after the Forward Capacity Auction in which the Demand Capacity Resource supplier's capacity award was made; and (c) target date 3 which is the date the resource is expected to be ready to demonstrate to the ISO that the Demand Capacity Resource described in the Project Sponsor's New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package has achieved its full demand reduction value, which must be on or before the first day of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period and by which date 100 percent of the total demand reduction value must be complete.

(ii) **Additional Requirements.** For each customer and each prospective customer the Project Sponsor shall provide: name, location, MW amount, and description of stage of negotiation. If the customer's Asset has been registered with the ISO, then the Project Sponsor shall also provide the Asset identification number.

#### **III.13.3.2.3. Additional Relevant Information.**

The Project Sponsor must include in the critical path schedule report any other information regarding the status or progress of the project or any of the project milestones that might be relevant to the ISO's evaluation of the feasibility of the project being built in accordance with the critical path schedule or the feasibility that the project will achieve all its critical path schedule milestones no later than the start of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period.

#### **III.13.3.2.4. Additional Information for Resources Previously Counted As Capacity.**

For each resource participating in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to Sections III.13.1.1.1.2, III.13.1.1.1.3, or III.13.1.1.1.4 or New Demand Capacity Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.4.1 and clearing in that auction, the Project Sponsor must provide information in the critical path schedule report demonstrating: (a) the shedding of the resource's Capacity Supply Obligation in accordance with the provisions of Section III.13.1.1.2.2.5(c); and (b) that the relevant cost threshold (described in Sections III.13.1.1.1.2, III.13.1.1.1.3, and III.13.1.1.1.4) is being met.

#### **III.13.3.3. Failure to Meet Critical Path Schedule.**

If the ISO determines that any critical path schedule milestone date has been missed, or if the Project Sponsor proposes a change to any milestone date in a quarterly critical path schedule report (as described in Section III.13.3.2.1), then the ISO shall consult with the Project Sponsor to determine the impact of the missed milestone or proposed revision, and shall determine a revised date for the milestone and for any other milestones affected by the change. If a milestone date is revised for any reason, the ISO may require the Project Sponsor to submit a written report to the ISO on the fifth Business Day of each month until the revised milestone is achieved detailing the progress toward meeting the revised milestone. If the Project Sponsor does not provide a written critical path schedule report to the ISO on the fifth Business Day of a month, then the ISO shall issue a notice thereof to the Project Sponsor. If the Project Sponsor fails to provide the critical path schedule report within five Business Days of issuance of that notice, then the resource will be subject to termination pursuant to Section III.13.3.4A. Such a monthly reporting requirement, if imposed, shall be in addition to the quarterly critical path schedule reports described in Section III.13.3.2.

#### **III.13.3.4. Covering Capacity Supply Obligations.**

(a) If a capacity supplier determines that a resource may not be able to demonstrate its ability to deliver the full amount of its Capacity Supply Obligation, the capacity supplier may take actions to cover all or part of the Capacity Supply Obligation for any portion of the Capacity Commitment Period, as follows:

- (i) A capacity supplier may cover its Capacity Supply Obligation through reconfiguration auctions as described in Section III.13.4.
- (ii) A capacity supplier may cover its Capacity Supply Obligation through one or more Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals, subject to the satisfaction of the requirements in Section III.13.5.

- (iii) A capacity supplier that has qualified a resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.1.2 may cover its Capacity Supply Obligation by electing, no later than ten Business Days prior to the offer and bid deadline for the third annual reconfiguration auction prior to the start of the applicable Capacity Commitment Period, to have the resource that was previously counted as a capacity resource cover the Capacity Supply Obligation of the New Generating Capacity Resource for up to two Capacity Commitment Periods. If an election is made to have the resource that was previously counted as a capacity resource cover the Capacity Supply Obligation of the New Generating Capacity Resource, the capacity supplier with the resource that was previously counted as a capacity resource shall be required to comply with the requirements set forth in Section III.13.6.1 so long as it continues to cover for the New Generating Capacity Resource.
- (b) During a Capacity Commitment Period, a failure to cover charge will apply to any capacity resource that has not demonstrated the ability to deliver the full amount of its Capacity Supply Obligation by the end of an Obligation Month. The failure to cover charge is the difference between a resource's monthly Capacity Supply Obligation and its Maximum Demonstrated Output, multiplied by the Failure to Cover Charge Rate, where:

**Maximum Demonstrated Output Period**

Maximum Demonstrated Output Period is the period beginning six years prior to the start of the applicable Capacity Commitment Period and ending with the most recently completed calendar month in the Capacity Commitment Period, including all prior months in the Capacity Commitment Period.

Provided that, for a resource that has previously been counted as a capacity resource and for which an election has been made to participate as a New Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.1.2, and for which a cover election has been made pursuant to Section III.13.3.4(a)(iii), then: (1) the Maximum Demonstrated Output Period will be the Maximum Demonstrated Output Period of the resource that has been previously counted as capacity, and; (2) the Maximum Demonstrated Output Period of the New Generating Capacity Resource will begin on the earlier of: (i) the date that the resource that has previously been counted as a capacity resource began any outage as provided in Section III.13.1.1.1.2, and; (ii) the date that the New

Generating Capacity Resource commenced Commercial Operation (as defined in Schedule 22, 23, or 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff).

### **Failure to Cover Charge Rate**

For Capacity Commitment Periods beginning prior to June 1, 2022, the Failure to Cover Charge Rate for a Capacity Zone is the higher of the Capacity Clearing Price and the clearing price in any annual reconfiguration auction for that Capacity Commitment Period.

For Capacity Commitment Periods beginning on or after June 1, 2022, the Failure to Cover Charge Rate for a Capacity Zone is the price determined by a second clearing of the third annual reconfiguration auction prior to the start of the Capacity Commitment Period in which the aggregated zonal quantities of undemonstrated Capacity Supply Obligation, as of the completion of the third annual reconfiguration auction, and as determined pursuant to Section III.13.3.4 (b), are included as demand bids at the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price for each applicable Capacity Zone.

Provided that, if an existing resource is covering for a New Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to Section III.13.3.4(a)(iii), then the undemonstrated Capacity Supply Obligation for the New Generating Capacity Resource is the difference between the existing resource's Maximum Demonstrated Output and the new resource's Capacity Supply Obligation.

### **Maximum Demonstrated Output**

The Maximum Demonstrated Output is the sum of the highest output levels achieved by each Generator Asset associated with a Generating Capacity Resource, each Demand Response Asset associated with an Active Demand Capacity Resources, and assets associated with a Seasonal Peak Demand Resource or On-Peak Demand Resource, during the Maximum Demonstrated Output Period as specified below. The minimum Maximum Demonstrated Output for all assets is zero.

Provided that, if a resource that was previously counted as capacity is covering for a New Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to Section III.13.3.4(a)(iii), then the Maximum Demonstrated Output is the sum of the highest aggregate output level achieved by each asset associated with the resource that has previously been counted as capacity during the Maximum Demonstrated Output Period.

At the asset level, Maximum Demonstrated Output is calculated as follows:

**Demand Response Assets associated with an Active Demand Capacity Resource:** The Maximum Demonstrated Output for dates occurring prior to June 1, 2018 is the highest audit value in the Maximum Demonstrated Output Period increased by average avoided peak transmission and distribution losses. The Maximum Demonstrated Output for dates occurring on or after to June 1, 2018 will be equal to the highest demand reduction calculated, pursuant to Section III.8.4, in the Maximum Demonstrated Output Period increased by average avoided peak transmission and distribution losses for non-Net Supply.

**Distributed Generation associated with a Seasonal Peak Demand Resource or an On-Peak Demand Resource:** The Maximum Demonstrated Output is the highest hourly metered output in the Maximum Demonstrated Output Period after the resource has completed testing and has achieved commercial operation, increased by average avoided peak transmission and distribution losses for non-Net Supply.

**Load Management associated with a Seasonal Peak Demand Resource or an On-Peak Demand Resource:** The Maximum Demonstrated Output is the highest hourly demand reduction value in the Maximum Demonstrated Output Period increased by average avoided peak transmission and distribution losses for non-Net Supply.

**Energy Efficiency associated with a Seasonal Peak Demand Resource or an On-Peak Demand Resource:** The Maximum Demonstrated Output is the highest reported monthly performance value in the Maximum Demonstrated Output Period increased by average avoided peak transmission and distribution losses.

**Generator Assets:** The Maximum Demonstrated Output for dates occurring prior to March 1, 2017 is the highest hourly Revenue Quality Metering in the Maximum Demonstrated Output Period beginning on or after Commercial Operation (as defined in Schedule 22, 23, or 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff). The Maximum Demonstrated Output for dates occurring on or after March 1, 2017 is the highest Metered Quantity for Settlement in the Maximum Demonstrated Output Period beginning on or after Commercial

Operation (as defined in Schedule 22, 23, or 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff).

If a single Generator Asset is split into two or more new Generator Assets, the Maximum Demonstrated Output associated with the single Generation Asset will be prorated among the new assets based on their summer maximum net output. If multiple Generator Assets are consolidated to fewer assets, the Maximum Demonstrated Output of the Generator Assets that are being consolidated will be allocated to the consolidated assets based on the summer maximum net output.

**Import Capacity Resources:** For an Import Capacity Resource that is backed by external generation that has not achieved commercial operation at the time of qualification, in part or entirely, the Maximum Demonstrated Output is the highest revenue quality metered output for a five-minute or greater interval after the resource has completed testing and has achieved commercial operation. Provided that, the Maximum Demonstrated Output of an Import Capacity Resource associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade may be limited by the highest demonstrated capability of the Elective Transmission Upgrade after the Elective Transmission Upgrade has completed testing and has achieved commercial operation.

#### **III.13.3.4A Termination of Capacity Supply Obligations.**

If a Project Sponsor fails to comply with the requirements of Sections III.13.3.2 or III.13.3.3, or if a Project Sponsor covers a Capacity Supply Obligation for two Capacity Commitment Periods, or if, as a result of milestone date revisions, the date by which a resource will have achieved all its critical path schedule milestones is more than two years after the beginning of the Capacity Commitment Period for which the resource first received a Capacity Supply Obligation, then the ISO, after consultation with the Project Sponsor, shall have the right, through a filing with the Commission, to terminate the resource's Capacity Supply Obligation for any future Capacity Commitment Periods and the resource's right to any payments associated with that Capacity Supply Obligation in the Capacity Commitment Period, and to adjust the resource's qualified capacity for participation in the Forward Capacity Market; provided that, where a Project Sponsor voluntarily withdraws its resource from critical path schedule monitoring in accordance with Section III.13.3.6, no filing with the Commission shall be necessary to terminate the resource's Capacity Supply Obligation. Upon Commission ruling, the Project Sponsor shall forfeit any financial assurance provided with respect to that Capacity Supply Obligation. If in these circumstances, however, the ISO does not take steps to terminate the resource's Capacity Supply Obligation and instead



permits the Project Sponsor to continue to cover its Capacity Supply Obligation, such continuation shall be subject to the ISO's right to revoke that permission and to file with the Commission to terminate the resource's Capacity Supply Obligation, and subject to continued reporting by the Project Sponsor as described in this Section III.13.3.

If a resource's Capacity Supply Obligation that was acquired in a substitution auction at a negative price is withdrawn or terminated, the Project Sponsor shall remain obligated for any settlement charges associated with the terminated Capacity Supply Obligation for the Capacity Commitment Period.

#### **III.13.3.5. Termination of Interconnection Agreement.**

If the ISO terminates, or files with the Commission to terminate, a resource's Capacity Supply Obligation as described in Section III.13.3.4A, the ISO shall have the right to terminate the Interconnection Agreement with that resource through a filing with the Commission and upon Commission ruling. If the Project Sponsor continues to cover all of its Capacity Supply Obligations while challenging such termination before the Commission, it shall retain its Queue Position.

#### **III.13.3.6. Withdrawal from Critical Path Schedule Monitoring.**

A Project Sponsor may withdraw its resource from critical path schedule monitoring by the ISO at any time by submitting a written request to the ISO. The ISO also may deem a resource withdrawn from critical path schedule monitoring if the Project Sponsor does not adhere to the requirements of this Section III.13.3. Any resource withdrawn from critical path schedule monitoring shall be subject to the provisions of Section III.13.3.4A.

#### **III.13.3.7 Request to Defer Capacity Supply Obligation**

A resource that has not yet achieved FCM Commercial Operation and that is subject to critical path schedule monitoring by the ISO pursuant to this Section III.13.3 may seek to defer the applicability of its entire Capacity Supply Obligation by one year pursuant to the provisions of this Section III.13.3.7.

A Project Sponsor seeking such a deferral must notify the ISO in writing no later than the first Business Day in September of the year prior to the third annual reconfiguration auction for the Capacity Commitment Period in which the resource has a Capacity Supply Obligation. If, after consultation with the Project Sponsor, the ISO determines that the absence of the capacity in the first Capacity Commitment Period in which the resource has a Capacity Supply Obligation, as well as in the subsequent Capacity Commitment Period, would result in the violation of any NERC or NPCC (or their successors) criteria or

of the ISO New England System Rules, not solely that it may result in the procurement of less capacity than the Installed Capacity Requirement (net of HQICCs) or the Local Sourcing Requirement for the Capacity Zone, then the ISO will review the specific reliability need with and seek feedback from the Reliability Committee and provide the Project Sponsor with a written determination to that effect within 30 days of the Project Sponsor's notification to the ISO.

If the ISO provides such a written determination, then the Project Sponsor may file with the Commission, no later than the first Business Day in November of the year prior to the third annual reconfiguration auction, a request to defer the applicability of its Capacity Supply Obligation by one year. Any such filing must include the ISO's written determination, and must also demonstrate that the deferral is critical to the resource's ability to achieve FCM Commercial Operation and that the reasons for the deferral are beyond the control of the Project Sponsor.

If the Commission approves the request, all of the rights, obligations, payments, and charges associated with the Capacity Supply Obligation described in Sections III.13.3.4(b), III.13.6 and III.13.7 shall only apply beginning one year after the start of the Capacity Commitment Period in which the resource has a Capacity Supply Obligation. Notwithstanding any other provision of this Section III.13, if the resource achieves FCM Commercial Operation prior to the deferred date, it will not be eligible to receive revenue in the Forward Capacity Market until the deferred date. Beginning on the deferred date, all of the rights, obligations, payments, and charges associated with the Capacity Supply Obligation shall apply, and the Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price (indexed using the Handy-Whitman Index of Public Utility Construction Costs in effect as of December 31 of the year preceding the Capacity Commitment Period) associated with the Forward Capacity Auction in which the resource cleared as a new resource shall apply for the full duration of the Capacity Supply Obligation (including multi-year elections made pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.2.4 or Section III.13.1.4.1.1.2.7). A Project Sponsor will not take actions to cover the resource's Capacity Supply Obligation for the deferral period as described in Section III.13.3.4(a), but the other requirements of III.13.3, including all reporting requirements and the ISO's right to seek termination, shall continue to apply during the deferral period. Upon Commission approval of the deferral, the resource may not participate in any reconfiguration auctions or Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals for any portion of the deferral period. Beginning at 8:00 a.m. (Eastern Time) 30 days after Commission approval of the request, the Project Sponsor shall be required to provide an additional amount of financial assurance as described in Section VII.B.2.c of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

Notwithstanding any other provision of this Section III.13, if any of the resource's Capacity Supply Obligation in the deferral period was shed in a reconfiguration auction or Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral prior to Commission approval of the deferral request, then the resource's settlements shall be adjusted by the ISO to ensure that the resource does not receive any payments associated with that transaction in excess of the charges associated with that transaction; the resource will be responsible for any charges in excess of payments.

#### **III.13.3.8 FCM Commercial Operation.**

A resource (or portion thereof) achieves FCM Commercial Operation when (1) the ISO has determined that the resource (or portion thereof) has achieved all its critical path schedule milestones, including completion of any transmission upgrades necessary for the resource to obtain the requisite interconnection service; and (2) the ISO verifies the resource's (or a portion of the resource's) summer capacity rating (or, for a resource with winter capacity only, its winter capacity rating).

(a) For a Generating Capacity Resource (or portion thereof) that has achieved all its critical path schedule milestones, the ISO shall confirm FCM Commercial Operation as soon as practicable following the ISO's verification of the resource's summer capacity rating (or, for a resource with winter capacity only, its winter capacity rating), which may take place in any month of the year. The ISO shall verify the summer capacity rating of a Generating Capacity Resource that is an Intermittent Power Resource following no fewer than 30 consecutive calendar days of operation (for periods from October 1 through May 31, a Market Participant must request such verification).

(b) For a Demand Capacity Resource (or portion thereof) that has achieved all its critical path schedule milestones, the ISO shall confirm FCM Commercial Operation upon verifying that the Demand Capacity Resource described in the New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package has achieved its full demand reduction value, subject to the requirements of Section III.13.6.1.5.3(b).

(c) For an Import Capacity Resource (or portion thereof) that has achieved all its critical path schedule milestones, the ISO shall confirm FCM Commercial Operation upon demonstration that the Import Capacity Resource described in the New Capacity Qualification Package has achieved its full Qualified Capacity.

### **III.13.4. Reconfiguration Auctions.**

For each Capacity Commitment Period, the ISO shall conduct annual and monthly reconfiguration auctions as described in this Section III.13.4. Reconfiguration auctions only permit the trading of Capacity Supply Obligations; load obligations are not traded in reconfiguration auctions. Each reconfiguration auction shall use a static double auction (respecting the interface limits and capacity requirements modeled as specified in Sections III.13.4.5 and III.13.4.7) to clear supply offers (i.e., offers to assume a Capacity Supply Obligation) and demand bids (i.e., bids to shed a Capacity Supply Obligation) for each Capacity Zone included in the reconfiguration auction. Supply offers and demand bids will be modeled in the Capacity Zone where the associated resources are electrically interconnected. Resources that are able to meet the requirements in other Capacity Zones shall be allowed to clear to meet such requirements, subject to the constraints modeled in the auction.

#### **III.13.4.1. Capacity Zones Included in Reconfiguration Auctions.**

Each reconfiguration auction associated with a Capacity Commitment Period shall include each of, and only, the final Capacity Zones and external interfaces as determined through the Forward Capacity Auction for that Capacity Commitment Period, as described in Section III.13.2.3.4.

#### **III.13.4.2. Participation in Reconfiguration Auctions.**

Each supply offer and demand bid in a reconfiguration auction must be associated with a specific resource, and must satisfy the requirements of this Section III.13.4.2. All resource types may submit supply offers and demand bids in reconfiguration auctions. In accordance with Section III.A.9.2 of *Appendix A* of this Market Rule 1, supply offers and demand bids submitted for reconfiguration auctions shall not be subject to mitigation by the Internal Market Monitor. A supply offer or demand bid submitted for a reconfiguration auction shall not be limited by the associated resource's Economic Minimum Limit. Offers composed of separate resources may not participate in reconfiguration auctions. Participation in any reconfiguration auction is conditioned on full compliance with the applicable financial assurance requirements as provided in the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy at the time of the offer and bid deadline. For annual reconfiguration auctions, the offer and bid deadline will be announced by the ISO no later than 30 days prior to that deadline. No later than 15 days before the offer and bid deadline for an annual reconfiguration auction, the ISO shall notify each resource of the amount of capacity that it may offer or bid in that auction, as calculated pursuant to this Section III.13.4.2. For monthly reconfiguration auctions, the offer and bid deadline will be announced by the ISO no later than 10 Business Days prior to that deadline. Upon issuance of the monthly bilateral results for the associated

Obligation Month, the ISO shall notify each resource of the amount of capacity that it may offer or bid in that monthly auction, as calculated pursuant to this Section III.13.4.2. For monthly reconfiguration auctions in which the most recently approved Winter Seasonal Claimed Capability established as of the fifth Business Day in June of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period is greater than the Winter ARA Qualified Capacity for the third annual reconfiguration auction, the ISO shall apply the greater of these two values to offer limits starting with the first monthly reconfiguration auction in the winter delivery period for the relevant Capacity Commitment Period, limited, as applicable, by the resource's CNR Capability.

**III.13.4.2.1. Supply Offers.**

Submission of supply offers in reconfiguration auctions shall be governed by this Section III.13.4.2.1. All supply offers in reconfiguration auctions shall be submitted by the Project Sponsor or Lead Market Participant, and shall specify the resource, the amount of capacity offered in MW, and the price, in dollars per kW/month. In no case may capacity associated with a Retirement De-List Bid or a Permanent De-List Bid that cleared in the Forward Capacity Auction, or a demand bid that cleared in a substitution auction, for a Capacity Commitment Period be offered in a reconfiguration auction for that, or any subsequent, Capacity Commitment Period, or any portion thereof. In no case may capacity associated with an Export Bid or an Administrative Export De-List Bid that cleared in the Forward Capacity Auction for a Capacity Commitment Period be offered in a reconfiguration auction for that Capacity Commitment Period, or any portion thereof.

**III.13.4.2.1.1. Amount of Capacity That May Be Submitted in a Supply Offer in an Annual Reconfiguration Auction.**

For each month of the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the annual reconfiguration auction, the ISO shall calculate the difference between the Summer ARA Qualified Capacity or Winter ARA Qualified Capacity, as applicable, and the amount of capacity from that resource that is already subject to a Capacity Supply Obligation for the month. The minimum of these 12 values shall be the amount of capacity up to which a resource may submit a supply offer in the annual reconfiguration auction.

**III.13.4.2.1.2. Calculation of Summer ARA Qualified Capacity and Winter ARA Qualified Capacity.**

**III.13.4.2.1.2.1. First Annual Reconfiguration Auction and Second Annual Reconfiguration Auction.**

### **III.13.4.2.1.2.1.1. Generating Capacity Resources Other than Intermittent Power Resources.**

#### **III.13.4.2.1.2.1.1.1. Summer ARA Qualified Capacity.**

For the first and second annual reconfiguration auctions associated with a Capacity Commitment Period, the Summer ARA Qualified Capacity of a Generating Capacity Resource that is not an Intermittent Power Resource shall be the sum of the values determined pursuant to subsections (a) and (b) below, limited, as applicable, by the resource's CNR Capability and any relevant overlapping interconnection impacts as described in Section III.13.1.1.2.3(f):

(a) For capacity that has achieved FCM Commercial Operation, the higher of the resource's summer Qualified Capacity as calculated for the Forward Capacity Auction for that Capacity Commitment Period and any summer Seasonal Claimed Capability values for summer periods completed after the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline for the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period and before the start of the Capacity Commitment Period. The amount of capacity described in this Section III.13.4.2.1.2.1.1.1(a) shall be zero, however, where the resource cleared in the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period as a new resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.1.2 and where the project has not achieved FCM Commercial Operation.

(b) Any amount of capacity that has not yet achieved FCM Commercial Operation but: (i) is being monitored by the ISO pursuant to the provisions of Section III.13.3; (ii) is expected to achieve all its critical path schedule milestones prior to the start of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period; and (iii) for which the Lead Market Participant or Project Sponsor has met all relevant financial assurance requirements as described in Section III.13.1.9 and in the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

#### **III.13.4.2.1.2.1.1.2. Winter ARA Qualified Capacity.**

For the first and second annual reconfiguration auctions associated with a Capacity Commitment Period, the Winter ARA Qualified Capacity of a Generating Capacity Resource that is not an Intermittent Power Resource shall be the sum of the values determined pursuant to subsections (a) and (b) below, limited, as applicable, by the resource's CNR Capability and any relevant overlapping interconnection impacts as described in Section III.13.1.1.2.3(f):

(a) For capacity that has achieved FCM Commercial Operation, the higher of the resource's winter Qualified Capacity as calculated for the Forward Capacity Auction for that Capacity Commitment Period

and any winter Seasonal Claimed Capability values for winter periods completed after the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline for the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period and before the start of the Capacity Commitment Period. The amount of capacity described in this Section III.13.4.2.1.2.1.1.2(a) shall be zero, however, where the resource cleared in the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period as a new resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.1.2 and where the project has not achieved FCM Commercial Operation.

(b) Any amount of capacity that has not yet achieved FCM Commercial Operation but: (i) is being monitored by the ISO pursuant to the provisions of Section III.13.3; (ii) is expected to achieve all its critical path schedule milestones prior to the start of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period; and (iii) for which the Lead Market Participant or Project Sponsor has met all relevant financial assurance requirements as described in Section III.13.1.9 and in the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

#### **III.13.4.2.1.2.1.2. Intermittent Power Resources.**

##### **III.13.4.2.1.2.1.2.1. Summer ARA Qualified Capacity.**

For the first and second annual reconfiguration auctions associated with a Capacity Commitment Period, the Summer ARA Qualified Capacity of an Intermittent Power Resource shall be the sum of the values determined pursuant to subsections (a) and (b) below, limited, as applicable, by the resource's CNR Capability and any relevant overlapping interconnection impacts as described in Section III.13.1.1.2.3(f):

(a) For capacity that has achieved FCM Commercial Operation, the resource's most recently-determined summer Qualified Capacity. The amount of capacity described in this Section III.13.4.2.1.2.1.2.1(a) shall be zero, however, where the resource cleared in the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period as a new resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.1.2 and the project has not achieved FCM Commercial Operation.

(b) Any amount of capacity that has not yet achieved FCM Commercial Operation but: (i) is being monitored by the ISO pursuant to the provisions of Section III.13.3; (ii) is expected to achieve all its critical path schedule milestones prior to the start of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period; and (iii) for which the Lead Market Participant or Project Sponsor has met all relevant financial assurance requirements as described in Section III.13.1.9 and in the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

##### **III.13.4.2.1.2.1.2.2. Winter ARA Qualified Capacity.**

For the first and second annual reconfiguration auctions associated with a Capacity Commitment Period, the Winter ARA Qualified Capacity of an Intermittent Power Resource shall be the sum of the values determined pursuant to subsections (a) and (b) below, limited, as applicable, by the resource's CNR Capability and any relevant overlapping interconnection impacts as described in Section III.13.1.1.2.3(f):

(a) For capacity that has achieved FCM Commercial Operation, the resource's most recently-determined winter Qualified Capacity. The amount of capacity described in this Section III.13.4.2.1.2.1.2.2(a) shall be zero, however, where the resource cleared in the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period as a new resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2 and the project has not achieved FCM Commercial Operation.

(b) Any amount of capacity that has not yet achieved FCM Commercial Operation but: (i) is being monitored by the ISO pursuant to the provisions of Section III.13.3; (ii) is expected to achieve all its critical path schedule milestones prior to the start of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period; and (iii) for which the Lead Market Participant or Project Sponsor has met all relevant financial assurance requirements as described in Section III.13.1.9 and in the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**III.13.4.2.1.2.1.3. Import Capacity Resources Backed By an External Control Area.**

For the first and second annual reconfiguration auctions associated with a Capacity Commitment Period, the Summer ARA Qualified Capacity and Winter ARA Qualified Capacity of an Import Capacity Resource shall be equal to its summer Qualified Capacity and winter Qualified Capacity, respectively, as determined for the Forward Capacity Auction for that Capacity Commitment Period.

**III.13.4.2.1.2.1.3.1. Import Capacity Resources Backed by One or More External Resources.**

For the first and second annual reconfiguration auctions associated with a Capacity Commitment Period, the Summer ARA Qualified Capacity and Winter ARA Qualified Capacity of an Import Capacity Resource backed by one or more External Resources shall be the greater of:

(a) the summer Qualified Capacity and winter Qualified Capacity, respectively, as determined for the Forward Capacity Auction for that Capacity Commitment Period; and

(b) the amount of capacity available to back the import, if submitted by the Lead Market Participant and approved by the ISO by the fifth Business Day in October and, if submitted for a New Import Capacity Resource backed by one or more External Resources, also subject to the satisfaction of the requirements



in Sections III.13.1.3.5.1(b), III.13.1.3.5.2, and III.13.3.1.1 and the relevant financial assurance requirements as described in Section III.13.1.9 and the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**III.13.4.2.1.2.1.4. Demand Capacity Resources.**

**III.13.4.2.1.2.1.4.1. Summer ARA Qualified Capacity.**

For the first and second annual reconfiguration auctions associated with a Capacity Commitment Period, the Summer ARA Qualified Capacity of a Demand Capacity Resource shall be determined as follows.

(a) For Demand Capacity Resources other than those composed of Energy Efficiency measures, the sum of the values determined pursuant to subsections (i) and (ii) below:

(i) For capacity that has achieved FCM Commercial Operation, the resource's most recently-determined summer Qualified Capacity.

(ii) Any amount of capacity that has not yet achieved FCM Commercial Operation but: (1) is being monitored by the ISO pursuant to the provisions of Section III.13.3; (2) is expected to achieve all its critical path schedule milestones prior to the start of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period; and (3) for which the Lead Market Participant or Project Sponsor has met all relevant financial assurance requirements as described in Section III.13.1.9 and in the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

(b) For Demand Capacity Resources composed of Energy Efficiency measures, the lesser of the values determined pursuant to subsections (i) and (ii) below:

(i) The sum of the most recently-determined summer demand reduction values of the resource's installed Energy Efficiency measures (excluding any capacity that will retire or permanently de-list, or whose Measure Life will expire, prior to the start of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period, and increased by average avoided peak transmission and distribution losses) and any summer capacity that has not yet achieved FCM Commercial Operation that satisfies the criteria found in subsection (a)(ii) above.

(ii) The amount of summer capacity that qualified for the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Demand Capacity Resource (excluding any capacity that is terminated or that will retire or

permanently de-list prior to the start of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period) that is expected to achieve all its critical path schedule milestones prior to the start of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period.

#### **III.13.4.2.1.2.1.4.2. Winter ARA Qualified Capacity.**

For the first and second annual reconfiguration auctions associated with a Capacity Commitment Period, the Winter ARA Qualified Capacity of a Demand Capacity Resource shall be determined as follows.

(a) For Demand Capacity Resources other than those composed of Energy Efficiency measures, the sum of the values determined pursuant to subsections (i) and (ii) below:

(i) For capacity that has achieved FCM Commercial Operation, the resource's most recently-determined winter Qualified Capacity.

(ii) Any amount of capacity that has not yet achieved FCM Commercial Operation but: (1) is being monitored by the ISO pursuant to the provisions of Section III.13.3; (2) is expected to achieve all its critical path schedule milestones prior to the start of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period; and (3) for which the Lead Market Participant or Project Sponsor has met all relevant financial assurance requirements as described in Section III.13.1.9 and in the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

(b) For Demand Capacity Resources composed of Energy Efficiency measures, the lesser of the values determined pursuant to subsections (i) and (ii) below:

(i) The sum of the most recently-determined winter demand reduction values of the resource's installed Energy Efficiency measures (excluding any capacity that will retire or permanently de-list, or whose Measure Life will expire, prior to the start of the winter period of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period, and increased by average avoided peak transmission and distribution losses) and any winter capacity that has not yet achieved FCM Commercial Operation that satisfies the criteria found in subsection (a)(ii) above.

(ii) The amount of winter capacity that qualified for the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Demand Capacity Resource (excluding any capacity that is terminated or that will retire or permanently de-list prior to the start of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period) that is

expected to achieve all its critical path schedule milestones prior to the start of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period.

**III.13.4.2.1.2.2. Third Annual Reconfiguration Auction.**

**III.13.4.2.1.2.2.1. Generating Capacity Resources other than Intermittent Power Resources.**

**III.13.4.2.1.2.2.1.1. Summer ARA Qualified Capacity.**

For the third annual reconfiguration auction associated with a Capacity Commitment Period, the Summer ARA Qualified Capacity of a Generating Capacity Resource that is not an Intermittent Power Resource shall be the sum of the values determined pursuant to subsections (a) and (b) below, limited, as applicable, by the resource's CNR Capability and any relevant overlapping interconnection impacts as described in Section III.13.1.1.2.3(f):

(a) For capacity that has achieved FCM Commercial Operation, the resource's summer Seasonal Claimed Capability value in effect after the most recently completed summer period. The amount of capacity described in this Section III.13.4.2.1.2.2.1.1(a) shall be zero, however, where the resource cleared in the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period as a new resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2 and the project has not achieved FCM Commercial Operation.

(b) Any amount of capacity that has not yet achieved FCM Commercial Operation but: (i) is being monitored by the ISO pursuant to the provisions of Section III.13.3; (ii) is expected to achieve all its critical path schedule milestones prior to the start of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period; and (iii) for which the Lead Market Participant or Project Sponsor has met all relevant financial assurance requirements as described in Section III.13.1.9 and in the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**III.13.4.2.1.2.2.1.2. Winter ARA Qualified Capacity.**

For the third annual reconfiguration auction associated with a Capacity Commitment Period, the Winter ARA Qualified Capacity of a Generating Capacity Resource that is not an Intermittent Power Resource shall be the sum of the values determined pursuant to subsections (a) and (b) below, limited, as applicable, by the resource's CNR Capability and any relevant overlapping interconnection impacts as described in Section III.13.1.1.2.3(f):

(a) For capacity that has achieved FCM Commercial Operation, the resource's winter Seasonal Claimed Capability value in effect after the most recently completed winter period. The amount of capacity described in this Section III.13.4.2.1.2.2.1.2(a) shall be zero, however, where the resource cleared in the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period as a new resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.1.2 and the project has not achieved FCM Commercial Operation.

(b) Any amount of capacity that has not yet achieved FCM Commercial Operation but: (i) is being monitored by the ISO pursuant to the provisions of Section III.13.3; (ii) is expected to achieve all its critical path schedule milestones prior to the start of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period; and (iii) for which the Lead Market Participant or Project Sponsor has met all relevant financial assurance requirements as described in Section III.13.1.9 and in the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

#### **III.13.4.2.1.2.2.2. Intermittent Power Resources.**

##### **III.13.4.2.1.2.2.2.1. Summer ARA Qualified Capacity.**

For the third annual reconfiguration auction associated with a Capacity Commitment Period, the Summer ARA Qualified Capacity of an Intermittent Power Resource shall be the sum of the values determined pursuant to subsections (a) and (b) below, limited, as applicable, by the resource's CNR Capability and any relevant overlapping interconnection impacts as described in Section III.13.1.1.2.3(f):

(a) For capacity that has achieved FCM Commercial Operation, the lesser of its most recently-determined summer Qualified Capacity and its summer Seasonal Claimed Capability value in effect after the most recently competed summer period. The amount of capacity described in this Section III.13.4.2.1.2.2.2.1(a) shall be zero, however, where the resource cleared in the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period as a new resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.1.2 and the project has not achieved FCM Commercial Operation.

(b) Any amount of capacity that has not yet achieved FCM Commercial Operation but: (i) is being monitored by the ISO pursuant to the provisions of Section III.13.3; (ii) is expected to achieve all its critical path schedule milestones prior to the start of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period; and (iii) for which the Lead Market Participant or Project Sponsor has met all relevant financial assurance requirements as described in Section III.13.1.9 and in the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

##### **III.13.4.2.1.2.2.2.2. Winter ARA Qualified Capacity.**

For the third annual reconfiguration auction associated with a Capacity Commitment Period, the Winter ARA Qualified Capacity of an Intermittent Power Resource shall be the sum of the values determined pursuant to subsections (a) and (b) below, limited, as applicable, by the resource's CNR Capability and any relevant overlapping interconnection impacts as described in Section III.13.1.1.2.3(f):

(a) For capacity that has achieved FCM Commercial Operation, the lesser of its most recently-determined winter Qualified Capacity and its winter Seasonal Claimed Capability value in effect after the most recently completed winter period. The amount of capacity described in this Section III.13.4.2.1.2.2.2(a) shall be zero, however, where the resource cleared in the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period as a new resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2 and the project has not achieved FCM Commercial Operation.

(b) Any amount of capacity that has not yet achieved FCM Commercial Operation but: (i) is being monitored by the ISO pursuant to the provisions of Section III.13.3; (ii) is expected to achieve all its critical path schedule milestones prior to the start of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period; and (iii) for which the Lead Market Participant or Project Sponsor has met all relevant financial assurance requirements as described in Section III.13.1.9 and in the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

#### **III.13.4.2.1.2.2.3. Import Capacity Resources.**

##### **III.13.4.2.1.2.2.3.1 Import Capacity Resources Backed by an External Control Area.**

For the third annual reconfiguration auction associated with a Capacity Commitment Period, the Summer ARA Qualified Capacity of an Import Capacity Resource shall be equal to the lesser of its summer Qualified Capacity as determined for the Forward Capacity Auction for that Capacity Commitment Period and the amount of capacity available to back the import, if submitted by the Lead Market Participant and approved by the ISO by the fifth Business Day in October. For the third annual reconfiguration auction associated with a Capacity Commitment Period, the Winter ARA Qualified Capacity of an Import Capacity Resource shall be equal to the lesser of its winter Qualified Capacity as determined for the Forward Capacity Auction for that Capacity Commitment Period and the amount of capacity available to back the import, if submitted by the Lead Market Participant and approved by the ISO by the fifth Business Day in October.

##### **III.13.4.2.1.2.2.3.2. Import Capacity Resources Backed by One or More External Resources.**

For the third annual reconfiguration auction associated with a Capacity Commitment Period, the Summer ARA Qualified Capacity and Winter ARA Qualified Capacity of an Import Capacity Resource backed by one or more External Resources shall be the lesser of:

(a) the summer Qualified Capacity and winter Qualified Capacity, respectively, as determined by the most recent Forward Capacity Auction that does not reflect a change to the Import Capacity Resource applicable to that Capacity Commitment Period; and

(b) the amount of capacity available to back the import, if submitted by the Lead Market Participant and approved by the ISO by the fifth Business Day in October and, if submitted for a New Import Capacity Resource backed by one or more External Resources, also subject to the satisfaction of the requirements in Sections III.13.1.3.5.1(b), III.13.1.3.5.2, and III.13.3.1.1 and the relevant financial assurance requirements as described in Section III.13.1.9 and the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

#### **III.13.4.2.1.2.2.4. Demand Capacity Resources.**

##### **III.13.4.2.1.2.2.4.1. Summer ARA Qualified Capacity.**

For the third annual reconfiguration auction associated with a Capacity Commitment Period, the Summer ARA Qualified Capacity of a Demand Capacity Resource shall be determined as follows.

(a) For Demand Capacity Resources other than those composed of Energy Efficiency measures, the sum of the values determined pursuant to subsections (i) and (ii) below:

(i) For capacity that has achieved FCM Commercial Operation, the lesser of: (1) its most recently-determined summer Qualified Capacity and (2) its summer Seasonal DR Audit value or summer Passive DR Audit value in effect at the time of qualification for the third annual reconfiguration auction.

(ii) Any amount of capacity that has not yet achieved FCM Commercial Operation but: (1) is being monitored by the ISO pursuant to the provisions of Section III.13.3; (2) is expected to achieve all its critical path schedule milestones prior to the start of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period; and (3) for which the Lead Market Participant or Project Sponsor has met all relevant financial assurance requirements as described in Section III.13.1.9 and in the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

(b) For Demand Capacity Resources composed of Energy Efficiency measures, the lesser of the values determined pursuant to subsections (i) and (ii) below:

(i) The sum of the most recently-determined summer demand reduction values of the resource's installed Energy Efficiency measures (excluding any capacity that will retire or permanently de-list, or whose Measure Life will expire, prior to the start of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period, and increased by average avoided peak transmission and distribution losses) and any summer capacity that has not yet achieved FCM Commercial Operation that satisfies the criteria found in subsection (a)(ii) above.

(ii) The amount of summer capacity that qualified for the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Demand Capacity Resource (excluding any capacity that will retire or permanently de-list prior to the start of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period) provided that the resource is expected to achieve all its critical path schedule milestones prior to the start of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period.

#### **III.13.4.2.1.2.2.4.2. Winter ARA Qualified Capacity.**

For the third annual reconfiguration auction associated with a Capacity Commitment Period, the Winter ARA Qualified Capacity of a Demand Capacity Resource shall be determined as follows.

(a) For Demand Capacity Resources other than those composed of Energy Efficiency measures, the sum of the values determined pursuant to subsections (i) and (ii) below:

(i) For capacity that has achieved FCM Commercial Operation, the lesser of: (1) its most recently-determined winter Qualified Capacity and (2) its winter Seasonal DR Audit value or winter Passive DR Audit value in effect at the time of qualification for the third annual reconfiguration auction.

(ii) Any amount of capacity that has not yet achieved FCM Commercial Operation but: (1) is being monitored by the ISO pursuant to the provisions of Section III.13.3; (2) is expected to achieve all its critical path schedule milestones prior to the start of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period; and (3) for which the Lead Market Participant or Project Sponsor has met

all relevant financial assurance requirements as described in Section III.13.1.9 and in the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

(b) For Demand Capacity Resources composed of Energy Efficiency measures, the lesser of the values determined pursuant to subsections (i) and (ii) below:

(i) The sum of the most recently-determined winter demand reduction values of the resource's installed Energy Efficiency measures (excluding any capacity that will retire or permanently de-list, or whose Measure Life will expire, prior to the start of the winter period of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period and increased by average avoided peak transmission and distribution losses) and any winter capacity that has cleared in a Forward Capacity Auction and not yet achieved FCM Commercial Operation that satisfies the criteria found in subsection (a)(ii) above.

(ii) The amount of winter capacity that qualified for the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Demand Capacity Resource (excluding any capacity that will retire or permanently de-list prior to the start of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period) provided that the resource is expected to achieve all its critical path schedule milestones prior to the start of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period.

#### **III.13.4.2.1.3. Adjustment for Significant Decreases in Capacity.**

For each month of the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the third annual reconfiguration auction, for each resource that has achieved FCM Commercial Operation, the ISO shall subtract the resource's Summer ARA Qualified Capacity or Winter ARA Qualified Capacity, as applicable, from the amount of capacity from the resource that is subject to a Capacity Supply Obligation for the month. For the month associated with the greatest of these 12 values (for Capacity Commitment Periods beginning on or before June 1, 2019) or the least of these 12 values (for Capacity Commitment Periods beginning on or after June 1, 2020), if the resource's Summer ARA Qualified Capacity or Winter ARA Qualified Capacity (as applicable) is below the amount of capacity from that resource that is subject to a Capacity Supply Obligation for that month by:

(1) for Capacity Commitment Periods beginning on or before June 1, 2019, more than the lesser of:

(i) 20 percent of the amount of capacity from that resource that is subject to a Capacity Supply Obligation for that month or;



- (ii) 40 MW;
- (2) for Capacity Commitment Periods beginning on June 1, 2020, June 1, 2021 and June 1, 2022, more than the lesser of:
  - (i) the greater of 20 percent of the amount of capacity from that resource that is subject to a Capacity Supply Obligation for that month or two MW, or;
  - (ii) 40 MW;
- (3) for Capacity Commitment Periods beginning on or after June 1, 2023, more than the lesser of:
  - (i) the greater of 10 percent of the amount of capacity from that resource that is subject to a Capacity Supply Obligation for that month or two MW, or;
  - (ii) 10 MW;

then the following provisions shall apply:

(a) The Lead Market Participant may submit a written plan to the ISO with any necessary supporting documentation describing the measures that will be taken and demonstrating that the resource will be able to provide an amount of capacity consistent with its total Capacity Supply Obligation for the Capacity Commitment Period by the start of all months in that Capacity Commitment Period in which the resource has a Capacity Supply Obligation. If submitted, such a plan must be received by the ISO no later than 10 Business Days after the ISO has notified the Lead Market Participant of its Summer ARA Qualified Capacity and Winter ARA Qualified Capacity for the third annual reconfiguration auction.

(b) If no such plan as described in Section III.13.4.2.1.3(a) is timely submitted to the ISO, or if such a plan is timely submitted but the ISO determines that the plan does not demonstrate that the resource will be able to provide the necessary amount of capacity by the start of all months in the Capacity Commitment Period in which the resource has a Capacity Supply Obligation, then the ISO shall enter a demand bid at the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price on behalf of the resource (with all payments, charges, rights, obligations, and other results associated with such bid applying to the resource as if the resource itself had submitted the bid) in the third annual reconfiguration auction in an amount equal to:

- (1) for Capacity Commitment Periods beginning prior to June 1, 2020, the greatest of the 12 monthly values determined pursuant to this Section III.13.4.2.1.3;
- (2) for Capacity Commitment Periods beginning on June 1, 2020, June 1, 2021 and June 1, 2022, where the Capacity Supply Obligation and Qualified Capacity values are those for the month in which the values as determined pursuant to Section III.13.4.2.1.3 vary the least, the greater of:
  - (i) the resource's Capacity Supply Obligation minus (Qualified Capacity divided by 0.8),
  - and;

(ii) the resource's Capacity Supply Obligation minus Qualified Capacity minus 40 MW;  
(3) for Capacity Commitment Periods beginning on or after June 1, 2023, where the Capacity Supply Obligation and Qualified Capacity values are those for the month in which the values as determined pursuant to Section III.13.4.2.1.3 vary the least, the greater of:

- (i) the resource's Capacity Supply Obligation minus (Qualified Capacity divided by 0.9),  
and;
- (ii) the resource's Capacity Supply Obligation minus Qualified Capacity minus 10 MW.

**III.13.4.2.1.4. Amount of Capacity That May Be Submitted in a Supply Offer in a Monthly Reconfiguration Auction.**

A resource may not submit a supply offer for a monthly reconfiguration auction unless it is expected to achieve FCM Commercial Operation prior to the end of the relevant Obligation Month, unless the resource has a negative Capacity Supply Obligation, in which case it may submit a supply offer for that reconfiguration auction in an amount up to the absolute value of its Capacity Supply Obligation. A resource may not submit a supply offer for a monthly reconfiguration auction if it is on an approved outage during that month. The amount of capacity up to which a resource may submit a supply offer in a monthly reconfiguration auction shall be the difference (but in no case less than zero) between the values determined pursuant to subsections (a) and (b) below:

- (a) The resource's Summer ARA Qualified Capacity or Winter ARA Qualified Capacity as adjusted pursuant to Section III.13.4.2, as applicable, for the auction month for the third annual reconfiguration auction for the relevant Capacity Commitment Period or, where the resource did not qualify for the third annual reconfiguration auction for the relevant Capacity Commitment Period, the quantity of MW either being monitored by the ISO in accordance with Section III.13.3 (provided that all applicable Financial Assurance requirements have been met and the resource is expected to achieve all its critical path schedule milestones prior to the end of the relevant Obligation Month in accordance with posted schedules) or the amount of capacity that achieved all its critical path schedule milestones after the third annual reconfiguration qualification deadline; provided that the value determined pursuant to this subsection (a) shall be limited by the resource's CNR Capability and any relevant overlapping interconnection impacts as described in Section III.13.1.1.2.3(f) or, for a Demand Capacity Resource, the amount of Qualified Capacity for the relevant Capacity Commitment Period.
- (b) The amount of capacity from that resource that is already subject to a Capacity Supply Obligation for that month.

#### **III.13.4.2.1.5. ISO Review of Supply Offers.**

Supply offers in reconfiguration auctions shall be reviewed by the ISO to ensure the regional and local adequacy achieved through the Forward Capacity Auction and other reliability needs are maintained. The ISO's reviews will consider the location and operating and rating limitations of resources associated with cleared supply offers to ensure reliability standards will remain satisfied if the offer is accepted. The ISO shall reject supply offers that would otherwise clear in a reconfiguration auction that will result in a violation of any NERC or NPCC criteria, or ISO New England System Rules during the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the reconfiguration auction. The ISO's reliability reviews will assess such offers, beginning with the marginal resource, based on operable capacity needs while considering any approved or interim approved transmission outage information and any approved Generator Asset or Demand Response Resource outage information, and will include transmission security studies. Supply offers that cannot meet the applicable reliability needs will be rejected in their entirety and the resource will not be rejected in part. Rejected resources will not be further included in clearing the reconfiguration auction and the Lead Market Participant or Project Sponsor, as appropriate, shall be notified as soon as practicable after the reconfiguration auction of the rejection and of the reliability need prompting such rejection.

#### **III.13.4.2.2. Demand Bids in Reconfiguration Auctions.**

Submission of demand bids in reconfiguration auctions shall be governed by this Section III.13.4.2.2. All demand bids in reconfiguration auctions shall be submitted by the Project Sponsor or Lead Market Participant, and shall specify the amount of capacity bid in MW, and the price, in dollars per kW/month.

- (a) To submit a demand bid in a reconfiguration auction, a resource must have a Capacity Supply Obligation for the Capacity Commitment Period (or portion thereof, as applicable) associated with that reconfiguration auction. Where capacity associated with a Self-Supplied FCA Resource that cleared in the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period is offered in a reconfiguration auction for that Capacity Commitment Period, or any portion thereof, a resource acquiring a Capacity Supply Obligation shall not as a result become a Self-Supplied FCA Resource.
- (b) Each demand bid submitted to the ISO for reconfiguration auction shall be no greater than the amount of the resource's capacity that is already obligated for the Capacity Commitment Period (or portion thereof, as applicable) as of the offer and bid deadline for the reconfiguration auction.

(c) All demand bids in reconfiguration auctions shall be reviewed by the ISO to ensure the regional and local adequacy achieved through the Forward Capacity Auction and other reliability needs are maintained. The ISO's reviews will consider the location and operating and rating limitations of resources associated with demand bids that would otherwise clear to ensure reliability standards will remain satisfied if the committed capacity is withdrawn. The ISO shall reject demand bids that would otherwise clear in a reconfiguration auction that will result in a violation of any NERC or NPCC criteria or ISO New England System Rules during the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the reconfiguration auction, provided that for annual reconfiguration auctions associated with a Capacity Commitment Period that begins on or after June 1, 2018, the ISO shall not reject a demand bid solely on the basis that acceptance of the demand bid may result in the procurement of less capacity than the Installed Capacity Requirement (net of HQICCs). For monthly reconfiguration auctions, the ISO shall obtain and consider information from the Local Control Center regarding whether the capacity associated with demand bids that would otherwise clear from resources with a Capacity Supply Obligation is needed for local system conditions. The ISO's reliability reviews will assess such bids, beginning with the marginal resource, based on operable capacity needs while considering any approved or interim approved transmission outage information and any approved Generator Asset or Demand Response Resource outage information, and will include transmission security studies. Where the applicable reliability needs cannot be met if a Demand Bid is cleared, such Demand Bids will be rejected in their entirety and the resource will not be rejected in part. Demand Bids from rejected resources will not be further included in clearing the reconfiguration auction, and the Lead Market Participant or Project Sponsor, as appropriate, shall be notified as soon as practicable after the reconfiguration auction of the rejection and of the reliability need prompting such rejection.

**III.13.4.3. [Reserved.]**

**III.13.4.4. Clearing Offers and Bids in Reconfiguration Auctions.**

All supply offers and demand bids may be cleared in whole or in part in all reconfiguration auctions. If after clearing, a resource has a Capacity Supply Obligation below its Economic Minimum Limit, it must meet the requirements of Section III.13.6.1.1.1.

**III.13.4.5. Annual Reconfiguration Auctions.**

Except as provided below, after the Forward Capacity Auction for a Capacity Commitment Period, and before the start of that Capacity Commitment Period, the ISO shall conduct three annual reconfiguration auctions for capacity commitments covering the whole of that Capacity Commitment Period. For each

annual reconfiguration auction, the capacity demand curves, New England Control Area and Capacity Zone capacity requirements and external interface limits, as updated pursuant to Section III.12, shall be modeled in the auction consistent with the Forward Capacity Auction for the associated Capacity Commitment Period. For purposes of the annual reconfiguration auctions, the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price used to define the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve shall be the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price associated with the Forward Capacity Auction for the same Capacity Commitment Period addressed by the reconfiguration auction.

**III.13.4.5.1.                    Timing of Annual Reconfiguration Auctions.**

The first annual reconfiguration auction for the Capacity Commitment Period shall be held in the month of June that is approximately 24 months before the start of the Capacity Commitment Period. The second annual reconfiguration auction for the Capacity Commitment Period shall be held in the month of August that is approximately 10 months before the start of the Capacity Commitment Period. The third annual reconfiguration auction for the Capacity Commitment Period shall be held in the month of March that is approximately 3 months before the start of the Capacity Commitment Period.

**III.13.4.5.2.                    Acceleration of Annual Reconfiguration Auction.**

If the difference between the forecasted Installed Capacity Requirement (net of HQICCs) for a Capacity Commitment Period and the amount of capacity obligated for that Capacity Commitment Period is sufficiently large, then the ISO may, upon reasonable notice to Market Participants, conduct an annual reconfiguration auction as much as six months earlier than its normally-scheduled time.

**III.13.4.6.                    [Reserved.]**

**III.13.4.7.                    Monthly Reconfiguration Auctions.**

Prior to each month in the Capacity Commitment Period, the ISO shall conduct a monthly reconfiguration auction for whole-month capacity commitments during that month. For each monthly reconfiguration auction for Capacity Commitment Periods beginning before June 1, 2020, the Local Sourcing Requirement and Maximum Capacity Limit applicable for each Capacity Zone and external interface limits, as updated pursuant to Section III.12, shall be modeled as constraints in the auction. For each monthly reconfiguration auction for Capacity Commitment Periods beginning or after June 1, 2020, the truncation points for import-constrained Capacity Zones and export-constrained Capacity Zones specified in Section III.13.2.2.2 and Section III.13.2.2.3, and external interface limits, as updated pursuant to

Section III.12, shall be modeled as constraints in the auction. The System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve is not modeled in monthly reconfiguration auctions.

**III.13.4.8. Adjustment to Capacity Supply Obligations.**

For each supply offer that clears in a reconfiguration auction, the resource's Capacity Supply Obligation for the relevant Capacity Commitment Period (or portion thereof, as applicable) shall be increased by the amount of capacity that clears. For each demand bid that clears in a reconfiguration auction, the resource's Capacity Supply Obligation for the relevant Capacity Commitment Period (or portion thereof, as applicable) shall be decreased by the amount of capacity that clears.

### **III.13.5. Bilateral Contracts in the Forward Capacity Market.**

Market Participants shall be permitted to enter into Annual Reconfiguration Transactions, Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals, Capacity Load Obligation Bilaterals and Capacity Performance Bilaterals in accordance with this Section III.13.5, with the ISO serving as Counterparty in each such transaction. Market Participants may not offset a Capacity Load Obligation with a Capacity Supply Obligation.

#### **III.13.5.1. Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals.**

Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals are available for monthly periods. The qualification of resources subject to a Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral is determined in the same manner as the qualification of resources is determined for reconfiguration auctions as specified in Section III.13.4.2.

A resource having a Capacity Supply Obligation seeking to shed that obligation (Capacity Transferring Resource) may enter into a bilateral transaction to transfer its Capacity Supply Obligation, in whole or in part (Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral), to a resource, or portion thereof, having Qualified Capacity for that Capacity Commitment Period that is not already obligated (Capacity Acquiring Resource), subject to the following limitations.

- (a) A Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral must be coterminous with a calendar month.
- (b) A Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral may not transfer a Capacity Supply Obligation amount that is greater than the monthly Capacity Supply Obligation of the Capacity Transferring Resource. A Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral may not transfer a Capacity Supply Obligation amount that is greater than the amount of unobligated Qualified Capacity (that is, Qualified Capacity as determined in the most recent Forward Capacity Auction or reconfiguration auction qualification process that is not subject to a Capacity Supply Obligation) of the Capacity Acquiring Resource during the month covered by the Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral, as determined in the qualification process for the most recent Forward Capacity Auction or annual reconfiguration auction prior to the submission of the Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral to the ISO.
- (c) A Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral may not transfer a Capacity Supply Obligation to a Capacity Acquiring Resource where that Capacity Acquiring Resource's unobligated Qualified Capacity is unobligated as a result of an Export Bid or Administrative Export De-List Bid that cleared in the Forward Capacity Auction.

(d) [Reserved.]

(e) [Reserved.]

(f) [Reserved.]

(g) [Reserved.]

(h) A resource, or a portion thereof, that has been designated as a Self-Supplied FCA Resource may transfer the self-supplied portion of its Capacity Supply Obligation by means of Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral. In such a case, however, the Capacity Acquiring Resource shall not become a Self-Supplied FCA Resource as a result of the transaction.

(i) A monthly Capacity Supply Obligation may not be acquired by any resource on an approved outage for the relevant Obligation Month.

(j) A resource that is not expected to achieve FCM Commercial Operation prior to the end of a given Obligation Month in accordance with posted schedules may not submit a transaction as a Capacity Acquiring Resource for that month, unless the resource has a negative Capacity Supply Obligation, in which case it may submit a Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral in an amount up to the absolute value of its Capacity Supply Obligation.

#### **III.13.5.1.1. Process for Approval of Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals.**

##### **III.13.5.1.1.1. Timing of Submission and Prior Notification to the ISO.**

The Lead Market Participant or Project Sponsor for either the Capacity Transferring Resource or the Capacity Acquiring Resource may submit a Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral to the ISO in accordance with posted schedules. The ISO will issue a schedule of the submittal windows for Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals as soon as practicable after the issuance of Forward Capacity Auction results. A Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral must be confirmed by the party other than the party submitting the Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral to the ISO no later than the end of the relevant submittal window.

##### **III.13.5.1.1.2. Application.**



The submission of a Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral to the ISO shall include the following: (i) the resource identification number of the Capacity Transferring Resource; (ii) the amount of the Capacity Supply Obligation being transferred in MW amounts up to three decimal places; (iii) the term of the transaction; and (iv) the resource identification number of the Capacity Acquiring Resource. If the parties to a Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral so choose, they may also submit a price, in \$/kW-month, to be used by the ISO in settling the Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral. If no price is submitted, the ISO shall use a default price of \$0.00/kW-month.

#### **III.13.5.1.1.3. ISO Review.**

(a) The ISO shall review the information provided in support of the Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral, and shall reject the Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral if any of the provisions of this Section III.13.5.1 are not met. For a Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral submitted before the relevant submittal window opens, this review shall occur once the submittal window opens. For a Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral submitted after the submittal window opens, this review shall occur upon submission.

(b) After the close of the relevant submittal window, each Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral shall be subject to a reliability review by the ISO to determine whether the transaction would result in a violation of any NERC or NPCC (or their successors) criteria, or ISO New England System Rules, during the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the transaction. Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals shall be reviewed by the ISO to ensure the regional and local adequacy achieved through the Forward Capacity Auction and other reliability needs are maintained. The ISO's review will consider the location and operating and rating limitations of resources associated with the Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral to ensure reliability standards will remain satisfied if the capacity associated with the Capacity Transferring Resource is withdrawn and the capacity associated with the Capacity Acquiring Resource is accepted. The ISO's reliability reviews will assess transactions based on operable capacity needs while considering any approved or interim approved transmission outage information and any approved Generator Asset or Demand Response Resource outage information, and will include transmission security studies. The ISO will review all confirmed Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals for each upcoming Obligation Month for reliability needs immediately preceding the monthly reconfiguration auction. The ISO shall obtain and consider information from the Local Control Center regarding whether the Capacity Supply Obligation of the Capacity Transferring Resource is needed for local system conditions and whether it is adequately replaced by the Acquiring Resource.

The ISO will approve or reject Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals based on the order in which they are confirmed. If multiple Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals are submitted between the same resources, they may be reviewed together as one transaction and the most recent confirmation time among the related transactions will be used to determine the review order of the grouped transaction. Transactions that cannot meet the applicable reliability needs will only be accepted or rejected in their entirety and the resources will not be accepted or rejected in part for purposes of that transaction. Where the ISO has determined that a Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral must be rejected for reliability reasons the Lead Market Participant or Project Sponsor, as appropriate, for the Capacity Transferring Resource and the Capacity Acquiring Resource shall be notified as soon as practicable of the rejection and of the reliability need prompting such rejection.

(c) Each Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral shall be subject to a financial assurance review by the ISO. If the Capacity Transferring Resource and the Capacity Acquiring Resource are not both in compliance with all applicable provisions of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy, including those regarding Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals, the ISO shall reject the Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral.

#### **III.13.5.1.1.4. Approval.**

Upon approval of a Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral, the Capacity Supply Obligation of the Capacity Transferring Resource shall be reduced by the amount set forth in the Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral, and the Capacity Supply Obligation of the Capacity Acquiring Resource shall be increased by the amount set forth in the Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral.

#### **III.13.5.2. Capacity Load Obligations Bilaterals.**

A Market Participant having a Capacity Load Obligation seeking to shed that obligation (“Capacity Load Obligation Transferring Participant”) may enter into a bilateral transaction to transfer all or a portion of its Capacity Load Obligation in a Capacity Zone (“Capacity Load Obligation Bilateral”) to any Market Participant seeking to acquire a Capacity Load Obligation (“Capacity Load Obligation Acquiring Participant”). A Capacity Load Obligation Bilateral must be in whole calendar month increments, may not exceed one year in duration, and must begin and end within the same Capacity Commitment Period. A Capacity Load Obligation Transferring Participant will be permitted to transfer, and a Capacity Load Obligation Acquiring Participant will be permitted to acquire, a Capacity Load Obligation if after entering into a Capacity Load Obligation Bilateral and submitting related information to the ISO within the specified submittal time period, the ISO approves such Capacity Load Obligation Bilateral.

### **III.13.5.2.1. Process for Approval of Capacity Load Obligation Bilaterals.**

#### **III.13.5.2.1.1. Timing.**

Either the Capacity Load Obligation Transferring Participant or the Capacity Load Obligation Acquiring Participant may submit a Capacity Load Obligation Bilateral to the ISO. All Capacity Load Obligation Bilaterals must be submitted to the ISO in accordance with resettlement provisions as described in ISO New England Manuals. However, to be included in the initial settlement of payments and charges associated with the Forward Capacity Market for the first month of the term of the Capacity Load Obligation Bilateral, a Capacity Load Obligation Bilateral must be submitted to the ISO no later than 12:00 pm on the second Business Day after the end of that month (though a Capacity Load Obligation Bilateral submitted at that time may be revised by the parties to the transaction throughout the resettlement process). A Capacity Load Obligation Bilateral must be confirmed by the party other than the party submitting the Capacity Load Obligation Bilateral to the ISO no later than the same deadline that applies to submission of the Capacity Load Obligation Bilateral.

#### **III.13.5.2.1.2. Application.**

The submission of a Capacity Load Obligation Bilateral to the ISO shall include the following : (i) the amount of the Capacity Load Obligation being transferred in MW amounts up to three decimal places; (ii) the term of the transaction; (iii) identification of the Capacity Load Obligation Transferring Participant and the Capacity Load Obligation Acquiring Participant; and (iv) the Capacity Zone in which the Capacity Load Obligation is being transferred is located.

#### **III.13.5.2.1.3. ISO Review.**

The ISO shall review the information provided in support of the Capacity Load Obligation Bilateral and shall reject the Capacity Load Obligation Bilateral if any of the provisions of this Section II.13.5.2 are not met.

#### **III.13.5.2.1.4. Approval.**

Upon approval of a Capacity Load Obligation Bilateral, the Capacity Load Obligation of the Capacity Load Obligation Transferring Participant in the Capacity Zone specified in the submission to the ISO shall be reduced by the amount set forth in the Capacity Load Obligation Bilateral and the Capacity Load Obligation of the Capacity Load Obligation Acquiring Participant in the specified Capacity Zone shall be increased by the amount set forth in the Capacity Load Obligation Bilateral.

### **III.13.5.3. Capacity Performance Bilaterals.**

A resource's Capacity Performance Score during a Capacity Scarcity Condition may be adjusted by entering into a Capacity Performance Bilateral as described in this Section III.13.5.3.

#### **III.13.5.3.1. Eligibility.**

If a resource has a Capacity Performance Score that is greater than zero in a five-minute interval that is subject to a Capacity Scarcity Condition, that resource may transfer all or some of that Capacity Performance Score to another resource for that same five-minute interval so long as both resources were subject to the same Capacity Scarcity Condition.

#### **III.13.5.3.2. Submission of Capacity Performance Bilaterals.**

The Lead Market Participant for a resource having a Capacity Performance Score that is greater than zero in a five-minute interval that is subject to a Capacity Scarcity Condition may submit a Capacity Performance Bilateral to the ISO assigning all or a portion of its Capacity Performance Score for that interval to another resource, subject to the eligibility requirements specified in Section III.13.5.3.1. The Capacity Performance Bilateral must be confirmed by the Lead Market Participant for the resource receiving the Capacity Performance Score.

##### **III.13.5.3.2.1. Timing.**

A Capacity Performance Bilateral must be submitted in accordance with resettlement provisions as described in ISO New England Manuals. However, to be included in the initial settlement of payments and charges associated with the Forward Capacity Market for the month associated with the Capacity Performance Bilateral, a Capacity Performance Bilateral must be submitted to the ISO no later than 12:00 pm on the second Business Day after the end of that month, or at such later deadline as specified by the ISO upon notice to Market Participants (though a Capacity Performance Bilateral may be revised by the parties to the transaction throughout the resettlement process).

##### **III.13.5.3.2.2. Application.**

The submission of a Capacity Performance Bilateral to the ISO shall include the following: (i) the resource identification number for the resource transferring its Capacity Performance Score; (ii) the resource identification number for the resource receiving the Capacity Performance Score; (iii) the MW amount of Capacity Performance Score being transferred; (iv) the specific five-minute interval or intervals for which the Capacity Performance Bilateral applies.

#### **III.13.5.3.2.3. ISO Review.**

The ISO shall review the information provided in submission of the Capacity Performance Bilateral, and shall reject the Capacity Performance Bilateral if any of the provisions of this Section III.13.5.3 are not met.

#### **III.13.5.3.3. Effect of Capacity Performance Bilateral.**

A Capacity Performance Bilateral does not affect in any way either party's Capacity Supply Obligation or the rights and obligations associated therewith. The sole effect of a Capacity Performance Bilateral is to modify the Capacity Performance Scores of the transferring and receiving resources for the Capacity Scarcity Conditions subject to the Capacity Performance Bilateral for purposes of calculating Capacity Performance Payments as described in Section III.13.7.2.

#### **III.13.5.4 Annual Reconfiguration Transactions.**

Annual Reconfiguration Transactions are available for annual reconfiguration auctions for Capacity Commitment Periods beginning on or after June 1, 2020, except that Annual Reconfiguration Transactions are not available for the first annual reconfiguration auction for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2020.

##### **III.13.5.4.1 Timing of Submission.**

The Lead Market Participant or Project Sponsor for either a Capacity Transferring Resource or a Capacity Acquiring Resource may submit an Annual Reconfiguration Transaction to the ISO in accordance with posted schedules. The ISO will issue a schedule of the submittal windows for Annual Reconfiguration Transactions as soon as practicable after the issuance of Forward Capacity Auction results. An Annual Reconfiguration Transaction must be confirmed by the party other than the party submitting the Annual Reconfiguration Transaction to the ISO no later than the end of the relevant submittal window.

##### **III.13.5.4.2 Components of an Annual Reconfiguration Transaction.**

The submission of an Annual Reconfiguration Transaction must include the following:

1. the resource identification number of the Capacity Transferring Resource;
2. the applicable Capacity Commitment Period;
- (3) the resource identification number of the Capacity Acquiring Resource, and;
3. a price (\$/kW-month), quantity (MW) and Capacity Zone, to be used in settling the Annual Reconfiguration Transaction.

The maximum quantity of an Annual Reconfiguration Transaction is the higher of:

- (1) the Capacity Transferring Resource's maximum demand bid quantity determined pursuant to Section III.13.4.2.2(b), less the quantity of any previously confirmed Annual Reconfiguration Transactions, and;
- (2) the Capacity Acquiring Resource's maximum supply offer quantity determined pursuant to Section III.13.4.2.1.1, less the quantity of any previously confirmed Annual Reconfiguration Transactions.

An Annual Reconfiguration Transaction may not be submitted unless the maximum demand bid quantity and maximum supply offer quantity are each greater than zero.

Each Annual Reconfiguration Transaction is limited to a single Capacity Acquiring Resource and a single Capacity Transferring Resource.

If any demand bid of a Capacity Transferring Resource or supply offer of a Capacity Acquiring Resource that is associated with an Annual Reconfiguration Transaction is rejected for reliability reasons pursuant to Section III.13.2.2(c) or Section III.13.4.2.1.5, respectively, the Annual Reconfiguration Transaction is cancelled.

#### **III.13.5.4.3 Settlement of Annual Reconfiguration Transactions.**

Annual Reconfiguration Transactions are settled on a monthly basis during the applicable Capacity Commitment Period. The monthly payment amount is equal to the transaction quantity multiplied by the difference between the annual reconfiguration auction clearing price and the transaction price. If the payment amount is positive, payment is made to the Lead Market Participant with the Capacity Transferring Resource and charged to the Lead Market Participant with the Capacity Acquiring Resource. If the payment amount is negative, payment is made to the Lead Market Participant with the Capacity Acquiring Resource and charged to the Lead Market Participant with the Capacity Transferring Resource.

### **III.13.6. Rights and Obligations.**

Resources assuming a Capacity Supply Obligation through a Forward Capacity Auction or resources assuming or shedding a Capacity Supply Obligation through a reconfiguration auction or a Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral shall comply with this Section III.13.6 for each Capacity Commitment Period. In the event a resource with a Capacity Supply Obligation assumed through a Forward Capacity Auction, reconfiguration auction, or Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral can not be allowed to shed its Capacity Supply Obligation due to system reliability considerations, the resource shall maintain the Capacity Supply Obligation until the resource can be released from its Capacity Supply Obligation. No additional compensation shall be provided through the Forward Capacity Market if the resource fails to be released from its Capacity Supply Obligation.

#### **III.13.6.1. Resources with Capacity Supply Obligations.**

A resource with a Capacity Supply Obligation assumed through a Forward Capacity Auction, reconfiguration auction, or a Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral shall comply with the requirements of this Section III.13.6.1 during the Capacity Commitment Period, or portion thereof, in which the Capacity Supply Obligation applies.

##### **III.13.6.1.1. Generating Capacity Resources with Capacity Supply Obligations.**

###### **III.13.6.1.1.1. Energy Market Offer Requirements.**

(a) A Generating Capacity Resource having a Capacity Supply Obligation shall be offered into both the Day-Ahead Energy Market and Real-Time Energy Market at a MW amount equal to or greater than its Capacity Supply Obligation whenever the resource is physically available. If the resource is physically available at a level less than its Capacity Supply Obligation, however, the resource shall be offered into both the Day-Ahead Energy Market and Real-Time Energy Market at that level. Day-Ahead Energy Market Supply Offers from such Generating Capacity Resources shall also meet one of the following requirements:

- (i) the sum of the Generating Capacity Resource's Notification Time plus Start-Up Time plus Minimum Run Time plus Minimum Down Time is less than or equal to 72 hours; or
- (ii) if the Generating Capacity Resource cannot meet the offer requirements in Section III.13.6.1.1.1(a)(i) due to physical design limits, then the resource shall be offered into the Day-Ahead Energy Market at a MW amount equal to or greater than its Economic Minimum Limit at

a price of zero or shall be self-scheduled in the Day-Ahead Energy Market at a MW amount equal to or greater than the resource's Economic Minimum Limit.

(b) Notwithstanding the foregoing, if the Generating Capacity Resource is a Settlement Only Resource, it may not submit Supply Offers into the Day-Ahead Energy Market or Real-Time Energy Market.

**III.13.6.1.1.2. Requirement that Offers Reflect Accurate Generating Capacity Resource Operating Characteristics.**

For each day, Day-Ahead Energy Market and Real-Time Energy Market offers for the listed portion of a resource must reflect the then-known unit-specific operating characteristics (taking into account, among other things, the physical design characteristics of the unit) consistent with Good Utility Practice.

Resources must re-declare to the ISO any changes to the offer parameters that occur in real time to reflect the known capability of the resource. A resource failing to comply with this requirement shall be subject to potential referral under Section III.A.19.

**III.13.6.1.1.3. [Reserved.]**

**III.13.6.1.1.4. [Reserved.]**

**III.13.6.1.1.5. Additional Requirements for Generating Capacity Resources.**

Generating Capacity Resources having a Capacity Supply Obligation are subject to the following additional requirements:

(a) auditing and rating requirements as detailed in the ISO New England Manuals and ISO New England Operating Procedures;

(b) Operating Data collection requirements as detailed in the ISO New England Manuals and Market Rule 1 and the requirement to provide to the ISO, upon request and as soon as practicable, confirmation of gas volume schedules sufficient to deliver the energy scheduled for each Generating Capacity Resource using natural gas;

(c) outage requirements in accordance with the ISO New England Manuals and ISO New England Operating Procedures (except that Settlement Only Resources are not subject to outage requirements),



provided, however, that the portion of a resource having no Capacity Supply Obligation is not subject to the forced re-scheduling provisions for outages in accordance with the ISO New England Manuals and ISO New England Operating Procedures.

#### **III.13.6.1.2. Import Capacity Resources with Capacity Supply Obligations.**

##### **III.13.6.1.2.1. Energy Market Offer Requirements.**

A Market Participant with an Import Capacity Resource must offer one or more External Transactions to import energy in the Day-Ahead Energy Market and Real-Time Energy Market for every hour of each Operating Day at the same external interface that, in total, equal the resource's Capacity Supply Obligation, except that:

- (i) the offer requirement does not apply to any hour in which any External Resource associated with an Import Capacity Resource is on an outage;
- (ii) the Day-Ahead Energy Market offer requirement does not apply to any hour in which the import transfer capability of the external interface is 0 MW, and;
- (iii) the Real-Time Energy Market offer requirement does not apply to Import Capacity Resources with Capacity Supply Obligations at an external interface for which Coordinated Transaction Scheduling is implemented.

Each External Transaction submitted in the Day-Ahead Energy Market must reference the associated Import Capacity Resource.

Each External Transaction submitted in the Real-Time Energy Market in accordance with Section III.1.10.7 must reference the associated Import Capacity Resource.

In all cases an Import Capacity Resource is subject to the provisions in Section III.13.7 for the entire Capacity Supply Obligation of the Import Capacity Resource.

##### **III.13.6.1.2.2. Additional Requirements for Import Capacity Resources.**

A Market Participant with an Import Capacity Resource that is associated with an External Resource must:

- (i) comply with all offer, outage scheduling and operating requirements applicable to capacity resources in the External Resource's native Control Area, and;
- (ii) notify the ISO of all outages impacting the Capacity Supply Obligation of the Import Capacity Resource in accordance with the outage notification requirements in ISO New England Operating Procedure No. 5.

### **III.13.6.1.3. Intermittent Power Resources with Capacity Supply Obligations.**

#### **III.13.6.1.3.1. Energy Market Offer Requirements.**

(a) Market Participants with Intermittent Power Resources that are Dispatchable Resources and have a Capacity Supply Obligation are required to submit offers in the Day-Ahead Energy Market consistent with the Market Participant's expectation of the output of the resource in Real-Time. Market Participants with non-dispatchable Intermittent Power Resources with a Capacity Supply Obligation may submit, but are not required to submit, offers into the Day-Ahead Energy Market. Market Participants are required to submit offers for Intermittent Power Resources with a Capacity Supply Obligation for use in the Real-Time Energy Market consistent with the characteristics of the resource. Day-Ahead projections of output shall be submitted as detailed in the ISO New England Manuals. For purposes of calculating Real-Time NCPC Charges, Intermittent Power Resources shall have a generation deviation of zero.

(b) Notwithstanding the foregoing, an Intermittent Power Resource that is a Settlement Only Resource may not submit Supply Offers into the Day-Ahead Energy Market or Real-Time Energy Market.

#### **III.13.6.1.3.2. [Reserved.]**

#### **III.13.6.1.3.3. Additional Requirements for Intermittent Power Resources.**

Intermittent Power Resources are subject to the following additional requirements:

- (a) auditing and rating requirements as detailed in the ISO New England Manuals;
- (b) Operating Data collection requirements as detailed in the ISO New England Manuals;

(c) complying with outage requirements as outlined in the ISO New England Operating Procedures and ISO New England Manuals (except that Intermittent Power Resources that are Settlement Only Resources need not comply with outage requirements).

**III.13.6.1.4. [Reserved.]**

**III.13.6.1.5. Demand Capacity Resources with Capacity Supply Obligations.**

**III.13.6.1.5.1. Energy Market Offer Requirements.**

(a) A Market Participant with an Active Demand Capacity Resource having a Capacity Supply Obligation shall submit Demand Reduction Offers for its Demand Response Resources into the Day-Ahead Energy Market and Real-Time Energy Market in at least the MW amount described in this Section III.13.6.1.5.1; for purposes of the following comparisons, the portion of Demand Reduction Offers not associated with Net Supply shall be increased by average avoided peak transmission and distribution losses. The sum of the Demand Reduction Offers must be equal to or greater than the Active Demand Capacity Resource's Capacity Supply Obligation whenever the Demand Response Resources are physically available. If the Demand Response Resources are physically available at a level less than the Active Demand Capacity Resource's Capacity Supply Obligation, the sum of the Demand Reduction Offers will equal that level and shall be offered into both the Day-Ahead Energy Market and Real-Time Energy Market. Each Demand Reduction Offer from a Demand Response Resource made into the Day-Ahead Energy Market shall also meet the following requirement:

(i) the sum of the Demand Response Resource Notification Time plus Demand Response Resource Start-Up Time plus Minimum Reduction Time plus Minimum Time Between Reductions is less than or equal to 72 hours.

(b) Seasonal Peak Demand Resources and On-Peak Demand Resources may not submit Demand Reduction Offers into the Day-Ahead Energy Market or Real-Time Energy Market.

**III.13.6.1.5.2. Requirement that Offers Reflect Accurate Demand Response Resource Operating Characteristics.**

For each day, Demand Reduction Offers submitted into the Day-Ahead Energy Market and Real-Time Energy Market for a Demand Response Resource associated with an Active Demand Capacity Resource

must reflect the then-known operating characteristics of the resource. Consistent with Section III.1.10.9(d), Demand Response Resources must re-declare to the ISO any changes to offer parameters that occur in real time to reflect the operating characteristics of the resource. A resource failing to comply with this requirement shall be subject to potential referral under Section III.A.

**III.13.6.1.5.3. Additional Requirements for Demand Capacity Resources.**

- (a) A Market Participant may not associate an Asset with a non-commercial Demand Capacity Resource during a Capacity Commitment Period if the Asset can be associated with a commercial Demand Capacity Resource whose capability is less than its Capacity Supply Obligation during that Capacity Commitment Period.
- (b) An Energy Efficiency measure may be added to an On-Peak Demand Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource (other than one consisting of Load Management or Distributed Generation) until two years after the start of the Capacity Commitment Period for which the resource first received a Capacity Supply Obligation; provided, however, that a resource that qualified for a Forward Capacity Auction associated with a Capacity Commitment Period beginning on or before June 1, 2024 may install Energy Efficiency measures until May 31, 2027. Once an Energy Efficiency measure has been associated with an On-Peak Demand Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource, the measure may not be transferred to a different resource.
- (c) For purposes of confirming FCM Commercial Operation as described in Section III.13.3.8, the ISO shall use a summer Seasonal DR Audit value or summer Passive DR Audit value to verify the capacity rating of a Demand Capacity Resource with summer Qualified Capacity. A winter Seasonal DR Audit value or winter Passive DR Audit value may only be used to verify the winter commercial capacity of a Demand Capacity Resource. The summer and winter commercial capacity of a Demand Capacity Resource consisting of Energy Efficiency measures may be verified in any month of the year.
- (d) For Active Demand Capacity Resources, a summer Seasonal DR Audit value shall be established for use from April 1 through November 30 and a winter Seasonal DR Audit value shall be established for use from December 1 through March 31. The summer or winter Seasonal DR Audit value of an Active Demand Capacity Resource is equal to the sum of the like-season Seasonal DR Audit values of its constituent Demand Response Resources as determined pursuant to Section III.1.5.1.3.1. The Seasonal DR Audit value of an Active Demand Capacity Resource shall automatically update whenever a new

Seasonal DR Audit value is approved for a constituent Demand Response Resource or with changes to the makeup of the constituent Demand Response Resources.

(e) On-Peak Demand Resources and Seasonal Peak Demand Resources shall in addition: (i) comply with the ISO's measurement and verification requirements pursuant to Section III.13.1.4.3 and the ISO New England Manuals; and (ii) comply with the auditing and rating requirements as detailed in Sections III.13.6.1.5.4 and III.13.6.1.5.5 and the ISO New England Manuals.

(f) Active Demand Capacity Resources shall in addition: (i) comply with the measurement and verification requirements and the Operating Data collection requirements as detailed in the ISO New England Manuals and Market Rule 1, and with outage requirements in accordance with the ISO New England Manuals and ISO New England Operating Procedures, provided, however, that the portion of a resource having no Capacity Supply Obligation is not subject to the forced re-scheduling provisions for outages in accordance with the ISO New England Manuals and ISO New England Operating Procedures; and (ii) comply with the auditing and rating requirements as detailed in Section III.13.6.1.5.5 and the ISO New England Manuals.

**III.13.6.1.5.4. On-Peak Demand Resource and Seasonal Peak Demand Resource Auditing Requirements.**

(a) A summer Passive DR Audit value and a winter Passive DR Audit value must be established for each On-Peak Demand Resource and Seasonal Peak Demand Resource in every Capacity Commitment Period during which the On-Peak Demand Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource has an annual or monthly Capacity Supply Obligation.

(b) Summer Passive DR Audit values shall be determined based on data for one or more months of the summer Passive DR Auditing Period (June through August). Winter Passive DR Audit values shall be determined based on data for one or more months of the winter Passive DR Auditing Period (December through January).

(c) Passive DR Audit values will be made available to the Market Participant within 20 Business Days following the end of the period for which the audit value is determined by the ISO.

- (d) The audit value of an On-Peak Demand Resource is determined by evaluating the Average Hourly Output or Average Hourly Load Reduction of each Asset associated with the On-Peak Demand Resource during the Demand Resource On-Peak Hours.
- (e) The audit value of a Seasonal Peak Demand Resource is determined by evaluating the Average Hourly Output or Average Hourly Load Reduction of each Asset associated with the Seasonal Peak Demand Resource during the Demand Resource Seasonal Peak Hours. If there are no Demand Resource Seasonal Peak Hours in a month during the Passive DR Auditing Period, performance during Demand Resource On-Peak Hours in that month may be used.
- (f) Passive DR Audit values shall become effective one calendar day after being made available to the Market Participant and remain valid until the earlier of: (i) the next like-season Passive DR Audit value becomes effective or (ii) the end of the following Capability Demonstration Year.
- (g) For On-Peak Demand Resources consisting of Energy Efficiency measures and Seasonal Peak Demand Resources consisting of Energy Efficiency measures, the ISO will calculate a summer Passive DR Audit value and a winter Passive DR Audit value in each month of the year. For all other On-Peak Demand Resources and Seasonal Peak Demand Resources, a Market Participant may request that a summer or winter Passive DR Audit value be determined based on data for, respectively, a summer or winter month outside of the Passive DR Auditing Periods. (For Demand Capacity Resources, summer months are April through November; all other months are winter months.) Such an audit shall not satisfy the Passive DR Audit requirement.

#### **III.13.6.1.5.5. Additional Demand Capacity Resource Audits.**

The ISO may perform additional audits for a Demand Capacity Resource to establish or verify the capability of the Demand Capacity Resource and its underlying assets and measures. This additional auditing may consist of two levels.

- (a) Level 1 Audit: the ISO will establish the audit results by conducting a review of records of the Assets and measures to verify that the reported Assets and measures have been installed and are operational. The audit shall include, but is not limited to, reviewing project or program databases, invoices, installation reports, work orders, and field inspection reports. In addition, the audit may involve reviewing any independent inspections or evaluations conducted as part of program implementation and program evaluation.

(b) Level 2 Audit: the ISO will establish the audit results by initiating or conducting an on-site field audit to verify the installation and performance of the Assets and measures. Such an audit may include a random or select sample of facilities and measures.

A level 1 audit is not required to precede a level 2 audit. If the results of the audit indicate that the demand reduction capability of the Demand Capacity Resource is less than or greater than its most recent like-season Passive DR Audit value or Seasonal DR Audit value, then the Demand Capacity Resource's audit value shall be adjusted accordingly.

### **III.13.6.1.6. DNE Dispatchable Generator.**

#### **III.13.6.1.6.1. Energy Market Offer Requirements.**

Beginning on June 1, 2019, Market Participants with DNE Dispatchable Generators with a Capacity Supply Obligation must submit offers into the Day-Ahead Energy Market for the full amount of the resource's expected hourly physical capability as determined by the Market Participant. Market Participants with DNE Dispatchable Generators having a Capacity Supply Obligation must submit offers for the Real-Time Energy Market consistent with the characteristics of the resource. For purposes of calculating Real-Time NCPC Charges, DNE Dispatchable Generators shall have a generation deviation of zero.

#### **III.13.6.2. Resources without a Capacity Supply Obligation.**

A resource that does not have any Capacity Supply Obligation shall comply with the requirements in this Section III.13.6.2, and shall not be subject to the requirements set forth in Section III.13.6.1 during the Capacity Commitment Period, or portion thereof, for which the resource has no Capacity Supply Obligation.

### **III.13.6.2.1. Generating Capacity Resources without a Capacity Supply Obligation.**

#### **III.13.6.2.1.1. Energy Market Offer Requirements.**

A Generating Capacity Resource having no Capacity Supply Obligation is not required to offer into the Day-Ahead Energy Market or Real-Time Energy Market. A Generating Capacity Resource that is a Settlement Only Resource may not offer into the Day-Ahead Energy Market or Real-Time Energy Market.

**III.13.6.2.1.1.1. Day-Ahead Energy Market Participation.**

A Generating Capacity Resource having no Capacity Supply Obligation may submit an offer into the Day-Ahead Energy Market. If any portion of the offered energy clears in the Day-Ahead Energy Market, the entire Supply Offer, up to the Economic Maximum Limit offered into the Day-Ahead Energy Market, will be subject to all of the rules and requirements applicable to that market for the operating day, including the obligation to follow ISO Dispatch Instructions. Such a resource that clears shall be eligible for dispatch in the Real-Time Energy Market.

**III.13.6.2.1.1.2. Real-Time Energy Market Participation.**

A Generating Capacity Resource having no Capacity Supply Obligation may submit an offer into the Real-Time Energy Market. If any portion of the offered energy clears in the Real-Time Energy Market, the entire Supply Offer, up to the Economic Maximum Limit offered into the Real-Time Energy Market, will be subject to all of the rules and requirements applicable to that market for the Operating Day, including the obligation to follow ISO Dispatch Instructions. Such a resource shall be eligible for dispatch in the Real-Time Energy Market.

**III.13.6.2.1.2. Additional Requirements for Generating Capacity Resources Having No Capacity Supply Obligation.**

Generating Capacity Resources having no Capacity Supply Obligation are subject to the following additional requirements:

- (a) complying with the auditing and rating requirements as detailed in the ISO New England Manuals;
- (b) complying with the Operating Data collection requirements detailed in the ISO New England Manuals; and
- (c) complying with outage requirements as outlined in the ISO New England Operating Procedures and ISO New England Manuals. Generating Capacity Resources having no Capacity Supply Obligation are not subject to the forced re-scheduling provisions for outages in accordance with the ISO New England Manuals and ISO New England Operating Procedures.

**III.13.6.2.2. [Reserved.]**



**III.13.6.2.3. Intermittent Power Resources without a Capacity Supply Obligation.**

**III.13.6.2.3.1. Energy Market Offer Requirements.**

An Intermittent Power Resource having no Capacity Supply Obligation is not required to offer into the Day-Ahead Energy Market or Real-Time Energy Market. An Intermittent Power Resource that is a Settlement Only Resource may not offer into the Day-Ahead Energy Market or Real-Time Energy Market.

**III.13.6.2.3.2. Additional Requirements for Intermittent Power Resources.**

Intermittent Power Resources are subject to the following additional requirements:

- (a) auditing and rating requirements as detailed in the ISO New England Manuals; and
- (b) Operating Data collection requirements as detailed in the ISO New England Manuals.

**III.13.6.2.4. [Reserved.]**

**III.13.6.2.5. Demand Capacity Resources without a Capacity Supply Obligation.**

**III.13.6.2.5.1. Energy Market Offer Requirements.**

A Market Participant with a Demand Response Resource associated with an Active Demand Capacity Resource without a Capacity Supply Obligation is not required to offer Demand Reduction Offers for the Demand Response Resource into the Day-Ahead Energy Market or Real-Time Energy Market.

Seasonal Peak Demand Resources and On-Peak Demand Resources may not submit Demand Reduction Offers into the Day-Ahead Energy Market or Real-Time Energy Market.

**III.13.6.2.5.1.1. Day-Ahead Energy Market Participation.**

A Market Participant with a Demand Response Resource associated with an Active Demand Capacity Resource without a Capacity Supply Obligation may submit a Demand Reduction Offer into the Day-Ahead Energy Market. If any portion of the Demand Reduction Offer clears in the Day-Ahead Energy Market, the entire Demand Reduction Offer, up to the Maximum Reduction offered into the Day-Ahead Energy Market, will be subject to all of the rules and requirements applicable to that market for the

Operating Day, including the obligation to follow Dispatch Instructions. Such a resource that clears shall be eligible for dispatch in the Real-Time Energy Market.

**III.13.6.2.5.1.2. Real-Time Energy Market Participation.**

A Market Participant with a Demand Response Resource associated with an Active Demand Capacity Resource without a Capacity Supply Obligation, that did not submit an offer into the Day-Ahead Energy Market or was offered into the Day-Ahead Energy Market and did not clear, may submit a Demand Reduction Offer in the Real-Time Energy Market and shall be subject to all of the requirements associated therewith. Such a resource shall be eligible for dispatch in the Real-Time Energy Market.

**III.13.6.2.5.2. Additional Requirements for Demand Capacity Resources Having No Capacity Supply Obligation.**

Demand Capacity Resources without a Capacity Supply Obligation are subject to the following additional requirements:

- (a) complying with Section III.13.6.1.5.3(a) and (b) and with the auditing and rating requirements described in Section III.13.6.1.5.5 and the ISO New England Manuals; and
- (b) for Active Demand Capacity Resources, complying with the Operating Data collection requirements detailed in the ISO New England Manuals; and
- (c) for Active Demand Capacity Resources, complying with outage requirements as outlined in the ISO New England Operating Procedures and ISO New England Manuals. Active Demand Capacity Resources having no Capacity Supply Obligation are not subject to the forced re-scheduling provisions for outages in accordance with the ISO New England Manuals and ISO New England Operating Procedures.

**III.13.6.3. Exporting Resources.**

A resource that is exporting capacity not subject to a Capacity Supply Obligation to an external Control Area shall comply with this Section III.13.6.3 and the ISO New England Manuals. Intermittent Power Resources and Demand Capacity Resources are not permitted to back a capacity export to an external Control Area. The portion of a resource without a Capacity Supply Obligation that will be used in Real-Time to support an External Transaction sale must comply with the energy market offer requirements of Section III.1.10.7.

**III.13.6.4. ISO Requests for Energy.**

The ISO may request that an Active Demand Capacity Resource or a Generating Capacity Resource having capacity that is not subject to a Capacity Supply Obligation provide energy for reliability purposes in the Real-Time Energy Market, but such resource shall not be obligated under Section III.13 of this Tariff by such a request to provide energy from that capacity. If such resource does provide energy from that capacity, the resource shall be paid based on its most recent offer and is eligible for NCPC.

**III.13.6.4.1. Real-Time High Operating Limit.**

For purposes of facilitating ISO requests for energy under Section III.13.6.4, a Market Participant must report an up-to-date Real-Time High Operating Limit value at all times for a Generating Capacity Resource.

### **III.13.7. Performance, Payments and Charges in the FCM.**

Revenue in the Forward Capacity Market for resources providing capacity shall be composed of Capacity Base Payments as described in Section III.13.7.1 and Capacity Performance Payments as described in Section III.13.7.2, adjusted as described in Section III.13.7.3 and Section III.13.7.4. Market Participants with a Capacity Load Obligation will be subject to charges as described in Section III.13.7.5.

In the event of a change in the Lead Market Participant for a resource that has a Capacity Supply Obligation, the Capacity Supply Obligation shall remain associated with the resource and the new Lead Market Participant for the resource shall be bound by all provisions of this Section III.13 arising from such Capacity Supply Obligation. The Lead Market Participant for the resource at the start of an Obligation Month shall be responsible for all payments and charges associated with that resource in that Obligation Month.

#### **III.13.7.1. Capacity Base Payments.**

Resources acquiring or shedding a Capacity Supply Obligation for the Obligation Month shall receive a Capacity Base Payment for the Obligation Month reflecting the payments and charges described in Section III.13.7.1.1, as adjusted to account for peak energy rents as described in Section III.13.7.1.2.

##### **III.13.7.1.1. Monthly Payments and Charges Reflecting Capacity Supply Obligations.**

Each resource that has: (i) cleared in a Forward Capacity Auction, except for the portion of resources designated as Self-Supplied FCA Resources; (ii) cleared in a reconfiguration auction; or (iii) entered into a Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral shall be entitled to a monthly payment or charge during the Capacity Commitment Period based on the following amounts:

(a) **Forward Capacity Auction.** For a resource whose offer has cleared in a Forward Capacity Auction, the monthly capacity payment shall equal the product of its cleared capacity and the Capacity Clearing Price in the Capacity Zone in which the resource is located as adjusted by applicable indexing for resources with additional Capacity Commitment Period elections pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.2.4 in the manner described below. For a resource that has elected to have the Capacity Clearing Price and the Capacity Supply Obligation apply for more than one Capacity Commitment Period, payments associated with the Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price (indexed using the Handy-Whitman Index of Public Utility Construction Costs in effect as of December 31 of the year preceding the Capacity Commitment Period) shall continue to apply after the Capacity Commitment Period associated

with the Forward Capacity Auction in which the offer clears, for up to six additional and consecutive Capacity Commitment Periods, in whole Capacity Commitment Period increments only.

(b) **Reconfiguration Auctions.** For a resource whose offer or bid has cleared in an annual or monthly reconfiguration auction, the monthly capacity payment or charge shall be equal to the product of its cleared capacity and the appropriate reconfiguration auction clearing price in the Capacity Zone in which the resource cleared.

(c) **Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals.** For resources that have acquired or shed a Capacity Supply Obligation through a Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral, the monthly capacity payment or charge shall be equal to the product of the Capacity Supply Obligation being assumed or shed and price associated with the Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral.

(d) **Substitution Auctions.** For a resource whose offer or bid has cleared in a substitution auction, the monthly capacity payment or charge shall be equal to the product of its cleared capacity and the substitution auction clearing price. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the monthly capacity charge for a demand bid cleared at a substitution auction clearing price above its bid price shall be calculated using its bid price.

#### **III.13.7.1.2 Peak Energy Rents.**

For Capacity Commitment Periods beginning prior to June 1, 2019, Capacity Base Payments to resources with Capacity Supply Obligations, except for (1) On-Peak Demand Resources, (2) Seasonal Peak Demand Resources, and (3) New Generating Capacity Resources that have cleared in the Forward Capacity Auction and have completed construction but due to a planned transmission facility (e.g., a radial interconnection) not being in service are not able to achieve FCM Commercial Operation, shall be decreased by Peak Energy Rents (“PER”) calculated in each Capacity Zone, as determined pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.4 in the Forward Capacity Auction, as provided below. The PER calculation shall utilize hourly integrated Real-Time LMPs. For each Capacity Zone in the Forward Capacity Auction, as determined pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.4, PER shall be computed based on the load-weighted Real-Time LMPs for each Capacity Zone, using the Real-Time Hub Price for the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone. Self-Supplied FCA Resources shall not be subject to a PER adjustment on the portion of the resource that is self-supplied.

### III.13.7.1.2.1 Hourly PER Calculations.

(a) For hours with a positive difference between the hourly Real-Time energy price and a strike price, the ISO shall compute PER for each hour ("Hourly PER") equal to this positive difference in accordance with one of the following formulas, which include scaling adjustments for system load and availability:

For hours within the period beginning September 30, 2016 through May 31, 2018:

$$\text{Hourly PER}(\$/\text{kW}) = [(\text{LMP} - \text{Adjusted Hourly PER Strike Price}) * [\text{Scaling Factor}] * [\text{Availability Factor}]]$$

Where:

$$\text{Adjusted Hourly PER Strike Price} = \text{Strike Price} + \text{Hourly PER Adjustment}$$

$$\text{Hourly PER Adjustment} = \text{average of Five-Minute PER Strike Price Adjustment values}$$

$$\text{Five-Minute PER Strike Price Adjustment} = \text{MAX} (\text{Thirty-Minute Operating Reserve clearing price} - \$500/\text{MWh}, 0) + \text{MAX} (\text{Ten-Minute Non-Spinning Reserve clearing price} - \text{Thirty-Minute Operating Reserve clearing price} - \$850/\text{MWh}, 0).$$

Strike Price = as defined below

Scaling Factor = as defined below

Availability Factor = as defined below

For all other hours:

$$\text{Hourly PER}(\$/\text{kW}) = [\text{LMP} - \text{Strike Price}] * [\text{Scaling Factor}] * [\text{Availability Factor}]$$

Where:

Strike Price = the heat rate x fuel cost of the PER Proxy Unit described below.

Scaling Factor = the ratio of actual hourly integrated system load (calculated as the sum of Real-Time Load Obligations for the system as calculated in the settlement of the Real-Time Energy

Market and adjusted for losses and including imports delivered in the Real-Time Energy Market) and the 50/50 predicted peak system load reduced appropriately for Demand Capacity Resources, used in the most recent calculation of the Installed Capacity Requirement for that Capacity Commitment Period, capped at an hourly ratio of 1.0.

Availability Factor = 0.95.

(b) PER Proxy Unit characteristics shall be as follows:

(i) The PER Proxy Unit shall be indexed to the marginal fuel, which shall be the higher of the following, as determined on a daily basis: ultra low-sulfur No. 2 oil measured at New York Harbor plus a seven percent markup for transportation; or day-ahead gas measured at the AGT-CG (Non-G) hub;

(ii) The PER Proxy Unit shall be assumed to have no start-up, ramp rate or minimum run time constraints;

(iii) The PER Proxy Unit shall have a 22,000 Btu/kWh heat rate. This assumption shall be periodically reviewed after the first Capacity Commitment Period by the ISO to ensure that the heat rate continues to reflect a level slightly higher than the marginal generating unit in the region that would be dispatched as the system enters a scarcity condition. Any changes to the heat rate of the PER Proxy Unit shall be considered in the stakeholder process in consultation with the state utility regulatory agencies, shall be filed pursuant to Section 205 of the Federal Power Act, and shall be applied prospectively to the settlement of future Forward Capacity Auctions.

#### **III.13.7.1.2.2. Monthly PER Application.**

The Hourly PER shall be summed for each calendar month to determine the total PER for that month ("Monthly PER"). The ISO shall then calculate the Average Monthly PER earned by the proxy unit. The Average Monthly PER shall be equal to the average of the Monthly PER values for the 12 months prior to the Obligation Month. The PER deduction for each resource shall be calculated as the Average Monthly PER multiplied by the resource's Capacity Supply Obligation for the Obligation Month (less any Capacity Supply Obligation MW from any portion of a Self-Supplied FCA Resource); provided, however, that in no case shall a resource's PER deduction for an Obligation Month be less than zero or

greater than the product of the resource's Capacity Supply Obligation and the relevant Forward Capacity Auction Capacity Clearing Price.

#### **III.13.7.1.3. Export Capacity.**

If there are any Export Bids or Administrative Export De-List Bids from resources located in an export-constrained Capacity Zone or in the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone that have cleared in the Forward Capacity Auction and if the resource is exporting capacity at an export interface that is connected to an import-constrained Capacity Zone or the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone that is different than the Capacity Zone in which the resource is located, then charges and credits are applied as follows (for the following calculation, the Capacity Clearing Price will be the value prior to PER adjustments).

Charge Amount to Resource Exporting = [Capacity Clearing Price<sub>location of the interface</sub> - Capacity Clearing Price<sub>location of the resource</sub>] x Cleared MWs of Export Bid or Administrative Export De-List Bid]

Credit Amount to Capacity Load Obligations in the Capacity Zone where the export interface is located = [Capacity Clearing Price<sub>location of the interface</sub> - Capacity Clearing Price<sub>location of the resource</sub>] x Cleared MWs of Export Bid or Administrative Export De-list Bid]

Credits and charges to load in the applicable Capacity Zones, as set forth above, shall be allocated in proportion to each LSE's Capacity Load Obligation as calculated in Section III.13.7.5.2.

#### **III.13.7.1.4. [Reserved.]**

### **III.13.7.2 Capacity Performance Payments.**

#### **III.13.7.2.1 Definition of Capacity Scarcity Condition.**

A Capacity Scarcity Condition shall exist in a Capacity Zone for any five-minute interval in which the Real-Time Reserve Clearing Price for that entire Capacity Zone is set based on the Reserve Constraint Penalty Factor pricing for: (i) the Minimum Total Reserve Requirement; (ii) the Ten-Minute Reserve Requirement; or (iii) the Zonal Reserve Requirement, each as described in Section III.2.7A(c); provided, however, that a Capacity Scarcity Condition shall not exist if the Reserve Constraint Penalty Factor pricing results only because of resource ramping limitations that are not binding on the energy dispatch.



### **III.13.7.2.2 Calculation of Actual Capacity Provided During a Capacity Scarcity Condition.**

For each five-minute interval in which a Capacity Scarcity Condition exists, the ISO shall calculate the Actual Capacity Provided by each resource, whether or not it has a Capacity Supply Obligation, in any Capacity Zone that is subject to the Capacity Scarcity Condition. For resources not having a Capacity Supply Obligation (including External Transactions), the Actual Capacity Provided shall be calculated using the provision below applicable to the resource type. Notwithstanding the specific provisions of this Section III.13.7.2.2, no resource shall have an Actual Capacity Provided that is less than zero.

(a) A Generating Capacity Resource's Actual Capacity Provided during a Capacity Scarcity Condition shall be the sum of the resource's output during the interval plus the resource's Reserve Quantity For Settlement during the interval; provided, however, that if the resource's output was limited during the Capacity Scarcity Condition as a result of a transmission system limitation, then the resource's Actual Capacity Provided may not be greater than the sum of the resource's Desired Dispatch Point during the interval, plus the resource's Reserve Quantity For Settlement during the interval. Where the resource is associated with one or more External Transaction sales submitted in accordance with Section III.1.10.7(f), the resource will have its hourly Actual Capacity Provided reduced by the hourly integrated delivered MW for the External Transaction sale or sales.

(b) An Import Capacity Resource's Actual Capacity Provided during a Capacity Scarcity Condition shall be the net energy delivered during the interval in which the Capacity Scarcity Condition occurred. Where a single Market Participant owns more than one Import Capacity Resource, then the difference between the total net energy delivered from those resources and the total of the Capacity Supply Obligations of those resources shall be allocated to those resources pro rata.

(c) An On-Peak Demand Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource's Actual Capacity Provided during a Capacity Scarcity Condition shall be the sum of the Actual Capacity Provided for each of its components, as determined below, where the MWhs of reduction, other than MWhs associated with Net Supply, are increased by average avoided peak transmission and distribution losses.

- (i) For Energy Efficiency measures, the Actual Capacity Provided shall be zero.
- (ii) For Distributed Generation measures submitting meter data for the full 24 hour calendar day during which the Capacity Scarcity Condition occurs, the Actual Capacity Provided

shall be equal to the submitted meter data, adjusted as necessary for the five-minute interval in which the Capacity Scarcity Condition occurs.

- (iii) For Load Management measures submitting meter data for the full 24 hour calendar day during which the Capacity Scarcity Condition occurs, the Actual Capacity Provided shall be equal to the submitted demand reduction data, adjusted as necessary for the five-minute interval in which the Capacity Scarcity Condition occurs.
  - (iv) Notwithstanding any other provision of this Section III.13.7.2.2(c), for any On-Peak Demand Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource that fails to provide the data necessary for the ISO to determine the Actual Capacity Provided as described in this Section III.13.7.2.2(c), the Actual Capacity Provided shall be zero.
- (d) An Active Demand Capacity Resource's Actual Capacity Provided during a Capacity Scarcity Condition shall be the sum of the Actual Capacity Provided by its constituent Demand Response Resources during the Capacity Scarcity Condition.
- (i) A Demand Response Resource's Actual Capacity Provided during a Capacity Scarcity Condition shall be: (1) the sum of the Real-Time demand reduction of its constituent Demand Response Assets (provided, however, that if the Demand Response Resource was limited during the Capacity Scarcity Condition as a result of a transmission system limitation, then the sum of the Real-Time demand reduction of its constituent Demand Response Assets may not be greater than its Desired Dispatch Point during the interval), plus (2) the Demand Response Resource's Reserve Quantity For Settlement, where the MW quantity, other than the MW quantity associated with Net Supply, is increased by average avoided peak transmission and distribution losses; provided, however, that a Demand Response Resource's Actual Capacity Provided shall not be less than zero.
  - (ii) The Real-Time demand reduction of a Demand Response Asset shall be calculated as described in Section III.8.4, except that: (1) in the case of a Demand Response Asset that is on a forced or scheduled curtailment as described in Section III.8.3, a Real-Time demand reduction shall also be calculated for intervals in which the associated Demand Response Resource does not receive a non-zero Dispatch Instruction; (2) in the case of a Demand Response Asset that is on a forced or scheduled curtailment as described in

Section III.8.3, the minuend in the calculation described in Section III.8.4 shall be the unadjusted Demand Response Baseline of the Demand Response Asset; and (3) the resulting MWhs of reduction, other than the MWhs associated with Net Supply, shall be increased by average avoided peak transmission and distribution losses.

### **III.13.7.2.3 Capacity Balancing Ratio.**

For each five-minute interval in which a Capacity Scarcity Condition exists, the ISO shall calculate a Capacity Balancing Ratio using the following formula:

$$(\text{Load} + \text{Reserve Requirement}) / \text{Total Capacity Supply Obligation}$$

(a) If the Capacity Scarcity Condition is a result of a violation of the Minimum Total Reserve Requirement such that the associated system-wide Reserve Constraint Penalty Factor pricing applies, then the terms used in the formula above shall be calculated as follows:

Load = the total amount of Actual Capacity Provided (excluding applicable Real-Time Reserve Designations) from all resources in the New England Control Area during the interval (with the Actual Capacity Provided of Energy Efficiency measures being zero, as specified in Section III.13.7.2.2(c)(i)).

Reserve Requirement = the Minimum Total Reserve Requirement during the interval.

Total Capacity Supply Obligation = the total amount of Capacity Supply Obligations in the New England Control Area during the interval, excluding the Capacity Supply Obligations associated with Energy Efficiency measures.

(b) If the Capacity Scarcity Condition is a result of a violation of the Ten-Minute Reserve Requirement such that the associated system-wide Reserve Constraint Penalty Factor pricing applies, then the terms used in the formula above shall be calculated as follows:

Load = the total amount of Actual Capacity Provided (excluding applicable Real-Time Reserve Designations) from all resources in the New England Control Area during the interval (with the Actual Capacity Provided of Energy Efficiency measures being zero, as specified in Section III.13.7.2.2(c)(i)).

Reserve Requirement = the Ten-Minute Reserve Requirement during the interval.

Total Capacity Supply Obligation = the total amount of Capacity Supply Obligations in the New England Control Area during the interval, excluding the Capacity Supply Obligations associated with Energy Efficiency measures.

(c) If the Capacity Scarcity Condition is a result of a violation of the Zonal Reserve Requirement such that the associated Reserve Constraint Penalty Factor pricing applies, then the terms used in the formula above shall be calculated as follows:

Load = the total amount of Actual Capacity Provided (excluding applicable Real-Time Reserve Designations) from all resources in the Capacity Zone during the interval plus the net amount of energy imported into the Capacity Zone from outside the New England Control Area during the interval (but not less than zero) (with the Actual Capacity Provided of Energy Efficiency measures being zero, as specified in Section III.13.7.2.2(c)(i)).

Reserve Requirement = the Zonal Reserve Requirement minus any reserve support coming into the Capacity Zone over the internal transmission interface.

Total Capacity Supply Obligation = the total amount of Capacity Supply Obligations in the Capacity Zone during the interval, excluding the Capacity Supply Obligations associated with Energy Efficiency measures.

(d) The following provisions shall be used to determine the applicable Capacity Balancing Ratio where more than one of the conditions described in subsections (a), (b), and (c) apply in a Capacity Zone.

(i) In any Capacity Zone subject to Reserve Constraint Penalty Factor pricing associated with both the Minimum Total Reserve Requirement and the Ten-Minute Reserve Requirement, but not the Zonal Reserve Requirement, the Capacity Balancing Ratio shall be calculated as described in Section III.13.7.2.3(a) for resources in that Capacity Zone.

(ii) In any Capacity Zone subject to Reserve Constraint Penalty Factor pricing associated with both the Ten-Minute Reserve Requirement and the Zonal Reserve Requirement, but not the Minimum Total Reserve Requirement, the Capacity Balancing Ratio for resources in that Capacity Zone shall be the higher of the Capacity Balancing Ratio calculated as described in

Section III.13.7.2.3(b) and the Capacity Balancing Ratio calculated as described in Section III.13.7.2.3(c).

(iii) In any Capacity Zone subject to Reserve Constraint Penalty Factor pricing associated with the Minimum Total Reserve Requirement and the Zonal Reserve Requirement (regardless of whether the Capacity Zone is also subject to Reserve Constraint Penalty Factor pricing associated with the Ten-Minute Reserve Requirement), the Capacity Balancing Ratio for resources in that Capacity Zone shall be the higher of the Capacity Balancing Ratio calculated as described in Section III.13.7.2.3(a) and the Capacity Balancing Ratio calculated as described in Section III.13.7.2.3(c).

#### **III.13.7.2.4 Capacity Performance Score.**

Each resource, whether or not it has a Capacity Supply Obligation, will be assigned a Capacity Performance Score for each five-minute interval in which a Capacity Scarcity Condition exists in the Capacity Zone in which the resource is located. A resource's Capacity Performance Score for the interval shall equal the resource's Actual Capacity Provided during the interval (with the Actual Capacity Provided of Energy Efficiency measures being zero, as specified in Section III.13.7.2.2(c)(i)) minus the product of the resource's Capacity Supply Obligation (which for this purpose shall not be less than zero) and the applicable Capacity Balancing Ratio; provided, however, that for an On-Peak Demand Resource or a Seasonal Peak Demand Resource, the Capacity Supply Obligation associated with any Energy Efficiency measures shall be excluded from the calculation of the resource's Capacity Performance Score. The resulting Capacity Performance Score may be positive, zero, or negative.

#### **III.13.7.2.5 Capacity Performance Payment Rate.**

For the three Capacity Commitment Periods beginning June 1, 2018 and ending May 31, 2021, the Capacity Performance Payment Rate shall be \$2000/MWh. For the three Capacity Commitment Periods beginning June 1, 2021 and ending May 31, 2024, the Capacity Performance Payment Rate shall be \$3500/MWh. For the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2024 and ending on May 31, 2025, the Capacity Performance Payment Rate shall be \$5455/MWh. For the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2025 and ending on May 31, 2026 ~~and thereafter~~, the Capacity Performance Payment Rate shall be \$9337/MWh. For the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2026 and ending on May 31, 2027 and thereafter, the Capacity Performance Payment Rate shall be \$10833/MWh. The ISO shall review the Capacity Performance Payment Rate in the stakeholder process

as needed and shall file with the Commission a new Capacity Performance Payment Rate if and as appropriate.

#### **III.13.7.2.6 Calculation of Capacity Performance Payments.**

For each resource, whether or not it has a Capacity Supply Obligation, the ISO shall calculate a Capacity Performance Payment for each five-minute interval in which a Capacity Scarcity Condition exists in the Capacity Zone in which the resource is located. A resource's Capacity Performance Payment for an interval shall equal the resource's Capacity Performance Score for the interval multiplied by the Capacity Performance Payment Rate. The resulting Capacity Performance Payment for an interval may be positive or negative.

#### **III.13.7.3 Monthly Capacity Payment and Capacity Stop-Loss Mechanism.**

Each resource's Monthly Capacity Payment for an Obligation Month, which may be positive or negative, shall be the sum of the resource's Capacity Base Payment for the Obligation Month plus the sum of the resource's Capacity Performance Payments for all five-minute intervals in the Obligation Month, except as provided in Section III.13.7.3.1 and Section III.13.7.3.2 below.

##### **III.13.7.3.1 Monthly Stop-Loss.**

If the sum of the resource's Capacity Performance Payments (excluding any Capacity Performance Payments associated with Actual Capacity Provided above the resource's Capacity Supply Obligation in any interval) for all five-minute intervals in the Obligation Month is negative, the amount subtracted from the resource's Capacity Base Payment for the Obligation Month will be limited to an amount equal to the product of the applicable Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price multiplied by the resource's Capacity Supply Obligation for the Obligation Month (or, in the case of a resource subject to a multi-year Capacity Commitment Period election made in a Forward Capacity Auction prior to the ninth Forward Capacity Auction as described in Sections III.13.1.1.2.2.4 and III.13.1.4.1.1.2.7, the amount subtracted from the resource's Capacity Base Payment for the Obligation Month will be limited to an amount equal to the product of the applicable Capacity Clearing Price (indexed for inflation) multiplied by the resource's Capacity Supply Obligation for the Obligation Month).

##### **III.13.7.3.2 Annual Stop-Loss.**

- (a) For each Obligation Month, the ISO shall calculate a stop-loss amount equal to:

$\text{MaxCSO} \times [3 \text{ months} \times (\text{FCAcp} - \text{FCAsp}) - (12 \text{ months} \times \text{FCAcp})]$

Where:

MaxCSO = the resource's highest monthly Capacity Supply Obligation in the Capacity Commitment Period to date.

FCAcp = the Capacity Clearing Price for the relevant Forward Capacity Auction.

FCAsp = the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price for the relevant Forward Capacity Auction.

(b) For each Obligation Month, the ISO shall calculate each resource's cumulative Capacity Performance Payments as the sum of the resource's Capacity Performance Payments for all months in the Capacity Commitment Period to date, with those monthly amounts limited as described in Section III.13.7.3.1.

(c) If the sum of the resource's Capacity Performance Payments (excluding any Capacity Performance Payments associated with Actual Capacity Provided above the resource's Capacity Supply Obligation in any interval) for all five-minute intervals in the Obligation Month is negative, the amount subtracted from the resource's Capacity Base Payment for the Obligation Month will be limited to an amount equal to the difference between the stop-loss amount calculated as described in Section III.13.7.3.2(a) and the resource's cumulative Capacity Performance Payments as described in Section III.13.7.3.2(b).

#### **III.13.7.4 Allocation of Deficient or Excess Capacity Performance Payments.**

For each type of Capacity Scarcity Condition as described in Section III.13.7.2.1 and for each Capacity Zone, the ISO shall allocate deficient or excess Capacity Performance Payments as described in subsections (a) and (b) below. Where more than one type of Capacity Scarcity Condition applies, then the provisions below shall be applied in proportion to the duration of each type of Capacity Scarcity Condition.

(a) If the sum of all Capacity Performance Payments to all resources subject to the Capacity Scarcity Condition in the Capacity Zone in an Obligation Month is positive, the deficiency will be charged to resources in proportion to each such resource's Capacity Supply Obligation for the Obligation Month,

excluding any resources subject to the stop-loss mechanism described in Section III.13.7.3 for the Obligation Month and excluding any resource, or portion thereof, consisting of Energy Efficiency measures. If the charge described in this Section III.13.7.4(a) causes a resource to reach the stop-loss limit described in Section III.13.7.3, then the stop-loss cap described in Section III.13.7.3 will be applied to that resource, and the remaining deficiency will be further allocated to other resources in the same manner as described in this Section III.13.7.4(a).

(b) If the sum of all Capacity Performance Payments to all resources subject to the Capacity Scarcity Condition in the Capacity Zone in an Obligation Month is negative, the excess will be credited to all such resources (excluding any resource, or portion thereof, consisting of Energy Efficiency measures) in proportion to each resource's Capacity Supply Obligation for the Obligation Month. For a resource subject to the stop-loss mechanism described in Section III.13.7.3 for the Obligation Month, any such credit shall be reduced (though not to less than zero) by the amount not charged to the resource as a result of the application of the stop-loss mechanism described in Section III.13.7.3, and the remaining excess will be further allocated to other resources in the same manner as described in this Section III.13.7.4(b)

### **III.13.7.5. Charges to Market Participants with Capacity Load Obligations.**

#### **III.13.7.5.1. Calculation of Capacity Charges Prior to June 1, 2022.**

The provisions in this subsection apply to charges associated with Capacity Commitment Periods beginning prior to June 1, 2022. A load serving entity with a Capacity Load Obligation as of the end of the Obligation Month shall be subject to a charge equal to the product of: (a) its Capacity Load Obligation in the Capacity Zone; and (b) the applicable Net Regional Clearing Price. The Net Regional Clearing Price is defined as the sum of the total payments as defined in Section III.13.7 paid to resources with Capacity Supply Obligations in the Capacity Zone (excluding any capacity payments and charges made for Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals and excluding any Capacity Performance Payments), less PER adjustments for resources in the zone as defined in Section III.13.7.1.2, and including any applicable export charges or credits as determined pursuant to Section III.13.7.1.3 divided by the sum of all Capacity Supply Obligations (excluding (i) the quantity of capacity subject to Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals and (ii) the quantity of capacity clearing as Self-Supplied FCA Resources) assumed by resources in the zone. A load serving entity satisfying its Capacity Load Obligation by a Self-Supplied FCA Resource shall not receive a credit for any PER payment for its Capacity Load Obligation so satisfied. A load serving entity with a Capacity Load Obligation as of the end of the Obligation Month may also receive a failure to cover credit equal to the product of: (a) its Capacity Load Obligation in the



Capacity Zone, and; (b) the sum of all failure to cover charges in the Capacity Zone calculated pursuant to Section III.13.3.4(b), divided by total Capacity Load Obligation in the Capacity Zone.

**III.13.7.5.1.1. Calculation of Capacity Charges On and After June 1, 2022.**

The provisions in this subsection apply to charges associated with Capacity Commitment Periods beginning on or after June 1, 2022. For purposes of this Section III.13.7.5.1.1, Capacity Zone costs calculated for a Capacity Zone that contains a nested Capacity Zone shall exclude the Capacity Zone costs of the nested Capacity Zone. A Market Participant with a Capacity Load Obligation as of the end of the Obligation Month shall be subject to the following charges and adjustments:

**III.13.7.5.1.1.1 Forward Capacity Auction Charge.**

The FCA charge, for each Capacity Zone, is: (a) Capacity Load Obligation in the Capacity Zone; multiplied by (b) Capacity Zone FCA Costs divided by Zonal Capacity Obligation.

Where

Capacity Zone FCA Costs, for each Capacity Zone, are the Total FCA Costs multiplied by the Zonal Peak Load Allocator and divided by the Total Peak Load Allocator.

Total FCA Costs are the sum of, for all Capacity Zones, (i) Capacity Supply Obligations in each zone (the total obligation awarded to or shed by resources in the Forward Capacity Auction process for the Obligation Month in the zone, excluding any obligations awarded to Intermittent Power Resources that are the basis for the Intermittent Power Resource Capacity Adjustment specified in Section III.13.7.5.1.1.6 and excluding any obligations procured in the Forward Capacity Auction that are terminated pursuant to Section III.13.3.4A) multiplied by the applicable clearing price from the auction in which the obligation was awarded to (or shed by) the resource, and (ii) the difference between the bid price and the substitution auction clearing price that was not included in the capacity charge pursuant to the second sentence of Section III.13.7.1.1(d). Capacity Supply Obligations awarded to Proxy De-List Bids in the primary auction, or shed by demand bids entered into the substitution auction on behalf of a Proxy De-List Bid, are excluded from Total FCA Costs.

Zonal Peak Load Allocator is the Zonal Capacity Obligation multiplied by the zonal Capacity Clearing Price.

Total Peak Load Allocator is the sum of the Zonal Peak Load Allocators.

**III.13.7.5.1.1.2 Annual Reconfiguration Auction Charge.**

The total annual reconfiguration auction charge, for each Capacity Zone and each associated annual reconfiguration auction, is: (a) Capacity Load Obligation in the Capacity Zone; multiplied by (b) Capacity Zone Annual Reconfiguration Auction Costs divided by Zonal Capacity Obligation.

Where

Capacity Zone Annual Reconfiguration Auction Costs, for each Capacity Zone, are the Total Annual Reconfiguration Costs multiplied by the Zonal Peak Load Allocator and divided by the Total Peak Load Allocator.

Total Annual Reconfiguration Auction Costs are the sum, for all Capacity Zones and each associated annual reconfiguration auction, of the product of the Capacity Supply Obligations acquired through the annual reconfiguration auction in each zone (adjusted for any obligations procured in the annual reconfiguration auction that are subsequently terminated pursuant to Section III.13.3.4A) and the zonal annual reconfiguration auction clearing price, minus the sum, for all Capacity Zones, of the product of the amount of any Capacity Supply Obligation shed through the annual reconfiguration auction in each zone and the applicable annual reconfiguration auction clearing price.

Zonal Peak Load Allocator is the Zonal Capacity Obligation multiplied by the zonal annual reconfiguration auction clearing price.

Total Peak Load Allocator is the sum of the Zonal Peak Load Allocators.

**III.13.7.5.1.1.3. Monthly Reconfiguration Auction Charge.**

The monthly reconfiguration auction charge is: (a) total Capacity Load Obligation for all Capacity Zones; multiplied by (b) Total Monthly Reconfiguration Auction Costs divided by Total Zonal Capacity Obligation.

Where

Total Monthly Reconfiguration Auction Costs are the sum of, for all Capacity Zones, the product of Capacity Supply Obligations acquired through the monthly reconfiguration auction in each

zone and the applicable monthly reconfiguration auction clearing price, minus the sum of, for all Capacity Zones, any Capacity Supply Obligations shed through the monthly reconfiguration auction in each zone and the applicable monthly reconfiguration auction clearing price.

Total Zonal Capacity Obligation is the total of the Zonal Capacity Obligation in all Capacity Zones.

**III.13.7.5.1.1.4. HQICC Capacity Charge.**

The HQICC capacity charge is: (a) total Capacity Load Obligation for all Capacity Zones; multiplied by (b) Total HQICC Credits divided by Total Capacity Load Obligation.

Where

Total HQICC credits are the product of HQICCs multiplied by the sum of the values calculated in Sections III.13.7.5.1.1.1(b), III.13.7.5.1.1.2(b), III.13.7.5.1.1.3(b), III.13.7.5.1.1.6(b), III.13.7.5.1.1.7(b), III.13.7.5.1.1.8(b), and III.13.7.5.1.1.9(b) in the Capacity Zone in which the HQ Phase I/II external node is located.

Total Capacity Load Obligation is the total Capacity Load Obligation in all Capacity Zones.

**III.13.7.5.1.1.5. Self-Supply Adjustment.**

The self-supply adjustment is: (a) Capacity Load Obligation in the Capacity Zone; multiplied by (b) the Self-Supply Variance divided by Total Capacity Load Obligation.

Where

Self-Supply Variance is the difference between foregone capacity payments and avoided capacity charges associated with designated self-supply quantities.

Foregone capacity payments to Self-Supplied FCA Resources are the sum, for all Capacity Zones, of the product of the zonal Capacity Supply Obligation (excluding any obligations procured in the Forward Capacity Auction that are terminated pursuant to Section III.13.3.4A) designated as self-supply, multiplied by the applicable clearing price from the auction in which the obligation was awarded.

Avoided capacity charges are the sum, for all Capacity Zones, of the product of any designated self-supply quantities multiplied by the sum of the values calculated in Sections III.13.7.5.1.1.1(b), III.13.7.5.1.1.2(b), III.13.7.5.1.1.3(b), III.13.7.5.1.1.6(b), III.13.7.5.1.1.7(b), III.13.7.5.1.1.8(b), and III.13.7.5.1.1.9(b) in the Capacity Zone associated with the designated self-supply quantity.

Total Capacity Load Obligation is the total Capacity Load Obligation in all Capacity Zones.

**III.13.7.5.1.1.6. Intermittent Power Resource Capacity Adjustment.**

The Intermittent Power Resource capacity adjustment in a winter season for the Obligation Months from October through May is: (a) total Capacity Load Obligation for all Capacity Zones; multiplied by (b) the Intermittent Power Resource Seasonal Variance divided by Total Zonal Capacity Obligation.

Where

Intermittent Power Resource Seasonal Variance is the difference between the FCA payments for Intermittent Power Resource in the Obligation Month and the base FCA payments for Intermittent Power Resources.

FCA payments to Intermittent Power Resources are the sum, for all Capacity Zones, of the product of the Capacity Supply Obligations awarded to or shed by Intermittent Power Resources in the Forward Capacity Auction process for the Obligation Month pursuant to Section III.13.2.7.6 or Section III.13.2.8.1.1 (excluding any obligations procured in the Forward Capacity Auction that are terminated pursuant to Section III.13.3.4A), multiplied by the applicable clearing price from the auction in which the obligation was awarded.

Base FCA payments for Intermittent Power Resources are the sum, for all Capacity Zones, of the product of the FCA Qualified Capacity procured from or shed by Intermittent Power Resources in the Forward Capacity Auction process (excluding any obligations procured in the Forward Capacity Auction that are terminated pursuant to Section III.13.3.4A), multiplied by the applicable clearing price from the auction in which the obligation was awarded.

Total Zonal Capacity Obligation is the total Capacity Load Obligation in all Capacity Zones.

**III.13.7.5.1.1.7. Multi-Year Rate Election Adjustment.**

For multi-year rate elections made in the primary Forward Capacity Auction for Capacity Commitment Periods beginning on or after June 1, 2022, the multi-year rate election adjustment, for each Capacity Zone, is: (a) Capacity Load Obligation in the Capacity Zone; multiplied by (b) Zonal Multi-Year Rate Election Costs divided by Zonal Capacity Obligation.

Where

Zonal Multi-Year Rate Election Costs is the sum, for each resource with a multi-year rate election in the Obligation Month, of the amount of Capacity Supply Obligation designated to receive the multi-year rate (excluding any obligations procured in the Forward Capacity Auction that are terminated pursuant to Section III.13.3.4A), multiplied by the difference in the applicable zonal Capacity Clearing Price for the Forward Capacity Auction in which the resource originally was awarded a Capacity Supply Obligation (indexed using the Handy-Whitman Index of Public Utility Construction Costs in effect as of December 31 of the year preceding the Capacity Commitment Period) and the applicable zonal Capacity Clearing Price for the current Capacity Commitment Period, multiplied by the Zonal Peak Load Allocator for the Forward Capacity Auction in which the resource originally was awarded a Capacity Supply Obligation and divided by the Total Peak Load Allocator for the Forward Capacity Auction in which the resource originally was awarded a Capacity Supply Obligation.

Zonal Peak Load Allocator is the Zonal Capacity Obligation multiplied by the zonal Capacity Clearing Price.

Total Peak Load Allocator is the sum of the Zonal Peak Load Allocators.

For multi-year rate elections made in the primary Forward Capacity Auction for Capacity Commitment Periods beginning prior to June 1, 2022, the multi-year rate election adjustment, for each Capacity Zone, is: (a) Capacity Load Obligation in the Capacity Zone; multiplied by (b) Zonal Multi-Year Rate Election Costs divided by Zonal Capacity Obligation.

Where

Zonal Multi-Year Rate Election Costs is the sum in each Capacity Zone, for each resource with a multi-year rate election in the Obligation Month, of the amount of Capacity Supply Obligation designated to receive the multi-year rate (excluding any obligations procured in the Forward Capacity Auction that are terminated pursuant to Section III.13.3.4A), multiplied by the difference in the applicable zonal Capacity Clearing Price for the Forward Capacity Auction in

which the resource originally was awarded a Capacity Supply Obligation (indexed using the Handy-Whitman Index of Public Utility Construction Costs in effect as of December 31 of the year preceding the Capacity Commitment Period) and the applicable zonal Capacity Clearing Price for the current Capacity Commitment Period.

#### **III.13.7.5.1.1.8 CTR Transmission Upgrade Charge.**

The CTR transmission upgrade charge is: (a) the Capacity Load Obligation in the Capacity Zones to which the applicable interface limits the transfer of capacity, multiplied by (b) Zonal CTR Transmission Upgrade Cost divided by Zonal Capacity Obligation.

Where

Zonal CTR Transmission Upgrade Cost for each Capacity Zone to which the interface limits the transfer of capacity is the amount calculated pursuant to Section III.13.7.5.4.4 (f), multiplied by the Zonal Capacity Obligation and divided by the sum of the Zonal Capacity Obligation for all Capacity Zones to which the interface limits the transfer of capacity.

#### **III.13.7.5.1.1.9 CTR Pool-Planned Unit Charge.**

The CTR Pool-Planned Unit charge is: (a) the Capacity Load Obligation in the Capacity Zone less the amount of any CTRs specifically allocated pursuant to Section III.13.7.5.4.5, multiplied by (b) CTR Pool-Planned Unit Cost divided by Total Zonal Capacity Obligation less the amount of any CTRs specifically allocated pursuant to Section III.13.7.5.4.5.

Where

The CTR Pool-Planned Unit Cost for each Capacity Zone is the sum of the amounts calculated pursuant to Section III.13.7.5.4.5 (b).

Total Zonal Capacity Obligation is the total of the Zonal Capacity Obligation in all Capacity Zones.

#### **III.13.7.5.1.1.10. Failure to Cover Charge Adjustment.**

The failure to cover charge adjustment, for each Capacity Zone, is (a) Capacity Load Obligation in the Capacity Zone; multiplied by (b) Zonal Failure to Cover Charges divided by Zonal Capacity Obligation.

Where:

Zonal Failure to Cover Charges are the product of: (1) the sum, for all Capacity Zones, of the failure to cover charges calculated pursuant to Section III.13.3.4(b), and; (2) the Zonal Peak Load Allocator and divided by the Total Peak Load Allocator.

Zonal Peak Load Allocator is the Zonal Capacity Obligation multiplied by the zonal annual reconfiguration auction clearing price as determined pursuant to Section III.13.3.4.

Total Peak Load Allocator is the sum of the Zonal Peak Load Allocators.

#### **III.13.7.5.2. Calculation of Capacity Load Obligation and Zonal Capacity Obligation.**

The ISO shall assign each Market Participant a share of the Zonal Capacity Obligation prior to the commencement of each Obligation Month for each Capacity Zone established in the Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.4. The Zonal Capacity Obligation of a Capacity Zone that contains a nested Capacity Zone shall exclude the Zonal Capacity Obligation of the nested Capacity Zone.

Zonal Capacity Obligation for each month and Capacity Zone shall equal the product of: (i) the total of the system-wide Capacity Supply Obligations (excluding the quantity of capacity subject to Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals for Capacity Commitment Periods beginning prior to June 1, 2022 and excluding any additional obligations awarded to Intermittent Power Resources pursuant to Section III.13.2.7.6 that exceed the FCA Qualified Capacity procured in the Forward Capacity Auction for Capacity Commitment Periods beginning on or after June 1, 2022) plus HQICCs; and (ii) the ratio of the sum of all load serving entities' annual coincident contributions to the system-wide annual peak load in that Capacity Zone from the calendar year two years prior to the start of the Capacity Commitment Period (for Capacity Commitment Periods beginning prior to June 1, 2022) and from the calendar year one year prior to the start of the Capacity Commitment Period (for Capacity Commitment Periods beginning on or after June 1, 2022) to the system-wide sum of all load serving entities' annual coincident contributions to the system-wide annual peak load from the calendar year two years prior to the start of the Capacity Commitment Period (for Capacity Commitment Periods beginning prior to June 1, 2022) and from the calendar year one year prior to the start of the Capacity Commitment Period (for Capacity Commitment Periods beginning on or after June 1, 2022).

The following loads are assigned a peak contribution of zero for the purposes of assigning obligations and tracking load shifts: load associated with the receipt of electricity from the grid by Storage DARDs for later injection of electricity back to the grid; Station service load that is modeled as a discrete Load Asset

and the Resource is complying with the maintenance scheduling procedures of the ISO; load that is modeled as a discrete Load Asset and is exclusively related to an Alternative Technology Regulation Resource following AGC Dispatch Instructions; and transmission losses associated with delivery of energy over the Control Area tie lines.

A Market Participant's share of Zonal Capacity Obligation for each month and Capacity Zone shall equal the product of: (i) the Capacity Zone's Zonal Capacity Obligation as calculated above and (ii) the ratio of the sum of the load serving entity's annual coincident contributions to the system-wide annual peak load in that Capacity Zone from the calendar year prior to the start of the Capacity Commitment Period to the sum of all load serving entities' annual coincident contributions to the system-wide annual peak load in that Capacity Zone from the calendar year prior to the start of the Capacity Commitment Period.

A Market Participant's Capacity Load Obligation shall be its share of Zonal Capacity Obligation for each month and Capacity Zone, adjusted as appropriate to account for any relevant Capacity Load Obligation Bilaterals, HQICCs, and Self-Supplied FCA Resource designations. A Capacity Load Obligation can be a positive or negative value.

A Market Participant's share of Zonal Capacity Obligation will not be reconstituted to include the demand reduction of a Demand Capacity Resource or Demand Response Resource.

#### **III.13.7.5.2.1. Charges Associated with Dispatchable Asset Related Demands.**

Dispatchable Asset Related Demand resources will not receive Forward Capacity Market payments, but instead each Dispatchable Asset Related Demand resource will receive an adjustment to its share of the associated Coincident Peak Contribution based on the ability of the Dispatchable Asset Related Demand resource to reduce consumption. The adjustment to a load serving entity's Coincident Peak Contribution resulting from Dispatchable Asset Related Demand resource reduction in consumption shall be based on the Nominated Consumption Limit submitted for the Dispatchable Asset Related Demand resource.

The Nominated Consumption Limit value of each Dispatchable Asset Related Demand resource is subject to adjustment as further described in the ISO New England Manuals, including adjustments based on the results of Nominated Consumption Limit audits performed in accordance with the ISO New England Manuals.

#### **III.13.7.5.3. Excess Revenues.**



(a) For Capacity Commitment Periods beginning prior to June 1, 2022, revenues collected from load serving entities in excess of revenues paid by the ISO to resources shall be paid by the ISO to the holders of Capacity Transfer Rights, as detailed in Section III.13.7.5.3.

(b) Any payment associated with a Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral that was to accrue to a Capacity Acquiring Resource for a Capacity Supply Obligation that is terminated pursuant to Section III.13.3.4A shall instead be allocated to Market Participants based on their pro rata share of all Capacity Load Obligations in the Capacity Zone in which the terminated resource is located.

#### **III.13.7.5.4. Capacity Transfer Rights.**

##### **III.13.7.5.4.1. Definition and Payments to Holders of Capacity Transfer Rights.**

This subsection applies to Capacity Commitment Periods beginning prior to June 1, 2022.

Capacity Transfer Rights are calculated for each internal interface associated with a Capacity Zone established in the Forward Capacity Auction (as determined pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.4). Based upon results of the Forward Capacity Auction and reconfiguration auctions, the total CTR fund will be calculated as the difference between the charges to load serving entities with Capacity Load Obligations and the payments to Capacity Resources as follows: The system-wide sum of the product of each Capacity Zone's Net Regional Clearing Price and absolute value of each Capacity Zone's Capacity Load Obligations, as calculated in Section III.13.7.5.1, minus the sum of the monthly capacity payments to Capacity Resources within each zone, as adjusted for PER.

Each Capacity Zone established in the Forward Capacity Auction (as determined pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.4) will be assigned its portion of the CTR fund.

For CTRs resulting from an export constrained zone, the assignment will be calculated as the product of:

(i) the Net Regional Clearing Price for the Capacity Zone to which the applicable interface limits the transfer of capacity minus the Net Regional Clearing Price for the Capacity Zone from which the applicable interface limits the transfer of capacity; and (ii) the difference between the absolute value of the total Capacity Supply Obligations obtained in the exporting Capacity Zone, adjusted for Capacity Supply Obligations associated with Self-Supplied FCA Resources, and the absolute value of the total Capacity Load Obligations in the exporting Capacity Zone.

For CTRs resulting from an import constrained zone, the assignment will be calculated as the product of:

(i) the Net Regional Clearing Price for the Capacity Zone to which the applicable interface limits the transfer of capacity minus the Net Regional Clearing Price for the absolute value of the Capacity Zone from which the applicable interface limits the transfer of capacity; and (ii) the difference between absolute value of the total Capacity Load Obligations in the importing Capacity Zone and the total Capacity Supply Obligations obtained in the importing Capacity Zone, adjusted for Capacity Supply Obligations associated with Self-Supplied FCA Resources.

#### **III.13.7.5.4.2. Allocation of Capacity Transfer Rights.**

This subsection applies to Capacity Commitment Periods beginning prior to June 1, 2022.

For Capacity Zones established in the Forward Capacity Auction as determined pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.4, the CTR fund shall be allocated among load serving entities using their Capacity Load Obligation (net of HQICCs) described in Section III.13.7.5.1. Market Participants with CTRs specifically allocated under Section III.13.7.5.3.6 will have their specifically allocated CTR MWs netted from their Capacity Load Obligation used to establish their share of the CTR fund.

(a) **Connecticut Import Interface.** The allocation of the CTR fund associated with the Connecticut Import Interface shall be made to load serving entities based on their Capacity Load Obligation in the Connecticut Capacity Zone.

(b) **NEMA/Boston Import Interface.** Except as provided in Section III.13.7.5.3.6 of Market Rule 1, the allocation of the CTR fund associated with the NEMA/Boston Import Interface shall be made to load serving entities based on their Capacity Load Obligation in the NEMA/Boston Capacity Zone.

#### **III.13.7.5.4.3. Allocations of CTRs Resulting From Revised Capacity Zones.**

This subsection applies to Capacity Commitment Periods beginning prior to June 1, 2022.

The portion of the CTR fund associated with revised definitions of Capacity Zones shall be fully allocated to load serving entities after deducting the value of applicable CTRs that have been specifically allocated. Allocations of the CTR fund among load serving entities will be made using their Capacity Load Obligations (net of HQICCs) as described in Section III.13.7.5.3.1. Market Participants with CTRs specifically allocated under Section III.13.7.5.3.6 will have their specifically allocated CTR MWs netted from the Capacity Load Obligation used to establish their share of the CTR fund.

(a) **Import Constraints.** The allocation of the CTR fund associated with newly defined import-constrained Capacity Zones restricting the transfer of capacity into a single adjacent import-constrained Capacity Zone shall be allocated to load serving entities with Capacity Load Obligations in that import-constrained Capacity Zone.

(b) **Export Constraints.** The allocation of the CTR fund associated with newly defined export-constrained Capacity Zones shall be allocated to load serving entities with Capacity Load Obligations on the import-constrained side of the interface.

#### **III.13.7.5.4.4. Specifically Allocated CTRs Associated with Transmission Upgrades.**

(a) A Market Participant that pays for transmission upgrades not funded through the Pool PTF Rate and which increase transfer capability across existing or potential Capacity Zone interfaces may request a specifically allocated CTR in an amount equal to the number of CTRs supported by that increase in transfer capability.

(b) The allocation of additional CTRs created through generator interconnections completed after February 1, 2009 shall be made in accordance with the provisions of the ISO generator interconnection or planning standards. In the event the ISO interconnection or planning standards do not address this issue, the CTRs created shall be allocated in the same manner as described in Section III.13.7.5.4.2.

(c) Specifically allocated CTRs shall expire when the Market Participant ceases to pay to support the transmission upgrades.

(d) CTRs resulting from transmission upgrades funded through the Pool PTF Rate shall not be specifically allocated but shall be allocated in the same manner as described in Section III.13.7.5.4.2.

(e) **Maine Export Interface.** Casco Bay shall receive specifically allocated CTRs of 325 MW across the Maine export interface for as long as Casco Bay continues to pay to support the transmission upgrades.

(f) The value of CTRs specifically allocated pursuant to this Section shall be calculated as the product of: (i) the Capacity Clearing Price to which the applicable interface limits the transfer of capacity

minus the Capacity Clearing Price from which the applicable interface limits the transfer of capacity; and  
(ii) the MW quantity of the specifically allocated CTRs across the applicable interface.

**III.13.7.5.4.5. Specifically Allocated CTRs for Pool-Planned Units.**

(a) In import-constrained Capacity Zones, in recognition of longstanding life of unit contracts, the municipal utility entitlement holder of a resource constructed as Pool-Planned Units shall receive an initial allocation of CTRs equal to the most recent seasonal claimed capability of the ownership entitlements in such unit, adjusted for any designated self-supply quantities as described in Section III.13.1.6.2. Municipal utility entitlements are set as shown in the table below and are not transferrable.

Millstone 3		Seabrook	Stonybrook GT 1A	Stonybrook GT 1B	Stonybrook GT 1C	Stonybrook 2A	Stonybrook 2B	Wyman 4	Summer (MW)	Winter (MW)
Nominal Summer (MW)	1155.001	1244.275	104.000	100.000	104.000	67.400	65.300	586.725		
Nominal Winter (MW)	1155.481	1244.275	119.000	116.000	119.000	87.400	85.300	608.575		
Danvers	0.2627%	1.1124%	8.4569%	8.4569%	8.4569%	11.5551%	11.5551%	0.0000%	58.26	63.73
Georgetown	0.0208%	0.0956%	0.7356%	0.7356%	0.7356%	1.0144%	1.0144%	0.0000%	5.04	5.55
Ipswich	0.0608%	0.1066%	0.2934%	0.2934%	0.2934%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	2.93	2.37
Marblehead	0.1544%	0.1351%	2.6840%	2.6840%	2.6840%	1.5980%	1.5980%	0.2793%	15.49	15.64
Middleton	0.0440%	0.3282%	0.8776%	0.8776%	0.8776%	1.8916%	1.8916%	0.1012%	10.40	11.07
Peabody	0.2969%	1.1300%	13.0520%	13.0520%	13.0520%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	57.69	60.26
Reading	0.4041%	0.6351%	14.4530%	14.4530%	14.4530%	19.5163%	19.5163%	0.0000%	82.98	92.77
Wakefield	0.2055%	0.3870%	3.9929%	3.9929%	3.9929%	6.3791%	6.3791%	0.4398%	30.53	32.64
Ashburnham	0.0307%	0.0652%	0.6922%	0.6922%	0.6922%	0.9285%	0.9285%	0.0000%	4.53	5.22
Boylston	0.0264%	0.0849%	0.5933%	0.5933%	0.5933%	0.9120%	0.9120%	0.0522%	4.71	5.35
Braintree	0.0000%	0.6134%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	7.63	7.63
Groton	0.0254%	0.1288%	0.8034%	0.8034%	0.8034%	1.0832%	1.0832%	0.0000%	5.81	6.61
Hingham	0.1007%	0.4740%	3.9815%	3.9815%	3.9815%	5.3307%	5.3307%	0.0000%	26.40	30.36
Holden	0.0726%	0.3971%	2.2670%	2.2670%	2.2670%	3.1984%	3.1984%	0.0000%	17.01	19.33
Holyoke	0.3194%	0.3096%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	2.8342%	2.8342%	0.6882%	15.34	16.63

Hudson	0.1056%	1.6745%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.3395%	24.05	24.12
Hull	0.0380%	0.1650%	1.4848%	1.4848%	1.4848%	2.1793%	2.1793%	0.1262%	10.70	12.28
Littleton	0.0536%	0.1093%	1.5115%	1.5115%	1.5115%	3.0607%	3.0607%	0.1666%	11.67	13.63
Mansfield	0.1581%	0.7902%	5.0951%	5.0951%	5.0951%	7.2217%	7.2217%	0.0000%	36.93	42.17
Middleborough	0.1128%	0.5034%	2.0657%	2.0657%	2.0657%	4.9518%	4.9518%	0.1667%	21.48	24.45
North Attleborough	0.1744%	0.3781%	3.2277%	3.2277%	3.2277%	5.9838%	5.9838%	0.1666%	25.58	29.49
Pascoag	0.0000%	0.1068%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	1.33	1.33
Paxton	0.0326%	0.0808%	0.6860%	0.6860%	0.6860%	0.9979%	0.9979%	0.0000%	4.82	5.53
Shrewsbury	0.2323%	0.5756%	3.9105%	3.9105%	3.9105%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.4168%	24.33	26.23
South Hadley	0.5755%	0.3412%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	10.89	10.90
Sterling	0.0294%	0.2044%	0.7336%	0.7336%	0.7336%	1.1014%	1.1014%	0.0000%	6.60	7.38
Taunton	0.0000%	0.1003%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	1.25	1.25
Templeton	0.0700%	0.1926%	1.3941%	1.3941%	1.3941%	2.3894%	2.3894%	0.0000%	10.67	12.27
Vermont Public Power Supply Authority	0.0000%	0.0000%	2.2008%	2.2008%	2.2008%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0330%	6.97	7.99
West Boylston	0.0792%	0.1814%	1.2829%	1.2829%	1.2829%	2.3041%	2.3041%	0.0000%	10.18	11.69
Westfield	1.1131%	0.3645%	9.0452%	9.0452%	9.0452%	13.5684%	13.5684%	0.7257%	67.51	77.27

This allocation of CTRs shall expire on December 31, 2040. If a resource listed in the table above retires prior to December 31, 2040, however, its allocation of CTRs shall expire upon retirement. In the event that the NEMA zone either becomes or is forecast to become a separate zone for Forward Capacity Auction purposes, National Grid agrees to discuss with Massachusetts Municipal Wholesale Electric Company ("MMWEC") and Wellesley Municipal Light Plant, Reading Municipal Light Plant and Concord Municipal Light Plant ("WRC") any proposal by National Grid to develop cost effective transmission improvements that would mitigate or alleviate the import constraints and to work cooperatively and in good faith with MMWEC and WRC regarding any such proposal. MMWEC and WRC agree to support any proposals advanced by National Grid in the regional system planning process to construct any such transmission improvements, provided that MMWEC and WRC determine that the proposed improvements are cost effective (without regard to CTRs) and will mitigate or alleviate the import constraints.

(b) The value of CTRs specifically allocated pursuant to this Section shall be calculated as the product of: (i) the Capacity Clearing Price for the Capacity Zone where the load of the municipal utility entitlement holder is located minus the Capacity Clearing Price for the Capacity Zone in which the Pool-Planned Unit is located, and; (ii) the MW quantity of the specifically allocated CTRs.

#### **III.13.7.5.5. Forward Capacity Market Net Charge Amount.**

The Forward Capacity Market net charge amount for each Market Participant as of the end of the Obligation Month shall be equal to the sum of: (a) its Capacity Load Obligation charges; (b) its revenues from any applicable specifically allocated CTRs; (c) its share of the CTR fund (for Capacity Commitment Periods beginning prior to June 1, 2022); and (d) any applicable export charges.

### **III.13.8. Reporting and Price Finality**

#### **III.13.8.1. Filing of Certain Determinations Made By the ISO Prior to the Forward Capacity Auction and Challenges Thereto.**

(a) For each Forward Capacity Auction, no later than 20 Business Days after the issuance of retirement determination notifications described in Section III.13.1.2.4(a), the ISO shall make a filing with the Commission pursuant to Section 205 of the Federal Power Act describing the Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids established pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2, and the substitution auction test prices established pursuant to Section III.13.2.8.3.1A. The ISO will file the following information confidentially: the determinations made by the Internal Market Monitor with respect to each Permanent De-List Bid, Retirement De-List Bid, and substitution auction test price, and supporting documentation for each such determination. The confidential filing shall indicate those resources that will permanently de-list or retire prior to the Forward Capacity Auction and those Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids for which a Lead Market Participant has made an election pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1.

(b) The Forward Capacity Auction shall be conducted using the determinations as approved by the Commission (unless the Commission directs otherwise), and challenges to Capacity Clearing Prices resulting from the Forward Capacity Auction shall be reviewed in accordance with the provisions of Section III.13.8.2(c).

(c) For each Forward Capacity Auction, no later than 90 days prior to the first day of the auction, the ISO shall make an informational filing with the Commission detailing the following determinations made by the ISO with respect to that Forward Capacity Auction, and providing supporting documentation for each such determination, provided, however, that the determinations in subsections (vi), (vii), ~~and (viii)~~, and (ix) below shall be filed confidentially with the Commission in the informational filing, except determinations on which new resources have been rejected due to overlapping interconnection impacts (the determinations in subsections (vi), (vii), ~~and (viii)~~, and (ix) shall be published by the ISO no later than 15 days after the Forward Capacity Auction), with the exception of ~~de-list-bid price and offer~~ price information and submitted Load-Side Relationship Certifications, which shall remain confidential):

(i) which Capacity Zones shall be modeled in the Forward Capacity Auction;

(ii) the transmission interface limits as determined pursuant to Section III.12.5;



(iii) which existing and proposed transmission lines the ISO determines will be in service by the start of the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction;

(iv) the expected amount of installed capacity in each modeled Capacity Zone during the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction, and the Local Sourcing Requirement for each modeled import-constrained Capacity Zone and the Maximum Capacity Limit for each modeled export-constrained Capacity Zone;

(v) for each resource that submitted a Load-Side Relationship Certification, the following information: the resource technology type; which qualifying circumstance in Section III.A.21.1.3 was asserted in the Load-Side Relationship Certification; the relevant state policy asserted in the Load-Side Relationship Certification, if any; whether the ISO accepted or rejected the Load-Side Relationship Certification; and, consequently, whether the resource was subject to a review for the exercise of buyer-side market power~~reserved~~;

(vi) which new resources are accepted and rejected in the qualification process to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction;

(vii) which new resources were not reviewed for an exercise of buyer-side market power because of one of the conditions described in Sections III.A.21.1.1, III.A.21.1.2, or III.A.21.1.3; the condition met by each such resource; and, for new resources that submitted a Load-Side Relationship Certification, the Load-Side Relationship Certification submitted by the resource;

(viii) the Internal Market Monitor's determinations ~~regarding each requested offer price from made as part of any buyer-side market power review conducted pursuant to Section III.A.21.2 and any New Resource Offer Floor Price determinations made pursuant to Section III.A.21.3 with regard to a new resource, and the basis for any such determinations submitted pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.2.3 or Section III.13.1.4.1.1.2.8, including information regarding each of the elements considered in the Internal Market Monitor's determination of expected net revenues (other than revenues from ISO-administered markets) and whether that element was included or excluded in the determination of whether the offer is consistent with the resource's long-run average costs net of expected net revenues other than capacity revenues; for the avoidance of doubt, any information employed by the Internal Market Monitor in making these determinations related to~~

the potential impact of a New Capacity Resource's offer on Capacity Clearing Prices, including any such information filed by the ISO in response to a pleading filed with the Commission, shall be filed confidentially and shall not be released to any entity, including to the Project Sponsor whose offer is the subject of dispute;

~~(ixviii)~~ the Internal Market Monitor's determinations regarding offers or Static De-List Bids, Export Bids, and Administrative De-List Bids submitted during the qualification process made according to the provisions of this Section III.13, including an explanation of the Internal Market Monitor-determined prices established for any Static De-List Bids, Export Bids, and Administrative De-List Bids as described in Section III.13.1.2.3.2 based on the Internal Market Monitor review and the resource's net going forward costs, reasonable expectations about the resource's Capacity Performance Payments, reasonable risk premium assumptions, and reasonable opportunity costs as determined by the Internal Market Monitor. The filing shall identify to the extent possible the components of the bid which were accepted as justified, and shall also identify to the extent possible the components of the bid which were not justified and which resulted in the Internal Market Monitor establishing an Internal Market Monitor-determined price for the bid;

~~(ix)~~ which existing resources are qualified to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction (this information will include resource type, capacity zone, and qualified MW); and

~~(xi)~~ aggregate MW from new resources qualified to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction and aggregate de-list bid amounts; ~~and~~

~~(xi) — aggregate quantity of supply offers and demand bids qualified to participate in the substitution auction.~~

(d) Any comments or challenges to the determinations contained in the informational filing described in Section III.13.8.1(c) or in the qualification determination notifications described in Sections III.13.1.1.2.8, III.13.1.2.4(b) and III.13.1.3.5.7 must be filed with the Commission no later than 15 days after the ISO's submission of the informational filing. If the Commission does not issue an order within 75 days after the ISO's submission of the informational filing that directs otherwise, the determinations contained in the informational filing shall be used in conducting the Forward Capacity Auction, and challenges to Capacity Clearing Prices resulting from the Forward Capacity Auction shall be reviewed in

accordance with the provisions of Section III.13.8.2(c). If within 75 days after the ISO's submission of the informational filing, the Commission does issue an order modifying one or more of the ISO's determinations, then the Forward Capacity Auction shall be conducted no earlier than 15 days following that order using the determinations as modified by the Commission (unless the Commission directs otherwise), and challenges to Capacity Clearing Prices resulting from the Forward Capacity Auction shall be reviewed in accordance with the provisions of Section III.13.8.2(c).

### **III.13.8.2. Filing of Forward Capacity Auction Results and Challenges Thereto.**

(a) As soon as practicable after the Forward Capacity Auction is complete, the ISO shall file the results of that Forward Capacity Auction with the Commission pursuant to Section 205 of the Federal Power Act, including the final set of Capacity Zones resulting from the auction, the Capacity Clearing Price in each of those Capacity Zones (and the Capacity Clearing Price associated with certain imports pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.3(d), if applicable), the substitution auction clearing prices and the total amount of payments associated with any demand bids cleared at a substitution auction clearing price above their demand bid prices, and a list of which resources received Capacity Supply Obligations in each Capacity Zone and the amount of those Capacity Supply Obligations. Upon completion of the fourth and future auctions, such list of resources that receive Capacity Supply Obligation shall also specify which resources cleared as Conditional Qualified New Resources. Upon completion of the fourth and future auctions, the filing shall also list each Long Lead Time Facility, as defined in Schedule 22 or Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff, that secured a Queue Position to participate as a New Generating Capacity Resource in the Forward Capacity Auction and each resource with lower queue priority that was selected in the Forward Capacity Auction subject to a Long Lead Time Facility with the higher queue priority. The filing shall also enumerate de-list bids rejected for reliability reasons pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5, and the reasons for those rejections.

(b) The filing of Forward Capacity Auction results made pursuant to this Section III.13.8.2 shall also include documentation regarding the competitiveness of the Forward Capacity Auction, which may include a certification from the auctioneer and the ISO that: (i) all entities offering and bidding in the Forward Capacity Auction were properly qualified in accordance with the provisions of Section III.13.1; and (ii) the Forward Capacity Auction was conducted in accordance with the provisions of Section III.13.

(c) Any objection to the Forward Capacity Auction results must be filed with the Commission within 45 days after the ISO's filing of the Forward Capacity Auction results. The filing of a timely objection with the Commission will be the exclusive means of challenging the Forward Capacity Auction results.

(d) Any change to the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff affecting the Forward Capacity Market or the Forward Capacity Auction that is filed after the results of a Forward Capacity Auction have been accepted or approved by the Commission shall not affect those Forward Capacity Auction results.

## **APPENDIX A**

### **MARKET MONITORING, REPORTING AND MARKET POWER MITIGATION**

## **APPENDIX A**

### **MARKET MONITORING, REPORTING AND MARKET POWER MITIGATION**

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## **MARKET MONITORING, REPORTING AND MARKET POWER MITIGATION**

### **III.A.1. Introduction and Purpose; Structure and Oversight: Independence.**

#### **III.A.1.1. Mission Statement.**

The mission of the Internal Market Monitor and External Market Monitor shall be (1) to protect both consumers and Market Participants by the identification and reporting of market design flaws and market power abuses; (2) to evaluate existing and proposed market rules, tariff provisions and market design elements to remove or prevent market design flaws and recommend proposed rule and tariff changes to the ISO; (3) to review and report on the performance of the New England Markets; (4) to identify and notify the Commission of instances in which a Market Participant's behavior, or that of the ISO, may require investigation; and (5) to carry out the mitigation functions set forth in this *Appendix A*.

#### **III.A.1.2. Structure and Oversight.**

The market monitoring and mitigation functions contained in this *Appendix A* shall be performed by the Internal Market Monitor, which shall report to the ISO Board of Directors and, for administrative purposes only, to the ISO Chief Executive Officer, and by an External Market Monitor selected by and reporting to the ISO Board of Directors. Members of the ISO Board of Directors who also perform management functions for the ISO shall be excluded from oversight and governance of the Internal Market Monitor and External Market Monitor. The ISO shall enter into a contract with the External Market Monitor addressing the roles and responsibilities of the External Market Monitor as detailed in this *Appendix A*. The ISO shall file its contract with the External Market Monitor with the Commission. In order to facilitate the performance of the External Market Monitor's functions, the External Market Monitor shall have, and the ISO's contract with the External Market Monitor shall provide for, access by the External Market Monitor to ISO data and personnel, including ISO management responsible for market monitoring, operations and billing and settlement functions. Any proposed termination of the contract with the External Market Monitor or modification of, or other limitation on, the External Market Monitor's scope of work shall be subject to prior Commission approval.

#### **III.A.1.3. Data Access and Information Sharing.**

The ISO shall provide the Internal Market Monitor and External Market Monitor with access to all market data, resources and personnel sufficient to enable the Internal Market Monitor and External Market Monitor to perform the market monitoring and mitigation functions provided for in this *Appendix A*.

This access shall include access to any confidential market information that the ISO receives from another independent system operator or regional transmission organization subject to the Commission's jurisdiction, or its market monitor, as part of an investigation to determine (a) if a Market Violation is occurring or has occurred, (b) if market power is being or has been exercised, or (c) if a market design flaw exists. In addition, the Internal Market Monitor and External Market Monitor shall have full access to the ISO's electronically generated information and databases and shall have exclusive control over any data created by the Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor. The Internal Market Monitor and External Market Monitor may share any data created by it with the ISO, which shall maintain the confidentiality of such data in accordance with the terms of the ISO New England Information Policy.

#### **III.A.1.4. Interpretation.**

In the event that any provision of any ISO New England Filed Document is inconsistent with the provisions of this *Appendix A*, the provisions of *Appendix A* shall control. Notwithstanding the foregoing, Sections III.A.1.2, III.A.2.2 (a)-(c), (e)-(h), Section III.A.2.3 (a)-(g), (i), (n) and Section III.A.17.3 are also part of the Participants Agreement and cannot be modified in either *Appendix A* or the Participants Agreement without a corresponding modification at the same time to the same language in the other document.

#### **III.A.1.5. Definitions.**

Capitalized terms not defined in this *Appendix A* are defined in the definitions section of Section I of the Tariff.

#### **III.A.2. Functions of the Market Monitor.**

##### **III.A.2.1. Core Functions of the Internal Market Monitor and External Market Monitor.**

The Internal Market Monitor and External Market Monitor will perform the following core functions:

- (a) Evaluate existing and proposed market rules, tariff provisions and market design elements, and recommend proposed rule and tariff changes to the ISO, the Commission, Market Participants, public utility commissioners of the six New England states, and to other interested entities, with the understanding that the Internal Market Monitor and External Market Monitor are not to effectuate any proposed market designs (except as specifically provided in Section III.A.2.4.4, Section III.A.9 and Section III.A.10 of this *Appendix A*). In the event the Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor believes broader dissemination could lead to exploitation, it shall limit distribution of its

identifications and recommendations to the ISO and to the Commission, with an explanation of why broader dissemination should be avoided at that time. Nothing in this Section III.A.2.1 (a) shall prohibit or restrict the Internal Market Monitor and External Market Monitor from implementing Commission accepted rule and tariff provisions regarding market monitoring or mitigation functions that, according to the terms of the applicable rule or tariff language, are to be performed by the Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor.

- (b) Review and report on the performance of the New England Markets to the ISO, the Commission, Market Participants, the public utility commissioners of the six New England states, and to other interested entities.
- (c) Identify and notify the Commission's Office of Enforcement of instances in which a Market Participant's behavior, or that of the ISO, may require investigation, including suspected tariff violations, suspected violations of Commission-approved rules and regulations, suspected market manipulation, and inappropriate dispatch that creates substantial concerns regarding unnecessary market inefficiencies.

### **III.A.2.2. Functions of the External Market Monitor.**

To accomplish the functions specified in Section III.A.2.1 of this *Appendix A*, the External Market Monitor shall perform the following functions:

- (a) Review the competitiveness of the New England Markets, the impact that the market rules and/or changes to the market rules will have on the New England Markets and the impact that the ISO's actions have had on the New England Markets. In the event that the External Market Monitor uncovers problems with the New England Markets, the External Market Monitor shall promptly inform the Commission, the Commission's Office of Energy Market Regulation staff, the ISO Board of Directors, the public utility commissions for each of the six New England states, and the Market Participants of its findings in accordance with the procedures outlined in Sections III.A.19 and III.A.20 of this *Appendix A*, provided that in the case of Market Participants and the public utility commissions, information in such findings shall be redacted as necessary to comply with the ISO New England Information Policy. Notwithstanding the foregoing, in the event the External Market Monitor believes broader dissemination could lead to exploitation, it shall limit distribution of its identifications to the ISO and to the Commission, with an explanation of why broader dissemination should be avoided at that time.
- (b) Perform independent evaluations and prepare annual and ad hoc reports on the overall competitiveness and efficiency of the New England Markets or particular aspects of the New England

Markets, including the adequacy of this *Appendix A*, in accordance with the provisions of Section III.A.17 of this *Appendix A*.

- (c) Conduct evaluations and prepare reports on its own initiative or at the request of others.
- (d) Monitor and review the quality and appropriateness of the mitigation conducted by the Internal Market Monitor. In the event that the External Market Monitor discovers problems with the quality or appropriateness of such mitigation, the External Market Monitor shall promptly inform the Commission, the Commission's Office of Energy Market Regulation staff, the ISO Board of Directors, the public utility commissions for each of the six New England states, and the Market Participants of its findings in accordance with the procedures outlined in Sections III.A.19 and/or III.A.20 of this *Appendix A*, provided that in the case of Market Participants and the public utility commissions, information in such findings shall be redacted as necessary to comply with the ISO New England Information Policy. Notwithstanding the foregoing, in the event the External Market Monitor believes broader dissemination could lead to exploitation, it shall limit distribution of its identifications to the ISO and to the Commission, with an explanation of why broader dissemination should be avoided at that time.
- (e) Prepare recommendations to the ISO Board of Directors and the Market Participants on how to improve the overall competitiveness and efficiency of the New England Markets or particular aspects of the New England Markets, including improvements to this *Appendix A*.
- (f) Recommend actions to the ISO Board of Directors and the Market Participants to increase liquidity and efficient trade between regions and improve the efficiency of the New England Markets.
- (g) Review the ISO's filings with the Commission from the standpoint of the effects of any such filing on the competitiveness and efficiency of the New England Markets. The External Market Monitor will have the opportunity to comment on any filings under development by the ISO and may file comments with the Commission when the filings are made by the ISO. The subject of any such comments will be the External Market Monitor's assessment of the effects of any proposed filing on the competitiveness and efficiency of the New England Markets, or the effectiveness of this *Appendix A*, as appropriate.
- (h) Provide information to be directly included in the monthly market updates that are provided at the meetings of the Market Participants.

### **III.A.2.3. Functions of the Internal Market Monitor.**

To accomplish the functions specified in Section III.A.2.1 of this *Appendix A*, the Internal Market Monitor shall perform the following functions:



- (a) Maintain *Appendix A* and consider whether *Appendix A* requires amendment. Any amendments deemed to be necessary by the Internal Market Monitor shall be undertaken after consultation with Market Participants in accordance with Section 11 of the Participants Agreement.
- (b) Perform the day-to-day, real-time review of market behavior in accordance with the provisions of this *Appendix A*.
- (c) Consult with the External Market Monitor, as needed, with respect to implementing and applying the provisions of this *Appendix A*.
- (d) Identify and notify the Commission's Office of Enforcement staff of instances in which a Market Participant's behavior, or that of the ISO, may require investigation, including suspected Tariff violations, suspected violations of Commission-approved rules and regulations, suspected market manipulation, and inappropriate dispatch that creates substantial concerns regarding unnecessary market inefficiencies, in accordance with the procedures outlined in Section III.A.19 of this *Appendix A*.
- (e) Review the competitiveness of the New England Markets, the impact that the market rules and/or changes to the market rules will have on the New England Markets and the impact that ISO's actions have had on the New England Markets. In the event that the Internal Market Monitor uncovers problems with the New England Markets, the Internal Market Monitor shall promptly inform the Commission, the Commission's Office of Energy Market Regulation staff, the ISO Board of Directors, the public utility commissions for each of the six New England states, and the Market Participants of its findings in accordance with the procedures outlined in Sections III.A.19 and III.A.20 of this *Appendix A*, provided that in the case of Market Participants and the public utility commissions, information in such findings shall be redacted as necessary to comply with the ISO New England Information Policy. Notwithstanding the foregoing, in the event the Internal Market Monitor believes broader dissemination could lead to exploitation, it shall limit distribution of its identifications to the ISO and to the Commission, with an explanation of why broader dissemination should be avoided at that time.
- (f) Provide support and information to the ISO Board of Directors and the External Market Monitor consistent with the Internal Market Monitor's functions.
- (g) Prepare an annual state of the market report on market trends and the performance of the New England Markets, as well as less extensive quarterly reports, in accordance with the provisions of Section III.A.17 of this *Appendix A*.
- (h) Make one or more of the Internal Market Monitor staff members available for regular conference calls, which may be attended, telephonically or in person, by Commission and state commission staff, by representatives of the ISO, and by Market Participants. The information to be provided in the

Internal Market Monitor conference calls is generally to consist of a review of market data and analyses of the type regularly gathered and prepared by the Internal Market Monitor in the course of its business, subject to appropriate confidentiality restrictions. This function may be performed through making a staff member of the Internal Market Monitor available for the monthly meetings of the Market Participants and inviting Commission staff and the staff of state public utility commissions to those monthly meetings.

- (i) Be primarily responsible for interaction with external Control Areas, the Commission, other regulators and Market Participants with respect to the matters addressed in this **Appendix A**.
- (j) Monitor for conduct whether by a single Market Participant or by multiple Market Participants acting in concert, including actions involving more than one Resource, that may cause a material effect on prices or other payments in the New England Markets if exercised from a position of market power, and impose appropriate mitigation measures if such conduct is detected and the other applicable conditions for the imposition of mitigation measures as set forth in this **Appendix A** are met. The categories of conduct for which the Internal Market Monitor shall perform monitoring for potential mitigation are:

- (i) *Economic withholding*, that is, submitting a Supply Offer for a Resource that is unjustifiably high and violates the economic withholding criteria set forth in Section III.A.5 so that (i) the Resource is not or will not be dispatched or scheduled, or (ii) the bid or offer will set an unjustifiably high market clearing price.
- (ii) *Uneconomic production from a Resource*, that is, increasing the output of a Resource to levels that would otherwise be uneconomic, absent an order of the ISO, in order to cause, and obtain benefits from, a transmission constraint.
- (iii) *Anti-competitive Increment Offers and Decrement Bids*, which are bidding practices relating to Increment Offers and Decrement Bids that cause Day-Ahead LMPs not to achieve the degree of convergence with Real-Time LMPs that would be expected in a workably competitive market, more fully addressed in Section III.A.11 of this **Appendix A**.
- (iv) *Anti-competitive Demand Bids*, which are addressed in Section III.A.10 of this **Appendix A**.
- (v) Other categories of conduct that have material effects on prices or NCPC payments in the New England Markets. The Internal Market Monitor, in consultation with the External Market Monitor, shall; (i) seek to amend **Appendix A** as may be appropriate to include any such conduct that would substantially distort or impair the competitiveness of any of

the New England Markets; and (ii) seek such other authorization to mitigate the effects of such conduct from the Commission as may be appropriate.

(k) Perform such additional monitoring as the Internal Market Monitor deems necessary, including without limitation, monitoring for:

- (i) Anti-competitive gaming of Resources;
- (ii) Conduct and market outcomes that are inconsistent with competitive markets;
- (iii) Flaws in market design or software or in the implementation of rules by the ISO that create inefficient incentives or market outcomes;
- (iv) Actions in one market that affect price in another market;
- (v) Other aspects of market implementation that prevent competitive market results, the extent to which market rules, including this *Appendix A*, interfere with efficient market operation, both short-run and long-run; and
- (vi) Rules or conduct that creates barriers to entry into a market.

The Internal Market Monitor will include significant results of such monitoring in its reports under Section III.A.17 of this *Appendix A*. Monitoring under this Section III.A.2.3(k) cannot serve as a basis for mitigation under III.A.11 of this *Appendix A*. If the Internal Market Monitor concludes as a result of its monitoring that additional specific monitoring thresholds or mitigation remedies are necessary, it may proceed under Section III.A.20.

- (l) Propose to the ISO and Market Participants appropriate mitigation measures or market rule changes for conduct that departs significantly from the conduct that would be expected under competitive market conditions but does not rise to the thresholds specified in Sections III.A.5, III.A.10, or III.A.11. In considering whether to recommend such changes, the Internal Market Monitor shall evaluate whether the conduct has a significant effect on market prices or NCPC payments as specified below. The Internal Market Monitor will not recommend changes if it determines, from information provided by Market Participants (or parties that would be subject to mitigation) or from other information available to the Internal Market Monitor, that the conduct and associated price or NCPC payments under investigation are attributable to legitimate competitive market forces or incentives.
- (m) Evaluate physical withholding of Supply Offers in accordance with Section III.A.4 below for referral to the Commission.

- (n) If and when established, participate in a committee of regional market monitors to review issues associated with interregional transactions, including any barriers to efficient trade and competition.

#### **III.A.2.4. Overview of the Internal Market Monitor's Mitigation Functions.**

##### **III.A.2.4.1. Purpose.**

The mitigation measures set forth in this *Appendix A* for mitigation of market power are intended to provide the means for the Internal Market Monitor to mitigate the market effects of any actions or transactions that are without a legitimate business purpose and that are intended to or foreseeably could manipulate market prices, market conditions, or market rules for electric energy or electricity products. Actions or transactions undertaken by a Market Participant that are explicitly contemplated in Market Rule 1 (such as virtual supply or load bidding) or taken at the direction of the ISO are not in violation of this *Appendix A*. These mitigation measures are intended to minimize interference with open and competitive markets, and thus to permit to the maximum extent practicable, price levels to be determined by competitive forces under the prevailing market conditions. To that end, the mitigation measures authorize the mitigation of only specific conduct that exceeds well-defined thresholds specified below. When implemented, mitigation measures affecting the LMP or clearing prices in other markets will be applied *ex ante*. Nothing in this *Appendix A*, including the application of a mitigation measure, shall be deemed to be a limitation of the ISO's authority to evaluate Market Participant behavior for potential referral under Section III.A.19.

##### **III.A.2.4.2. Conditions for the Imposition of Mitigation.**

- (a) Imposing Mitigation. To achieve the foregoing purpose and objectives, mitigation measures are imposed pursuant to Sections III.A.5, III.A.10, and III.A.11 below.

##### **III.A.2.4.3. Applicability.**

Mitigation measures may be applied to Supply Offers, Increment Offers, Demand Bids, and Decrement Bids, as well as to the scheduling or operation of a generation unit or transmission facility.

##### **III.A.2.4.4. Mitigation Not Provided for Under This *Appendix A*.**

The Internal Market Monitor shall monitor the New England Markets for conduct that it determines constitutes an abuse of market power but does not trigger the thresholds specified below for the imposition of mitigation measures by the Internal Market Monitor. If the Internal Market Monitor identifies any such conduct, and in particular conduct exceeding the thresholds specified in this *Appendix A*, it may make a filing under §205 of the Federal Power Act (“§205”) with the Commission requesting authorization to apply appropriate mitigation measures. Any such filing shall identify the particular conduct the Internal Market Monitor believes warrants mitigation, shall propose a specific mitigation measure for the conduct, and shall set forth the Internal Market Monitor’s justification for imposing that mitigation measure.

**III.A.2.4.5. Duration of Mitigation.**

Any mitigation measure imposed on a specific Market Participant, as specified below, shall expire not later than six months after the occurrence of the conduct giving rise to the measure, or at such earlier time as may be specified by the Internal Market Monitor or as otherwise provided in this *Appendix A*.

**III.A.3. Consultation Prior to Determination of Reference Levels for Physical and Financial Parameters of Resources; Fuel Price Adjustments.**

Upon request of a Market Participant or at the initiative of the Internal Market Monitor, the Internal Market Monitor shall consult with a Market Participant with respect to the information and analysis used to determine Reference Levels under Section III.A.7 for that Market Participant. In order for the Internal Market Monitor to revise Reference Levels or treat an offer as not violating applicable conduct tests specified in Section III.A.5.5 for an Operating Day for which the offer is submitted, all cost data and other information, other than automated index-based cost data received by the Internal Market Monitor from third party vendors, cost data and information calculated by the Internal Market Monitor, and cost data and information provided under the provisions of Section III.A.3.1 or Section III.A.3.2, must be submitted by a Market Participant, and all consultations must be completed, no later than 5:00 p.m. of the second business day prior to the Operating Day for which the Reference Level will be effective. Adjustments to fuel prices after this time must be submitted in accordance with the fuel price adjustment provisions in Section III.A.3.4.

**III.A.3.1. Consultation Prior to Offer.**

If an event occurs within the 24 hour period prior to the Operating Day that a Market Participant, including a Market Participant that is not permitted to submit a fuel price adjustment pursuant to Section

III.A.3.4(d) believes will cause the operating cost of a Resource to exceed the level that would violate one of the conduct tests specified in Section III.A.5 of this *Appendix A*, the Market Participant may contact the Internal Market Monitor to provide an explanation of the increased costs. In order for the information to be considered for the purposes of the Day-Ahead Energy Market, the Market Participant must contact the Internal Market Monitor at least 30 minutes prior to the close of the Day-Ahead Energy Market. In order for the information to be considered for purposes of the first commitment analysis performed following the close of the Re-Offer Period, the Market Participant must contact the Internal Market Monitor at least 30 minutes prior to the close of the Re-Offer Period. Cost information submitted thereafter shall be considered in subsequent commitment and dispatch analyses if received between 8:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m. and at least one hour prior to the close of the next hourly Supply Offer submittal period. If the Internal Market Monitor determines that there is an increased cost, the Internal Market Monitor will either update the Reference Level or treat an offer as not violating applicable conduct tests specified in Section III.A.5.5 for the Operating Day for which the offer is submitted. Any request and all supporting cost data and other verifiable supporting information must be submitted to the Internal Market Monitor prior to the Market participant's submission of the offer.

If a Market Participant believes that the fuel price determined under Section III.A.7.5(e) should be modified, it may contact the Internal Market Monitor to request a change to the fuel price and provide an explanation of the basis for the change. Any request to change the fuel price determined under Section III.A.7.5(e) must be received between the hours of 8:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m. on any day.

### **III.A.3.2. Dual Fuel Resources.**

In evaluating bids or offers under this *Appendix A* for dual fuel Resources, the Internal Market Monitor shall utilize the fuel type specified in the Supply Offer for the calculation of Reference Levels pursuant to Section III.A.7 below. If a Market Participant specifies a fuel type in the Supply Offer that, at the time the Supply Offer is submitted, is the higher cost fuel available to the Resource, then if the ratio of the higher cost fuel to the lower cost fuel, as calculated in accordance with the formula specified below, is greater than 1.75, the Market Participant must within five Business Days:

- (a) provide the Internal Market Monitor with written verification as to the cause for the use of the higher cost fuel.
- (b) provide the Internal Market Monitor with evidence that the higher cost fuel was used.

If the Market Participant fails to provide supporting information demonstrating the use of the higher-cost fuel within five Business Days of the Operating Day, then the Reference Level based on the lower cost fuel will be used in place of the Supply Offer for settlement purposes.

For purposes of this Section III.A.3.2, the ratio of the Resource's higher cost fuel to the lower cost fuel is calculated as, for the two primary fuels utilized in the dispatch of the Resource, the maximum fuel index price for the Operating Day divided by the minimum fuel index price for the Operating Day, using the two fuel indices that are utilized in the calculation of the Resource's Reference Levels for the Day-Ahead Energy Market for that Operating Day.

### **III.A.3.3. Market Participant Access to its Reference Levels.**

The Internal Market Monitor will make available to the Market Participant the Reference Levels applicable to that Market Participant's Supply Offers through the MUI. Updated Reference Levels will be made available whenever calculated. The Market Participant shall not modify such Reference Levels in the ISO's or Internal Market Monitor's systems.

### **III.A.3.4. Fuel Price Adjustments.**

(a) A Market Participant may submit a fuel price, to be used in calculating the Reference Levels for a Resource's Supply Offer, whenever the Market Participant's expected price to procure fuel for the Resource will be greater than that used by the Internal Market Monitor in calculating the Reference Levels for the Supply Offer. A fuel price may be submitted for Supply Offers entered in the Day-Ahead Energy Market, the Re-Offer Period, or for a Real-Time Offer Change. A fuel price is subject to the following conditions:

(i) In order for the submitted fuel price to be utilized in calculating the Reference Levels for a Supply Offer, the fuel price must be submitted prior to the applicable Supply Offer deadline,

(ii) The submitted fuel price must reflect the price at which the Market Participant expects to be able to procure fuel to supply energy under the terms of its Supply Offer, exclusive of resource-specific transportation costs. Modifications to Reference Levels based on changes to transportation costs must be addressed through the consultation process specified in Section III.A.3.1.

(iii) The submitted fuel price may be no lower than the lesser of (1) 110% of the fuel price used by the Internal Market Monitor in calculating the Reference Levels for the Resource's Supply Offer

or (2) the fuel price used by the Internal Market Monitor in calculating the Reference Levels for the Resource's Supply Offer plus \$2.50/MMbtu.

(b) Within five Business Days following submittal of a fuel price, a Market Participant must provide the Internal Market Monitor with documentation or analysis to support the submitted fuel price, which may include but is not limited to (i) an invoice or purchase confirmation for the fuel utilized or (ii) a quote from a named supplier or (iii) a price from a publicly available trading platform or price reporting agency, demonstrating that the submitted fuel price reflects the cost at which the Market Participant expected to purchase fuel for the operating period covered by the Supply Offer, as of the time that the Supply Offer was submitted, under an arm's length fuel purchase transaction. Any amount to be added to the quote from a named supplier, or to a price from a publicly available trading platform or price reporting agency, must be submitted and approved using the provision for consultations prior to the determination of Reference Levels in Section III.A.3. The submitted fuel price must be consistent with the fuel price reflected on the submitted invoice or purchase confirmation for the fuel utilized, the quote from a named supplier or the price from a publicly available trading platform or price reporting agency, plus any approved adder, or the other documentation or analysis provided to support the submitted fuel price.

(c) If, within a 12 month period, the requirements in sub-section (b) are not met for a Resource and, for the time period for which the fuel price adjustment that does not meet the requirements in sub-section (b) was submitted, (i) the Market Participant was determined to be pivotal according to the pivotal supplier test described in Section III.A.5.2.1 or (ii) the Resource was determined to be in a constrained area according to the constrained area test described in Section III.A.5.2.2 or (iii) the Resource satisfied any of the conditions described in Section III.A.5.5.6.1, then a fuel price adjustment pursuant to Section III.A.3.4 shall not be permitted for that Resource for up to six months. The following table specifies the number of months for which a Market Participant will be precluded from using the fuel price adjustment, based on the number of times the requirements in sub-section (b) are not met within the 12 month period. The 12 month period excludes any previous days for which the Market Participant was precluded from using the fuel price adjustment. The period of time for which a Market Participant is precluded from using the fuel price adjustment begins two weeks after the most-recent incident occurs.

Number of Incidents	Months Precluded (starting from most-recent incident)
1	2



2 or more	6
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#### **III.A.4. Physical Withholding.**

##### **III.A.4.1. Identification of Conduct Inconsistent with Competition.**

This section defines thresholds used to identify possible instances of physical withholding. This section does not limit the Internal Market Monitor's ability to refer potential instances of physical withholding to the Commission.

Generally, physical withholding involves not offering to sell or schedule the output of or services provided by a Resource capable of serving the New England Markets when it is economic to do so. Physical withholding may include, but is not limited to:

- (a) falsely declaring that a Resource has been forced out of service or otherwise become unavailable,
- (b) refusing to make a Supply Offer, or schedules for a Resource when it would be in the economic interest absent market power, of the withholding entity to do so,
- (c) operating a Resource in Real-Time to produce an output level that is less than the ISO Dispatch Rate, or
- (d) operating a transmission facility in a manner that is not economic, is not justified on the basis of legitimate safety or reliability concerns, and contributes to a binding transmission constraint.

##### **III.A.4.2. Thresholds for Identifying Physical Withholding.**

###### **III.A.4.2.1. Initial Thresholds.**

Except as specified in subsection III.A.4.2.4 below, the following initial thresholds will be employed by the Internal Market Monitor to identify physical withholding of a Resource:

- (a) Withholding that exceeds the lower of 10% or 100 MW of a Resource's capacity;
- (b) Withholding that exceeds in the aggregate the lower of 5% or 200 MW of a Market Participant's total capacity for Market Participants with more than one Resource; or

- (c) Operating a Resource in Real-Time at an output level that is less than 90% of the ISO's Dispatch Rate for the Resource.

#### **III.A.4.2.2. Adjustment to Generating Capacity.**

The amounts of generating capacity considered withheld for purposes of applying the foregoing thresholds shall include unjustified deratings, that is, falsely declaring a Resource derated, and the portions of a Resource's available output that are not offered. The amounts deemed withheld shall not include generating output that is subject to a forced outage or capacity that is out of service for maintenance in accordance with an ISO maintenance schedule, subject to verification by the Internal Market Monitor as may be appropriate that an outage was forced.

#### **III.A.4.2.3. Withholding of Transmission.**

A transmission facility shall be deemed physically withheld if it is not operated in accordance with ISO instructions and such failure to conform to ISO instructions causes transmission congestion. A transmission facility shall not be deemed withheld if it is subject to a forced outage or is out of service for maintenance in accordance with an ISO maintenance schedule, subject to verification by the Internal Market Monitor as may be appropriate that an outage was forced.

#### **III.A.4.2.4. Resources in Congestion Areas.**

Minimum quantity thresholds shall not be applicable to the identification of physical withholding by a Resource in an area the ISO has determined is congested.

#### **III.A.4.3. Hourly Market Impacts.**

Before evaluating possible instances of physical withholding for imposition of sanctions, the Internal Market Monitor shall investigate the reasons for the change in accordance with Section III.A.3. If the physical withholding in question is not explained to the satisfaction of the Internal Market Monitor, the Internal Market Monitor will determine whether the conduct in question causes a price impact in the New England Markets in excess of any of the thresholds specified in Section III.A.5, as appropriate.

#### **III.A.5. Mitigation.**

##### **III.A.5.1. Resources with Capacity Supply Obligations.**

Only Supply Offers associated with Resources with Capacity Supply Obligations will be evaluated for economic withholding in the Day-Ahead Energy Market. All Supply Offers will be evaluated for economic withholding in the Real-Time Energy Market.

#### **III.A.5.1.1. Resources with Partial Capacity Supply Obligations.**

Supply Offers associated with Resources with a Capacity Supply Obligation for less than their full capacity shall be evaluated for economic withholding and mitigation as follows:

- (a) all Supply Offer parameters shall be reviewed for economic withholding;
- (b) the energy price Supply Offer parameter shall be reviewed for economic withholding up to and including the higher of: (i) the block containing the Resource's Economic Minimum Limit, or; (ii) the highest block that includes any portion of the Capacity Supply Obligation;
- (c) if a Resource with a partial Capacity Supply Obligation consists of multiple assets, the offer blocks associated with the Resource that shall be evaluated for mitigation shall be determined by using each asset's Seasonal Claimed Capability value in proportion to the total of the Seasonal Claimed Capabilities for all of the assets that make up the Resource. The Lead Market Participant of a Resource with a partial Capacity Supply Obligation consisting of multiple assets may also propose to the Internal Market Monitor the offer blocks that shall be evaluated for mitigation based on an alternative allocation on a monthly basis. The proposal must be made at least five Business Days prior to the start of the month. A proposal shall be rejected by the Internal Market Monitor if the designation would be inconsistent with competitive behavior

#### **III.A.5.2. Structural Tests.**

There are two structural tests that determine which mitigation thresholds are applied to a Supply Offer:

- (a) if a supplier is determined to be pivotal according to the pivotal supplier test, then the thresholds in Section III.A.5.5.1 "General Threshold Energy Mitigation" and Section III.A.5.5.4 "General Threshold Commitment Mitigation" apply, and;
- (b) if a Resource is determined to be in a constrained area according to the constrained area test, then the thresholds in Section III.A.5.5.2 "Constrained Area Energy Mitigation" and Section III.A.5.5.4 "Constrained Area Commitment Mitigation" apply.

##### **III.A.5.2.1. Pivotal Supplier Test.**

The pivotal supplier test examines whether a Market Participant has aggregate energy Supply Offers (up to and including Economic Max) that exceed the supply margin in the Real-Time Energy Market. A Market Participant whose aggregate energy associated with Supply Offers exceeds the supply margin is a pivotal supplier.

The supply margin for an interval is the total energy Supply Offers from available Resources (up to and including Economic Max), less total system load (as adjusted for net interchange with other Control Areas, including Operating Reserve). Resources are considered available for an interval if they can provide energy within the interval. The applicable interval for the current operating plan in the Real-Time Energy Market is any of the hours in the plan. The applicable interval for UDS is the interval for which UDS issues instructions.

The pivotal supplier test shall be run prior to each determination of a new operating plan for the Operating Day, and prior to each execution of the UDS.

#### **III.A.5.2.2. Constrained Area Test.**

A Resource is considered to be within a constrained area if:

- (a) for purposes of the Real-Time Energy Market, the Resource is located on the import-constrained side of a binding constraint and there is a sensitivity to the binding constraint such that the UDS used to relieve transmission constraints would commit or dispatch the Resource in order to relieve that binding transmission constraint, or;
- (b) for purposes of the Day-Ahead Energy Market, the LMP at the Resource's Node exceeds the LMP at the Hub by more than \$25/MWh.

#### **III.A.5.3. Calculation of Impact Test in the Day-Ahead Energy Market.**

The price impact for the purposes of Section III.A.5.5.2 "Constrained Area Energy Mitigation" is equal to the difference between the LMP at the Resource's Node and the LMP at the Hub.

#### **III.A.5.4. Calculation of Impact Tests in the Real-Time Energy Market.**

The energy price impact test applied in the Real-Time Energy Market shall compare two LMPs at the Resource's Node. The first LMP will be calculated based on the Supply Offers submitted for all Resources. If a Supply Offer has been mitigated in a prior interval, the calculation of the first LMP shall be based on the mitigated value. The second LMP shall be calculated substituting Reference Levels for

Supply Offers that have failed the applicable conduct test. The difference between the two LMPs is the price impact of the conduct violation.

A Supply Offer shall be determined to have no price impact if the offer block that violates the conduct test is:

- (a) less than the LMP calculated using the submitted Supply Offers, and less than the LMP calculated using Reference Levels for Supply Offers that have failed the conduct test, or;
- (b) greater than the LMP calculated using the submitted Supply Offers, and greater than the LMP calculated using Reference Levels for Supply Offers that have failed the conduct test, and the Resource has not been dispatched into the offer block that exceeds the LMP.

### **III.A.5.5. Mitigation by Type.**

#### **III.A.5.5.1. General Threshold Energy Mitigation.**

##### **III.A.5.5.1.1. Applicability.**

Mitigation pursuant to this section shall be applied to all Supply Offers in the Real-Time Energy Market submitted by a Lead Market Participant that is determined to be a pivotal supplier in the Real-Time Energy Market.

##### **III.A.5.5.1.2. Conduct Test.**

A Supply Offer fails the conduct test for general threshold energy mitigation if any offer block price exceeds the Reference Level by an amount greater than 300% or \$100/MWh, whichever is lower. Offer block prices below \$25/MWh are not subject to the conduct test.

##### **III.A.5.5.1.3. Impact Test.**

A Supply Offer that fails the conduct test for general threshold energy mitigation shall be evaluated against the impact test for general threshold energy mitigation. A Supply Offer fails the impact test for general threshold energy mitigation if there is an increase in the LMP greater than 200% or \$100/MWh, whichever is lower as determined by the real-time impact test.

##### **III.A.5.5.1.4. Consequence of Failing Both Conduct and Impact Test.**

If a Supply Offer fails the general threshold conduct and impact tests, then the financial parameters of the Supply Offer shall be set to their Reference Levels, including all energy offer block prices and all types of Start-Up Fees and the No-Load Fee.

#### **III.A.5.5.2. Constrained Area Energy Mitigation.**

##### **III.A.5.5.2.1. Applicability.**

Mitigation pursuant to this section shall be applied to Supply Offers in the Day-Ahead Energy Market and Real-Time Energy Market associated with a Resource determined to be within a constrained area.

##### **III.A.5.5.2.2. Conduct Test.**

A Supply Offer fails the conduct test for constrained area energy mitigation if any offer block price exceeds the Reference Level by an amount greater than 50% or \$25/MWh, whichever is lower.

##### **III.A.5.5.2.3. Impact Test.**

A Supply Offer fails the impact test for constrained area energy mitigation if there is an increase greater than 50% or \$25/MWh, whichever is lower, in the LMP as determined by the day-ahead or real-time impact test.

##### **III.A.5.5.2.4. Consequence of Failing Both Conduct and Impact Test.**

If a Supply Offer fails the constrained area conduct and impact tests, then the financial parameters of the Supply Offer shall be set to their Reference Levels, including all energy offer blocks and all types of Start-Up Fees and the No-Load Fee.

#### **III.A.5.5.3. Manual Dispatch Energy Mitigation.**

##### **III.A.5.5.3.1. Applicability.**

Mitigation pursuant to this section shall be applied to Supply Offers associated with a Resource, when the Resource is manually dispatched above the Economic Minimum Limit value specified in the Resource's Supply Offer and the energy price parameter of its Supply Offer at the Desired Dispatch Point is greater than the Real-Time Price at the Resource's Node.

#### **III.A.5.5.3.2. Conduct Test.**

A Supply Offer fails the conduct test for manual dispatch energy mitigation if any offer block price divided by the Reference Level is greater than 1.10.

#### **III.A.5.5.3.3. Consequence of Failing the Conduct Test.**

If a Supply Offer for a Resource fails the manual dispatch energy conduct test, then the financial parameters of the Supply Offer shall be set to their Reference Levels, including all energy offer blocks and all types of Start-Up Fees and the No-Load Fee.

#### **III.A.5.5.4. General Threshold Commitment Mitigation.**

##### **III.A.5.5.4.1. Applicability.**

Mitigation pursuant to this section shall be applied to all Supply Offers in the Real-Time Energy Market submitted by a Lead Market Participant that is determined to be a pivotal supplier in the Real-Time Energy Market.

##### **III.A.5.5.4.2. Conduct Test.**

A Resource shall fail the conduct test for general threshold commitment mitigation if the low Load Cost at Offer divided by the Low Load Cost at Reference Level is greater than 3.00.

##### **III.A.5.5.4.3. Consequence of Failing Conduct Test.**

If a Resource fails the general threshold commitment conduct test, then all financial parameters of its Supply Offer are set to their Reference Levels.

#### **III.A.5.5.5. Constrained Area Commitment Mitigation.**

##### **III.A.5.5.5.1. Applicability.**

Mitigation pursuant to this section shall be applied to any Resource determined to be within a constrained area in the Real-Time Energy Market.

##### **III.A.5.5.5.2. Conduct Test.**

A Resource shall fail the conduct test for constrained area commitment mitigation if the Low Load Cost at Offer divided by the Low Load Cost at Reference Level is greater than 1.25.

#### **III.A.5.5.3. Consequence of Failing Test.**

If a Supply Offer fails the constrained area commitment conduct test, then all financial parameters of its Supply Offer are set to their Reference Levels.

#### **III.A.5.5.6. Reliability Commitment Mitigation.**

##### **III.A.5.5.6.1. Applicability.**

Mitigation pursuant to this section shall be applied to Supply Offers for Resources that are (a) committed to provide, or Resources that are required to remain online to provide, one or more of the following:

- i. local first contingency;
- ii. local second contingency;
- iii. VAR or voltage;
- iv. distribution (Special Constraint Resource Service);
- v. dual fuel resource auditing;

(b) otherwise manually committed by the ISO for reasons other than meeting anticipated load plus reserve requirements.

##### **III.A.5.5.6.2. Conduct Test.**

A Supply Offer shall fail the conduct test for local reliability commitment mitigation if the Low Load Cost at Offer divided by the Low Load Cost at Reference Level is greater than 1.10.

##### **III.A.5.5.6.3. Consequence of Failing Test.**

If a Supply Offer fails the local reliability commitment conduct test, it shall be evaluated for commitment based on an offer with all financial parameters set to their Reference Levels. This includes all offer blocks and all types of Start-Up Fees and the No-Load Fee. If a Resource is committed, then all financial parameters of its Supply Offer are set to their Reference Level.

#### **III.A.5.5.7. Start-Up Fee and No-Load Fee Mitigation.**

##### **III.A.5.5.7.1. Applicability.**



Mitigation pursuant to this section shall be applied to any Supply Offer submitted in the Day-Ahead Energy Market or Real-Time Energy Market if the resource is committed.

**III.A.5.5.7.2. Conduct Test.**

A Supply Offer shall fail the conduct test for Start-Up Fee and No-Load Fee mitigation if its Start-Up Fee or No-Load Fee divided by the Reference Level for that fee is greater than 3.

**III.A.5.5.7.3. Consequence of Failing Conduct Test.**

If a Supply Offer fails the conduct test, then all financial parameters of its Supply Offer shall be set to their Reference Levels.

**III.A.5.5.8. Low Load Cost.**

Low Load Cost, which is the cost of operating the Resource at its Economic Minimum Limit, is calculated as the sum of:

- (a) If the Resource is starting from an offline state, the Start-Up Fee;
- (b) The sum of the No Load Fees for the Commitment Period; and
- (c) The sum of the hourly values resulting from the multiplication of the price of energy at the Resource's Economic Minimum Limit times its Economic Minimum Limit, for each hour of the Commitment Period.

All Supply Offer parameter values used in calculating the Low Load Cost are the values in place at the time the commitment decision is made.

Low Load Cost at Offer equals the Low Load Cost calculated with financial parameters of the Supply Offer as submitted by the Lead Market Participant.

Low Load Cost at Reference Level equals the Low Load Cost calculated with the financial parameters of the Supply Offer set to Reference Levels.

For Low Load Cost at Offer, the price of energy is the energy price parameter of the Resource's Supply Offer at the Economic Minimum Limit offer block. For Low Load Cost at Reference Level, the price of energy is the energy price parameter of the Resource's Reference Level at the Economic Minimum Limit offer block.

### **III.A.5.6. Duration of Energy Threshold Mitigation.**

Any mitigation imposed pursuant to Sections III.A.5.5.1 “General Threshold Energy Mitigation” or III.A.5.5.2 “Constrained Area Energy Mitigation” is in effect for the following duration:

- (a) in the Real-Time Energy Market, mitigation starts when the impact test violation occurs and remains in effect until there is one complete hour in which:
  - i. for general threshold mitigation, the Market Participant whose Supply Offer is subject to mitigation is not a pivotal supplier; or,
  - ii. for constrained area energy mitigation, the Resource is not located within a constrained area.
- (b) in the Day-Ahead Energy Market (applicable only for Section III.A.5.5.2 “Constrained Area Energy Mitigation”), mitigation is in effect in each hour in which the impact test is violated.

Any mitigation imposed pursuant to Section III.A.5.5.3 “Manual Dispatch Energy Mitigation” is in effect for at least one hour until the earlier of either (a) the hour when manual dispatch is no longer in effect and the Resource returns to its Economic Minimum Limit, or (b) the hour when the energy price parameter of its Supply Offer at the Desired Dispatch Point is no longer greater than the Real-Time Price at the Resource’s Node.

### **III.A.5.7. Duration of Commitment Mitigation.**

Any mitigation imposed pursuant to Sections III.A.5.5.4 “General Threshold Commitment Mitigation”, III.A.5.5.5 “Constrained Area Commitment Mitigation”, or III.A.5.5.6 “Reliability Commitment Mitigation” is in effect for the duration of the Commitment Period.

### **III.A.5.8. Duration of Start-Up Fee and No-Load Fee Mitigation.**

Any mitigation imposed pursuant to Sections III.A.5.5.7 “Start-Up Fee and No-Load Fee Mitigation” is in effect for any hour in which the Supply Offer fails the conduct test in Section III.A.5.5.7.2.

### **III.A.5.9. Correction of Mitigation.**

If the Internal Market Monitor determines that there are one or more errors in the mitigation applied in an Operating Day due to data entry, system or software errors by the ISO or the Internal Market Monitor, the Internal Market Monitor shall notify the market monitoring contacts specified by the Lead Market Participant within five Business Days of the applicable Operating Day. The ISO shall correct the error as

part of the Data Reconciliation Process by applying the correct values to the relevant Supply Offer in the settlement process.

The permissibility of correction of errors in mitigation, and the timeframes and procedures for permitted corrections, are addressed solely in this section and not in those sections of Market Rule 1 relating to settlement and billing processes.

#### **III.A.5.10. Delay of Day-Ahead Energy Market Due to Mitigation Process.**

The posting of the Day-Ahead Energy Market results may be delayed if necessary for the completion of mitigation procedures.

#### **III.A.6. Physical and Financial Parameter Offer Thresholds.**

Physical parameters of a Supply Offer are limited to thresholds specified in this section. Physical parameters are limited by the software accepting offers, except those that can be re-declared in real time during the Operating Day. Parameters that exceed the thresholds specified here but are not limited through the software accepting offers are subject to Internal Market Monitor review after the Operating Day and possible referral to the Commission under Section III.A.19 of this Appendix.

##### **III.A.6.1. Time-Based Offer Parameters.**

Supply Offer parameters that are expressed in time (i.e., Minimum Run Time, Minimum Down Time, Start-Up Time, and Notification Time) shall have a threshold of two hours for an individual parameter or six hours for the combination of the time-based offer parameters compared to the Resource's Reference Levels. Offers may not exceed these thresholds in a manner that reduce the flexibility of the Resource. To determine if the six hour threshold is exceeded, all time-based offer parameters will be summed for each start-up state (hot, intermediate and cold). If the sum of the time-based offer parameters for a start-up state exceeds six hours above the sum of the Reference Levels for those offer parameters, then the six hour threshold is exceeded.

##### **III.A.6.2. Financial Offer Parameters.**

The Start-Up Fee and the No-Load Fee values of a Resource's Supply Offer may be no greater than three times the Start-Up Fee and No-Load Fee Reference Level values for the Resource. In the event a fuel price has been submitted under Section III.A.3.4, the Start-Up Fee and No-Load Fee for the associated Supply Offer shall be limited in a Real-Time Offer Change. The limit shall be the percent increase in the new fuel price, relative to the fuel price otherwise used by the Internal Market Monitor, multiplied by the

Start-Up Fee or No-Load Fee from the Re-Offer Period. Absent a fuel price adjustment, a Start-Up Fee or No-Load Fee may be changed in a Real-Time Offer Change to no more than the Start-Up Fee and No-Load Fee values submitted for the Re-Offer Period.

### **III.A.6.3. Other Offer Parameters.**

Non-financial or non-time-based offer parameters shall have a threshold of a 100% increase, or greater, for parameters that are minimum values, or a 50% decrease, or greater, for parameters that are maximum values (including, but not limited to, ramp rates, Economic Maximum Limits and maximum starts per day) compared to the Resource's Reference Levels.

Offer parameters that are limited by performance caps or audit values imposed by the ISO are not subject to the provisions of this section.

### **III.A.7. Calculation of Resource Reference Levels for Physical Parameters and Financial Parameters of Resources.**

Market Participants are responsible for providing the Internal Market Monitor with all the information and data necessary for the Internal Market Monitor to calculate up-to-date Reference Levels for each of a Market Participant's Resources.

#### **III.A.7.1. Methods for Determining Reference Levels for Physical Parameters.**

The Internal Market Monitor will calculate a Reference Level for each element of a bid or offer that is expressed in units other than dollars (such as time-based or quantity level bid or offer parameters) on the basis of one or more of the following:

- (a) Original equipment manufacturer (OEM) operating recommendations and performance data for all Resource types in the New England Control Area, grouped by unit classes, physical parameters and fuel types.
- (b) Applicable environmental operating permit information currently on file with the issuing environmental regulatory body.
- (c) Verifiable Resource physical operating characteristic data, including but not limited to facility and/or Resource operating guides and procedures, historical operating data and any verifiable documentation related to the Resource, which will be reviewed in consultation with the Market Participant.

#### **III.A.7.2. Methods for Determining Reference Levels for Financial Parameters of Offers.**

The Reference Levels for Start-Up Fees, No-Load Fees, Interruption Costs and offer blocks will be calculated separately and assuming no costs from one component are included in another component.

**III.A.7.2.1. Order of Reference Level Calculation.**

The Internal Market Monitor will calculate a Reference Level for each offer block of an offer according to the following hierarchy, under which the first method that can be calculated is used:

- (a) accepted offer-based Reference Levels pursuant to Section III.A.7.3;
- (b) LMP-based Reference Levels pursuant to Section III.A.7.4; and,
- (c) cost-based Reference Levels pursuant to Section III.A.7.5.

**III.A.7.2.2. Circumstances in Which Cost-Based Reference Levels Supersede the Hierarchy of Reference Level Calculation.**

In the following circumstances, cost-based Reference Levels shall be used notwithstanding the hierarchy specified in Section III.A.7.2.1.

- (a) When in any hour the cost-based Reference Level is higher than either the accepted offer-based or LMP-based Reference Level.
- (b) When the Supply Offer parameter is a Start-Up Fee or the No-Load Fee.
- (c) For any Operating Day for which the Lead Market Participant requests the cost-based Reference Level.
- (d) For any Operating Day for which, during the previous 90 days:
  - (i) the Resource has been flagged for VAR, SCR, or as a Local Second Contingency Protection Resource for any hour in the Day-Ahead Energy Market or the Real-Time Energy Market, and;
  - (ii) the ratio of the sum of the operating hours for days for which the Resource has been flagged during the previous 90 days in which the number of hours operated out of economic merit order in the Day-Ahead Energy Market and the Real-Time Energy Market exceed the number of hours operated in economic merit order in the Day-Ahead Energy Market and Real-Time Energy Market, to the total number of operating hours in the Day-Ahead Energy Market and Real-Time Energy Market during the previous 90 days is greater than or equal to 50 percent.
- (e) When in any hour the incremental energy parameter of an offer, including adjusted offers pursuant to Section III.2.4, is greater than \$1,000/MWh.

For the purposes of this subsection:

- i. A flagged day is any day in which the Resource has been flagged for VAR, SCR, or as a Local Second Contingency Protection Resource for any hour in either the Day-Ahead Energy Market or the Real-Time Energy Market.
  - ii. Operating hours are the hours in the Day-Ahead Energy Market for which a Resource has cleared output (MW) greater than zero and hours in the Real-Time Energy Market for which a Resource has metered output (MW) greater than zero. For days for which Real-time Energy Market metered values are not yet available in the ISO's or the Internal Market Monitor's systems, telemetered values will be used.
  - iii. Self-scheduled hours will be excluded from all of the calculations described in this subsection, including the determination of operating hours.
  - iv. The determination as to whether a Resource operated in economic merit order during an hour will be based on the energy offer block within which the Resource is operating.
- (e) The Market Participant submits a fuel price pursuant to Section III.A.3.4. When the Market Participant submits a fuel price for any hour of a Supply Offer in the Day-Ahead Energy Market or Re-Offer Period, then the cost-based Reference Level is used for the entire Operating Day. If a fuel price is submitted for a Supply Offer after the close of the Re-Offer Period for the next Operating Day or for the current Operating Day, then the cost-based Reference Level for the Supply Offer is used from the time of the submittal to the end of the Operating Day.
- (f) When the Market Participant submits a change to any of the following parameters of the Supply Offer after the close of the Re-Offer Period:
- (i) hot, intermediate, or cold Start-Up Fee, or a corresponding fuel blend,
  - (ii) No-Load Fee or its corresponding fuel blends,
  - (iii) whether to include the Start-Up Fee and No-Load Fee in the Supply Offer,
  - (iv) the quantity or price value of any Block in the Supply Offer or its corresponding fuel blends, and
  - (v) whether to use the offer slope for the Supply Offer,

then, the cost-based Reference Level for the Supply Offer will be used from the time of the submittal to the end of the Operating Day.

### **III.A.7.3. Accepted Offer-Based Reference Level.**

The Internal Market Monitor shall calculate the accepted offer-based Reference Level as the lower of the mean or the median of a generating Resource's Supply Offers that have been accepted and are part of the seller's Day-Ahead Generation Obligation or Real-Time Generation Obligation in competitive periods over the previous 90 days, adjusted for changes in fuel prices utilizing fuel indices generally applicable for the location and type of Resource. For purposes of this section, a competitive period is an Operating Day in which the Resource is scheduled in economic merit order.

### **III.A.7.4. LMP-Based Reference Level.**

The Internal Market Monitor shall calculate the LMP-based Reference Level as the mean of the LMP at the Resource's Node during the lowest-priced 25% of the hours that the Resource was dispatched over the previous 90 days for similar hours (on-peak or off-peak), adjusted for changes in fuel prices.

### **III.A.7.5. Cost-Based Reference Level.**

The Internal Market Monitor shall calculate cost-based Reference Levels taking into account information on costs provided by the Market Participant through the consultation process prescribed in Section III.A.3.

The following criteria shall be applied to estimates of cost:

- (a) The provision of cost estimates by a Market Participant shall conform with the timing and requirements of Section III.A.3 "Consultation Prior to Determination of Reference Levels for Physical and Financial Parameters of Resources".
- (b) Costs must be documented.
- (c) All cost estimates shall be based on estimates of current market prices or replacement costs and not inventory costs wherever possible. All cost estimates, including opportunity cost estimates, must be quantified and analytically supported.
- (d) When market prices or replacement costs are unavailable, cost estimates shall identify whether the reported costs are the result of a product or service provided by an Affiliate of the Market Participant.
- (e) The Internal Market Monitor will evaluate cost information provided by the Market Participant in comparison to other information available to the Internal Market Monitor. Reference Levels associated with Resources for which a fuel price has been submitted under Section III.A.3.4 shall be calculated using the lower of the submitted fuel price or a price, calculated by the Internal Market Monitor, that takes account of the following factors and conditions:

- i. Fuel market conditions, including the current spread between bids and asks for current fuel delivery, fuel trading volumes, near-term price quotes for fuel, expected natural gas heating demand, and Market Participant-reported quotes for trading and fuel costs; and
- ii. Fuel delivery conditions, including current and forecasted fuel delivery constraints and current line pack levels for natural gas pipelines.

### **III.A.7.5.1. Estimation of Incremental Operating Cost.**

The Internal Market Monitor's determination of a Resource's marginal costs shall include an assessment of the Resource's incremental operating costs in accordance with the following formulas,

Incremental Energy/Reduction:

$(\text{incremental heat rate} * \text{fuel costs}) + (\text{emissions rate} * \text{emissions allowance price}) + \text{variable operating and maintenance costs} + \text{opportunity costs}.$

Opportunity costs may include, but are not limited to, economic costs associated with complying with:

- (a) emissions limits;
- (b) water storage limits;
- (c) other operating permits that limit production of energy; and
- (d) reducing electricity consumption.

No-Load:

$(\text{no-load fuel use} * \text{fuel costs}) + (\text{no-load emissions} * \text{emission allowance price})$   
 $+ \text{no-load variable operating and maintenance costs} + \text{other no-load costs that are not fuel, emissions or variable and maintenance costs}.$

Start-Up/Interruption:

$(\text{start-up fuel use} * \text{fuel costs}) + (\text{start-up emissions} * \text{emission allowance price}) + \text{start-up variable and maintenance costs} + \text{other start-up costs that are not fuel, emissions or variable and maintenance costs}.$



**III.A.8. [Reserved.]**

**III.A.9. Regulation.**

The Internal Market Monitor will monitor the Regulation market for conduct that it determines constitutes an abuse of market power. If the Internal Market Monitor identifies any such conduct, it may make a filing under Section 205 of the Federal Power Act with the Commission requesting authorization to apply appropriate mitigation measures or to revise Market Rule 1 to address such conduct (or both). The Internal Market Monitor may make such a filing at any time it deems necessary, and may request expedited treatment from the Commission. Any such filing shall identify the particular conduct the Internal Market Monitor believes warrants mitigation or revisions to Market Rule 1 (or both), shall propose a specific mitigation measure for the conduct or revision to Market Rule 1 (or both), and shall set forth the Internal Market Monitor's justification for imposing that mitigation measure or revision to Market Rule 1 (or both).

**III.A.10. Demand Bids.**

The Internal Market Monitor will monitor the Energy Market as outlined below:

- (a) LMPs in the Day-Ahead Energy Market and Real-Time Energy Market shall be monitored to determine whether there is a persistent hourly deviation in any location that would not be expected in a workably competitive market.
- (b) The Internal Market Monitor shall compute the average hourly deviation between Day-Ahead Energy Market and Real-Time Energy Market LMPs, measured as:  $(LMP_{\text{real time}} / LMP_{\text{day ahead}}) - 1$ . The average hourly deviation shall be computed over a rolling four-week period or such other period determined by the Internal Market Monitor.
- (c) The Internal Market Monitor shall estimate and monitor the average percentage of each Market Participant's bid to serve load scheduled in the Day-Ahead Energy Market, using a methodology intended to identify a sustained pattern of under-bidding as accurately as deemed practicable. The average percentage will be computed over a specified time period determined by the Internal Market Monitor.

If the Internal Market Monitor determines that: (i) The average hourly deviation is greater than ten percent (10%) or less than negative ten percent (-10%), (ii) one or more Market Participants on behalf of one or more LSEs have been purchasing a substantial portion of their loads with purchases in the Real-Time Energy Market, (iii) this practice has contributed to an unwarranted divergence of LMPs between

the two markets, and (iv) this practice has created operational problems, the Internal Market Monitor may make a filing under Section 205 of the Federal Power Act with the Commission requesting authorization to apply appropriate mitigation measures or to revise Market Rule 1 to address such conduct (or both). The thresholds identified above shall not limit the Internal Market Monitor's authority to make such a filing. The Internal Market Monitor may make such a filing at any time it deems necessary, and may request expedited treatment from the Commission. Any such filing shall identify the particular conduct that the Internal Market Monitor believes warrants mitigation or revisions to Market Rule 1 (or both), shall propose a specific mitigation measure for the conduct or revision to Market Rule 1 (or both), and shall set forth the Internal Market Monitor's justification for imposing that mitigation measure or revision to Market Rule 1 (or both).

### **III.A.11. Mitigation of Increment Offers and Decrement Bids.**

#### **III.A.11.1. Purpose.**

The provisions of this section specify the market monitoring and mitigation measures applicable to Increment Offers and Decrement Bids. An Increment Offer is one to supply energy and a Decrement Bid is one to purchase energy, in either such case not being backed by physical load or generation and submitted in the Day-Ahead Energy Market in accordance with the procedures and requirements specified in Market Rule 1 and the ISO New England Manuals.

#### **III.A.11.2. Implementation.**

##### **III.A.11.2.1. Monitoring of Increment Offers and Decrement Bids.**

Day-Ahead LMPs and Real-Time LMPs in each Load Zone or Node, as applicable, shall be monitored to determine whether there is a persistent hourly deviation in the LMPs that would not be expected in a workably competitive market. The Internal Market Monitor shall compute the average hourly deviation between Day-Ahead LMPs and Real-Time LMPs, measured as:

$$(\text{LMP}_{\text{real time}} / \text{LMP}_{\text{day ahead}}) - 1.$$

The average hourly deviation shall be computed over a rolling four-week period or such other period determined by the Internal Market Monitor to be appropriate to achieve the purpose of this mitigation measure.

#### **III.A.11.3. Mitigation Measures.**

If the Internal Market Monitor determines that (i) the average hourly deviation computed over a rolling four week period is greater than ten percent (10%) or less than negative ten percent (-10%), and (ii) the bid and offer practices of one or more Market Participants has contributed to a divergence between LMPs in the Day-Ahead Energy Market and Real-Time Energy Market, then the following mitigation measure may be imposed:

The Internal Market Monitor may limit the hourly quantities of Increment Offers for supply or Decrement Bids for load that may be offered in a Location by a Market Participant, subject to the following provisions:

- (i) The Internal Market Monitor shall, when practicable, request explanations of the relevant bid and offer practices from any Market Participant submitting such bids.
- (ii) Prior to imposing a mitigation measure, the Internal Market Monitor shall notify the affected Market Participant of the limitation.
- (iii) The Internal Market Monitor, with the assistance of the ISO, will restrict the Market Participant for a period of six months from submitting any virtual transactions at the same Node(s), and/or electrically similar Nodes to, the Nodes where it had submitted the virtual transactions that contributed to the unwarranted divergence between the LMPs in the Day-Ahead Energy Market and Real-Time Energy Market.

#### **III.A.11.4. Monitoring and Analysis of Market Design and Rules.**

The Internal Market Monitor shall monitor and assess the impact of Increment Offers and Decrement Bids on the competitive structure and performance, and the economic efficiency of the New England Markets. Such monitoring and assessment shall include the effects, if any, on such bids and offers of any mitigation measures specified in this Market Rule 1.

#### **III.A.12. Cap on FTR Revenues.**

If a holder of an FTR between specified delivery and receipt Locations (i) had an Increment Offer and/or Decrement Bid that was accepted by the ISO for an applicable hour in the Day-Ahead Energy Market for delivery or receipt at or near delivery or receipt Locations of the FTR; and (ii) the result of the acceptance of such Increment Offer or Decrement Bid is that the difference in LMP in the Day-Ahead Energy Market between such delivery and receipt Locations is greater than the difference in LMP between such delivery and receipt Locations in the Real-Time Energy Market, then the Market Participant shall not receive any Transmission Congestion Credit associated with such FTR in such hour, in excess of one divided by the

number of hours in the applicable month multiplied by the amount originally paid for the FTR in the FTR Auction. A Location shall be considered at or near the FTR delivery or receipt Location if seventy-five % or more of the energy injected or withdrawn at that Location and which is withdrawn or injected at another Location is reflected in the constrained path between the subject FTR delivery and receipt Locations that were acquired in the FTR Auction.

### **III.A.13. Additional Internal Market Monitor Functions Specified in Tariff.**

#### **III.A.13.1. Review of Offers and Bids in the Forward Capacity Market.**

In accordance with the following provisions of Section III.13 of Market Rule 1, the Internal Market Monitor is responsible for reviewing certain bids and offers made in the Forward Capacity Market. Section III.13 of Market Rule 1 specifies the nature and detail of the Internal Market Monitor's review and the consequences that will result from the Internal Market Monitor's determination following such review.

- (a) [Reserved].
- (b) Section III.13.1.2.3.1.6.3 - Internal Market Monitor review of Static De-List Bids, Permanent De-List Bids, and Retirement De-List Bids from an Existing Generating Capacity Resource that is associated with a Station having Common Costs.
- (c) Section III.13.1.2.3.2 - Review by Internal Market Monitor of Bids from Existing Generating Capacity Resources.
- (d) Section III.13.1.3.3A(d) - Review by Internal Market Monitor of offers from Existing Import Capacity Resources.
- (e) Section III.13.1.3.5.6 - Review by Internal Market Monitor of Offers from New Import Capacity Resources.
- (f) Section III.13.1.7 - Internal Market Monitor review of summer and winter Seasonal Claimed Capability values.

#### **III.A.13.2. Supply Offers and Demand Bids Submitted for Reconfiguration Auctions in the Forward Capacity Market.**

Section III.13.4 of Market Rule 1 addresses reconfiguration auctions in the Forward Capacity Market. As addressed in Section III.13.4.2 of Market Rule 1, a supply offer or demand bid submitted for a reconfiguration auction shall not be subject to mitigation by the Internal Market Monitor.

### **III.A.13.3. Monitoring of Transmission Facility Outage Scheduling.**

*Appendix G* of Market Rule 1 addresses the scheduling of outages for transmission facilities. The Internal Market Monitor shall monitor the outage scheduling activities of the Transmission Owners. The Internal Market Monitor shall have the right to request that each Transmission Owner provide information to the Internal Market Monitor concerning the Transmission Owner's scheduling of transmission facility outages, including the repositioning or cancellation of any interim approved or approved outage, and the Transmission Owner shall provide such information to the Internal Market Monitor in accordance with the ISO New England Information Policy.

### **III.A.13.4. Monitoring of Forward Reserve Resources.**

The Internal Market Monitor will receive information that will identify Forward Reserve Resources, the Forward Reserve Threshold Price, and the assigned Forward Reserve Obligation. Prior to mitigation of Supply Offers or Demand Bids associated with a Forward Reserve Resource, the Internal Market Monitor shall consult with the Market Participant in accordance with Section III.A.3 of this *Appendix A*. The Internal Market Monitor and the Market Participant shall consider the impact on meeting any Forward Reserve Obligations in those consultations. If mitigation is imposed, any mitigated offers shall be used in the calculation of qualifying megawatts under Section III.9.6.4 of Market Rule 1.

### **III.A.14. Treatment of Supply Offers for Resources Subject to a Cost-of-Service Agreement.**

Article 5 of the form of Cost-of-Service Agreement in *Appendix I* to Market Rule 1 addresses the monitoring of resources subject to a cost-of-service agreement by the Internal Market Monitor and External Market Monitor. Pursuant to Section 5.2 of Article 5 of the Form of Cost-of-Service Agreement, after consultation with the Lead Market Participant, Supply Offers that exceed Stipulated Variable Cost as determined in the agreement are subject to adjustment by the Internal Market Monitor to Stipulated Variable Cost.

### **III.A.15. Request for Additional Cost Recovery.**

#### **III.A.15.1. Cost Recovery Request Following Capping.**

If as a result of an offer being capped under Section III.1.9, a Market Participant believes that it will not recover the fuel and variable operating and maintenance costs of the Resource, as reflected in the offer, for the hours of the Operating Day during which the offer was capped, the Market Participant may, within 20 days of the receipt of the first Invoice issued containing credits or charges for the applicable Operating Day, submit an additional cost recovery request to the Internal Market Monitor.

A request under this Section III.A.15 may seek recovery of additional costs incurred for the duration of the period of time for which the Resource was operated at the cap.

**III.A.15.1.1. Timing and Contents of Request.**

Within 20 days of the receipt of the first Invoice containing credits or charges for the applicable Operating Day, a Market Participant requesting additional cost recovery under this Section III.A.15.1 shall submit to the Internal Market Monitor a request in writing detailing: (i) the actual fuel and variable operating and maintenance costs for the Resource for the applicable Operating Days, with supporting data, documentation and calculations for those costs; and (ii) an explanation of why the actual costs of operating the Resource exceeded the capped costs.

**III.A.15.1.2. Review by Internal Market Monitor.**

To evaluate a Market Participant's request, the Internal Market Monitor shall use the data, calculations and explanations provided by the Market Participant to verify the actual fuel and variable operating and maintenance costs for the Resource for the applicable Operating Days, using the same standards and methodologies the Internal Market Monitor uses to evaluate requests to update Reference Levels under Section III.A.3 of Appendix A. To the extent the Market Participant's request warrants additional cost recovery, the Internal Market Monitor shall reflect that adjustment in the Resource's Reference Levels for the period covered by the request. The ISO shall then re-apply the cost verification and capping formulas in Section III.1.9 using the updated Reference Levels to re-calculate the adjustments to the Market Participant's offers required thereunder, and then shall calculate additional cost recovery using the adjusted offer values.

Within 20 days of the receipt of a completed submittal, the Internal Market Monitor shall provide a written response to the Market Participant's request, detailing (i) the extent to which it agrees with the request with supporting explanation, and (ii) a calculation of the additional cost recovery. Changes to credits and charges resulting from an additional cost recovery request shall be included in the Data Reconciliation Process.

**III.A.15.1.3. Cost Allocation.**

The ISO shall allocate charges to Market Participants for payment of any additional cost recovery granted under this Section III.A.15.1 in accordance with the cost allocation provisions of Market Rule 1 that

otherwise would apply to payments for the services provided based on the Resource's actual dispatch for the Operating Days in question.

### **III.A.15.2. Section 205 Filing Right.**

If either

- (a) as a result of mitigation applied to a Resource under this *Appendix A* for all or part of one or more Operating Days, or
- (b) in the absence of mitigation, as a result of a request under Section III.A.15.1 being denied in whole or in part,

a Market Participant believes that it will not recover the fuel and variable operating and maintenance costs of the Resource, as reflected in the offer, for the hours of the Operating Day during which the offer was mitigated or the Section III.A.15.1 request was denied, the Market Participant may submit a filing to the Commission seeking recovery of those costs pursuant to Section 205 of the Federal Power Act. For filings to address cost recovery under Section III.A.15.2(a), the filing must be made within sixty days of receipt of the first Invoice issued containing credits or charges for the applicable Operating Day. For filings to address cost recovery under Section III.A.15.2(b), the filing must be made within sixty days of receipt of the first Invoice issued that reflects the denied request for additional cost recovery under Section III.A.15.1.

A request under this Section III.A.15.2 may seek recovery of additional costs incurred during the following periods: (a) if as a result of mitigation, costs incurred for the duration of the mitigation event, and (b) if as a result of having a Section III.A.15.1 request denied, costs incurred for the duration of the period of time addressed in the Section III.A.15.1 request.

#### **III.A.15.2.1. Contents of Filing.**

Any Section 205 filing made pursuant to this section shall include: (i) the actual fuel and variable operating and maintenance costs for the Resource for the applicable Operating Days, with supporting data and calculations for those costs; (ii) an explanation of (a) why the actual costs of operating the Resource exceeded the Reference Level costs or, (b) in the absence of mitigation, why the actual costs of operating the Resource, as reflected in the original offer and to the extent not recovered under Section III.A.15.1, exceeded the costs as reflected in the capped offer; (iii) the Internal Market Monitor's written explanation provided pursuant to Section III.A.15.3; and (iv) all requested regulatory costs in connection with the filing.

#### **III.A.15.2.2. Review by Internal Market Monitor Prior to Filing.**

Within twenty days of the receipt of the applicable Invoice, a Market Participant that intends to make a Section 205 filing pursuant to this Section III.A.15.2 shall submit to the Internal Market Monitor the information and explanation detailed in Section III.A.15.2.1 (i) and (ii) that is to be included in the Section 205 filing. Within twenty days of the receipt of a completed submittal, the Internal Market Monitor shall provide a written explanation of the events that resulted in the Section III.A.15.2 request for additional cost recovery. The Market Participant shall include the Internal Market Monitor's written explanation in the Section 205 filing made pursuant to this Section III A.15.2.

#### **III.A.15.2.3. Cost Allocation.**

In the event that the Commission accepts a Market Participant's filing for cost recovery under this section, the ISO shall allocate charges to Market Participants for payment of those costs in accordance with the cost allocation provisions of Market Rule 1 that otherwise would apply to payments for the services provided based on the Resource's actual dispatch for the Operating Days in question.

#### **III.A.16. ADR Review of Internal Market Monitor Mitigation Actions.**

##### **III.A.16.1. Actions Subject to Review.**

A Market Participant may obtain prompt Alternative Dispute Resolution ("ADR") review of any Internal Market Monitor mitigation imposed on a Resource as to which that Market Participant has bidding or operational authority. A Market Participant must seek review pursuant to the procedure set forth in *Appendix D* to this Market Rule 1, but in all cases within the time limits applicable to billing adjustment requests. These deadlines are currently specified in the ISO New England Manuals. Actions subject to review are:

- Imposition of a mitigation remedy.
- Continuation of a mitigation remedy as to which a Market Participant has submitted material evidence of changed facts or circumstances. (Thus, after a Market Participant has unsuccessfully challenged imposition of a mitigation remedy, it may challenge the continuation of that mitigation in a subsequent ADR review on a showing of material evidence of changed facts or circumstances.)

##### **III.A.16.2. Standard of Review.**



On the basis of the written record and the presentations of the Internal Market Monitor and the Market Participant, the ADR Neutral shall review the facts and circumstances upon which the Internal Market Monitor based its decision and the remedy imposed by the Internal Market Monitor. The ADR Neutral shall remove the Internal Market Monitor's mitigation only if it concludes that the Internal Market Monitor's application of the Internal Market Monitor mitigation policy was clearly erroneous. In considering the reasonableness of the Internal Market Monitor's action, the ADR Neutral shall consider whether adequate opportunity was given to the Market Participant to present information, any voluntary remedies proposed by the Market Participant, and the need of the Internal Market Monitor to act quickly to preserve competitive markets.

### **III.A.17. Reporting.**

#### **III.A.17.1. Data Collection and Retention.**

Market Participants shall provide the Internal Market Monitor and External Market Monitor with any and all information within their custody or control that the Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor deems necessary to perform its obligations under this *Appendix A*, subject to applicable confidentiality limitations contained in the ISO New England Information Policy. This would include a Market Participant's cost information if the Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor deems it necessary, including start up, no-load and all other actual marginal costs, when needed for monitoring or mitigation of that Market Participant. Additional data requirements may be specified in the ISO New England Manuals. If for any reason the requested explanation or data is unavailable, the Internal Market Monitor and External Market Monitor will use the best information available in carrying out their responsibilities. The Internal Market Monitor and External Market Monitor may use any and all information they receive in the course of carrying out their market monitor and mitigation functions to the extent necessary to fully perform those functions.

Market Participants must provide data and any other information requested by the Internal Market Monitor that the Internal Market Monitor requests to determine:

- (a) the opportunity costs associated with Demand Reduction Offers;
- (b) the accuracy of Demand Response Baselines;
- (c) the method used to achieve a demand reduction, and;
- (d) the accuracy of metered demand reported to the ISO.

### **III.A.17.2. Periodic Reporting by the ISO and Internal Market Monitor.**

#### **III.A.17.2.1. Monthly Report.**

The ISO will prepare a monthly report, which will be available to the public both in printed form and electronically, containing an overview of the market's performance in the most recent period.

#### **III.A.17.2.2. Quarterly Report.**

The Internal Market Monitor will prepare a quarterly report consisting of market data regularly collected by the Internal Market Monitor in the course of carrying out its functions under this *Appendix A* and analysis of such market data. Final versions of such reports shall be disseminated contemporaneously to the Commission, the ISO Board of Directors, the Market Participants, and state public utility commissions for each of the six New England states, provided that in the case of the Market Participants and public utility commissions, such information shall be redacted as necessary to comply with the ISO New England Information Policy. The format and content of the quarterly reports will be updated periodically through consensus of the Internal Market Monitor, the Commission, the ISO, the public utility commissions of the six New England States and Market Participants. The entire quarterly report will be subject to confidentiality protection consistent with the ISO New England Information Policy and the recipients will ensure the confidentiality of the information in accordance with state and federal laws and regulations. The Internal Market Monitor will make available to the public a redacted version of such quarterly reports. The Internal Market Monitor, subject to confidentiality restrictions, may decide whether and to what extent to share drafts of any report or portions thereof with the Commission, the ISO, one or more state public utility commission(s) in New England or Market Participants for input and verification before the report is finalized. The Internal Market Monitor shall keep the Market Participants informed of the progress of any report being prepared pursuant to the terms of this *Appendix A*.

#### **III.A.17.2.3. Reporting on General Performance of the Forward Capacity Market.**

The performance of the Forward Capacity Market, including reconfiguration auctions, shall be subject to the review of the Internal Market Monitor. No later than 180 days after the completion of the second Forward Capacity Auction, the Internal Market Monitor shall file with the Commission and post to the ISO's website a full report analyzing the operations and effectiveness of the Forward Capacity Market. Thereafter, the Internal Market Monitor shall report on the

functioning of the Forward Capacity Market in its annual markets report in accordance with the provisions of Section III.A.17.2.4 of this *Appendix A*.

**III.A.17.2.4. Annual Review and Report by the Internal Market Monitor.**

The Internal Market Monitor will prepare an annual state of the market report on market trends and the performance of the New England Markets and will present an annual review of the operations of the New England Markets. The annual report and review will include an evaluation of the procedures for the determination of energy, reserve and regulation clearing prices, NCPC costs and the performance of the Forward Capacity Market and FTR Auctions. The review will include a public forum to discuss the performance of the New England Markets, the state of competition, and the ISO's priorities for the coming year. In addition, the Internal Market Monitor will arrange a non-public meeting open to appropriate state or federal government agencies, including the Commission and state regulatory bodies, attorneys general, and others with jurisdiction over the competitive operation of electric power markets, subject to the confidentiality protections of the ISO New England Information Policy, to the greatest extent permitted by law.

**III.A.17.3. Periodic Reporting by the External Market Monitor.**

The External Market Monitor will perform independent evaluations and prepare annual and ad hoc reports on the overall competitiveness and efficiency of the New England Markets or particular aspects of the New England Markets, including the adequacy of *Appendix A*. The External Market Monitor shall have the sole discretion to determine whether and when to prepare ad hoc reports and may prepare such reports on its own initiative or pursuant to requests by the ISO, state public utility commissions or one or more Market Participants. Final versions of such reports shall be disseminated contemporaneously to the Commission, the ISO Board of Directors, the Market Participants, and state public utility commissions for each of the six New England states, provided that in the case of the Market Participants and public utility commissions, such information shall be redacted as necessary to comply with the ISO New England Information Policy. Such reports shall, at a minimum, include:

- (i) Review and assessment of the practices, market rules, procedures, protocols and other activities of the ISO insofar as such activities, and the manner in which the ISO implements such activities, affect the competitiveness and efficiency of New England Markets.

- (ii) Review and assessment of the practices, procedures, protocols and other activities of any independent transmission company, transmission provider or similar entity insofar as its activities affect the competitiveness and efficiency of the New England Markets.
- (iii) Review and assessment of the activities of Market Participants insofar as these activities affect the competitiveness and efficiency of the New England Markets.
- (iv) Review and assessment of the effectiveness of **Appendix A** and the administration of **Appendix A** by the Internal Market Monitor for consistency and compliance with the terms of **Appendix A**.
- (v) Review and assessment of the relationship of the New England Markets with any independent transmission company and with adjacent markets.

The External Market Monitor, subject to confidentiality restrictions, may decide whether and to what extent to share drafts of any report or portions thereof with the Commission, the ISO, one or more state public utility commission(s) in New England or Market Participants for input and verification before the report is finalized. The External Market Monitor shall keep the Market Participants informed of the progress of any report being prepared.

#### **III.A.17.4. Other Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor Communications With Government Agencies.**

##### **III.A.17.4.1. Routine Communications.**

The periodic reviews are in addition to any routine communications the Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor may have with appropriate state or federal government agencies, including the Commission and state regulatory bodies, attorneys general, and others with jurisdiction over the competitive operation of electric power markets.

##### **III.A.17.4.2. Additional Communications.**

The Internal Market Monitor and External Market Monitor are not a regulatory or enforcement agency. However, they will monitor market trends, including changes in Resource ownership as well as market performance. In addition to the information on market performance and mitigation provided in the monthly, quarterly and annual reports the External Market Monitor or Internal Market Monitor shall:

- (a) Inform the jurisdictional state and federal regulatory agencies, as well as the Markets Committee, if the External Market Monitor or Internal Market Monitor determines that a

- market problem appears to be developing that will not be adequately remediable by existing market rules or mitigation measures;
- (b) If the External Market Monitor or Internal Market Monitor receives information from any entity regarding an alleged violation of law, refer the entity to the appropriate state or federal agencies;
  - (c) If the External Market Monitor or Internal Market Monitor reasonably concludes, in the normal course of carrying out its monitoring and mitigation responsibilities, that certain market conduct constitutes a violation of law, report these matters to the appropriate state and federal agencies; and,
  - (d) Provide the names of any companies subjected to mitigation under these procedures as well as a description of the behaviors subjected to mitigation and any mitigation remedies or sanctions applied.

**III.A.17.4.3. Confidentiality.**

Information identifying particular participants required or permitted to be disclosed to jurisdictional bodies under this section shall be provided in a confidential report filed under Section 388.112 of the Commission regulations and corresponding provisions of other jurisdictional agencies. The Internal Market Monitor will include the confidential report with the quarterly submission it provides to the Commission pursuant to Section III.A.17.2.2.

**III.A.17.5. Other Information Available from Internal Market Monitor and External Market Monitor on Request by Regulators.**

The Internal Market Monitor and External Market Monitor will normally make their records available as described in this paragraph to authorized state or federal agencies, including the Commission and state regulatory bodies, attorneys general and others with jurisdiction over the competitive operation of electric power markets (“authorized government agencies”). With respect to state regulatory bodies and state attorneys general (“authorized state agencies”), the Internal Market Monitor and External Market Monitor shall entertain information requests for information regarding general market trends and the performance of the New England Markets, but shall not entertain requests that are designed to aid enforcement actions of a state agency. The Internal Market Monitor and External Market Monitor shall promptly make available all requested data and information that they are permitted to disclose to authorized government agencies under the ISO New England Information Policy. Notwithstanding the foregoing, in the event an information request is unduly burdensome in terms of the demands it places on the time and/or resources of the Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor, the Internal Market Monitor or External

Market Monitor shall work with the authorized government agency to modify the scope of the request or the time within which a response is required, and shall respond to the modified request.

The Internal Market Monitor and External Market Monitor also will comply with compulsory process, after first notifying the owner(s) of the items and information called for by the subpoena or civil investigative demand and giving them at least ten Business Days to seek to modify or quash the compulsory process. If an authorized government agency makes a request in writing, other than compulsory process, for information or data whose disclosure to authorized government agencies is not permitted by the ISO New England Information Policy, the Internal Market Monitor and External Market Monitor shall notify each party with an interest in the confidentiality of the information and shall process the request under the applicable provisions of the ISO New England Information Policy. Requests from the Commission for information or data whose disclosure is not permitted by the ISO New England Information Policy shall be processed under Section 3.2 of the ISO New England Information Policy. Requests from authorized state agencies for information or data whose disclosure is not permitted by the ISO New England Information Policy shall be processed under Section 3.3 of the ISO New England Information Policy. In the event confidential information is ultimately released to an authorized state agency in accordance with Section 3.3 of the ISO New England Information Policy, any party with an interest in the confidentiality of the information shall be permitted to contest the factual content of the information, or to provide context to such information, through a written statement provided to the Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor and the authorized state agency that has received the information.

### **III.A.18. Ethical Conduct Standards.**

#### **III.A.18.1. Compliance with ISO New England Inc. Code of Conduct.**

The employees of the ISO that perform market monitoring and mitigation services for the ISO and the employees of the External Market Monitor that perform market monitoring and mitigation services for the ISO shall execute and shall comply with the terms of the ISO New England Inc. Code of Conduct, as amended from time to time and available on the ISO's website. Consistent with the ISO New England Inc. Code of Conduct, at a minimum each such monitoring unit and its employees: (a) must have no material affiliation with any Market Participant or Affiliate, (b) must have no material financial interest in any Market Participant or Affiliate with potential exceptions for mutual funds and non-directed investments, (c) must not engage in any market transactions other than the performance of their duties hereunder, (d) may not accept anything of value from a Market Participant in excess of a *de minimis*

amount, and (e) must advise a supervisor in the event they seek employment with a Market Participant, and must disqualify themselves from participating in any matter that would have an effect on the financial interest of the Market Participant.

### **III.A.18.2. Additional Ethical Conduct Standards.**

The employees of the ISO that perform market monitoring and mitigation services for the ISO and the employees of the External Market Monitor that perform market monitoring and mitigation services for the ISO shall also comply with the following additional ethical conduct standards. In the event of a conflict between one or more standards set forth below and one or more standards contained in the ISO New England Inc. Code of Conduct, the more stringent standard(s) shall control.

#### **III.A.18.2.1. Prohibition on Employment with a Market Participant.**

No such employee shall serve as an officer, director, employee or partner of a Market Participant.

#### **III.A.18.2.2. Prohibition on Compensation for Services.**

No such employee shall be compensated, other than by the ISO or, in the case of employees of the External Market Monitor, by the External Market Monitor, for any expert witness testimony or other commercial services, either to the ISO or to any other party, in connection with any legal or regulatory proceeding or commercial transaction relating to the ISO or the New England Markets.

#### **III.A.18.2.3. Additional Standards Applicable to External Market Monitor.**

In addition to the standards referenced in the remainder of this Section 18 of *Appendix A*, the employees of the External Market Monitor that perform market monitoring and mitigation services for the ISO are subject to conduct standards set forth in the External Market Monitor Services Agreement entered into between the External Market Monitor and the ISO, as amended from time-to-time. In the event of a conflict between one or more standards set forth in the External Market Monitor Services Agreement and one or more standards set forth above or in the ISO New England Inc. Code of Conduct, the more stringent standard(s) shall control.

### **III.A.19. Protocols on Referral to the Commission of Suspected Violations.**

(A) The Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor is to make a non-public referral to the Commission in all instances where the Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor has reason to believe that a Market Violation has occurred. While the Internal Market Monitor or

External Market Monitor need not be able to prove that a Market Violation has occurred, the Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor is to provide sufficient credible information to warrant further investigation by the Commission. Once the Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor has obtained sufficient credible information to warrant referral to the Commission, the Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor is to immediately refer the matter to the Commission and desist from independent action related to the alleged Market Violation. This does not preclude the Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor from continuing to monitor for any repeated instances of the activity by the same or other entities, which would constitute new Market Violations. The Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor is to respond to requests from the Commission for any additional information in connection with the alleged Market Violation it has referred.

- (B) All referrals to the Commission of alleged Market Violations are to be in writing, whether transmitted electronically, by fax, mail or courier. The Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor may alert the Commission orally in advance of the written referral.
- (C) The referral is to be addressed to the Commission's Director of the Office of Enforcement, with a copy also directed to both the Director of the Office of Energy Market Regulation and the General Counsel.
- (D) The referral is to include, but need not be limited to, the following information
  - (1) The name(s) of and, if possible, the contact information for, the entity(ies) that allegedly took the action(s) that constituted the alleged Market Violation(s);
  - (2) The date(s) or time period during which the alleged Market Violation(s) occurred and whether the alleged wrongful conduct is ongoing;
  - (3) The specific rule or regulation, and/or tariff provision, that was allegedly violated, or the nature of any inappropriate dispatch that may have occurred;
  - (4) The specific act(s) or conduct that allegedly constituted the Market Violation;
  - (5) The consequences to the market resulting from the acts or conduct, including, if known, an estimate of economic impact on the market;
  - (6) If the Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor believes that the act(s) or conduct constituted a violation of the anti-manipulation rule of Part 1c of the Commission's Rules and Regulations, 18 C.F.R. Part 1c, a description of the alleged manipulative effect on market prices, market conditions, or market rules;
  - (7) Any other information the Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor believes is relevant and may be helpful to the Commission.



- (E) Following a referral to the Commission, the Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor is to continue to notify and inform the Commission of any information that the Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor learns of that may be related to the referral, but the Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor is not to undertake any investigative steps regarding the referral except at the express direction of the Commission or Commission staff.

**III.A.20. Protocol on Referrals to the Commission of Perceived Market Design Flaws and Recommended Tariff Changes.**

- (A) The Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor is to make a referral to the Commission in all instances where the Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor has reason to believe market design flaws exist that it believes could effectively be remedied by rule or tariff changes. The Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor must limit distribution of its identifications and recommendations to the ISO and to the Commission in the event it believes broader dissemination could lead to exploitation, with an explanation of why further dissemination should be avoided at that time.
- (B) All referrals to the Commission relating to perceived market design flaws and recommended tariff changes are to be in writing, whether transmitted electronically, by fax, mail, or courier. The Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor may alert the Commission orally in advance of the written referral.
- (C) The referral should be addressed to the Commission's Director of the Office of Energy Market Regulation, with copies directed to both the Director of the Office of Enforcement and the General Counsel.
- (D) The referral is to include, but need not be limited to, the following information.
- (1) A detailed narrative describing the perceived market design flaw(s);
  - (2) The consequences of the perceived market design flaw(s), including, if known, an estimate of economic impact on the market;
  - (3) The rule or tariff change(s) that the Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor believes could remedy the perceived market design flaw;
  - (4) Any other information the Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor believes is relevant and may be helpful to the Commission.
- (E) Following a referral to the Commission, the Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor is to continue to notify and inform the Commission of any additional information regarding the perceived market design flaw, its effects on the market, any additional or modified observations concerning the rule or tariff changes that could remedy the perceived design flaw, any recommendations made by the

Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor to the regional transmission organization or independent system operator, stakeholders, market participants or state commissions regarding the perceived design flaw, and any actions taken by the regional transmission organization or independent system operator regarding the perceived design flaw.

### **III.A.21. Review of Offers ~~f~~From New Resources in the Forward Capacity Market.**

The Internal Market Monitor shall review offers from certain New Capacity Resources in the Forward Capacity Auction as described in this Section III.A.21. The provisions of Sections III.A.21.1 and III.A.21.2 are not applicable to offers from New Import Capacity Resources that are subject to the pivotal supplier test in Section III.A.23.

#### **III.A.21.1. Applicability of Buyer-Side Market Power Review.**

The Internal Market Monitor will not conduct a buyer-side market power review of New Capacity Resources that meet the criteria described in this Section III.A.21.1.

##### **III.A.21.1.1. Resources with Capacity Not Exceeding 5 MW.**

A New Capacity Resource will not be subject to the Internal Market Monitor's buyer-side market power review if the project's expected auction capacity (in MW) at the time of the qualification process for the Forward Capacity Auction does not exceed 5 MW.

If a New Capacity Resource's expected auction capacity exceeds 5 MW at the time of the qualification process for the Forward Capacity Auction, but the final FCA Qualified Capacity for the New Capacity Resource does not exceed 5 MW, an offer from the New Capacity Resource will not be mitigated pursuant to Section III.A.21.2.3, notwithstanding any buyer-side market review that may have been conducted at the time of the qualification process.

##### **III.A.21.1.2. Passive Demand Response Resources.**

New Demand Capacity Resources that consist solely of On-Peak Demand Resources or Seasonal Peak Demand Resources will not be subject to the Internal Market Monitor's buyer-side market power review.

##### **III.A.21.1.3. Resources Supported by a Qualifying Load-Side Relationship Certification.**

New Capacity Resources will not be subject to the Internal Market Monitor's buyer-side market power review if the Project Sponsor submits a Load-Side Relationship Certification, as described in this Section III.A.21.1.3, demonstrating one of the following qualifying circumstances:

(a) the Project Sponsor and its Affiliates or partners, if any, are not load serving entities and are neither receiving nor expecting to receive any revenues from a load serving entity, state, or political subdivision of a state that relate to the development, operation, control, or output of the New Capacity Resource (excepting any revenues earned through an ISO-administered market); or

(b) the New Capacity Resource is a Sponsored Policy Resource.

For the purpose of this Section III.A.21, a load serving entity is any entity that has or is the type of entity that could acquire a Capacity Load Obligation in the Forward Capacity Market.

To demonstrate such circumstances, the Project Sponsor must include as part of the Load-Side Relationship Certification a sworn affidavit from an officer or principal for the Project Sponsor that includes factual detail sufficient to explain the qualifying circumstances. The Project Sponsor must submit the Load-Side Relationship Certification with the New Capacity Qualification Package, described in Section III.13.1.1.2.2, or the New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package, described in Section III.13.1.4.1.1.2. If the ISO is unable to determine from the Load-Side Relationship Certification that one of the qualifying circumstances exists, the New Capacity Resource's offer shall be subject to buyer-side market power review pursuant to Section III.A.21.2.

### **III.A.21.2. Review for the Exercise of Buyer-Side Market Power.**

With the exception of New Capacity Resources that meet the criteria described in Section III.A.21.1, the Internal Market Monitor shall review requested lowest offer prices from New Capacity Resources, as described in Sections III.13.1.1.2.2.3(a) and III.13.1.4.1.1.2.8(a), for the potential exercise of buyer-side market power following the process described in this Section III.A.21.2.

#### **III.A.21.2.1. Conduct Test.**

The Internal Market Monitor will perform a conduct test by reviewing the information described in Sections III.13.1.1.2.2.3(a) and III.13.1.4.1.1.2.8(a) and determining a New Resource Offer Floor Price, as described in Section III.A.21.3, for the New Capacity Resource. A requested lowest offer price from a New Capacity Resource fails the conduct test if the Internal Market Monitor determines that the New Resource Offer Floor Price exceeds the requested lowest offer price.

**III.A.21.2.2. Demonstration of Lack of Incentive to Exercise Buyer-Side Market Power.**

If the Project Sponsor does not submit a Load-Side Relationship Certification (or the ISO rejects the Project Sponsor's Load-Side Relationship Certification) because the Project Sponsor is or is affiliated with a load serving entity or because the Project Sponsor receives or expects to receive revenues outside of ISO-administered markets from a load serving entity, the Project Sponsor is entitled to submit documentation and information as part of the New Capacity Qualification Package or the New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification package to demonstrate that, notwithstanding such a relationship with a load serving entity with regard to the New Capacity Resource, such load serving entity would be unlikely to realize a material, net financial benefit from any reduction in Forward Capacity Auction clearing prices resulting from entry of the New Capacity Resource in the Forward Capacity Market. If, after consideration of such documentation and information, the Internal Market Monitor determines that a load serving entity as described in this Section III.A.21.2.2 would be unlikely to realize a material, net financial benefit from any reduction in Forward Capacity Auction clearing prices resulting from entry of the New Capacity Resource in the Forward Capacity Market, then the Internal Market Monitor will not subject the requested lowest offer price to the mitigation described in Section III.A.21.2.3. For the avoidance of doubt, a Project Sponsor may not utilize the provisions of this Section III.A.21.2.2 if it receives or expects to receive any revenues from a state, or from a political subdivision of a state that is not also a load serving entity, that relate to the development, operation, control, or output of the New Capacity Resource.

As part of the documentation and information the Project Sponsor submits pursuant to this Section III.A.21.2.2, the Project Sponsor must include in its documentation and information a disclosure of any and all direct or indirect relationships or arrangements with a load serving entity regarding the New Capacity Resource and any other information necessary for the Internal Market Monitor to make the determination described in this Section III.A.21.2.2.

**III.A.21.2.3. Consequence of Failing the Conduct Test and Failing to Rebut Presumed Incentive.**

If a requested lowest offer price from a New Capacity Resource fails the conduct test and the Internal Market Monitor does not determine the lack of a material financial net benefit to a load serving entity, as described in Section III.A.21.2.2, the New Resource Offer Floor Price calculated as part of the conduct test shall be used in the Forward Capacity Auction, as described in Section III.13.2.3.2.

As described in Section III.A.21.1.1, the mitigation described in this Section III.A.21.2.3 will not apply to a New Capacity Resource with an FCA Qualified Capacity that does not exceed the capacity threshold set forth in Section III.A.21.1.1, notwithstanding the results of any buyer-side market power review.

### **~~III.A.21.1. — Offer Review Trigger Prices.~~**

~~For each new technology type, the Internal Market Monitor shall establish an Offer Review Trigger Price. Offers in the Forward Capacity Auction at prices that are equal to or above the relevant Offer Review Trigger Price will not be subject to further review by the Internal Market Monitor. A request to submit offers in the Forward Capacity Auction at prices that are below the relevant Offer Review Trigger Price must be submitted in advance of the Forward Capacity Auction as described in Sections III.13.1.1.2.2.3, III.13.1.3.5 or III.13.1.4.1.1.2.8 and shall be reviewed by the Internal Market Monitor as described in this Section III.A.21.~~

### **~~III.A.21.1.1. — Offer Review Trigger Prices for the Forward Capacity Auction.~~**

~~For resources other than New Import Capacity Resources, the Offer Review Trigger Prices for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2025 shall be as follows:~~

<b>Generating Capacity Resources</b>	
<b>Technology Type</b>	<b>Offer Review Trigger Price (\$/kW-month)</b>
Simple Cycle Combustion Turbine	\$5.355
Combined Cycle Gas Turbine	\$9.811
On-Shore Wind	\$0.000
Energy Storage Device — Lithium Ion Battery	\$2.601
Photovoltaic Solar	\$1.381

<b>Demand Capacity Resources</b>	
<b>Technology Type</b>	<b>Offer Review Trigger Price (\$/kW-month)</b>
Load Management (Commercial / Industrial)	\$0.750
Previously Installed Distributed Generation	\$0.750
New Distributed Generation	Based on generation technology type
On Peak Solar	\$5.414
Energy Efficiency	\$0.000

<del>Other Resources</del>	
<del>All other technology types</del>	<del>Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price</del>

~~Where a new resource is composed of assets having different technology types, the resource's Offer Review Trigger Price will be calculated in accordance with the weighted average formula in Section III.A.21.2(c).~~

~~For purposes of determining the Offer Review Trigger Price of a Demand Capacity Resource composed in whole or in part of Distributed Generation, the Distributed Generation is considered new, rather than previously installed, if (1) the Project Sponsor for the New Demand Capacity Resource has participated materially in the development, installation or funding of the Distributed Generation during the five years prior to commencement of the Capacity Commitment Period for which the resource is being qualified for participation, and (2) the Distributed Generation has not been assigned to a Demand Capacity Resource with a Capacity Supply Obligation in a prior Capacity Commitment Period.~~

~~For a New Import Capacity Resource that is backed by a single new External Resource and that is associated with an investment in transmission that increases New England's import capability, the Offer Review Trigger Prices in the table above shall apply, based on the technology type of the External Resource; provided that, if a New Import Capacity Resource is associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade, it shall have an Offer Review Trigger Price of the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price plus \$0.01/kW-month.~~

~~For any other New Import Capacity Resource, the Offer Review Trigger Price shall be the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price plus \$0.01/kW-month.~~

**~~III.A.21.1.2.—Calculation of Offer Review Trigger Prices.~~**

~~(a) The Offer Review Trigger Price for each of the technology types listed above shall be recalculated using updated data for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2025 and no less often than once every three years thereafter. Where any Offer Review Trigger Price is recalculated, the Internal Market Monitor will review the results of the recalculation with stakeholders and the new Offer Review~~

~~Trigger Price shall be filed with the Commission prior to the Forward Capacity Auction in which the Offer Review Trigger Price is to apply.~~

~~(b) For New Generating Capacity Resources, the methodology used to recalculate the Offer Review Trigger Price pursuant to subsection (a) above is as follows. Capital costs, expected non-capacity revenues and operating costs, assumptions regarding depreciation, taxes and discount rate are input into a capital budgeting model which is used to calculate the break-even contribution required from the Forward Capacity Market to yield a discounted cash flow with a net present value of zero for the project. The Offer Review Trigger Price is set equal to the year one capacity price output from the model. The model looks at 20 years of real dollar cash flows discounted at a rate (Weighted Average Cost of Capital) consistent with that expected of a project whose output is under contract (i.e., a contract negotiated at arm's length between two unrelated parties).~~

~~(c) For New Demand Capacity Resources comprised of Energy Efficiency, the methodology used to recalculate the Offer Review Trigger Price pursuant to subsection (a) above shall be the same as that used for New Generating Capacity Resources, with the following exceptions. First, the model takes account of all costs incurred by the utility and end-use customer to deploy the efficiency measure. Second, rather than energy revenues, the model recognizes end-use customer savings associated with the efficiency programs. Third, the model assumes that all costs are expensed as incurred. Fourth, the benefits realized by end-use customers are assumed to have no tax implications for the utility. Fifth, the model discounts cash flows over the Measure Life of the energy efficiency measure.~~

~~(d) For New Demand Capacity Resources other than Demand Capacity Resources comprised of Energy Efficiency, the methodology used to recalculate the Offer Review Trigger Price pursuant to subsection (a) above is the same as that used for New Generating Capacity Resources, except that the model discounts cash flows over the contract life. For Demand Capacity Resources (other than those comprised of Energy Efficiency) that are composed primarily of large commercial or industrial customers that use pre-existing equipment or strategies, incremental costs include new equipment costs and annual operating costs such as customer incentives and sales representative commissions. For Demand Capacity Resources (other than Demand Capacity Resources comprised of Energy Efficiency) primarily composed of residential or small commercial customers that do not use pre-existing equipment or strategies, incremental costs include equipment costs, customer incentives, marketing, sales, and recruitment costs, operations and maintenance costs, and software and network infrastructure costs.~~

~~(e) — For years in which no full recalculation is performed pursuant to subsection (a) above, the Offer Review Trigger Prices will be adjusted as follows:~~

~~(1) For the simple cycle combustion turbine and combined cycle gas turbine technology types, each line item associated with capital costs that is included in the capital budgeting model will be updated to reflect changes in the Bureau of Labor Statistics Producer Price Index for Machinery and Equipment: General Purpose Machinery and Equipment (WPU114). For all other Generating Capacity Resource technology types, each line item associated with capital costs that is included in the capital budgeting model will be updated to reflect changes in the levelized cost of energy for that technology as published by Bloomberg.~~

~~(2) For each line item in (1) above, the ISO shall calculate a multiplier that is equal to the average of values published during the most recent 12 month period available at the time of making the adjustment divided by the average of the most recent 12 month period available at the time of establishing the Offer Review Trigger Prices reflected in the table in Section III.A.21.1.1. The value of each line item associated with capital costs in the capital budgeting model for the FCA reflected in the table in Section A.21.1.1 will be adjusted by the relevant multiplier.~~

~~(3) The energy and ancillary services offset values for gas technology types in the capital budgeting model shall be adjusted by inputting to the capital budgeting model the Henry Hub natural gas futures prices, the Algonquin Citygates Basis natural gas futures prices and the Massachusetts Hub Day Ahead Peak electricity prices, as published by ICE for the first five trading days in February, for each month of the Capacity Commitment Period to which the updated value will apply.~~

~~The energy and ancillary services offset values for non-gas technology types in the capital budgeting model shall be adjusted by inputting to the capital budgeting model the Massachusetts Hub Day Ahead Peak electricity prices, as published by ICE for the first five trading days in February, for each month of the Capacity Commitment Period to which the updated value will apply.~~

~~(4) Renewable energy credit values in the capital budgeting model shall be updated based on the first MA Class 1 REC prices published in February for the five vintages closest to the first year of the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the relevant FCA as published by SNL Financial.~~

~~(5) The bonus tax depreciation adjustment included in the financial model for the Offer Review Trigger Prices (which is 40 percent for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2025), shall be 20~~



~~percent for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2026, and zero for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2027 and thereafter.~~

~~(6) The investment tax credit adjustment included in the capital budgeting model for the Offer Review Trigger Price for the photovoltaic solar Generating Capacity Resource technology type (which is 26 percent for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2025), shall be 26 percent for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2026, 22 percent for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2027, and 10 percent thereafter.~~

~~(7) The capital budgeting model and the Offer Review Trigger Prices adjusted pursuant to this subsection (e) will be published on the ISO's web site.~~

~~(8) If any of the values required for the calculations described in this subsection (e) are unavailable, then comparable values, prices or sources shall be used.~~

### **III.A.21.32. New Resource Offer Floor Prices ~~and Offer Prices.~~**

~~For every new resource participating in a Forward Capacity Auction~~ any New Capacity Resource for which the Internal Market Monitor is required to calculate a New Resource Offer Floor Price, the Internal Market Monitor shall ~~determine a New Resource Offer Floor Price or offer prices, as described in this Section III.A.21.2~~ use the calculation methodology described in this Section III.A.21.3.

~~(a) For a Lead Market Participant with a New Capacity Resource that does not submit a request to submit offers in the Forward Capacity Auction at prices that are below the relevant Offer Review Trigger Price as described in Sections III.13.1.1.2.2.3, III.13.1.3.5 or III.13.1.4.1.1.2.8, the New Resource Offer Floor Price shall be calculated as follows:~~

~~For a New Import Capacity Resource (other than a New Import Capacity Resource that is (i) backed by a single new External Resource and that is associated with an investment in transmission that increases New England's import capability or (ii) associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade) the New Resource Offer Floor Price shall be \$0.00/kW-month.~~

~~For a New Generating Capacity Resource, New Import Capacity Resource that is backed by a single new External Resource and that is associated with an investment in transmission that increases New England's import capability, New Import Capacity Resource that is associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade, and New Demand Capacity Resource, the New Resource Offer Floor Price shall be equal to the applicable Offer Review Trigger Price.~~

A resource having a New Resource Offer Floor Price determined pursuant to this Section III.A.21.3 that is higher than the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price shall not be included in the Forward Capacity Auction.

~~(b) For a Lead Market Participant with a New Capacity Resource that does submit a request to submit offers in the Forward Capacity Auction at prices that are below the relevant Offer Review Trigger Price as described in Sections III.13.1.1.2.2.3, III.13.1.3.5 and III.13.1.4.1.1.2.8, the resource's New Resource Offer Floor Price and offer prices in the case of a New Import Capacity Resource (other than a New Import Capacity Resource that is backed by a single new External Resource and that is associated with an investment in transmission that increases New England's import capability or a New Import Capacity Resource that is associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade) shall be calculated as follows:~~

~~For a New Import Capacity Resource that is subject to the pivotal supplier test in Section III.A.23 and is found not to be associated with a pivotal supplier as determined pursuant to Section III.A.23, the resource's New Resource Offer Floor Price and offer prices shall be equal to the lower of (i) the requested offer price submitted to the ISO as described in Sections III.13.1.1.2.2.3 and III.13.1.3.5; or (ii) the price revised pursuant to Section III.13.1.3.5.7.~~

(a) When calculating a New Resource Offer Floor Price ~~For any other New Capacity Resource, t~~The Internal Market Monitor shall enter all relevant resource capital and operating costs and non-capacity revenue data, as well as assumptions regarding depreciation, taxes, and discount rate into the capital budgeting model ~~used to develop the relevant Offer Review Trigger Price~~ and shall calculate the break-even contribution required from the Forward Capacity Market to yield a discounted cash flow with a net present value of zero for the project. The default model looks at 20 years of real-dollar cash flows

discounted at a rate (Weighted Average Cost of Capital) consistent with that expected of a project whose output is under contract (i.e., a contract negotiated at arm's length between two unrelated parties). The model horizon shall be longer or shorter than 20 years for a resource's New Resource Offer Floor Price calculation, if sufficiently documented in the offer information submitted pursuant to Sections III.13.1.1.2.2.3 or III.13.1.4.1.1.2.8. Adjustments to the model and calculation methodology will be made for certain types of New Demand Capacity Resources as described below in this subsection (a):

(i) For New Demand Capacity Resources, the Internal Market Monitor will model discounted cash flows over the contract life.

(ii) For New Demand Capacity Resources that are composed primarily of large commercial or industrial customers that use pre-existing equipment or strategies, the Internal Market Monitor will include new equipment costs and annual operating costs, such as customer incentives and sales representative commissions, as incremental costs.

(iii) For New Demand Capacity Resources primarily composed of residential or small commercial customers that do not use pre-existing equipment or strategies, the Internal Market Monitor will include equipment costs, customer incentives, marketing, sales, and recruitment costs, operations and maintenance costs, and software and network infrastructure costs as incremental costs.

(b) -The Internal Market Monitor shall compare the requested lowest offer price to the ~~is~~ capacity price estimate calculated pursuant to subsection (a), and the resource's New Resource Offer Floor Price ~~and offer prices~~ shall be determined as follows:

(i) The Internal Market Monitor will exclude any out-of-market revenue sources from the cash flows used to evaluate the requested offer price. Out-of-market revenues are any revenues that are: (a) not tradable throughout the New England Control Area or that are restricted to resources within a particular state or other geographic sub-region; or (b) not available to all resources of the same physical type within the New England Control Area, regardless of the resource owner. Expected revenues associated with economic development incentives that are offered broadly by state or local government and that are not expressly intended to reduce prices in the Forward

Capacity Market are not considered out-of-market revenues for this purpose. In submitting its requested offer price, the Project Sponsor shall indicate whether and which project cash flows are supported by a regulated rate, charge, or other regulated cost recovery mechanism. If the project is supported by a regulated rate, charge, or other regulated cost recovery mechanism, then that rate will be replaced with the Internal Market Monitor estimate of energy revenues. Where possible, the Internal Market Monitor will use like-unit historical production, revenue, and fuel cost data. Where such information is not available (e.g., there is no resource of that type in service), the Internal Market Monitor will use a forecast provided by a credible third party source. The Internal Market Monitor will review capital costs, discount rates, depreciation and tax treatment to ensure that it is consistent with overall market conditions. Any assumptions that are clearly inconsistent with prevailing market conditions will be adjusted.

(ii) For a New Demand Capacity Resource, the resource's costs shall include all expenses, including incentive payments, equipment costs, marketing and selling and administrative and general costs incurred to acquire and/or develop the Demand Capacity Resource. Revenues shall include all non-capacity payments expected from the ISO-administered markets made for services delivered from the associated Demand Response Resource, and expected costs avoided by the associated end-use customer as a direct result of the installation or implementation of the associated Asset(s).

(iii) For a New Capacity Resource that has achieved commercial operation prior to the New Capacity Qualification Deadline for the Forward Capacity Auction in which it seeks to participate, the relevant capital costs to be entered into the capital budgeting model will be the undepreciated original capital costs adjusted for inflation. For any such resource, the prevailing market conditions will be those that were in place at the time of the decision to construct the resource.

(iv) Sufficient documentation and information must be included in the resource's qualification package (as described in Sections III.13.1.1.2.2.3(a) and III.13.1.4.1.1.2.8(a)) to allow the Internal Market Monitor to make the determinations described in this subsection (b). Section III.A.21.3. ~~Such documentation should include all relevant financial estimates and cost projections for the project, including the project's pro-forma financing support data. For a New Import Capacity Resource, such documentation should also include the expected costs of purchasing power outside the New England Control Area (including transaction costs and supported by forward~~

~~power price index values or a power price forecast for the applicable Capacity Commitment Period), expected transmission costs outside the New England Control Area, and expected transmission costs associated with importing to the New England Control Area, and may also include reasonable opportunity costs and risk adjustments. For a new capacity resource that has achieved commercial operation prior to the New Capacity Qualification Deadline, such documentation should also include all relevant financial data of actual incurred capital costs, actual operating costs, and actual revenues since the date of commercial operation. If the supporting documentation and information required by this subsection (b) is deficient, the Internal Market Monitor, at its sole discretion, may consult with the Project Sponsor to gather further information as necessary to complete its analysis. If after consultation, the Project Sponsor does not provide sufficient documentation and information for the Internal Market Monitor to complete its analysis, then the resource's New Resource Offer Floor Price shall be equal to the Offer Review Trigger Price~~Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price.

(v) If the Internal Market Monitor determines that the requested offer prices ~~is~~are consistent with the Internal Market Monitor's capacity price estimate, then the resource's New Resource Offer Floor Price shall be equal to the requested offer price,~~subject to the provisions of subsection (vii) concerning New Import Capacity Resources.~~

(vi) If the Internal Market Monitor determines that the requested offer prices ~~are~~is not consistent with the Internal Market Monitor's capacity price estimate, then the ~~resource's offer prices~~New Resource Offer Floor Price shall be set to a level that is consistent with the capacity price estimate, as determined by the Internal Market Monitor. Any such determination will be explained in the resource's qualification determination notification and will be filed with the Commission as part of the filing described in Section III.13.8.1(c),~~subject to the provisions of subsection (vii) concerning New Import Capacity Resources.~~

~~(vii) For New Import Capacity Resources that have been found to be associated with a pivotal supplier as determined pursuant to Section III.A.23, if the supplier elects to revise the requested offer prices pursuant to Section III.13.1.3.5.7 to values that are below the Internal Market Monitor's capacity price estimate established pursuant to subsection (v) or (vi), then the resource's offer prices~~New Resource Offer Floor Price shall be equal to the revised offer prices.

~~(c) For a new capacity resource composed of assets having different technology types the Offer Review Trigger Price shall be the weighted average of the Offer Review Trigger Prices of the asset technology types of the assets that comprise the resource, based on the expected capacity contribution from each asset technology type. Sufficient documentation must be included in the resource's qualification package to permit the Internal Market Monitor to determine the weighted average Offer Review Trigger Price.~~

#### **III.A.21.4. Offer Prices for New Import Capacity Resources.**

(a) All New Import Capacity Resources (other than a New Import Capacity Resource that is backed by a single new External Resource and that is associated with an investment in transmission that increases New England's import capability or a New Import Capacity Resource that is associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade) shall be subject to the pivotal supplier test in Section III.A.23.

(b) For any New Import Capacity Resource that is subject to the pivotal supplier test in Section III.A.23 that does not seek to specify a price below which it would not accept a Capacity Supply Obligation that is at or above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold, the resource's offer price shall be \$0.00/kW-month, subject to the provisions of Section III.13.2.3.2(a)(v).

(c) For any New Import Capacity Resource that is subject to the pivotal supplier test in Section III.A.23 and seeks to specify a price below which it would not accept a Capacity Supply Obligation that is at or above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold, the Internal Market Monitor shall calculate an Internal Market Monitor-determined offer price for the resource using the methodology for calculating New Resource Offer Floor Prices set forth in Section III.A.21.3. For any New Import Capacity Resource that is not subject to the pivotal supplier test in Section III.A.23, the Internal Market Monitor shall calculate a New Resource Offer Floor Price using the methodology set forth in Section III.A.21.3, if such a calculation is required for the resource under Section III.A.21.2 above.

(d) For any New Import Capacity Resource that is subject to the pivotal supplier test in Section III.A.23 and is found to be associated with a pivotal supplier, if the supplier elects to revise the requested offer prices pursuant to Section III.13.1.3.5.7, the resource's offer prices shall be reduced to equal the lower of (1) the prices determined by the Internal Market Monitor pursuant to subsection (c); or (2) the offer prices as revised pursuant to Section III.13.1.3.5.7. For any New Import Capacity Resource that is subject to the pivotal supplier test and is found not to be associated with a pivotal supplier, if the supplier elects to revise the requested offer prices pursuant to Section III.13.1.3.5.7, the resource's offer prices shall be reduced to the prices revised pursuant to Section III.13.1.3.5.7.

**III.A.22. [Reserved.]**

**III.A.23. Pivotal Supplier Test for Existing Capacity Resources and New Import Capacity Resources in the Forward Capacity Market.**

**III.A.23.1. Pivotal Supplier Test.**

The pivotal supplier test is performed prior to the commencement of the Forward Capacity Auction at the system level and for each import-constrained Capacity Zone.

An Existing Capacity Resource or New Import Capacity Resource is associated with a pivotal supplier if, after removing all the supplier's FCA Qualified Capacity, the ability to meet the relevant requirement is less than the requirement. Only those New Import Capacity Resources that are not (i) backed by a single new External Resource and associated with an investment in transmission that increases New England's import capability, or (ii) associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade, are subject to the pivotal supplier test.

For the system level determination, the relevant requirement is the Installed Capacity Requirement (net of HQICCs). For each import-constrained Capacity Zone, the relevant requirement is the Local Sourcing Requirement for that import-constrained Capacity Zone.

At the system level, the ability to meet the relevant requirement is the sum of the following:

- (a) The total FCA Qualified Capacity from all Existing Generating Capacity Resources and Existing Demand Capacity Resources in the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone;
- (b) For each modeled import-constrained Capacity Zone, the greater of:
  - (1) the total FCA Qualified Capacity from all Existing Generating Capacity Resources and Existing Demand Capacity Resources within the import-constrained Capacity Zone plus, for each modeled external interface connected to the import-constrained Capacity Zone, the lesser of: (i) the capacity transfer limit of the interface (net of tie benefits), and; (ii) the total amount of FCA Qualified Capacity from Import Capacity Resources over the interface, and;
  - (2) the Local Sourcing Requirement of the import-constrained Capacity Zone;

- (c) For each modeled nested export-constrained Capacity Zone, the lesser of:
  - (1) the total FCA Qualified Capacity from all Existing Generating Capacity Resources and Existing Demand Capacity Resources within the nested export-constrained Capacity Zone plus, for each external interface connected to the nested export-constrained Capacity Zone, the lesser of: (i) the capacity transfer limit of the interface (net of tie benefits), and; (ii) the total amount of FCA Qualified Capacity from Import Capacity Resources over the interface, and;
  - (2) the Maximum Capacity Limit of the nested export-constrained Capacity Zone;
- (d) For each modeled export-constrained Capacity Zone that is not a nested export-constrained Capacity Zone, the lesser of:
  - (1) the total FCA Qualified Capacity from all Existing Generating Capacity Resources and Existing Demand Capacity Resources within the export-constrained Capacity Zone, excluding the total FCA Qualified Capacity from Existing Generating Capacity Resources and Existing Demand Capacity Resources within a nested export-constrained Capacity Zone, plus, for each external interface connected to the export-constrained Capacity Zone that is not included in any nested export-constrained Capacity Zone, the lesser of: (i) the capacity transfer limit of the interface (net of tie benefits), and; (ii) the total amount of FCA Qualified Capacity from Import Capacity Resources over the interface, excluding the contribution from any nested export-constrained Capacity Zone as determined pursuant to Section III.A.23.1(c), and;
  - (2) the Maximum Capacity Limit of the export-constrained Capacity Zone minus the contribution from any associated nested export-constrained Capacity Zone as determined pursuant to Section III.A.23.1(c), and;
- (e) For each modeled external interface connected to the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone, the lesser of:
  - (1) the capacity transfer limit of the interface (net of tie benefits), and;
  - (2) the total amount of FCA Qualified Capacity from Import Capacity Resources over the interface.

For each import-constrained Capacity Zone, the ability to meet the relevant requirement is the sum of the following:

- (1) The total FCA Qualified Capacity from all Existing Generating Capacity Resources and Existing Demand Capacity Resources located within the import-constrained Capacity Zone; and



- (2) For each modeled external interface connected to the import-constrained Capacity Zone, the lesser of: (1) the capacity transfer limit of the interface (net of tie benefits), and; (2) the total amount of FCA Qualified Capacity from Import Capacity Resources over the interface.

**III.A.23.2. Conditions Under Which Capacity is Treated as Non-Pivotal.**

FCA Qualified Capacity of a supplier that is determined to be pivotal under Section III.A.23.1 is treated as non-pivotal under the following four conditions:

- (a) If the removal of a supplier's FCA Qualified Capacity in an export-constrained Capacity Zone or nested export-constrained Capacity Zone does not change the quantity calculated in Section III.A.23.1(c) for that export-constrained Capacity Zone or nested export-constrained Capacity Zone, then that capacity is treated as capacity of a non-pivotal supplier.
- (b) If the removal of a supplier's FCA Qualified Capacity in the form of Import Capacity Resources at an external interface does not change the quantity calculated in Section III.A.23.1(d) for that interface, then that capacity is treated as capacity of a non-pivotal supplier.
- (c) If the removal of a supplier's FCA Qualified Capacity in the form of Import Capacity Resources at an external interface connected to an import-constrained Capacity Zone does not change the quantity calculated in Section III.A.23.1(f) for that interface, then that capacity is treated as capacity of a non-pivotal supplier.
- (d) If a supplier whose only FCA Qualified Capacity is a single capacity resource with a bid that (i) is not subject to rationing under Section III.13.1.2.3.1 or III.13.2.6, and (ii) contains only one price-quantity pair for the entire FCA Qualified Capacity amount, then the capacity of that resource is treated as capacity of a non-pivotal supplier.

**III.A.23.3. Pivotal Supplier Test Notification of Results.**

Results of the pivotal supplier test will be made available to suppliers no later than seven days prior to the start of the Forward Capacity Auction.

**III.A.23.4. Qualified Capacity for Purposes of Pivotal Supplier Test.**

For purposes of the tests performed in Sections III.A.23.1 and III.A.23.2, the FCA Qualified Capacity of a supplier includes the capacity of Existing Generating Capacity Resources, Existing Demand Capacity Resources, Existing Import Capacity Resources, and New Import Capacity Resources (other than (i) a

New Import Capacity Resource that is backed by a single new External Resource and that is associated with an investment in transmission that increases New England's import capability; and (ii) a New Import Capacity Resource associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade) that is controlled by the supplier or its Affiliates.

For purposes of determining the ability to meet the relevant requirement under Section III.A.23.1, the FCA Qualified Capacity from New Import Capacity Resources does not include (i) any New Import Capacity Resource that is backed by a single new External Resource and that is associated with an investment in transmission that increases New England's import capability; and (ii) any New Import Capacity Resource associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade.

For purposes of determining the FCA Qualified Capacity of a supplier or its Affiliates under Section III.A.23.4, "control" or "controlled" means the possession, directly or indirectly, of the authority to direct the decision-making regarding how capacity is offered into the Forward Capacity Market, and includes control by contract with unaffiliated third parties. In complying with Section I.3.5 of the ISO Tariff, a supplier shall inform the ISO of all capacity that it and its Affiliates control under this Section III.A.23.4 and all capacity the control of which it has contracted to a third party.

#### **III.A.24. Retirement Portfolio Test for Existing Capacity Resources in the Forward Capacity Market.**

The retirement portfolio test is performed prior to the commencement of the Forward Capacity Auction for each Lead Market Participant submitting a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid. The test will be performed as follows:

If

- i. The annual capacity revenue from the Lead Market Participant's total FCA Qualified Capacity, not including the FCA Qualified Capacity associated with the Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid, is greater than
- ii. the annual capacity revenue from the Lead Market Participant's total FCA Qualified Capacity, including the FCA Qualified Capacity associated with the Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid, then
- iii. the Lead Market Participant will be found to have a portfolio benefit pursuant to the retirement portfolio test.

Where,

- iv. the Lead Market Participant's annual capacity revenue from the Lead Market Participant's total FCA Qualified Capacity not including the FCA Qualified Capacity associated with the Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid is calculated as the product of (a) the Lead Market Participant's total FCA Qualified Capacity not including the FCA Qualified Capacity associated with the Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid and (b) the Internal Market Monitor-estimated capacity clearing price not including the FCA Qualified Capacity associated with the Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid.
- v. The Lead Market Participant's annual capacity revenue from the Lead Market Participant's total FCA Qualified Capacity including the FCA Qualified Capacity associated with the Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid is calculated as the product of (a) the Lead Market Participant's total FCA Qualified Capacity including the FCA Qualified Capacity associated with the Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid and (b) the Internal Market Monitor-estimated capacity clearing price including the FCA Qualified Capacity associated with the Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid.
- vi. The Internal Market Monitor-estimated capacity clearing price, not to exceed the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price, is based on the parameters of the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve and Capacity Zone Demand Curves as specified in Section III.13.2.2.

For purposes of the test performed in this Section III.A.24, the FCA Qualified Capacity of a Lead Market Participant includes the capacity of Existing Capacity Resources that is controlled by the Lead Market Participant or its Affiliates.

For purposes of determining the FCA Qualified Capacity of a Lead Market Participant or its Affiliates under this Section III.A.24, "control" or "controlled" means the possession, directly or indirectly, of the authority to direct the decision-making regarding how capacity is offered into the Forward Capacity Market, and includes control by contract with unaffiliated third parties. In complying with Section I.3.5 of the ISO Tariff, a Lead Market Participant shall inform the ISO of all capacity that it and its Affiliates control under this Section III.A.4 and all capacity the control of which it has contracted to a third party.



# MOPR Transition Proposal

January 11, 2022

# Purpose of Proposal

- **Transition proposal borne from concerns over ISO-NE's current path forward.**
  - Market risks: ISO-NE's proposal creates market risks that will remain unresolved until long-term designs can be approved.
  - Reliability risks:
    - ISO-NE's market has faced reliability challenges for a decade and engaged in out-of-market type designs to address those issues.
    - Reliability impacts of the immediate MOPR elimination remains unknown.
      - No study on reliability conducted.
    - Unknown, but sudden and significant volume of subsidized entry could lead to unintended reliability harms.
      - Risks of market disruptions created by this uncertainty.
  - Legal risks: FERC and Court precedent require protection of competitive prices and preventing exercise of buyer side market power.
    - MOPR deemed critical tool for achieving those objectives.

- .

# Objectives of Proposal

- **Transition Proposal addresses market risks, reliability risks, and legal risks.**
  - Market risks: Two year transition buys time for ISO-NE to finalize ELCCs and enhanced reserves product, minimizing the market gap created by MOPR elimination.
  - Reliability risks: Transition allows for a knowable volume of subsidized resources to enter the market, creating a measured approach for eliminating MOPR.
    - Better enables ISO-NE and market participants to manage MOPR elimination.
    - Does not eliminate reliability risk, but significantly changes likelihood of market disruptions.
  - Legal risks:
    - Broad stakeholder support reduces likelihood of contentious years long litigation that would distract stakeholders from focus on important reforms.
    - Addressing the market risks and reliability risks as described above also reduces legal risk.

# Specific Elements of Proposal

1. 2 year Transition Period
  2. Elimination of Test Price
  3. MOPR remains in place with an RTR exemption
    - Base RTR exemptions for each FCA
      - FCA 17: 300 MW
      - FCA 18: 400 MW
    - Netting of CASPR clears
      - Reduce RTR Exemptions to account for CASPR effectiveness
      - RTR Exemption for FCA 17: 300 MW – (MW clear through FCA 16 CASPR)
      - RTR Exemption for FCA 18: 400 MW – (MW clear through FCA 17 CASPR)
    - Justification for RTR Volumes
      - Past CASPR participation
      - Participation in CASPR for FCAs 13-15 was as follows
        - FCA-13: 274 MW of sponsored resources went into the SA
        - FCA-14: 292 MW of sponsored resources went into the SA
        - FCA-15: 229 MW of sponsored resources went into the SA
      - Proposed RTR volumes reflect this level of participation with an upward adjustment for FCAs 17 and 18 recognizing likely increasing participation, while reflecting a compromise approach.
  4. ISO-NE will commit to filing ELCCs/capacity accreditation and enhanced reserves during the Transition Period.
- No Net CONE adder during transition period.



# Key Aspects of Proposal

- **Amendment to ISO-NE Proposal.** MOPR Transition Proposal is an amendment to ISO-NE Proposal.
  - Transition Proposal is effective for FCAs 17 and 18.
  - Complete ISO-NE Proposal is effective for FCA 19 going forward.
- **Filing:** One 205 filing in the first quarter of 2022.
  - Two parts
    - 1. MOPR Transition Proposal
    - 2. ISO-NE Proposal
    - Key Element: ISO-NE commits to filing ELCCs/capacity accreditation and enhanced reserves product during the Transition Period.
      - Elimination of MOPR not contingent upon ISO-NE satisfying this commitment.
- **No Net CONE Adder during Transition Period.**
  - Given MOPR remains intact until FCA 19 (with the RTR exemption), no Net CONE Adder during the transition period. Consideration of Net CONE adjustment due to MOPR elimination will be a part of the Net CONE reset process for FCA 19.

## III.13.1.1.1.7 Renewable Technology Resources.

To participate in the Forward Capacity Market as a Renewable Technology Resource, a Generating Capacity Resource or an On-Peak Demand Resource (including every Asset that is part of the On-Peak Demand Resource) must satisfy the following requirements:

~~(a) receive an out-of-market revenue source supported by a state or federally regulated rate, charge or other regulated cost recovery mechanism;~~

~~(b)(a) qualify as a renewable or alternative energy generating resource under any New England state's mandated (either by statute or regulation) renewable or alternative energy portfolio standards as in effect on January 1, 2014, or, in states without a standard, qualify under that state's renewable energy goals as a renewable resource (either by statute or regulation) as in effect on January 1, 2014. The resource must qualify as a renewable or alternative energy generating resource in the New England state in which it is geographically located. A resource physically located in United States federal waters directly adjacent to New England state maritime boundaries and directly interconnecting to the New England system is considered to be geographically located in the state where its Point of Interconnection is located~~Sponsored Policy Resource;

### III.13.1.1.1.7 (cont)

~~(e)~~(b) \_\_\_\_\_ participate in a Forward Capacity Auction for a Capacity Commitment Period beginning on or after June 1, ~~2018-2026~~ as a New Generating Capacity Resource or New Demand Capacity Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1, and;

~~(d)~~(c) \_\_\_\_\_ has been designated for treatment as a Renewable Technology Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.9.

An Export Bid or Administrative Export De-List Bid may not be submitted for Generating Capacity Resources that assumed a Capacity Supply Obligation by participating in a Forward Capacity Auction as a Renewable Technology Resource.

# Definition of Sponsored Policy Resource

- Originated from CASPR
- Revised to update effective date
- Keeps original version of definition rather than updated version in ISO-NE Proposal.
  - Expectation is original definition has been approved by FERC in prior proceedings is likely more appealing for states/renewable resources. Note that many if not most clean resources will be allowed through the MOPR with existing ORTPs, so they don't eat up the RTR exemption. The revised definition appears to introduce unnecessary complication.

**Sponsored Policy Resource** is a New Capacity Resource that: receives an out-of-market revenue source supported by a government-regulated rate, charge or other regulated cost recovery mechanism, and; qualifies as a renewable, clean or alternative energy resource under a renewable energy portfolio standard, clean energy standard, alternative energy portfolio standard, renewable energy goal, or clean energy goal enacted (either by statute or regulation) in the New England state from which the resource receives the out-of-market revenue source and that is in effect on January 1, ~~2018~~2022.

### III.13.1.1.2.9 Renewable Technology Resource Election.

A Project Sponsor or Market Participant may not elect Renewable Technology Resource treatment for the FCA associated with a Capacity Commitment Period beginning on or after June 1, ~~2025~~2028.

A Project Sponsor or Market Participant electing Renewable Technology Resource treatment for the FCA Qualified Capacity of a New Generating Capacity Resource or New Demand Capacity Resource shall submit a Renewable Technology Resource election form no later than two Business Days after the date on which the ISO provides qualification determination notifications pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.8 or Section III.13.1.4.1.1.6. Only the portion of the FCA Qualified Capacity of the resource that meets the requirements of Section III.13.1.1.1.7 is eligible for treatment as a Renewable Technology Resource.

Renewable Technology Resource elections may not be modified or withdrawn after the deadline for submission of the Renewable Technology Resource election form.

## III.13.1.1.2.10 Determination of Renewable Technology Resource Qualified Capacity.

- (a) If the total FCA Qualified Capacity of Renewable Technology Resources exceeds the cap specified in subsections ~~(b) and, (c), (d) and (e)~~ the qualified capacity value of each resource shall be prorated by the ratio of the cap divided by the total FCA Qualified Capacity. The ISO shall notify the Project Sponsor or Market Participant, as applicable, of the Qualified Capacity value of its resource no more than five Business Days after the deadline for submitting Renewable Technology Resource elections.
- The cap for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, ~~2018-2026~~ is ~~3200~~ MW, ~~minus the amount of Capacity Supply Obligations acquired through the Substitution Auction, as described in Section III.13.2.8, for the sixteenth Forward Capacity Auction (associated with the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2025) by Renewable Technology Resources that are New Capacity Resources pursuant to Section III.13.2 and acquired that CSO in the FCA-16 Substitution Auction, as described in Section III.13.2.8 in the prior Capacity Commitment Period.~~

### III.13.1.1.2.10 (cont)

- (c) The cap for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, ~~2019-2027~~ is 400 MW, minus the amount of Capacity Supply Obligations acquired through the Substitution Auction, as described in Section III.13.2.8, for the seventeenth Forward Capacity Auction (associated with the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2026). by Renewable Technology Resources that are New Capacity Resources ~~pursuant to Section III.13.2 in the prior Capacity Commitment Period and that acquired that acquired that CSO in the FCA 17 through the Substitution Auction, as described in Section III.13.2.8, for the seventeenth Forward Capacity Auction (associated with the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2026).~~
- ~~(d) The cap for each Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2020 or June 1, 2021 is 600 MW minus the amount of Capacity Supply Obligations acquired by Renewable Technology Resources that are New Capacity Resources pursuant to Section III.13.2 in the prior two Capacity Commitment Periods.~~

### III.13.1.1.2.10 (cont)

~~(e) The cap for each Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2022 or June 1, 2023 or June 1, 2024 is 514 MW minus the cumulative amount of Capacity Supply Obligations acquired by Renewable Technology Resources that are New Capacity Resources in the first or second run of the primary auction-clearing process pursuant to Section III.13.2 for each Capacity Commitment Period that begins on or after June 1, 2021.~~



**III.13.1.2.4. Retirement Determination Notification for Existing Capacity and Qualification Determination Notification for Existing Capacity; ~~Right to Increase Retirement De-List Bid or Permanent De-List Bid up to IMM-determined substitution auction test price.~~**

(a) No later than five Business Days before the Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline, the ISO shall send notification to the Lead Market Participant that submitted each Permanent De-List Bid and, Retirement De-List Bid ~~and substitution auction test price~~ concerning the result of the Internal Market Monitor's review conducted pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2 ~~and Section III.13.2.8.3.1A~~. This retirement determination notification shall not include the results of the reliability review pursuant to Sections III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1 or III.13.2.5.2.5. ~~For auctions associated with a Capacity Commitment Period that begins on or after June 1, 2023, within five Business Days of the issuance of the retirement determination notification, a Lead Market Participant that submitted a Retirement De-List Bid or a Permanent De-List Bid and a substitution auction demand bid for the resource associated with the de-list bid, may make the following adjustments:~~

## III.13.1.2.4 (cont)

~~(i) for a Retirement De List Bid, if, but for the limits in Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.1.2 on adjusting a Market Participant submitted Retirement De List Bid, the Internal Market Monitor would have calculated a Retirement De List Bid price that is higher than the Market Participant submitted de list bid price and the Market Participant submitted de list bid is less than the Internal Market Monitor determined substitution auction test price multiplied by 0.9, the Market Participant may increase the de list bid price up to the minimum of (x) the Internal Market Monitor determined substitution auction test price multiplied by 0.9 and (y) the higher Retirement De List Bid price that the Internal Market Monitor would have calculated;~~

~~(ii) for a Permanent De List Bid, if, but for the limits in Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.1.2 on adjusting a Market Participant submitted Permanent De List Bid, the Internal Market Monitor would have calculated a Permanent De List Bid price that is higher than the Market Participant submitted de list bid price and the Market Participant submitted de list bid is less than the Internal Market Monitor determined substitution auction test price multiplied by 0.9, the Market Participant may increase the de list bid price up to the minimum of (x) the Internal Market Monitor determined substitution auction test price multiplied by 0.9 and (y) the higher Permanent De List Bid price that the Internal Market Monitor would have calculated.~~

## ~~III.13.2.8.3.1A Substitution Auction Test Prices.~~

~~(a) Participant Submitted Test Price. For auctions associated with a Capacity Commitment Period that begins on or after June 1, 2023, Market Participants that submit a substitution auction demand bid must submit a test price, calculated using the method described below, by the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline.~~

~~The test price for the capacity associated with a resource's demand bid must be calculated using the same methodology as a Retirement De List Bid, except that a Market Participant may not submit test prices for multiple price-quantity segments but must submit a single test price using, as necessary, aggregated cost and revenue data. The test price must be accompanied by the same documentation required for Retirement De List Bids above the Dynamic De List Bid Threshold pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1. A Market Participant must submit a test price regardless of whether the price is below the Dynamic De List Bid Threshold.~~ |

## III.13.2.8.3.1A (cont)

~~A Market Participant is not required to submit a test price for any resource for which the demand bid is less than 3 MW. The applicable test price for any such resource is \$0.00/kW-month.~~

~~(b)——**IMM Determined Test Price.** The Internal Market Monitor shall review each test price submission using the methodology specified in Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1 for evaluating Retirement De-List Bids, regardless of whether the submitted test price is below the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold. For purposes of this review, the expected revenues for a cleared substitution auction demand bid shall not be included as a component of opportunity costs. After due consideration and consultation with the Market Participant, as appropriate, the Internal Market Monitor shall replace the submitted test price with an IMM-determined test price if the submitted test price is not consistent with the sum of the net present value of the resource's expected cash flows plus reasonable expectations about the resource's Capacity-Performance Payments plus reasonable opportunity costs.~~

~~The Internal Market Monitor's determination regarding a Market Participant submitted test price shall be included in the retirement determination notification described in Section III.13.1.2.4(a) and in the filing made to the Commission as described in Section III.13.8.1(a).~~

~~The test price used for purposes of the substitution auction shall be the Market Participant submitted test price, as adjusted by the Internal Market Monitor pursuant to this Section III.13.2.8.3.1A(b), and as further adjusted by the Commission in response to the Internal Market Monitor's filing pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4(a).~~

### III.13.2.8.3.3. Demand Bids Entered into the Substitution Auction.

If a resource is determined to be needed for reliability pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5, then any demand bid associated with the resource will not be further included in the substitution auction. ~~If a resource is awarded a Capacity Supply Obligation in the primary auction clearing process and the Capacity Clearing Price is less than ninety percent of the resource's test price as established pursuant to Section III.13.2.8.3.1A, then the resource's demand bid will not be included in the substitution auction.~~

### **III.13.8.1. Filing of Certain Determinations Made By the ISO Prior to the Forward Capacity Auction and Challenges Thereto.**

(a) For each Forward Capacity Auction, no later than 20 Business Days after the issuance of retirement determination notifications described in Section III.13.1.2.4(a), the ISO shall make a filing with the Commission pursuant to Section 205 of the Federal Power Act describing the Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids established pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2, ~~and the substitution auction test prices established pursuant to Section III.13.2.8.3.1A~~. The ISO will file the following information confidentially: the determinations made by the Internal Market Monitor with respect to each Permanent De-List Bid and, Retirement De-List Bid, ~~and substitution auction test price~~, and supporting documentation for each such determination. The confidential filing shall indicate those resources that will permanently de-list or retire prior to the Forward Capacity Auction and those Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids for which a Lead Market Participant has made an election pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1.]

# Questions?

# MOPR Transition Proposal UPDATE

January 26, 2022



Two areas discussed at length at the Markets Committee on January 11 were netting of CASPR clears and the definition of Sponsored Policy Resource. Based upon that discussion, we are proposing two updates:

## 1. Removal of Netting for FCA 17

- Proposal at January MC
  - Netting of CASPR clears
    - Reduce RTR Exemptions to account for CASPR effectiveness
    - RTR Exemption for FCA 17: 300 MW – (MW clear through FCA 16 CASPR)
    - RTR Exemption for FCA 18: 400 MW – (MW clear through FCA 17 CASPR)
- **UPDATE**
  - Netting of RTR Exemption for FCA 17 is removed from our proposal.
  - RTR Exemption for FCA 17 will be 300 MW, with no opportunity for netting.
  - For FCA 18, netting will still be part of the proposal.
    - RTR Exemption for FCA 18: 400 MW – (MW clear through FCA 17 CASPR)

# Two Updates (Continued)

## 2. Definition of Sponsored Policy Resource

- Proposal at January MC.
- Original definition in Transition proposal lifted directly from existing tariff with an updated effective date for relevant state laws, as included below.

**Sponsored Policy Resource** is a New Capacity Resource that: receives an out-of-market revenue source supported by a government-regulated rate, charge or other regulated cost recovery mechanism, and; qualifies as a renewable, clean or alternative energy resource under a renewable energy portfolio standard, clean energy standard, alternative energy portfolio standard, renewable energy goal, or clean energy goal enacted (either by statute or regulation) in the New England state from which the resource receives the out-of-market revenue source and that is in effect on January 1, ~~2018~~2022.

### ▪ UPDATE

- As part of ISO-NE's proposal, ISO-NE updated the definition for Sponsored Policy Resource with the revisions below.
- The Transition proposal will use this updated definition, removing the prior definition from the proposal.

# Two Updates (Continued)

”

**Sponsored Policy Resource** is a New Capacity Resource that: receives ~~an out-of-market~~ revenue source, ~~other than revenues from ISO-administered markets, that is~~ supported by a government-regulated rate, charge, or other regulated cost recovery mechanism, and; qualifies as a renewable, clean, ~~zero carbon,~~ ~~net-zero carbon,~~ or alternative energy resource under a renewable energy portfolio standard, clean energy standard, ~~decarbonization or net-zero carbon standard,~~ alternative energy portfolio standard, renewable energy goal, ~~or~~ clean energy goal, ~~or decarbonization or net-zero carbon goal~~ enacted ~~(either by federal or New England state statute, or regulation, or executive or administrative order) in the New England state from and as a result of~~ which the resource receives the ~~out-of-market~~ revenue source ~~and that is in effect on January 1, 2018.~~¶

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# **MOPR Transition Proposal UPDATE (revised)**

January 31, 2022



# Two Updates

Two areas discussed at length at the Markets Committee on January 11 were netting of CASPR clears and the definition of Sponsored Policy Resource. Based upon that discussion, we are proposing two updates noted below. In addition, we have included as an update a new tariff revision that is a clean-up revision to remove outdated language.

## 1. Removal of Netting for FCA 17

- Proposal at January MC
  - Netting of CASPR clears
    - Reduce RTR Exemptions to account for CASPR effectiveness
    - RTR Exemption for FCA 17: 300 MW – (MW clear through FCA 16 CASPR)
    - RTR Exemption for FCA 18: 400 MW – (MW clear through FCA 17 CASPR)
- **UPDATE**
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  - RTR Exemption for FCA 17 will be 300 MW, with no opportunity for netting.
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    - RTR Exemption for FCA 18: 400 MW – (MW clear through FCA 17 CASPR)

# Two Updates (Continued)

## 2. Definition of Sponsored Policy Resource

- Proposal at January MC.
- Original definition in Transition proposal lifted directly from existing tariff with an updated effective date for relevant state laws, as included below.

**Sponsored Policy Resource** is a New Capacity Resource that: receives an out-of-market revenue source supported by a government-regulated rate, charge or other regulated cost recovery mechanism, and; qualifies as a renewable, clean or alternative energy resource under a renewable energy portfolio standard, clean energy standard, alternative energy portfolio standard, renewable energy goal, or clean energy goal enacted (either by statute or regulation) in the New England state from which the resource receives the out-of-market revenue source and that is in effect on January 1, ~~2018~~2022.

### ▪ **UPDATE**

- As part of ISO-NE's proposal, ISO-NE updated the definition for Sponsored Policy Resource with the revisions below.
- The Transition proposal will use this updated definition, removing the prior definition from the proposal.

## Two Updates (Continued)

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**Sponsored Policy Resource** is a New Capacity Resource that: receives ~~an out-of-market~~ revenue source, ~~other than revenues from ISO-administered markets, that is~~ supported by a government-regulated rate, charge, or other regulated cost recovery mechanism, and; qualifies as a renewable, clean, ~~zero carbon,~~ ~~net-zero carbon,~~ or alternative energy resource under a renewable energy portfolio standard, clean energy standard, ~~decarbonization or net-zero carbon standard,~~ alternative energy portfolio standard, renewable energy goal, ~~or~~ clean energy goal, ~~or decarbonization or net-zero carbon goal~~ enacted ~~(either by federal or New England state statute, or regulation, or executive or administrative order) in the New England state from and as a result of~~ which the resource receives the ~~out-of-market~~ revenue source ~~and that is in effect on January 1, 2018.~~

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# Non-Substantive Tariff Clean Up

## **III.13. Forward Capacity Market.**

The ISO shall administer a forward market for capacity (“Forward Capacity Market”) in accordance with the provisions of this Section III.13. For each one-year period from June 1 through May 31, starting with the period June 1, 2010 to May 31, 2011, for which Capacity Supply Obligations are assumed and payments are made in the Forward Capacity Market (“Capacity Commitment Period”), the ISO shall conduct a Forward Capacity Auction in accordance with the provisions of Section III.13.2 to procure the amount of capacity needed in the New England Control Area and in each modeled Capacity Zone during the Capacity Commitment Period, as determined in accordance with the provisions of Section III.12. To be eligible to assume a Capacity Supply Obligation for a Capacity Commitment Period through the Forward Capacity Auction, a resource must be accepted in the Forward Capacity Auction qualification process in accordance with the provisions of Section III.13.1.



# Non-Substantive Tariff Clean Up (continued)

~~Special Retirement De-List Bid, Permanent De-List Bid and Substitution Auction Demand Bid Modification and Withdrawal Provisions for the sixteenth Forward Capacity Auction (associated with the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2025). For the sixteenth Forward Capacity Auction (associated with the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2025), on or before June 3, 2021, the Internal Market Monitor will modify any submitted Permanent De-List Bids, Retirement De-List Bids and substitution auction test prices (whether or not associated with a Retirement De-List Bid) submitted for the sixteenth Forward Capacity Auction to reflect the impact of updated CONE, Net CONE and Capacity Performance Payment Rate values accepted by the Commission in Docket No. ER21-787.~~

~~The Internal Market Monitor will provide Lead Market Participants with updated Permanent De-List Bids, Retirement De-List Bids and substitution auction test prices in the retirement determination notifications that it issues on June 3, 2021. Within 5 Business Days of the issuance of the retirement determination notifications, a Lead Market Participant may withdraw its Retirement De-List Bid, Permanent De-List Bid, or substitution auction demand bid, and the attendant substitution auction test price, by written notification to the Internal Market Monitor. The election to withdraw a Retirement De-List Bid will also withdraw the associated substitution auction demand bid.~~

# Non-Substantive Tariff Clean Up (continued)

~~Special Dynamic De-List Threshold and Certain Information Publications for the sixteenth Forward Capacity Auction (associated with the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2025). For the sixteenth Forward Capacity Auction (associated with the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2025), on or before June 3, 2021, the ISO will recalculate and re-post the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.A to reflect the impact of updated CONE and Net CONE values accepted by the Commission for use in the sixteenth Forward Capacity Auction in Docket No. ER21-787.~~

~~In addition, the ISO will, on or before June 11, 2021, repost information concerning Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids pursuant to Section III.13.1.8(e) and will repost information about the aggregate quantity of supply offers and demand bids that have elected to participate in the substitution auction pursuant to Section III.13.1.8(g).~~ |

## DYNEGY-CALPINE MOPR REFORMS PROPOSED AMENDMENT

### TRANSITION RULES – TO BE EFFECTIVE FOR FCAs 17 and 18

Changes made since the January 2022 Markets Committee meeting are highlighted in green

#### I.2 Rules of Construction; Definitions

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##### I.2.2. Definitions:

In this Tariff, the terms listed in this section shall be defined as described below:

.....

**Sponsored Policy Resource** is a New Capacity Resource that: receives ~~an out-of-market~~ revenue source, ~~other than revenues from ISO-administered markets, that is~~ supported by a government-regulated rate, charge or other regulated cost recovery mechanism, and; qualifies as a renewable, clean, zero carbon, or alternative energy resource under a renewable energy portfolio standard, clean energy standard, decarbonization or net-zero carbon standard, alternative energy portfolio standard, renewable energy goal, ~~or~~ clean energy goal, or decarbonization or net-zero carbon goal enacted ~~(either by federal or New England state statute, or regulation, or executive or administrative order) in the New England state from~~ and as a result of which the resource receives the ~~out-of-market~~ revenue source ~~and that is in effect on January 1, 2018~~.

#### III.13. Forward Capacity Market.

The ISO shall administer a forward market for capacity (“Forward Capacity Market”) in accordance with the provisions of this Section III.13. For each one-year period from June 1 through May 31, starting with the period June 1, 2010 to May 31, 2011, for which Capacity Supply Obligations are assumed and payments are made in the Forward Capacity Market (“Capacity Commitment Period”), the ISO shall conduct a Forward Capacity Auction in accordance with the provisions of Section III.13.2 to procure the amount of capacity needed in the New England Control Area and in each modeled Capacity Zone during the Capacity Commitment Period, as determined in accordance with the provisions of Section III.12. To be eligible to assume a Capacity Supply Obligation for a Capacity Commitment Period through the Forward Capacity Auction, a resource must be accepted in the Forward Capacity Auction qualification process in accordance with the provisions of Section III.13.1.



**Special Retirement De-List Bid, Permanent De-List Bid and Substitution Auction Demand Bid Modification and Withdrawal Provisions for the sixteenth Forward Capacity Auction (associated with the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2025).** For the sixteenth Forward Capacity Auction (associated with the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2025), on or before June 3, 2021, the Internal Market Monitor will modify any submitted Permanent De-List Bids, Retirement De-List Bids and substitution auction test prices (whether or not associated with a Retirement De-List Bid) submitted for the sixteenth Forward Capacity Auction to reflect the impact of updated CONE, Net CONE and Capacity Performance Payment Rate values accepted by the Commission in Docket No. ER21-787.

The Internal Market Monitor will provide Lead Market Participants with updated Permanent De-List Bids, Retirement De-List Bids and substitution auction test prices in the retirement determination notifications that it issues on June 3, 2021. Within 5 Business Days of the issuance of the retirement determination notifications, a Lead Market Participant may withdraw its Retirement De-List Bid, Permanent De-List Bid, or substitution auction demand bid, and the attendant substitution auction test price, by written notification to the Internal Market Monitor. The election to withdraw a Retirement De-List Bid will also withdraw the associated substitution auction demand bid.

**Special Dynamic De-List Threshold and Certain Information Publications for the sixteenth Forward Capacity Auction (associated with the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2025).** For the sixteenth Forward Capacity Auction (associated with the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2025), on or before June 3, 2021, the ISO will recalculate and re-post the Dynamic

~~De-List Bid Threshold pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.A to reflect the impact of updated CONE and Net CONE values accepted by the Commission for use in the sixteenth Forward Capacity Auction in Docket No. ER21-787.~~

~~In addition, the ISO will, on or before June 11, 2021, repost information concerning Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids pursuant to Section III.13.1.8(e) and will repost information about the aggregate quantity of supply offers and demand bids that have elected to participate in the substitution auction pursuant to Section III.13.1.8(g).~~

### **III.13.1. Forward Capacity Auction Qualification.**

Each resource, or portion thereof, must qualify as a New Generating Capacity Resource (Section III.13.1.1), an Existing Generating Capacity Resource (Section III.13.1.2), a New Import Capacity Resource or Existing Import Capacity Resource (Section III.13.1.3), or a New Demand Capacity Resource or Existing Demand Capacity Resource (Section III.13.1.4). Each resource must be at least 100 kW in size to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction, except for resources registered with the ISO prior to the earliest date that any portion of this Section III.13 becomes effective. An offer may be composed of separate resources, pursuant to the provisions of Section III.13.1.5. Pursuant to the provisions of this Section III.13.1, the ISO shall determine a summer Qualified Capacity and a winter Qualified Capacity for each resource, and an FCA Qualified Capacity for each Existing Generating Capacity Resource, Existing Import Capacity Resource, Existing Demand Capacity Resource, New Generating Capacity Resource, New Import Capacity Resource, and New Demand Capacity Resource.

All Project Sponsors must be Market Participants no later than 30 days prior to the deadline for submitting the FCM Deposit. The Lead Market Participant for a resource participating in a Forward Capacity Auction may not change in the 15 Business Days prior to, or during, that Forward Capacity Auction.

#### **III.13.1.1. New Generating Capacity Resources.**

To participate in a Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource, a resource or proposed resource must meet the requirements of this Section III.13.1.1.

##### **III.13.1.1.1. Definition of New Generating Capacity Resource.**

A resource or a portion of a resource that is not a New Import Capacity Resource or Existing Import Capacity Resource (as defined in Section III.13.1.3), or a New Demand Capacity Resource or Existing Demand Capacity Resource (as discussed in Section III.13.1.4) shall be considered a New Generating Capacity Resource for participation in a Forward Capacity Auction if either: (i) the resource has never previously been counted as a capacity resource as described in Section III.13.1.1.1.1; or (ii) the resource, or a portion thereof, meets one of the criteria in Section III.13.1.1.1.2.

##### **III.13.1.1.1.1. Resources Never Previously Counted as Capacity.**

(a) A resource, or a portion thereof, will be considered to have never been counted as a capacity resource if it has not cleared in any previous Forward Capacity Auction.

(b) [Reserved.]

(c) Where a New Capacity Generating Resource was accepted for participation in the qualification process for a previous Forward Capacity Auction, but cleared less than its summer Qualified Capacity in that previous Forward Capacity Auction and is having its critical path schedule monitored by the ISO in accordance with Section III.13.3, the portion of the resource that did not clear in the previous Forward Capacity Auction shall be a New Generating Capacity Resource in the subsequent Forward Capacity Auction. Such a New Generating Capacity Resource must satisfy all of the qualification process requirements applicable to a New Generating Capacity Resource as described in Section III.13.1.1.2, except that the Project Sponsor is not required to resubmit documentation demonstrating site control (Section III.13.1.1.2.2.1) or to resubmit a critical path schedule (Section III.13.1.1.2.2.2) or to provide a new Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit (Section III.13.1.1.2.1(e)).

#### **III.13.1.1.2. Resources Previously Counted as Capacity.**

A resource that has previously been counted as a capacity resource, including a deactivated or retired capacity resource, may elect to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource, as described in this Section III.13.1.1.2. The incremental expenditure required to reactivate a resource that previously has been deactivated or retired pursuant to Section I.3.9 of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff (or its predecessor provisions) may be included in the calculation of the dollar per kilowatt thresholds in this Section III.13.1.1.2. A resource accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to this Section III.13.1.1.2 shall participate in the Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.2(e). A Market Participant that elects to have a resource that has previously been counted as a capacity resource participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource, must notify the ISO when the existing resource ceases to operate and the New Generating Capacity Resource commences operation. If a Market Participant with a resource that has previously been counted as a capacity resource elects, pursuant to Section III.13.3.4(a)(iii), to have the resource that has previously been counted as a capacity resource cover the Capacity Supply Obligation of a New Generating Capacity Resource and the resource that has previously been counted as a capacity resource must take an outage in order for the New Generating Capacity Resource to commence Commercial Operation (as defined in

Schedule 22, 23, or 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff), then the Market Participant must notify the ISO that the outage is for the purpose of the New Generating Capacity Resource commencing Commercial Operation (as defined in Schedule 22, 23, or 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff). A resource shall be accepted for participation as a new resource if it complies with one of the following three subsections:

- (a) Where investment in the resource will result, by the commencement of the Capacity Commitment Period, in an increase in output by an amount exceeding the greater of: (i) 20 percent of the summer Qualified Capacity of the resource at the time of the qualification process for the Forward Capacity Auction; or (ii) 40 MW above the summer Qualified Capacity of the resource at the time of the qualification process for the Forward Capacity Auction, the whole resource shall participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource; or
- (b) Where investment in the resource subsequent to January 1, 2007 and prior to the conclusion of the first Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Capacity Supply Obligation for which treatment as a new resource may be applied, for the purposes of re-powering will be equal to or greater than \$200 per kilowatt of the whole resource's summer Qualified Capacity after re-powering, the owner of the resource may elect that the whole resource participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource. The \$200 threshold (in base year 2008 dollars) shall be adjusted annually in accordance with the Handy-Whitman Index of Public Utility Construction Costs reflecting data for the period ending January 1 of the year preceding the start of the qualification process for the relevant Forward Capacity Auction; or
- (c) Where investment in the resource subsequent to January 1, 2007 and prior to the conclusion of the first Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Capacity Supply Obligation for which treatment as a new resource may be applied, for the purpose of compliance with environmental regulations or permits will be equal to or greater than \$100 per kilowatt of the whole resource's summer Qualified Capacity after the investment, the owner of the resource may elect that the whole resource participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource. The \$100 threshold (in base year 2008 dollars) shall be adjusted annually in accordance with the Handy-Whitman Index of Public Utility Construction Costs reflecting data for the period ending January 1 of the year preceding the start of the qualification process for the relevant Forward Capacity Auction.



**III.13.1.1.1.3. Incremental Capacity of Resources Previously Counted as Capacity.**

The owner of a resource previously counted as a capacity resource may elect to have the incremental amount of capacity above the summer Qualified Capacity of the resource at the time of the qualification process participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource, where investment in the resource:

- (a) will result, by the start of the Capacity Commitment Period, in an increase in output less than or equal to the greater of: (i) 20 percent of the summer Qualified Capacity of the resource at the time of the qualification process for the Forward Capacity Auction; or (ii) 40 MW; and
- (b) will be equal to or greater than \$200 per kilowatt of the amount of the increase in summer Qualified Capacity resulting from the investment. The \$200 threshold (in base year 2008 dollars) shall be adjusted annually in accordance with the Handy-Whitman Index of Public Utility Construction Costs reflecting data for the period ending January 1 of the year preceding the start of the qualification process for the relevant Forward Capacity Auction. These investment costs may include the costs associated with reactivating a resource that was previously deactivated pursuant to Section I.3.9 of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff (or its predecessor provisions) and in which investment in the resource was undertaken prior to reactivation.
- (c) A Project Sponsor or Lead Market Participant making an election pursuant to this Section III.13.1.1.1.3 must submit a New Capacity Show of Interest Form pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.1 and a New Capacity Qualification Package pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2 for the incremental amount.

**III.13.1.1.1.3.A. Treatment of New Incremental Capacity and Existing Generating Capacity at the Same Generating Resource.**

For incremental summer capacity seeking to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.1.3 or incremental winter capacity that meets the investment thresholds in Section III.13.1.1.1.3 as applied to the resource's winter Qualified Capacity, if the incremental summer or winter capacity does not span the entire Capacity Commitment Period, then the ISO shall match the incremental summer or winter capacity with excess existing winter or summer Qualified Capacity at that same resource, as appropriate, not to exceed the Qualified Capacity of the existing portion of the resource, in order to cover the entire Capacity Commitment Period. This provision shall not apply to Intermittent Power Resources.

**III.13.1.1.1.4. De-rated Capacity of Resources Previously Counted as Capacity.**

For purposes of the Forward Capacity Market, de-rated capacity of a resource shall be measured by the difference between the summer Qualified Capacity prior to the de-rating of the resource and the most recent summer demonstration of Seasonal Claimed Capability of a resource, as of the fifth Business Day of October. The owner of a resource previously counted as a capacity resource that has been de-rated by at least 2 percent of its summer Qualified Capacity (as an Existing Generating Capacity Resource) but by no more than the lesser of 20 percent of its summer Qualified Capacity (as an Existing Generating Capacity Resource) or 40 MW for three or more years at the time of the Forward Capacity Auction may elect to have the incremental amount of capacity above the capacity level established while de-rated treated as a New Generating Capacity Resource if it demonstrates that it will be reestablished prior to the start of the Capacity Commitment Period and that the investment in the resource for such purposes shall be equal to or greater than \$200 per kilowatt of the amount of the increase in summer Qualified Capacity resulting from the investment. The Project Sponsor must submit a New Capacity Show of Interest Form pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.1 and a New Capacity Qualification Package pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.2 for the incremental amount of capacity for the relevant Forward Capacity Auction. The \$200 threshold (in base year 2008 dollars) shall be adjusted annually in accordance with the Handy-Whitman Index of Public Utility Construction Costs reflecting data for the period ending January 1 of the year preceding the start of the qualification process for the relevant Forward Capacity Auction. The owner of a resource seeking to have the incremental amount of capacity counted as a New Generating Capacity Resource as provided in this Section, must demonstrate based on historical data that the resource previously operated at a level at least 2 percent above the de-rated amount.

**III.13.1.1.1.5. Treatment of Resources that are Partially New and Partially Existing.**

For purposes of this Section III.13.1, where only a portion of a single resource is treated as a New Generating Capacity Resource, either as a result of partial clearing in a previous Forward Capacity Auction or pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.1.3 or Section III.13.1.1.1.4, then except as otherwise indicated in this Section III.13.1, that portion of the resource shall be treated as a New Generating Capacity Resource, and the remainder of the resource shall be treated as an Existing Generating Capacity Resource.

**III.13.1.1.1.6. Treatment of Deactivated and Retired Units.**

(a) [Reserved.]

(b) A resource that previously has been deactivated or retired pursuant to Section I.3.9 of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff (or its predecessor provisions), as applicable, that submits to the ISO a reactivation plan demonstrating that the resource shall return to operation shall, subject to ISO review and acceptance of that reactivation plan, be treated as an Existing Generating Capacity Resource unless that resource satisfies the criteria under Section III.13.1.1.1.2 as a New Generating Capacity Resource. Such reactivation plans must be received by the ISO no later than 10 Business Days before the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline. A resource that previously has been deactivated or retired pursuant to Section I.3.9 of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff (or its predecessor provisions), as applicable, that submits to the ISO a reactivation plan demonstrating that the resource shall return to operation and having a material modification as described in Section I.3.9 of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff (or its predecessor provisions), as applicable, shall be subject to Section III.13.1.1.2.3 (Initial Interconnection Analysis).

#### **III.13.1.1.1.7 Renewable Technology Resources.**

To participate in the Forward Capacity Market as a Renewable Technology Resource, a Generating Capacity Resource or an On-Peak Demand Resource (including every Asset that is part of the On-Peak Demand Resource) must satisfy the following requirements:

~~(a) receive an out of market revenue source supported by a state or federally regulated rate, charge or other regulated cost recovery mechanism;~~

~~(b)(a) qualify as a renewable or alternative energy generating resource under any New England state's mandated (either by statute or regulation) renewable or alternative energy portfolio standards as in effect on January 1, 2014, or, in states without a standard, qualify under that state's renewable energy goals as a renewable resource (either by statute or regulation) as in effect on January 1, 2014. The resource must qualify as a renewable or alternative energy generating resource in the New England state in which it is geographically located. A resource physically located in United States federal waters directly adjacent to New England state maritime boundaries and directly interconnecting to the New England system is considered to be geographically located in the state where its Point of Interconnection is located.~~  
Sponsored Policy Resource;

(e)(b) participate in a Forward Capacity Auction for a Capacity Commitment Period beginning on or after June 1, ~~2018-2026~~ as a New Generating Capacity Resource or New Demand Capacity Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1, and;

(d)(c) has been designated for treatment as a Renewable Technology Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.9.

An Export Bid or Administrative Export De-List Bid may not be submitted for Generating Capacity Resources that assumed a Capacity Supply Obligation by participating in a Forward Capacity Auction as a Renewable Technology Resource.

#### **III.13.1.1.2. Qualification Process for New Generating Capacity Resources.**

For a resource to qualify as a New Generating Capacity Resource, the resource's Project Sponsor must make two separate submissions to the ISO: First, the Project Sponsor must submit a New Capacity Show of Interest Form during the New Capacity Show of Interest Submission Window. Second, the Project Sponsor must submit a New Capacity Qualification Package no later than the New Capacity Qualification Deadline. Each of these submissions is described in more detail in this Section III.13.1.1.2. The Project Sponsor must also have, or in the case of an Import Capacity Resource seeking to qualify with an Elective Transmission Upgrade be associated with, a valid Interconnection Request under Schedules 22, 23 or 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff prior to submitting a New Capacity Show of Interest Form during the New Capacity Show of Interest Submission Window. Both the New Capacity Show of Interest Form and the New Capacity Qualification Package are required regardless of the status of the project under the interconnection procedures described in Schedules 22, 23 and 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff. Neither the New Capacity Show of Interest Form nor the New Capacity Qualification Package constitutes an Interconnection Request. A Project Sponsor may withdraw from the qualification process at any time prior to three Business Days before the submission of the FCM Deposit pursuant to Section III.13.1.9.1 by providing written notification of such withdrawal to the ISO. Any withdrawal, whether pursuant to this provision or as determined by the ISO (for example as described in Section III.13.1.1.2.1 or Section III.13.1.9.3), shall be irrevocable. The Project Sponsor of a withdrawn application is subject to reconciliation of its Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit described in Section III.13.1.9.3. None of the provisions of this Section III.13.1, including the initial interconnection analysis and the analysis of overlapping interconnection impacts, supersedes,

replaces, or satisfies any of the requirements of Schedules 22, 23 and 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff, except as specifically provided thereunder. Determinations by the ISO pursuant to this Section III.13.1.1.2, including the initial interconnection analysis and the analysis of overlapping interconnection impacts, are for purposes of qualification for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction only, and do not constitute a right or approval to interconnect, and do not guarantee the ability to interconnect.

**III.13.1.1.2.1. New Capacity Show of Interest Form.**

Except as otherwise provided in this Section III.13.1.1.2.1, for each resource that a Project Sponsor seeks to offer in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource, the Project Sponsor must submit to the ISO a New Capacity Show of Interest Form as described in this Section III.13.1.1.2.1 during the New Capacity Show of Interest Submission Window. After submission of a New Capacity Show of Interest Form, Material Modification (as defined in Section 4.4 of Schedule 22, Section 1.5 of Schedule 23, or Section 4.4 of Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff) may not be made to the information contained therein or the New Capacity Show of Interest Form shall be considered withdrawn. No change that may result in a reduction in capacity may be made to a project described in a New Capacity Show of Interest Form or New Capacity Qualification Package between the date that is 150 days before the start of the Forward Capacity Auction and the deadline for qualification determination notifications described in Section III.13.1.1.2.8.

(a) A completed New Capacity Show of Interest Form shall include the following information, to the extent the information is not already provided under an active Interconnection Request under Schedules 22, 23 and 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff, and other such information necessary to evaluate a project: the project name; the Project Sponsor's contact information; the Project Sponsor's ISO customer status; the date by which the project is expected to achieve Commercial Operation (as defined in Schedule 22, 23, or 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff); the project address or location, and if relevant, asset identification number; the status of the project under the interconnection procedures described in Schedules 22, 23 and 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff; whether the resource has ever previously had a Capacity Supply Obligation or previously received payment as a capacity resource pursuant to the market rules in effect prior to June 1, 2010; the capacity (in MW) of the New Generating Capacity Resource; a general description of the project's equipment configuration, including a description of the resource type (such as those listed in the table in Section III.A.21 or some other type); a simple location plan and a one-line

diagram of the plant and station facilities, including any known transmission facilities; the location of the proposed interconnection; and other specific project data as set forth in the New Capacity Show of Interest Form. The ISO may waive the submission of any information not required for evaluation of a project. A completed New Capacity Show of Interest Form shall also specify the Queue Position associated with the project pursuant to Section 4.1 of Schedule 22, Section 1.5 of Schedule 23 or Section 4.1 of Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff. In the case of a resource that a Project Sponsor seeks to offer in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource that is supported by an Internal Elective Transmission Upgrade, all Queue Positions associated with the project must be submitted in the New Capacity Show of Interest Form. Submittal of the Interconnection Request may take place prior to the qualification process described here, but no later than the date on which the New Capacity Show of Interest Form is submitted to the ISO; however, the Interconnection Customer Interconnection Request must still be active and consistent with the project described in the New Capacity Show of Interest Form as well as the New Capacity Qualification Package to be submitted as described in Section III.13.1.1.2.2.

(b) The Project Sponsor must submit with the New Capacity Show of Interest Form, documentation demonstrating that the Project Sponsor has already achieved control of the project site for the duration of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.2.1.

(c) In the New Capacity Show of Interest Form, the Project Sponsor must indicate if the New Generating Capacity Resource is incremental capacity associated with a resource that previously had a Capacity Supply Obligation or previously received payment as a capacity resource pursuant to the market rules in effect prior to June 1, 2010 as discussed in Section III.13.1.1.1.3, or if the New Generating Capacity Resource is incremental capacity associated with a resource previously listed as a capacity resource that has been de-rated for three or more years at the time of the Forward Capacity Auction, as discussed in Section III.13.1.1.1.4.

(d) [Reserved.]

(e) With the New Capacity Show of Interest Form, the Project Sponsor must submit the Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit, as described in Section III.13.1.9.3.

**III.13.1.1.2.2. New Capacity Qualification Package.**

For each resource that a Project Sponsor seeks to offer in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource, the Project Sponsor must submit a New Capacity Qualification Package no later than the New Capacity Qualification Deadline, described in Section III.13.1.10. Except as otherwise provided in this Section III.13.1, the New Capacity Qualification Package shall conform to the requirements of this Section III.13.1.1.2.2. The ISO may waive the submission of any information not required for evaluation of a project. No change that may result in a reduction in capacity may be made to a project described in a New Capacity Show of Interest Form or New Capacity Qualification Package between the date that is 150 days before the start of the Forward Capacity Auction and the deadline for qualification determination notifications described in Section III.13.1.1.2.8.

**III.13.1.1.2.2.1. Site Control.**

For all Forward Capacity Auctions and reconfiguration auctions, the Project Sponsor must achieve, prior to the close of the New Capacity Show of Interest Submission Window, control of the project site for the duration of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period, which shall be as defined in Section 4.1 of Schedule 22, Section 1.5 of Schedule 23 or Section 4.1 of Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff.

**III.13.1.1.2.2.2. Critical Path Schedule.**

In the New Capacity Qualification Package, the Project Sponsor must provide a critical path schedule for the project with sufficient detail to allow the ISO to evaluate the feasibility of the project being built and the feasibility that the project will meet the requirement that the project achieve all its critical path schedule milestones no later than the start of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period. The critical path schedule shall include, at a minimum, the dates on which the following milestones have or are expected to occur:

(a) **Major Permits.** In the New Capacity Qualification Package, the Project Sponsor must list all major permits required for the project, and for each major permit, the Project Sponsor must list the agency requiring the permit, the date on which application for the permit is expected to be made, and the expected date of approval. Major permits shall include, but are not limited to: (i) all federal and state permits; and (ii) local, regional, and town permits. The permitting and installation process associated with any major ancillary infrastructure (such as new gas pipelines, new water supply systems, or large storage tanks) should be included in this portion of the New Capacity Qualification Package.

(b) **Project Financing Closing.** In the New Capacity Qualification Package, the Project Sponsor shall provide (i) the estimated dollar amount of required project financing; (ii) the expected sources of that financing; and (iii) the expected closing date(s) for the project financing.

(c) **Major Equipment Orders.** In the New Capacity Qualification Package, the Project Sponsor must provide a list of all of the major components necessary for the project, and the date or dates on which all major components necessary for the project have been or are expected to be ordered. Although the specific technology will determine the list of major components to be included, the list shall include, to the extent applicable: (i) electric generators which may include equipment such as fuel cells or solar photovoltaic equipment; (ii) turbines; (iii) step-up transformers; (iv) relay panels (v) distributed control systems; and (vi) any other single piece of equipment or system such as a cooling water system, steam generation, steam handling system, water treatment system, fuel handling system or emissions control system that is not included as a sub-component of other equipment listed in this Section III.13.1.1.2.2.2(c) and that accounts for more than five percent of the total project cost. For an Import Capacity Resource associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade that has not yet achieved Commercial Operation as defined in Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff, major components shall also include, to the extent applicable, transmission facilities and associated substation equipment.

(d) **Substantial Site Construction.** In the New Capacity Qualification Package, the Project Sponsor must provide the approximate date on which the amount of money expended on construction activities occurring on the project site is expected to exceed 20 percent of construction financing costs.

(e) **Major Equipment Delivery.** In the New Capacity Qualification Package, the Project Sponsor must provide the dates on which the major equipment described in subsection (d) above has been or is scheduled to be delivered to the project site.

(f) **Major Equipment Testing.** In the New Capacity Qualification Package, the Project Sponsor must provide the date or dates on which each piece of major equipment described in subsection (c) above is scheduled to undergo testing, including major systems testing, as appropriate for the specific technology to establish its suitability to allow, in conjunction with other major equipment, subsequent operation of the project in accordance with the design capacity of the resource and in accordance with Good Utility Practice. The test(s) shall include those conducted at the point at which the operation of the



major equipment will be determined to be in compliance with the requirements of the engineering or purchase specifications.

(g) **Commissioning.** In the New Capacity Qualification Package, the Project Sponsor must provide the date on which the project is expected to have demonstrated the level of performance specified in the New Capacity Show of Interest Form and in the New Capacity Qualification Package.

(h) **Commercial Operation.** In the New Capacity Qualification Package, the Project Sponsor must provide the date by which the project is expected to achieve Commercial Operation (as defined in Schedule 22, 23, or 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff) and/or the date by which the Project Sponsor expects to be ready to demonstrate to the ISO that the Demand Capacity Resource described in the New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package has achieved its full demand reduction value. This date must be no later than the start of the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction.

### **III.13.1.1.2.2.3. Offer Information.**

(a) All New Generating Capacity Resources that might submit offers in the Forward Capacity Auction at prices below the relevant Offer Review Trigger Price must include in the New Capacity Qualification Package the lowest price at which the resource requests to offer capacity in the Forward Capacity Auction and supporting documentation justifying that price as competitive in light of the resource's costs (as described in Section III.A.21). This price is subject to review by the Internal Market Monitor pursuant to Section III.A.21.2 and must include the additional documentation described in that Section.

(b) The Project Sponsor for a New Generating Capacity Resource must indicate in the New Capacity Qualification Package if an offer from the New Generating Capacity Resource may be rationed. A Project Sponsor may specify a Rationing Minimum Limit to which offers may be rationed. Without such indication, offers will only be accepted or rejected in whole. This rationing election shall apply for the entire Forward Capacity Auction.

(c) By submitting a New Capacity Qualification Package, the Project Sponsor certifies that an offer from the New Generating Capacity Resource will not include any anticipated revenues the resource is

expected to receive for its capacity cost as a Qualified Generator Reactive Resource pursuant to Schedule 2 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff.

**III.13.1.1.2.2.4. Capacity Commitment Period Election.**

Project Sponsors shall be required to specify whether they are making the election set forth in this Section III.13.1.1.2.2.4 for each Forward Capacity Auction up to and including the auction held in February 2021 for the June 1, 2024 through May 31, 2025 Capacity Commitment Period, and no election shall be permitted thereafter.

For each Forward Capacity Auction occurring up to and including the February 2021 auction, in the New Capacity Qualification Package, the Project Sponsor must specify whether, if its New Capacity Offer clears in the Forward Capacity Auction, the associated Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price (indexed for inflation) shall continue to apply after the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction in which the offer clears, for up to six additional and consecutive Capacity Commitment Periods, in whole Capacity Commitment Period increments only. For incremental capacity qualified pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.1.3.A, this election shall apply to both the incremental amount of capacity and the existing Qualified Capacity matched to the incremental capacity at the same generating resource. If no such election is made in the New Capacity Qualification Package, the Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price associated with the New Capacity Offer shall apply only for the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction in which the New Capacity Offer clears. If a New Capacity Offer clears in the Forward Capacity Auction, the capacity associated with the resulting Capacity Supply Obligation may not be subject to any type of de-list or export bid in subsequent Forward Capacity Auctions for Capacity Commitment Periods for which the Project Sponsor elected to have the Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price continue to apply pursuant to this Section III.13.1.1.2.2.4.

**III.13.1.1.2.2.5. Additional Requirements for Resources Previously Counted As Capacity.**

In addition to the information described elsewhere in this Section III.13.1.1.2.2:

- (a) For each resource seeking to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.1.2 (re-powering), Section III.13.1.1.1.3 (incremental capacity), or Section III.13.1.1.1.4 (de-rated capacity), the Project Sponsor must include in the New Capacity Qualification Package documentation of the costs associated with the project in sufficient detail

to allow the ISO to determine that the relevant cost threshold (described in Sections III.13.1.1.1.2(b), III.13.1.1.1.3(b), and III.13.1.1.1.4) will be met.

(b) For each resource seeking to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.1.2(c) (environmental compliance), the Project Sponsor must include in the New Capacity Qualification Package: (i) a detailed description of the specific regulations that it is seeking to comply with and the permits that it must obtain; and (ii) documentation of the costs associated with the project in sufficient detail to allow the ISO to determine that the relevant cost threshold (described in Section III.13.1.1.1.2(c)) will be met.

(c) For each resource seeking to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to Sections III.13.1.1.1.2, III.13.1.1.1.3, or III.13.1.1.1.4, the Project Sponsor must include in the New Capacity Qualification Package detailed information showing how and when the resource will shed its Capacity Supply Obligation to accommodate necessary work on the facility, if necessary. The Project Sponsor must also include the shedding of its Capacity Supply Obligation as an additional milestone in the critical path schedule described in Section III.13.1.1.2.2.2.

**III.13.1.1.2.2.6. Additional Requirements for New Generating Capacity Resources that are Intermittent Power Resources.**

In addition to the information described elsewhere in this Section III.13.1.1.2.2, for each Intermittent Power Resource that a Project Sponsor seeks to offer in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource, the Project Sponsor must include in the New Capacity Qualification Package:

(a) a claimed summer Qualified Capacity and a claimed winter Qualified Capacity based on the data described in Section III.13.1.1.2.2.6(b);

(b) measured and recorded site-specific summer and winter data relevant to the expected performance of the Intermittent Power Resource (including wind speed data for wind resources, water flow data for run-of-river hydropower resources, and irradiance data for solar resources) that, with the other information provided in the New Capacity Qualification Package, will enable the ISO to confirm the summer and winter Qualified Capacity that the Project Sponsor claims for the Intermittent Power Resource.

**III.13.1.1.2.3. Initial Interconnection Analysis.**

(a) For each New Generating Capacity Resource, the ISO shall perform an initial interconnection analysis, including an analysis of overlapping interconnection impacts, based on the information provided in the New Capacity Show of Interest Form and shall determine the amount of capacity that the resource could provide by the start of the associated Capacity Commitment Period. The initial interconnection analysis shall be performed consistent with the criteria and conditions described in ISO New England Planning Procedures, and will include, but will not be limited to, a power flow analysis and a short circuit analysis. No initial interconnection analysis is required where the total requested Qualified Capacity of a New Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to Sections III.13.1.1.2, III.13.1.1.3, III.13.1.1.4, or III.13.1.1.6 can be realized without a Material Modification (as defined in Section 4.4 of Schedule 22, Section 1.5 of Schedule 23 and Section 4.4 of Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff). The ISO will perform the initial interconnection analysis in the form of a group study that will (i) include all the projects that have submitted a New Capacity Show of Interest Form to participate in the same Capacity Commitment Period (as described in Section 4.1 of Schedule 22 and Section 1.5 of Schedule 23 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff) and (ii) exclude any existing capacity that will be retired as of the start of the same Capacity Commitment Period. Participation in an initial interconnection analysis is a requirement for obtaining Capacity Network Resource Interconnection Service or Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service in a manner that meets the Capacity Capability Interconnection Standard in accordance with the provisions in Schedules 22, 23 and 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff.

(b) If as a result of the initial interconnection analysis, the ISO determines that the interconnection facilities and upgrades identified in the qualification process that are necessary to enable the New Generating Capacity Resource to provide the entire amount of capacity indicated in the New Capacity Show of Interest Form can not be implemented before the start of the Capacity Commitment Period, the New Generating Capacity Resource's Qualified Capacity values may be adjusted accordingly, as described in Section III.13.1.1.2.5.

(c) If as a result of the initial interconnection analysis, the ISO determines that the interconnection facilities and upgrades identified in the qualification process that are necessary to enable the New Generating Capacity Resource to provide capacity indicated in the New Capacity Show of Interest Form can not be implemented before the start of the Capacity Commitment Period and the New Generating

Capacity Resource can not provide any capacity without those facilities and upgrades, the resource shall not be accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction. In this case, the ISO will provide an explanation of its determination in the qualification determination notification, discussed in Section III.13.1.1.2.8.

(d) If as a result of the initial interconnection analysis, the ISO determines that the New Generating Capacity Resource can provide all or some of the capacity indicated in the New Capacity Show of Interest Form by the start of the Capacity Commitment Period, and if the New Generating Capacity Resource is accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction in accordance with the other provisions and requirements of this Section III.13.1, then in the qualification determination notification, discussed in Section III.13.1.1.2.8, the ISO, after consultation with the applicable Transmission Owner(s) or Elective Transmission Upgrade Interconnection Customer as appropriate, shall include a list of the facilities that may be required to complete the interconnection and time required to construct those facilities by the start of the associated Capacity Commitment Period.

(e) Where, as a result of the initial interconnection analysis, the ISO concludes, after consultation with the Project Sponsor and the applicable Transmission Owner(s) or Elective Transmission Upgrade Interconnection Customer, as appropriate, that the capacity indicated in the New Capacity Show of Interest Form can not be interconnected by the commencement of the Capacity Commitment Period, the Forward Capacity Market qualification process for that resource shall be terminated and the ISO will notify the Project Sponsor of such termination.

(f) Where, as a result of the initial interconnection analysis, the ISO determines that because of overlapping interconnection impacts, New Generating Capacity Resources that are otherwise accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction in accordance with the other provisions and requirements of this Section III.13.1 cannot provide the full amount of capacity that they each would otherwise be able to provide (in the absence of the other relevant Existing Generating Capacity Resources and New Generating Capacity Resources seeking to qualify for the Forward Capacity Auction), those New Generating Capacity Resources will be accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction on the basis of their Queue Position, as described in Schedules 22, 23 and 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff, with priority given to resources that entered the queue earlier. Resources with lower priority in the queue may be accepted partially. Starting with the fourth auction, a New Generating Capacity Resource that meets the requirements of this Section III.13.1, but that would not be

accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction as a result of overlapping interconnection impacts with another resource having a higher priority in the queue may be accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction as a Conditional Qualified New Resource, as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(f), provided that the resource having a higher priority in the queue is not a resource offering capacity into the Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.2(e).

**III.13.1.1.2.4. Evaluation of New Capacity Qualification Package.**

The ISO shall review a New Generating Capacity Resource's New Capacity Qualification Package consistent with the dates set forth in Section III.13.1.10, and shall determine whether the package is complete and whether, based on the information provided, the New Generating Capacity Resource is accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction. In making these determinations, the ISO may consider, but is not limited to considering, the following:

- (a) whether the New Capacity Qualification Package contains all of the elements required by this Section III.13.1.1.2;
- (b) whether the critical path schedule includes all necessary elements and is sufficiently developed;
- (c) whether the milestones in the critical path schedule are reasonable and likely to be met;
- (d) whether, in the case of a resource previously counted as a capacity resource, the requirements for treatment as a New Generating Capacity Resource are satisfied; and
- (e) whether, in the case of an Intermittent Power Resource, sufficient data for confirming the resource's claimed summer and winter Qualified Capacity is provided, and whether the data provided reasonably supports the claimed summer and winter Qualified Capacity.

**III.13.1.1.2.5. Qualified Capacity for New Generating Capacity Resources.**

**III.13.1.1.2.5.1. New Generating Capacity Resources Other Than Intermittent Power Resources.**

The summer Qualified Capacity and winter Qualified Capacity of a New Generating Capacity Resource that is not an Intermittent Power Resource that has cleared in the Forward Capacity Auction shall be based on the data provided to the ISO during the qualification process, subject to ISO review and

verification, and possibly as modified pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.3(b). The FCA Qualified Capacity for such a resource shall be the lesser of the resource's summer Qualified Capacity and winter Qualified Capacity, as adjusted to account for applicable offers composed of separate resources.

**III.13.1.1.2.5.2. [Reserved]**

**III.13.1.1.2.5.3. New Generating Capacity Resources that are Intermittent Power Resources.**

The summer Qualified Capacity and winter Qualified Capacity of a New Generating Capacity Resource that is an Intermittent Power Resource shall be the summer Qualified Capacity and winter Qualified Capacity claimed by the Project Sponsor pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.2.6, as confirmed by the ISO pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.4(e). The FCA Qualified Capacity for such a resource shall be equal to the resource's summer Qualified Capacity, as adjusted to account for applicable offers composed of separate resources.

**III.13.1.1.2.5.4. New Generating Capacity Resources Partially Clearing in a Previous Forward Capacity Auction.**

Where, as discussed in Section III.13.1.1.1(c), a New Generating Capacity Resource was accepted for participation in a previous Forward Capacity Auction, but cleared less than its summer or winter Qualified Capacity in that previous Forward Capacity Auction and is having its critical path schedule monitored by the ISO as described in Section III.13.3, its summer and winter Qualified Capacity as a New Generating Capacity Resource in the instant Forward Capacity Auction shall be the summer and winter Qualified Capacity from the previous Forward Capacity Auction minus the amount of capacity clearing from the New Generating Capacity Resource in the previous Forward Capacity Auction. The FCA Qualified Capacity for such a resource shall be the lesser of the resource's summer Qualified Capacity and winter Qualified Capacity, as adjusted to account for applicable offers composed of separate resources. The amount of capacity clearing in a Forward Capacity Auction from a New Generating Capacity Resource shall be treated as an Existing Generating Capacity Resource in subsequent Forward Capacity Auctions.

**III.13.1.1.2.6. [Reserved.]**

**III.13.1.1.2.7. Opportunity to Consult with Project Sponsor.**

In its review of a New Capacity Show of Interest Form or a New Capacity Qualification Package, the ISO may consult with the Project Sponsor to seek clarification, to gather additional necessary information, or to address questions or concerns arising from the materials submitted. At the discretion of the ISO, the ISO may consider revisions or additions to the qualification materials resulting from such consultation; provided, however, that in no case shall the ISO consider revisions or additions to the qualification materials if the ISO believes that such consideration cannot be properly accomplished within the time periods established for the qualification process. In addition, the ISO or the Project Sponsor may confer to seek clarification, to gather additional necessary information, or to address questions or concerns prior to the ISO's final determination and notification of qualification.

**III.13.1.1.2.8. Qualification Determination Notification for New Generating Capacity Resources.**

No later than 127 days before the Forward Capacity Auction, the ISO shall send notification to Project Sponsors or Market Participants, as applicable, for each New Generating Capacity Resource indicating:

- (a) whether the New Generating Capacity Resource has been accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction as a result of the initial interconnection analysis made pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.3, and if not accepted, an explanation of the reasons the New Generating Capacity Resource was not accepted in the initial interconnection analysis;
- (b) whether the New Generating Capacity Resource has been accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction as a result of the New Capacity Qualification Package evaluation made pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.4, and if not accepted, an explanation of the reasons the New Generating Capacity Resource's New Capacity Qualification Package was not accepted;
- (c) if accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction, a list of the facilities that may be required to complete the interconnection for purposes of providing capacity and time required to construct those facilities by the start of the associated Capacity Commitment Period, as discussed in Section III.13.1.1.2.3(d);
- (d) if accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction, the New Generating Capacity Resource's summer Qualified Capacity and winter Qualified Capacity, as determined pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.5;



(e) if accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction, but subject to the provisions of Section III.13.1.1.2.3(f) (where not all New Generating Capacity Resources can be interconnected due to their combined effects on the New England Transmission System), a description of how the New Generating Capacity Resource shall participate in the Forward Capacity Auction, including, for the fourth and future auctions: (i) whether the resource shall participate as a Conditional Qualified New Resource; (ii) for the notification to a Conditional Qualified New Resource, the Queue Position of the associated resource with higher queue priority; and (iii) for the notification to a resource with higher queue priority than a Conditional Qualified New Resource, the Queue Position of the Conditional Qualified New Resource; and

(f) if accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction and requesting to submit offers at prices below the relevant Offer Review Trigger Price pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.2.3, the Internal Market Monitor's determination regarding whether the requested offer price is consistent with the long run average costs of that New Generating Capacity Resource.

#### **III.13.1.1.2.9 Renewable Technology Resource Election.**

A Project Sponsor or Market Participant may not elect Renewable Technology Resource treatment for the FCA associated with a Capacity Commitment Period beginning on or after June 1, ~~2025~~2028.

A Project Sponsor or Market Participant electing Renewable Technology Resource treatment for the FCA Qualified Capacity of a New Generating Capacity Resource or New Demand Capacity Resource shall submit a Renewable Technology Resource election form no later than two Business Days after the date on which the ISO provides qualification determination notifications pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.8 or Section III.13.1.4.1.1.6. Only the portion of the FCA Qualified Capacity of the resource that meets the requirements of Section III.13.1.1.1.7 is eligible for treatment as a Renewable Technology Resource.

Renewable Technology Resource elections may not be modified or withdrawn after the deadline for submission of the Renewable Technology Resource election form.

The submission of a Renewable Technology Resource election that satisfies the requirements of Section III.13.1.1.1.7 will invalidate a prior multi-year Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price

election for the same resource made pursuant to Section III.13.1.4.1.1.2.7 or Section III.13.1.1.2.2.4 for a Forward Capacity Auction.

### **III.13.1.1.2.10 Determination of Renewable Technology Resource Qualified Capacity.**

- (a) If the total FCA Qualified Capacity of Renewable Technology Resources exceeds the cap specified in subsections (b) and (c), ~~-(d) and (e)~~ the qualified capacity value of each resource shall be prorated by the ratio of the cap divided by the total FCA Qualified Capacity. The ISO shall notify the Project Sponsor or Market Participant, as applicable, of the Qualified Capacity value of its resource no more than five Business Days after the deadline for submitting Renewable Technology Resource elections.

~~—~~ The cap for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, ~~2018-2026~~ is ~~3200 MW~~.

- (b) ~~minus the amount of Capacity Supply Obligations acquired through the Substitution Auction, as described in Section III.13.2.8, for the sixteenth Forward Capacity Auction (associated with the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2025) by Renewable Technology Resources that are New Capacity Resources~~

- (c) The cap for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, ~~2019-2027~~ is 400 MW, minus the amount of Capacity Supply Obligations acquired through the Substitution Auction, as described in Section III.13.2.8, for the seventeenth Forward Capacity Auction (associated with the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2026) ~~by Renewable Technology Resources that are New Capacity Resources~~, pursuant to Section III.13.2 in the prior Capacity Commitment Period

- ~~(d) The cap for each Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2020 or June 1, 2021 is 600 MW minus the amount of Capacity Supply Obligations acquired by Renewable Technology Resources that are New Capacity Resources pursuant to Section III.13.2 in the prior two Capacity Commitment Periods.~~

- ~~(e) The cap for each Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2022 or June 1, 2023 or June 1, 2024 is 514 MW minus the cumulative amount of Capacity Supply Obligations acquired by Renewable Technology Resources that are New Capacity Resources in the first or second run of the primary auction clearing process pursuant to Section III.13.2 for each Capacity Commitment Period that begins on or after June 1, 2021.~~

**III.13.1.2. Existing Generating Capacity Resources.**

An Existing Generating Capacity Resource, as defined in Section III.13.1.2.1, may participate in the Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to the provisions of this Section III.13.1.2.

**III.13.1.2.1. Definition of Existing Generating Capacity Resource.**

Any resource that does not satisfy the criteria for participating in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource (Section III.13.1.1), as an Existing Import Capacity Resource or New

Import Capacity Resource (Section III.13.1.3), or as a New Demand Capacity Resource or Existing Demand Capacity Resource (Section III.13.1.4) shall be an Existing Generating Capacity Resource.

**III.13.1.2.1.1. Attributes of Existing Generating Capacity Resources.**

For purposes of Forward Capacity Auction qualification, a Market Participant may not change any Existing Generating Capacity Resource attribute (including but not limited to the resource's status as an Intermittent Power Resource) in the period beginning 20 Business Days prior to the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline and ending with the conclusion of the Forward Capacity Auction. Outside of this period, any such change must be accompanied by documentation justifying the change.

**III.13.1.2.1.2 Rationing Minimum Limit.**

No later than 120 days before the Forward Capacity Auction Market Participants may specify a Rationing Minimum Limit for an Existing Generating Capacity Resource.

**III.13.1.2.2. Qualified Capacity for Existing Generating Capacity Resources.**

**III.13.1.2.2.1. Existing Generating Capacity Resources Other Than Intermittent Power Resources.**

**III.13.1.2.2.1.1. Summer Qualified Capacity.**

The summer Qualified Capacity of an Existing Generating Capacity Resource that is not an Intermittent Power Resource shall be equal to the median of that Existing Generating Capacity Resource's summer Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings from the most recent five years, as of the fifth Business Day in October of each year, with only positive summer ratings included in the median calculation. For the first Forward Capacity Auction, the summer Qualified Capacity of an Existing Generating Capacity Resource shall be equal to the median of that Existing Generating Capacity Resource's summer Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings from the most recent four years, as of the fifth Business Day in October of each year, with only positive summer ratings included in the median calculation. Where an Existing Generating Capacity Resource has fewer than five summer Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings, or in the case of the first Forward Capacity Auction, fewer than four summer Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings, then the summer Qualified Capacity for that Existing Generating Capacity Resource shall be equal to the median of all of that Existing Generating Capacity Resource's previous summer Seasonal Claimed Capability

ratings, as of the fifth Business Day in October of each year, with only positive summer ratings included in the median calculation. If for an Existing Generating Capacity Resource there are no previous positive summer Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings because the Existing Generating Capacity Resource had not yet achieved FCM Commercial Operation, then the Existing Generating Capacity Resource's summer Qualified Capacity shall be equal to the amount of capacity clearing from the resource as a New Generating Capacity Resource in previous Forward Capacity Auctions.

**III.13.1.2.2.1.2. Winter Qualified Capacity.**

The winter Qualified Capacity of an Existing Generating Capacity Resource that is not an Intermittent Power Resource shall be equal to the median of that Existing Generating Capacity Resource's winter Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings from the most recent five years, as of the fifth Business Day in June of each year, with only positive winter ratings included in the median calculation. For the first Forward Capacity Auction, the winter Qualified Capacity of an Existing Generating Capacity Resource shall be equal to the median of that Existing Generating Capacity Resource's winter Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings from the most recent four years, as of the fifth Business Day in June of each year, with only positive winter ratings included in the median calculation. Where an Existing Generating Capacity Resource has fewer than five winter Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings, or in the case of the first Forward Capacity Auction, fewer than four winter Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings, then the winter Qualified Capacity for that Existing Generating Capacity Resource shall be equal to the median of all of that Existing Generating Capacity Resource's previous winter Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings, as of the fifth Business Day in June of each year, with only positive winter ratings included in the median calculation. If for an Existing Generating Capacity Resource there are no previous positive winter Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings because the Existing Generating Capacity Resource had not yet achieved FCM Commercial Operation, then the Existing Generating Capacity Resource's winter Qualified Capacity shall be equal to the amount of capacity clearing from the resource as a New Generating Capacity Resource in previous Forward Capacity Auctions.

**III.13.1.2.2.2. Existing Generating Capacity Resources that are Intermittent Power Resources.**

The summer and winter Qualified Capacity for an Existing Generating Capacity Resource that is an Intermittent Power Resource shall be calculated as follows:

**III.13.1.2.2.2.1. Summer Qualified Capacity for an Intermittent Power Resource.**

(a) With regard to any Forward Capacity Auction qualification process, for each of the previous five summer periods, the ISO shall determine the median of the Intermittent Power Resource's net output in the Summer Intermittent Reliability Hours. If there are less than five full summer periods since the Intermittent Power Resource achieved FCM Commercial Operation, the ISO shall determine the median of the Intermittent Power Resource's net output in each of the previous summer periods, or portion thereof, since the Intermittent Power Resource achieved FCM Commercial Operation.

(b) The Intermittent Power Resource's summer Qualified Capacity shall be the average of the median numbers determined in Section III.13.1.2.2.2.1(a).

(c) The Summer Intermittent Reliability Hours shall be hours ending 1400 through 1800 each day of the summer period (June through September) and all summer period hours in which there was a system-wide Capacity Scarcity Condition and if the Intermittent Power Resource was in an import-constrained Capacity Zone, all Capacity Scarcity Conditions in that Capacity Zone.

(d) If for an Existing Generating Capacity Resource that is an Intermittent Power Resource there are no previous positive summer Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings because the Existing Generating Capacity Resource had not yet achieved FCM Commercial Operation, then the Existing Generating Capacity Resource's summer Qualified Capacity shall be equal to the amount of capacity clearing from the resource as a New Generating Capacity Resource in previous Forward Capacity Auctions.

**III.13.1.2.2.2.2. Winter Qualified Capacity for an Intermittent Power Resource.**

(a) With regard to any Forward Capacity Auction qualification process, for each of the previous five winter periods, the ISO shall determine the median of the Intermittent Power Resource's net output in the Winter Intermittent Reliability Hours. If there are less than five full winter periods since the Intermittent Power Resource achieved FCM Commercial Operation, the ISO shall determine the median of the Intermittent Power Resource's net output in each of the previous winter periods, or portion thereof, since the Intermittent Power Resource achieved FCM Commercial Operation.

(b) The Intermittent Power Resource's winter Qualified Capacity shall be the average of the median numbers determined in Section III.13.1.2.2.2.2(a).

(c) The Winter Intermittent Reliability Hours shall be hours ending 1800 and 1900 each day of the winter period (October through May) and all winter period hours in which there was a system-wide Capacity Scarcity Condition and if the Intermittent Power Resource was in an import-constrained Capacity Zone, all Capacity Scarcity Conditions in that Capacity Zone.

(d) If for an Existing Generating Capacity Resource that is an Intermittent Power Resource there are no previous positive winter Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings because the Existing Generating Capacity Resource had not yet achieved FCM Commercial Operation, then the Existing Generating Capacity Resource's winter Qualified Capacity shall be equal to the amount of capacity clearing from the resource as a New Generating Capacity Resource in previous Forward Capacity Auctions.

**III.13.1.2.2.3. Qualified Capacity Adjustment for Partially New and Partially Existing Resources.**

(a) Where an Existing Generating Capacity Resource is associated with a New Generating Capacity Resource that was accepted for participation in a previous Forward Capacity Auction qualification process and that cleared in a previous Forward Capacity Auction, then in each subsequent Forward Capacity Auction until the New Generating Capacity Resource achieves FCM Commercial Operation the summer Qualified Capacity of that Existing Generating Capacity Resource shall be the sum of [the median of that Existing Generating Capacity Resource's positive summer Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings from the most recent five years, as of the fifth Business Day of October of each year, calculated in a manner consistent with Section III.13.1.2.2.1.1] plus [the amount of the New Generating Capacity Resource's capacity clearing in previous Forward Capacity Auctions]. After the New Generating Capacity Resource achieves FCM Commercial Operation, the Existing Generating Capacity Resource's summer Qualified Capacity shall be calculated as described in Section III.13.1.2.2.1.1, except that no data from the time period prior to the New Generating Capacity Resource's FCM Commercial Operation date shall be used to determine the summer Qualified Capacity associated with the Existing Generating Capacity Resource.

(b) Where an Existing Generating Capacity Resource is associated with a New Generating Capacity Resource that was accepted for participation in a previous Forward Capacity Auction qualification process and that cleared in a previous Forward Capacity Auction, then in each subsequent Forward Capacity Auction until the New Generating Capacity Resource achieves FCM Commercial Operation the winter Qualified Capacity of that Existing Generating Capacity Resource shall be the sum of [the median

of that Existing Generating Capacity Resource's positive winter Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings from the most recent five years, as of the fifth Business Day of June of each year, calculated in a manner consistent with Section III.13.1.2.2.1.2] plus [the amount of the New Generating Capacity Resource's capacity clearing in previous Forward Capacity Auctions]. After the New Generating Capacity Resource achieves FCM Commercial Operation, the Existing Generating Capacity Resource's winter Qualified Capacity shall be calculated as described in Section III.13.1.2.2.1.2, except that no data from the time period prior to the New Generating Capacity Resource's FCM Commercial Operation date shall be used to determine the winter Qualified Capacity associated with the Existing Generating Capacity Resource.

**III.13.1.2.2.4. Adjustment for Significant Decreases in Capacity Prior to the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline.**

Where the most recent summer Seasonal Claimed Capability, as of the fifth Business Day in October, of an Existing Generating Capacity Resource (other than a Settlement Only Resource or an Intermittent Power Resource) is below its summer Qualified Capacity, as determined pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.2.1.1, by:

- (1) for Capacity Commitment Periods beginning prior to June 1, 2023, more than the lesser of 20 percent of that summer Qualified Capacity or 40 MW;
- (2) for Capacity Commitment Periods beginning on or after June 1, 2023, more than the lesser of:
  - (i) the greater of 10 percent of that summer Qualified Capacity or two MW, or;
  - (ii) 10 MW;

then the Lead Market Participant must elect one of the two treatments described in this Section III.13.1.2.2.4 by the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline. If the Lead Market Participant makes no election, or elects treatment pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.2.4(c) and fails to meet the associated requirements, then the treatment described in Section III.13.1.2.2.4(a) shall apply.

(a) A Lead Market Participant may elect, for the purposes of the Forward Capacity Auction only, to have the Existing Generating Capacity Resource's summer Qualified Capacity set to the most recent summer Seasonal Claimed Capability as of the fifth Business Day in October, provided that the Lead Market Participant has furnished evidence regarding the cause of the de-rating.

(b) [Reserved.]



(c) A Lead Market Participant may elect: (i) to submit a critical path schedule as described in Section III.13.1.1.2.2.2, modified as appropriate, describing the measures that will be taken and showing that the Existing Generating Capacity Resource will be able to provide an amount of capacity consistent with the summer Qualified Capacity as calculated pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.2.1.1 by the start of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period; and (ii) to have the Existing Generating Capacity Resource's summer Qualified Capacity remain as calculated pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.2.1.1 for the Forward Capacity Auction. For an Existing Generating Capacity Resource subject to this election, the critical path schedule monitoring provisions of Section III.13.3 shall apply.

**III.13.1.2.2.5. Adjustment for Certain Significant Increases in Capacity.**

Where an Existing Generating Capacity Resource (other than a Settlement Only Resource) meets the requirements of Section III.13.1.1.1.3(a) but not the requirements of Section III.13.1.1.1.3(b), the Lead Market Participant may elect to have the Existing Generating Capacity Resource's summer Qualified Capacity be the sum of [the median of that Existing Generating Capacity Resource's positive summer Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings from the most recent five years, as of the fifth Business Day in October of each year, calculated in a manner consistent with Section III.13.1.2.2.1.1] plus [the amount of incremental capacity as described in Section III.13.1.1.1.3(a)]; provided, however, that the Lead Market Participant must abide by all other provisions of this Section III.13 applicable to a resource that is a New Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.1.3. Such an election must be made in writing and must be received by the ISO no later than the close of the New Capacity Show of Interest Submission Window. If the incremental amount of capacity seeking to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction meets the requirements of this Section, but the incremental amount of capacity does not span the entire Capacity Commitment Period, then the ISO shall match the incremental amount of capacity with excess Qualified Capacity at that same resource, not to exceed the Qualified Capacity of the existing portion of the resource, in order to cover the entire Capacity Commitment Period. This provision shall not apply to Intermittent Power Resources.

**III.13.1.2.2.5.1. [Reserved.]**

**III.13.1.2.2.5.2. Requirements for an Existing Generating Capacity Resource, Existing Demand Capacity Resource or Existing Import Capacity Resource Having a Higher Summer Qualified Capacity than Winter Qualified Capacity.**

Where an Existing Generating Capacity Resource, Existing Demand Capacity Resource, or Existing Import Capacity Resource (other than an Intermittent Power Resource) has a summer Qualified Capacity that exceeds its winter Qualified Capacity, both as calculated pursuant to this Section III.13.1.2.2, then that resource must either: (i) offer its summer Qualified Capacity as part of an offer composed of separate resources, as discussed in Section III.13.1.5; or (ii) have its FCA Qualified Capacity administratively set by the ISO to the lesser of its summer Qualified Capacity and winter Qualified Capacity.

**III.13.1.2.3. Qualification Process for Existing Generating Capacity Resources.**

(a) For each Existing Generating Capacity Resource, no later than 15 Business Days before the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline, the ISO will notify the resource's Lead Market Participant of the resource's summer Qualified Capacity and winter Qualified Capacity and the Load Zone in which the Existing Generating Capacity Resource is located.

(b) If the Lead Market Participant believes that the ISO has made a mathematical error in calculating the summer Qualified Capacity or winter Qualified Capacity for an Existing Generating Capacity Resource as described in Section III.13.1.2.2, then the Lead Market Participant must notify the ISO within five Business Days of receipt of the Qualified Capacity notification.

(c) The ISO shall notify the Lead Market Participant of the outcome of any such challenge no later than five Business Days before the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline. If an Existing Generating Capacity Resource does not submit a Static De-List Bid, an Export Bid, an Administrative Export De-List Bid, a Permanent De-List Bid, or a Retirement De-List Bid in the Forward Capacity Auction qualification process, then the resource shall be entered into the Forward Capacity Auction as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(c).

**III.13.1.2.3.1. Existing Capacity Retirement Package and Existing Capacity Qualification Package.**

A resource that previously has been deactivated pursuant to Section I.3.9 of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff (or its predecessor provisions) and seeks to reactivate and participate in the Forward Capacity Market as an Existing Generating Capacity Resource must submit a reactivation plan no later than 10 Business Days before the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline, as described in Section III.13.1.1.1.6(b). All Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids in the Forward Capacity

Auction must be detailed in an Existing Capacity Retirement Package submitted to the ISO no later than the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline. All Static De-List Bids, Export Bids and Administrative Export De-List Bids in the Forward Capacity Auction must be detailed in an Existing Capacity Qualification Package submitted to the ISO no later than the Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline. Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids may not be modified or withdrawn after the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline, except as provided for in Section III.13.1.2.4.1. All Static De-List Bids, Export Bids, and Administrative Export De-List Bids submitted in the qualification process may not be modified or withdrawn after the Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline, except as provided for in Section III.13.1.2.3.1.1. An Existing Generating Capacity Resource may not submit a Static De-List Bid, Export Bid, Administrative Export De-List Bid, Permanent De-List Bid, or Retirement De-List Bid for an amount of capacity greater than its summer Qualified Capacity, unless the submittal is for the entire resource. Where a resource elected pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.2.4 or Section III.13.1.4.1.1.2.7 to have the Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price continue to apply after the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction in which the offer clears, the capacity associated with any resulting Capacity Supply Obligation may not be subject to any type of de-list or export bid in subsequent Forward Capacity Auctions for Capacity Commitment Periods for which the Project Sponsor elected to have the Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price continue to apply. For a single resource, a Lead Market Participant may combine a Static De-List Bid, an Export Bid, and an Administrative Export De-List Bid; neither a Permanent De-List Bid nor a Retirement De-List Bid may be combined with any other type of de-list or export bid.

Static De-List Bids and Export Bids may elect to be rationed (as described in Section III.13.2.6, however, an Export Bid is always subject to potential rationing where the associated external interface binds). Where a Lead Market Participant submits any combination of Static De-List Bid and Export Bid for a single resource, each of those bids must have the same rationing election. Where a Lead Market Participant submits any combination of Static De-List Bid, Export Bid, and Administrative Export De-List Bid for a single resource, none of the prices in a set of price-quantity pairs associated with a bid may be the same as any price in any other set of price-quantity pairs associated with another bid for the same resource.

#### **III.13.1.2.3.1.A            Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold.**

For the fifteenth Forward Capacity Auction (for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning June 1, 2024), the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold is \$4.30/kW-month. For each Forward Capacity Auction

thereafter, the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold shall be calculated as described below in this Section III.13.1.2.3.1.A, and shall be published to the ISO's website no later than 5 Business Days before the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline. This publication shall include the preliminary value calculated pursuant to subsection (a) below, whether the preliminary value was constrained by either of the limitations described in subsection (b) below, the margin value as calculated pursuant to subsection (c) below, and the final value as calculated pursuant to subsection (d) below.

(a) Subject to the limitations described in subsection (b) below, a preliminary value of the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold shall be calculated as the average of: (i) the Capacity Clearing Price for the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone from the immediately preceding Forward Capacity Auction (provided, however, that if there is a second run of the primary auction-clearing process pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.1(d), the resulting Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone clearing price from that run shall be used instead); and (ii) the price at which the total amount of capacity clearing in the immediately preceding Forward Capacity Auction intersects the estimated System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve for the upcoming Forward Capacity Auction. For this purpose, the estimated System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve shall be constructed, in the same manner as described in Section III.13.2.2.1, using the system-wide Marginal Reliability Impact values from the immediately preceding Forward Capacity Auction, the most recent estimate of the Installed Capacity Requirement (net of HQICCs) for the upcoming Forward Capacity Auction, and the Net CONE and Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price for the upcoming Forward Capacity Auction.

(b) The preliminary value of the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold shall not be higher than 75 percent of the Net CONE value for the upcoming Forward Capacity Auction. The preliminary value of the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold shall not be lower than 75 percent of the clearing price applicable pursuant to (a)(i) of this Section III.13.1.2.3.1.A, except as needed to ensure that it is not higher than 75 percent of the Net CONE value for the upcoming Forward Capacity Auction.

(c) A margin value shall be calculated using the following formula:

$$Margin = \$1/kW-month \times \left[ \frac{(75\% \times Net\ CONE_{upcoming\ FCA}) - DDBT_{preliminary}}{(75\% \times Net\ CONE_{upcoming\ FCA})} \right]$$

(d) The final value of the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold for the upcoming Forward Capacity Auction shall be equal to the preliminary value of the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold calculated pursuant to Sections III.13.1.2.3.1.A(a) and III.13.1.2.3.1.A(b) plus the margin value calculated pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.A(c).

#### **III.13.1.2.3.1.1. Static De-List Bids.**

A Lead Market Participant with an Existing Capacity Resource, or a portion thereof, seeking to specify a price below which it would not accept a Capacity Supply Obligation for that resource, or a portion thereof, at prices at or above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold during a single Capacity Commitment Period may submit a Static De-List Bid in the associated Forward Capacity Auction qualification process. A Static De-List Bid may not result in a resource's Capacity Supply Obligation being less than its Rationing Minimum Limit except where the resource submits de-list and export bids totaling the resource's full summer Qualified Capacity. Each Static De-List Bid must be detailed in an Existing Capacity Qualification Package submitted to the ISO no later than the Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline, and must be in the form of a curve (up to five price-quantity pairs). The curve may in no case increase the quantity offered as the price decreases. All Static De-List Bids are subject to a reliability review as described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5. Static De-List Bids are subject to review by the Internal Market Monitor pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2 and must include the additional documentation described in that section. With the submission of a Static De-List Bid, the Lead Market Participant must notify the ISO if the Existing Capacity Resource will not be participating in the energy and ancillary services markets during the Capacity Commitment Period (except for necessary audits or tests).

No later than seven days after the issuance by the ISO of the qualification determination notification described in Section III.13.1.2.4(b), a Lead Market Participant that submitted a Static De-List Bid may: (a) lower the price of any price-quantity pair of a Static De-List Bid, provided that the revised price is greater than or equal to the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold, or; (b) withdraw any price-quantity pair of a Static De-List Bid.

#### **III.13.1.2.3.1.2. [Reserved.]**

#### **III.13.1.2.3.1.3. Export Bids.**

An Existing Generating Capacity Resource within the New England Control Area, other than an Intermittent Power Resource or a Renewable Technology Resource, seeking to export all or part of its capacity during a Capacity Commitment Period may submit an Export Bid in the associated Forward Capacity Auction qualification process. An Export Bid may not result in a resource's Capacity Supply Obligation being less than its Rationing Minimum Limit except where the resource submits de-list and export bids totaling the resource's full summer Qualified Capacity. All Export Bids are subject to a

reliability review as described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5. Export Bids at or above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold are subject to review by the Internal Market Monitor pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2 and must include the additional information described in that Section. Each Export Bid must be detailed in an Existing Capacity Qualification Package submitted to the ISO no later than the Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline, and must be in the form of a curve (up to five price-quantity pairs) associated with a specific Existing Generating Capacity Resource. The curve may in no case increase the quantity offered as the price decreases. Each price-quantity pair must be less than the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price. The Existing Capacity Qualification Package for each Export Bid must also specify the interface over which the capacity will be exported. Export Bids shall be entered into the Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.2(b).

#### **III.13.1.2.3.1.4. Administrative Export De-List Bids.**

An Existing Generating Capacity Resource other than an Intermittent Power Resource or a Renewable Technology Resource subject to a multiyear contract to sell capacity outside of the New England Control Area during the Capacity Commitment Period that either: (i) cleared as an Export Bid in a previous Forward Capacity Auction for a Capacity Commitment Period within the duration of the contract; or (ii) entered into a contract prior to April 30, 2007 to sell capacity outside of the New England Control Area during the Capacity Commitment Period, may submit an Administrative Export De-List Bid in the associated Forward Capacity Auction qualification process. An Administrative Export De-List Bid may not result in a resource's Capacity Supply Obligation being less than its Rationing Minimum Limit except where the resource submits de-list and export bids totaling the resource's full summer Qualified Capacity. Unless reviewed as an Export Bid in a previous Forward Capacity Auction, an Administrative Export De-List Bid is subject to a reliability review prior to clearing in a Forward Capacity Auction, as described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5, and is subject to review by the Internal Market Monitor in the first Forward Capacity Auction in which it participates, pursuant to Section III.13.1.7. Both the reliability review and the review by the Internal Market Monitor shall be conducted once and shall remain valid for the multiyear contract period. Each Administrative Export De-List Bid must be detailed in an Existing Capacity Qualification Package submitted to the ISO no later than the Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline, must be associated with a specific Existing Generating Capacity Resource, and must indicate the quantity of capacity subject to the bid. The Existing Capacity Qualification Package for each Administrative Export De-List Bid must also specify the interface over which the capacity will be exported, and must include documentation demonstrating a contractual obligation to sell capacity outside

of the New England Control Area during the whole Capacity Commitment Period. Administrative Export De-List Bids shall be entered into the Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.4.

**III.13.1.2.3.1.5. Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids.**

(a) A Lead Market Participant with an Existing Capacity Resource seeking to specify a price at or below which it would not accept a Capacity Supply Obligation permanently for all or part of a Generating Capacity Resource beginning at the start of a particular Capacity Commitment Period may submit a Permanent De-List Bid in the associated Forward Capacity Auction qualification process.

(b) A Lead Market Participant with an Existing Capacity Resource seeking to specify a price at or below which it would retire all or part of a Generating Capacity Resource from all New England Markets beginning at the start of a particular Capacity Commitment Period may submit a Retirement De-List Bid in the associated Forward Capacity Auction qualification process.

(c) No Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid may result in a resource's Capacity Supply Obligation being less than its Rationing Minimum Limit unless the Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid is for the entire resource. Each Permanent De-List Bid and Retirement De-List Bid must be detailed in an Existing Capacity Retirement Package submitted to the ISO no later than the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline, and must be in the form of a curve (up to five price-quantity pairs) associated with a specific Existing Capacity Resource. The curve may in no case increase the quantity offered as the price decreases. Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids are subject to review by the Internal Market Monitor pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1 and must include the additional documentation described in that section. Once submitted, no Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid may be withdrawn, except as provided in Section III.13.1.2.4.1.

**III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1. Reliability Review of Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids During the Qualification Process.**

During the qualification process, the ISO will review the following de-list bids to determine if the resource is needed for reliability: (1) Internal Market Monitor-accepted Permanent De-List Bids and Internal Market Monitor-accepted Retirement De-List Bids that are at or above the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price; and (2) Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids for which the Lead Market Participant has opted to have the resource reviewed for reliability as described in Section

III.13.1.2.4.1(a) or Section III.13.1.2.4.1(b). The reliability review will be conducted according to Section III.13.2.5.2.5, except as follows:

- (a) Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids that cannot be priced (for example, due to the expiration of an operating license) will be reviewed first.
- (b) System needs associated with Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids for resources found needed for reliability reasons pursuant to this Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1 will be reviewed with the Reliability Committee during the month of August following the issuance of retirement determination notifications pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4(a). The Lead Market Participant shall be notified as soon as practicable following the ISO's consultation with the Reliability Committee that the capacity associated with a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid is needed for reliability reasons.
- (c) If the capacity associated with a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid is needed for reliability reasons pursuant to this Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1, the de-list bid shall be rejected and the resource shall be entered into the Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.2(c) and compensated according to Section III.13.2.5.2.5, unless the resource declines to be retained for reliability, as provided in Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1(d).
- (d) No later than the fifth Business Day in the month of September following the review of system needs with the Reliability Committee per (b) above, a Lead Market Participant may notify the ISO that it declines to provide the associated capacity for reliability. Such an election will be binding. A resource for which a Lead Market Participant has made such an election will not be eligible for compensation pursuant to Sections III.13.2.5.2.5.1 or III.13.2.5.2.5.2.
- (e) Where a resource is determined not to be needed for reliability or where a Lead Market Participant notifies the ISO that it declines to provide capacity for reliability pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1(d), the capacity associated with the Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid will be treated as follows:
  - (i) For a Retirement De-List Bid at or above the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price, or a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid for which a Lead Market Participant has elected to retire the resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(a), the portion of the resource



subject to the de-list bid will be retired as permitted by applicable law coincident with the commencement of the Capacity Commitment Period for which the de-list bid was submitted, as described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3(a).

(ii) For a Permanent De-List Bid at or above the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price for which a Lead Market Participant has not elected to retire the resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(a), the portion of the resource subject to the de-list bid will be permanently de-listed coincident with the commencement of the Capacity Commitment Period for which the de-list bid was submitted, as described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3(b).

(iii) For a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid for which a Lead Market Participant has elected conditional treatment pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(b), the de-list bid will continue to receive conditional treatment as described in Section III.13.1.2.4.1(b), Section III.13.2.3.2(b)(ii), and Section III.13.2.5.2.1.

**III.13.1.2.3.1.6. Static De-List Bids, Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids for Existing Generating Capacity Resources at Stations having Common Costs.**

Where Existing Generating Capacity Resources at a Station having Common Costs elect to submit Static De-List Bids, Permanent De-List Bids, or Retirement De-List Bids, the provisions of this Section III.13.1.2.3.1.6 shall apply.

**III.13.1.2.3.1.6.1. Submission of Cost Data.**

In addition to the information required elsewhere in this Section III.13.1.2.3, Static De-List Bids, Permanent De-List Bids, or Retirement De-List Bids submitted by an Existing Generating Capacity Resource that is associated with a Station having Common Costs and seeking to delist must include detailed cost data to allow the ISO to determine the Asset-Specific Going Forward Costs for each asset associated with the Station and the Station Going Forward Common Costs.

**III.13.1.2.3.1.6.2. [Reserved.]**

**III.13.1.2.3.1.6.3. Internal Market Monitor Review of Stations having Common Costs.**

The Internal Market Monitor will review each Static De-List Bid, Permanent De-List Bid and Retirement De-List Bids from an Existing Generating Capacity Resource that is associated with a Station having Common Costs pursuant to the following methodology:

- (i) Calculate the average Asset-Specific Going Forward Costs of each asset at the Station.
- (ii) Order the assets from highest average Asset-Specific Going Forward Costs to lowest average Asset-Specific Going Forward Costs; this is the preferred de-list order.
- (iii) Calculate and assign to each asset a station cost that is equal to the average cost of the assets remaining at the Station, including Station Going Forward Common Costs, assuming the successive de-listing of each individual asset in preferred de-list order.
- (iv) Calculate a set of composite costs that is equal to the maximum of the cost associated with each asset as calculated in (i) and (iii) above.

The Internal Market Monitor will adjust the set of composite costs to ensure a monotonically non-increasing set of bids as follows: any asset with a composite cost that is greater than the composite cost of the asset with the lowest composite cost and that has average Asset-Specific Going Forward Costs that are less than its composite costs will have its composite cost set equal to that of the asset with the lowest composite cost. The bids of the asset with the lowest composite cost and of any assets whose composite costs are so adjusted will be considered a single non-rationable bid for use in the Forward Capacity Auction.

The Internal Market Monitor will compare a de-list bid developed using the adjusted composite costs to the de-list bid submitted by the Existing Generating Capacity Resource that is associated with a Station having Common Costs. If the Internal Market Monitor determines that the submitted de-list bid is less than or equal to the bid developed using the adjusted composite costs, then the bid shall be entered into the Forward Capacity Auction as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(b). If the Internal Market Monitor determines that the submitted de-list bid is greater than the bid developed using the adjusted composite costs or is not consistent with the submitted supporting cost data, then the Internal Market Monitor will establish an Internal Market Monitor-determined or Internal Market Monitor-accepted price for the bid as described in Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.

**III.13.1.2.3.2. Review by Internal Market Monitor of Bids from Existing Capacity Resources.**

The Internal Market Monitor shall review bids for Existing Capacity Resources as follows.

**III.13.1.2.3.2.1. Static De-List Bids and Export Bids, Permanent De-List Bids, and Retirement De-List Bids at or Above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold.**

The Internal Market Monitor shall review each Static De-List Bid and each Export Bid at or above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold to determine whether the bid is consistent with: (1) the Existing Capacity Resource's net going forward costs (as determined pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.2.A); (2) reasonable expectations about the resource's Capacity Performance Payments (as determined pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.3); (3) reasonable risk premium assumptions (as determined pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.4); and (4) the resource's reasonable opportunity costs (as determined pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.5).

The Internal Market Monitor shall review each Permanent De-List Bid greater than 20 MW that is at or above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold and each Retirement De-List Bid greater than 20 MW that is at or above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold to determine whether the bid is consistent with: (1) the net present value of the resource's expected cash flows (as determined pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.2.B); (2) reasonable expectations about the resource's Capacity Performance Payments (as determined pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.3); and (3) the resource's reasonable opportunity costs (as determined pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.5). If more than one Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid is submitted by a single Lead Market Participant or its Affiliates (as used in Section III.A.24), the Internal Market Monitor shall review each such bid at or above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold if the sum of all such bids at or above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold is greater than 20 MW. The Internal Market Monitor shall review each Permanent De-List Bid and each Retirement De-List Bid submitted at any price pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.1(b) if the sum of the Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids submitted by the Lead Market Participant or its Affiliates (as used in Section III.A.24) is greater than 20 MW. Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids that are not reviewed by the Internal Market Monitor shall be included in the retirement determination notification described in Section III.13.1.2.4(a) and in the filing made to the Commission as described in Section III.13.8.1(a).

Sufficient documentation and information about each bid component must be included in the Existing Capacity Retirement Package or the Existing Capacity Qualification Package to allow the Internal Market Monitor to make the requisite determinations. If a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid is submitted pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.1(b), all relevant updates to previously submitted documentation and information must be provided to support the newly submitted price and allow the Internal Market Monitor to make updated determinations. The updated information may include a request to discontinue the Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid such that it will not be entered into the Forward Capacity Auction, in which case the update must include sufficient supporting information on the nature of resource investments that were undertaken, or other materially changed circumstances, to allow the Internal Market Monitor to determine whether discontinuation is appropriate.

The entire de-list submittal shall be accompanied by an affidavit executed by a corporate officer attesting to the accuracy of its content, including reported costs, the reasonableness of the estimates and adjustments of costs that would otherwise be avoided if the resource were not required to meet the obligations of a listed resource, and the reasonableness of the expectations and assumptions regarding Capacity Performance Payments, cash flows, opportunity costs, and risk premiums, and shall be subject to audit upon request by the ISO.

#### **III.13.1.2.3.2.1.1. Internal Market Monitor Review of De-List Bids.**

The Internal Market Monitor may seek additional information from the Lead Market Participant (including information about the other existing or potential new resources controlled by the Lead Market Participant) after the qualification deadline to address any questions or concerns regarding the data submitted, as appropriate. The Internal Market Monitor shall review all relevant information (including data, studies, and assumptions) to determine whether the bid is consistent with the resource's net going forward costs, reasonable expectations about the resource's Capacity Performance Payments, reasonable risk premium assumptions, and reasonable opportunity costs. In making this determination, the Internal Market Monitor shall consider, among other things, industry standards, market conditions (including published indices and projections), resource-specific characteristics and conditions, portfolio size, and consistency of assumptions across that portfolio.

#### **III.13.1.2.3.2.1.1.1. Review of Static De-List Bids and Export Bids.**

The Internal Market Monitor shall review Static De-List Bids and Export Bids and, after due consideration and consultation with the Lead Market Participant, as appropriate, shall develop an Internal

Market Monitor-accepted Static De-List Bid or an Internal Market Monitor-accepted Export Bid. The Internal Market Monitor-accepted Static De-List Bid and Internal Market Monitor-accepted Export Bid shall be equal to the Static De-List Bid or Export Bid submitted by the Lead Market Participant unless the de-list bid price(s) submitted by the Lead Market Participant are more than 10% greater than the Internal Market Monitor-accepted de-list bid price(s) for the same de-list bid. If the de-list bid price(s) submitted by the Lead Market Participant are more than 10% greater than the Internal Market Monitor-accepted de-list bid price(s), the Internal Market Monitor shall calculate an Internal Market Monitor-accepted Static De-List Bid or Internal Market-Monitor-accepted Export Bid that is consistent with the sum of the resource's net going forward costs plus reasonable expectations about the resource's Capacity Performance Payments plus reasonable risk premium assumptions plus reasonable opportunity costs.

If an Internal Market Monitor-determined price is established for a Static De-List Bid or an Export Bid, both the qualification determination notification described in Section III.13.1.2.4 and the informational filing made to the Commission as described in Section III.13.8.1(c) shall include an explanation of the Internal Market Monitor-determined price based on the Internal Market Monitor review and the resource's net going forward costs, reasonable expectations about the resource's Capacity Performance Payments, reasonable risk premium assumptions, and reasonable opportunity costs as determined by the Internal Market Monitor.

#### **III.13.1.2.3.2.1.1.2. Review of Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids.**

The Internal Market Monitor shall review those Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids identified in Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1 and, after due consideration and consultation with the Lead Market Participant, as appropriate, shall develop an Internal Market Monitor-accepted Permanent De-List Bid or an Internal Market Monitor-accepted Retirement De-List Bid. The Internal Market Monitor-accepted Permanent De-List Bid and Internal Market Monitor-accepted Retirement De-List Bid shall be equal to the Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid submitted by the Lead Market Participant unless the de-list bid price(s) submitted by the Lead Market Participant are more than 10% greater than the Internal Market Monitor-accepted de-list bid price(s) for the same de-list bid. If the de-list bid price(s) submitted by the Lead Market Participant are more than 10% greater than the Internal Market Monitor-accepted de-list bid price(s), the Internal Market Monitor shall calculate an Internal Market Monitor-accepted Permanent De-List Bid or Internal Market-Monitor-accepted Retirement De-List Bid that is consistent with the sum of the net present value of the resource's expected cash flows plus reasonable expectations about the resource's Capacity Performance Payments plus reasonable opportunity costs.

The retirement determination notification described in Section III.13.1.2.4(a) and the filing made to the Commission as described in Section III.13.8.1(a) shall include an explanation of the Internal Market Monitor-accepted price and the Internal Market Monitor determination on any request to discontinue the Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid.

**III.13.1.2.3.2.1.2.A. Static De-List Bid and Export Bid Net Going Forward Costs.**

The Lead Market Participant for an Existing Capacity Resource that submits a Static De-List Bid or an Export Bid at or above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold that is to be reviewed by the Internal Market Monitor shall report expected net going forward costs for the applicable Capacity Commitment Period in a manner and format specified by the Internal Market Monitor, and may supplement this information with other evidence. A Static De-List Bid or Export Bid at or above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold shall be considered consistent with the Existing Capacity Resource's net going forward costs based on a review of the data submitted in the following formula.

*Net Going Forward Costs =*

$$\frac{(GFC - IMR) \times InfIndex}{(CQ_{Summer, kw}) \times (12 months)}$$

Where:

GFC = annual going forward costs, in dollars. These are the expected costs and capital expenditures that might otherwise be avoided or not incurred if the resource were not subject to the obligations of a resource with a Capacity Supply Obligation during the Capacity Commitment Period (i.e., maintaining a constant condition of being ready to respond to commitment and dispatch orders). Costs that are not avoidable in a single Capacity Commitment Period and costs associated with the production of energy are not to be included. Service of debt is not a going forward cost. Staffing, maintenance, capital expenses, and other normal expenses that would be avoided only in the absence of a Capacity Supply Obligation may be included. Staffing, maintenance, capital expenses, and other normal expenses that would be avoided only if the resource were not participating in the energy and ancillary services markets may not be included, except in the case of a resource that has indicated in the submission of a Static De-List Bid that the resource will not be participating in the energy and ancillary services markets during the Capacity Commitment Period.

$CQ_{\text{Summer}}kW$  = capacity seeking to de-list in kW. In no case shall this value exceed the resource's summer Qualified Capacity.

IMR = expected annual infra-marginal rents, in dollars. In the case of a resource that has indicated in the submission of a Static De-List Bid that the resource will not be participating in the energy and ancillary services markets during the Capacity Commitment Period, this value shall be calculated by subtracting all submitted cost data representing the cumulative expected cost of production (total expenses related to the production of energy, e.g. fuel, actual consumables such as chemicals and water, and, if quantified, incremental labor and maintenance) from the Existing Generating Capacity Resource's total ISO market revenues. In the case of a resource that has indicated in the submission of a Static De-List Bid that the resource will be participating in the energy and ancillary services markets during the Capacity Commitment Period, this value shall be \$0.00.

InfIndex = inflation index.  $\text{infIndex} = (1 + i)^4$

Where: "i" is the most recent reported 4- Year expected inflation number published by the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland at the beginning of the qualification period. The specific value to be used shall be specified by the ISO and available to the Lead Market Participant.

### **III.13.1.2.3.2.1.2.B Permanent De-List Bid and Retirement De-List Bid Net Present Value of Expected Cash Flows.**

The Lead Market Participant for an Existing Capacity Resource that submits a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid that is to be reviewed by the Internal Market Monitor shall report all expected costs, revenues, prices, discount rates and capital expenditures in a manner and format specified by the Internal Market Monitor, and may supplement this information with other evidence. The Internal Market Monitor will review the Lead Market Participant's submitted data to ensure that it is consistent with overall market conditions and reflects expected values.

The Internal Market Monitor will adjust any data that are inconsistent with overall market conditions or do not reflect expected values. The Internal Market Monitor shall enter all relevant expected costs, revenues, prices, discount rates and capital expenditures into a capital budgeting model and shall determine the net present value of the Existing Capacity Resource's expected cash flows as follows:

The net present value of the Existing Capacity Resource's expected cash flows is equal to (i) the net present value of the Existing Capacity Resource's net annual expected cash flows over the resource's remaining economic life (as determined pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.2.C) plus the net present value of the resource's expected terminal value, using the resource's discount rate, divided by (ii) the product of the resource's Qualified Capacity (in kilowatts) and 12 months.

The Existing Capacity Resource's net annual expected cash flow for the first Capacity Commitment Period of the resource's remaining economic life is the resource's expected annual net operating profit excluding expected capacity revenues less its expected capital expenditures in the Capacity Commitment Period.

The Existing Capacity Resource's net annual expected cash flow for each of the subsequent Capacity Commitment Periods of the resource's remaining economic life is the resource's expected annual net operating profit less its expected capital expenditures in the Capacity Commitment Period.

Where:

**Expected net operating profit**, in dollars, is the Lead Market Participant's expected annual profit that might otherwise be avoided or not accrued if the resource were not subject to the obligations of a listed capacity resource during the Capacity Commitment Period. Expected labor, maintenance, taxes, insurance, administrative and other normal expenses that can be avoided or not incurred if the resource is retired or permanently de-listed may be included. Service of debt is not an avoidable cost and may not be included.

**Expected capacity revenues**, in dollars, are the forecasted annual expected capacity revenues based on the Lead Market Participant's forecasted expected capacity prices for each of the subsequent Capacity Commitment Periods of the resource's remaining economic life. The Lead Market Participant shall provide the Internal Market Monitor with documentation supporting the forecasted expected capacity prices. The supporting documentation must include a detailed description and sources of the Lead Market Participant's assumptions about expected resource additions, resource retirements, estimated Installed Capacity Requirements, estimated Local Sourcing Requirements, expected market conditions, and any other assumptions used to develop the forecasted expected capacity price in each Capacity Commitment



Period.

If the Internal Market Monitor determines the Lead Market Participant has not provided adequate supporting documentation for the forecasted expected capacity prices, the Internal Market Monitor will replace the Lead Market Participant's forecasted expected capacity prices with the Internal Market Monitor's estimate thereof in each of the subsequent Capacity Commitment Periods of the resource's remaining economic life.

**Expected capital expenditures**, in dollars, are the Lead Market Participant's expected capital investments that might otherwise be avoided or not incurred if the resource were not subject to the obligations of a listed capacity resource during the Capacity Commitment Periods.

**Expected terminal value**, in dollars, for resources with five years or less of remaining economic life, is the Lead Market Participant's expected revenue less expected costs associated with retiring or permanently de-listing the resource. For resources with more than five years of remaining economic life, the expected terminal value in the fifth year of the evaluation period is the Lead Market Participant's expected revenue less expected costs associated with retiring or permanently de-listing the resource at the end of the resource's economic life plus the net present value of the Existing Capacity Resource's net annual expected cash flows from the sixth year of the evaluation period through the end of the resource's remaining economic life, using the resource's discount rate.

**Discount rate** is a value reflecting the Lead Market Participant's weighted average cost of capital for the Existing Capacity Resource adjusted to reflect the risk to cash flows calculated pursuant to the net present value of expected cash flows analysis in this Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.2.B.

The Lead Market Participant shall provide the Internal Market Monitor with documentation supporting the weighted average cost of capital for the Existing Capacity Resource adjusted for risk.

The supporting documentation must include a detailed description and sources of the Lead Market Participant's assumptions associated with the cost of capital, risks and any other assumptions used to develop the weighted average cost of capital for the Existing Capacity Resource adjusted for risk.

If the Internal Market Monitor determines the Lead Market Participant has not provided adequate supporting documentation for the weighted average cost of capital for the Existing Capacity Resource adjusted for risk, the Lead Market Participant has included risks not associated with cash flows calculated

pursuant to the net present value of expected cash flows analysis in this Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.2.B or the Lead Market Participant has submitted costs, revenues, capital expenditures or prices that are not reflective of expected values, the Internal Market Monitor will replace the Lead Market Participant's discount rate with a value determined by the Internal Market Monitor.

**III.13.1.2.3.2.1.2.C      Permanent De-List Bid and Retirement De-List Bid Calculation of Remaining Economic Life.**

The Internal Market Monitor shall calculate the Existing Capacity Resource's remaining economic life, using evaluation periods ranging from one to five years. For each evaluation period, the Internal Market Monitor will calculate the net present value of (a) the annual expected net operating profit minus annual expected capital expenditures assuming the Capacity Clearing Price for the first year is equal to the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price and (b) the expected terminal value of the resource at the end of the given evaluation period. The economic life is the maximum evaluation period in which a resource's net present value is non-negative. However, effective April 9, 2020, beginning with the sixteenth Forward Capacity Auction, the economic life is the evaluation period in which a resource's net present value is maximized.

**III.13.1.2.3.2.1.3.      Expected Capacity Performance Payments.**

The Lead Market Participant for an Existing Capacity Resource that submits a Static De-List Bid or an Export Bid, Permanent De-List Bid, or Retirement De-List Bid at or above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold that is to be reviewed by the Internal Market Monitor shall also provide documentation separately detailing the expected Capacity Performance Payments for the resource. This documentation must include expectations regarding the applicable Capacity Balancing Ratio, the number of hours of reserve deficiency, and the resource's performance during reserve deficiencies.

**III.13.1.2.3.2.1.4.      Risk Premium.**

The Lead Market Participant for an Existing Capacity Resource that submits a Static De-List Bid, or an Export Bid at or above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold that is to be reviewed by the Internal Market Monitor shall also provide documentation separately detailing any risk premium included in the bid. This documentation should address all components of physical and financial risk reflected in the bid, including, for example, catastrophic events, a higher than expected amount of reserve deficiencies, and performing scheduled maintenance during reserve deficiencies. Any risk that can be quantified and

analytically supported and that is not already reflected in the formula for net going forward costs described in Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.2.A may be included in this risk premium component. In support of the resource's risk premium, the Lead Market Participant may also submit an affidavit from a corporate officer attesting that the risk premium submitted is the minimum necessary to ensure that the overall level of risk associated with the resource's participation in the Forward Capacity Market is consistent with the participant's corporate risk management practices.

**III.13.1.2.3.2.1.5. Opportunity Costs.**

To the extent that an Existing Capacity Resource submitting a Static De-List Bid or an Export Bid, Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid at or above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold has additional opportunity costs that are not reflected in the net going forward costs, net present value of expected cash flows, expected Capacity Performance Payments, discount rate, or risk premium components of the bid, the Lead Market Participant must include in the Existing Capacity Qualification Package evidence supporting such costs. Opportunity costs associated with major repairs necessary to restore decreases in capacity as described in Section III.13.1.2.2.4, capital projects required to operate the plant as a capacity resource or other uses of the resource shall be considered, provided such costs are substantiated by evidence of a repair plan, documented business plan and fundamental market analysis, or other independent and transparent trading index or indices as applicable. Substantiation of opportunity costs relying on sales in reconfiguration auctions or risk aversion premiums shall not be considered sufficient justification.

**III.13.1.2.3.2.2. [Reserved.]**

**III.13.1.2.3.2.3. Administrative Export De-List Bids.**

The Internal Market Monitor shall review each Administrative Export De-List Bid associated with a multi-year contract entered into prior to April 30, 2007 in the first Forward Capacity Auction in which it clears. An Administrative Export De-List Bid shall be rejected if the Internal Market Monitor determines that the bid may be an attempt to manipulate the Forward Capacity Auction, and the matter will be referred to the Commission in accordance with the protocols set forth in Appendix A to the Commission's Market Monitoring Policy Statement (111 FERC ¶ 61,267 (2005)).

**III.13.1.2.3.2.4. Static De-List Bids for Reductions in Ratings Due to Ambient Air Conditions.**

A Lead Market Participant may submit a Static De-List Bid for up to the megawatt amount that the Lead Market Participant expects will not be physically available due to the difference between the summer Qualified Capacity at 90 degrees and the expected rating of the resource at 100 degrees. The ISO shall verify during the qualification process that the rating is accurate. Such Static De-List Bids may be entered into the Forward Capacity Market at prices up to and including the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price, subject to validation of the physical limit. Static De-List Bids for reductions in ratings due to ambient air conditions shall not be subject to the review described in Section III.13.1.2.3.2 and need not include documentation for that purpose.

**III.13.1.2.3.2.5. Static De-List Bid Incremental Capital Expenditure Recovery Schedule.**

Except as described below, the Internal Market Monitor shall review all Static De-List Bids using the following cost recovery schedule for incremental capital expenditures, which assumes an annual pre-tax weighted average cost of capital of 10 percent.

<b>Age of Existing Resource (years)</b>	<b>Remaining Life (years)</b>	<b>Annual Rate of Capital Cost Recovery</b>
1 to 5	30	0.106
6 to 10	25	0.110
11 to 15	20	0.117
16 to 20	15	0.131
21 to 25	10	0.163
25 plus	5	0.264

A Market Participant may request that a different pre-tax weighted average cost of capital be used to determine the resource's annual rate of capital cost recovery by submitting the request, along with supporting documentation, in the Existing Capacity Qualification Package. The Internal Market Monitor shall review the request and supporting documentation and may, at its sole discretion, replace the annual rate of capital cost recovery from the table above with a resource-specific value based on an adjusted pre-tax weighted average cost of capital. If the Internal Market Monitor uses an adjusted pre-tax weighted average cost of capital for the resource, then the resource's annual rate of capital cost recovery will be determined according to the following formula:

$$\frac{Cost\ Of\ Capital}{(1 - (1 + CostOfCapital)^{-RemainingLife})}$$

Where:

Cost Of Capital = the adjusted pre-tax weighted average cost of capital.

Remaining Life = the remaining life of the existing resource, based on the age of the resource, as indicated in the table above.

**III.13.1.2.4. Retirement Determination Notification for Existing Capacity and Qualification Determination Notification for Existing Capacity; ~~Right to Increase Retirement De-List Bid or Permanent De-List Bid up to IMM-determined substitution auction test price.~~**

(a) No later than five Business Days before the Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline, the ISO shall send notification to the Lead Market Participant that submitted each Permanent De-List Bid and, Retirement De-List Bid ~~and substitution auction test price~~ concerning the result of the Internal Market Monitor's review conducted pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2 ~~and Section III.13.2.8.3.1A~~. This retirement determination notification shall not include the results of the reliability review pursuant to Sections III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1 or III.13.2.5.2.5. ~~For auctions associated with a Capacity Commitment Period that begins on or after June 1, 2023, within five Business Days of the issuance of the retirement determination notification, a Lead Market Participant that submitted a Retirement De-List Bid or a Permanent De-List Bid and a substitution auction demand bid for the resource associated with the de-list bid, may make the following adjustments:~~

- ~~(i) for a Retirement De-List Bid, if, but for the limits in Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.1.2 on adjusting a Market Participant submitted Retirement De-List Bid, the Internal Market Monitor would have calculated a Retirement De-List Bid price that is higher than the Market Participant submitted de-list bid price and the Market Participant submitted de-list bid is less than the Internal Market Monitor determined substitution auction test price multiplied by 0.9, the Market Participant may increase the de-list bid price up to the minimum of (x) the Internal Market Monitor determined substitution auction test price multiplied by 0.9 and (y) the higher Retirement De-List Bid price that the Internal Market Monitor would have calculated;~~
- ~~(ii) for a Permanent De-List Bid, if, but for the limits in Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.1.2 on adjusting a Market Participant submitted Permanent De-List Bid, the Internal Market Monitor would have calculated a Permanent De-List Bid price that is higher than the Market Participant submitted de-list bid price and the~~

~~Market Participant submitted de-list bid is less than the Internal Market Monitor determined substitution auction test price multiplied by 0.9, the Market Participant may increase the de-list bid price up to the minimum of (x) the Internal Market Monitor determined substitution auction test price multiplied by 0.9 and (y) the higher Permanent De-List Bid price that the Internal Market Monitor would have calculated.~~

(b) No later than 127 days before the Forward Capacity Auction, the ISO shall send notification to the Lead Market Participant that submitted each Static De-List Bid and Export Bid concerning the result of the Internal Market Monitor's de-list bid review conducted pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2. The qualification determination shall not include the results of the reliability review pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5.

#### **III.13.1.2.4.1. Participant-Elected Retirement or Conditional Treatment.**

No later than five Business Days after the issuance by the ISO of the retirement determination notification described in Section III.13.1.2.4(a), a Lead Market Participant that submitted a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid may make an election pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(a) or Section III.13.1.2.4.1(b). If the Lead Market Participant does not make an election pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(a) or Section III.13.1.2.4.1(b), the prices provided by the Internal Market Monitor in the retirement determination notifications shall be the finalized prices used in the Forward Capacity Auction as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(b) (unless otherwise directed by the Commission).

(a) A Lead Market Participant may elect to retire the resource, or portion thereof, for which it has submitted a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid. The capacity associated with a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid subject to this election will not be subject to reliability review and will be retired pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3(a); provided, however, that when making the retirement election pursuant to this Section III.13.1.2.4.1(a) the Lead Market Participant may opt to have the resource reviewed for reliability pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1, in which case the Lead Market Participant may have the opportunity (but will not be obligated) to provide capacity from the resource if the ISO determines that the resource is needed for reliability reasons, as described in Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1(d).

(b) A Lead Market Participant may elect conditional treatment for the Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid. The capacity associated with a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid subject to this election will be treated as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(b)(ii), Section III.13.2.5.2.1, and

Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3; provided, however, that in making this election the Lead Market Participant may opt to have the resource reviewed for reliability pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1, in which case the Lead Market Participant may have the opportunity (but will not be obligated) to provide capacity from the resource if the ISO determines that the resource is needed for reliability reasons, as described in Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1(d).

**III.13.1.2.5. Optional Existing Capacity Qualification Package for New Generating Capacity Resources Previously Counted as Capacity.**

A resource seeking to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.1.2 (resources previously counted as capacity resources) may elect to submit an Existing Capacity Qualification Package in addition to the New Capacity Show of Interest Form and New Capacity Qualification Package that it is required to submit pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2. The bids contained in an Existing Capacity Qualification Package submitted pursuant to this Section III.13.1.2.5 must clearly indicate which New Generating Capacity Resource the Existing Capacity Qualification Package is associated with, and if accepted in accordance with Section III.13.1.2.3, would only be entered into the Forward Capacity Auction where: (i) the new resource is not accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2; or (ii) no offer from that New Generating Capacity Resource clears in the Forward Capacity Auction, as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(e). An Existing Capacity Qualification Package submitted pursuant to this Section III.13.1.2.5 must conform in all other respects to the requirements of this Section III.13.1.2.

**III.13.1.3. Import Capacity.**

The qualification requirements for import capacity shall depend on whether the import capacity is an Existing Import Capacity Resource or a New Import Capacity Resource. Both Existing Import Capacity Resources and New Import Capacity Resources clearing in the Forward Capacity Auction must be backed by one or more External Resources or by an external Control Area throughout the relevant Capacity Commitment Period. An external demand resource may not be an Existing Import Capacity Resource or a New Import Capacity Resource. External nodes shall be established and mapped to Capacity Zones pursuant to the provisions in Attachment K to Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff.

An Elective Transmission Upgrade with an Interconnection Request for Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service under Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff shall be included in the FCM (1) after it has established a contractual association with an Import Capacity Resource and that Import Capacity Resource has met the Forward Capacity Market qualification requirements or (2) after it has met the requirements of an Elective Transmission Upgrade with Long Lead Time Facility treatment pursuant to Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff. An external node for such an Elective Transmission Upgrade will be modeled for participation in the Forward Capacity Market after the Import Capacity Resource meets the requirements to participate in the FCA. The Qualified Capacity of an Import Capacity Resource associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade shall not exceed the Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service Interconnection Request. In order for an Elective Transmission Upgrade to maintain its Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service, an associated Import Capacity Resource must meet the Forward Capacity Market qualification requirements and offer into each Forward Capacity Auction. Otherwise, the Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service will revert to Network Import Interconnection Service for the portion of the Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service for which no Import Capacity Resource is offered into the Forward Capacity Auction and the Elective Transmission Upgrade's Interconnection Agreement will be revised. The provisions in Sections III.13.1.3.5.4, permitting a Capacity Commitment Period Election, and in Section III.13.1.3.5.8, permitting a rationing election, shall apply to a New Import Capacity Resource associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade seeking to reestablish Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service if the threshold to be treated as a new resource in Section III.13.1.1.1.4 is met. If the threshold to be treated as a new increment in Section III.13.1.1.1.3 is met, only the increment will be eligible for the provisions in Sections III.13.1.3.5.4, permitting a Capacity Commitment Period Election, and in Section III.13.1.3.5.8, permitting a rationing election.

**III.13.1.3.1. Definition of Existing Import Capacity Resource.**

Capacity associated with a multi-year contract entered into before the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline to provide capacity in the New England Control Area from outside of the New England Control Area for a period including the whole Capacity Commitment Period, or capacity from an External Resource that is owned or directly controlled by the Lead Market Participant and which is committed for at least two whole consecutive Capacity Commitment Periods by the Lead Market Participant in the New Capacity Qualification Package, shall participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as an Existing Import Capacity Resource, except that if that Existing Import Capacity Resource has not cleared in a previous



Forward Capacity Auction, then the import capacity shall participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Import Capacity Resource.

**III.13.1.3.2. Qualified Capacity for Existing Import Capacity Resources.**

The summer Qualified Capacity and winter Qualified Capacity of an Existing Import Capacity Resource shall be based on the data provided to the ISO during the qualification process, subject to ISO review and verification.

The qualified capacity for the Existing Import Capacity Resources associated with the VJO and NYPA contracts listed in Section III.13.1.3.3.A(c) as of the Capacity Commitment Period beginning June 1, 2014 shall be equal to the lesser of the stated amount in Section III.13.1.3.3.A(c) or the median amount of the energy delivered from the Existing Import Capacity Resource during the New England system coincident peak over the previous five Capacity Commitment Periods at the time of qualification.

**III.13.1.3.3.A Qualification Process for Existing Import Capacity Resources that are not associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade with Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service.**

Existing Import Capacity Resources shall be subject to the same qualification process as Existing Generating Capacity Resources, as described in Section III.13.1.2.3, except as follows:

- (a) The Qualified Capacity shall be the lesser of the multi-year contract values as documented in the new resource qualification determination notification and the capacity clearing in the Forward Capacity Auction to which the new resource qualification determination notification applied.
- (b) The rationing election described in Section III.13.1.2.3.1 shall not apply.
- (c) The Existing Import Capacity Resources associated with contracts listed in the table below may qualify to receive the treatment described in Section III.13.2.7.3A for the duration of the contracts as listed. For each Forward Capacity Auction after the first Forward Capacity Auction, in order for an Existing Import Capacity Resource associated with a contract listed below to qualify for the treatment described in Section III.13.2.7.3A, no later than 10 Business Days prior to the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline, the Market Participant submitting the Existing Import Capacity Resource must also submit to the ISO documentation verifying that the contract will remain in effect throughout the Capacity Commitment Period and that it has not been amended. For the first Forward Capacity Auction, Existing

Import Capacity Resources associated with contracts listed in the table below are qualified to receive the treatment described in Section III.13.2.7.3A.

<b>Contract Description</b>	<b>MW</b>	<b>Contract End Date</b>
NYPA: NY — NE: CMEEC	13.2	8/31/2025
NYPA: NY — NE: MMWEC	53.3	8/31/2025
NYPA: NY — NE: Pascoag	2.3	8/31/2025
NYPA: NY— NE: VELCO	15.3	8/31/2025
	84.1	
VJO: Highgate — NE	Up to 225	10/31/2016
VJO: Highgate — NE (extension) (beginning 11/01/2016)	Up to 6	October 2020
VJO: Phase I/II — NE	Up to 110	10/31/2016

(d) In addition to the review described in Section III.13.1.2.3.2, the Internal Market Monitor shall review each bid from Existing Import Capacity Resources. A bid from an Existing Import Capacity Resource shall be rejected if the Internal Market Monitor determines that the bid may be an attempt to manipulate the Forward Capacity Auction, and the matter will be referred to the Commission in accordance with the protocols set forth in Appendix A to the Commission’s Market Monitoring Policy Statement (111 FERC ¶ 61,267 (2005)).

**III.13.1.3.3.B. Qualification Process for Existing Import Capacity Resources that are associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade with Capacity Import Interconnection Service.**

Existing Import Capacity Resources associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade with Capacity Import Interconnection Service pursuant to Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff shall be subject to the same qualification process as Existing Generating Capacity Resources as described in Section III.13.1.2.3, except the Qualified Capacity shall be the lesser of the multi-year contract values as documented in the new resource qualification determination notification and the capacity clearing in the Forward Capacity Auction to which the new resource qualification determination notification applied.

**III.13.1.3.4. Definition of New Import Capacity Resource.**

Capacity not associated with a multi-year contract entered into before the New Capacity Qualification Deadline to provide capacity in the New England Control Area from outside the New England Control Area for the whole Capacity Commitment Period, but that meets the requirements of Section III.13.1.3.5.1, shall participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Import Capacity Resource. For capacity associated with a multi-year contract entered into before the New Capacity Qualification Deadline to provide capacity in the New England Control Area from outside the New England Control Area for a period including the whole Capacity Commitment Period, or capacity from an External Resource that is owned or directly controlled by the Lead Market Participant and which is committed for at least two whole consecutive Capacity Commitment Periods by the Lead Market Participant in the New Capacity Qualification Package, if the import capacity has not cleared in a previous Forward Capacity Auction, then the import capacity shall participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Import Capacity Resource.

**III.13.1.3.5. Qualification Process for New Import Capacity Resources.**

The qualification process for a New Import Capacity Resource, whether backed by a new External Resource, by one or more existing External Resources, or by an external Control Area, shall be the same as the qualification process for a New Generating Capacity Resource, as described in Section III.13.1.1.2, except as follows:

**III.13.1.3.5.1. Documentation of Import.**

(a) For each New Import Capacity Resource, the Project Sponsor submitting the import capacity must also submit: (i) documentation of a one-year contract entered into before the New Capacity Qualification Deadline to provide capacity in the New England Control Area from outside of the New England Control Area for the entire Capacity Commitment Period, including documentation of the MW value of the contract; (ii) documentation of a multi-year contract entered into before the New Capacity Qualification Deadline to provide capacity in the New England Control Area from outside of the New England Control Area for the contract period including the entire Capacity Commitment Period, including documentation of the MW value of the contract; (iii) proof of ownership or direct control over one or more External Resources that will be used to back the New Import Capacity Resource during the Capacity Commitment Period, including information to establish the summer and winter ratings of the resource(s) backing the import; or (iv) documentation for system-backed import capacity that the import capacity will be supported by the Control Area and that the energy associated with that system-backed import capacity will be afforded the same curtailment priority as that Control Area's native load. For each

New Import Capacity Resource, the Project Sponsor must specify the interface over which the capacity will be imported. The Project Sponsor must indicate whether the import is associated with any investment in transmission that increases New England's import capability or is associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade with an Interconnection Request for Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service pursuant to Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff that has not yet achieved Commercial Operation as defined in Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff. The Project Sponsor must submit a contract confirming its association with the Elective Transmission Upgrade Interconnection Customer and the ISO will confirm that relationship. If the import will be backed by a single new External Resource, the Project Sponsor submitting the import capacity must also submit a general description of the project's equipment configuration, including a description of the resource type (such as those listed in the table in Section III.A.21.1 or some other type).

(b) To qualify for Capacity Commitment Periods prior to the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction for which the import capacity is qualifying, the Project Sponsor must submit documentation of one or more one-year contracts for each prior Capacity Commitment Period, entered into before the New Capacity Qualification Deadline to provide capacity in the New England Control Area from outside of the New England Control Area for the entire Capacity Commitment Period, including documentation of the MW value of the contract(s); the Project Sponsor must also satisfy the relevant requirements of Sections III.13.1.3.5.1(a) , III.13.1.3.5.2, III.13.1.9, and III.13.3.1.1.

#### **III.13.1.3.5.2. Import Backed by Existing External Resources.**

If the New Import Capacity Resource will be backed by one or more External Resources existing at the time of the Forward Capacity Auction and the capacity will be imported over an interface that has achieved Commercial Operation as defined in Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff, the provisions regarding site control (Section III.13.1.1.2.2.1) and critical path schedule (Section III.13.1.1.2.2.2) shall not apply, and the Project Sponsor shall instead submit a description of how the New Import Capacity Resource will meet its Capacity Supply Obligation in the Capacity Commitment Period(s) for which it seeks to qualify.

If the New Import Capacity Resource will be backed by one or more External Resources existing at the time of the Forward Capacity Auction and the capacity will be imported over an interface that has not

achieved Commercial Operation as defined in Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets, the provisions regarding site control (Section III.13.1.1.2.2.1) and critical path schedule (Section III.13.1.1.2.2.2) shall apply in addition to the requirement that the Project Sponsor submit a description of how the New Import Capacity Resource will meet its Capacity Supply Obligation in the Capacity Commitment Period(s) for which it seeks to qualify.

The description must indicate specifically which External Resources will back the New Import Capacity Resource during the Capacity Commitment Period, and if those External Resources are not owned or controlled directly by the Project Sponsor, the description must include a commitment that the External Resources will have sufficient capacity that is not obligated outside the New England Control Area to fully satisfy the New Import Capacity Resource's potential Capacity Supply Obligation during the Capacity Commitment Period and demonstrate how that commitment will be met.

#### **III.13.1.3.5.3. Imports Backed by an External Control Area.**

If the New Import Capacity Resource will be backed by an external Control Area and the capacity will be imported over an interface that has achieved Commercial Operation as defined in Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff, the provisions regarding site control (Section III.13.1.1.2.2.1) and critical path schedule (Section III.13.1.1.2.2.2) shall not apply, and the Project Sponsor shall instead submit system load and capacity projections for the external Control Area showing sufficient excess capacity during the Capacity Commitment Period to back the New Import Capacity Resource.

If the New Import Capacity Resource will be backed by an external Control Area and the capacity will be imported over an Elective Transmission Upgrade and the capacity will be imported over an interface that has not achieved Commercial Operation as defined in Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff, the provisions regarding site control (Section III.13.1.1.2.2.1) and critical path schedule (Section III.13.1.1.2.2.2) shall apply in addition to the requirement that the Project Sponsor submit system load and capacity projections for the external Control Area showing sufficient excess capacity during the Capacity Commitment Period to back the New Import Capacity Resource for the length of the multi-year contract.

#### **III.13.1.3.5.3.1. Imports Crossing Intervening Control Areas.**

The preceding rules define requirements associated with the import of capacity from a Control Area, or resources located in a Control Area, directly adjacent to the New England Control Area. Imports of capacity from a Control Area or resources located in a Control Area where such import crosses an intervening Control Area or Control Areas shall comply with the following additional requirements: (1) For imports crossing a single intervening Control Area, the Project Sponsor entering the import contract shall demonstrate, as detailed in the ISO New England Manuals, that the remote Control Area will afford the energy export to the adjacent intervening Control Area the same curtailment priority as its native load, that the adjacent intervening Control Area has procedures in place to explicitly recognize the linkage between the import and re-export of energy in support of the import contract, and that the energy export to the ISO will not be curtailed (except pro-rata with a curtailment of native load) so long as the linked import is flowing. (2) For imports crossing more than one intervening Control Area, in addition to the requirements above, the Project Sponsor entering the import contract shall demonstrate, as detailed in the ISO New England Manuals, by the New Capacity Qualification Deadline, that explicit market and operating procedures exist among the intervening Control Areas to ensure that the energy required to be delivered to the New England Control Area will be guaranteed the same curtailment priority as the intervening native loads, and that none of the intervening Control Areas will curtail the transaction except in conjunction with a curtailment of native load. (3) The Project Sponsor entering the import contract shall demonstrate that capacity it supplies to the New England Control Area will not be recalled or curtailed to satisfy the load of the external Control Area, or that the external Control Area in which it is located will afford New England Control Area load the same curtailment priority that it affords its own Control Area native load.

#### **III.13.1.3.5.4. Capacity Commitment Period Election.**

The provisions regarding Capacity Commitment Period election (Section III.13.1.1.2.2.4) shall only apply to a New Import Capacity Resource associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade with a Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service Interconnection Request. All other New Import Capacity Resources clearing in the Forward Capacity Auction shall have a Capacity Supply Obligation and shall receive payments only for the one-year Capacity Commitment Period associated with that Forward Capacity Auction.

#### **III.13.1.3.5.5. Initial Interconnection Analysis.**

The provisions regarding initial interconnection analysis (Section III.13.1.1.2.3) shall not apply unless the capacity will be imported over an Elective Transmission Upgrade pursuing Capacity Network Import

Interconnection Service pursuant to Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff that has not achieved Commercial Operation as defined in Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff.

**III.13.1.3.5.5.A. Cost Information.**

The offer information described in Section III.13.1.1.2.2.3 and Section III.A.21.2 may be submitted in the form of a curve (up to five price-quantity pairs) associated with a specific New Import Capacity Resource. The curve may in no case increase the quantity offered as the price decreases. Each price is subject to review by the Internal Market Monitor pursuant to Section III.A.21.2 and must include the additional documentation described in that Section.

**III.13.1.3.5.6. Review by Internal Market Monitor of Offers from New Import Capacity Resources.**

In addition to the review described in Section III.13.1.1.2.2.3 and Section III.A.21, the Internal Market Monitor shall review each offer from New Import Capacity Resources. An offer from a New Import Capacity Resource shall be rejected if the Internal Market Monitor determines that the bid may be an attempt to manipulate the Forward Capacity Auction, and the matter will be referred to the Commission in accordance with the protocols set forth in Appendix A to the Commission's Market Monitoring Policy Statement (111 FERC ¶ 61,267 (2005)).

**III.13.1.3.5.7. Qualification Determination Notification for New Import Capacity Resources.**

For New Import Capacity Resources, the qualification determination notification described in Section III.13.1.1.2.8 shall be modified to reflect the differences in the qualification process described in this Section III.13.1.3.5.

No later than seven days after the issuance by the ISO of the qualification determination notification described in Section III.13.1.1.2.8, a Lead Market Participant with a New Import Capacity Resource (other than a New Import Capacity Resource that is (i) backed by a single new External Resource and associated with an investment in transmission that increases New England's import capability, or (ii) associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade) that submitted a request to submit offers in the Forward Capacity Auction at prices that are below the relevant Offer Review Trigger Price as described in Sections III.13.1.1.2.2.3 and III.13.1.3.5 may: (a) lower the requested offer price of any price-quantity

pair submitted to the ISO pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.2.3, provided that the revised price is greater than or equal to the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold, or (b) withdraw any price-quantity pair of a requested offer price.

#### **III.13.1.3.5.8.                    Rationing Election.**

New Import Capacity Resources are subject to rationing except New Import Capacity Resource associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade with a Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service Interconnection Request, which are eligible for the rationing election described in Section III.13.1.1.2.2.3(b).

#### **III.13.1.4.                        Demand Capacity Resources.**

To participate in a Forward Capacity Auction as a Demand Capacity Resource, a resource must meet the requirements of this Section III.13.1.4. Each Demand Capacity Resource shall be a minimum of 100 kW. An Active Demand Capacity Resource comprises one or more Demand Response Resources located in a single Dispatch Zone. An On-Peak Demand Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource comprises one or more Assets located in a single Load Zone. An On-Peak Demand Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource may consist of Load Management measures, Distributed Generation measures, or a combination thereof, or may consist solely of Energy Efficiency measures. A Demand Capacity Resource may include an end-use customer facility with a Net Supply Capability of 5 MW or more only if the facility's Net Supply Capability does not exceed its Maximum Facility Load. Demand Capacity Resources must comply with all applicable federal, state, and local regulatory, siting, and tariff requirements, including interconnection tariff requirements related to siting, interconnection, and operation of the Demand Capacity Resource. Demand Capacity Resources are not permitted to submit import or export bids or Administrative Export De-List Bids.

#### **III.13.1.4.1.                    Definition of New Demand Capacity Resource.**

A New Demand Capacity Resource is an Active Demand Capacity Resource that has not cleared in a previous Forward Capacity Auction, and On-Peak Demand Resource consisting of measures that have not been in service prior to the Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline of the applicable Forward Capacity Auction, or a Seasonal Peak Demand Resource consisting of measures that have not been in service prior to the Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline of the applicable Forward Capacity Auction. A Demand Capacity Resource that has previously been defined as an Existing Demand Capacity Resource shall be



considered a New Demand Capacity Resource if it meets one of the conditions listed in Section III.13.1.1.1.2.

**III.13.1.4.1.1. Qualification Process for New Demand Capacity Resources.**

For Forward Capacity Auctions a New Demand Capacity Resource shall have a summer Qualified Capacity and winter Qualified Capacity based on the resource's estimated demand reduction value as submitted and reviewed pursuant to this Section III.13.1.4. The FCA Qualified Capacity for a New Demand Capacity Resource shall be the lesser of the resource's summer Qualified Capacity and winter Qualified Capacity, as adjusted to account for applicable offers composed of separate resources.

(a) For a resource to qualify as a New Demand Capacity Resource, the resource's Project Sponsor must make two separate submissions to the ISO: First, the Project Sponsor must submit estimated demand reduction values and supporting information in the New Demand Capacity Resource Show of Interest Form as described in Section III.13.1.4.1.1.1. Second, the Project Sponsor must submit a New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package as described in Section III.13.1.4.1.1.2.

(b) For a resource to qualify as a New Demand Capacity Resource that is an On-Peak Demand Resource or a Seasonal Peak Demand Resource, the Project Sponsor must in addition submit, as part of the New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package, a Measurement and Verification Plan providing the documentation, analysis, studies and methodologies used to support the estimates described in this Section III.13.1.4.1.1, which shall be reviewed by the ISO to ensure consistency with the measurement and verification requirements pursuant to Section III.13.1.4.3 and the ISO New England Manuals.

**III.13.1.4.1.1.1. New Demand Capacity Resource Show of Interest Form.**

For each resource that a Project Sponsor seeks to offer in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Demand Capacity Resource, the Project Sponsor must submit to the ISO a New Demand Capacity Resource Show of Interest Form as described in this Section III.13.1.4.1.1.1 during the New Capacity Show of Interest Submission Window, as described in Section III.13.1.10. A New Demand Capacity Resource Show of Interest Form for a resource composed of Energy Efficiency measures must represent a resource with a new and unique resource identification number. The ISO may waive the submission of any information not required for evaluation of a project.

A completed New Demand Capacity Resource Show of Interest Form shall include, but is not limited to, the following information: project name; Load Zone within which the Demand Capacity Resource will be located; the Dispatch Zone within which an Active Demand Capacity Resource will be located; estimated summer and winter demand reduction values (MW) per measure and/or per customer facility (measured at the customer meter and not including losses); estimated total summer and winter demand reduction value of the Demand Capacity Resource (for an Active Demand Capacity Resource, this estimate must be consistent with the baseline calculation methodology in Section III.8.2); supporting documentation (e.g., engineering estimates or documentation of verified savings from comparable projects) to substantiate the reasonableness of the estimated demand reduction values; Demand Capacity Resource type (Active Demand Capacity Resource, On-Peak Demand Resource, or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource); brief Demand Capacity Resource project description including measure type (i.e., Energy Efficiency, Load Management, and/or Distributed Generation); types of facilities at which the measures will be implemented; customer classes and end-uses served; the date by which the Project Sponsor expects to be ready to demonstrate to the ISO that the Demand Capacity Resource described in the Project Sponsor's New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package has achieved its full demand reduction value; ISO Market Participant status and ISO customer identification (if applicable); status under Schedules 22 or 23 of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff (if applicable); project/technical and credit/financial contacts; for individual Distributed Generation projects and Demand Capacity Resource projects from a single facility with a demand reduction value equal to or greater than 5 MW, the Pnode and service address at which the end-use facility is located; capability and experience of the Project Sponsor.

**III.13.1.4.1.1.2. New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package.**

For each resource that a Project Sponsor seeks to offer in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Demand Capacity Resource, the Project Sponsor must submit a New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package no later than the New Capacity Qualification Deadline. The New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package shall conform to the requirements of this Section

III.13.1.4.1.1.2. The ISO may waive the submission of any information not required for evaluation of a project.

**III.13.1.4.1.1.2.1. Source of Funding.**

The Project Sponsor must provide in the New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package the source of funding, which includes, but is not limited to, the following: the source(s) of public benefits

funding or private financing, or a funding plan supplemented by information on how previous projects were funded; and a completed ISO credit application.

**III.13.1.4.1.1.2.2. Measurement and Verification Plan.**

For On-Peak Demand Resources and Seasonal Peak Demand Resources, the Project Sponsor must provide in the New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package a Measurement and Verification Plan that complies with the ISO's measurement and verification requirements pursuant to Section III.13.1.4.3 and the ISO New England Manuals.

**III.13.1.4.1.1.2.3. Customer Acquisition Plan.**

(a) A Project Sponsor with more than a single customer must include in the New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package a description of its plan to acquire customers that includes, but is not limited to, the following information: a description of proposed customer market; the estimated size of target market and supporting documentation; a marketing plan with supporting documentation describing the manner in which customers will be recruited; and evidence supporting the viability of the marketing plan.

(b) A Project Sponsor for a New Demand Capacity Resource that includes one or more end-use customer facilities with behind-the-meter generation must include in the New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package information demonstrating that each facility's Net Supply Capability will be less than 5 MW or less than or equal to the facility's Maximum Facility Load.

**III.13.1.4.1.1.2.4. Critical Path Schedule for a Demand Capacity Resource with a Demand Reduction Value of at Least 5 MW at a Single Retail Delivery Point.**

The Project Sponsor of a Demand Capacity Resource with a demand reduction value of at least 5 MW at a single Retail Delivery Point shall provide in the New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package a critical path schedule as set forth in Section III.13.1.1.2.2.2.

**III.13.1.4.1.1.2.5. Critical Path Schedule for a Demand Capacity Resource with All Retail Delivery Points Having a Demand Reduction Value of Less Than 5 MW.**

The Project Sponsor of a Demand Capacity Resource with all Retail Delivery Points having a demand reduction value of less than 5 MW shall provide in the New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package a critical path schedule comprised of a delivery schedule of the share of total offered demand

reduction value achieved as of target dates, as follows: (i) the cumulative percentage of total demand reduction value achieved on target date 1 occurring five weeks prior to the first annual Forward Capacity Auction after the Forward Capacity Auction in which the Project Sponsor's capacity award was made; (ii) the cumulative percentage of total demand reduction value achieved on target date 2 occurring five weeks prior to the second annual Forward Capacity Auction after the Forward Capacity Auction in which the Project Sponsor's capacity award was made; and (iii) target date 3 which is the date by which the Project Sponsor expects to be ready to demonstrate to the ISO that the Demand Capacity Resource described in the Project Sponsor's New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package has achieved its full demand reduction value, which must be on or before the first day of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period and by which date 100% of total demand reduction value must be complete.

**III.13.1.4.1.1.2.6. [Reserved.]**

**III.13.1.4.1.1.2.7. Capacity Commitment Period Election.**

Project Sponsors shall be required to specify whether they are making the election set forth in this Section III.13.1.4.1.1.2.7 for each Forward Capacity Auction up to and including the auction held in February 2021 for the June 1, 2024 through May 31, 2025 Capacity Commitment Period, and no election shall be permitted thereafter.

For each Forward Capacity Auction occurring up to and including the February 2021 auction, in the New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package, the Project Sponsor must specify whether, if its New Demand Capacity Resource offer clears in the Forward Capacity Auction, the associated Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price (indexed for inflation) shall continue to apply after the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction in which the offer clears, for up to six additional and consecutive Capacity Commitment Periods, in whole Capacity Commitment Period increments only. If no such election is made in the New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package, the Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price associated with the New Demand Capacity Resource offer shall apply only for the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction in which the New Demand Capacity Resource offer clears. If the Project Sponsor elects to have the Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price continue to apply after the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction in which the offer clears, then the Project Sponsor may not change the Demand Capacity Resource type as long as that Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price continue to apply. If an offer from a New

Demand Capacity Resource clears in the Forward Capacity Auction, the capacity associated with the resulting Capacity Supply Obligation may not be subject to any type of de-list or export bid in subsequent Forward Capacity Auctions for Capacity Commitment Periods for which the Project Sponsor elected to have the Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price continue to apply pursuant to this Section III.13.1.4.1.1.2.7.

**III.13.1.4.1.1.2.8. Offer Information From New Demand Capacity Resources.**

(a) All New Demand Capacity Resources that might submit offers in the Forward Capacity Auction at prices below the relevant Offer Review Trigger Price must include in the New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package the lowest price at which the resource requests to offer capacity in the Forward Capacity Auction and supporting documentation justifying that price as competitive in light of the resource's costs (as described in Section III.A.21). This price is subject to review by the Internal Market Monitor pursuant to Section III.A.21.2 and must include the additional documentation described in that section.

(b) The Project Sponsor for a New Demand Capacity Resource must indicate in the New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package if an offer from the New Demand Capacity Resource may be rationed. A Project Sponsor may specify a single MW quantity to which offers may be rationed. Without such indication, offers will only be accepted or rejected in whole. This rationing election shall apply for the entire Forward Capacity Auction.

**III.13.1.4.1.1.3. Initial Analysis for Active Demand Capacity Resources.**

For each New Demand Capacity Resource that is an Active Demand Capacity Resource, the ISO shall perform an analysis based on the information provided in the New Demand Capacity Resource Show of Interest Form to determine the amount of capacity that the resource could provide by the start of the associated Capacity Commitment Period. This analysis shall be performed consistent with the criteria and conditions described in ISO New England Planning Procedures. Where, as a result of this analysis, the ISO determines that because of overlapping interconnection impacts, such a New Demand Capacity Resource that is otherwise accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction in accordance with the other provisions and requirements of this Section III.13.1 cannot deliver any of the capacity that it would otherwise be able to provide (in the absence of the other relevant Existing Capacity Resources), then that New Demand Capacity Resource will not be accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction.

**III.13.1.4.1.1.4. Consistency of the New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package and New Demand Capacity Resource Show of Interest Form.**

The ISO shall review the Project Sponsor's New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package for consistency with its New Demand Capacity Resource Show of Interest Form. The New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package may not contain material changes relative to the New Demand Capacity Resource Show of Interest Form. A material change may include, but is not limited to the following: (i) a change in the designation of the Demand Capacity Resource type; (ii) a change in the Project Sponsor, subject to review by the ISO of the capability and experience of the new Project Sponsor; (iii) a change in the Load Zone within which the project is located, and a change in the Dispatch Zone within which the Active Demand Capacity Resource is located; (iv) a change in the total summer or winter demand reduction value of the project by more than 30 percent; (v) a change in the general type of measure being implemented (e.g., Energy Efficiency, Load Management, Distributed Generation); or (vi) a misrepresentation of the interconnection status of a Distributed Generation project.

**III.13.1.4.1.1.5. Evaluation of New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Materials.**

The ISO shall review the information submitted by New Demand Capacity Resources and shall determine whether the information submitted complies with the requirements set forth in this Section III.13.1.4 and whether, based on the information provided, the Demand Capacity Resource is accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction. In making these determinations, the ISO may consider, but is not limited to consideration of, the following:

- (a) whether the information submitted by New Demand Capacity Resources is accurate and contains all of the elements required by this Section III.13.1.4;
- (b) whether the critical path schedule submitted by New Demand Capacity Resources includes all necessary elements and is sufficiently developed;
- (c) whether the milestones in the critical path schedule submitted by New Demand Capacity Resources are reasonable and likely to be met;
- (d) whether, in the case of a resource previously counted as a capacity resource, the requirements for treatment as a New Demand Capacity Resource are satisfied; and

(e) whether, in the case of a New Demand Capacity Resource that is an On-Peak Demand Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource, the Measurement and Verification Plan complies with the ISO's measurement and verification requirements pursuant to Section III.13.1.4.3 and the ISO New England Manuals.

**III.13.1.4.1.1.6. Qualification Determination Notification for New Demand Capacity Resources.**

No later than 127 days prior to the relevant Forward Capacity Auction, the ISO shall send notification to Project Sponsors for each New Demand Capacity Resource indicating whether the New Demand Capacity Resource has been accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction.

(a) For a New Demand Capacity Resource accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction, the notification will specify the Demand Capacity Resource type and the Demand Capacity Resource's summer and winter Qualified Capacity, which shall be the ISO-determined summer and winter demand reduction value increased by average avoided peak transmission and distribution losses (that is, eight percent).

(b) For a New Demand Capacity Resource not accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction, the notification will provide an explanation as to why the resource did not meet the requirements set forth in this Section III.13.1.4 and was not accepted.

**III.13.1.4.2. Definition of Existing Demand Capacity Resources.**

Demand Capacity Resources that previously have been in service and registered with the ISO, and which are not otherwise New Demand Capacity Resources, shall be Existing Demand Capacity Resources.

Existing Demand Capacity Resources shall include and are limited to Demand Capacity Resources that have been in service and registered with the ISO to fulfill a Capacity Supply Obligation created by clearing in a past Forward Capacity Auction before the Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline of the applicable Forward Capacity Auction. Except as specified in this Section III.13.1.4, Existing Demand Capacity Resources shall be subject to the same qualification process as Existing Generating Capacity Resources, as described in Section III.13.1.2.3. Existing Demand Capacity Resources shall be subject to Section III.13.1.2.2.5.2. An On-Peak Demand Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource may not include in its summer or winter demand reduction value an Energy Efficiency measure whose Measure

Life will expire before the beginning of the applicable season of the associated Capacity Commitment Period.

**III.13.1.4.2.A Qualified Capacity for Existing Demand Capacity Resources.**

(a) For Existing Demand Capacity Resources composed of Energy Efficiency measures, the summer (or winter, as applicable) Qualified Capacity shall equal the lesser of: (i) the sum of the summer (or winter, as applicable) demand reduction values of the installed Energy Efficiency measures as of the Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline (excluding any capacity that will retire or permanently de-list, or whose Measure Life will expire, prior to start of the applicable season of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period, and increased by average avoided peak transmission and distribution losses) and any summer (or winter, as applicable) capacity that has cleared in a Forward Capacity Auction and has not yet achieved FCM Commercial Operation (provided that such capacity is being monitored by the ISO pursuant to the provisions of Section III.13.3, is expected to achieve all its critical path schedule milestones prior to the start of the applicable season of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period, and for which the Lead Market Participant or Project Sponsor has met all relevant financial assurance requirements as described in Section III.13.1.9 and in the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy) and (ii) the amount of summer (or winter, as applicable) capacity that cleared in a Forward Capacity Auction as a New Demand Capacity Resource.

(b) For Existing Demand Capacity Resources other than those composed of Energy Efficiency measures, the summer and winter Qualified Capacity shall equal the summer and winter demand reduction value, respectively, increased by average avoided peak transmission and distribution losses.

**III.13.1.4.2.1. Qualified Capacity Notification for Existing Demand Capacity Resources.**

(a) For each Existing Demand Capacity Resource, the ISO will notify the Resource's Lead Market Participant no later than 15 Business Days before the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline of: the Demand Capacity Resource type; summer and winter Qualified Capacity; the Load Zone in which the Demand Capacity Resource is located; and, for Active Demand Capacity Resources, the Dispatch Zone in which the resource is located.

(b) If the Lead Market Participant believes that the ISO's assessment of the Qualified Capacity is inaccurate, the Market Participant must notify the ISO within five Business Days of receipt of the Qualified Capacity notification.



(c) If a Market Participant with an Existing On-Peak Demand Resource or Existing Seasonal Peak Demand Resource wishes to change its Demand Capacity Resource type, the Market Participant must submit an Updated Measurement and Verification Plan to reflect the change in its resource type. Updated Measurement and Verification Plans must be received by the ISO no later than five Business Days after receipt of the Qualified Capacity notification. Designation of the Demand Capacity Resource type may not be changed during the Capacity Commitment Period.

(d) A Market Participant with an Existing On-Peak Demand Resource or Existing Seasonal Peak Demand Resource may provide an Updated Measurement and Verification Plan as described in Section III.13.1.4.3.1.2 that complies with the ISO's measurement and verification requirements pursuant to Section III.13.1.4.3 and the ISO New England Manuals. Updated Measurement and Verification Plans must be received by the ISO no later than five Business Days after receipt of the Qualified Capacity notification.

(e) If an Existing Demand Capacity Resource is not submitting a Static De-List Bid, Permanent De-List Bid, or Retirement De-List Bid for the Forward Capacity Auction, then no further submissions or actions for that resource are necessary, and the resource shall participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(c) with Qualified Capacity as indicated in the ISO's notification.

#### **III.13.1.4.2.2. Existing Demand Capacity Resource De-List Bids.**

An Existing Demand Capacity Resource may submit a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid pursuant to the provisions of Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5 no later than the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline or a Static De-List Bid pursuant to the provisions of Section III.13.1.2.3.1.1 no later than the Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline, provided, however, that no de-list bid shall be used as a mechanism to inappropriately qualify Assets associated with Existing Demand Capacity Resources as New Demand Capacity Resources.

#### **III.13.1.4.3. Measurement and Verification Applicable to On-Peak Demand Resources and Seasonal Peak Demand Resources.**

To demonstrate the demand reduction value of an On-Peak Demand Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource, the Project Sponsor or Market Participant of such a resource participating in the Forward Capacity Auction, Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals, or reconfiguration auctions shall submit to the

ISO the Measurement and Verification Documents in accordance with this Section III.13.1.4.3 and the ISO New England Manuals. The ISO shall review such Measurement and Verification Documents to determine whether they are consistent with the measurement and verification requirements set forth in this Section III.13.1.4.3 and the ISO New England Manuals.

**III.13.1.4.3.1. Measurement and Verification Documents.**

Measurement and Verification Documents must demonstrate both availability and performance of an On-Peak Demand Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource in reducing demand coincident with Demand Resource On-Peak Hours or Demand Resource Seasonal Peak Hours such that the reported monthly demand reduction value shall achieve at least a ten percent relative precision and an eighty percent confidence interval as described and applied in the ISO New England Manuals and ISO New England Operating Procedures. The Measurement and Verification Documents shall serve as the basis for the claimed demand reduction value of an On-Peak Demand Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource. The Measurement and Verification Documents shall document the measurement and verification performed to verify the achieved demand reduction value of the On-Peak Demand Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource. The Measurement and Verification Documents shall contain a projection of the On-Peak Demand Resource's or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource's demand reduction value for each month of the Capacity Commitment Period and over the expected Measure Lives associated with the Demand Capacity Resources. An On-Peak Demand Resource's or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource's Measurement and Verification Documents must describe the methodology used to calculate electrical energy load reduction or output during Demand Resource On-Peak Hours, or Demand Resource Seasonal Peak Hours. If an On-Peak Demand Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource includes Distributed Generation, the Measurement and Verification Documents must describe the individual metering or metering protocol used to monitor and verify the output of the Distributed Generation, consistent with the measurement and verification requirements set forth in Market Rule 1 and the ISO New England Manuals.

The Measurement and Verification Documents shall include a Measurement and Verification Plan submitted in the Forward Capacity Auction Qualification, as described in Section III.13.1.4.3 and a monthly Measurement and Verification Summary Report during the Capacity Commitment Period. The monthly Measurement and Verification Summary Reports shall reference the measurement and verification protocols and performance data documented in the Measurement and Verification Plan or the Measurement and Verification Reference Report(s). Such monthly Measurement and Verification

Summary Reports will document the Project Sponsor's total demand reduction value from eligible pre-existing measures and new measures, and the Project Sponsor's total demand reduction value from both eligible pre-existing measures and new measures, for all measures it had in operation as of the end of the previous month. The monthly Measurement and Verification Summary Reports shall be based on Measurement and Verification Documents determined in accordance with Market Rule 1 and the ISO New England Manuals, and shall be the basis for monthly settlement with Project Sponsors. All Measurement and Verification Documents shall conform to the ISO's specifications with respect to content, format and delivery methodology, and shall be submitted in accordance with the timelines and deadlines set forth in Market Rule 1 and the ISO New England Manuals.

**III.13.1.4.3.1.1. Optional Measurement and Verification Reference Reports.**

At the option of the Project Sponsor, the Measurement and Verification Documents for an On-Peak Demand Resource or a Seasonal Peak Demand Resource may also include one or more Measurement and Verification Reference Report(s) submitted during the Capacity Commitment Period subject to the schedule in the Measurement and Verification Plan and consistent with the schedule and reporting standards set forth in the ISO New England Manuals. Measurement and Verification Reference Reports shall update the prospective demand reduction value of the On-Peak Demand Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource based on measurement and verification studies performed during the Capacity Commitment Period.

**III.13.1.4.3.1.2. Updated Measurement and Verification Documents.**

At the option of the Project Sponsor, an Updated Measurement and Verification Plan for an On-Peak Demand Resource or a Seasonal Peak Demand Resource may be submitted during a subsequent Forward Capacity Auction qualification process prior to the beginning of the Capacity Commitment Period of the Demand Capacity Resource project. The Updated Measurement and Verification Plan may include updated project specifications, measurement and verification protocols, and performance data. However, the Updated Measurement and Verification Plan shall not modify for the duration of the Capacity Commitment Period the total claimed demand reduction value or the Demand Capacity Resource type from the applicable Forward Capacity Auction in which the Project Sponsor's offer cleared. Additionally, the Updated Measurement and Verification Plan shall provide measurement and verification consistent with the requirements specified in the ISO New England Manuals, and shall be comparable to the quality of the original Measurement and Verification Plan accepted during the Forward Capacity Auction

qualification process in which the Demand Capacity Resource project cleared the Forward Capacity Auction.

**III.13.1.4.3.1.3. Annual Certification of Accuracy of Measurement and Verification Documents.**

Project Sponsors for On-Peak Demand Resources and Seasonal Peak Demand Resources shall submit no less frequently than once per year, a statement certifying that the Demand Capacity Resource projects for which the Project Sponsor is requesting compensation continue to perform in accordance with the submitted Measurement and Verification Documents reviewed by the ISO. One such statement must be received by the ISO no later than 10 Business Days before the Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline.

**III.13.1.4.3.1.4. Record Requirement of Retail Customers Served.**

For On-Peak Demand Resources and Seasonal Peak Demand Resources targeting customer facilities with greater than or equal to 10 kW of demand reduction value per facility, Project Sponsors shall maintain records of retail customers served including, at a minimum, the retail customer's address, the customer's utility distribution company, utility distribution company account identifier, measures installed, and corresponding monthly demand reduction values. For On-Peak Demand Resources and Seasonal Peak Demand Resources targeting customer facilities with under 10 kW of demand reduction value per facility, the Project Sponsor shall maintain records as described above for customer facilities with greater than or equal to 10 kW of demand reduction value per facility, or shall maintain records of aggregated demand reduction value and measures installed by Load Zone and meter domain. Project Sponsors shall maintain such records until the end of the Measure Life, or until the Demand Capacity Resource is permanently delisted from the Forward Capacity Market, and shall submit such records to the ISO upon request in a readable electronic format.

**III.13.1.4.3.2. ISO Review of Measurement and Verification Documents.**

The ISO shall review the Measurement and Verification Documents and complete such review and identify any necessary modifications in accordance with the Forward Capacity Auction qualification process as described in Section III.13.1 and pursuant to the ISO New England Manuals. In its review of the Measurement and Verification Documents, the ISO may consult with the Project Sponsor or Lead Market Participant to seek clarification, to gather additional necessary information, or to address questions or concerns arising from the materials submitted. At the discretion of the ISO, the ISO may consider revisions or additions to the Measurement and Verification Documents resulting from such

consultation; provided, however, that in no case shall the ISO consider revisions or additions to the Measurement and Verification Documents if the ISO believes that such consideration cannot be properly accomplished within the time periods established for the qualification process.

#### **III.13.1.5. Offers Composed of Separate Resources.**

Separate resources seeking to participate together in a Forward Capacity Auction shall submit a composite offer form no later than 10 Business Days after the date on which the ISO provides qualification determination notifications, as described in Section III.13.1.1.2.8, Section III.13.1.2.4, and Section III.13.1.4.1.1.6. Offers composed of separate resources may not be modified or withdrawn after the deadline for submission of the composite offer form. Separate resources may together participate in a Forward Capacity Auction as a single resource if the following conditions are met:

(a) In all months of the summer period (June through September where the summer resource is not a Demand Capacity Resource, April through November where the summer resource is a Demand Capacity Resource) of the Capacity Commitment Period, only one resource may be used to supply the amount of capacity offered during the entire summer period. In all months of the winter period (October through May where the summer resource is not a Demand Capacity Resource, December through March where the summer resource is a Demand Capacity Resource) of the Capacity Commitment Period, multiple resources may be combined to supply the amount of capacity offered, provided that: (i) the resources together meet the amount of the offer in all months of the winter period; and (ii) to combine for a month, that month must be considered a winter month for both the summer resource and the resource combining with that summer resource in that month.

(b) Each resource that is part of an offer composed of separate resources must qualify in accordance with all of the provisions of this Section III.13.1.5 applicable to that resource type. An offer composed of separate resources participates in the Forward Capacity Auction in accordance with the resource type of the resource providing capacity in the summer period. A resource electing (pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.2.4 or Section III.13.1.4.1.1.2.7) to have the Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price continue to apply after the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction in which its New Capacity Offer clears shall not be eligible to participate in an offer composed of separate resources as the resource providing capacity in the summer period in the Forward Capacity Auction in which the resource is a New Generating Capacity Resource or New Demand Capacity Resource.

(c) The summer Qualified Capacity of an offer composed of separate resources shall be the summer Qualified Capacity of the single resource that will provide the Capacity Supply Obligation during the summer period. If the summer Qualified Capacity of an offer composed of separate resources is greater than the winter capacity for any month, then the provisions of Section III.13.1.2.2.5.2 shall apply, even where any of the resources comprising the offer composed of separate resources is an Intermittent Power Resource. If the winter capacity of the offer composed of separate resources in any month is higher than the summer Qualified Capacity, then the capacity offered from the winter resources will be reduced pro-rata to equal the summer Qualified Capacity.

(d) Offers composed of separate resources are subject to the locational restrictions specified in the following table:

		Location of Summer Resource			
		Import-Constrained Capacity Zone	Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone	Export-Constrained Capacity Zone	Nested Export-Constrained Capacity Zone
<b>Location of Winter Resource</b>	Import-Constrained Capacity Zone	Eligible (within same Capacity Zone)	Eligible	Eligible	Eligible
	Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone	Ineligible	Eligible	Eligible	Eligible
	Export-Constrained Capacity Zone	Ineligible	Ineligible	Eligible (within same Capacity Zone)	Eligible (within same Capacity Zone where nested export-constrained Capacity Zone is located)
	Nested Export-Constrained Capacity Zone	Ineligible	Ineligible	Ineligible	Eligible (within same Capacity Zone)

(e) A Renewable Technology Resource may only participate in an offer composed of separate resources if its FCA Qualified Capacity has not been prorated pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.10.

**III.13.1.5.A. Notification of FCA Qualified Capacity.**

No later than five Business Days after the deadline for submission of offers composed of separate resources, the ISO shall notify the Project Sponsor or Lead Market Participant for each New Generating Capacity Resource, New Import Capacity Resource, and New Demand Capacity Resource of the resource's final FCA Qualified Capacity for the Forward Capacity Auction. Such notification will detail the resource's financial assurance requirements in accordance with Section III.13.1.9.

**III.13.1.6. Self-Supplied FCA Resources.**

Where a Project Sponsor elects to designate all or a portion of a New Generating Capacity Resource or an Existing Generating Capacity Resource as a Self-Supplied FCA Resource, the Project Sponsor must make such designation in writing to the ISO no later than the date by which the Project Sponsor is required to submit the FCM Deposit and, if the Project Sponsor is not also the associated load serving entity, the Project Sponsor must at that time provide written confirmation from the load serving entity regarding the Self-Supplied FCA Resource designation. A New Import Capacity Resource or Existing Import Capacity Resource may be designated as a Self-Supplied FCA Resource. All Self-Supplied FCA Resources shall be subject to the eligibility and locational requirements in this Section III.13.1.6. If designated as a Self-Supplied FCA Resource and otherwise accepted in the qualification process, the resource will clear in the Forward Capacity Auction as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(c) and, with the exception of demand programs for Self-Supplied FCA Resources, shall offset an equal amount of the load serving entity's Capacity Load Obligation in the Capacity Commitment Period. A load serving entity seeking to self-supply using a Demand Capacity Resource shall realize the benefit through the actual reduction in its annual system coincident peak load, shall not receive credit for a resource and, therefore, is not required to participate in the qualification process described in this Section III.13.1. All designations as a Self-Supplied FCA Resource in the Forward Capacity Auction qualification process are binding.

**III.13.1.6.1. Self-Supplied FCA Resource Eligibility.**

Where all or a portion of a resource is designated as a Self-Supplied FCA Resource, it shall also maintain its status as a New Generating Capacity Resource, Existing Generating Capacity Resource, New Import Capacity Resource or Existing Import Capacity Resource, and must satisfy the Forward Capacity Auction qualification process requirements set forth in the remainder of Section III.13.1 applicable to that resource type, in addition to the requirements of this Section III.13.1.6. Where an offer composed of separate resources is designated as a Self-Supplied FCA Resource, all of the requirements and deadlines specified

in Section III.13.1.5 shall apply to that offer, in addition to the requirements of this Section III.13.1.6. The total quantity of capacity that an load serving entity designates as Self-Supplied FCA Resources may not exceed the load serving entity's projected share of the Installed Capacity Requirement during the Capacity Commitment Period which shall be calculated by determining the load serving entity's most recent percentage share of the Installed Capacity Requirement multiplied by the projected Installed Capacity Requirement for the commitment year. No resource may be designated as a Self-Supplied FCA Resource for more MW than the lesser of that resource's summer Qualified Capacity and winter Qualified Capacity.

#### **III.13.1.6.2. Locational Requirements for Self-Supplied FCA Resources.**

In order to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a Self-Supplied FCA Resource for a load in an import-constrained Capacity Zone, the Self-Supplied FCA Resource must be located in the same Capacity Zone as the associated load, unless the Self-Supplied FCA Resource is a pool-planned unit or other unit with a special allocation of Capacity Transfer Rights. In order to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a Self-Supplied FCA Resource in an export-constrained Capacity Zone for a load outside that export-constrained Capacity Zone, the Self-Supplied FCA Resource must be a pool-planned unit or other unit with a special allocation of Capacity Transfer Rights.

#### **III.13.1.7. Internal Market Monitor Review of Offers and Bids.**

In addition to the other provisions of this Section III.13.1, the Internal Market Monitor shall have the authority to review in the qualification process each resource's summer and winter Seasonal Claimed Capability if it is significantly lower than historical values, and if the Internal Market Monitor determines that it may be an attempt to exercise physical withholding, the matter will be referred to the Commission in accordance with the protocols set forth in Appendix A to the Commission's Market Monitoring Policy Statement (111 FERC ¶ 61,267 (2005)). Where an entity submits: (i) an offer as a New Generating Capacity Resource, a New Import Capacity Resource or a New Demand Capacity Resource; and (ii) a Static De-List Bid, a Permanent De-List Bid, a Retirement De-List Bid, an Export Bid or an Administrative Export De-List Bid in the same Forward Capacity Auction, the Internal Market Monitor shall take appropriate steps to ensure that the resource bid to de-list, retire or export in the Forward Capacity Auction is not inappropriately replaced by that new capacity in a subsequent reconfiguration auction or Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral. In its review of any offer or bid pursuant to this Section III.13.1.7, the Internal Market Monitor may consult with the Project Sponsor or Market Participant, as appropriate, to seek clarification, or to address questions or concerns regarding the materials submitted.



**III.13.1.8. Publication of Offer and Bid Information.**

- (a) Resource name, quantity and Load Zone (or interface, as applicable) in which the resource is located about each Permanent De-list Bid and Retirement De-List Bid will be posted no later than 15 days after the Forward Capacity Auction is conducted.
- (b) The quantity and Load Zone (or interface, as applicable) in which the resource is located of each Static De-List Bid will be posted no later than 15 days after the Forward Capacity Auction is conducted.
- (c) Name of submitter, quantity, and interface of Export Bids and Administrative Export Bids shall be published no later than 15 days after the Forward Capacity Auction is conducted.
- (d) Name of submitter, quantity, and interface about offers from New Import Capacity Resources shall be published no later than 15 days after the Forward Capacity Auction is conducted.
- (e) No later than three Business Days after the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline, the ISO shall post on its website information concerning Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids.
- (f) The name of each Lead Market Participant submitting Static De-List Bids, Export Bids, and Administrative Export De-List Bids, as well as the number and type of such de-list bids submitted by each Lead Market Participant, shall be published no later than three Business Days after the ISO issues the qualification determination notifications described in Sections III.13.1.1.2.8, III.13.1.2.4(b), and III.13.1.3.5.7. Authorized Persons of Authorized Commissions will be provided confidential access to full information about posted Static De-list Bids, Permanent De-List Bids, and Retirement De-List Bids upon request pursuant to Section 3.3 of the ISO New England Information Policy.
- (g) No later than five Business Days after the close of the New Capacity Show of Interest Submission Window, the ISO shall post on its website the aggregate quantity of supply offers and demand bids that have been elected to participate in the substitution auction by Capacity Zone (where the zones used are those being studied for inclusion in the associated Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to Section III.12.4).

**III.13.1.9. Financial Assurance.**

Except as noted in this Section III.13.1.9, all financial assurance requirements associated with Forward Capacity Auctions and annual reconfiguration auctions and other payments and charges resulting from the Forward Capacity Market shall be governed by the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**III.13.1.9.1. Financial Assurance for New Generating Capacity Resources and New Demand Capacity Resources Participating in the Forward Capacity Auction.**

In order to participate in any Forward Capacity Auction, New Generating Capacity Resources (including Conditional Qualified New Resources) and New Demand Capacity Resources shall be required to meet the financial assurance requirements as described in the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy. Timely payment of the FCM Deposit by the Project Sponsor for a New Generating Capacity Resource or New Demand Capacity Resource accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction constitutes a commitment to offer the full FCA Qualified Capacity of that New Generating Capacity Resource or New Demand Capacity Resource in the Forward Capacity Auction at the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price. If the FCM Deposit is not received within the timeframe specified in the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy, the New Generating Capacity Resource or New Demand Capacity Resource shall not be permitted to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction. If capacity offered by the New Generating Capacity Resource or New Demand Capacity Resource clears in the Forward Capacity Auction, financial assurance required prior to the auction pursuant to FAP shall be applied toward the resource's financial assurance obligation, as described in the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy. If no capacity offered by that New Generating Capacity Resource or New Demand Capacity Resource clears in the Forward Capacity Auction, the financial assurance required prior to the auction pursuant to FAP will be released pursuant to the terms of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**III.13.1.9.2. Financial Assurance for New Generating Capacity Resources and New Demand Capacity Resources Clearing in a Forward Capacity Auction.**

Where a New Generating Capacity Resource's offer or a New Demand Capacity Resource's offer is accepted in a Forward Capacity Auction, that resource must provide financial assurance as described in the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**III.13.1.9.2.1. Failure to Provide Financial Assurance or to Meet Milestone.**

If a New Generating Capacity Resource or New Demand Capacity Resource: (i) fails to provide the required financial assurance as described in the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy or (ii) has its Capacity Supply Obligation terminated by the ISO pursuant to Section III.13.3.4A, it shall lose its Capacity Supply Obligation and its right to any payments associated with that Capacity Supply Obligation, and it shall forfeit any financial assurance provided with respect to that Capacity Supply Obligation.

**III.13.1.9.2.2. Release of Financial Assurance.**

Once a New Generating Capacity Resource or New Demand Capacity Resource achieves FCM Commercial Operation, its financial assurance obligation shall be released pursuant to the terms of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy and it shall have the same financial assurance requirements as an Existing Generating Capacity Resource, as governed by the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy. If a New Generating Capacity Resource or New Demand Capacity Resource is only capable of delivering less than the amount of capacity that cleared in the Forward Capacity Auction, then the portion of its financial assurance associated with the shortfall shall be forfeited.

**III.13.1.9.2.2.1. [Reserved.]**

**III.13.1.9.2.3. Forfeit of Financial Assurance.**

Where any financial assurance is forfeited pursuant to the provisions of Section III.13, there shall be no further coverage for such forfeit under the ISO New England Billing Policy. Any financial assurance that is forfeited pursuant to Section III.13 shall be used to reduce charges incurred by load in the relevant Capacity Zone.

**III.13.1.9.2.4. Financial Assurance for New Import Capacity Resources.**

A New Import Capacity Resource that is backed by a new External Resource or will be delivered over an Elective Transmission Upgrade with a Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service Interconnection Request pursuant to Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff shall be subject to the same financial assurance requirements as a New Generating Capacity Resource, as described in Section III.13.1.9.1 and Section III.13.1.9.2. Once the new External Resource or the Elective Transmission Upgrade achieves FCM Commercial Operation, the New Import Capacity Resource shall be subject to the same financial assurance requirements as an Existing Generating Capacity Resource, as described in Section III.13.1.9. A New Import Capacity Resource that is backed by one or more existing

External Resources or by an external Control Area shall be subject to the same financial assurance requirements as an Existing Generating Capacity Resource, as governed by the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

### **III.13.1.9.3. Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit.**

For each New Capacity Show of Interest Form and New Demand Capacity Resource Show of Interest Form submitted for the purposes of qualifying for either a Forward Capacity Auction or reconfiguration auction, the Project Sponsor must submit to the ISO a refundable deposit in the amount shown in the table below (“Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit”). The Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit must be received in accordance with the ISO New England Billing Policy. Such deposit shall be used for costs incurred by the ISO and its consultants, including the documented and reasonably-incurred costs of the affected Transmission Owners, associated with the qualification process described in Section III.13.1 and with the critical path schedule monitoring described in Section III.13.3. An additional Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit is not required if: (i) the Project Sponsor is actively seeking qualification for another Forward Capacity Auction or annual reconfiguration auction, or is having the project’s critical path schedule monitored pursuant to Section III.13.3; and (ii) the costs already incurred in the qualification process and critical path schedule monitoring do not equal or exceed 90 percent of the amount of the previously-submitted Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit(s). The ISO shall provide the Project Sponsor with an annual statement in writing of the costs incurred by the ISO and its consultants, including the documented and reasonably-incurred costs of the affected Transmission Owner(s), associated with the qualification process and critical path schedule monitoring. In any case where resources are aggregated or disaggregated, the associated Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposits will be adjusted as appropriate. After aggregation or disaggregation of resources, historical data regarding the costs already incurred in the qualification process of the original resources will no longer be provided. Coincident with the issuance of the annual statement, where incurred costs are equal to or greater than 90 percent of the Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit(s) previously submitted, the ISO will issue an invoice in the amount determined pursuant to the Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit table contained in Section III.13.1.9.3.1 plus any excess of costs incurred to date by the ISO and its consultants, including the documented and reasonably-incurred costs of the affected Transmission Owners, associated with the qualification process described in Section III.13.1 and with the critical path schedule monitoring described in Section III.13.3. Any refunds that may result from aggregation of resources will be issued coincident with the annual statement. Payment on the invoice must be received in accordance with the

ISO New England Billing Policy. If the Project Sponsor fails to pay the amount due by the stated due date, the ISO will consider the resources that were invoiced withdrawn by the Project Sponsor. Such a withdrawal shall be irrevocable, and payment on the invoice after the due date will not remedy the failure to pay or the withdrawal.

### III.13.1.9.3.1. Partial Waiver Of Deposit.

A portion of the deposit shall be waived when there is an active Interconnection Request and an executed Interconnection Feasibility Study Agreement or Interconnection System Impact Study Agreement under Schedule 22, 23 or 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff or where a resource modification does not require a revision to the Interconnection Agreement.

<b>New Generating Capacity Resources <math>\geq</math> 20 MW or an Import Capacity Resource associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade that has not achieved Commercial Operation as defined in Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff</b>	<b>New Generating Capacity Resources <math>&lt;</math> 20 MW and <math>\geq</math> 2 MW</b>	<b>Imports and New Demand Capacity Resources</b>		<b>New Generating Capacity Resources <math>&lt;</math> 2 MW</b>
<i>Including Up-rates, Re-powering, Environmental Compliance &amp; Intermittent Power Resources</i>	<i>Including Up-rates, Re-powering, Environmental Compliance &amp; Intermittent Power Resources</i>			
\$25,000	\$7,500	\$1,000		\$500
<i>With Executed Interconnection Feasibility Study Agreement or System Impact Study Agreement</i>	<i>With Executed Interconnection Feasibility Study Agreement or System Impact Study Agreement</i>			

\$15,000	\$6,500	n/a		n/a
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### **III.13.1.9.3.2. Settlement of Costs.**

#### **III.13.1.9.3.2.1. Settlement Of Costs Associated With Resources Participating In A Forward Capacity Auction Or Reconfiguration Auction.**

Upon the latter of: (i) the first day of the Capacity Commitment Period for which a resource offers into the Forward Capacity Market or (ii) the date on which the entire resource is accepted by the ISO for FCM Commercial Operation, the ISO shall provide the Project Sponsor with a statement in writing of the costs incurred by the ISO and its consultants, including the documented and reasonably-incurred costs of the affected Transmission Owner(s), associated with the qualification process and critical path schedule monitoring. If any portion of the Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit exceeds the costs incurred by the ISO and its consultants, including the documented and reasonably-incurred costs of the affected Transmission Owner(s) associated with the qualification process and critical path schedule monitoring, the ISO shall refund to the Project Sponsor the excess including interest calculated in accordance with 18 CFR § 35.19a(a)(2). If the costs incurred by the ISO and its consultants, including the documented and reasonably-incurred costs of the affected Transmission Owner(s), associated with the qualification process and critical path schedule monitoring exceed the Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit, the Project Sponsor shall pay such excess, including interest calculated in accordance with 18 CFR § 35.19a(a)(2) – For Demand Capacity Resources, the ISO shall provide all of the above concurrently with the annual statement required under Section III.13.1.9.3.

#### **III.13.1.9.3.2.2. Settlement Of Costs Associated With Resources That Withdraw From A Forward Capacity Auction Or Reconfiguration Auction.**

Upon the withdrawal or failure to meet the requirements of the qualification process set forth in Section III.13.1, the ISO shall provide the Project Sponsor with a statement in writing of the costs incurred by the ISO and its consultants, including the documented and reasonably-incurred costs of affected Transmission Owner(s), associated with the qualification process and critical path schedule monitoring. A Project Sponsor that withdraws or is deemed to have withdrawn its request for qualification shall pay to the ISO all costs prudently incurred by the ISO and its consultants, including the documented and reasonably-incurred costs of affected Transmission Owner(s), associated with the qualification process and critical path schedule monitoring. The ISO shall refund to the Project Sponsor any portion of the Qualification

Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit that exceeds the costs associated with the qualification process and critical path schedule monitoring incurred by the ISO and its consultants, including the documented and reasonably-incurred costs of affected Transmission Owner(s), including interest calculated in accordance with 18 CFR § 35.19a(a)(2). The ISO shall charge the Project Sponsor the amount of such costs incurred by the ISO and its consultants, including the documented and reasonably-incurred costs of affected Transmission Owner(s), that exceeds the Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit, including interest calculated in accordance with 18 CFR § 35.19a(a)(2). For Demand Capacity Resources, the ISO shall provide all of the above concurrently with the annual statement required under Section III.13.1.9.3.

**III.13.1.9.3.2.3.                    Crediting Of Reimbursements.**

Cost reimbursements received (excluding amounts passed through to the ISO's consultants and to affected Transmission Owner(s)) by the ISO pursuant to this Section III.13.1.9.3.2 shall be credited against revenues received by the ISO pursuant to Section IV.A.6.1 of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff.

**III.13.1.10.                    Forward Capacity Auction Qualification Schedule.**

Beginning with the timeline for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2017 (the eighth Forward Capacity Auction), and for each Capacity Commitment Period thereafter, the deadlines will be consistent for each Capacity Commitment Period, as follows:

- (a) each Capacity Commitment Period shall begin in June;
- (b) the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline will be in March, approximately four years and three months before the beginning of the Capacity Commitment Period;
- (c) the New Capacity Show of Interest Submission Window will be in April, approximately four years and two months before the beginning of the Capacity Commitment Period;
- (d) the Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline will be 90 days after the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline, approximately four years before the beginning of the Capacity Commitment Period;
- (e) the New Capacity Qualification Deadline will be in June or July that is just under four years before the beginning of the Capacity Commitment Period; and

(f) the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period will begin in February approximately three years and four months before the beginning of the Capacity Commitment Period.

**III.13.1.11 Opt-Out for Resources Electing Multiple-Year Treatment.**

Beginning in the qualification process for the ninth Forward Capacity Auction (for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning June 1, 2018), any resource that had elected in a Forward Capacity Auction prior to the ninth Forward Capacity Auction (pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.2.4 or Section III.13.1.4.1.1.2.7) to have the Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price continue to apply after the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction in which its New Capacity Offer cleared may, by submitting a written notification to the ISO no later than the Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline (or, in the case of the ninth Forward Capacity Auction, no later than September 19, 2014), opt-out of the remaining years of the resource's multiple-year election. A decision to so opt-out shall be irrevocable. A resource choosing to so opt-out will participate in subsequent Forward Capacity Auctions in the same manner as other Existing Capacity Resources.



### **III.13.2. Annual Forward Capacity Auction.**

#### **III.13.2.1. Timing of Annual Forward Capacity Auctions.**

Each Forward Capacity Auction will be conducted beginning on the first Monday in the February that is approximately three years and four months before the beginning of the associated Capacity Commitment Period (unless, no later than the immediately preceding December 1, an alternative date is announced by the ISO), or, where exigent circumstances prevent the start of the Forward Capacity Auction at that time, as soon as possible thereafter.

#### **III.13.2.2. Amount of Capacity Cleared in Each Forward Capacity Auction.**

The total amount of capacity cleared in each Forward Capacity Auction shall be determined using the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve and the Capacity Zone Demand Curves for the modeled Capacity Zones pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.3.

##### **III.13.2.2.1. System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve.**

The MRI Transition Period is the period from the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning June 1, 2020 through the earlier of:

- (i) the Forward Capacity Auction for which the amount of the Installed Capacity Requirement (net of HQICCs) that is filed by the ISO with the Commission pursuant to Section III.12.3 for the upcoming Forward Capacity Auction is greater than or equal to the sum of: 34,151 MW, and: (a) 722 MW (for the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning June 1, 2020); (b) 375 MW (for the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning June 1, 2021), or; (c) 150 MW (for the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning June 1, 2022);
- (ii) the Forward Capacity Auction for which the product of the system-wide Marginal Reliability Impact value, calculated pursuant to Section III.12.1.1, and the scaling factor specified in Section III.13.2.2.4, specifies a quantity at \$7.03/kW-month in excess of the MW value determined under the applicable subsection (2)(b), (2)(c), or (2)(d), below, or;

- (iii) the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning June 1, 2022.

During the MRI Transition Period, the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve shall consist of the following three segments:

- (1) at prices above \$7.03/kW-month and below the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price, the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve shall specify a price for system capacity quantities based on the product of the system-wide Marginal Reliability Impact value, calculated pursuant to Section III.12.1.1, and the scaling factor specified in Section III.13.2.2.4;
- (2) at prices below \$7.03/kW-month, the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve shall be linear between \$7.03/kW-month and \$0.00/kW-month and determined by the following quantities:
  - (a) At the price of \$0.00/kW-month, the quantity specified by the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve shall be 1616 MW plus the MW value determined under the applicable provision in (b), (c), or (d) of this subsection.
  - (b) for the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning June 1, 2020, at \$7.03/kW-month, the quantity shall be the lesser of:
    - 1. 35,437 MW; and
    - 2. 722 MW plus the quantity at which the product of the system-wide Marginal Reliability Impact value and the scaling factor yield a price of \$7.03/kW-month;
  - (c) for the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning June 1, 2021, at \$7.03/kW-month, the quantity shall be the lesser of:
    - 1. 35,090 MW; and
    - 2. 375 MW plus the quantity at which the product of the system-wide Marginal Reliability Impact value and the scaling factor yield a price of \$7.03/kW-month;
  - (d) for the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning June 1, 2022, at \$7.03/kW-month, the quantity shall be the lesser of:
    - 1. 34,865 MW; and
    - 2. 150 MW plus the quantity at which the product of the system-wide Marginal Reliability Impact value and the scaling factor yield a price of \$7.03/kW-month

(3) a price of \$7.03/kW-month for all quantities between those curves segments.

In addition to the foregoing, the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve shall not specify a price in excess of the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price.

Following the MRI Transition Period, the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve shall specify a price for system capacity quantities based on the product of the system-wide Marginal Reliability Impact value, calculated pursuant to Section III.12.1.1, and the scaling factor specified in Section III.13.2.2.4. For any system capacity quantity greater than 110% of the Installed Capacity Requirement (net of HQICCs), the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve shall specify a price of zero. The System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve shall not specify a price in excess of the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price.

#### **III.13.2.2.2. Import-Constrained Capacity Zone Demand Curves.**

For each import-constrained Capacity Zone, the Capacity Zone Demand Curve shall specify a price for all Capacity Zone quantities based on the product of the import-constrained Capacity Zone's Marginal Reliability Impact value, calculated pursuant to Section III.12.2.1.3, and the scaling factor specified in Section III.13.2.2.4. The prices specified by an import-constrained Capacity Zone Demand Curve shall be non-negative. At all quantities greater than the truncation point, which is the amount of capacity for which the Capacity Zone Demand Curve specifies a price of \$0.01/kW-month, the Capacity Zone Demand Curve shall specify a price of zero. The Capacity Zone Demand Curve shall not specify a price in excess of the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price.

#### **III.13.2.2.3. Export-Constrained Capacity Zone Demand Curves.**

For each export-constrained Capacity Zone, the Capacity Zone Demand Curve shall specify a price for all Capacity Zone quantities based on the product of the export-constrained Capacity Zone's Marginal Reliability Impact value, calculated pursuant to Section III.12.2.2.1, and the scaling factor specified in Section III.13.2.2.4. The prices specified by an export-constrained Capacity Zone Demand Curve shall be non-positive. At all quantities less than the truncation point, which is the amount of capacity for which the Capacity Zone Demand Curve specifies a price of negative \$0.01/kW-month, the Capacity Zone Demand Curve shall specify a price of zero.

#### **III.13.2.2.4. Capacity Demand Curve Scaling Factor.**

The demand curve scaling factor shall be set at the value such that, at the quantity specified by the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve at a price of Net CONE, the Loss of Load Expectation is 0.1 days per year.

**III.13.2.3. Conduct of the Forward Capacity Auction.**

The Forward Capacity Auction shall include a descending clock auction, which will determine, subject to the provisions of Section III.13.2.7, the Capacity Clearing Price for each Capacity Zone modeled in that Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to Section III.12.4, and the Capacity Clearing Price for certain offers from New Import Capacity Resources and Existing Import Capacity Resources pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.3(d). The Forward Capacity Auction shall determine the outcome of all offers and bids accepted during the qualification process and submitted during the auction. The descending clock auction shall be conducted as a series of rounds, which shall continue (for up to five consecutive Business Days, with up to eight rounds per day, absent extraordinary circumstances) until the Forward Capacity Auction is concluded for all modeled Capacity Zones in accordance with the provisions of Section III.13.2.3.3. Each round of the Forward Capacity Auction shall consist of the following steps, which shall be completed simultaneously for each Capacity Zone included in the round:

**III.13.2.3.1. Step 1: Announcement of Start-of-Round Price and End-of-Round Price.**

For each round, the auctioneer shall announce a single Start-of-Round Price (the highest price associated with a round of the Forward Capacity Auction) and a single (lower) End-of-Round Price (the lowest price associated with a round of the Forward Capacity Auction). In the first round, the Start-of-Round Price shall equal the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price for all modeled Capacity Zones. In each round after the first round, the Start-of-Round Price shall equal the End-of-Round Price from the previous round.

**III.13.2.3.2. Step 2: Compilation of Offers and Bids.**

The auctioneer shall compile all of the offers and bids for that round, as follows:

**(a) Offers from New Generating Capacity Resources, New Import Capacity Resources, and New Demand Capacity Resources.**

- (i) The Project Sponsor for any New Generating Capacity Resource, New Import Capacity Resource that is backed by a single new External Resource and that is associated with an investment in transmission that increases New England's import capability, New Import Capacity

Resource that is associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade, or New Demand Capacity Resource accepted in the qualification process for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction may submit a New Capacity Offer indicating the quantity of capacity that the Project Sponsor would commit to provide from the resource during the Capacity Commitment Period at that round's prices. A New Capacity Offer shall be defined by the submission of one to five prices, each strictly less than the Start-of-Round Price but greater than or equal to the End-of-Round Price, and an associated quantity in the applicable Capacity Zone. Each price shall be expressed in units of dollars per kilowatt-month to an accuracy of at most three digits to the right of the decimal point, and each quantity shall be expressed in units of MWs to an accuracy of at most three digits to the right of the decimal point. A New Capacity Offer shall imply a supply curve indicating quantities offered at all of that round's prices, pursuant to the convention of Section III.13.2.3.2(a)(iii).

(ii) If the Project Sponsor of a New Generating Capacity Resource, New Import Capacity Resource that is backed by a single new External Resource and that is associated with an investment in transmission that increases New England's import capability, New Import Capacity Resource that is associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade, or New Demand Capacity Resource elects to offer in a Forward Capacity Auction, the Project Sponsor must offer the resource's full FCA Qualified Capacity at the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price in the first round of the auction. A New Capacity Offer for a resource may in no event be for greater capacity than the resource's full FCA Qualified Capacity at any price. A New Capacity Offer for a resource may not be for less capacity than the resource's Rationing Minimum Limit at any price, except where the New Capacity Offer is for a capacity quantity of zero.

(iii) Let the Start-of-Round Price and End-of-Round Price for a given round be  $P_S$  and  $P_E$ , respectively. Let the  $m$  prices ( $1 \leq m \leq 5$ ) submitted by a Project Sponsor for a modeled Capacity Zone be  $p_1, p_2, \dots, p_m$ , where  $P_S > p_1 > p_2 > \dots > p_m \geq P_E$ , and let the associated quantities submitted for a New Capacity Resource be  $q_1, q_2, \dots, q_m$ . Then the Project Sponsor's supply curve, for all prices strictly less than  $P_S$  but greater than or equal to  $P_E$ , shall be taken to be:

$$S(p) = \begin{cases} q_0, & \text{if } p > p_1, \\ q_1, & \text{if } p_2 < p \leq p_1, \\ q_2, & \text{if } p_3 < p \leq p_2, \\ \dots & \dots, \\ q_m, & \text{if } p \leq p_m. \end{cases}$$

where, in the first round,  $q_0$  is the resource's full FCA Qualified Capacity and, in subsequent rounds,  $q_0$  is the resource's quantity offered at the lowest price of the previous round.

(iv) Except for Renewable Technology Resources and except as provided in Section III.13.2.3.2(a)(v), a New Capacity Resource may not include any capacity in a New Capacity Offer during the Forward Capacity Auction at any price below the resource's New Resource Offer Floor Price. The amount of capacity included in each New Capacity Offer at each price shall be included in the aggregate supply curves at that price as described in Section III.13.2.3.3.

(v) Capacity associated with a New Import Capacity Resource (other than a New Import Capacity Resource that is backed by a single new External Resource and that is associated with an investment in transmission that increases New England's import capability or a New Import Capacity Resource that is associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade) shall be automatically included in the aggregate supply curves as described in Section III.13.2.3.3 at prices at or above the resource's offer prices (as they may be modified pursuant to Section III.A.21.2) and shall be automatically removed from the aggregate supply curves at prices below the resource's offer prices (as they may be modified pursuant to Section III.A.21.2), except under the following circumstances:

In any round of the Forward Capacity Auction in which prices are below the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold, the Project Sponsor for a New Import Capacity Resource (other than a New Import Capacity Resource that is backed by a single new External Resource and that is associated with an investment in transmission that increases New England's import capability or a New Import Capacity Resource that is associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade) with offer prices (as they may be modified pursuant to Section III.A.21.2) that are less than the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold may submit a New Capacity Offer indicating the quantity of capacity that

the Project Sponsor would commit to provide from the resource during the Capacity Commitment Period at that round's prices. Such an offer shall be defined by the submission of one to five

prices, each less than the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold (or the Start-of-Round Price, if lower than the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold) but greater than or equal to the End-of-Round Price, and a single quantity associated with each price. Such an offer shall be expressed in the same form as specified in Section III.13.2.3.2(a)(i) and shall imply a curve indicating quantities at all of that round's relevant prices, pursuant to the convention of Section III.13.2.3.2(a)(iii). The curve may not increase the quantity offered as the price decreases.

(b) **Bids from Existing Capacity Resources**

(i) Static De-List Bids, Permanent De-List Bids, Retirement De-List Bids, and Export Bids from Existing Generating Capacity Resources, Existing Import Capacity Resources, and Existing Demand Capacity Resources, as finalized in the qualification process or as otherwise directed by the Commission shall be automatically bid into the appropriate rounds of the Forward Capacity Auction, such that each such resource's FCA Qualified Capacity will be included in the aggregate supply curves as described in Section III.13.2.3.3 until any Static De-List Bid, Permanent De-List Bid, Retirement D-List Bid, or Export Bid clears in the Forward Capacity Auction, as described in Section III.13.2.5.2, and is removed from the aggregate supply curves. In the case of a Commission-approved Permanent De-List Bid or Commission-approved Retirement De-List Bid at or above the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price, or where a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid is subject to an election under Section III.13.1.2.4.1(a), the resource's FCA Qualified Capacity will be reduced by the quantity of the de-list bid (unless the resource was retained for reliability pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1) and the Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid shall not be included in the Forward Capacity Auction. Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids subject to an election under Section III.13.1.2.4.1(a) or Section III.13.1.2.4.1(b) shall not be included in the Forward Capacity Auction and shall be treated according to Section III.13.2.3.2(b)(ii). In the case of a Static De-List Bid, if the Market Participant revised the bid pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.1, then the revised bid shall be used in place of the submitted bid; if the Market Participant withdrew the bid pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.1, then the capacity associated with the withdrawn bid shall be entered into the auction pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.2(c). If the amount of capacity associated with Export Bids for an interface exceeds the transfer limit of that interface (minus any accepted Administrative De-List Bids over that interface), then the set of Export Bids associated with that interface equal to the interface's transfer limit (minus any accepted Administrative De-List Bids over that interface) having the highest bid prices shall be included in the auction as described above;



capacity for which Export Bids are not included in the auction as a result of this provision shall be entered into the auction pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.2(c).

(ii) For Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids, the ISO will enter a Proxy De-List Bid into the appropriate rounds of the Forward Capacity Auction in the following circumstances: (1) if the Lead Market Participant has elected pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(a) to retire the resource or portion thereof, the resource has not been retained for reliability pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1, the price specified in the Commission-approved de-list bid is less than the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price, and the Internal Market Monitor has found a portfolio benefit pursuant to Section III.A.24; or (2) if the Lead Market Participant has elected conditional treatment pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(b), the resource has not been retained for reliability pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1, and the price specified in the Commission-approved de-list bid is less than the price specified in the de-list bid submitted by the Lead Market Participant and less than the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price. The Proxy De-List Bid shall be non-rationable and shall be equal in price and quantity to, and located in the same Capacity Zone as, the Commission-approved Permanent De-List Bid or Commission-approved Retirement De-List Bid, and shall be entered into the appropriate rounds of the Forward Capacity Auction such that the capacity associated with the Proxy De-List Bid will be included in the aggregate supply curves as described in Section III.13.2.3.3 until the Proxy De-List Bid clears in the Forward Capacity Auction, as described in Section III.13.2.5.2, and is removed from the aggregate supply curves. If the Lead Market Participant has elected conditional treatment pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(b), the resource has not been retained for reliability pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1, and the Commission-approved Permanent De-List Bid or Commission-approved Retirement De-List Bid is equal to or greater than the de-list bid submitted by the Lead Market Participant, no Proxy De-List Bid shall be used and the Commission-approved de-list bid shall be entered in the Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.2(b)(i).

(iii) For purposes of this subsection (b), if an Internal Market Monitor-determined price has been established for a Static De-List Bid and the associated resource's capacity is pivotal pursuant to Sections III.A.23.1 and III.A.23.2, then (unless otherwise directed by the Commission) the lower of the Internal Market Monitor-determined price and any revised bid that is submitted pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.1 will be used in place of the initially submitted bid; provided, however, that if the bid was withdrawn pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.1, then the capacity associated with the withdrawn bid shall be entered into the auction pursuant to

Section III.13.2.3.2(c). If an Internal Market Monitor-determined price has been established for an Export Bid and the associated resource's capacity is pivotal pursuant to Sections III.A.23.1 and III.A.23.2, then the Internal Market Monitor-determined price (or price directed by the Commission) will be used in place of the submitted bid.

Any Static De-List Bid for ambient air conditions that has not been verified pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2.4 shall not be subject to the provisions of this subsection (b).

(c) **Existing Capacity Resources Without De-List or Export Bids and Self-Supplied FCA Resources.** Each Existing Generating Capacity Resource, Existing Import Capacity Resource, and Existing Demand Capacity Resource without a Static De-List Bid, a Permanent De-List Bid, a Retirement De-List Bid, an Export Bid or an Administrative Export De-List Bid in its Existing Capacity Qualification Package, and each existing Self-Supplied FCA Resource shall be automatically entered into each round of the Forward Capacity Auction at its FCA Qualified Capacity, such that the resource's FCA Qualified Capacity will be included in the aggregate supply curves as described in Section III.13.2.3.3, except where such resource, if permitted, submits an appropriate Dynamic De-List Bid, as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(d). Each new Self-Supplied FCA Resource shall be automatically entered into each round of the Forward Capacity Auction at its designated self-supplied quantity at prices at or above the resource's New Resource Offer Floor Price, such that the resource's designated self-supply quantity will be included in the aggregate supply curves as described in Section III.13.2.3.3.

(d) **Dynamic De-List Bids.** In any round of the Forward Capacity Auction in which prices are below the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold, any Existing Generating Capacity Resource, Existing Import Capacity Resource, or Existing Demand Capacity Resource (but not any Self-Supplied FCA Resources) may submit a Dynamic De-List Bid at prices below the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold. Such a bid shall be defined by the submission of one to five prices, each less than the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold (or the Start-of-Round Price, if lower than the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold) but greater than or equal to the End-of-Round Price, and a single quantity associated with each price. Such a bid shall be expressed in the same form as specified in Section III.13.2.3.2(a)(i) and shall imply a curve indicating quantities at all of that round's relevant prices, pursuant to the convention of Section III.13.2.3.2(a)(iii). The curve may in no case increase the quantity offered as the price decreases. A dynamic De-List Bid may not offer less capacity than the resource's Rationing Minimum Limit at any price, except where the amount of capacity offered is zero. All Dynamic De-List Bids are subject to a reliability review as described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5, and if not rejected for reliability reasons, shall be included in the round in the same

manner as Static De-List Bids as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(b). Where a resource elected pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.2.4 or Section III.13.1.4.1.1.2.7 to have the Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price continue to apply after the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction in which the offer clears, the capacity associated with any resulting Capacity Supply Obligation may not be subject to a Dynamic De-List Bid in subsequent Forward Capacity Auctions for Capacity Commitment Periods for which the Project Sponsor elected to have the Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price continue to apply. Where a Lead Market Participant submits any combination of Dynamic De-List Bid, Static De-List Bid, Export Bid, and Administrative Export De-List Bid for a single resource, none of the prices in a set of price-quantity pairs associated with a bid may be the same as any price in any other set of price-quantity pairs associated with another bid for the same resource.

(e) **Repowering.** Offers and bids associated with a resource participating in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.1.2 (resources previously counted as capacity resources) shall be addressed in the Forward Capacity Auction in accordance with the provisions of this Section III.13.2.3.2(e). The Project Sponsor shall offer such a New Generating Capacity Resource into the Forward Capacity Auction in the same manner and pursuant to the same rules as other New Generating Capacity Resources, as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(a). As long as any capacity is offered from the New Generating Capacity Resource, the amount of capacity offered is the amount that the auctioneer shall include in the aggregate supply curve at the relevant prices, and the quantity of capacity offered from the associated Existing Generating Capacity Resource shall not be included in the aggregate supply curve. If any portion of the New Generating Capacity Resource clears in the Forward Capacity Auction, the associated Existing Generating Capacity Resource shall be permanently de-listed as of the start of the associated Capacity Commitment Period. If at any price, no capacity is offered from the New Generating Capacity Resource, then the auctioneer shall include capacity from the associated Existing Generating Capacity Resource at that price, subject to any bids submitted and accepted in the qualification process for that Existing Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.5. Bids submitted and accepted in the qualification process for an Existing Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.5 shall only be entered into the Forward Capacity Auction after the associated New Generating Capacity Resource is fully withdrawn (that is, the Forward Capacity Auction reaches a price at which the resource's New Capacity Offer is zero capacity), and shall only then be subject to the reliability review described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5.

(f) **Conditional Qualified New Resources.** Offers associated with a resource participating in the Forward Capacity Auction as a Conditional Qualified New Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.3(f) shall be addressed in the Forward Capacity Auction in accordance with the provisions of this Section III.13.2.3.2(f). The Project Sponsor shall offer such a Conditional Qualified New Resource into the Forward Capacity Auction in the same manner and pursuant to the same rules as other New Generating Capacity Resources, as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(a). An offer from at most one resource at a Conditional Qualified New Resource's location will be permitted to clear (receive a Capacity Supply Obligation for the associated Capacity Commitment Period) in the Forward Capacity Auction. As long as a positive quantity is offered at the End-of-Round Price in the final round of the Forward Capacity Auction by the resource having a higher queue priority at the Conditional Qualified New Resource's location, as described in Section III.13.1.1.2.3(f), then no capacity from the Conditional Qualified New Resource shall clear. If at any price greater than or equal to the End-of-Round Price in the final round of the Forward Capacity Auction, zero quantity is offered from the resource having higher queue priority at the Conditional Qualified New Resource's location, as described in Section III.13.1.1.2.3(f), then the auctioneer shall consider capacity offered from the Conditional Qualified New Resource in the determination of clearing, including the application of Section III.13.2.7.

(g) **Mechanics.** Offers and bids that may be submitted during a round of the Forward Capacity Auction must be received between the starting time and ending time of the round, as announced by the auctioneer in advance. The ISO at its sole discretion may authorize a participant in the auction to complete or correct its submission after the ending time of a round, but only if the participant can demonstrate to the ISO's satisfaction that the participant was making reasonable efforts to complete a valid offer submission before the ending time of the round, and only if the ISO determines that allowing the completion or correction will not unreasonably disrupt the auction process. All decisions by the ISO concerning whether or not a participant may complete or correct a submission after the ending time of a round are final.

### **III.13.2.3.3. Step 3: Determination of the Outcome of Each Round.**

The auctioneer shall use the offers and bids for the round as described in Section III.13.2.3.2 to determine the aggregate supply curves for the New England Control Area and for each modeled Capacity Zone included in the round.

The aggregate supply curve for the New England Control Area, the Total System Capacity, shall reflect at each price the sum of the following:

- (1) the amount of capacity offered in all Capacity Zones modeled as import-constrained Capacity Zones at that price (excluding capacity offered from New Import Capacity Resources and Existing Import Capacity Resources);
- (2) the amount of capacity offered in the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone at that price (excluding capacity offered from New Import Capacity Resources and Existing Import Capacity Resources);
- (3) for each Capacity Zone modeled as an export-constrained Capacity Zone, the lesser of:
  - (i) the amount of capacity offered in the Capacity Zone at that price (including the amount of capacity offered from New Import Capacity Resources and Existing Import Capacity Resources for each interface between the New England Control Area and an external Control Area mapped to the export-constrained Capacity Zone up to that interface's approved capacity transfer limit (net of tie benefits)), or;
  - (ii) the amount of capacity determined by the Capacity Zone Demand Curve at zero minus that price, and;
- (4) for each interface between the New England Control Area and an external Control Area mapped to an import-constrained Capacity Zone or the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone, the lesser of:
  - (i) that interface's approved capacity transfer limit (net of tie benefits), or;
  - (ii) the amount of capacity offered from New Import Capacity Resources and Existing Import Capacity Resources.

In computing the Total System Capacity, capacity associated with any New Capacity Offer at any price greater than the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price will not be included in the tally of total capacity at the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price for that Capacity Zone. On the basis of these aggregate supply curves, the auctioneer shall determine the outcome of the round for each modeled Capacity Zone as follows:

(a) **Import-Constrained Capacity Zones.**

For a Capacity Zone modeled as an import-constrained Capacity Zone, if either of the following two conditions is met during the round:

- (1) the aggregate supply curve for the import-constrained Capacity Zone, adjusted as necessary in accordance with Section III.13.2.6 (Capacity Rationing Rule), equals or is less than the quantity determined by the Capacity Zone Demand Curve at the difference between the End-of-Round Price and the price specified by the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve (at a quantity no less than Total System Capacity at the Start-of-Round Price), or;
- (2) the Forward Capacity Auction is concluded for the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone;

then the Forward Capacity Auction for that Capacity Zone is concluded and such Capacity Zone will not be included in further rounds of the Forward Capacity Auction.

The Capacity Clearing Price for that Capacity Zone shall be set at the greater of: (1) the sum of the price specified by the Capacity Zone Demand Curve at the amount of capacity equal to the total amount that is awarded a Capacity Supply Obligation in the import-constrained Capacity Zone, and the Capacity Clearing Price for the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone, or; (2) the highest price of any offer or bid for a resource in the Capacity Zone that is awarded a Capacity Supply Obligation, subject to the other provisions of this Section III.13.2.

If neither of the two conditions above are met in the round, then that Capacity Zone will be included in the next round of the Forward Capacity Auction.

**(b) Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone.**

If the Total System Capacity at the End-of-Round Price, adjusted as necessary in accordance with Section III.13.2.6 (Capacity Rationing Rule), and adjusted to include the additional supply in the import-constrained Capacity Zone that may be cleared at a higher price, equals or is less than the amount of capacity determined by the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve, then the Forward Capacity Auction for the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone is concluded and the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone will not be included in further rounds of the Forward Capacity Auction.

The Capacity Clearing Price for the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone shall be set at the highest price at which the Total System Capacity is less than or equal to the amount of capacity determined by the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve, subject to the other provisions of this Section III.13.2.

If the Forward Capacity Auction for the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone is not concluded then the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone will be included in the next round of the Forward Capacity Auction, and the auctioneer shall publish the Total System Capacity at the End-of-Round Price, adjusted to include the additional supply in the import-constrained Capacity Zone that may be cleared at a higher price, less the amount of capacity determined by the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve at the End-of-Round Price.

(c) **Export-Constrained Capacity Zones.**

For a Capacity Zone modeled as an export-constrained Capacity Zone, if all of the following conditions are met during the round:

- (1) the aggregate supply curve for the export-constrained Capacity Zone, adjusted as necessary in accordance with Section III.13.2.6 (Capacity Rationing Rule), is equal to or less than the maximum amount of capacity determined by the Capacity Zone Demand Curve at a price of zero;
- (2) in the case of a nested Capacity Zone, the Forward Capacity Auction is concluded for the Capacity Zone within which the nested Capacity Zone is located, and;
- (3) the Forward Capacity Auction is concluded for the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone;

then the Forward Capacity Auction for that Capacity Zone is concluded and such Capacity Zone will not be included in further rounds of the Forward Capacity Auction.

The Capacity Clearing Price for an export-constrained Capacity Zone that is not a nested export-constrained Capacity Zone shall be set at the greater of:

- (1) the sum of:
  - (i) the price specified by the Capacity Zone Demand Curve at the amount of capacity equal to the total amount that is awarded a Capacity Supply Obligation in that Capacity Zone; and
  - (ii) the Capacity Clearing Price for the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone.
- or;
- (2) the highest price of any offer or bid for a resource in the Capacity Zone that is awarded a Capacity Supply Obligation, and subject to the other provisions of this Section III.13.2.

The Capacity Clearing Price for a nested export-constrained Capacity Zone shall be set at the greater of:

- (1) the sum of:
  - (i) the price specified by the Capacity Zone Demand Curve at the amount of capacity equal to the total amount that is awarded a Capacity Supply Obligation in that Capacity Zone; and

- (ii) the Capacity Clearing Price for the Capacity Zone in which the nested Capacity Zone is located,
- or;
- (2) the highest price of any offer or bid for a resource in the Capacity Zone that is awarded a Capacity Supply Obligation, subject to the other provisions of this Section III.13.2.

If all of the conditions above are not satisfied in the round, then the auctioneer shall publish the quantity of excess supply in the export-constrained Capacity Zone at the End-of-Round Price (the amount of capacity offered at the End-of-Round Price in the export-constrained Capacity Zone minus the maximum amount of capacity determined by the Capacity Zone Demand Curve at a price of zero) and that Capacity Zone will be included in the next round of the Forward Capacity Auction.

(d) **Treatment of Import Capacity.** Where the amount of capacity offered from New Import Capacity Resources and Existing Import Capacity Resources over an interface between the New England Control Area and an external Control Area is less than or equal to that interface's approved capacity transfer limit (net of tie benefits, or net of HQICC in the case of the Phase I/II HVDC-TF), then the capacity offers from those resources shall be treated as capacity offers in the modeled Capacity Zone associated with that interface. Where the amount of capacity offered from New Import Capacity Resources and Existing Import Capacity Resources over an interface between the New England Control Area and an external Control Area is greater than that interface's approved capacity transfer limit (net of tie benefits, or net of HQICC in the case of the Phase I/II HVDC-TF), then the following provisions shall apply (separately for each such interface):

- (i) For purposes of determining which capacity offers from the New Import Capacity Resources and Existing Import Capacity Resources over the interface shall clear and at what price, the offers over the interface shall be treated in the descending-clock auction as if they comprised a separately-modeled export-constrained capacity zone, with an aggregate supply curve consisting of the offers from the New Import Capacity Resources and Existing Import Capacity Resources over the interface.
- (ii) The amount of capacity offered over the interface that will be included in the aggregate supply curve of the modeled Capacity Zone associated with the interface shall be the lesser of the following two quantities: the amount of capacity offered from New Import Capacity Resources



and Existing Import Capacity Resources over the interface; and the interface's approved capacity transfer limit (net of tie benefits, or net of HQICC in the case of the Phase I/II HVDC-TF).

(iii) The Forward Capacity Auction for New Import Capacity Resources and Existing Import Capacity Resources over the interface is concluded when the following two conditions are both satisfied: the amount of capacity offered from New Import Capacity Resource and Existing Import Capacity Resources over the interface is less than or equal to the interface's approved capacity transfer limit (net of tie benefits, or net of HQICC in the case of the Phase I/II HVDC-TF); and the Forward Capacity Auction is concluded in the modeled Capacity Zone associated with the interface.

(e) **Treatment of Export Capacity.** Any Export Bid or any Administrative Export De-List Bid that is used to export capacity through an export interface connected to an import-constrained Capacity Zone from another Capacity Zone, or through an export interface connected to the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone from an export-constrained Capacity Zone in the Forward Capacity Auction will be modeled in the Capacity Zone where the export interface that is identified in the Existing Capacity Qualification Package is located. The Export Bid or Administrative Export De-List Bid clears in the Capacity Zone where the Export Bid or Administrative Export De-List Bid is modeled.

(i) Then the MW quantity equal to the relevant Export Bid or Administrative Export De-List Bid from the resource associated with the Export Bid or Administrative Export De-List Bid will be de-listed in the Capacity Zone where the resource is located. If the export interface is connected to an import-constrained Capacity Zone, the MW quantity procured will be in addition to the amount of capacity determined by the Capacity Zone Demand Curve for the import-constrained Capacity Zone.

(ii) If the Export Bid or Administrative Export De-List Bid does not clear, then the resource associated with the Export Bid or Administrative Export De-List Bid will not be de-listed in the Capacity Zone where the resource is located.

#### **III.13.2.3.4. Determination of Final Capacity Zones.**

(a) For all Forward Capacity Auctions up to and including the sixth Forward Capacity Auction (for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning June 1, 2015), after the Forward Capacity Auction is concluded for all modeled Capacity Zones, the final set of distinct Capacity Zones that will be used for all

purposes associated with the relevant Capacity Commitment Period, including for the purposes of reconfiguration auctions and Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals, shall be those having distinct Capacity Clearing Prices as a result of constraints between modeled Capacity Zones binding in the running of the Forward Capacity Auction. Where a modeled constraint does not bind in the Forward Capacity Auction, and as a result adjacent modeled Capacity Zones clear at the same Capacity Clearing Price, those modeled Capacity Zones shall be a single Capacity Zone used for all purposes of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period, including for the purposes of reconfiguration auctions and Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals.

(b) For all Forward Capacity Auctions beginning with the seventh Forward Capacity Auction (for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning June 1, 2016) the final set of distinct Capacity Zones that will be used for all purposes associated with the relevant Capacity Commitment Period, including for the purposes of reconfiguration auctions and Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals, shall be those described in Section III.12.4.

**III.13.2.4. Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price and the Cost of New Entry.**

The Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price is max [1.6 multiplied by Net CONE, CONE]. References in this Section III.13 to the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price shall mean the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price for the Forward Capacity Auction associated with the relevant Capacity Commitment Period.

CONE for the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2025 is \$12.400/kW-month.

Net CONE for the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2025 is \$7.468/kW-month.

CONE and Net CONE shall be recalculated no less often than once every three years. Whenever these values are recalculated, the ISO will review the results of the recalculation with stakeholders and the new values will be filed with the Commission prior to the Forward Capacity Auction in which the new value is to apply.

Between recalculations, CONE and Net CONE will be adjusted for each Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to Section III.A.21.1.2(e) (except that the bonus tax depreciation adjustment described in Section

III.A.21.1.2(e)(5) shall not apply). Prior to applying the annual adjustment for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2019, Net CONE will be reduced by \$0.43/kW-month to reflect the elimination of the PER adjustment. The adjusted CONE and Net CONE values will be published on the ISO's web site.

**III.13.2.5. Treatment of Specific Offer and Bid Types in the Forward Capacity Auction.**

**III.13.2.5.1. Offers from New Generating Capacity Resources, New Import Capacity Resources, and New Demand Capacity Resources.**

A New Capacity Offer (other than one from a Conditional Qualified New Resource) clears (receives a Capacity Supply Obligation for the associated Capacity Commitment Period) in the Forward Capacity Auction if the Capacity Clearing Price is greater than or equal to the price specified in the offer, except possibly as a result of the Capacity Rationing Rule described in Section III.13.2.6. An offer from a Conditional Qualified New Resource clears (receives a Capacity Supply Obligation for the associated Capacity Commitment Period) in the Forward Capacity Auction, except possibly as a result of the Capacity Rationing Rule described in Section III.13.2.6, if all of the following conditions are met: (i) the Capacity Clearing Price is greater than or equal to the price specified in the offer; (ii) capacity from that resource is considered in the determination of clearing as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(f); and (iii) such offer minimizes the costs for the associated Capacity Commitment Period, subject to Section III.13.2.7.7(c).

The amount of capacity that receives a Capacity Supply Obligation through the Forward Capacity Auction shall not exceed the quantity of capacity offered from the New Generating Capacity Resource, New Import Capacity Resource, or New Demand Capacity Resource at the Capacity Clearing Price.

**III.13.2.5.2. Bids and Offers from Existing Generating Capacity Resources, Existing Import Capacity Resources, and Existing Demand Capacity Resources.**

**III.13.2.5.2.1. Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids.**

(a) Except as provided in Section III.13.2.5.2.5, a Permanent De-List Bid, Retirement De-List Bid or Proxy De-List Bid clears in the Forward Capacity Auction (does not receive a Capacity Supply Obligation) if the Capacity Clearing Price is less than or equal to the price specified in the bid, except possibly as a result of the Capacity Rationing Rule described in Section III.13.2.6.

(b) Unless the capacity has been retained for reliability pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5, if all or part of a resource with a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid does not clear in the Forward Capacity Auction (receives a Capacity Supply Obligation), the Lead Market Participant shall enter the uncleared portion of the bid into the qualification process for the following Forward Capacity Auction as described in Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.

(c) If the Capacity Clearing Price is greater than the price specified in a de-list bid submitted by a Lead Market Participant that elected conditional treatment for the de-list bid pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(b), and there is an associated Proxy De-List Bid that does not clear (receives a Capacity Supply Obligation), the resource will receive a Capacity Supply Obligation at the Capacity Clearing Price.

(d) The process by which the primary auction is cleared (but not the compilation of offers and bids pursuant to Sections III.13.2.3.1 and III.13.2.3.2) will be repeated after the substitution auction is completed if one of the following conditions is met: (1) if any Proxy De-List Bid entered as a result of a Lead Market Participant electing to retire pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(a) does not clear (receives a Capacity Supply Obligation) in the first run of the primary auction-clearing process and retains some portion of its Capacity Supply Obligation in the substitution auction; or (2) if any Proxy De-List Bid entered as a result of a Lead Market Participant electing conditional treatment pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(b) does not clear (receives a Capacity Supply Obligation) in the first run of the primary auction-clearing process, the de-list bid submitted by the Lead Market Participant is at or above the Capacity Clearing Price, and the Proxy De-List Bid retains some portion of its Capacity Supply Obligation in the substitution auction. The second run of the primary auction-clearing process: (i) excludes all Proxy De-List Bids, (ii) includes the offers and bids of resources compiled pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.2 that did not receive a Capacity Supply Obligation in the first run of the primary auction-clearing process, excluding the offers, or portion thereof, associated with resources that acquired a Capacity Supply Obligation in the substitution auction, and (iii) includes the capacity of resources, or portion thereof, that retain a Capacity Supply Obligation after the first run of the primary auction-clearing process and the substitution auction. The second run of the primary auction-clearing process shall not affect the Capacity Clearing Price of the Forward Capacity Auction (which is established by the first run of the primary auction-clearing process).

(e) Resources (other than those still subject to a multi-year Capacity Commitment Period election as described in Sections III.13.1.1.2.2.4 and III.13.1.4.1.1.2.7) that receive a Capacity Supply Obligation as a result of the first run of the primary auction-clearing process shall be paid the Capacity Clearing Price during the associated Capacity Commitment Period. Where the second run of the primary auction-clearing process procures additional capacity, the resulting price, paid during the associated Capacity Commitment Period (and subsequent Capacity Commitment Periods, as elected pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.2.4 or Section III.13.1.4.1.1.2.7) to the additionally procured capacity, shall be equal to or greater than the adjusted price resulting from the first run of the primary auction-clearing process for that Capacity Zone.

**III.13.2.5.2.2. Static De-List Bids and Export Bids.**

Except as provided in Section III.13.2.5.2.5, a Static De-List Bid or an Export Bid clears in the Forward Capacity Auction (does not receive a Capacity Supply Obligation for the associated Capacity Commitment Period) if the Capacity Clearing Price is less than or equal to the price specified in the bid, except possibly as a result of the Capacity Rationing Rule described in Section III.13.2.6.

**III.13.2.5.2.3. Dynamic De-List Bids.**

A Dynamic De-List Bid clears in the Forward Capacity Auction (does not receive a Capacity Supply Obligation for the associated Capacity Commitment Period) if the Capacity Clearing Price is less than or equal to the price specified in the bid, except possibly as a result of the Capacity Rationing Rule described in Section III.13.2.6. If more Dynamic De-List Bids are submitted at a price than are needed to clear the market, such Dynamic De-List Bids shall be cleared pro-rata, but in no case less than a resource's Rationing Minimum Limit.

**III.13.2.5.2.4. Administrative Export De-List Bids.**

An Administrative Export De-List Bid clears in the Forward Capacity Auction (does not receive a Capacity Supply Obligation for the associated Capacity Commitment Period) regardless of the Capacity Clearing Price.

**III.13.2.5.2.5. Reliability Review.**

The ISO shall review each Retirement De-List Bid, Permanent De-List Bid, Static De-List Bid, Export Bid, Administrative Export De-List Bid, Dynamic De-List Bid, and substitution auction demand bid to determine whether the capacity associated with that bid is needed for reliability reasons during the

Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction; Proxy De-List Bids shall not be reviewed.

(a) The reliability review of de-list bids will be conducted in descending price order using the price as finalized during qualification or as otherwise directed by the Commission. De-list bids with the same price will be reviewed in the order that produces the least negative impact to reliability; where bids are the same price and provide the same impact to reliability, they will be reviewed based on their submission time. If de-list bids with the same price are from a single generating station, they will be reviewed in an order that seeks to provide (1) the least-cost solution under Section III.13.2.5.2.5.1(d) and (2) the minimum aggregate quantity required for reliability from the generating station. The reliability review of substitution auction demand bids that would otherwise clear will be conducted in order beginning with the resource whose cleared bids contribute the greatest amount to social surplus. The capacity associated with a bid shall be deemed needed for reliability reasons if the absence of the capacity would result in the violation of any NERC or NPCC criteria, or ISO New England System Rules. Bids shall only be rejected pursuant to this Section III.13.2.5.2.5 for the sole purpose of addressing a local reliability issue, and shall not be rejected solely on the basis that acceptance of the bid may result in the procurement of less capacity than the Installed Capacity Requirement (net of HQICCs) or the Local Sourcing Requirement for a Capacity Zone.

(b) If a Retirement De-List Bid, Permanent De-List Bid, Static De-List Bid, Export Bid, Administrative Export De-List Bid, or Dynamic De-List Bid would otherwise clear in the Forward Capacity Auction, but the ISO has determined that some or all of the capacity associated with the de-list bid is needed for reliability reasons, then the de-list bid having capacity needed for reliability will not clear in the Forward Capacity Auction. If the ISO has determined that some or all of the capacity associated with a substitution auction demand bid that would otherwise clear is needed for reliability reasons, then the entire demand bid will not be further included in the substitution auction.

(c) The Lead Market Participant shall be notified that its bid did not clear for reliability reasons at the later of: (i) immediately after the end of the Forward Capacity Auction round in which the auction price reaches the price of the de-list bid; or (ii) as soon as practicable after the time at which the ISO has determined that the bid must be rejected for reliability reasons. In no event, however, shall a Lead Market Participant be notified that a bid submitted pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.5 and accepted in the qualification process for an Existing Generating Capacity Resource did not clear for reliability reasons if the associated New Generating Capacity Resource remains in the Forward Capacity Auction. In such a

case, the Lead Market Participant shall be notified that its bid did not clear for reliability reasons at the later of: (i) immediately after the end of the Forward Capacity Auction round in which the auction price reaches the price of the bid; (ii) immediately after the end of the Forward Capacity Auction round in which the associated New Generating Capacity Resource is fully withdrawn (that is, the Forward Capacity Auction reaches a price at which the resource's New Capacity Offer is zero capacity); or (iii) as soon as practicable after the time at which the ISO has determined that the bid must be rejected for reliability reasons.

(d) A resource that has a de-list bid rejected for reliability reasons shall be compensated pursuant to the terms set out in Section III.13.2.5.2.5.1 and shall have a Capacity Supply Obligation as described in Section III.13.6.1.

(e) The ISO shall review the results of each annual reconfiguration auction and determine whether the reliability need which caused the ISO to reject the de-list bid has been met through the annual reconfiguration auction. The ISO may also attempt to address the reliability concern through other reasonable means (including transmission enhancements).

(f) If the reliability need that caused the ISO to reject a de-list bid is met through a reconfiguration auction or other means, the resource shall retain its Capacity Supply Obligation through the end of the Capacity Commitment Period for which it was retained for reliability (provided that resources that have Permanent De-List Bids or Retirement De-List Bids rejected for reliability shall be permanently de-listed or retired as of the first day of the subsequent Capacity Commitment Period (or earlier if the resource sheds the entirety of the Capacity Supply Obligation as described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3(a)(ii) or Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3(b)(ii))).

(g) If a Permanent De-List Bid or a Retirement De-List Bid is rejected for reliability reasons, and the reliability need is not met through a reconfiguration auction or other means, that resource, or portion thereof, as applicable, is no longer eligible to participate as an Existing Capacity Resource in any reconfiguration auction, Forward Capacity Auction or Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral for that and subsequent Capacity Commitment Periods. If the resource, or portion thereof, continues to be needed for reliability reasons, it shall be counted as capacity in the Forward Capacity Auction and shall be compensated as described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5.1.

(h) The ISO shall review with the Reliability Committee (i) the status of any prior rejected de-list bids reported to the Commission in an FCA results filing pursuant to Section 13.8.2, and (ii) the status of any Retirement De-List Bid or Permanent De-List Bid that has been rejected for reliability reasons and has elected to continue to operate, prior to the New Capacity Qualification Deadline in accordance with Section 4.1(c) of Attachment K of the ISO OATT.

If an identified reliability need results in the rejection of a Retirement De-List Bid, Permanent De-List Bid, Export Bid, Administrative Export De-List Bid, Static De-List Bid, or Dynamic De-List Bid while executing an FCA, the ISO shall (i) review each specific reliability need with the Reliability Committee in accordance with the timing provided for in the ISO New England Operating Documents and, (ii) update the current system Needs Assessments pursuant to Section 4.1(c) of Attachment K of the ISO OATT. This review and update will follow ISO's filing of the FCA results with the Commission pursuant to Section 13.8.2.

#### **III.13.2.5.2.5 A Fuel Security Reliability Review**

(a) This Section III.13.2.5.2.5A will remain in effect for the 2022/23, 2023/24 and 2024/25 Capacity Commitment Period, after which this Section III.13.2.5.2.5A will sunset.

(b) This Section III.13.2.5.2.5A will apply to (i) Retirement De-List Bids, (ii) substitution auction demand bids, and (iii) bilateral transactions and reconfiguration auctions demand bids submitted by an Existing Generating Capacity Resource that has been identified as being needed for fuel security during a Forward Capacity Auction. Terms set out in this Section III.13.2.5.2.5A will apply only for the period and resources described within this Section III.13.2.5.2.5A. Where the terms and conditions in this Section III.13.2.5.2.5A differ from terms otherwise set out in Section III.13, the terms of this Section III.13.2.5.2.5A will control for the period and circumstances described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5A.

(c) A fuel security reliability review for the Forward Capacity Market will be performed pursuant to Appendix L to Section III of the Tariff, and in accordance with the inputs and methodology set out to establish the fuel security reliability standard in Appendix I of Planning Procedure No. 10.

(d) For fuel security reliability reviews performed for the primary Forward Capacity Auction, the fuel security reliability review will be performed after the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline and conducted in descending price order using the price as submitted in the Retirement De-List Bids. Bids



with the same price will be reviewed in the order that produces the least negative impact to reliability. Where multiple bids have the same price and the retirement of the Existing Generating Capacity Resources would have the same impact to reliability, they will be reviewed based on their submission time. If bids with the same price are from a single generating station, they will be reviewed in an order that seeks to provide (1) the least-cost solution under Section III.13.2.5.2.5.1(d), and (2) the minimum aggregate quantity required for reliability from the generating station. An Existing Generating Capacity Resource may be needed for both fuel security and for transmission security pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5. The fuel security reliability review will be performed in advance of the reliability review for transmission security. Where an Existing Generating Capacity Resource is needed for both fuel security reasons pursuant to this Section III.13.2.5.2.5A, and transmission security reliability reasons pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5, the generator will be retained for fuel security for purposes of cost allocation.

(e) If an Existing Generating Capacity Resource is identified as being needed for fuel security reasons, and the reliability need is not met through a reconfiguration auction or other means, that resource, or portion thereof, as applicable may not participate in Annual Reconfiguration Auctions for the Capacity Commitment Period(s) for which it is needed for fuel security, or earlier 2022/23, 2023/24 and 2024/25 Capacity Commitment Periods. Such an Existing Generating Capacity Resource that is identified as being needed for fuel security may participate in monthly bilateral transactions and monthly reconfiguration auctions, but may not submit monthly bilateral transactions for December, January or February, or demand bids for the December, January, or February monthly reconfiguration auctions for any period for which they have been identified as being needed for fuel security.

(f) Participants that have submitted a Retirement De-List Bid will be notified by ISO New England if their resource is needed for fuel security reliability reasons no later than 90 days after the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline. Participants that have submitted a substitution auction demand bid, and where the demand bid has been rejected for reliability reasons, will be notified after the relevant Forward Capacity Auction has been completed.

(g) Where a Retirement De-List Bid would otherwise clear in the Forward Capacity Auction, but the ISO has determined that some or all of the capacity associated with the de-list bid is needed for fuel security reliability reasons, the provisions of III.13.2.5.2.5(b) shall apply.

(h) Existing Generating Capacity Resources that have had their Retirement De-list Bid rejected for fuel security reliability reasons and that do not elect to unconditionally or conditionally retire shall be eligible for compensation pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5.1, except that the difference between payments based on resource de-list bids or cost-of-service compensation as detailed in Section III.13.2.5.2.5.1 and payments based on the Capacity Clearing Price for the Forward Capacity Market under this Section III.13.2.5.2.5.1 shall be allocated on a regional basis to Real Time Load Obligation, excluding Real-Time Load Obligation associated with Dispatchable Asset Related Demand Resources (DARD Pumps and other electric storage based DARDs) and Real-Time Load Obligation associated with Coordinated External Transactions, allocated and collected over a 12 month period. Resources that are identified as needed for fuel security reliability reasons will have their capacity entered into the Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to III.13.2.5.2.5(g) and III.13.2.3.2(b).

(i) Where an Existing Generating Capacity Resource elects a cost-of-service agreement pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5.1 to address a fuel security reliability need, the term of such a cost-of-service agreement may not exceed two years, including renewal through evergreen provisions. A cost-of-service agreement entered into for the 2024/2025 Capacity Commitment Period shall be limited to a total duration of one year.

(j) The ISO shall perform an annual reevaluation of any Existing Generating Capacity Resources retained for reliability under this provision. If a resource associated with a Retirement De-List Bid that was rejected for reliability reasons pursuant to this section, is found to no longer be needed for fuel security, and is not needed for another reliability reason pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5, the resource will be retired from the system as described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3(a)(1). In no case will a resource retained for fuel security be retained for fuel security beyond June 1, 2025.

(k) The ISO will review Retirement De-List Bids rejected for fuel security reliability reasons with the Reliability Committee in the same manner as described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5(h).

**III.13.2.5.2.5.1. Compensation for Bids Rejected for Reliability Reasons.**

(a) In cases where a Static De-List Bid, Export Bid, Administrative Export De-List Bid, Dynamic De-List Bid, partial Permanent De-List Bid, or partial Retirement De-List Bid has been rejected for reliability reasons pursuant to Sections III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1 or III.13.2.5.2.5, the resource will be paid by the ISO in the same manner as all other capacity resources, except that payment shall be made on the basis of its de-list bid as accepted for the Forward Capacity Auction for the relevant Capacity Commitment Period

instead of the Forward Capacity Market Clearing Price. Under this Section, accepted Dynamic De-List Bids filed with the Commission as part of the FCA results filing are subject to review and approval by the Commission pursuant to the “just and reasonable” standard of Section 205 of the Federal Power Act. If a resource with a partial Permanent De-List Bid or partial Retirement De-List Bid continues to be needed for reliability in Capacity Commitment Periods following the Capacity Commitment Period for which the partial Permanent De-List Bid or partial Retirement De-List Bid was rejected, payment will continue to be pursuant to this Section III.13.2.5.2.5.1(a).

(b) In cases where a Permanent De-List Bid or a Retirement De-List Bid for the capacity of an entire resource has been rejected for reliability reasons pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1 or III.13.2.5.2.5, the resource will be paid either (i) in the same manner as all other capacity resources, except that payment shall be made on the basis of its Commission-approved Permanent De-List Bid or Commission-approved Retirement De-List Bid for the relevant Capacity Commitment Period instead of the Forward Capacity Market Clearing Price or (ii) under the terms of a cost-of-service agreement pursuant to Section III, Appendix I. Resources must notify the ISO of their election within six months after the ISO files the results of the relevant Forward Capacity Auction with the Commission. A resource that has had a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid rejected for reliability reasons and does not notify the ISO of its election as described in this paragraph will be paid on the basis of the resource’s Commission-approved Permanent De-List Bid or Commission-approved Retirement De-List Bid. Cost-of-service agreements must be filed with and approved by the Commission, and cost-of-service compensation may not commence until the Commission has approved the use of cost-of-service rates for the unit in question or has accepted the use of the cost-of-service rates subject to refund while the rate is reviewed. In no event will payment under the cost-of-service agreement start prior to the start of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period for which the Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid was submitted. If a resource continues to be needed for reliability in Capacity Commitment Periods following the Capacity Commitment Period for which the Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid was rejected, payment will continue to be pursuant to this Section III.13.2.5.2.5.1(b). Resources that elect payment based on the Commission-approved Permanent De-List Bid or Commission-approved Retirement De-List Bid may file with the Commission pursuant to Section 205 of the Federal Power Act to update its Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid if the unit is retained for reliability for a period longer than the Capacity Commitment Period for which the Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid was originally submitted.

(c) The difference between payments based on resource de-list bids or cost-of-service compensation as detailed in this Section III.13.2.5.2.5.1 and payments based on the market clearing price for the Forward Capacity Market under this Section III.13.2.5.2.5.1 shall be allocated to Regional Network Load within the affected Reliability Region.

(d) **Compensation for Existing Generating Capacity Resources at Stations with Common Costs that are Retained for Reliability.** If a Static De-List Bid, Permanent De-List Bid, or Retirement De-List Bid from an Existing Generating Capacity Resource that is associated with a Station having Common Costs is rejected for reliability reasons, the Existing Generating Capacity Resource will be paid as follows: (i) if one or more Existing Generating Capacity Resources at the Station assume a Capacity Supply Obligation through the normal clearing of the Forward Capacity Auction and one or more Existing Generating Capacity Resources are retained for reliability, then the Existing Generating Capacity Resources retained for reliability will be paid the sum of the Asset-Specific Going Forward Costs for the assets comprising that Existing Generating Capacity Resource; or (ii) if no Existing Generating Capacity Resources at the Station assumes a Capacity Supply Obligation through the normal clearing of the Forward Capacity Auction and one or more Existing Generating Capacity Resources are retained for reliability, then each Existing Generating Capacity Resource retained for reliability will be paid the sum of the Asset-Specific Going Forward Costs for the assets associated with that Existing Generating Capacity Resource plus a portion of the Station Going Forward Common Costs (such that the full amount of Station Going Forward Common Costs are allocated to the Existing Generating Capacity Resources retained for reliability).

(e) If ISO-NE is a party to a cost-of-service agreement filed after January 1, 2019 that changes any resource performance-related obligations contained in Section III, Appendix I (provided that those obligations are different than the obligations of an Existing Generating Capacity Resource with a Capacity Supply Obligation), no later than 30 days after such agreement is filed with the Commission, ISO-NE shall provide to stakeholders quantitative and qualitative information on the need for, and the impacts of, the proposed changes.

**III.13.2.5.2.5.2. Incremental Cost of Reliability Service From Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid Resources.**

In cases where an Existing Generating Capacity Resource or Existing Demand Capacity Resource has had a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid for the entire resource rejected for reliability reasons pursuant to Sections III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1 or III.13.2.5.2.5, does not elect to retire pursuant to Section

III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1(d), and must make a capital improvement to the unit to remain in operation in order to continue to operate to meet the reliability need identified by the ISO, the resource may make application to the Commission pursuant to Section 205 of the Federal Power Act to receive just and reasonable compensation of the capital investment pursuant to the following:

(a) **Notice to State Utility Commissions, the ISO and Stakeholder Committees of Expectation that a Capital Expense will be Necessary to Meet the Reliability Need Identified by the ISO:** A resource seeking to avail itself of the recovery mechanism provided in this Section must notify the state utility commissions in the states where rate payers will fund the capital improvement, the ISO, and the Participants Committee of its intent to make the capital expenditure and the need for the expenditure. This notification must be made at least 120 days prior to the resource making the capital expenditure.

(b) **Required Showing Made to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission:** In order to receive just and reasonable compensation for a capital expenditure under this Section, a resource must file an explanation of need with the Commission that explains why the capital expenditure is necessary in order to meet the reliability need identified by the ISO. This showing must demonstrate that the expenditure is reasonably determined to be the least-cost commercially reasonable option consistent with Good Utility Practice to meet the reliability need identified by the ISO. If the resource elects cost-of-service treatment pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5.1(b), the Incremental Cost of Reliability Service filing described in this Section must be made separately from and may be made in advance of the resource's cost-of-service filing.

(c) **Allocation:** Costs of capital expenditures approved by the Commission under this provision shall be allocated to Regional Network Load within the affected Reliability Region.

### **III.13.2.5.2.5.3. Retirement and Permanent De-Listing of Resources.**

(a)(i) A resource, or portion thereof, will be retired coincident with the commencement of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period, or earlier as described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3(a)(ii), if the resource: (1) submitted a Retirement De-List Bid at or above the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price and was not retained for reliability pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1; (2) submitted a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid, elected to retire pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(a), and was not retained for reliability pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1; (3) elected conditional treatment pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(b) for a Retirement De-List Bid with a submitted price at or above the Capacity Clearing Price and was not retained for reliability pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1; or (4) had a Commission-

approved Retirement De-List Bid clear in the Forward Capacity Auction. In the case of a Retirement De-List Bid rejected for reliability, if the reliability need that resulted in the rejection for reliability is met, the resource, or portion thereof, will be retired coincident with the end of Capacity Supply Obligation (or earlier as described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3(a)(ii)) unless the Commission directs that the obligation to retire be removed or the retirement date extended as part of an Incremental Cost of Reliability Service filing made pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5.2. The interconnection rights, or relevant portion thereof, for the resource will terminate and the status of the resource, or portion thereof, will be converted to retired on the date of retirement, consistent with the provisions of Schedules 22 and 23 of the OATT.

(a)(ii) A resource, or portion thereof, that is to be retired pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3(a)(i) may retire the resource, or portion thereof, earlier than the Capacity Commitment Period for which its Retirement De-List Bid was submitted if it is able to transfer the relevant Capacity Supply Obligation of the resource to another resource through one or more approved Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral transactions as described in Section III.13.5.1 or reconfiguration auctions as described in Section III.13.4.1. A resource, or portion thereof, electing to retire pursuant to this provision must notify the ISO in writing of its election to retire and the date of retirement. The interconnection rights, or relevant portion thereof, for the resource will terminate and the status of the resource, or portion thereof, will be converted to retired on the date of retirement, consistent with the provisions of Schedules 22 and 23 of the OATT.

(b)(i) A resource, or portion thereof, will be permanently de-listed from the Forward Capacity Market as of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period, or earlier as described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3(b)(ii), if the resource: (1) submitted an Internal Market Monitor-approved Permanent De-List Bid at or above the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price and was not retained for reliability pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1; (2) elected conditional treatment pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(b) for a Permanent De-List Bid with a submitted price at or above the Capacity Clearing Price and was not retained for reliability pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1; or (3) had a Commission-approved Permanent De-List Bid clear in the Forward Capacity Auction. The CNR Capability interconnection rights, or relevant portion thereof, for the resource will be adjusted downward to reflect the Permanent De-List Bid, consistent with the provisions of Schedules 22 and 23 of the OATT. A resource that permanently de-lists pursuant to this Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3(b)(i) is precluded from subsequent participation in the Forward Capacity Market unless it qualifies as a New Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.1.2.

(b)(ii) A resource, or portion thereof, that is to be permanently de-listed pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3(b)(i) may be permanently de-listed earlier than the Capacity Commitment Period for which its Permanent De-List Bid was submitted if it is able to transfer the entire Capacity Supply Obligation of the resource to another resource through one or more approved Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral transactions as described in Section III.13.5.1 or reconfiguration auctions as described in Section III.13.4.

(c) A resource that has never been counted as a capacity resource may retire the asset by notifying the ISO in writing of its election to retire and the date of retirement. The date specified for retirement is subject to the limit for resource inactivity set out in Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3(d). The interconnection rights for the resource will terminate and the status of the resource will be converted to retired on the date of retirement.

(d) A resource that does not operate commercially for a period of three calendar years will be deemed by the ISO to be retired. The interconnection rights for the unit will terminate and the status of the unit will be converted to retired on the date of retirement. Where a generator has submitted an application to repower under Schedule 22 or 23 of the OATT, the current interconnection space will be maintained beyond the three years unless the application under Schedule 22 or 23 is withdrawn voluntarily or by the operation of those provisions. Where an application is withdrawn under Schedule 22 or 23, the three year period will be calculated from the last day of commercial operation of the resource.

#### **III.13.2.6. Capacity Rationing Rule.**

Except for Dynamic De-List Bids, Export Bids, and offers from New Import Capacity Resources that are subject to rationing pursuant to Section III.13.1.3.5.8 and Existing Import Capacity Resources that are subject to rationing pursuant to Section III.13.1.3.3.A, offers and bids in the Forward Capacity Auction must clear or not clear in whole, unless the offer or bid specifically indicates that it may be rationed. A resource may elect to be rationed to its Rationing Minimum Limit pursuant to Sections III.13.1.1.2.2.3 and III.13.1.2.1.2. Offers from New Import Capacity Resources and Existing Import Capacity Resources will not be rationed where such rationing would violate any applicable physical minimum flow requirements on the associated interface. Export Bids may elect to be rationed generally, but regardless of such election will always be subject to potential rationing where the associated external interface binds. If more Dynamic De-List Bids are submitted at a price than are needed to clear the market, the bids shall be cleared pro-rata, subject to honoring the Rationing Minimum Limit of the resources. Where an offer or

bid may be rationed, such rationing may not result in procuring an amount of capacity that is below the associated resource's Rationing Minimum Limit.

**III.13.2.7. Determination of Capacity Clearing Prices.**

The Capacity Clearing Price in each Capacity Zone shall be the price established by the descending clock auction as described in Section III.13.2.3, subject to the other provisions of this Section III.13.2.7. The Capacity Clearing Price for the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone and the Capacity Clearing Price for each import-constrained Capacity Zone shall not exceed the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price. The Capacity Clearing Price for an export-constrained Capacity Zone shall not be less than zero.

**III.13.2.7.1. Import-Constrained Capacity Zone Capacity Clearing Price Floor.**

The Capacity Clearing Price in an import-constrained Capacity Zone shall not be lower than the Capacity Clearing Price in the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone. If after the Forward Capacity Auction is conducted, the Capacity Clearing Price in an import-constrained Capacity Zone is less than the Capacity Clearing Price in the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone, all resources clearing in the import-constrained Capacity Zone shall be paid based on the Capacity Clearing Price in the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone during the associated Capacity Commitment Period.

**III.13.2.7.2. Export-Constrained Capacity Zone Capacity Clearing Price Ceiling.**

The Capacity Clearing Price in an export-constrained Capacity Zone shall not be higher than the Capacity Clearing Price in the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone.

The Capacity Clearing Price in a nested Capacity Zone shall not be higher than the Capacity Clearing Price in the Capacity Zone within which it is located.

**III.13.2.7.3. [Reserved.]**

**III.13.2.7.3 A. Treatment of Imports.**

At the Capacity Clearing Price, if the amount of capacity offered from New Import Capacity Resources and Existing Import Capacity Resources over an interface between an external Control Area and the New England Control Area is greater than that interface's approved capacity transfer limit (net of tie benefits, or net of HQICC in the case of the Phase I/II HVDC-TF):



(a) the full amount of capacity offered at that price from Existing Import Capacity Resources associated with contracts listed in Section III.13.1.3.3.A(c) shall clear, unless that amount of capacity is greater than the interface's approved capacity transfer limit (net of tie benefits, or net of HQICC in the case of the Phase I/II HVDC-TF), in which case the capacity offered at that price from Existing Import Capacity Resources associated with contracts listed in Section III.13.1.3.3.A(c) shall be rationed such that the interface's approved capacity transfer limit (net of tie benefits, or net of HQICC in the case of the Phase I/II HVDC-TF) is not exceeded; and

(b) if there is space remaining over the interface after the allocation described in subsection (a) above, then the capacity offered at that price from New Import Capacity Resources and Existing Import Capacity Resources other than Existing Import Capacity Resources associated with the contracts listed in Section III.13.1.3.3.A(c) will be rationed such that the interface's approved capacity transfer limit (net of tie benefits, or net of HQICC in the case of the Phase I/II HVDC-TF) is not exceeded. If the capacity offered at that price by any single New Import Capacity Resource or Existing Import Capacity Resource that is not associated with the contracts listed in Section III.13.1.3.3.A(c) is greater than the interface's approved capacity transfer limit (net of tie benefits, or net of HQICC in the case of the Phase I/II HVDC-TF), then the capacity offered by that resource that is above the interface's approved capacity transfer limit (net of tie benefits, or net of HQICC in the case of the Phase I/II HVDC-TF) shall not be included in the rationing.

#### **III.13.2.7.4. Effect of Capacity Rationing Rule on Capacity Clearing Price.**

Where the requirement that offers and bids clear or not clear in whole (Section III.13.2.6) prohibits the descending clock auction in its normal progression from clearing one or more Capacity Zones at the precise amount of capacity determined by the Capacity Zone Demand Curves specified in Section III.13.2.2, then the auctioneer shall analyze the aggregate supply curve to determine cleared capacity offers and Capacity Clearing Prices that seek to maximize social surplus for the associated Capacity Commitment Period. The clearing algorithm may result in offers below the Capacity Clearing Price not clearing, and in de-list bids below the Capacity Clearing Price clearing.

#### **III.13.2.7.5. Effect of Decremental Repowerings on the Capacity Clearing Price.**

Where the effect of accounting for certain repowering offers and bids (as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(e)) results in the auction not clearing at the lowest price for the required quantity of capacity,

then the auctioneer will conduct additional auction rounds of the Forward Capacity Auction as necessary to minimize capacity costs.

**III.13.2.7.6. Minimum Capacity Award.**

Each offer (excluding offers from Conditional Qualified New Resources that do not satisfy the conditions specified in Sections III.13.2.5.1(i)-(iii)) clearing in the Forward Capacity Auction shall be awarded a Capacity Supply Obligation at least as great as the amount of capacity offered at the End-of-Round Price in the final round of the Forward Capacity Auction. For Intermittent Power Resources, the Capacity Supply Obligation for months in the winter period (as described in Section III.13.1.5) shall be adjusted based on its winter Qualified Capacity as determined pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.2.6 and Section III.13.1.2.2.2.

**III.13.2.7.7. Tie-Breaking Rules.**

Where the provisions in this Section III.13.2 for clearing the Forward Capacity Auction (system-wide or in a single Capacity Zone) result in a tie – that is, where two or more resources offer sufficient capacity at prices that would clear the auction at the same minimum costs – the auctioneer shall apply the following rules (in sequence, as necessary) to determine clearing:

- (a) [Reserved.]
- (b) If multiple projects may be rationed, they will be rationed proportionately.
- (c) Where clearing either the offer associated with a resource with a higher queue priority at a Conditional Qualified New Resource's location or the offer associated with the Conditional Qualified New Resource would result in equal costs, the offer associated with the resource with the higher queue priority shall clear.
- (d) The offer associated with the Project Sponsor having the lower market share in the capacity auction (including Existing Generating Capacity Resources, Existing Import Capacity Resources, and Existing Demand Capacity Resources) shall be cleared.

**III.13.2.8. Capacity Substitution Auctions.**

**III.13.2.8.1. Administration of Substitution Auctions.**

Following the completion of the primary auction-clearing process of the Forward Capacity Auction as provided for in Section III.13.2, the ISO shall conduct a substitution auction, using a static double auction to clear supply offers (offers to assume a Capacity Supply Obligation) and demand bids (bids to shed a Capacity Supply Obligation). Supply offers and demand bids will be modeled in the Capacity Zone where the associated resources are electrically interconnected.

**III.13.2.8.1.1. Substitution Auction Clearing and Awards.**

The substitution auction shall maximize total social surplus as specified by the demand bids and supply offers used in the auction. The maximization is constrained as follows:

- (i) By the external interface limits modeled in the primary auction-clearing process.
- (ii) Such that the net cleared Capacity Supply Obligations (total acquired less total shed) in the substitution auction is equal to zero.
- (iii) Such that, for each import-constrained Capacity Zone, if the zone's total Capacity Supply Obligations awarded in the primary auction-clearing process of the Forward Capacity Auction is less than the zone threshold quantity specified below, then the zone's net cleared Capacity Supply Obligations (total acquired less total shed) in the substitution auction is equal to zero; otherwise, the sum of the zone's total Capacity Supply Obligations awarded in the primary auction-clearing process and the zone's net cleared Capacity Supply Obligations (total acquired less total shed) in the substitution auction is greater than or equal to the zone threshold quantity specified below.
- (iv) Such that, for each export-constrained Capacity Zone, if the zone's total Capacity Supply Obligations awarded in the primary auction-clearing process of the Forward Capacity Auction is greater than the zone threshold quantity specified below, then the zone's net cleared Capacity Supply Obligations (total acquired less total shed) in the substitution auction is equal to zero; otherwise, the sum of the zone's total Capacity Supply Obligations awarded in the primary auction-clearing process and the zone's net cleared Capacity Supply Obligations (total acquired less total shed) in the substitution auction is less than or equal to the zone threshold quantity specified below.

In applying constraint (iii), the zone threshold quantity for an import-constrained Capacity Zone shall be equal to the sum of its Capacity Zone Demand Curve truncation point quantity specified in Section III.13.2.2.2 and the total quantity of any Export Bids and any Administrative Export De-List Bids for which the exporting resource is located outside the import-constrained Capacity Zone, that are used to

export capacity across an external interface connected to the import-constrained Capacity Zone, and that cleared in the primary auction-clearing process of the Forward Capacity Auction.

In applying constraint (iv), the zone threshold quantity for an export-constrained Capacity Zone shall be equal to its Capacity Zone Demand Curve truncation point quantity specified in Section III.13.2.2.3 less the total quantity of any Export Bids and any Administrative Export De-List Bids for which the exporting resource is located in the export-constrained Capacity Zone, including any Export Bids and any Administrative Export De-List Bids in an associated nested export-constrained Capacity Zone, that are used to export capacity across an external interface connected to another Capacity Zone, and that cleared in the primary auction-clearing process of the Forward Capacity Auction.

In applying constraints (iii) and (iv), a zone's total Capacity Supply Obligations awarded in the primary auction-clearing process of the Forward Capacity Auction and net cleared Capacity Supply Obligations (total acquired less total shed) in the substitution auction shall include the Capacity Supply Obligations of Import Capacity Resources at each external interface connected to the Capacity Zone.

In applying constraints (iii) and (iv), a zone's total Capacity Supply Obligations awarded in the primary auction-clearing process of the Forward Capacity Auction shall include the Capacity Supply Obligations awarded to Proxy De-List Bids within the zone, and the zone's net cleared Capacity Supply Obligations (total acquired less total shed) in the substitution auction shall include the Capacity Supply Obligations shed from demand bids associated with Proxy De-List Bids within the zone.

In cases in which there are multiple clearing outcomes that would each maximize the substitution auction's objective, the following tie-breaking rules will apply in the following sequence: (i) non-rationable demand bids associated with Lead Market Participants having the largest total FCA Qualified Capacity of Existing Capacity Resources will be cleared first; and (ii) rationable supply offers will be cleared in proportion to their offer quantity.

For Intermittent Power Resources, other than those participating as the summer resource in a Composite FCM Transaction, the cleared award for supply offers and demand bids shall be adjusted for the months in the winter period (as described in Section III.13.1.5) using the ratio of the resource's cleared offer or bid amount divided by its FCA Qualified Capacity multiplied by its winter Qualified Capacity as determined pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.2.6 and Section III.13.1.2.2.2 after removing any portion of the resource's winter Qualified Capacity that is participating in a Composite FCM Transaction.

The cleared offer amount awarded to a Composite FCM Transaction in the substitution auction will be assigned to the summer and winter resources for their respective obligation months during the Capacity Commitment Period as described in Section III.13.1.5.

If, after the substitution auction, a resource has a Capacity Supply Obligation below its Economic Minimum Limit, it must meet the requirements of Section III.13.6.1.1.1.

### **III.13.2.8.1.2. Substitution Auction Pricing.**

The substitution auction will specify clearing prices for Capacity Zones and external interfaces as follows.

For each import-constrained Capacity Zone, if the sum of the zone's total Capacity Supply Obligations awarded in the primary auction-clearing process of the Forward Capacity Auction and the zone's net cleared Capacity Supply Obligations (total acquired less total shed) in the substitution auction is greater than its zone threshold quantity specified in Section III.13.2.8.1.1, then supply offers and demand bids in the substitution auction in the import-constrained Capacity Zone shall be treated as offers and bids in the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone for purposes of determining substitution auction clearing prices.

For each export-constrained Capacity Zone,

- (i) if the sum of the zone's total Capacity Supply Obligations, including Capacity Supply Obligations in a nested Capacity Zone, awarded in the primary auction-clearing process of the Forward Capacity Auction and the zone's net cleared Capacity Supply Obligations (total acquired less total shed) in the substitution auction including net cleared Capacity Supply Obligations in the nested Capacity Zone is less than its zone threshold quantity specified in Section III.13.2.8.1.1, then supply offers and demand bids in the substitution auction in the export-constrained Capacity Zone (excluding supply offers and demand bids in the nested Capacity Zone that are not treated as offers and bids in the export-constrained Capacity Zone pursuant to Section III.13.2.8.1.2(ii)) shall be treated as offers and bids in the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone for purposes of determining substitution auction clearing prices.
- (ii) if the sum of a nested Capacity Zone's Capacity Supply Obligations awarded in the primary auction-clearing process of the Forward Capacity Auction and the nested Capacity Zone's net cleared Capacity Supply Obligations (total acquired less total shed) in the substitution auction is less than its zone threshold quantity specified in Section

III.13.2.8.1.1, then supply offers and demand bids in the substitution auction in the nested Capacity Zone shall be treated as offers and bids in the export-constrained Capacity Zone within which the nested Capacity Zone is located, for purposes of determining substitution auction clearing prices.

The substitution auction clearing prices for the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone and for any constrained zones pooled with the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone for pricing purposes shall be determined by the price of the demand bid or supply offer that is marginal. If a demand bid associated with a Proxy De-List Bid is marginal, then the substitution auction clearing prices shall be set equal to the Capacity Clearing Prices.

The substitution auction clearing price for a constrained Capacity Zone that is not pooled with the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone for pricing purposes shall be determined by the price of the demand bid or supply offer associated with the separately-priced constrained Capacity Zone that is marginal. If a demand bid associated with a Proxy De-List Bid is marginal, then the substitution auction clearing price shall be set equal to the Capacity Clearing Price for the constrained Capacity Zone.

The substitution auction clearing price for a nested export-constrained Capacity Zone that is not pooled with the export-constrained Capacity Zone in which it is located for pricing purposes shall be determined by the price of the demand bid or supply offer that is marginal in the nested export-constrained Capacity Zone. If a demand bid associated with a Proxy De-List Bid is marginal, then the substitution auction clearing price for the nested export-constrained Capacity Zone shall be equal to the Capacity Clearing Price for that nested export-constrained Capacity Zone.

If the net quantity of Capacity Supply Obligations awarded in the primary Forward Capacity Auction and substitution auction over an interface between the New England Control Area and an external Control Area is less than that interface's approved capacity transfer limit (net of tie benefits, or net of HQICC in the case of the Phase I/II HVDC-TF), then supply offers and demand bids in the substitution auction at the interface shall be treated as offers and bids in the modeled Capacity Zone associated with that interface for purposes of determining substitution auction clearing prices.

If the net quantity of Capacity Supply Obligations awarded in the primary Forward Capacity Auction and substitution auction over an interface between the New England Control Area and an external Control Area is equal to that interface's approved capacity transfer limit (net of tie benefits, or net of HQICC in the case of the Phase I/II HVDC-TF), then the substitution auction clearing price for that interface will be determined by the demand bid or supply offer that is marginal at that interface. If a cleared demand bid

associated with a Proxy De-List Bid is marginal at the external interface, then the substitution auction clearing price for that interface shall be set equal to the Capacity Clearing Price for that interface.

The substitution auction clearing price for an import-constrained Capacity Zone where the total Capacity Supply Obligations awarded in the primary auction-clearing process of the Forward Capacity Auction are greater than or equal to the zone's threshold quantity specified in Section III.13.2.8.1.1 shall not be lower than the substitution auction clearing price for the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone.

The substitution auction clearing price for an export-constrained Capacity Zone that is not a nested export-constrained Capacity Zone, where the total Capacity Supply Obligations awarded in the primary auction-clearing process of the Forward Capacity Auction are less than or equal to the zone's threshold quantity specified in Section III.13.2.8.1.1 shall not exceed the substitution auction clearing price for the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone.

The substitution auction clearing price for a nested export-constrained Capacity Zone where the total Capacity Supply Obligations awarded in the primary auction-clearing process of the Forward Capacity Auction are less than or equal to the zone's threshold quantity specified in Section III.13.2.8.1.1 shall not exceed the substitution auction clearing price for the Capacity Zone within which it is located.

The substitution auction clearing price at an external interface shall not exceed the substitution auction clearing price in the Capacity Zone connected to the external interface.

If, pursuant to the rules specified above, the substitution auction clearing price for any Capacity Zone or external interface would exceed the Capacity Clearing Price for that location, the substitution auction clearing price for that location only is set equal to its Capacity Clearing Price.

The substitution auction clearing price for any Capacity Zone or external interface cannot be less than negative one multiplied by the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price.

### **III.13.2.8.2. Supply Offers in the Substitution Auction.**

#### **III.13.2.8.2.1. Supply Offers.**

To participate as supply in the substitution auction, a Project Sponsor for a New Capacity Resource must meet the following criteria:

(a) The Project Sponsor and the New Capacity Resource must meet all the requirements for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction specified in Section III.13.1.

(b) The Project Sponsor must elect to have the resource participate in the substitution auction during the New Capacity Show of Interest Window. Pursuant to an election, the resource's total amount of FCA Qualified Capacity that qualifies as a New Capacity Resource will be obligated to participate in the substitution auction, including any capacity of a Renewable Technology Resource that was not qualified due to proration pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.10(a), and subject to the other provisions of this Section III.13.2.8.2.

(c) The Project Sponsor must certify that the New Capacity Resource is a Sponsored Policy Resource as part of the submission of the New Capacity Qualification Package.

Substitution auction supply offers are rationable.

A resource participating in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.1.2 (resources previously counted as capacity resources) is not eligible to participate as supply in the substitution auction. A resource is not eligible to participate as supply in the substitution auction if it has submitted a demand bid for the substitution auction.

A Composite FCM Transaction comprised of a summer resource that is a Sponsored Policy Resource is eligible to participate as supply in the substitution auction.

A Conditional Qualified New Resource may participate in the substitution auction provided that the resource with which it has overlapping interconnection impacts: (i) did not receive a Capacity Supply Obligation, fully or partially, in the primary auction-clearing process, and: (ii) is not eligible to participate in the substitution auction. A resource having a higher priority in the queue than a Conditional Qualified New Resource with which it has overlapping interconnection impact may participate in the substitution auction provided that the Conditional Qualified New Resource did not receive a Capacity Supply Obligation, fully or partially, in the primary auction-clearing process.

#### **III.13.2.8.2.2. Supply Offer Prices.**

Project Sponsors must submit substitution auction supply offer prices no later than five Business Days after the deadline for submission of offers composed of separate resources.



A substitution auction supply offer must be in the form of a curve (with up to five price-quantity pairs). The curve may not decrease in quantity as the price increases. A supply offer price for the substitution auction may not be greater than the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price or lower than negative one multiplied by the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price.

If the offer quantity does not equal the resource's FCA Qualified Capacity, the quantity for which no offer price was submitted will be assigned a price equal to the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price.

### **III.13.2.8.2.3. Supply Offers Entered into the Substitution Auction**

Supply offers for resources that satisfy all of the criteria in Section III.13.2.8.2.1 to participate in the substitution auction may be adjusted prior to conducting the substitution auction-clearing process using the following adjustments:

- (a) Any portion of a resource's FCA Qualified Capacity that was cleared (received a Capacity Supply Obligation) in the primary auction-clearing process will be removed from the resource's substitution auction supply offer beginning with the lowest priced price-quantity pairs.
- (b) After performing the adjustment specified in Section III.13.2.8.2.3(a), any price-quantity pairs in a resource's substitution auction supply offer with a price greater than the Capacity Clearing Price for the resource's Capacity Zone or external interface are removed from the offer.

### **III.13.2.8.3. Demand Bids in the Substitution Auction.**

#### **III.13.2.8.3.1. Demand Bids.**

Market Participants with Existing Generating Capacity Resources or Existing Import Capacity Resources associated with External Elective Transmission Upgrades may elect to submit demand bids for the substitution auction for those resources by the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline. The election must specify the total amount of the resource's Qualified Capacity that will be associated with its demand bid.

A resource, including any portion of an existing resource that qualifies as a New Capacity Resource, must have achieved FCM Commercial Operation no later than seven days after the issuance by the ISO of the qualification determination notification described in Section III.13.1.2.4(b) in order to participate as demand in the substitution auction.

Regardless of whether an election is made, a demand bid is required for any portion of a resource that is associated with a Retirement De-List Bid, provided that the entire resource has achieved FCM Commercial Operation no later than seven days after the issuance by the ISO of the qualification determination notification described in Section III.13.1.2.4(b).

A resource for which a demand bid election has been made cannot participate in a Composite FCM Transaction, cannot be designated as a Self-Supplied FCA Resource, and will not have incremental summer or winter capacity that does not span the entire Capacity Commitment Period subjected to the treatment specified in Section III.13.1.1.1.3.A.

Demand bids are non-rationable.

A demand bid will be entered into the substitution auction for the portion of the resource that receives a Capacity Supply Obligation in the primary auction-clearing process, subject to the other provisions of this Section III.13.2.8.3. A resource, or portion thereof, associated with a cleared demand bid shall be retired from all New England Markets at the start of the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction.

**~~III.13.2.8.3.1A — Substitution Auction Test Prices.~~**

~~(a) — Participant Submitted Test Price. For auctions associated with a Capacity Commitment Period that begins on or after June 1, 2023, Market Participants that submit a substitution auction demand bid must submit a test price, calculated using the method described below, by the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline.~~

~~The test price for the capacity associated with a resource's demand bid must be calculated using the same methodology as a Retirement De-List Bid, except that a Market Participant may not submit test prices for multiple price-quantity segments but must submit a single test price using, as necessary, aggregated cost and revenue data. The test price must be accompanied by the same documentation required for Retirement De-List Bids above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1. A Market Participant must submit a test price regardless of whether the price is below the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold.~~

~~A Market Participant is not required to submit a test price for any resource for which the demand bid is less than 3 MW. The applicable test price for any such resource is \$0.00/kW-month.~~

~~(b) — **IMM-Determined Test Price.** The Internal Market Monitor shall review each test price submission using the methodology specified in Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1 for evaluating Retirement De List Bids, regardless of whether the submitted test price is below the Dynamic De List Bid Threshold. For purposes of this review, the expected revenues for a cleared substitution auction demand bid shall not be included as a component of opportunity costs. After due consideration and consultation with the Market Participant, as appropriate, the Internal Market Monitor shall replace the submitted test price with an IMM-determined test price if the submitted test price is not consistent with the sum of the net present value of the resource's expected cash flows plus reasonable expectations about the resource's Capacity Performance Payments plus reasonable opportunity costs.~~

~~The Internal Market Monitor's determination regarding a Market Participant submitted test price shall be included in the retirement determination notification described in Section III.13.1.2.4(a) and in the filing made to the Commission as described in Section III.13.8.1(a).~~

~~The test price used for purposes of the substitution auction shall be the Market Participant submitted test price, as adjusted by the Internal Market Monitor pursuant to this Section III.13.2.8.3.1A(b), and as further adjusted by the Commission in response to the Internal Market Monitor's filing pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4(a).~~

### **III.13.2.8.3.2. Demand Bid Prices.**

Market Participants must submit substitution auction demand bid prices no later than five Business Days after the deadline for submission of offers composed of separate resources.

A substitution auction demand bid must be in the form of a curve (with up to five price-quantity pairs).

The curve may not decrease in quantity as the price decreases. A demand bid price for the substitution auction may not be greater than the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price or lower than negative one multiplied by the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price.

If the bid quantity does not equal the total bid amount submitted by the Market Participant or required for a Retirement De-List Bid pursuant to Section III.13.2.8.3.1, the quantity for which no bid price was

specified will be assigned a price equal to negative one multiplied by the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price.

For auctions associated with a Capacity Commitment Period that begins on or after June 1, 2023, Market Participants may elect either of the demand bid adjustment methods specified in Section III.13.2.8.3.3(b) for the resource by no later than five Business Days after the deadline for submission of offers composed of separate resources. If no such election is made, the adjustment applied shall be the method specified in Section III.13.2.8.3.3(b)(i).

### **III.13.2.8.3.3. Demand Bids Entered into the Substitution Auction.**

If a resource is determined to be needed for reliability pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5, then any demand bid associated with the resource will not be further included in the substitution auction. ~~If a resource is awarded a Capacity Supply Obligation in the primary auction-clearing process and the Capacity Clearing Price is less than ninety percent of the resource's test price as established pursuant to Section III.13.2.8.3.1A, then the resource's demand bid will not be included in the substitution auction.~~

Demand bids for resources that satisfy all of the criteria in Section III.13.2.8.3.1 to participate in the substitution auction will be adjusted prior to conducting the substitution auction-clearing process using the following adjustments:

- (a) For the substitution auction associated with the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2022, any portion of a resource's demand bid that exceeds its Capacity Supply Obligation awarded in the primary auction-clearing process will be removed from the substitution auction demand bid beginning with the highest priced price-quantity pairs.
- (b) For substitution auctions associated with a Capacity Commitment Period that begins on or after June 1, 2023, a resource's demand bid will be adjusted using one of the following methods as elected pursuant to Section III.13.2.8.3.2:
  - (i) The portion of a resource's capacity that did not receive a Capacity Supply Obligation in the primary auction-clearing process will be removed from the substitution auction demand bid beginning with the highest priced price-quantity pair.
  - (ii) Any portion of a resource's demand bid that exceeds its Capacity Supply Obligation awarded in the primary auction-clearing process will be removed from the substitution auction demand bid beginning with the lowest priced price-quantity pair.

(c) After performing the modification specified in Sections III.13.2.8.3.3(a) or III.13.2.8.3.3(b), any price-quantity pairs in a resource's substitution auction demand bid with a price greater than the Capacity Clearing Price for the resource's Capacity Zone or external interface will have its price reduced to the Capacity Clearing Price for the resource's Capacity Zone or external interface.

Except as provided in Section III.13.2.5.2.1(c), a rationable demand bid will be entered into the substitution auction on behalf of any Proxy De-List Bid associated with a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid. The demand bid quantity will equal the portion of the Proxy De-List Bid that was not cleared (received a Capacity Supply Obligation) in the first run of the primary auction-clearing process. The demand bid will have priority to clear before non-rationable demand bids.

### **III.13.3. Critical Path Schedule Monitoring.**

#### **III.13.3.1. Resources Subject to Critical Path Schedule Monitoring.**

##### **III.13.3.1.1. New Resources Electing Critical Path Schedule Monitoring.**

A Project Sponsor that submits a critical path schedule for a New Capacity Resource in the qualification process may request that the ISO monitor that resource's compliance with its critical path schedule in accordance with the provisions of this Section III.13.3. The ISO will monitor the New Capacity Resource's compliance from the time the ISO approves the request until the resource achieves FCM Commercial Operation, loses its Capacity Supply Obligation pursuant to Section III.13.3.4A, or withdraws from critical path schedule monitoring pursuant to Section III.13.3.6.

In addition, a Lead Market Participant with a New Import Capacity Resource backed by one or more existing External Resources seeking to qualify for Capacity Commitment Period(s) prior to the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction for which it is qualifying must request monitoring under this Section III.13.3.1.1.

A request under this Section III.13.3.1.1 must be made in writing no later than five Business Days after the deadline for submission of the FCM Deposit pursuant to Section III.13.1.9.1.

##### **III.13.3.1.2. New Resources Clearing in the Forward Capacity Auction.**

For each new resource required to submit a critical path schedule in the qualification process, including but not limited to a New Generating Capacity Resource (pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.2), a New Import Capacity Resource backed by a new External Resource (pursuant to Section III.13.1.3.5), or a New Demand Capacity Resource (pursuant to Section III.13.1.4), if capacity from that resource clears in the Forward Capacity Auction, then the ISO shall monitor that resource's compliance with its critical path schedule in accordance with the provisions of this Section III.13.3 (regardless of whether the Project Sponsor requested monitoring pursuant to Section III.13.3.1.1) from the time that the Forward Capacity Auction is conducted until the resource achieves FCM Commercial Operation, loses its Capacity Supply Obligation pursuant to Section III.13.3.4A, or withdraws from critical path schedule monitoring pursuant to Section III.13.3.6.

**III.13.3.1.3. New Resources Not Offering or Not Clearing in the Forward Capacity Auction.**

If no capacity from a new resource that was required to submit a critical path schedule in the qualification process clears in the Forward Capacity Auction, or if such a resource does not submit an offer in the Forward Capacity Auction, then the ISO shall not monitor that resource's compliance with its critical path schedule after the Forward Capacity Auction unless the Project Sponsor previously requested pursuant to Section III.13.3.1.1 that the ISO continue to monitor that resource's compliance with its critical path schedule. However, if a New Generating Capacity Resource participated but did not clear in the Forward Capacity Auction either as: (i) a Conditional Qualified New Resource, or (ii) a New Generating Capacity Resource with a higher priority in the queue and overlapping interconnection impacts with a Conditional Qualified New Resource, the ISO will not continue to monitor that resource's compliance with its critical path schedule even if that resource requested critical path schedule monitoring pursuant to Section III.13.3.1.1.

**III.13.3.2. Quarterly Critical Path Schedule Reports.**

For each new resource that is being monitored for compliance with its critical path schedule, the Project Sponsor for that resource must provide a written critical path schedule report to the ISO no later than five Business Days after the end of each calendar quarter. If the Project Sponsor does not provide a written critical path schedule report to the ISO by the fifth Business Day after the end of the calendar quarter, then the ISO shall issue a notice thereof to the Project Sponsor. If the Project Sponsor fails to provide the critical path schedule report within five Business Days of issuance of that notice, then the resource will be subject to termination pursuant to Section III.13.3.4A. Each critical path schedule report shall include the following:

**III.13.3.2.1. Updated Critical Path Schedule.**

The critical path schedule report must include a complete updated version of the critical path schedule as described in Section III.13.1.1.2.2.2, dated contemporaneously with the submission of the critical path schedule report. The updated critical path schedule should clearly indicate if the Project Sponsor is proposing to change any of the milestones or dates from the previously submitted version of the critical path schedule, and must include an explanation of any such proposed changes. In the critical path schedule report, the Project Sponsor should also explain in detail any proposed changes to the project design and the potential impact of such changes on the amount of capacity the resource will be able to provide.

### **III.13.3.2.2. Documentation of Milestones Achieved.**

(a) For all new resources except for Demand Capacity Resources installed at multiple facilities and Demand Capacity Resources from a single facility with a demand reduction value of less than 5 MW (discussed in Section III.13.3.2.2(b)), for each critical path schedule milestone achieved since the submission of the previous critical path schedule report, the Project Sponsor must include in the critical path schedule report documentation demonstrating that the milestone has been achieved by the date indicated and as otherwise described in the critical path schedule, as follows:

(i) **Major Permits.** For each major permit described in the critical path schedule, the Project Sponsor shall provide documentation showing that the permit was applied for and obtained as described in the critical path schedule. For permit applications, this documentation could include a dated copy of the permit application or cover letter requesting the permit. For approved permits, this documentation could include a dated copy of the approved permit or letter granting the permit from the permitting authority.

(ii) **Project Financing Closing.** The Project Sponsor shall provide documentation showing that the sources of financing identified in the critical path schedule have committed to provide the amount of financing described in the critical path schedule. This documentation could include copies of commitment letters from the sources of financing.

(iii) **Major Equipment Orders.** For each major component described in the critical path schedule, the Project Sponsor shall provide documentation showing that the equipment was ordered as described in the critical path schedule. This documentation should include a copy of a dated confirmation of the order from the manufacturer or supplier. This documentation should confirm scheduled delivery dates consistent with milestone Section III.13.3.2.2(a)(vi).

(iv) **Substantial Site Construction.** The Project Sponsor shall provide documentation showing that the amount of money expended on construction activities occurring on the project site has exceeded 20 percent of the construction financing costs.

(v) **Major Equipment Delivery.** For each major component described in the critical path schedule, the Project Sponsor shall provide documentation showing that the equipment was delivered to the project site and received as preliminarily acceptable as described in the critical



path schedule. This documentation should include a copy of a dated confirmation of delivery to the project site.

(vi) **Major Equipment Testing.** For each major component described in the critical path schedule, the Project Sponsor shall provide documentation showing that the component was tested, including major systems testing as appropriate for the specific technology as described in the critical path schedule, and that the test results demonstrate the equipment's suitability to allow, in conjunction with other major components, subsequent operation of the project in accordance with the amount of capacity obligated from the resource in the Capacity Commitment Period in accordance with Good Utility Practice. This documentation could include a dated copy of the satisfactory test results.

(vii) **Commissioning.** The Project Sponsor shall provide documentation showing that the resource has demonstrated a level of performance equal to or greater than the amount of capacity obligated from the resource in the Capacity Commitment Period. This documentation should include a copy of a dated letter of confirmation from the applicable manufacturer, contractor, or installer.

(viii) **Commercial Operation.** The Project Sponsor is not required to provide documentation of Commercial Operation (as defined in Schedule 22, 23, or 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff) to the ISO as part of the ISO's critical path schedule monitoring. The ISO shall confirm that the resource has achieved Commercial Operation (as defined in Schedule 22, 23, or 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff) as described in the critical path schedule through the resource's compliance with the other relevant requirements of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff and the ISO New England System Rules.

(ix) **Transmission Upgrades.** If during the qualification process it was determined that transmission upgrades (including any upgrades identified in a re-study pursuant to Section 3.2.1.3 of Schedule 22, Section 1.7.1.3 of Schedule 23, or Section 3.2.1.3 of Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff) are needed for the new resource to complete its interconnection, then the Project Sponsor shall provide documentation showing that the transmission upgrades have been completed.

(b) For Demand Capacity Resources installed at multiple facilities and Demand Capacity Resources from a single facility with a demand reduction value of less than 5 MW, for each critical path schedule milestone achieved since the submission of the previous critical path schedule report, the Project Sponsor must include in the critical path schedule report documentation demonstrating that the milestone has been achieved by the date indicated and as otherwise described in the critical path schedule, as follows:

(i) **Substantial Project Completion.** The Project Sponsor shall provide documentation showing the total offered demand reduction value achieved as of target dates which are: (a) the cumulative percentage of total demand reduction value achieved on target date 1 occurring five weeks prior to the first Forward Capacity Auction after the Forward Capacity Auction in which the Demand Capacity Resource supplier's capacity award was made; (b) the cumulative percentage of total demand reduction value achieved on target date 2 occurring five weeks prior to the second Forward Capacity Auction after the Forward Capacity Auction in which the Demand Capacity Resource supplier's capacity award was made; and (c) target date 3 which is the date the resource is expected to be ready to demonstrate to the ISO that the Demand Capacity Resource described in the Project Sponsor's New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package has achieved its full demand reduction value, which must be on or before the first day of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period and by which date 100 percent of the total demand reduction value must be complete.

(ii) **Additional Requirements.** For each customer and each prospective customer the Project Sponsor shall provide: name, location, MW amount, and description of stage of negotiation. If the customer's Asset has been registered with the ISO, then the Project Sponsor shall also provide the Asset identification number.

#### **III.13.3.2.3. Additional Relevant Information.**

The Project Sponsor must include in the critical path schedule report any other information regarding the status or progress of the project or any of the project milestones that might be relevant to the ISO's evaluation of the feasibility of the project being built in accordance with the critical path schedule or the feasibility that the project will achieve all its critical path schedule milestones no later than the start of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period.

#### **III.13.3.2.4. Additional Information for Resources Previously Counted As Capacity.**

For each resource participating in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to Sections III.13.1.1.1.2, III.13.1.1.1.3, or III.13.1.1.1.4 or New Demand Capacity Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.4.1 and clearing in that auction, the Project Sponsor must provide information in the critical path schedule report demonstrating: (a) the shedding of the resource's Capacity Supply Obligation in accordance with the provisions of Section III.13.1.1.2.2.5(c); and (b) that the relevant cost threshold (described in Sections III.13.1.1.1.2, III.13.1.1.1.3, and III.13.1.1.1.4) is being met.

### **III.13.3.3. Failure to Meet Critical Path Schedule.**

If the ISO determines that any critical path schedule milestone date has been missed, or if the Project Sponsor proposes a change to any milestone date in a quarterly critical path schedule report (as described in Section III.13.3.2.1), then the ISO shall consult with the Project Sponsor to determine the impact of the missed milestone or proposed revision, and shall determine a revised date for the milestone and for any other milestones affected by the change. If a milestone date is revised for any reason, the ISO may require the Project Sponsor to submit a written report to the ISO on the fifth Business Day of each month until the revised milestone is achieved detailing the progress toward meeting the revised milestone. If the Project Sponsor does not provide a written critical path schedule report to the ISO on the fifth Business Day of a month, then the ISO shall issue a notice thereof to the Project Sponsor. If the Project Sponsor fails to provide the critical path schedule report within five Business Days of issuance of that notice, then the resource will be subject to termination pursuant to Section III.13.3.4A. Such a monthly reporting requirement, if imposed, shall be in addition to the quarterly critical path schedule reports described in Section III.13.3.2.

### **III.13.3.4. Covering Capacity Supply Obligations.**

(a) If a capacity supplier determines that a resource may not be able to demonstrate its ability to deliver the full amount of its Capacity Supply Obligation, the capacity supplier may take actions to cover all or part of the Capacity Supply Obligation for any portion of the Capacity Commitment Period, as follows:

- (i) A capacity supplier may cover its Capacity Supply Obligation through reconfiguration auctions as described in Section III.13.4.
- (ii) A capacity supplier may cover its Capacity Supply Obligation through one or more Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals, subject to the satisfaction of the requirements in Section III.13.5.

- (iii) A capacity supplier that has qualified a resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.1.2 may cover its Capacity Supply Obligation by electing, no later than ten Business Days prior to the offer and bid deadline for the third annual reconfiguration auction prior to the start of the applicable Capacity Commitment Period, to have the resource that was previously counted as a capacity resource cover the Capacity Supply Obligation of the New Generating Capacity Resource for up to two Capacity Commitment Periods. If an election is made to have the resource that was previously counted as a capacity resource cover the Capacity Supply Obligation of the New Generating Capacity Resource, the capacity supplier with the resource that was previously counted as a capacity resource shall be required to comply with the requirements set forth in Section III.13.6.1 so long as it continues to cover for the New Generating Capacity Resource.
- (b) During a Capacity Commitment Period, a failure to cover charge will apply to any capacity resource that has not demonstrated the ability to deliver the full amount of its Capacity Supply Obligation by the end of an Obligation Month. The failure to cover charge is the difference between a resource's monthly Capacity Supply Obligation and its Maximum Demonstrated Output, multiplied by the Failure to Cover Charge Rate, where:

**Maximum Demonstrated Output Period**

Maximum Demonstrated Output Period is the period beginning six years prior to the start of the applicable Capacity Commitment Period and ending with the most recently completed calendar month in the Capacity Commitment Period, including all prior months in the Capacity Commitment Period.

Provided that, for a resource that has previously been counted as a capacity resource and for which an election has been made to participate as a New Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.1.2, and for which a cover election has been made pursuant to Section III.13.3.4(a)(iii), then: (1) the Maximum Demonstrated Output Period will be the Maximum Demonstrated Output Period of the resource that has been previously counted as capacity, and; (2) the Maximum Demonstrated Output Period of the New Generating Capacity Resource will begin on the earlier of: (i) the date that the resource that has previously been counted as a capacity resource began any outage as provided in Section III.13.1.1.1.2, and; (ii) the date that the New

Generating Capacity Resource commenced Commercial Operation (as defined in Schedule 22, 23, or 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff).

### **Failure to Cover Charge Rate**

For Capacity Commitment Periods beginning prior to June 1, 2022, the Failure to Cover Charge Rate for a Capacity Zone is the higher of the Capacity Clearing Price and the clearing price in any annual reconfiguration auction for that Capacity Commitment Period.

For Capacity Commitment Periods beginning on or after June 1, 2022, the Failure to Cover Charge Rate for a Capacity Zone is the price determined by a second clearing of the third annual reconfiguration auction prior to the start of the Capacity Commitment Period in which the aggregated zonal quantities of undemonstrated Capacity Supply Obligation, as of the completion of the third annual reconfiguration auction, and as determined pursuant to Section III.13.3.4 (b), are included as demand bids at the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price for each applicable Capacity Zone.

Provided that, if an existing resource is covering for a New Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to Section III.13.3.4(a)(iii), then the undemonstrated Capacity Supply Obligation for the New Generating Capacity Resource is the difference between the existing resource's Maximum Demonstrated Output and the new resource's Capacity Supply Obligation.

### **Maximum Demonstrated Output**

The Maximum Demonstrated Output is the sum of the highest output levels achieved by each Generator Asset associated with a Generating Capacity Resource, each Demand Response Asset associated with an Active Demand Capacity Resources, and assets associated with a Seasonal Peak Demand Resource or On-Peak Demand Resource, during the Maximum Demonstrated Output Period as specified below. The minimum Maximum Demonstrated Output for all assets is zero.

Provided that, if a resource that was previously counted as capacity is covering for a New Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to Section III.13.3.4(a)(iii), then the Maximum Demonstrated Output is the sum of the highest aggregate output level achieved by each asset associated with the resource that has previously been counted as capacity during the Maximum Demonstrated Output Period.

At the asset level, Maximum Demonstrated Output is calculated as follows:

**Demand Response Assets associated with an Active Demand Capacity Resource:** The Maximum Demonstrated Output for dates occurring prior to June 1, 2018 is the highest audit value in the Maximum Demonstrated Output Period increased by average avoided peak transmission and distribution losses. The Maximum Demonstrated Output for dates occurring on or after to June 1, 2018 will be equal to the highest demand reduction calculated, pursuant to Section III.8.4, in the Maximum Demonstrated Output Period increased by average avoided peak transmission and distribution losses for non-Net Supply.

**Distributed Generation associated with a Seasonal Peak Demand Resource or an On-Peak Demand Resource:** The Maximum Demonstrated Output is the highest hourly metered output in the Maximum Demonstrated Output Period after the resource has completed testing and has achieved commercial operation, increased by average avoided peak transmission and distribution losses for non-Net Supply.

**Load Management associated with a Seasonal Peak Demand Resource or an On-Peak Demand Resource:** The Maximum Demonstrated Output is the highest hourly demand reduction value in the Maximum Demonstrated Output Period increased by average avoided peak transmission and distribution losses for non-Net Supply.

**Energy Efficiency associated with a Seasonal Peak Demand Resource or an On-Peak Demand Resource:** The Maximum Demonstrated Output is the highest reported monthly performance value in the Maximum Demonstrated Output Period increased by average avoided peak transmission and distribution losses.

**Generator Assets:** The Maximum Demonstrated Output for dates occurring prior to March 1, 2017 is the highest hourly Revenue Quality Metering in the Maximum Demonstrated Output Period beginning on or after Commercial Operation (as defined in Schedule 22, 23, or 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff). The Maximum Demonstrated Output for dates occurring on or after March 1, 2017 is the highest Metered Quantity for Settlement in the Maximum Demonstrated Output Period beginning on or after Commercial

Operation (as defined in Schedule 22, 23, or 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff).

If a single Generator Asset is split into two or more new Generator Assets, the Maximum Demonstrated Output associated with the single Generation Asset will be prorated among the new assets based on their summer maximum net output. If multiple Generator Assets are consolidated to fewer assets, the Maximum Demonstrated Output of the Generator Assets that are being consolidated will be allocated to the consolidated assets based on the summer maximum net output.

**Import Capacity Resources:** For an Import Capacity Resource that is backed by external generation that has not achieved commercial operation at the time of qualification, in part or entirely, the Maximum Demonstrated Output is the highest revenue quality metered output for a five-minute or greater interval after the resource has completed testing and has achieved commercial operation. Provided that, the Maximum Demonstrated Output of an Import Capacity Resource associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade may be limited by the highest demonstrated capability of the Elective Transmission Upgrade after the Elective Transmission Upgrade has completed testing and has achieved commercial operation.

#### **III.13.3.4A Termination of Capacity Supply Obligations.**

If a Project Sponsor fails to comply with the requirements of Sections III.13.3.2 or III.13.3.3, or if a Project Sponsor covers a Capacity Supply Obligation for two Capacity Commitment Periods, or if, as a result of milestone date revisions, the date by which a resource will have achieved all its critical path schedule milestones is more than two years after the beginning of the Capacity Commitment Period for which the resource first received a Capacity Supply Obligation, then the ISO, after consultation with the Project Sponsor, shall have the right, through a filing with the Commission, to terminate the resource's Capacity Supply Obligation for any future Capacity Commitment Periods and the resource's right to any payments associated with that Capacity Supply Obligation in the Capacity Commitment Period, and to adjust the resource's qualified capacity for participation in the Forward Capacity Market; provided that, where a Project Sponsor voluntarily withdraws its resource from critical path schedule monitoring in accordance with Section III.13.3.6, no filing with the Commission shall be necessary to terminate the resource's Capacity Supply Obligation. Upon Commission ruling, the Project Sponsor shall forfeit any financial assurance provided with respect to that Capacity Supply Obligation. If in these circumstances, however, the ISO does not take steps to terminate the resource's Capacity Supply Obligation and instead

permits the Project Sponsor to continue to cover its Capacity Supply Obligation, such continuation shall be subject to the ISO's right to revoke that permission and to file with the Commission to terminate the resource's Capacity Supply Obligation, and subject to continued reporting by the Project Sponsor as described in this Section III.13.3.

If a resource's Capacity Supply Obligation that was acquired in a substitution auction at a negative price is withdrawn or terminated, the Project Sponsor shall remain obligated for any settlement charges associated with the terminated Capacity Supply Obligation for the Capacity Commitment Period.

**III.13.3.5. Termination of Interconnection Agreement.**

If the ISO terminates, or files with the Commission to terminate, a resource's Capacity Supply Obligation as described in Section III.13.3.4A, the ISO shall have the right to terminate the Interconnection Agreement with that resource through a filing with the Commission and upon Commission ruling. If the Project Sponsor continues to cover all of its Capacity Supply Obligations while challenging such termination before the Commission, it shall retain its Queue Position.

**III.13.3.6. Withdrawal from Critical Path Schedule Monitoring.**

A Project Sponsor may withdraw its resource from critical path schedule monitoring by the ISO at any time by submitting a written request to the ISO. The ISO also may deem a resource withdrawn from critical path schedule monitoring if the Project Sponsor does not adhere to the requirements of this Section III.13.3. Any resource withdrawn from critical path schedule monitoring shall be subject to the provisions of Section III.13.3.4A.

**III.13.3.7 Request to Defer Capacity Supply Obligation**

A resource that has not yet achieved FCM Commercial Operation and that is subject to critical path schedule monitoring by the ISO pursuant to this Section III.13.3 may seek to defer the applicability of its entire Capacity Supply Obligation by one year pursuant to the provisions of this Section III.13.3.7.

A Project Sponsor seeking such a deferral must notify the ISO in writing no later than the first Business Day in September of the year prior to the third annual reconfiguration auction for the Capacity Commitment Period in which the resource has a Capacity Supply Obligation. If, after consultation with the Project Sponsor, the ISO determines that the absence of the capacity in the first Capacity Commitment Period in which the resource has a Capacity Supply Obligation, as well as in the subsequent Capacity Commitment Period, would result in the violation of any NERC or NPCC (or their successors) criteria or



of the ISO New England System Rules, not solely that it may result in the procurement of less capacity than the Installed Capacity Requirement (net of HQICCs) or the Local Sourcing Requirement for the Capacity Zone, then the ISO will review the specific reliability need with and seek feedback from the Reliability Committee and provide the Project Sponsor with a written determination to that effect within 30 days of the Project Sponsor's notification to the ISO.

If the ISO provides such a written determination, then the Project Sponsor may file with the Commission, no later than the first Business Day in November of the year prior to the third annual reconfiguration auction, a request to defer the applicability of its Capacity Supply Obligation by one year. Any such filing must include the ISO's written determination, and must also demonstrate that the deferral is critical to the resource's ability to achieve FCM Commercial Operation and that the reasons for the deferral are beyond the control of the Project Sponsor.

If the Commission approves the request, all of the rights, obligations, payments, and charges associated with the Capacity Supply Obligation described in Sections III.13.3.4(b), III.13.6 and III.13.7 shall only apply beginning one year after the start of the Capacity Commitment Period in which the resource has a Capacity Supply Obligation. Notwithstanding any other provision of this Section III.13, if the resource achieves FCM Commercial Operation prior to the deferred date, it will not be eligible to receive revenue in the Forward Capacity Market until the deferred date. Beginning on the deferred date, all of the rights, obligations, payments, and charges associated with the Capacity Supply Obligation shall apply, and the Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price (indexed using the Handy-Whitman Index of Public Utility Construction Costs in effect as of December 31 of the year preceding the Capacity Commitment Period) associated with the Forward Capacity Auction in which the resource cleared as a new resource shall apply for the full duration of the Capacity Supply Obligation (including multi-year elections made pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.2.4 or Section III.13.1.4.1.1.2.7). A Project Sponsor will not take actions to cover the resource's Capacity Supply Obligation for the deferral period as described in Section III.13.3.4(a), but the other requirements of III.13.3, including all reporting requirements and the ISO's right to seek termination, shall continue to apply during the deferral period. Upon Commission approval of the deferral, the resource may not participate in any reconfiguration auctions or Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals for any portion of the deferral period. Beginning at 8:00 a.m. (Eastern Time) 30 days after Commission approval of the request, the Project Sponsor shall be required to provide an additional amount of financial assurance as described in Section VII.B.2.c of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

Notwithstanding any other provision of this Section III.13, if any of the resource's Capacity Supply Obligation in the deferral period was shed in a reconfiguration auction or Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral prior to Commission approval of the deferral request, then the resource's settlements shall be adjusted by the ISO to ensure that the resource does not receive any payments associated with that transaction in excess of the charges associated with that transaction; the resource will be responsible for any charges in excess of payments.

#### **III.13.3.8 FCM Commercial Operation.**

A resource (or portion thereof) achieves FCM Commercial Operation when (1) the ISO has determined that the resource (or portion thereof) has achieved all its critical path schedule milestones, including completion of any transmission upgrades necessary for the resource to obtain the requisite interconnection service; and (2) the ISO verifies the resource's (or a portion of the resource's) summer capacity rating (or, for a resource with winter capacity only, its winter capacity rating).

(a) For a Generating Capacity Resource (or portion thereof) that has achieved all its critical path schedule milestones, the ISO shall confirm FCM Commercial Operation as soon as practicable following the ISO's verification of the resource's summer capacity rating (or, for a resource with winter capacity only, its winter capacity rating), which may take place in any month of the year. The ISO shall verify the summer capacity rating of a Generating Capacity Resource that is an Intermittent Power Resource following no fewer than 30 consecutive calendar days of operation (for periods from October 1 through May 31, a Market Participant must request such verification).

(b) For a Demand Capacity Resource (or portion thereof) that has achieved all its critical path schedule milestones, the ISO shall confirm FCM Commercial Operation upon verifying that the Demand Capacity Resource described in the New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package has achieved its full demand reduction value, subject to the requirements of Section III.13.6.1.5.3(b).

(c) For an Import Capacity Resource (or portion thereof) that has achieved all its critical path schedule milestones, the ISO shall confirm FCM Commercial Operation upon demonstration that the Import Capacity Resource described in the New Capacity Qualification Package has achieved its full Qualified Capacity.

### **III.13.4. Reconfiguration Auctions.**

For each Capacity Commitment Period, the ISO shall conduct annual and monthly reconfiguration auctions as described in this Section III.13.4. Reconfiguration auctions only permit the trading of Capacity Supply Obligations; load obligations are not traded in reconfiguration auctions. Each reconfiguration auction shall use a static double auction (respecting the interface limits and capacity requirements modeled as specified in Sections III.13.4.5 and III.13.4.7) to clear supply offers (i.e., offers to assume a Capacity Supply Obligation) and demand bids (i.e., bids to shed a Capacity Supply Obligation) for each Capacity Zone included in the reconfiguration auction. Supply offers and demand bids will be modeled in the Capacity Zone where the associated resources are electrically interconnected. Resources that are able to meet the requirements in other Capacity Zones shall be allowed to clear to meet such requirements, subject to the constraints modeled in the auction.

#### **III.13.4.1. Capacity Zones Included in Reconfiguration Auctions.**

Each reconfiguration auction associated with a Capacity Commitment Period shall include each of, and only, the final Capacity Zones and external interfaces as determined through the Forward Capacity Auction for that Capacity Commitment Period, as described in Section III.13.2.3.4.

#### **III.13.4.2. Participation in Reconfiguration Auctions.**

Each supply offer and demand bid in a reconfiguration auction must be associated with a specific resource, and must satisfy the requirements of this Section III.13.4.2. All resource types may submit supply offers and demand bids in reconfiguration auctions. In accordance with Section III.A.9.2 of *Appendix A* of this Market Rule 1, supply offers and demand bids submitted for reconfiguration auctions shall not be subject to mitigation by the Internal Market Monitor. A supply offer or demand bid submitted for a reconfiguration auction shall not be limited by the associated resource's Economic Minimum Limit. Offers composed of separate resources may not participate in reconfiguration auctions. Participation in any reconfiguration auction is conditioned on full compliance with the applicable financial assurance requirements as provided in the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy at the time of the offer and bid deadline. For annual reconfiguration auctions, the offer and bid deadline will be announced by the ISO no later than 30 days prior to that deadline. No later than 15 days before the offer and bid deadline for an annual reconfiguration auction, the ISO shall notify each resource of the amount of capacity that it may offer or bid in that auction, as calculated pursuant to this Section III.13.4.2. For monthly reconfiguration auctions, the offer and bid deadline will be announced by the ISO no later than 10 Business Days prior to that deadline. Upon issuance of the monthly bilateral results for the associated

Obligation Month, the ISO shall notify each resource of the amount of capacity that it may offer or bid in that monthly auction, as calculated pursuant to this Section III.13.4.2. For monthly reconfiguration auctions in which the most recently approved Winter Seasonal Claimed Capability established as of the fifth Business Day in June of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period is greater than the Winter ARA Qualified Capacity for the third annual reconfiguration auction, the ISO shall apply the greater of these two values to offer limits starting with the first monthly reconfiguration auction in the winter delivery period for the relevant Capacity Commitment Period, limited, as applicable, by the resource's CNR Capability.

**III.13.4.2.1. Supply Offers.**

Submission of supply offers in reconfiguration auctions shall be governed by this Section III.13.4.2.1. All supply offers in reconfiguration auctions shall be submitted by the Project Sponsor or Lead Market Participant, and shall specify the resource, the amount of capacity offered in MW, and the price, in dollars per kW/month. In no case may capacity associated with a Retirement De-List Bid or a Permanent De-List Bid that cleared in the Forward Capacity Auction, or a demand bid that cleared in a substitution auction, for a Capacity Commitment Period be offered in a reconfiguration auction for that, or any subsequent, Capacity Commitment Period, or any portion thereof. In no case may capacity associated with an Export Bid or an Administrative Export De-List Bid that cleared in the Forward Capacity Auction for a Capacity Commitment Period be offered in a reconfiguration auction for that Capacity Commitment Period, or any portion thereof.

**III.13.4.2.1.1. Amount of Capacity That May Be Submitted in a Supply Offer in an Annual Reconfiguration Auction.**

For each month of the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the annual reconfiguration auction, the ISO shall calculate the difference between the Summer ARA Qualified Capacity or Winter ARA Qualified Capacity, as applicable, and the amount of capacity from that resource that is already subject to a Capacity Supply Obligation for the month. The minimum of these 12 values shall be the amount of capacity up to which a resource may submit a supply offer in the annual reconfiguration auction.

**III.13.4.2.1.2. Calculation of Summer ARA Qualified Capacity and Winter ARA Qualified Capacity.**

**III.13.4.2.1.2.1. First Annual Reconfiguration Auction and Second Annual Reconfiguration Auction.**

### **III.13.4.2.1.2.1.1. Generating Capacity Resources Other than Intermittent Power Resources.**

#### **III.13.4.2.1.2.1.1.1. Summer ARA Qualified Capacity.**

For the first and second annual reconfiguration auctions associated with a Capacity Commitment Period, the Summer ARA Qualified Capacity of a Generating Capacity Resource that is not an Intermittent Power Resource shall be the sum of the values determined pursuant to subsections (a) and (b) below, limited, as applicable, by the resource's CNR Capability and any relevant overlapping interconnection impacts as described in Section III.13.1.1.2.3(f):

(a) For capacity that has achieved FCM Commercial Operation, the higher of the resource's summer Qualified Capacity as calculated for the Forward Capacity Auction for that Capacity Commitment Period and any summer Seasonal Claimed Capability values for summer periods completed after the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline for the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period and before the start of the Capacity Commitment Period. The amount of capacity described in this Section III.13.4.2.1.2.1.1.1(a) shall be zero, however, where the resource cleared in the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period as a new resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2 and where the project has not achieved FCM Commercial Operation.

(b) Any amount of capacity that has not yet achieved FCM Commercial Operation but: (i) is being monitored by the ISO pursuant to the provisions of Section III.13.3; (ii) is expected to achieve all its critical path schedule milestones prior to the start of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period; and (iii) for which the Lead Market Participant or Project Sponsor has met all relevant financial assurance requirements as described in Section III.13.1.9 and in the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

#### **III.13.4.2.1.2.1.1.2. Winter ARA Qualified Capacity.**

For the first and second annual reconfiguration auctions associated with a Capacity Commitment Period, the Winter ARA Qualified Capacity of a Generating Capacity Resource that is not an Intermittent Power Resource shall be the sum of the values determined pursuant to subsections (a) and (b) below, limited, as applicable, by the resource's CNR Capability and any relevant overlapping interconnection impacts as described in Section III.13.1.1.2.3(f):

(a) For capacity that has achieved FCM Commercial Operation, the higher of the resource's winter Qualified Capacity as calculated for the Forward Capacity Auction for that Capacity Commitment Period

and any winter Seasonal Claimed Capability values for winter periods completed after the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline for the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period and before the start of the Capacity Commitment Period. The amount of capacity described in this Section III.13.4.2.1.2.1.1.2(a) shall be zero, however, where the resource cleared in the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period as a new resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.1.2 and where the project has not achieved FCM Commercial Operation.

(b) Any amount of capacity that has not yet achieved FCM Commercial Operation but: (i) is being monitored by the ISO pursuant to the provisions of Section III.13.3; (ii) is expected to achieve all its critical path schedule milestones prior to the start of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period; and (iii) for which the Lead Market Participant or Project Sponsor has met all relevant financial assurance requirements as described in Section III.13.1.9 and in the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

#### **III.13.4.2.1.2.1.2. Intermittent Power Resources.**

##### **III.13.4.2.1.2.1.2.1. Summer ARA Qualified Capacity.**

For the first and second annual reconfiguration auctions associated with a Capacity Commitment Period, the Summer ARA Qualified Capacity of an Intermittent Power Resource shall be the sum of the values determined pursuant to subsections (a) and (b) below, limited, as applicable, by the resource's CNR Capability and any relevant overlapping interconnection impacts as described in Section III.13.1.1.2.3(f):

(a) For capacity that has achieved FCM Commercial Operation, the resource's most recently-determined summer Qualified Capacity. The amount of capacity described in this Section III.13.4.2.1.2.1.2.1(a) shall be zero, however, where the resource cleared in the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period as a new resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.1.2 and the project has not achieved FCM Commercial Operation.

(b) Any amount of capacity that has not yet achieved FCM Commercial Operation but: (i) is being monitored by the ISO pursuant to the provisions of Section III.13.3; (ii) is expected to achieve all its critical path schedule milestones prior to the start of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period; and (iii) for which the Lead Market Participant or Project Sponsor has met all relevant financial assurance requirements as described in Section III.13.1.9 and in the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

##### **III.13.4.2.1.2.1.2.2. Winter ARA Qualified Capacity.**

For the first and second annual reconfiguration auctions associated with a Capacity Commitment Period, the Winter ARA Qualified Capacity of an Intermittent Power Resource shall be the sum of the values determined pursuant to subsections (a) and (b) below, limited, as applicable, by the resource's CNR Capability and any relevant overlapping interconnection impacts as described in Section III.13.1.1.2.3(f):

(a) For capacity that has achieved FCM Commercial Operation, the resource's most recently-determined winter Qualified Capacity. The amount of capacity described in this Section III.13.4.2.1.2.1.2.2(a) shall be zero, however, where the resource cleared in the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period as a new resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.1.2 and the project has not achieved FCM Commercial Operation.

(b) Any amount of capacity that has not yet achieved FCM Commercial Operation but: (i) is being monitored by the ISO pursuant to the provisions of Section III.13.3; (ii) is expected to achieve all its critical path schedule milestones prior to the start of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period; and (iii) for which the Lead Market Participant or Project Sponsor has met all relevant financial assurance requirements as described in Section III.13.1.9 and in the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**III.13.4.2.1.2.1.3. Import Capacity Resources Backed By an External Control Area.**

For the first and second annual reconfiguration auctions associated with a Capacity Commitment Period, the Summer ARA Qualified Capacity and Winter ARA Qualified Capacity of an Import Capacity Resource shall be equal to its summer Qualified Capacity and winter Qualified Capacity, respectively, as determined for the Forward Capacity Auction for that Capacity Commitment Period.

**III.13.4.2.1.2.1.3.1. Import Capacity Resources Backed by One or More External Resources.**

For the first and second annual reconfiguration auctions associated with a Capacity Commitment Period, the Summer ARA Qualified Capacity and Winter ARA Qualified Capacity of an Import Capacity Resource backed by one or more External Resources shall be the greater of:

(a) the summer Qualified Capacity and winter Qualified Capacity, respectively, as determined for the Forward Capacity Auction for that Capacity Commitment Period; and

(b) the amount of capacity available to back the import, if submitted by the Lead Market Participant and approved by the ISO by the fifth Business Day in October and, if submitted for a New Import Capacity Resource backed by one or more External Resources, also subject to the satisfaction of the requirements

in Sections III.13.1.3.5.1(b), III.13.1.3.5.2, and III.13.3.1.1 and the relevant financial assurance requirements as described in Section III.13.1.9 and the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**III.13.4.2.1.2.1.4. Demand Capacity Resources.**

**III.13.4.2.1.2.1.4.1. Summer ARA Qualified Capacity.**

For the first and second annual reconfiguration auctions associated with a Capacity Commitment Period, the Summer ARA Qualified Capacity of a Demand Capacity Resource shall be determined as follows.

(a) For Demand Capacity Resources other than those composed of Energy Efficiency measures, the sum of the values determined pursuant to subsections (i) and (ii) below:

(i) For capacity that has achieved FCM Commercial Operation, the resource's most recently-determined summer Qualified Capacity.

(ii) Any amount of capacity that has not yet achieved FCM Commercial Operation but: (1) is being monitored by the ISO pursuant to the provisions of Section III.13.3; (2) is expected to achieve all its critical path schedule milestones prior to the start of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period; and (3) for which the Lead Market Participant or Project Sponsor has met all relevant financial assurance requirements as described in Section III.13.1.9 and in the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

(b) For Demand Capacity Resources composed of Energy Efficiency measures, the lesser of the values determined pursuant to subsections (i) and (ii) below:

(i) The sum of the most recently-determined summer demand reduction values of the resource's installed Energy Efficiency measures (excluding any capacity that will retire or permanently de-list, or whose Measure Life will expire, prior to the start of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period, and increased by average avoided peak transmission and distribution losses) and any summer capacity that has not yet achieved FCM Commercial Operation that satisfies the criteria found in subsection (a)(ii) above.

(ii) The amount of summer capacity that qualified for the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Demand Capacity Resource (excluding any capacity that is terminated or that will retire or



permanently de-list prior to the start of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period) that is expected to achieve all its critical path schedule milestones prior to the start of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period.

**III.13.4.2.1.2.1.4.2. Winter ARA Qualified Capacity.**

For the first and second annual reconfiguration auctions associated with a Capacity Commitment Period, the Winter ARA Qualified Capacity of a Demand Capacity Resource shall be determined as follows.

(a) For Demand Capacity Resources other than those composed of Energy Efficiency measures, the sum of the values determined pursuant to subsections (i) and (ii) below:

(i) For capacity that has achieved FCM Commercial Operation, the resource's most recently-determined winter Qualified Capacity.

(ii) Any amount of capacity that has not yet achieved FCM Commercial Operation but: (1) is being monitored by the ISO pursuant to the provisions of Section III.13.3; (2) is expected to achieve all its critical path schedule milestones prior to the start of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period; and (3) for which the Lead Market Participant or Project Sponsor has met all relevant financial assurance requirements as described in Section III.13.1.9 and in the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

(b) For Demand Capacity Resources composed of Energy Efficiency measures, the lesser of the values determined pursuant to subsections (i) and (ii) below:

(i) The sum of the most recently-determined winter demand reduction values of the resource's installed Energy Efficiency measures (excluding any capacity that will retire or permanently de-list, or whose Measure Life will expire, prior to the start of the winter period of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period, and increased by average avoided peak transmission and distribution losses) and any winter capacity that has not yet achieved FCM Commercial Operation that satisfies the criteria found in subsection (a)(ii) above.

(ii) The amount of winter capacity that qualified for the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Demand Capacity Resource (excluding any capacity that is terminated or that will retire or permanently de-list prior to the start of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period) that is

expected to achieve all its critical path schedule milestones prior to the start of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period.

**III.13.4.2.1.2.2. Third Annual Reconfiguration Auction.**

**III.13.4.2.1.2.2.1. Generating Capacity Resources other than Intermittent Power Resources.**

**III.13.4.2.1.2.2.1.1. Summer ARA Qualified Capacity.**

For the third annual reconfiguration auction associated with a Capacity Commitment Period, the Summer ARA Qualified Capacity of a Generating Capacity Resource that is not an Intermittent Power Resource shall be the sum of the values determined pursuant to subsections (a) and (b) below, limited, as applicable, by the resource's CNR Capability and any relevant overlapping interconnection impacts as described in Section III.13.1.1.2.3(f):

(a) For capacity that has achieved FCM Commercial Operation, the resource's summer Seasonal Claimed Capability value in effect after the most recently completed summer period. The amount of capacity described in this Section III.13.4.2.1.2.2.1.1(a) shall be zero, however, where the resource cleared in the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period as a new resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.1.2 and the project has not achieved FCM Commercial Operation.

(b) Any amount of capacity that has not yet achieved FCM Commercial Operation but: (i) is being monitored by the ISO pursuant to the provisions of Section III.13.3; (ii) is expected to achieve all its critical path schedule milestones prior to the start of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period; and (iii) for which the Lead Market Participant or Project Sponsor has met all relevant financial assurance requirements as described in Section III.13.1.9 and in the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**III.13.4.2.1.2.2.1.2. Winter ARA Qualified Capacity.**

For the third annual reconfiguration auction associated with a Capacity Commitment Period, the Winter ARA Qualified Capacity of a Generating Capacity Resource that is not an Intermittent Power Resource shall be the sum of the values determined pursuant to subsections (a) and (b) below, limited, as applicable, by the resource's CNR Capability and any relevant overlapping interconnection impacts as described in Section III.13.1.1.2.3(f):

(a) For capacity that has achieved FCM Commercial Operation, the resource's winter Seasonal Claimed Capability value in effect after the most recently completed winter period. The amount of capacity described in this Section III.13.4.2.1.2.2.1.2(a) shall be zero, however, where the resource cleared in the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period as a new resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.1.2 and the project has not achieved FCM Commercial Operation.

(b) Any amount of capacity that has not yet achieved FCM Commercial Operation but: (i) is being monitored by the ISO pursuant to the provisions of Section III.13.3; (ii) is expected to achieve all its critical path schedule milestones prior to the start of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period; and (iii) for which the Lead Market Participant or Project Sponsor has met all relevant financial assurance requirements as described in Section III.13.1.9 and in the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

#### **III.13.4.2.1.2.2.2. Intermittent Power Resources.**

##### **III.13.4.2.1.2.2.2.1. Summer ARA Qualified Capacity.**

For the third annual reconfiguration auction associated with a Capacity Commitment Period, the Summer ARA Qualified Capacity of an Intermittent Power Resource shall be the sum of the values determined pursuant to subsections (a) and (b) below, limited, as applicable, by the resource's CNR Capability and any relevant overlapping interconnection impacts as described in Section III.13.1.1.2.3(f):

(a) For capacity that has achieved FCM Commercial Operation, the lesser of its most recently-determined summer Qualified Capacity and its summer Seasonal Claimed Capability value in effect after the most recently competed summer period. The amount of capacity described in this Section III.13.4.2.1.2.2.2.1(a) shall be zero, however, where the resource cleared in the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period as a new resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.1.2 and the project has not achieved FCM Commercial Operation.

(b) Any amount of capacity that has not yet achieved FCM Commercial Operation but: (i) is being monitored by the ISO pursuant to the provisions of Section III.13.3; (ii) is expected to achieve all its critical path schedule milestones prior to the start of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period; and (iii) for which the Lead Market Participant or Project Sponsor has met all relevant financial assurance requirements as described in Section III.13.1.9 and in the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

##### **III.13.4.2.1.2.2.2.2. Winter ARA Qualified Capacity.**

For the third annual reconfiguration auction associated with a Capacity Commitment Period, the Winter ARA Qualified Capacity of an Intermittent Power Resource shall be the sum of the values determined pursuant to subsections (a) and (b) below, limited, as applicable, by the resource's CNR Capability and any relevant overlapping interconnection impacts as described in Section III.13.1.1.2.3(f):

(a) For capacity that has achieved FCM Commercial Operation, the lesser of its most recently-determined winter Qualified Capacity and its winter Seasonal Claimed Capability value in effect after the most recently completed winter period. The amount of capacity described in this Section III.13.4.2.1.2.2.2(a) shall be zero, however, where the resource cleared in the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period as a new resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2 and the project has not achieved FCM Commercial Operation.

(b) Any amount of capacity that has not yet achieved FCM Commercial Operation but: (i) is being monitored by the ISO pursuant to the provisions of Section III.13.3; (ii) is expected to achieve all its critical path schedule milestones prior to the start of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period; and (iii) for which the Lead Market Participant or Project Sponsor has met all relevant financial assurance requirements as described in Section III.13.1.9 and in the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

#### **III.13.4.2.1.2.2.3. Import Capacity Resources.**

##### **III.13.4.2.1.2.2.3.1 Import Capacity Resources Backed by an External Control Area.**

For the third annual reconfiguration auction associated with a Capacity Commitment Period, the Summer ARA Qualified Capacity of an Import Capacity Resource shall be equal to the lesser of its summer Qualified Capacity as determined for the Forward Capacity Auction for that Capacity Commitment Period and the amount of capacity available to back the import, if submitted by the Lead Market Participant and approved by the ISO by the fifth Business Day in October. For the third annual reconfiguration auction associated with a Capacity Commitment Period, the Winter ARA Qualified Capacity of an Import Capacity Resource shall be equal to the lesser of its winter Qualified Capacity as determined for the Forward Capacity Auction for that Capacity Commitment Period and the amount of capacity available to back the import, if submitted by the Lead Market Participant and approved by the ISO by the fifth Business Day in October.

##### **III.13.4.2.1.2.2.3.2. Import Capacity Resources Backed by One or More External Resources.**

For the third annual reconfiguration auction associated with a Capacity Commitment Period, the Summer ARA Qualified Capacity and Winter ARA Qualified Capacity of an Import Capacity Resource backed by one or more External Resources shall be the lesser of:

(a) the summer Qualified Capacity and winter Qualified Capacity, respectively, as determined by the most recent Forward Capacity Auction that does not reflect a change to the Import Capacity Resource applicable to that Capacity Commitment Period; and

(b) the amount of capacity available to back the import, if submitted by the Lead Market Participant and approved by the ISO by the fifth Business Day in October and, if submitted for a New Import Capacity Resource backed by one or more External Resources, also subject to the satisfaction of the requirements in Sections III.13.1.3.5.1(b), III.13.1.3.5.2, and III.13.3.1.1 and the relevant financial assurance requirements as described in Section III.13.1.9 and the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

#### **III.13.4.2.1.2.2.4. Demand Capacity Resources.**

##### **III.13.4.2.1.2.2.4.1. Summer ARA Qualified Capacity.**

For the third annual reconfiguration auction associated with a Capacity Commitment Period, the Summer ARA Qualified Capacity of a Demand Capacity Resource shall be determined as follows.

(a) For Demand Capacity Resources other than those composed of Energy Efficiency measures, the sum of the values determined pursuant to subsections (i) and (ii) below:

(i) For capacity that has achieved FCM Commercial Operation, the lesser of: (1) its most recently-determined summer Qualified Capacity and (2) its summer Seasonal DR Audit value or summer Passive DR Audit value in effect at the time of qualification for the third annual reconfiguration auction.

(ii) Any amount of capacity that has not yet achieved FCM Commercial Operation but: (1) is being monitored by the ISO pursuant to the provisions of Section III.13.3; (2) is expected to achieve all its critical path schedule milestones prior to the start of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period; and (3) for which the Lead Market Participant or Project Sponsor has met all relevant financial assurance requirements as described in Section III.13.1.9 and in the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

(b) For Demand Capacity Resources composed of Energy Efficiency measures, the lesser of the values determined pursuant to subsections (i) and (ii) below:

(i) The sum of the most recently-determined summer demand reduction values of the resource's installed Energy Efficiency measures (excluding any capacity that will retire or permanently de-list, or whose Measure Life will expire, prior to the start of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period, and increased by average avoided peak transmission and distribution losses) and any summer capacity that has not yet achieved FCM Commercial Operation that satisfies the criteria found in subsection (a)(ii) above.

(ii) The amount of summer capacity that qualified for the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Demand Capacity Resource (excluding any capacity that will retire or permanently de-list prior to the start of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period) provided that the resource is expected to achieve all its critical path schedule milestones prior to the start of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period.

**III.13.4.2.1.2.2.4.2. Winter ARA Qualified Capacity.**

For the third annual reconfiguration auction associated with a Capacity Commitment Period, the Winter ARA Qualified Capacity of a Demand Capacity Resource shall be determined as follows.

(a) For Demand Capacity Resources other than those composed of Energy Efficiency measures, the sum of the values determined pursuant to subsections (i) and (ii) below:

(i) For capacity that has achieved FCM Commercial Operation, the lesser of: (1) its most recently-determined winter Qualified Capacity and (2) its winter Seasonal DR Audit value or winter Passive DR Audit value in effect at the time of qualification for the third annual reconfiguration auction.

(ii) Any amount of capacity that has not yet achieved FCM Commercial Operation but: (1) is being monitored by the ISO pursuant to the provisions of Section III.13.3; (2) is expected to achieve all its critical path schedule milestones prior to the start of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period; and (3) for which the Lead Market Participant or Project Sponsor has met

all relevant financial assurance requirements as described in Section III.13.1.9 and in the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

(b) For Demand Capacity Resources composed of Energy Efficiency measures, the lesser of the values determined pursuant to subsections (i) and (ii) below:

(i) The sum of the most recently-determined winter demand reduction values of the resource's installed Energy Efficiency measures (excluding any capacity that will retire or permanently de-list, or whose Measure Life will expire, prior to the start of the winter period of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period and increased by average avoided peak transmission and distribution losses) and any winter capacity that has cleared in a Forward Capacity Auction and not yet achieved FCM Commercial Operation that satisfies the criteria found in subsection (a)(ii) above.

(ii) The amount of winter capacity that qualified for the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Demand Capacity Resource (excluding any capacity that will retire or permanently de-list prior to the start of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period) provided that the resource is expected to achieve all its critical path schedule milestones prior to the start of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period.

#### **III.13.4.2.1.3. Adjustment for Significant Decreases in Capacity.**

For each month of the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the third annual reconfiguration auction, for each resource that has achieved FCM Commercial Operation, the ISO shall subtract the resource's Summer ARA Qualified Capacity or Winter ARA Qualified Capacity, as applicable, from the amount of capacity from the resource that is subject to a Capacity Supply Obligation for the month. For the month associated with the greatest of these 12 values (for Capacity Commitment Periods beginning on or before June 1, 2019) or the least of these 12 values (for Capacity Commitment Periods beginning on or after June 1, 2020), if the resource's Summer ARA Qualified Capacity or Winter ARA Qualified Capacity (as applicable) is below the amount of capacity from that resource that is subject to a Capacity Supply Obligation for that month by:

(1) for Capacity Commitment Periods beginning on or before June 1, 2019, more than the lesser of:

(i) 20 percent of the amount of capacity from that resource that is subject to a Capacity Supply Obligation for that month or;

- (ii) 40 MW;
- (2) for Capacity Commitment Periods beginning on June 1, 2020, June 1, 2021 and June 1, 2022, more than the lesser of:
  - (i) the greater of 20 percent of the amount of capacity from that resource that is subject to a Capacity Supply Obligation for that month or two MW, or;
  - (ii) 40 MW;
- (3) for Capacity Commitment Periods beginning on or after June 1, 2023, more than the lesser of:
  - (i) the greater of 10 percent of the amount of capacity from that resource that is subject to a Capacity Supply Obligation for that month or two MW, or;
  - (ii) 10 MW;

then the following provisions shall apply:

(a) The Lead Market Participant may submit a written plan to the ISO with any necessary supporting documentation describing the measures that will be taken and demonstrating that the resource will be able to provide an amount of capacity consistent with its total Capacity Supply Obligation for the Capacity Commitment Period by the start of all months in that Capacity Commitment Period in which the resource has a Capacity Supply Obligation. If submitted, such a plan must be received by the ISO no later than 10 Business Days after the ISO has notified the Lead Market Participant of its Summer ARA Qualified Capacity and Winter ARA Qualified Capacity for the third annual reconfiguration auction.

(b) If no such plan as described in Section III.13.4.2.1.3(a) is timely submitted to the ISO, or if such a plan is timely submitted but the ISO determines that the plan does not demonstrate that the resource will be able to provide the necessary amount of capacity by the start of all months in the Capacity Commitment Period in which the resource has a Capacity Supply Obligation, then the ISO shall enter a demand bid at the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price on behalf of the resource (with all payments, charges, rights, obligations, and other results associated with such bid applying to the resource as if the resource itself had submitted the bid) in the third annual reconfiguration auction in an amount equal to:

- (1) for Capacity Commitment Periods beginning prior to June 1, 2020, the greatest of the 12 monthly values determined pursuant to this Section III.13.4.2.1.3;
- (2) for Capacity Commitment Periods beginning on June 1, 2020, June 1, 2021 and June 1, 2022, where the Capacity Supply Obligation and Qualified Capacity values are those for the month in which the values as determined pursuant to Section III.13.4.2.1.3 vary the least, the greater of:
  - (i) the resource's Capacity Supply Obligation minus (Qualified Capacity divided by 0.8), and;



(ii) the resource's Capacity Supply Obligation minus Qualified Capacity minus 40 MW;  
(3) for Capacity Commitment Periods beginning on or after June 1, 2023, where the Capacity Supply Obligation and Qualified Capacity values are those for the month in which the values as determined pursuant to Section III.13.4.2.1.3 vary the least, the greater of:

- (i) the resource's Capacity Supply Obligation minus (Qualified Capacity divided by 0.9),  
and;
- (ii) the resource's Capacity Supply Obligation minus Qualified Capacity minus 10 MW.

**III.13.4.2.1.4. Amount of Capacity That May Be Submitted in a Supply Offer in a Monthly Reconfiguration Auction.**

A resource that has not achieved FCM Commercial Operation may not submit a supply offer for that reconfiguration auction, unless the resource has a negative Capacity Supply Obligation, in which case it may submit a supply offer for that reconfiguration auction in an amount up to the absolute value of its Capacity Supply Obligation. The amount of capacity up to which a resource may submit a supply offer in a monthly reconfiguration auction shall be the difference (but in no case less than zero) between (i) the resource's Summer ARA Qualified Capacity or Winter ARA Qualified Capacity as adjusted pursuant to Section III.13.4.2, as applicable, for the auction month for the third annual reconfiguration auction for the relevant Capacity Commitment Period; and (ii) the amount of capacity from that resource that is already subject to a Capacity Supply Obligation for that month. However, a resource may not submit a supply offer for a monthly reconfiguration auction if it is on an approved outage during that month.

**III.13.4.2.1.5. ISO Review of Supply Offers.**

Supply offers in reconfiguration auctions shall be reviewed by the ISO to ensure the regional and local adequacy achieved through the Forward Capacity Auction and other reliability needs are maintained. The ISO's reviews will consider the location and operating and rating limitations of resources associated with cleared supply offers to ensure reliability standards will remain satisfied if the offer is accepted. The ISO shall reject supply offers that would otherwise clear in a reconfiguration auction that will result in a violation of any NERC or NPCC criteria, or ISO New England System Rules during the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the reconfiguration auction. The ISO's reliability reviews will assess such offers, beginning with the marginal resource, based on operable capacity needs while considering any approved or interim approved transmission outage information and any approved Generator Asset or Demand Response Resource outage information, and will include transmission security studies. Supply offers that cannot meet the applicable reliability needs will be rejected in their entirety and the resource will not be rejected in part. Rejected resources will not be further included in clearing the reconfiguration

auction and the Lead Market Participant or Project Sponsor, as appropriate, shall be notified as soon as practicable after the reconfiguration auction of the rejection and of the reliability need prompting such rejection.

#### **III.13.4.2.2. Demand Bids in Reconfiguration Auctions.**

Submission of demand bids in reconfiguration auctions shall be governed by this Section III.13.4.2.2. All demand bids in reconfiguration auctions shall be submitted by the Project Sponsor or Lead Market Participant, and shall specify the amount of capacity bid in MW, and the price, in dollars per kW/month.

- (a) To submit a demand bid in a reconfiguration auction, a resource must have a Capacity Supply Obligation for the Capacity Commitment Period (or portion thereof, as applicable) associated with that reconfiguration auction. Where capacity associated with a Self-Supplied FCA Resource that cleared in the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period is offered in a reconfiguration auction for that Capacity Commitment Period, or any portion thereof, a resource acquiring a Capacity Supply Obligation shall not as a result become a Self-Supplied FCA Resource.
- (b) Each demand bid submitted to the ISO for reconfiguration auction shall be no greater than the amount of the resource's capacity that is already obligated for the Capacity Commitment Period (or portion thereof, as applicable) as of the offer and bid deadline for the reconfiguration auction.
- (c) All demand bids in reconfiguration auctions shall be reviewed by the ISO to ensure the regional and local adequacy achieved through the Forward Capacity Auction and other reliability needs are maintained. The ISO's reviews will consider the location and operating and rating limitations of resources associated with demand bids that would otherwise clear to ensure reliability standards will remain satisfied if the committed capacity is withdrawn. The ISO shall reject demand bids that would otherwise clear in a reconfiguration auction that will result in a violation of any NERC or NPCC criteria or ISO New England System Rules during the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the reconfiguration auction, provided that for annual reconfiguration auctions associated with a Capacity Commitment Period that begins on or after June 1, 2018, the ISO shall not reject a demand bid solely on the basis that acceptance of the demand bid may result in the procurement of less capacity than the Installed Capacity Requirement (net of HQICCs). For monthly reconfiguration auctions, the ISO shall obtain and consider information from the Local Control Center regarding whether the capacity associated with demand bids that would otherwise clear from resources with a Capacity Supply Obligation is needed for local system conditions. The ISO's reliability reviews will assess such bids, beginning with the marginal resource,

based on operable capacity needs while considering any approved or interim approved transmission outage information and any approved Generator Asset or Demand Response Resource outage information, and will include transmission security studies. Where the applicable reliability needs cannot be met if a Demand Bid is cleared, such Demand Bids will be rejected in their entirety and the resource will not be rejected in part. Demand Bids from rejected resources will not be further included in clearing the reconfiguration auction, and the Lead Market Participant or Project Sponsor, as appropriate, shall be notified as soon as practicable after the reconfiguration auction of the rejection and of the reliability need prompting such rejection.

**III.13.4.3. [Reserved.]**

**III.13.4.4. Clearing Offers and Bids in Reconfiguration Auctions.**

All supply offers and demand bids may be cleared in whole or in part in all reconfiguration auctions. If after clearing, a resource has a Capacity Supply Obligation below its Economic Minimum Limit, it must meet the requirements of Section III.13.6.1.1.1.

**III.13.4.5. Annual Reconfiguration Auctions.**

Except as provided below, after the Forward Capacity Auction for a Capacity Commitment Period, and before the start of that Capacity Commitment Period, the ISO shall conduct three annual reconfiguration auctions for capacity commitments covering the whole of that Capacity Commitment Period. For each annual reconfiguration auction, the capacity demand curves, New England Control Area and Capacity Zone capacity requirements and external interface limits, as updated pursuant to Section III.12, shall be modeled in the auction consistent with the Forward Capacity Auction for the associated Capacity Commitment Period. For purposes of the annual reconfiguration auctions, the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price used to define the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve shall be the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price associated with the Forward Capacity Auction for the same Capacity Commitment Period addressed by the reconfiguration auction.

**III.13.4.5.1. Timing of Annual Reconfiguration Auctions.**

The first annual reconfiguration auction for the Capacity Commitment Period shall be held in the month of June that is approximately 24 months before the start of the Capacity Commitment Period. The second annual reconfiguration auction for the Capacity Commitment Period shall be held in the month of August that is approximately 10 months before the start of the Capacity Commitment Period. The third annual

reconfiguration auction for the Capacity Commitment Period shall be held in the month of March that is approximately 3 months before the start of the Capacity Commitment Period.

**III.13.4.5.2. Acceleration of Annual Reconfiguration Auction.**

If the difference between the forecasted Installed Capacity Requirement (net of HQICCs) for a Capacity Commitment Period and the amount of capacity obligated for that Capacity Commitment Period is sufficiently large, then the ISO may, upon reasonable notice to Market Participants, conduct an annual reconfiguration auction as much as six months earlier than its normally-scheduled time.

**III.13.4.6. [Reserved.]**

**III.13.4.7. Monthly Reconfiguration Auctions.**

Prior to each month in the Capacity Commitment Period, the ISO shall conduct a monthly reconfiguration auction for whole-month capacity commitments during that month. For each monthly reconfiguration auction for Capacity Commitment Periods beginning before June 1, 2020, the Local Sourcing Requirement and Maximum Capacity Limit applicable for each Capacity Zone and external interface limits, as updated pursuant to Section III.12, shall be modeled as constraints in the auction. For each monthly reconfiguration auction for Capacity Commitment Periods beginning or after June 1, 2020, the truncation points for import-constrained Capacity Zones and export-constrained Capacity Zones specified in Section III.13.2.2.2 and Section III.13.2.2.3, and external interface limits, as updated pursuant to Section III.12, shall be modeled as constraints in the auction. The System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve is not modeled in monthly reconfiguration auctions.

**III.13.4.8. Adjustment to Capacity Supply Obligations.**

For each supply offer that clears in a reconfiguration auction, the resource's Capacity Supply Obligation for the relevant Capacity Commitment Period (or portion thereof, as applicable) shall be increased by the amount of capacity that clears. For each demand bid that clears in a reconfiguration auction, the resource's Capacity Supply Obligation for the relevant Capacity Commitment Period (or portion thereof, as applicable) shall be decreased by the amount of capacity that clears.

### **III.13.5. Bilateral Contracts in the Forward Capacity Market.**

Market Participants shall be permitted to enter into Annual Reconfiguration Transactions, Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals, Capacity Load Obligation Bilaterals and Capacity Performance Bilaterals in accordance with this Section III.13.5, with the ISO serving as Counterparty in each such transaction. Market Participants may not offset a Capacity Load Obligation with a Capacity Supply Obligation.

#### **III.13.5.1. Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals.**

Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals are available for monthly periods. The qualification of resources subject to a Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral is determined in the same manner as the qualification of resources is determined for reconfiguration auctions as specified in Section III.13.4.2.

A resource having a Capacity Supply Obligation seeking to shed that obligation (Capacity Transferring Resource) may enter into a bilateral transaction to transfer its Capacity Supply Obligation, in whole or in part (Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral), to a resource, or portion thereof, having Qualified Capacity for that Capacity Commitment Period that is not already obligated (Capacity Acquiring Resource), subject to the following limitations.

- (a) A Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral must be coterminous with a calendar month.
- (b) A Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral may not transfer a Capacity Supply Obligation amount that is greater than the monthly Capacity Supply Obligation of the Capacity Transferring Resource. A Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral may not transfer a Capacity Supply Obligation amount that is greater than the amount of unobligated Qualified Capacity (that is, Qualified Capacity as determined in the most recent Forward Capacity Auction or reconfiguration auction qualification process that is not subject to a Capacity Supply Obligation) of the Capacity Acquiring Resource during the month covered by the Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral, as determined in the qualification process for the most recent Forward Capacity Auction or annual reconfiguration auction prior to the submission of the Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral to the ISO.
- (c) A Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral may not transfer a Capacity Supply Obligation to a Capacity Acquiring Resource where that Capacity Acquiring Resource's unobligated Qualified Capacity is unobligated as a result of an Export Bid or Administrative Export De-List Bid that cleared in the Forward Capacity Auction.

(d) [Reserved.]

(e) [Reserved.]

(f) [Reserved.]

(g) [Reserved.]

(h) A resource, or a portion thereof, that has been designated as a Self-Supplied FCA Resource may transfer the self-supplied portion of its Capacity Supply Obligation by means of Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral. In such a case, however, the Capacity Acquiring Resource shall not become a Self-Supplied FCA Resource as a result of the transaction.

(i) A monthly Capacity Supply Obligation may not be acquired by any resource on an approved outage for the relevant Obligation Month.

(j) A resource that has not achieved FCM Commercial Operation may not submit a transaction as a Capacity Acquiring Resource for that Capacity Commitment Period month, unless the resource has a negative Capacity Supply Obligation, in which case it may submit a Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral in an amount up to the absolute value of its Capacity Supply Obligation.

#### **III.13.5.1.1. Process for Approval of Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals.**

##### **III.13.5.1.1.1. Timing of Submission and Prior Notification to the ISO.**

The Lead Market Participant or Project Sponsor for either the Capacity Transferring Resource or the Capacity Acquiring Resource may submit a Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral to the ISO in accordance with posted schedules. The ISO will issue a schedule of the submittal windows for Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals as soon as practicable after the issuance of Forward Capacity Auction results. A Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral must be confirmed by the party other than the party submitting the Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral to the ISO no later than the end of the relevant submittal window.

**III.13.5.1.1.2. Application.**

The submission of a Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral to the ISO shall include the following: (i) the resource identification number of the Capacity Transferring Resource; (ii) the amount of the Capacity Supply Obligation being transferred in MW amounts up to three decimal places; (iii) the term of the transaction; and (iv) the resource identification number of the Capacity Acquiring Resource. If the parties to a Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral so choose, they may also submit a price, in \$/kW-month, to be used by the ISO in settling the Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral. If no price is submitted, the ISO shall use a default price of \$0.00/kW-month.

**III.13.5.1.1.3. ISO Review.**

(a) The ISO shall review the information provided in support of the Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral, and shall reject the Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral if any of the provisions of this Section III.13.5.1 are not met. For a Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral submitted before the relevant submittal window opens, this review shall occur once the submittal window opens. For a Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral submitted after the submittal window opens, this review shall occur upon submission.

(b) After the close of the relevant submittal window, each Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral shall be subject to a reliability review by the ISO to determine whether the transaction would result in a violation of any NERC or NPCC (or their successors) criteria, or ISO New England System Rules, during the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the transaction. Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals shall be reviewed by the ISO to ensure the regional and local adequacy achieved through the Forward Capacity Auction and other reliability needs are maintained. The ISO's review will consider the location and operating and rating limitations of resources associated with the Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral to ensure reliability standards will remain satisfied if the capacity associated with the Capacity Transferring Resource is withdrawn and the capacity associated with the Capacity Acquiring Resource is accepted. The ISO's reliability reviews will assess transactions based on operable capacity needs while considering any approved or interim approved transmission outage information and any approved Generator Asset or Demand Response Resource outage information, and will include transmission security studies. The ISO will review all confirmed Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals for each upcoming Obligation Month for reliability needs immediately preceding the monthly reconfiguration auction. The ISO shall obtain and consider information from the Local Control Center regarding whether the Capacity Supply Obligation of the Capacity Transferring Resource is needed for local system conditions and whether it is adequately replaced by the Acquiring Resource.

The ISO will approve or reject Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals based on the order in which they are confirmed. If multiple Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals are submitted between the same resources, they may be reviewed together as one transaction and the most recent confirmation time among the related transactions will be used to determine the review order of the grouped transaction. Transactions that cannot meet the applicable reliability needs will only be accepted or rejected in their entirety and the resources will not be accepted or rejected in part for purposes of that transaction. Where the ISO has determined that a Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral must be rejected for reliability reasons the Lead Market Participant or Project Sponsor, as appropriate, for the Capacity Transferring Resource and the Capacity Acquiring Resource shall be notified as soon as practicable of the rejection and of the reliability need prompting such rejection.

(c) Each Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral shall be subject to a financial assurance review by the ISO. If the Capacity Transferring Resource and the Capacity Acquiring Resource are not both in compliance with all applicable provisions of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy, including those regarding Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals, the ISO shall reject the Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral.

#### **III.13.5.1.1.4. Approval.**

Upon approval of a Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral, the Capacity Supply Obligation of the Capacity Transferring Resource shall be reduced by the amount set forth in the Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral, and the Capacity Supply Obligation of the Capacity Acquiring Resource shall be increased by the amount set forth in the Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral.

#### **III.13.5.2. Capacity Load Obligations Bilaterals.**

A Market Participant having a Capacity Load Obligation seeking to shed that obligation (“Capacity Load Obligation Transferring Participant”) may enter into a bilateral transaction to transfer all or a portion of its Capacity Load Obligation in a Capacity Zone (“Capacity Load Obligation Bilateral”) to any Market Participant seeking to acquire a Capacity Load Obligation (“Capacity Load Obligation Acquiring Participant”). A Capacity Load Obligation Bilateral must be in whole calendar month increments, may not exceed one year in duration, and must begin and end within the same Capacity Commitment Period. A Capacity Load Obligation Transferring Participant will be permitted to transfer, and a Capacity Load Obligation Acquiring Participant will be permitted to acquire, a Capacity Load Obligation if after entering



into a Capacity Load Obligation Bilateral and submitting related information to the ISO within the specified submittal time period, the ISO approves such Capacity Load Obligation Bilateral.

### **III.13.5.2.1. Process for Approval of Capacity Load Obligation Bilaterals.**

#### **III.13.5.2.1.1. Timing.**

Either the Capacity Load Obligation Transferring Participant or the Capacity Load Obligation Acquiring Participant may submit a Capacity Load Obligation Bilateral to the ISO. All Capacity Load Obligation Bilaterals must be submitted to the ISO in accordance with resettlement provisions as described in ISO New England Manuals. However, to be included in the initial settlement of payments and charges associated with the Forward Capacity Market for the first month of the term of the Capacity Load Obligation Bilateral, a Capacity Load Obligation Bilateral must be submitted to the ISO no later than 12:00 pm on the second Business Day after the end of that month (though a Capacity Load Obligation Bilateral submitted at that time may be revised by the parties to the transaction throughout the resettlement process). A Capacity Load Obligation Bilateral must be confirmed by the party other than the party submitting the Capacity Load Obligation Bilateral to the ISO no later than the same deadline that applies to submission of the Capacity Load Obligation Bilateral.

#### **III.13.5.2.1.2. Application.**

The submission of a Capacity Load Obligation Bilateral to the ISO shall include the following : (i) the amount of the Capacity Load Obligation being transferred in MW amounts up to three decimal places; (ii) the term of the transaction; (iii) identification of the Capacity Load Obligation Transferring Participant and the Capacity Load Obligation Acquiring Participant; and (iv) the Capacity Zone in which the Capacity Load Obligation is being transferred is located.

#### **III.13.5.2.1.3. ISO Review.**

The ISO shall review the information provided in support of the Capacity Load Obligation Bilateral and shall reject the Capacity Load Obligation Bilateral if any of the provisions of this Section II.13.5.2 are not met.

#### **III.13.5.2.1.4. Approval.**

Upon approval of a Capacity Load Obligation Bilateral, the Capacity Load Obligation of the Capacity Load Obligation Transferring Participant in the Capacity Zone specified in the submission to the ISO

shall be reduced by the amount set forth in the Capacity Load Obligation Bilateral and the Capacity Load Obligation of the Capacity Load Obligation Acquiring Participant in the specified Capacity Zone shall be increased by the amount set forth in the Capacity Load Obligation Bilateral.

### **III.13.5.3. Capacity Performance Bilaterals.**

A resource's Capacity Performance Score during a Capacity Scarcity Condition may be adjusted by entering into a Capacity Performance Bilateral as described in this Section III.13.5.3.

#### **III.13.5.3.1. Eligibility.**

If a resource has a Capacity Performance Score that is greater than zero in a five-minute interval that is subject to a Capacity Scarcity Condition, that resource may transfer all or some of that Capacity Performance Score to another resource for that same five-minute interval so long as both resources were subject to the same Capacity Scarcity Condition.

#### **III.13.5.3.2. Submission of Capacity Performance Bilaterals.**

The Lead Market Participant for a resource having a Capacity Performance Score that is greater than zero in a five-minute interval that is subject to a Capacity Scarcity Condition may submit a Capacity Performance Bilateral to the ISO assigning all or a portion of its Capacity Performance Score for that interval to another resource, subject to the eligibility requirements specified in Section III.13.5.3.1. The Capacity Performance Bilateral must be confirmed by the Lead Market Participant for the resource receiving the Capacity Performance Score.

##### **III.13.5.3.2.1. Timing.**

A Capacity Performance Bilateral must be submitted in accordance with resettlement provisions as described in ISO New England Manuals. However, to be included in the initial settlement of payments and charges associated with the Forward Capacity Market for the month associated with the Capacity Performance Bilateral, a Capacity Performance Bilateral must be submitted to the ISO no later than 12:00 pm on the second Business Day after the end of that month, or at such later deadline as specified by the ISO upon notice to Market Participants (though a Capacity Performance Bilateral may be revised by the parties to the transaction throughout the resettlement process).

##### **III.13.5.3.2.2. Application.**

The submission of a Capacity Performance Bilateral to the ISO shall include the following: (i) the resource identification number for the resource transferring its Capacity Performance Score; (ii) the resource identification number for the resource receiving the Capacity Performance Score; (iii) the MW amount of Capacity Performance Score being transferred; (iv) the specific five-minute interval or intervals for which the Capacity Performance Bilateral applies.

**III.13.5.3.2.3. ISO Review.**

The ISO shall review the information provided in submission of the Capacity Performance Bilateral, and shall reject the Capacity Performance Bilateral if any of the provisions of this Section III.13.5.3 are not met.

**III.13.5.3. Effect of Capacity Performance Bilateral.**

A Capacity Performance Bilateral does not affect in any way either party's Capacity Supply Obligation or the rights and obligations associated therewith. The sole effect of a Capacity Performance Bilateral is to modify the Capacity Performance Scores of the transferring and receiving resources for the Capacity Scarcity Conditions subject to the Capacity Performance Bilateral for purposes of calculating Capacity Performance Payments as described in Section III.13.7.2.

**III.13.5.4 Annual Reconfiguration Transactions.**

Annual Reconfiguration Transactions are available for annual reconfiguration auctions for Capacity Commitment Periods beginning on or after June 1, 2020, except that Annual Reconfiguration Transactions are not available for the first annual reconfiguration auction for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2020.

**III.13.5.4.1 Timing of Submission.**

The Lead Market Participant or Project Sponsor for either a Capacity Transferring Resource or a Capacity Acquiring Resource may submit an Annual Reconfiguration Transaction to the ISO in accordance with posted schedules. The ISO will issue a schedule of the submittal windows for Annual Reconfiguration Transactions as soon as practicable after the issuance of Forward Capacity Auction results. An Annual Reconfiguration Transaction must be confirmed by the party other than the party submitting the Annual Reconfiguration Transaction to the ISO no later than the end of the relevant submittal window.

**III.13.5.4.2 Components of an Annual Reconfiguration Transaction.**

The submission of an Annual Reconfiguration Transaction must include the following:

1. the resource identification number of the Capacity Transferring Resource;
2. the applicable Capacity Commitment Period;
- (3) the resource identification number of the Capacity Acquiring Resource, and;
3. a price (\$/kW-month), quantity (MW) and Capacity Zone, to be used in settling the Annual Reconfiguration Transaction.

The maximum quantity of an Annual Reconfiguration Transaction is the higher of:

- (1) the Capacity Transferring Resource's maximum demand bid quantity determined pursuant to Section III.13.4.2.2(b), less the quantity of any previously confirmed Annual Reconfiguration Transactions, and;
- (2) the Capacity Acquiring Resource's maximum supply offer quantity determined pursuant to Section III.13.4.2.1.1, less the quantity of any previously confirmed Annual Reconfiguration Transactions.

An Annual Reconfiguration Transaction may not be submitted unless the maximum demand bid quantity and maximum supply offer quantity are each greater than zero.

Each Annual Reconfiguration Transaction is limited to a single Capacity Acquiring Resource and a single Capacity Transferring Resource.

If any demand bid of a Capacity Transferring Resource or supply offer of a Capacity Acquiring Resource that is associated with an Annual Reconfiguration Transaction is rejected for reliability reasons pursuant to Section III.13.2.2(c) or Section III.13.4.2.1.5, respectively, the Annual Reconfiguration Transaction is cancelled.

#### **III.13.5.4.3 Settlement of Annual Reconfiguration Transactions.**

Annual Reconfiguration Transactions are settled on a monthly basis during the applicable Capacity Commitment Period. The monthly payment amount is equal to the transaction quantity multiplied by the difference between the annual reconfiguration auction clearing price and the transaction price. If the payment amount is positive, payment is made to the Lead Market Participant with the Capacity Transferring Resource and charged to the Lead Market Participant with the Capacity Acquiring Resource. If the payment amount is negative, payment is made to the Lead Market Participant with the Capacity Acquiring Resource and charged to the Lead Market Participant with the Capacity Transferring Resource.

### **III.13.6. Rights and Obligations.**

Resources assuming a Capacity Supply Obligation through a Forward Capacity Auction or resources assuming or shedding a Capacity Supply Obligation through a reconfiguration auction or a Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral shall comply with this Section III.13.6 for each Capacity Commitment Period. In the event a resource with a Capacity Supply Obligation assumed through a Forward Capacity Auction, reconfiguration auction, or Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral can not be allowed to shed its Capacity Supply Obligation due to system reliability considerations, the resource shall maintain the Capacity Supply Obligation until the resource can be released from its Capacity Supply Obligation. No additional compensation shall be provided through the Forward Capacity Market if the resource fails to be released from its Capacity Supply Obligation.

#### **III.13.6.1. Resources with Capacity Supply Obligations.**

A resource with a Capacity Supply Obligation assumed through a Forward Capacity Auction, reconfiguration auction, or a Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral shall comply with the requirements of this Section III.13.6.1 during the Capacity Commitment Period, or portion thereof, in which the Capacity Supply Obligation applies.

##### **III.13.6.1.1. Generating Capacity Resources with Capacity Supply Obligations.**

###### **III.13.6.1.1.1. Energy Market Offer Requirements.**

(a) A Generating Capacity Resource having a Capacity Supply Obligation shall be offered into both the Day-Ahead Energy Market and Real-Time Energy Market at a MW amount equal to or greater than its Capacity Supply Obligation whenever the resource is physically available. If the resource is physically available at a level less than its Capacity Supply Obligation, however, the resource shall be offered into both the Day-Ahead Energy Market and Real-Time Energy Market at that level. Day-Ahead Energy Market Supply Offers from such Generating Capacity Resources shall also meet one of the following requirements:

- (i) the sum of the Generating Capacity Resource's Notification Time plus Start-Up Time plus Minimum Run Time plus Minimum Down Time is less than or equal to 72 hours; or
- (ii) if the Generating Capacity Resource cannot meet the offer requirements in Section III.13.6.1.1.1(a)(i) due to physical design limits, then the resource shall be offered into the Day-Ahead Energy Market at a MW amount equal to or greater than its Economic Minimum Limit at

a price of zero or shall be self-scheduled in the Day-Ahead Energy Market at a MW amount equal to or greater than the resource's Economic Minimum Limit.

(b) Notwithstanding the foregoing, if the Generating Capacity Resource is a Settlement Only Resource, it may not submit Supply Offers into the Day-Ahead Energy Market or Real-Time Energy Market.

**III.13.6.1.1.2. Requirement that Offers Reflect Accurate Generating Capacity Resource Operating Characteristics.**

For each day, Day-Ahead Energy Market and Real-Time Energy Market offers for the listed portion of a resource must reflect the then-known unit-specific operating characteristics (taking into account, among other things, the physical design characteristics of the unit) consistent with Good Utility Practice.

Resources must re-declare to the ISO any changes to the offer parameters that occur in real time to reflect the known capability of the resource. A resource failing to comply with this requirement shall be subject to potential referral under Section III.A.19.

**III.13.6.1.1.3. [Reserved.]**

**III.13.6.1.1.4. [Reserved.]**

**III.13.6.1.1.5. Additional Requirements for Generating Capacity Resources.**

Generating Capacity Resources having a Capacity Supply Obligation are subject to the following additional requirements:

- (a) auditing and rating requirements as detailed in the ISO New England Manuals and ISO New England Operating Procedures;
- (b) Operating Data collection requirements as detailed in the ISO New England Manuals and Market Rule 1 and the requirement to provide to the ISO, upon request and as soon as practicable, confirmation of gas volume schedules sufficient to deliver the energy scheduled for each Generating Capacity Resource using natural gas;
- (c) outage requirements in accordance with the ISO New England Manuals and ISO New England Operating Procedures (except that Settlement Only Resources are not subject to outage requirements),

provided, however, that the portion of a resource having no Capacity Supply Obligation is not subject to the forced re-scheduling provisions for outages in accordance with the ISO New England Manuals and ISO New England Operating Procedures.

#### **III.13.6.1.2. Import Capacity Resources with Capacity Supply Obligations.**

##### **III.13.6.1.2.1. Energy Market Offer Requirements.**

A Market Participant with an Import Capacity Resource must offer one or more External Transactions to import energy in the Day-Ahead Energy Market and Real-Time Energy Market for every hour of each Operating Day at the same external interface that, in total, equal the resource's Capacity Supply Obligation, except that:

- (i) the offer requirement does not apply to any hour in which any External Resource associated with an Import Capacity Resource is on an outage;
- (ii) the Day-Ahead Energy Market offer requirement does not apply to any hour in which the import transfer capability of the external interface is 0 MW, and;
- (iii) the Real-Time Energy Market offer requirement does not apply to Import Capacity Resources with Capacity Supply Obligations at an external interface for which Coordinated Transaction Scheduling is implemented.

Each External Transaction submitted in the Day-Ahead Energy Market must reference the associated Import Capacity Resource.

Each External Transaction submitted in the Real-Time Energy Market in accordance with Section III.1.10.7 must reference the associated Import Capacity Resource.

In all cases an Import Capacity Resource is subject to the provisions in Section III.13.7 for the entire Capacity Supply Obligation of the Import Capacity Resource.

##### **III.13.6.1.2.2. Additional Requirements for Import Capacity Resources.**

A Market Participant with an Import Capacity Resource that is associated with an External Resource must:

- (i) comply with all offer, outage scheduling and operating requirements applicable to capacity resources in the External Resource's native Control Area, and;
- (ii) notify the ISO of all outages impacting the Capacity Supply Obligation of the Import Capacity Resource in accordance with the outage notification requirements in ISO New England Operating Procedure No. 5.

### **III.13.6.1.3. Intermittent Power Resources with Capacity Supply Obligations.**

#### **III.13.6.1.3.1. Energy Market Offer Requirements.**

(a) Market Participants with Intermittent Power Resources that are Dispatchable Resources and have a Capacity Supply Obligation are required to submit offers in the Day-Ahead Energy Market consistent with the Market Participant's expectation of the output of the resource in Real-Time. Market Participants with non-dispatchable Intermittent Power Resources with a Capacity Supply Obligation may submit, but are not required to submit, offers into the Day-Ahead Energy Market. Market Participants are required to submit offers for Intermittent Power Resources with a Capacity Supply Obligation for use in the Real-Time Energy Market consistent with the characteristics of the resource. Day-Ahead projections of output shall be submitted as detailed in the ISO New England Manuals. For purposes of calculating Real-Time NCPC Charges, Intermittent Power Resources shall have a generation deviation of zero.

(b) Notwithstanding the foregoing, an Intermittent Power Resource that is a Settlement Only Resource may not submit Supply Offers into the Day-Ahead Energy Market or Real-Time Energy Market.

#### **III.13.6.1.3.2. [Reserved.]**

#### **III.13.6.1.3.3. Additional Requirements for Intermittent Power Resources.**

Intermittent Power Resources are subject to the following additional requirements:

- (a) auditing and rating requirements as detailed in the ISO New England Manuals;
- (b) Operating Data collection requirements as detailed in the ISO New England Manuals;



(c) complying with outage requirements as outlined in the ISO New England Operating Procedures and ISO New England Manuals (except that Intermittent Power Resources that are Settlement Only Resources need not comply with outage requirements).

**III.13.6.1.4. [Reserved.]**

**III.13.6.1.5. Demand Capacity Resources with Capacity Supply Obligations.**

**III.13.6.1.5.1. Energy Market Offer Requirements.**

(a) A Market Participant with an Active Demand Capacity Resource having a Capacity Supply Obligation shall submit Demand Reduction Offers for its Demand Response Resources into the Day-Ahead Energy Market and Real-Time Energy Market in at least the MW amount described in this Section III.13.6.1.5.1; for purposes of the following comparisons, the portion of Demand Reduction Offers not associated with Net Supply shall be increased by average avoided peak transmission and distribution losses. The sum of the Demand Reduction Offers must be equal to or greater than the Active Demand Capacity Resource's Capacity Supply Obligation whenever the Demand Response Resources are physically available. If the Demand Response Resources are physically available at a level less than the Active Demand Capacity Resource's Capacity Supply Obligation, the sum of the Demand Reduction Offers will equal that level and shall be offered into both the Day-Ahead Energy Market and Real-Time Energy Market. Each Demand Reduction Offer from a Demand Response Resource made into the Day-Ahead Energy Market shall also meet the following requirement:

(i) the sum of the Demand Response Resource Notification Time plus Demand Response Resource Start-Up Time plus Minimum Reduction Time plus Minimum Time Between Reductions is less than or equal to 72 hours.

(b) Seasonal Peak Demand Resources and On-Peak Demand Resources may not submit Demand Reduction Offers into the Day-Ahead Energy Market or Real-Time Energy Market.

**III.13.6.1.5.2. Requirement that Offers Reflect Accurate Demand Response Resource Operating Characteristics.**

For each day, Demand Reduction Offers submitted into the Day-Ahead Energy Market and Real-Time Energy Market for a Demand Response Resource associated with an Active Demand Capacity Resource

must reflect the then-known operating characteristics of the resource. Consistent with Section III.1.10.9(d), Demand Response Resources must re-declare to the ISO any changes to offer parameters that occur in real time to reflect the operating characteristics of the resource. A resource failing to comply with this requirement shall be subject to potential referral under Section III.A.

**III.13.6.1.5.3. Additional Requirements for Demand Capacity Resources.**

- (a) A Market Participant may not associate an Asset with a non-commercial Demand Capacity Resource during a Capacity Commitment Period if the Asset can be associated with a commercial Demand Capacity Resource whose capability is less than its Capacity Supply Obligation during that Capacity Commitment Period.
- (b) An Energy Efficiency measure may be added to an On-Peak Demand Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource (other than one consisting of Load Management or Distributed Generation) until two years after the start of the Capacity Commitment Period for which the resource first received a Capacity Supply Obligation; provided, however, that a resource that qualified for a Forward Capacity Auction associated with a Capacity Commitment Period beginning on or before June 1, 2024 may install Energy Efficiency measures until May 31, 2027. Once an Energy Efficiency measure has been associated with an On-Peak Demand Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource, the measure may not be transferred to a different resource.
- (c) For purposes of confirming FCM Commercial Operation as described in Section III.13.3.8, the ISO shall use a summer Seasonal DR Audit value or summer Passive DR Audit value to verify the capacity rating of a Demand Capacity Resource with summer Qualified Capacity. A winter Seasonal DR Audit value or winter Passive DR Audit value may only be used to verify the winter commercial capacity of a Demand Capacity Resource. The summer and winter commercial capacity of a Demand Capacity Resource consisting of Energy Efficiency measures may be verified in any month of the year.
- (d) For Active Demand Capacity Resources, a summer Seasonal DR Audit value shall be established for use from April 1 through November 30 and a winter Seasonal DR Audit value shall be established for use from December 1 through March 31. The summer or winter Seasonal DR Audit value of an Active Demand Capacity Resource is equal to the sum of the like-season Seasonal DR Audit values of its constituent Demand Response Resources as determined pursuant to Section III.1.5.1.3.1. The Seasonal DR Audit value of an Active Demand Capacity Resource shall automatically update whenever a new

Seasonal DR Audit value is approved for a constituent Demand Response Resource or with changes to the makeup of the constituent Demand Response Resources.

(e) On-Peak Demand Resources and Seasonal Peak Demand Resources shall in addition: (i) comply with the ISO's measurement and verification requirements pursuant to Section III.13.1.4.3 and the ISO New England Manuals; and (ii) comply with the auditing and rating requirements as detailed in Sections III.13.6.1.5.4 and III.13.6.1.5.5 and the ISO New England Manuals.

(f) Active Demand Capacity Resources shall in addition: (i) comply with the measurement and verification requirements and the Operating Data collection requirements as detailed in the ISO New England Manuals and Market Rule 1, and with outage requirements in accordance with the ISO New England Manuals and ISO New England Operating Procedures, provided, however, that the portion of a resource having no Capacity Supply Obligation is not subject to the forced re-scheduling provisions for outages in accordance with the ISO New England Manuals and ISO New England Operating Procedures; and (ii) comply with the auditing and rating requirements as detailed in Section III.13.6.1.5.5 and the ISO New England Manuals.

**III.13.6.1.5.4. On-Peak Demand Resource and Seasonal Peak Demand Resource Auditing Requirements.**

(a) A summer Passive DR Audit value and a winter Passive DR Audit value must be established for each On-Peak Demand Resource and Seasonal Peak Demand Resource in every Capacity Commitment Period during which the On-Peak Demand Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource has an annual or monthly Capacity Supply Obligation.

(b) Summer Passive DR Audit values shall be determined based on data for one or more months of the summer Passive DR Auditing Period (June through August). Winter Passive DR Audit values shall be determined based on data for one or more months of the winter Passive DR Auditing Period (December through January).

(c) Passive DR Audit values will be made available to the Market Participant within 20 Business Days following the end of the period for which the audit value is determined by the ISO.

- (d) The audit value of an On-Peak Demand Resource is determined by evaluating the Average Hourly Output or Average Hourly Load Reduction of each Asset associated with the On-Peak Demand Resource during the Demand Resource On-Peak Hours.
- (e) The audit value of a Seasonal Peak Demand Resource is determined by evaluating the Average Hourly Output or Average Hourly Load Reduction of each Asset associated with the Seasonal Peak Demand Resource during the Demand Resource Seasonal Peak Hours. If there are no Demand Resource Seasonal Peak Hours in a month during the Passive DR Auditing Period, performance during Demand Resource On-Peak Hours in that month may be used.
- (f) Passive DR Audit values shall become effective one calendar day after being made available to the Market Participant and remain valid until the earlier of: (i) the next like-season Passive DR Audit value becomes effective or (ii) the end of the following Capability Demonstration Year.
- (g) For On-Peak Demand Resources consisting of Energy Efficiency measures and Seasonal Peak Demand Resources consisting of Energy Efficiency measures, the ISO will calculate a summer Passive DR Audit value and a winter Passive DR Audit value in each month of the year. For all other On-Peak Demand Resources and Seasonal Peak Demand Resources, a Market Participant may request that a summer or winter Passive DR Audit value be determined based on data for, respectively, a summer or winter month outside of the Passive DR Auditing Periods. (For Demand Capacity Resources, summer months are April through November; all other months are winter months.) Such an audit shall not satisfy the Passive DR Audit requirement.

#### **III.13.6.1.5.5. Additional Demand Capacity Resource Audits.**

The ISO may perform additional audits for a Demand Capacity Resource to establish or verify the capability of the Demand Capacity Resource and its underlying assets and measures. This additional auditing may consist of two levels.

- (a) Level 1 Audit: the ISO will establish the audit results by conducting a review of records of the Assets and measures to verify that the reported Assets and measures have been installed and are operational. The audit shall include, but is not limited to, reviewing project or program databases, invoices, installation reports, work orders, and field inspection reports. In addition, the audit may involve reviewing any independent inspections or evaluations conducted as part of program implementation and program evaluation.

(b) Level 2 Audit: the ISO will establish the audit results by initiating or conducting an on-site field audit to verify the installation and performance of the Assets and measures. Such an audit may include a random or select sample of facilities and measures.

A level 1 audit is not required to precede a level 2 audit. If the results of the audit indicate that the demand reduction capability of the Demand Capacity Resource is less than or greater than its most recent like-season Passive DR Audit value or Seasonal DR Audit value, then the Demand Capacity Resource's audit value shall be adjusted accordingly.

### **III.13.6.1.6. DNE Dispatchable Generator.**

#### **III.13.6.1.6.1. Energy Market Offer Requirements.**

Beginning on June 1, 2019, Market Participants with DNE Dispatchable Generators with a Capacity Supply Obligation must submit offers into the Day-Ahead Energy Market for the full amount of the resource's expected hourly physical capability as determined by the Market Participant. Market Participants with DNE Dispatchable Generators having a Capacity Supply Obligation must submit offers for the Real-Time Energy Market consistent with the characteristics of the resource. For purposes of calculating Real-Time NCPC Charges, DNE Dispatchable Generators shall have a generation deviation of zero.

### **III.13.6.2. Resources without a Capacity Supply Obligation.**

A resource that does not have any Capacity Supply Obligation shall comply with the requirements in this Section III.13.6.2, and shall not be subject to the requirements set forth in Section III.13.6.1 during the Capacity Commitment Period, or portion thereof, for which the resource has no Capacity Supply Obligation.

#### **III.13.6.2.1. Generating Capacity Resources without a Capacity Supply Obligation.**

##### **III.13.6.2.1.1. Energy Market Offer Requirements.**

A Generating Capacity Resource having no Capacity Supply Obligation is not required to offer into the Day-Ahead Energy Market or Real-Time Energy Market. A Generating Capacity Resource that is a Settlement Only Resource may not offer into the Day-Ahead Energy Market or Real-Time Energy Market.

**III.13.6.2.1.1.1. Day-Ahead Energy Market Participation.**

A Generating Capacity Resource having no Capacity Supply Obligation may submit an offer into the Day-Ahead Energy Market. If any portion of the offered energy clears in the Day-Ahead Energy Market, the entire Supply Offer, up to the Economic Maximum Limit offered into the Day-Ahead Energy Market, will be subject to all of the rules and requirements applicable to that market for the operating day, including the obligation to follow ISO Dispatch Instructions. Such a resource that clears shall be eligible for dispatch in the Real-Time Energy Market.

**III.13.6.2.1.1.2. Real-Time Energy Market Participation.**

A Generating Capacity Resource having no Capacity Supply Obligation may submit an offer into the Real-Time Energy Market. If any portion of the offered energy clears in the Real-Time Energy Market, the entire Supply Offer, up to the Economic Maximum Limit offered into the Real-Time Energy Market, will be subject to all of the rules and requirements applicable to that market for the Operating Day, including the obligation to follow ISO Dispatch Instructions. Such a resource shall be eligible for dispatch in the Real-Time Energy Market.

**III.13.6.2.1.2. Additional Requirements for Generating Capacity Resources Having No Capacity Supply Obligation.**

Generating Capacity Resources having no Capacity Supply Obligation are subject to the following additional requirements:

- (a) complying with the auditing and rating requirements as detailed in the ISO New England Manuals;
- (b) complying with the Operating Data collection requirements detailed in the ISO New England Manuals; and
- (c) complying with outage requirements as outlined in the ISO New England Operating Procedures and ISO New England Manuals. Generating Capacity Resources having no Capacity Supply Obligation are not subject to the forced re-scheduling provisions for outages in accordance with the ISO New England Manuals and ISO New England Operating Procedures.

**III.13.6.2.2. [Reserved.]**

**III.13.6.2.3. Intermittent Power Resources without a Capacity Supply Obligation.**

**III.13.6.2.3.1. Energy Market Offer Requirements.**

An Intermittent Power Resource having no Capacity Supply Obligation is not required to offer into the Day-Ahead Energy Market or Real-Time Energy Market. An Intermittent Power Resource that is a Settlement Only Resource may not offer into the Day-Ahead Energy Market or Real-Time Energy Market.

**III.13.6.2.3.2. Additional Requirements for Intermittent Power Resources.**

Intermittent Power Resources are subject to the following additional requirements:

- (a) auditing and rating requirements as detailed in the ISO New England Manuals; and
- (b) Operating Data collection requirements as detailed in the ISO New England Manuals.

**III.13.6.2.4. [Reserved.]**

**III.13.6.2.5. Demand Capacity Resources without a Capacity Supply Obligation.**

**III.13.6.2.5.1. Energy Market Offer Requirements.**

A Market Participant with a Demand Response Resource associated with an Active Demand Capacity Resource without a Capacity Supply Obligation is not required to offer Demand Reduction Offers for the Demand Response Resource into the Day-Ahead Energy Market or Real-Time Energy Market.

Seasonal Peak Demand Resources and On-Peak Demand Resources may not submit Demand Reduction Offers into the Day-Ahead Energy Market or Real-Time Energy Market.

**III.13.6.2.5.1.1. Day-Ahead Energy Market Participation.**

A Market Participant with a Demand Response Resource associated with an Active Demand Capacity Resource without a Capacity Supply Obligation may submit a Demand Reduction Offer into the Day-Ahead Energy Market. If any portion of the Demand Reduction Offer clears in the Day-Ahead Energy Market, the entire Demand Reduction Offer, up to the Maximum Reduction offered into the Day-Ahead Energy Market, will be subject to all of the rules and requirements applicable to that market for the

Operating Day, including the obligation to follow Dispatch Instructions. Such a resource that clears shall be eligible for dispatch in the Real-Time Energy Market.

**III.13.6.2.5.1.2. Real-Time Energy Market Participation.**

A Market Participant with a Demand Response Resource associated with an Active Demand Capacity Resource without a Capacity Supply Obligation, that did not submit an offer into the Day-Ahead Energy Market or was offered into the Day-Ahead Energy Market and did not clear, may submit a Demand Reduction Offer in the Real-Time Energy Market and shall be subject to all of the requirements associated therewith. Such a resource shall be eligible for dispatch in the Real-Time Energy Market.

**III.13.6.2.5.2. Additional Requirements for Demand Capacity Resources Having No Capacity Supply Obligation.**

Demand Capacity Resources without a Capacity Supply Obligation are subject to the following additional requirements:

- (a) complying with Section III.13.6.1.5.3(a) and (b) and with the auditing and rating requirements described in Section III.13.6.1.5.5 and the ISO New England Manuals; and
- (b) for Active Demand Capacity Resources, complying with the Operating Data collection requirements detailed in the ISO New England Manuals; and
- (c) for Active Demand Capacity Resources, complying with outage requirements as outlined in the ISO New England Operating Procedures and ISO New England Manuals. Active Demand Capacity Resources having no Capacity Supply Obligation are not subject to the forced re-scheduling provisions for outages in accordance with the ISO New England Manuals and ISO New England Operating Procedures.

**III.13.6.3. Exporting Resources.**

A resource that is exporting capacity not subject to a Capacity Supply Obligation to an external Control Area shall comply with this Section III.13.6.3 and the ISO New England Manuals. Intermittent Power Resources and Demand Capacity Resources are not permitted to back a capacity export to an external Control Area. The portion of a resource without a Capacity Supply Obligation that will be used in Real-Time to support an External Transaction sale must comply with the energy market offer requirements of Section III.1.10.7.



**III.13.6.4. ISO Requests for Energy.**

The ISO may request that an Active Demand Capacity Resource or a Generating Capacity Resource having capacity that is not subject to a Capacity Supply Obligation provide energy for reliability purposes in the Real-Time Energy Market, but such resource shall not be obligated under Section III.13 of this Tariff by such a request to provide energy from that capacity. If such resource does provide energy from that capacity, the resource shall be paid based on its most recent offer and is eligible for NCPC.

**III.13.6.4.1. Real-Time High Operating Limit.**

For purposes of facilitating ISO requests for energy under Section III.13.6.4, a Market Participant must report an up-to-date Real-Time High Operating Limit value at all times for a Generating Capacity Resource.

### **III.13.7. Performance, Payments and Charges in the FCM.**

Revenue in the Forward Capacity Market for resources providing capacity shall be composed of Capacity Base Payments as described in Section III.13.7.1 and Capacity Performance Payments as described in Section III.13.7.2, adjusted as described in Section III.13.7.3 and Section III.13.7.4. Market Participants with a Capacity Load Obligation will be subject to charges as described in Section III.13.7.5.

In the event of a change in the Lead Market Participant for a resource that has a Capacity Supply Obligation, the Capacity Supply Obligation shall remain associated with the resource and the new Lead Market Participant for the resource shall be bound by all provisions of this Section III.13 arising from such Capacity Supply Obligation. The Lead Market Participant for the resource at the start of an Obligation Month shall be responsible for all payments and charges associated with that resource in that Obligation Month.

#### **III.13.7.1. Capacity Base Payments.**

Resources acquiring or shedding a Capacity Supply Obligation for the Obligation Month shall receive a Capacity Base Payment for the Obligation Month reflecting the payments and charges described in Section III.13.7.1.1, as adjusted to account for peak energy rents as described in Section III.13.7.1.2.

##### **III.13.7.1.1. Monthly Payments and Charges Reflecting Capacity Supply Obligations.**

Each resource that has: (i) cleared in a Forward Capacity Auction, except for the portion of resources designated as Self-Supplied FCA Resources; (ii) cleared in a reconfiguration auction; or (iii) entered into a Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral shall be entitled to a monthly payment or charge during the Capacity Commitment Period based on the following amounts:

- (a) **Forward Capacity Auction.** For a resource whose offer has cleared in a Forward Capacity Auction, the monthly capacity payment shall equal the product of its cleared capacity and the Capacity Clearing Price in the Capacity Zone in which the resource is located as adjusted by applicable indexing for resources with additional Capacity Commitment Period elections pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.2.4 in the manner described below. For a resource that has elected to have the Capacity Clearing Price and the Capacity Supply Obligation apply for more than one Capacity Commitment Period, payments associated with the Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price (indexed using the Handy-Whitman Index of Public Utility Construction Costs in effect as of December 31 of the year preceding the Capacity Commitment Period) shall continue to apply after the Capacity Commitment Period associated

with the Forward Capacity Auction in which the offer clears, for up to six additional and consecutive Capacity Commitment Periods, in whole Capacity Commitment Period increments only.

(b) **Reconfiguration Auctions.** For a resource whose offer or bid has cleared in an annual or monthly reconfiguration auction, the monthly capacity payment or charge shall be equal to the product of its cleared capacity and the appropriate reconfiguration auction clearing price in the Capacity Zone in which the resource cleared.

(c) **Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals.** For resources that have acquired or shed a Capacity Supply Obligation through a Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral, the monthly capacity payment or charge shall be equal to the product of the Capacity Supply Obligation being assumed or shed and price associated with the Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral.

(d) **Substitution Auctions.** For a resource whose offer or bid has cleared in a substitution auction, the monthly capacity payment or charge shall be equal to the product of its cleared capacity and the substitution auction clearing price. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the monthly capacity charge for a demand bid cleared at a substitution auction clearing price above its bid price shall be calculated using its bid price.

#### **III.13.7.1.2 Peak Energy Rents.**

For Capacity Commitment Periods beginning prior to June 1, 2019, Capacity Base Payments to resources with Capacity Supply Obligations, except for (1) On-Peak Demand Resources, (2) Seasonal Peak Demand Resources, and (3) New Generating Capacity Resources that have cleared in the Forward Capacity Auction and have completed construction but due to a planned transmission facility (e.g., a radial interconnection) not being in service are not able to achieve FCM Commercial Operation, shall be decreased by Peak Energy Rents (“PER”) calculated in each Capacity Zone, as determined pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.4 in the Forward Capacity Auction, as provided below. The PER calculation shall utilize hourly integrated Real-Time LMPs. For each Capacity Zone in the Forward Capacity Auction, as determined pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.4, PER shall be computed based on the load-weighted Real-Time LMPs for each Capacity Zone, using the Real-Time Hub Price for the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone. Self-Supplied FCA Resources shall not be subject to a PER adjustment on the portion of the resource that is self-supplied.

##### **III.13.7.1.2.1 Hourly PER Calculations.**

(a) For hours with a positive difference between the hourly Real-Time energy price and a strike price, the ISO shall compute PER for each hour ("Hourly PER") equal to this positive difference in accordance with one of the following formulas, which include scaling adjustments for system load and availability:

For hours within the period beginning September 30, 2016 through May 31, 2018:

$$\text{Hourly PER}(\$/\text{kW}) = [(\text{LMP} - \text{Adjusted Hourly PER Strike Price}) * [\text{Scaling Factor}] * [\text{Availability Factor}]$$

Where:

$$\text{Adjusted Hourly PER Strike Price} = \text{Strike Price} + \text{Hourly PER Adjustment}$$

$$\text{Hourly PER Adjustment} = \text{average of Five-Minute PER Strike Price Adjustment values}$$

$$\text{Five-Minute PER Strike Price Adjustment} = \text{MAX} (\text{Thirty-Minute Operating Reserve clearing price} - \$500/\text{MWh}, 0) + \text{MAX} (\text{Ten-Minute Non-Spinning Reserve clearing price} - \text{Thirty-Minute Operating Reserve clearing price} - \$850/\text{MWh}, 0).$$

Strike Price = as defined below

Scaling Factor = as defined below

Availability Factor = as defined below

For all other hours:

$$\text{Hourly PER}(\$/\text{kW}) = [\text{LMP} - \text{Strike Price}] * [\text{Scaling Factor}] * [\text{Availability Factor}]$$

Where:

Strike Price = the heat rate x fuel cost of the PER Proxy Unit described below.

Scaling Factor = the ratio of actual hourly integrated system load (calculated as the sum of Real-Time Load Obligations for the system as calculated in the settlement of the Real-Time Energy Market and adjusted for losses and including imports delivered in the Real-Time Energy Market)

and the 50/50 predicted peak system load reduced appropriately for Demand Capacity Resources, used in the most recent calculation of the Installed Capacity Requirement for that Capacity Commitment Period, capped at an hourly ratio of 1.0.

Availability Factor = 0.95.

(b) PER Proxy Unit characteristics shall be as follows:

(i) The PER Proxy Unit shall be indexed to the marginal fuel, which shall be the higher of the following, as determined on a daily basis: ultra low-sulfur No. 2 oil measured at New York Harbor plus a seven percent markup for transportation; or day-ahead gas measured at the AGT-CG (Non-G) hub;

(ii) The PER Proxy Unit shall be assumed to have no start-up, ramp rate or minimum run time constraints;

(iii) The PER Proxy Unit shall have a 22,000 Btu/kWh heat rate. This assumption shall be periodically reviewed after the first Capacity Commitment Period by the ISO to ensure that the heat rate continues to reflect a level slightly higher than the marginal generating unit in the region that would be dispatched as the system enters a scarcity condition. Any changes to the heat rate of the PER Proxy Unit shall be considered in the stakeholder process in consultation with the state utility regulatory agencies, shall be filed pursuant to Section 205 of the Federal Power Act, and shall be applied prospectively to the settlement of future Forward Capacity Auctions.

#### **III.13.7.1.2.2. Monthly PER Application.**

The Hourly PER shall be summed for each calendar month to determine the total PER for that month ("Monthly PER"). The ISO shall then calculate the Average Monthly PER earned by the proxy unit. The Average Monthly PER shall be equal to the average of the Monthly PER values for the 12 months prior to the Obligation Month. The PER deduction for each resource shall be calculated as the Average Monthly PER multiplied by the resource's Capacity Supply Obligation for the Obligation Month (less any Capacity Supply Obligation MW from any portion of a Self-Supplied FCA Resource); provided, however, that in no case shall a resource's PER deduction for an Obligation Month be less than zero or greater than the product of the resource's Capacity Supply Obligation and the relevant Forward Capacity Auction Capacity Clearing Price.

### **III.13.7.1.3. Export Capacity.**

If there are any Export Bids or Administrative Export De-List Bids from resources located in an export-constrained Capacity Zone or in the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone that have cleared in the Forward Capacity Auction and if the resource is exporting capacity at an export interface that is connected to an import-constrained Capacity Zone or the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone that is different than the Capacity Zone in which the resource is located, then charges and credits are applied as follows (for the following calculation, the Capacity Clearing Price will be the value prior to PER adjustments).

Charge Amount to Resource Exporting = [Capacity Clearing Price<sub>location of the interface</sub> - Capacity Clearing Price<sub>location of the resource</sub>] x Cleared MWs of Export Bid or Administrative Export De-List Bid]

Credit Amount to Capacity Load Obligations in the Capacity Zone where the export interface is located = [Capacity Clearing Price<sub>location of the interface</sub> - Capacity Clearing Price<sub>location of the resource</sub>] x Cleared MWs of Export Bid or Administrative Export De-list Bid]

Credits and charges to load in the applicable Capacity Zones, as set forth above, shall be allocated in proportion to each LSE's Capacity Load Obligation as calculated in Section III.13.7.5.2.

### **III.13.7.1.4. [Reserved.]**

## **III.13.7.2 Capacity Performance Payments.**

### **III.13.7.2.1 Definition of Capacity Scarcity Condition.**

A Capacity Scarcity Condition shall exist in a Capacity Zone for any five-minute interval in which the Real-Time Reserve Clearing Price for that entire Capacity Zone is set based on the Reserve Constraint Penalty Factor pricing for: (i) the Minimum Total Reserve Requirement; (ii) the Ten-Minute Reserve Requirement; or (iii) the Zonal Reserve Requirement, each as described in Section III.2.7A(c); provided, however, that a Capacity Scarcity Condition shall not exist if the Reserve Constraint Penalty Factor pricing results only because of resource ramping limitations that are not binding on the energy dispatch.

### **III.13.7.2.2 Calculation of Actual Capacity Provided During a Capacity Scarcity Condition.**

For each five-minute interval in which a Capacity Scarcity Condition exists, the ISO shall calculate the Actual Capacity Provided by each resource, whether or not it has a Capacity Supply Obligation, in any Capacity Zone that is subject to the Capacity Scarcity Condition. For resources not having a Capacity Supply Obligation (including External Transactions), the Actual Capacity Provided shall be calculated using the provision below applicable to the resource type. Notwithstanding the specific provisions of this Section III.13.7.2.2, no resource shall have an Actual Capacity Provided that is less than zero.

(a) A Generating Capacity Resource's Actual Capacity Provided during a Capacity Scarcity Condition shall be the sum of the resource's output during the interval plus the resource's Reserve Quantity For Settlement during the interval; provided, however, that if the resource's output was limited during the Capacity Scarcity Condition as a result of a transmission system limitation, then the resource's Actual Capacity Provided may not be greater than the sum of the resource's Desired Dispatch Point during the interval, plus the resource's Reserve Quantity For Settlement during the interval. Where the resource is associated with one or more External Transaction sales submitted in accordance with Section III.1.10.7(f), the resource will have its hourly Actual Capacity Provided reduced by the hourly integrated delivered MW for the External Transaction sale or sales.

(b) An Import Capacity Resource's Actual Capacity Provided during a Capacity Scarcity Condition shall be the net energy delivered during the interval in which the Capacity Scarcity Condition occurred. Where a single Market Participant owns more than one Import Capacity Resource, then the difference between the total net energy delivered from those resources and the total of the Capacity Supply Obligations of those resources shall be allocated to those resources pro rata.

(c) An On-Peak Demand Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource's Actual Capacity Provided during a Capacity Scarcity Condition shall be the sum of the Actual Capacity Provided for each of its components, as determined below, where the MWhs of reduction, other than MWhs associated with Net Supply, are increased by average avoided peak transmission and distribution losses.

(i) For Energy Efficiency measures, the Actual Capacity Provided shall be zero.

(ii) For Distributed Generation measures submitting meter data for the full 24 hour calendar day during which the Capacity Scarcity Condition occurs, the Actual Capacity Provided shall be equal to the submitted meter data, adjusted as necessary for the five-minute interval in which the Capacity Scarcity Condition occurs.

- (iii) For Load Management measures submitting meter data for the full 24 hour calendar day during which the Capacity Scarcity Condition occurs, the Actual Capacity Provided shall be equal to the submitted demand reduction data, adjusted as necessary for the five-minute interval in which the Capacity Scarcity Condition occurs.
  - (iv) Notwithstanding any other provision of this Section III.13.7.2.2(c), for any On-Peak Demand Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource that fails to provide the data necessary for the ISO to determine the Actual Capacity Provided as described in this Section III.13.7.2.2(c), the Actual Capacity Provided shall be zero.
- (d) An Active Demand Capacity Resource's Actual Capacity Provided during a Capacity Scarcity Condition shall be the sum of the Actual Capacity Provided by its constituent Demand Response Resources during the Capacity Scarcity Condition.
- (i) A Demand Response Resource's Actual Capacity Provided during a Capacity Scarcity Condition shall be: (1) the sum of the Real-Time demand reduction of its constituent Demand Response Assets (provided, however, that if the Demand Response Resource was limited during the Capacity Scarcity Condition as a result of a transmission system limitation, then the sum of the Real-Time demand reduction of its constituent Demand Response Assets may not be greater than its Desired Dispatch Point during the interval), plus (2) the Demand Response Resource's Reserve Quantity For Settlement, where the MW quantity, other than the MW quantity associated with Net Supply, is increased by average avoided peak transmission and distribution losses; provided, however, that a Demand Response Resource's Actual Capacity Provided shall not be less than zero.
  - (ii) The Real-Time demand reduction of a Demand Response Asset shall be calculated as described in Section III.8.4, except that: (1) in the case of a Demand Response Asset that is on a forced or scheduled curtailment as described in Section III.8.3, a Real-Time demand reduction shall also be calculated for intervals in which the associated Demand Response Resource does not receive a non-zero Dispatch Instruction; (2) in the case of a Demand Response Asset that is on a forced or scheduled curtailment as described in Section III.8.3, the minuend in the calculation described in Section III.8.4 shall be the unadjusted Demand Response Baseline of the Demand Response Asset; and (3) the



resulting MWhs of reduction, other than the MWhs associated with Net Supply, shall be increased by average avoided peak transmission and distribution losses.

### **III.13.7.2.3 Capacity Balancing Ratio.**

For each five-minute interval in which a Capacity Scarcity Condition exists, the ISO shall calculate a Capacity Balancing Ratio using the following formula:

$$(\text{Load} + \text{Reserve Requirement}) / \text{Total Capacity Supply Obligation}$$

(a) If the Capacity Scarcity Condition is a result of a violation of the Minimum Total Reserve Requirement such that the associated system-wide Reserve Constraint Penalty Factor pricing applies, then the terms used in the formula above shall be calculated as follows:

Load = the total amount of Actual Capacity Provided (excluding applicable Real-Time Reserve Designations) from all resources in the New England Control Area during the interval (with the Actual Capacity Provided of Energy Efficiency measures being zero, as specified in Section III.13.7.2.2(c)(i)).

Reserve Requirement = the Minimum Total Reserve Requirement during the interval.

Total Capacity Supply Obligation = the total amount of Capacity Supply Obligations in the New England Control Area during the interval, excluding the Capacity Supply Obligations associated with Energy Efficiency measures.

(b) If the Capacity Scarcity Condition is a result of a violation of the Ten-Minute Reserve Requirement such that the associated system-wide Reserve Constraint Penalty Factor pricing applies, then the terms used in the formula above shall be calculated as follows:

Load = the total amount of Actual Capacity Provided (excluding applicable Real-Time Reserve Designations) from all resources in the New England Control Area during the interval (with the Actual Capacity Provided of Energy Efficiency measures being zero, as specified in Section III.13.7.2.2(c)(i)).

Reserve Requirement = the Ten-Minute Reserve Requirement during the interval.

Total Capacity Supply Obligation = the total amount of Capacity Supply Obligations in the New England Control Area during the interval, excluding the Capacity Supply Obligations associated with Energy Efficiency measures.

(c) If the Capacity Scarcity Condition is a result of a violation of the Zonal Reserve Requirement such that the associated Reserve Constraint Penalty Factor pricing applies, then the terms used in the formula above shall be calculated as follows:

Load = the total amount of Actual Capacity Provided (excluding applicable Real-Time Reserve Designations) from all resources in the Capacity Zone during the interval plus the net amount of energy imported into the Capacity Zone from outside the New England Control Area during the interval (but not less than zero) (with the Actual Capacity Provided of Energy Efficiency measures being zero, as specified in Section III.13.7.2.2(c)(i)).

Reserve Requirement = the Zonal Reserve Requirement minus any reserve support coming into the Capacity Zone over the internal transmission interface.

Total Capacity Supply Obligation = the total amount of Capacity Supply Obligations in the Capacity Zone during the interval, excluding the Capacity Supply Obligations associated with Energy Efficiency measures.

(d) The following provisions shall be used to determine the applicable Capacity Balancing Ratio where more than one of the conditions described in subsections (a), (b), and (c) apply in a Capacity Zone.

(i) In any Capacity Zone subject to Reserve Constraint Penalty Factor pricing associated with both the Minimum Total Reserve Requirement and the Ten-Minute Reserve Requirement, but not the Zonal Reserve Requirement, the Capacity Balancing Ratio shall be calculated as described in Section III.13.7.2.3(a) for resources in that Capacity Zone.

(ii) In any Capacity Zone subject to Reserve Constraint Penalty Factor pricing associated with both the Ten-Minute Reserve Requirement and the Zonal Reserve Requirement, but not the Minimum Total Reserve Requirement, the Capacity Balancing Ratio for resources in that Capacity Zone shall be the higher of the Capacity Balancing Ratio calculated as described in

Section III.13.7.2.3(b) and the Capacity Balancing Ratio calculated as described in Section III.13.7.2.3(c).

(iii) In any Capacity Zone subject to Reserve Constraint Penalty Factor pricing associated with the Minimum Total Reserve Requirement and the Zonal Reserve Requirement (regardless of whether the Capacity Zone is also subject to Reserve Constraint Penalty Factor pricing associated with the Ten-Minute Reserve Requirement), the Capacity Balancing Ratio for resources in that Capacity Zone shall be the higher of the Capacity Balancing Ratio calculated as described in Section III.13.7.2.3(a) and the Capacity Balancing Ratio calculated as described in Section III.13.7.2.3(c).

#### **III.13.7.2.4 Capacity Performance Score.**

Each resource, whether or not it has a Capacity Supply Obligation, will be assigned a Capacity Performance Score for each five-minute interval in which a Capacity Scarcity Condition exists in the Capacity Zone in which the resource is located. A resource's Capacity Performance Score for the interval shall equal the resource's Actual Capacity Provided during the interval (with the Actual Capacity Provided of Energy Efficiency measures being zero, as specified in Section III.13.7.2.2(c)(i)) minus the product of the resource's Capacity Supply Obligation (which for this purpose shall not be less than zero) and the applicable Capacity Balancing Ratio; provided, however, that for an On-Peak Demand Resource or a Seasonal Peak Demand Resource, the Capacity Supply Obligation associated with any Energy Efficiency measures shall be excluded from the calculation of the resource's Capacity Performance Score. The resulting Capacity Performance Score may be positive, zero, or negative.

#### **III.13.7.2.5 Capacity Performance Payment Rate.**

For the three Capacity Commitment Periods beginning June 1, 2018 and ending May 31, 2021, the Capacity Performance Payment Rate shall be \$2000/MWh. For the three Capacity Commitment Periods beginning June 1, 2021 and ending May 31, 2024, the Capacity Performance Payment Rate shall be \$3500/MWh. For the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2024 and ending on May 31, 2025, the Capacity Performance Payment Rate shall be \$5455/MWh. For the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2025 and ending on May 31, 2026 and thereafter, the Capacity Performance Payment Rate shall be \$9337/MWh. The ISO shall review the Capacity Performance Payment Rate in the stakeholder process as needed and shall file with the Commission a new Capacity Performance Payment Rate if and as appropriate.

### **III.13.7.2.6 Calculation of Capacity Performance Payments.**

For each resource, whether or not it has a Capacity Supply Obligation, the ISO shall calculate a Capacity Performance Payment for each five-minute interval in which a Capacity Scarcity Condition exists in the Capacity Zone in which the resource is located. A resource's Capacity Performance Payment for an interval shall equal the resource's Capacity Performance Score for the interval multiplied by the Capacity Performance Payment Rate. The resulting Capacity Performance Payment for an interval may be positive or negative.

### **III.13.7.3 Monthly Capacity Payment and Capacity Stop-Loss Mechanism.**

Each resource's Monthly Capacity Payment for an Obligation Month, which may be positive or negative, shall be the sum of the resource's Capacity Base Payment for the Obligation Month plus the sum of the resource's Capacity Performance Payments for all five-minute intervals in the Obligation Month, except as provided in Section III.13.7.3.1 and Section III.13.7.3.2 below.

#### **III.13.7.3.1 Monthly Stop-Loss.**

If the sum of the resource's Capacity Performance Payments (excluding any Capacity Performance Payments associated with Actual Capacity Provided above the resource's Capacity Supply Obligation in any interval) for all five-minute intervals in the Obligation Month is negative, the amount subtracted from the resource's Capacity Base Payment for the Obligation Month will be limited to an amount equal to the product of the applicable Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price multiplied by the resource's Capacity Supply Obligation for the Obligation Month (or, in the case of a resource subject to a multi-year Capacity Commitment Period election made in a Forward Capacity Auction prior to the ninth Forward Capacity Auction as described in Sections III.13.1.1.2.2.4 and III.13.1.4.1.1.2.7, the amount subtracted from the resource's Capacity Base Payment for the Obligation Month will be limited to an amount equal to the product of the applicable Capacity Clearing Price (indexed for inflation) multiplied by the resource's Capacity Supply Obligation for the Obligation Month).

#### **III.13.7.3.2 Annual Stop-Loss.**

(a) For each Obligation Month, the ISO shall calculate a stop-loss amount equal to:

$$\text{MaxCSO} \times [3 \text{ months} \times (\text{FCAcp} - \text{FCAsp}) - (12 \text{ months} \times \text{FCAcp})]$$

Where:

MaxCSO = the resource's highest monthly Capacity Supply Obligation in the Capacity Commitment Period to date.

FCACP = the Capacity Clearing Price for the relevant Forward Capacity Auction.

FCASP = the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price for the relevant Forward Capacity Auction.

(b) For each Obligation Month, the ISO shall calculate each resource's cumulative Capacity Performance Payments as the sum of the resource's Capacity Performance Payments for all months in the Capacity Commitment Period to date, with those monthly amounts limited as described in Section III.13.7.3.1.

(c) If the sum of the resource's Capacity Performance Payments (excluding any Capacity Performance Payments associated with Actual Capacity Provided above the resource's Capacity Supply Obligation in any interval) for all five-minute intervals in the Obligation Month is negative, the amount subtracted from the resource's Capacity Base Payment for the Obligation Month will be limited to an amount equal to the difference between the stop-loss amount calculated as described in Section III.13.7.3.2(a) and the resource's cumulative Capacity Performance Payments as described in Section III.13.7.3.2(b).

#### **III.13.7.4 Allocation of Deficient or Excess Capacity Performance Payments.**

For each type of Capacity Scarcity Condition as described in Section III.13.7.2.1 and for each Capacity Zone, the ISO shall allocate deficient or excess Capacity Performance Payments as described in subsections (a) and (b) below. Where more than one type of Capacity Scarcity Condition applies, then the provisions below shall be applied in proportion to the duration of each type of Capacity Scarcity Condition.

(a) If the sum of all Capacity Performance Payments to all resources subject to the Capacity Scarcity Condition in the Capacity Zone in an Obligation Month is positive, the deficiency will be charged to resources in proportion to each such resource's Capacity Supply Obligation for the Obligation Month, excluding any resources subject to the stop-loss mechanism described in Section III.13.7.3 for the Obligation Month and excluding any resource, or portion thereof, consisting of Energy Efficiency measures. If the charge described in this Section III.13.7.4(a) causes a resource to reach the stop-loss limit

described in Section III.13.7.3, then the stop-loss cap described in Section III.13.7.3 will be applied to that resource, and the remaining deficiency will be further allocated to other resources in the same manner as described in this Section III.13.7.4(a).

(b) If the sum of all Capacity Performance Payments to all resources subject to the Capacity Scarcity Condition in the Capacity Zone in an Obligation Month is negative, the excess will be credited to all such resources (excluding any resource, or portion thereof, consisting of Energy Efficiency measures) in proportion to each resource's Capacity Supply Obligation for the Obligation Month. For a resource subject to the stop-loss mechanism described in Section III.13.7.3 for the Obligation Month, any such credit shall be reduced (though not to less than zero) by the amount not charged to the resource as a result of the application of the stop-loss mechanism described in Section III.13.7.3, and the remaining excess will be further allocated to other resources in the same manner as described in this Section III.13.7.4(b)

### **III.13.7.5. Charges to Market Participants with Capacity Load Obligations.**

#### **III.13.7.5.1. Calculation of Capacity Charges Prior to June 1, 2022.**

The provisions in this subsection apply to charges associated with Capacity Commitment Periods beginning prior to June 1, 2022. A load serving entity with a Capacity Load Obligation as of the end of the Obligation Month shall be subject to a charge equal to the product of: (a) its Capacity Load Obligation in the Capacity Zone; and (b) the applicable Net Regional Clearing Price. The Net Regional Clearing Price is defined as the sum of the total payments as defined in Section III.13.7 paid to resources with Capacity Supply Obligations in the Capacity Zone (excluding any capacity payments and charges made for Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals and excluding any Capacity Performance Payments), less PER adjustments for resources in the zone as defined in Section III.13.7.1.2, and including any applicable export charges or credits as determined pursuant to Section III.13.7.1.3 divided by the sum of all Capacity Supply Obligations (excluding (i) the quantity of capacity subject to Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals and (ii) the quantity of capacity clearing as Self-Supplied FCA Resources) assumed by resources in the zone. A load serving entity satisfying its Capacity Load Obligation by a Self-Supplied FCA Resource shall not receive a credit for any PER payment for its Capacity Load Obligation so satisfied. A load serving entity with a Capacity Load Obligation as of the end of the Obligation Month may also receive a failure to cover credit equal to the product of: (a) its Capacity Load Obligation in the Capacity Zone, and; (b) the sum of all failure to cover charges in the Capacity Zone calculated pursuant to Section III.13.3.4(b), divided by total Capacity Load Obligation in the Capacity Zone.

### **III.13.7.5.1.1. Calculation of Capacity Charges On and After June 1, 2022.**

The provisions in this subsection apply to charges associated with Capacity Commitment Periods beginning on or after June 1, 2022. For purposes of this Section III.13.7.5.1.1, Capacity Zone costs calculated for a Capacity Zone that contains a nested Capacity Zone shall exclude the Capacity Zone costs of the nested Capacity Zone. A Market Participant with a Capacity Load Obligation as of the end of the Obligation Month shall be subject to the following charges and adjustments:

#### **III.13.7.5.1.1.1 Forward Capacity Auction Charge.**

The FCA charge, for each Capacity Zone, is: (a) Capacity Load Obligation in the Capacity Zone; multiplied by (b) Capacity Zone FCA Costs divided by Zonal Capacity Obligation.

Where

Capacity Zone FCA Costs, for each Capacity Zone, are the Total FCA Costs multiplied by the Zonal Peak Load Allocator and divided by the Total Peak Load Allocator.

Total FCA Costs are the sum of, for all Capacity Zones, (i) Capacity Supply Obligations in each zone (the total obligation awarded to or shed by resources in the Forward Capacity Auction process for the Obligation Month in the zone, excluding any obligations awarded to Intermittent Power Resources that are the basis for the Intermittent Power Resource Capacity Adjustment specified in Section III.13.7.5.1.1.6 and excluding any obligations procured in the Forward Capacity Auction that are terminated pursuant to Section III.13.3.4A) multiplied by the applicable clearing price from the auction in which the obligation was awarded to (or shed by) the resource, and (ii) the difference between the bid price and the substitution auction clearing price that was not included in the capacity charge pursuant to the second sentence of Section III.13.7.1.1(d). Capacity Supply Obligations awarded to Proxy De-List Bids in the primary auction, or shed by demand bids entered into the substitution auction on behalf of a Proxy De-List Bid, are excluded from Total FCA Costs.

Zonal Peak Load Allocator is the Zonal Capacity Obligation multiplied by the zonal Capacity Clearing Price.

Total Peak Load Allocator is the sum of the Zonal Peak Load Allocators.

#### **III.13.7.5.1.1.2 Annual Reconfiguration Auction Charge.**

The total annual reconfiguration auction charge, for each Capacity Zone and each associated annual reconfiguration auction, is: (a) Capacity Load Obligation in the Capacity Zone; multiplied by (b) Capacity Zone Annual Reconfiguration Auction Costs divided by Zonal Capacity Obligation.

Where

Capacity Zone Annual Reconfiguration Auction Costs, for each Capacity Zone, are the Total Annual Reconfiguration Costs multiplied by the Zonal Peak Load Allocator and divided by the Total Peak Load Allocator.

Total Annual Reconfiguration Auction Costs are the sum, for all Capacity Zones and each associated annual reconfiguration auction, of the product of the Capacity Supply Obligations acquired through the annual reconfiguration auction in each zone (adjusted for any obligations procured in the annual reconfiguration auction that are subsequently terminated pursuant to Section III.13.3.4A) and the zonal annual reconfiguration auction clearing price, minus the sum, for all Capacity Zones, of the product of the amount of any Capacity Supply Obligation shed through the annual reconfiguration auction in each zone and the applicable annual reconfiguration auction clearing price.

Zonal Peak Load Allocator is the Zonal Capacity Obligation multiplied by the zonal annual reconfiguration auction clearing price.

Total Peak Load Allocator is the sum of the Zonal Peak Load Allocators.

#### **III.13.7.5.1.1.3. Monthly Reconfiguration Auction Charge.**

The monthly reconfiguration auction charge is: (a) total Capacity Load Obligation for all Capacity Zones; multiplied by (b) Total Monthly Reconfiguration Auction Costs divided by Total Zonal Capacity Obligation.

Where

Total Monthly Reconfiguration Auction Costs are the sum of, for all Capacity Zones, the product of Capacity Supply Obligations acquired through the monthly reconfiguration auction in each zone and the applicable monthly reconfiguration auction clearing price, minus the sum of, for all Capacity Zones, any Capacity Supply Obligations shed through the monthly reconfiguration auction in each zone and the applicable monthly reconfiguration auction clearing price.



Total Zonal Capacity Obligation is the total of the Zonal Capacity Obligation in all Capacity Zones.

**III.13.7.5.1.1.4. HQICC Capacity Charge.**

The HQICC capacity charge is: (a) total Capacity Load Obligation for all Capacity Zones; multiplied by (b) Total HQICC Credits divided by Total Capacity Load Obligation.

Where

Total HQICC credits are the product of HQICCs multiplied by the sum of the values calculated in Sections III.13.7.5.1.1.1(b), III.13.7.5.1.1.2(b), III.13.7.5.1.1.3(b), III.13.7.5.1.1.6(b), III.13.7.5.1.1.7(b), III.13.7.5.1.1.8(b), and III.13.7.5.1.1.9(b) in the Capacity Zone in which the HQ Phase I/II external node is located.

Total Capacity Load Obligation is the total Capacity Load Obligation in all Capacity Zones.

**III.13.7.5.1.1.5. Self-Supply Adjustment.**

The self-supply adjustment is: (a) Capacity Load Obligation in the Capacity Zone; multiplied by (b) the Self-Supply Variance divided by Total Capacity Load Obligation.

Where

Self-Supply Variance is the difference between foregone capacity payments and avoided capacity charges associated with designated self-supply quantities.

Foregone capacity payments to Self-Supplied FCA Resources are the sum, for all Capacity Zones, of the product of the zonal Capacity Supply Obligation (excluding any obligations procured in the Forward Capacity Auction that are terminated pursuant to Section III.13.3.4A) designated as self-supply, multiplied by the applicable clearing price from the auction in which the obligation was awarded.

Avoided capacity charges are the sum, for all Capacity Zones, of the product of any designated self-supply quantities multiplied by the sum of the values calculated in Sections III.13.7.5.1.1.1(b), III.13.7.5.1.1.2(b), III.13.7.5.1.1.3(b), III.13.7.5.1.1.6(b),

III.13.7.5.1.1.7(b), III.13.7.5.1.1.8(b), and III.13.7.5.1.1.9(b) in the Capacity Zone associated with the designated self-supply quantity.

Total Capacity Load Obligation is the total Capacity Load Obligation in all Capacity Zones.

**III.13.7.5.1.1.6. Intermittent Power Resource Capacity Adjustment.**

The Intermittent Power Resource capacity adjustment in a winter season for the Obligation Months from October through May is: (a) total Capacity Load Obligation for all Capacity Zones; multiplied by (b) the Intermittent Power Resource Seasonal Variance divided by Total Zonal Capacity Obligation.

Where

Intermittent Power Resource Seasonal Variance is the difference between the FCA payments for Intermittent Power Resource in the Obligation Month and the base FCA payments for Intermittent Power Resources.

FCA payments to Intermittent Power Resources are the sum, for all Capacity Zones, of the product of the Capacity Supply Obligations awarded to or shed by Intermittent Power Resources in the Forward Capacity Auction process for the Obligation Month pursuant to Section III.13.2.7.6 or Section III.13.2.8.1.1 (excluding any obligations procured in the Forward Capacity Auction that are terminated pursuant to Section III.13.3.4A), multiplied by the applicable clearing price from the auction in which the obligation was awarded.

Base FCA payments for Intermittent Power Resources are the sum, for all Capacity Zones, of the product of the FCA Qualified Capacity procured from or shed by Intermittent Power Resources in the Forward Capacity Auction process (excluding any obligations procured in the Forward Capacity Auction that are terminated pursuant to Section III.13.3.4A), multiplied by the applicable clearing price from the auction in which the obligation was awarded.

Total Zonal Capacity Obligation is the total Capacity Load Obligation in all Capacity Zones.

**III.13.7.5.1.1.7. Multi-Year Rate Election Adjustment.**

For multi-year rate elections made in the primary Forward Capacity Auction for Capacity Commitment Periods beginning on or after June 1, 2022, the multi-year rate election adjustment, for each Capacity

Zone, is: (a) Capacity Load Obligation in the Capacity Zone; multiplied by (b) Zonal Multi-Year Rate Election Costs divided by Zonal Capacity Obligation.

Where

Zonal Multi-Year Rate Election Costs is the sum, for each resource with a multi-year rate election in the Obligation Month, of the amount of Capacity Supply Obligation designated to receive the multi-year rate (excluding any obligations procured in the Forward Capacity Auction that are terminated pursuant to Section III.13.3.4A), multiplied by the difference in the applicable zonal Capacity Clearing Price for the Forward Capacity Auction in which the resource originally was awarded a Capacity Supply Obligation (indexed using the Handy-Whitman Index of Public Utility Construction Costs in effect as of December 31 of the year preceding the Capacity Commitment Period) and the applicable zonal Capacity Clearing Price for the current Capacity Commitment Period, multiplied by the Zonal Peak Load Allocator for the Forward Capacity Auction in which the resource originally was awarded a Capacity Supply Obligation and divided by the Total Peak Load Allocator for the Forward Capacity Auction in which the resource originally was awarded a Capacity Supply Obligation.

Zonal Peak Load Allocator is the Zonal Capacity Obligation multiplied by the zonal Capacity Clearing Price.

Total Peak Load Allocator is the sum of the Zonal Peak Load Allocators.

For multi-year rate elections made in the primary Forward Capacity Auction for Capacity Commitment Periods beginning prior to June 1, 2022, the multi-year rate election adjustment, for each Capacity Zone, is: (a) Capacity Load Obligation in the Capacity Zone; multiplied by (b) Zonal Multi-Year Rate Election Costs divided by Zonal Capacity Obligation.

Where

Zonal Multi-Year Rate Election Costs is the sum in each Capacity Zone, for each resource with a multi-year rate election in the Obligation Month, of the amount of Capacity Supply Obligation designated to receive the multi-year rate (excluding any obligations procured in the Forward Capacity Auction that are terminated pursuant to Section III.13.3.4A), multiplied by the difference in the applicable zonal Capacity Clearing Price for the Forward Capacity Auction in which the resource originally was awarded a Capacity Supply Obligation (indexed using the

Handy-Whitman Index of Public Utility Construction Costs in effect as of December 31 of the year preceding the Capacity Commitment Period) and the applicable zonal Capacity Clearing Price for the current Capacity Commitment Period.

**III.13.7.5.1.1.8 CTR Transmission Upgrade Charge.**

The CTR transmission upgrade charge is: (a) the Capacity Load Obligation in the Capacity Zones to which the applicable interface limits the transfer of capacity, multiplied by (b) Zonal CTR Transmission Upgrade Cost divided by Zonal Capacity Obligation.

Where

Zonal CTR Transmission Upgrade Cost for each Capacity Zone to which the interface limits the transfer of capacity is the amount calculated pursuant to Section III.13.7.5.4.4 (f), multiplied by the Zonal Capacity Obligation and divided by the sum of the Zonal Capacity Obligation for all Capacity Zones to which the interface limits the transfer of capacity.

**III.13.7.5.1.1.9 CTR Pool-Planned Unit Charge.**

The CTR Pool-Planned Unit charge is: (a) the Capacity Load Obligation in the Capacity Zone less the amount of any CTRs specifically allocated pursuant to Section III.13.7.5.4.5, multiplied by (b) CTR Pool-Planned Unit Cost divided by Total Zonal Capacity Obligation less the amount of any CTRs specifically allocated pursuant to Section III.13.7.5.4.5.

Where

The CTR Pool-Planned Unit Cost for each Capacity Zone is the sum of the amounts calculated pursuant to Section III.13.7.5.4.5 (b).

Total Zonal Capacity Obligation is the total of the Zonal Capacity Obligation in all Capacity Zones.

**III.13.7.5.1.1.10. Failure to Cover Charge Adjustment.**

The failure to cover charge adjustment, for each Capacity Zone, is (a) Capacity Load Obligation in the Capacity Zone; multiplied by (b) Zonal Failure to Cover Charges divided by Zonal Capacity Obligation.

Where:

Zonal Failure to Cover Charges are the product of: (1) the sum, for all Capacity Zones, of the failure to cover charges calculated pursuant to Section III.13.3.4(b), and; (2) the Zonal Peak Load Allocator and divided by the Total Peak Load Allocator.

Zonal Peak Load Allocator is the Zonal Capacity Obligation multiplied by the zonal annual reconfiguration auction clearing price as determined pursuant to Section III.13.3.4.

Total Peak Load Allocator is the sum of the Zonal Peak Load Allocators.

### **III.13.7.5.2. Calculation of Capacity Load Obligation and Zonal Capacity Obligation.**

The ISO shall assign each Market Participant a share of the Zonal Capacity Obligation prior to the commencement of each Obligation Month for each Capacity Zone established in the Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.4. The Zonal Capacity Obligation of a Capacity Zone that contains a nested Capacity Zone shall exclude the Zonal Capacity Obligation of the nested Capacity Zone.

Zonal Capacity Obligation for each month and Capacity Zone shall equal the product of: (i) the total of the system-wide Capacity Supply Obligations (excluding the quantity of capacity subject to Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals for Capacity Commitment Periods beginning prior to June 1, 2022 and excluding any additional obligations awarded to Intermittent Power Resources pursuant to Section III.13.2.7.6 that exceed the FCA Qualified Capacity procured in the Forward Capacity Auction for Capacity Commitment Periods beginning on or after June 1, 2022) plus HQICCs; and (ii) the ratio of the sum of all load serving entities' annual coincident contributions to the system-wide annual peak load in that Capacity Zone from the calendar year two years prior to the start of the Capacity Commitment Period (for Capacity Commitment Periods beginning prior to June 1, 2022) and from the calendar year one year prior to the start of the Capacity Commitment Period (for Capacity Commitment Periods beginning on or after June 1, 2022) to the system-wide sum of all load serving entities' annual coincident contributions to the system-wide annual peak load from the calendar year two years prior to the start of the Capacity Commitment Period (for Capacity Commitment Periods beginning prior to June 1, 2022) and from the calendar year one year prior to the start of the Capacity Commitment Period (for Capacity Commitment Periods beginning on or after June 1, 2022).

The following loads are assigned a peak contribution of zero for the purposes of assigning obligations and tracking load shifts: load associated with the receipt of electricity from the grid by Storage DARDs for later injection of electricity back to the grid; Station service load that is modeled as a discrete Load Asset

and the Resource is complying with the maintenance scheduling procedures of the ISO; load that is modeled as a discrete Load Asset and is exclusively related to an Alternative Technology Regulation Resource following AGC Dispatch Instructions; and transmission losses associated with delivery of energy over the Control Area tie lines.

A Market Participant's share of Zonal Capacity Obligation for each month and Capacity Zone shall equal the product of: (i) the Capacity Zone's Zonal Capacity Obligation as calculated above and (ii) the ratio of the sum of the load serving entity's annual coincident contributions to the system-wide annual peak load in that Capacity Zone from the calendar year prior to the start of the Capacity Commitment Period to the sum of all load serving entities' annual coincident contributions to the system-wide annual peak load in that Capacity Zone from the calendar year prior to the start of the Capacity Commitment Period.

A Market Participant's Capacity Load Obligation shall be its share of Zonal Capacity Obligation for each month and Capacity Zone, adjusted as appropriate to account for any relevant Capacity Load Obligation Bilaterals, HQICCs, and Self-Supplied FCA Resource designations. A Capacity Load Obligation can be a positive or negative value.

A Market Participant's share of Zonal Capacity Obligation will not be reconstituted to include the demand reduction of a Demand Capacity Resource or Demand Response Resource.

#### **III.13.7.5.2.1. Charges Associated with Dispatchable Asset Related Demands.**

Dispatchable Asset Related Demand resources will not receive Forward Capacity Market payments, but instead each Dispatchable Asset Related Demand resource will receive an adjustment to its share of the associated Coincident Peak Contribution based on the ability of the Dispatchable Asset Related Demand resource to reduce consumption. The adjustment to a load serving entity's Coincident Peak Contribution resulting from Dispatchable Asset Related Demand resource reduction in consumption shall be based on the Nominated Consumption Limit submitted for the Dispatchable Asset Related Demand resource.

The Nominated Consumption Limit value of each Dispatchable Asset Related Demand resource is subject to adjustment as further described in the ISO New England Manuals, including adjustments based on the results of Nominated Consumption Limit audits performed in accordance with the ISO New England Manuals.

#### **III.13.7.5.3. Excess Revenues.**

(a) For Capacity Commitment Periods beginning prior to June 1, 2022, revenues collected from load serving entities in excess of revenues paid by the ISO to resources shall be paid by the ISO to the holders of Capacity Transfer Rights, as detailed in Section III.13.7.5.3.

(b) Any payment associated with a Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral that was to accrue to a Capacity Acquiring Resource for a Capacity Supply Obligation that is terminated pursuant to Section III.13.3.4A shall instead be allocated to Market Participants based on their pro rata share of all Capacity Load Obligations in the Capacity Zone in which the terminated resource is located.

#### **III.13.7.5.4. Capacity Transfer Rights.**

##### **III.13.7.5.4.1. Definition and Payments to Holders of Capacity Transfer Rights.**

This subsection applies to Capacity Commitment Periods beginning prior to June 1, 2022.

Capacity Transfer Rights are calculated for each internal interface associated with a Capacity Zone established in the Forward Capacity Auction (as determined pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.4). Based upon results of the Forward Capacity Auction and reconfiguration auctions, the total CTR fund will be calculated as the difference between the charges to load serving entities with Capacity Load Obligations and the payments to Capacity Resources as follows: The system-wide sum of the product of each Capacity Zone's Net Regional Clearing Price and absolute value of each Capacity Zone's Capacity Load Obligations, as calculated in Section III.13.7.5.1, minus the sum of the monthly capacity payments to Capacity Resources within each zone, as adjusted for PER.

Each Capacity Zone established in the Forward Capacity Auction (as determined pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.4) will be assigned its portion of the CTR fund.

For CTRs resulting from an export constrained zone, the assignment will be calculated as the product of:

(i) the Net Regional Clearing Price for the Capacity Zone to which the applicable interface limits the transfer of capacity minus the Net Regional Clearing Price for the Capacity Zone from which the applicable interface limits the transfer of capacity; and (ii) the difference between the absolute value of the total Capacity Supply Obligations obtained in the exporting Capacity Zone, adjusted for Capacity Supply Obligations associated with Self-Supplied FCA Resources, and the absolute value of the total Capacity Load Obligations in the exporting Capacity Zone.

For CTRs resulting from an import constrained zone, the assignment will be calculated as the product of:

(i) the Net Regional Clearing Price for the Capacity Zone to which the applicable interface limits the transfer of capacity minus the Net Regional Clearing Price for the absolute value of the Capacity Zone from which the applicable interface limits the transfer of capacity; and (ii) the difference between absolute value of the total Capacity Load Obligations in the importing Capacity Zone and the total Capacity Supply Obligations obtained in the importing Capacity Zone, adjusted for Capacity Supply Obligations associated with Self-Supplied FCA Resources.

#### **III.13.7.5.4.2. Allocation of Capacity Transfer Rights.**

This subsection applies to Capacity Commitment Periods beginning prior to June 1, 2022.

For Capacity Zones established in the Forward Capacity Auction as determined pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.4, the CTR fund shall be allocated among load serving entities using their Capacity Load Obligation (net of HQICCs) described in Section III.13.7.5.1. Market Participants with CTRs specifically allocated under Section III.13.7.5.3.6 will have their specifically allocated CTR MWs netted from their Capacity Load Obligation used to establish their share of the CTR fund.

(a) **Connecticut Import Interface.** The allocation of the CTR fund associated with the Connecticut Import Interface shall be made to load serving entities based on their Capacity Load Obligation in the Connecticut Capacity Zone.

(b) **NEMA/Boston Import Interface.** Except as provided in Section III.13.7.5.3.6 of Market Rule 1, the allocation of the CTR fund associated with the NEMA/Boston Import Interface shall be made to load serving entities based on their Capacity Load Obligation in the NEMA/Boston Capacity Zone.

#### **III.13.7.5.4.3. Allocations of CTRs Resulting From Revised Capacity Zones.**

This subsection applies to Capacity Commitment Periods beginning prior to June 1, 2022.

The portion of the CTR fund associated with revised definitions of Capacity Zones shall be fully allocated to load serving entities after deducting the value of applicable CTRs that have been specifically allocated. Allocations of the CTR fund among load serving entities will be made using their Capacity Load Obligations (net of HQICCs) as described in Section III.13.7.5.3.1. Market Participants with CTRs specifically allocated under Section III.13.7.5.3.6 will have their specifically allocated CTR MWs netted from the Capacity Load Obligation used to establish their share of the CTR fund.



(a) **Import Constraints.** The allocation of the CTR fund associated with newly defined import-constrained Capacity Zones restricting the transfer of capacity into a single adjacent import-constrained Capacity Zone shall be allocated to load serving entities with Capacity Load Obligations in that import-constrained Capacity Zone.

(b) **Export Constraints.** The allocation of the CTR fund associated with newly defined export-constrained Capacity Zones shall be allocated to load serving entities with Capacity Load Obligations on the import-constrained side of the interface.

#### **III.13.7.5.4.4. Specifically Allocated CTRs Associated with Transmission Upgrades.**

(a) A Market Participant that pays for transmission upgrades not funded through the Pool PTF Rate and which increase transfer capability across existing or potential Capacity Zone interfaces may request a specifically allocated CTR in an amount equal to the number of CTRs supported by that increase in transfer capability.

(b) The allocation of additional CTRs created through generator interconnections completed after February 1, 2009 shall be made in accordance with the provisions of the ISO generator interconnection or planning standards. In the event the ISO interconnection or planning standards do not address this issue, the CTRs created shall be allocated in the same manner as described in Section III.13.7.5.4.2.

(c) Specifically allocated CTRs shall expire when the Market Participant ceases to pay to support the transmission upgrades.

(d) CTRs resulting from transmission upgrades funded through the Pool PTF Rate shall not be specifically allocated but shall be allocated in the same manner as described in Section III.13.7.5.4.2.

(e) **Maine Export Interface.** Casco Bay shall receive specifically allocated CTRs of 325 MW across the Maine export interface for as long as Casco Bay continues to pay to support the transmission upgrades.

(f) The value of CTRs specifically allocated pursuant to this Section shall be calculated as the product of: (i) the Capacity Clearing Price to which the applicable interface limits the transfer of capacity

minus the Capacity Clearing Price from which the applicable interface limits the transfer of capacity; and  
(ii) the MW quantity of the specifically allocated CTRs across the applicable interface.

**III.13.7.5.4.5. Specifically Allocated CTRs for Pool-Planned Units.**

(a) In import-constrained Capacity Zones, in recognition of longstanding life of unit contracts, the municipal utility entitlement holder of a resource constructed as Pool-Planned Units shall receive an initial allocation of CTRs equal to the most recent seasonal claimed capability of the ownership entitlements in such unit, adjusted for any designated self-supply quantities as described in Section III.13.1.6.2. Municipal utility entitlements are set as shown in the table below and are not transferrable.

Millstone 3		Seabrook	Stonybrook GT 1A	Stonybrook GT 1B	Stonybrook GT 1C	Stonybrook 2A	Stonybrook 2B	Wyman 4	Summer (MW)	Winter (MW)
Nominal Summer (MW)	1155.001	1244.275	104.000	100.000	104.000	67.400	65.300	586.725		
Nominal Winter (MW)	1155.481	1244.275	119.000	116.000	119.000	87.400	85.300	608.575		
Danvers	0.2627%	1.1124%	8.4569%	8.4569%	8.4569%	11.5551%	11.5551%	0.0000%	58.26	63.73
Georgetown	0.0208%	0.0956%	0.7356%	0.7356%	0.7356%	1.0144%	1.0144%	0.0000%	5.04	5.55
Ipswich	0.0608%	0.1066%	0.2934%	0.2934%	0.2934%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	2.93	2.37
Marblehead	0.1544%	0.1351%	2.6840%	2.6840%	2.6840%	1.5980%	1.5980%	0.2793%	15.49	15.64
Middleton	0.0440%	0.3282%	0.8776%	0.8776%	0.8776%	1.8916%	1.8916%	0.1012%	10.40	11.07
Peabody	0.2969%	1.1300%	13.0520%	13.0520%	13.0520%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	57.69	60.26
Reading	0.4041%	0.6351%	14.4530%	14.4530%	14.4530%	19.5163%	19.5163%	0.0000%	82.98	92.77
Wakefield	0.2055%	0.3870%	3.9929%	3.9929%	3.9929%	6.3791%	6.3791%	0.4398%	30.53	32.64
Ashburnham	0.0307%	0.0652%	0.6922%	0.6922%	0.6922%	0.9285%	0.9285%	0.0000%	4.53	5.22
Boylston	0.0264%	0.0849%	0.5933%	0.5933%	0.5933%	0.9120%	0.9120%	0.0522%	4.71	5.35
Braintree	0.0000%	0.6134%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	7.63	7.63
Groton	0.0254%	0.1288%	0.8034%	0.8034%	0.8034%	1.0832%	1.0832%	0.0000%	5.81	6.61
Hingham	0.1007%	0.4740%	3.9815%	3.9815%	3.9815%	5.3307%	5.3307%	0.0000%	26.40	30.36
Holden	0.0726%	0.3971%	2.2670%	2.2670%	2.2670%	3.1984%	3.1984%	0.0000%	17.01	19.33
Holyoke	0.3194%	0.3096%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	2.8342%	2.8342%	0.6882%	15.34	16.63

Hudson	0.1056%	1.6745%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.3395%	24.05	24.12
Hull	0.0380%	0.1650%	1.4848%	1.4848%	1.4848%	2.1793%	2.1793%	0.1262%	10.70	12.28
Littleton	0.0536%	0.1093%	1.5115%	1.5115%	1.5115%	3.0607%	3.0607%	0.1666%	11.67	13.63
Mansfield	0.1581%	0.7902%	5.0951%	5.0951%	5.0951%	7.2217%	7.2217%	0.0000%	36.93	42.17
Middleborough	0.1128%	0.5034%	2.0657%	2.0657%	2.0657%	4.9518%	4.9518%	0.1667%	21.48	24.45
North Attleborough	0.1744%	0.3781%	3.2277%	3.2277%	3.2277%	5.9838%	5.9838%	0.1666%	25.58	29.49
Pascoag	0.0000%	0.1068%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	1.33	1.33
Paxton	0.0326%	0.0808%	0.6860%	0.6860%	0.6860%	0.9979%	0.9979%	0.0000%	4.82	5.53
Shrewsbury	0.2323%	0.5756%	3.9105%	3.9105%	3.9105%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.4168%	24.33	26.23
South Hadley	0.5755%	0.3412%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	10.89	10.90
Sterling	0.0294%	0.2044%	0.7336%	0.7336%	0.7336%	1.1014%	1.1014%	0.0000%	6.60	7.38
Taunton	0.0000%	0.1003%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	1.25	1.25
Templeton	0.0700%	0.1926%	1.3941%	1.3941%	1.3941%	2.3894%	2.3894%	0.0000%	10.67	12.27
Vermont Public Power Supply Authority	0.0000%	0.0000%	2.2008%	2.2008%	2.2008%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0330%	6.97	7.99
West Boylston	0.0792%	0.1814%	1.2829%	1.2829%	1.2829%	2.3041%	2.3041%	0.0000%	10.18	11.69
Westfield	1.1131%	0.3645%	9.0452%	9.0452%	9.0452%	13.5684%	13.5684%	0.7257%	67.51	77.27

This allocation of CTRs shall expire on December 31, 2040. If a resource listed in the table above retires prior to December 31, 2040, however, its allocation of CTRs shall expire upon retirement. In the event that the NEMA zone either becomes or is forecast to become a separate zone for Forward Capacity Auction purposes, National Grid agrees to discuss with Massachusetts Municipal Wholesale Electric Company ("MMWEC") and Wellesley Municipal Light Plant, Reading Municipal Light Plant and Concord Municipal Light Plant ("WRC") any proposal by National Grid to develop cost effective transmission improvements that would mitigate or alleviate the import constraints and to work cooperatively and in good faith with MMWEC and WRC regarding any such proposal. MMWEC and WRC agree to support any proposals advanced by National Grid in the regional system planning process to construct any such transmission improvements, provided that MMWEC and WRC determine that the proposed improvements are cost effective (without regard to CTRs) and will mitigate or alleviate the import constraints.

(b) The value of CTRs specifically allocated pursuant to this Section shall be calculated as the product of: (i) the Capacity Clearing Price for the Capacity Zone where the load of the municipal utility entitlement holder is located minus the Capacity Clearing Price for the Capacity Zone in which the Pool-Planned Unit is located, and; (ii) the MW quantity of the specifically allocated CTRs.

#### **III.13.7.5.5. Forward Capacity Market Net Charge Amount.**

The Forward Capacity Market net charge amount for each Market Participant as of the end of the Obligation Month shall be equal to the sum of: (a) its Capacity Load Obligation charges; (b) its revenues from any applicable specifically allocated CTRs; (c) its share of the CTR fund (for Capacity Commitment Periods beginning prior to June 1, 2022); and (d) any applicable export charges.

### **III.13.8. Reporting and Price Finality**

#### **III.13.8.1. Filing of Certain Determinations Made By the ISO Prior to the Forward Capacity Auction and Challenges Thereto.**

(a) For each Forward Capacity Auction, no later than 20 Business Days after the issuance of retirement determination notifications described in Section III.13.1.2.4(a), the ISO shall make a filing with the Commission pursuant to Section 205 of the Federal Power Act describing the Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids established pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2, ~~and the substitution-auction test prices established pursuant to Section III.13.2.8.3.1A~~. The ISO will file the following information confidentially: the determinations made by the Internal Market Monitor with respect to each Permanent De-List Bid ~~and~~, Retirement De-List Bid, ~~and substitution-auction test price~~, and supporting documentation for each such determination. The confidential filing shall indicate those resources that will permanently de-list or retire prior to the Forward Capacity Auction and those Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids for which a Lead Market Participant has made an election pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1.

(b) The Forward Capacity Auction shall be conducted using the determinations as approved by the Commission (unless the Commission directs otherwise), and challenges to Capacity Clearing Prices resulting from the Forward Capacity Auction shall be reviewed in accordance with the provisions of Section III.13.8.2(c).

(c) For each Forward Capacity Auction, no later than 90 days prior to the first day of the auction, the ISO shall make an informational filing with the Commission detailing the following determinations made by the ISO with respect to that Forward Capacity Auction, and providing supporting documentation for each such determination, provided, however, that the determinations in subsections (vi), (vii), and (viii) below shall be filed confidentially with the Commission in the informational filing, except determinations on which new resources have been rejected due to overlapping interconnection impacts (the determinations in subsections (vi), (vii), and (viii) shall be published by the ISO no later than 15 days after the Forward Capacity Auction) , with the exception of de-list bid price information, which shall remain confidential):

- (i) which Capacity Zones shall be modeled in the Forward Capacity Auction;
- (ii) the transmission interface limits as determined pursuant to Section III.12.5;

- (iii) which existing and proposed transmission lines the ISO determines will be in service by the start of the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction;
- (iv) the expected amount of installed capacity in each modeled Capacity Zone during the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction, and the Local Sourcing Requirement for each modeled import-constrained Capacity Zone and the Maximum Capacity Limit for each modeled export-constrained Capacity Zone;
- (v) [reserved];
- (vi) which new resources are accepted and rejected in the qualification process to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction;
- (vii) the Internal Market Monitor's determinations regarding each requested offer price from a new resource submitted pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.2.3 or Section III.13.1.4.1.1.2.8, including information regarding each of the elements considered in the Internal Market Monitor's determination of expected net revenues (other than revenues from ISO-administered markets) and whether that element was included or excluded in the determination of whether the offer is consistent with the resource's long run average costs net of expected net revenues other than capacity revenues;
- (viii) the Internal Market Monitor's determinations regarding offers or Static De-List Bids, Export Bids, and Administrative De-List Bids submitted during the qualification process made according to the provisions of this Section III.13, including an explanation of the Internal Market Monitor-determined prices established for any Static De-List Bids, Export Bids, and Administrative De-List Bids as described in Section III.13.1.2.3.2 based on the Internal Market Monitor review and the resource's net going forward costs, reasonable expectations about the resource's Capacity Performance Payments, reasonable risk premium assumptions, and reasonable opportunity costs as determined by the Internal Market Monitor. The filing shall identify to the extent possible the components of the bid which were accepted as justified, and shall also identify to the extent possible the components of the bid which were not justified and which resulted in the Internal Market Monitor establishing an Internal Market Monitor-determined price for the bid;

(ix) which existing resources are qualified to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction (this information will include resource type, capacity zone, and qualified MW);

(x) aggregate MW from new resources qualified to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction and aggregate de-list bid amounts; and

(xi) aggregate quantity of supply offers and demand bids qualified to participate in the substitution auction.

(d) Any comments or challenges to the determinations contained in the informational filing described in Section III.13.8.1(c) or in the qualification determination notifications described in Sections III.13.1.1.2.8, III.13.1.2.4(b) and III.13.1.3.5.7 must be filed with the Commission no later than 15 days after the ISO's submission of the informational filing. If the Commission does not issue an order within 75 days after the ISO's submission of the informational filing that directs otherwise, the determinations contained in the informational filing shall be used in conducting the Forward Capacity Auction, and challenges to Capacity Clearing Prices resulting from the Forward Capacity Auction shall be reviewed in accordance with the provisions of Section III.13.8.2(c). If within 75 days after the ISO's submission of the informational filing, the Commission does issue an order modifying one or more of the ISO's determinations, then the Forward Capacity Auction shall be conducted no earlier than 15 days following that order using the determinations as modified by the Commission (unless the Commission directs otherwise), and challenges to Capacity Clearing Prices resulting from the Forward Capacity Auction shall be reviewed in accordance with the provisions of Section III.13.8.2(c).

### **III.13.8.2. Filing of Forward Capacity Auction Results and Challenges Thereto.**

(a) As soon as practicable after the Forward Capacity Auction is complete, the ISO shall file the results of that Forward Capacity Auction with the Commission pursuant to Section 205 of the Federal Power Act, including the final set of Capacity Zones resulting from the auction, the Capacity Clearing Price in each of those Capacity Zones (and the Capacity Clearing Price associated with certain imports pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.3(d), if applicable), the substitution auction clearing prices and the total amount of payments associated with any demand bids cleared at a substitution auction clearing price above their demand bid prices, and a list of which resources received Capacity Supply Obligations in each Capacity Zone and the amount of those Capacity Supply Obligations. Upon completion of the fourth and future auctions, such list of resources that receive Capacity Supply Obligation shall also specify which



resources cleared as Conditional Qualified New Resources. Upon completion of the fourth and future auctions, the filing shall also list each Long Lead Time Facility, as defined in Schedule 22 or Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff, that secured a Queue Position to participate as a New Generating Capacity Resource in the Forward Capacity Auction and each resource with lower queue priority that was selected in the Forward Capacity Auction subject to a Long Lead Time Facility with the higher queue priority. The filing shall also enumerate de-list bids rejected for reliability reasons pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5, and the reasons for those rejections.

(b) The filing of Forward Capacity Auction results made pursuant to this Section III.13.8.2 shall also include documentation regarding the competitiveness of the Forward Capacity Auction, which may include a certification from the auctioneer and the ISO that: (i) all entities offering and bidding in the Forward Capacity Auction were properly qualified in accordance with the provisions of Section III.13.1; and (ii) the Forward Capacity Auction was conducted in accordance with the provisions of Section III.13.

(c) Any objection to the Forward Capacity Auction results must be filed with the Commission within 45 days after the ISO's filing of the Forward Capacity Auction results. The filing of a timely objection with the Commission will be the exclusive means of challenging the Forward Capacity Auction results.

(d) Any change to the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff affecting the Forward Capacity Market or the Forward Capacity Auction that is filed after the results of a Forward Capacity Auction have been accepted or approved by the Commission shall not affect those Forward Capacity Auction results.

**DYNEGY-CALPINE MOPR REFORMS PROPOSED AMENDMENT**  
**FULL MOPR ELIMINATION/REPLACEMENT – TO BE EFFECTIVE BEGINNING**  
**WITH FCA 19**

**Changes made since the January 2022 Markets Committee meeting are highlighted in green**

**I.2 Rules of Construction; Definitions**

**I.2.1. Rules of Construction:**

In this Tariff, unless otherwise provided herein:

- (a) words denoting the singular include the plural and vice versa;
- (b) words denoting a gender include all genders;
- (c) references to a particular part, clause, section, paragraph, article, exhibit, schedule, appendix or other attachment shall be a reference to a part, clause, section, paragraph, or article of, or an exhibit, schedule, appendix or other attachment to, this Tariff;
- (d) the exhibits, schedules and appendices attached hereto are incorporated herein by reference and shall be construed with an as an integral part of this Tariff to the same extent as if they were set forth verbatim herein;
- (e) a reference to any statute, regulation, proclamation, ordinance or law includes all statutes, regulations, proclamations, amendments, ordinances or laws varying, consolidating or replacing the same from time to time, and a reference to a statute includes all regulations, policies, protocols, codes, proclamations and ordinances issued or otherwise applicable under that statute unless, in any such case, otherwise expressly provided in any such statute or in this Tariff;
- (f) a reference to a particular section, paragraph or other part of a particular statute shall be deemed to be a reference to any other section, paragraph or other part substituted therefor from time to time;
- (g) a definition of or reference to any document, instrument or agreement includes any amendment or supplement to, or restatement, replacement, modification or novation of, any such document, instrument or agreement unless otherwise specified in such definition or in the context in which such reference is used;
- (h) a reference to any person (as hereinafter defined) includes such person's successors and permitted assigns in that designated capacity;

- (i) any reference to “days” shall mean calendar days unless “Business Days” (as hereinafter defined) are expressly specified;
- (j) if the date as of which any right, option or election is exercisable, or the date upon which any amount is due and payable, is stated to be on a date or day that is not a Business Day, such right, option or election may be exercised, and such amount shall be deemed due and payable, on the next succeeding Business Day with the same effect as if the same was exercised or made on such date or day (without, in the case of any such payment, the payment or accrual of any interest or other late payment or charge, provided such payment is made on such next succeeding Business Day);
- (k) words such as “hereunder,” “hereto,” “hereof” and “herein” and other words of similar import shall, unless the context requires otherwise, refer to this Tariff as a whole and not to any particular article, section, subsection, paragraph or clause hereof; and a reference to “include” or “including” means including without limiting the generality of any description preceding such term, and for purposes hereof the rule of *ejusdem generis* shall not be applicable to limit a general statement, followed by or referable to an enumeration of specific matters, to matters similar to those specifically mentioned.

#### **I.2.2. Definitions:**

In this Tariff, the terms listed in this section shall be defined as described below:

**Active Demand Capacity Resource** is one or more Demand Response Resources located within the same Dispatch Zone, that is registered with the ISO, assigned a unique resource identification number by the ISO, and participates in the Forward Capacity Market to fulfill a Market Participant’s Capacity Supply Obligation pursuant to Section III.13 of Market Rule 1.

**Actual Capacity Provided** is the measure of capacity provided during a Capacity Scarcity Condition, as described in Section III.13.7.2.2 of Market Rule 1.

**Actual Load** is the consumption at the Retail Delivery Point for the hour.

**Additional Resource Blackstart O&M Payment** is defined and calculated as specified in Section 5.1.2 of Schedule 16 to the OATT.

**Additional Resource Specified-Term Blackstart Capital Payment** is defined and calculated as specified in Section 5.1.2 of Schedule 16 to the OATT.

**Additional Resource Standard Blackstart Capital Payment** is defined and calculated as specified in Section 5.1.2 of Schedule 16 to the OATT.

**Administrative Costs** are those costs incurred in connection with the review of Applications for transmission service and the carrying out of System Impact Studies and Facilities Studies.

**Administrative Export De-List Bid** is a bid that may be submitted in a Forward Capacity Auction by certain Existing Generating Capacity Resources subject to a multi-year contract to sell capacity outside of the New England Control Area during the associated Capacity Commitment Period, as described in Section III.13.1.2.3.1.4 of Market Rule 1.

**ADR Neutrals** are one or more firms or individuals identified by the ISO with the advice and consent of the Participants Committee that are prepared to act as neutrals in ADR proceedings under Appendix D to Market Rule 1.

**Advance** is defined in Section IV.A.3.2 of the Tariff.

**Affected Party**, for purposes of the ISO New England Billing Policy, is defined in Section 6.3.5 of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

**Affiliate** is any person or entity that controls, is controlled by, or is under common control by another person or entity. For purposes of this definition, "control" means the possession, directly or indirectly, of the authority to direct the management or policies of an entity. A voting interest of ten percent or more shall create a rebuttable presumption of control.

**AGC** is automatic generation control.

**AGC SetPoint** is the desired output signal for a Resource providing Regulation that is produced by the AGC system as frequently as every four seconds.

**AGC SetPoint Deadband** is a deadband expressed in megawatts that is applied to changing values of the AGC SetPoint for generating units.

**Allocated Assessment** is a Covered Entity's right to seek and obtain payment and recovery of its share in any shortfall payments under Section 3.3 or Section 3.4 of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

**Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR)** is the procedure set forth in Appendix D to Market Rule 1.

**Alternative Technology Regulation Resource (ATRR)** is one or more facilities capable of providing Regulation that have been registered in accordance with the Asset Registration Process. An Alternative Technology Regulation Resource is eligible to participate in the Regulation Market.

**Ancillary Services** are those services that are necessary to support the transmission of electric capacity and energy from resources to loads while maintaining reliable operation of the New England Transmission System in accordance with Good Utility Practice.

**Announced Schedule 1 EA Amount, Announced Schedule 2 EA Amount, Announced Schedule 3 EA Amount** are defined in Section IV.B.2.2 of the Tariff.

**Annual Transmission Revenue Requirements** are the annual revenue requirements of a PTO's PTF or of all PTOs' PTF for purposes of the OATT shall be the amount determined in accordance with Attachment F to the OATT.

**Annual Reconfiguration Transaction** is a bilateral transaction that may be used in accordance with Section III.13.5.4 of Market Rule 1 to specify a price when a Capacity Supply Obligation is transferred using supply offers and demand bids in Annual Reconfiguration Auctions.

**Applicants**, for the purposes of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy, are entities applying for Market Participant status or for transmission service from the ISO.

**Application** is a written request by an Eligible Customer for transmission service pursuant to the provisions of the OATT.

**Asset** is a Generator Asset, a Demand Response Asset, a component of an On-Peak Demand Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource, a Load Asset (including an Asset Related Demand), an Alternative Technology Regulation Resource, or a Tie-Line Asset.

**Asset Registration Process** is the ISO business process for registering an Asset.

**Asset Related Demand** is a Load Asset that has been discretely modeled within the ISO's dispatch and settlement systems, settles at a Node, has been registered in accordance with the Asset Registration Process, and is made up of either: (1) one or more individual end-use metered customers receiving service from the same point or points of electrical supply with an aggregate average hourly load of 1 MW or greater during the 12 months preceding its registration or (2) one or more storage facilities with an aggregate consumption capability of at least 1 MW.

**Asset Related Demand Bid Block-Hours** are Block-Hours assigned to the Lead Market Participant for each Asset Related Demand bid. Blocks of the bid in effect for each hour will be totaled to determine the daily quantity of Asset Related Demand Bid Block-Hours. In the case that a Resource has a Real-Time unit status of "unavailable" for an entire day, that day will not contribute to the quantity of Asset Related Demand Bid Block-Hours. However, if the Resource has at least one hour of the day with a unit status of "available," the entire day will contribute to the quantity of Asset Related Demand Bid Block-Hours.

**Asset-Specific Going Forward Costs** are the net costs of an asset that is part of an Existing Generating Capacity Resource, calculated for the asset in the same manner as the net costs of Existing Generating Capacity Resources as described in Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.1.1 (for an asset with a Static De-List Bid or an Export Bid) or Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.1.2 (for an asset with a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid).

**Assigned Meter Reader** reports to the ISO the hourly and monthly MWh associated with the Asset. These MWh are used for settlement. The Assigned Meter Reader may designate an agent to help fulfill its Assigned Meter Reader responsibilities; however, the Assigned Meter Reader remains functionally responsible to the ISO.

**Auction Revenue Right (ARR)** is a right to receive FTR Auction Revenues in accordance with Appendix C of Market Rule 1.

**Auction Revenue Right Allocation (ARR Allocation)** is defined in Section 1 of Appendix C of Market Rule 1.

**Auction Revenue Right Holder (ARR Holder)** is an entity which is the record holder of an Auction Revenue Right (excluding an Incremental ARR) in the register maintained by the ISO.

**Authorized Commission** is defined in Section 3.3 of the ISO New England Information Policy.

**Authorized Person** is defined in Section 3.3 of the ISO New England Information Policy.

**Automatic Response Rate** is the response rate, in MW/Minute, at which a Market Participant is willing to have a Regulation Resource change its output or consumption while providing Regulation between the Regulation High Limit and Regulation Low Limit.

**Average Hourly Load Reduction** is either: (i) the sum of the On-Peak Demand Resource's electrical energy reduction during Demand Resource On-Peak Hours in the month divided by the number of Demand Resource On-Peak Hours in the month; or (ii) the sum of the Seasonal Peak Demand Resource's electrical energy reduction during Demand Resource Seasonal Peak Hours in the month divided by the number of Demand Resource Seasonal Peak Hours in the month. The On-Peak Demand Resource's or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource's electrical energy reduction and Average Hourly Load Reduction shall be determined consistent with the resource's Measurement and Verification Plan, which shall be reviewed by the ISO to ensure consistency with the measurement and verification requirements, as described in Section III.13.1.4.3 of Market Rule 1 and the ISO New England Manuals.

**Average Hourly Output** is either: (i) the sum of the On-Peak Demand Resource's electrical energy output during Demand Resource On-Peak Hours in the month divided by the number of Demand Resource On-Peak Hours in the month; or (ii) the sum of the Seasonal Peak Demand Resource's electrical energy output during Demand Resource Seasonal Peak Hours in the month divided by the number of Demand Resource Seasonal Peak Hours in the month. Electrical energy output and Average Hourly Output shall be determined consistent with the resource's Measurement and Verification Plan, which shall be reviewed by the ISO to ensure consistency with the measurement and verification requirements, as described in Section III.13.1.4.3 of Market Rule 1 and the ISO New England Manuals.

**Average Monthly PER** is calculated in accordance with Section III.13.7.1.2.2 of Market Rule 1.

**Backstop Transmission Solution** is a solution proposed: (i) to address a reliability or market efficiency need identified by the ISO in a Needs Assessment reported by the ISO pursuant to Section 4.1(i) of Attachment K to the ISO OATT, (ii) by the PTO or PTOs with an obligation under Schedule 3.09(a) of the TOA to address the identified need; and (iii) in circumstances in which the competitive solution process specified in Section 4.3 of Attachment K to the ISO OATT will be utilized.

**Bankruptcy Code** is the United States Bankruptcy Code.

**Bankruptcy Event** occurs when a Covered Entity files a voluntary or involuntary petition in bankruptcy or commences a proceeding under the United States Bankruptcy Code or any other applicable law concerning insolvency, reorganization or bankruptcy by or against such Covered Entity as debtor.

**Bilateral Contract (BC)** is any of the following types of contracts: Internal Bilateral for Load, Internal Bilateral for Market for Energy, and External Transactions.

**Bilateral Contract Block-Hours** are Block-Hours assigned to the seller and purchaser of an Internal Bilateral for Load, Internal Bilateral for Market for Energy and External Transactions; provided, however, that only those contracts which apply to the Real-Time Energy Market will accrue Block-Hours.

**Binary Storage DARD** is a DARD that participates in the New England Markets as part of a Binary Storage Facility, as described in Section III.1.10.6 of Market Rule 1.

**Binary Storage Facility** is a type of Electric Storage Facility, as described in Section III.1.10.6 of Market Rule 1.

**Blackstart Capability Test** is the test, required by ISO New England Operating Documents, of a resource's capability to provide Blackstart Service.

**Blackstart Capital Payment** is the annual compensation, as calculated pursuant to Section 5.1, or as referred to in Section 5.2, of Schedule 16 to the OATT, for a Designated Blackstart Resource's Blackstart



Equipment capital costs associated with the provision of Blackstart Service (excluding the capital costs associated with compliance with NERC Critical Infrastructure Protection Reliability Standards as part of Blackstart Service).

**Blackstart Equipment** is any equipment that is solely necessary to enable the Designated Blackstart Resource to provide Blackstart Service and is not required to provide other products or services under the Tariff.

**Blackstart O&M Payment** is the annual Blackstart O&M compensation calculated under either Section 5.1 or 5.2 of Schedule 16 of the OATT, as applicable.

**Blackstart Owner** is the Market Participant who is authorized on behalf of the Generator Owner(s) to offer or operate the resource as a Designated Blackstart Resource and is authorized to commit the resource to provide Blackstart Service.

**Blackstart Service** is the Ancillary Service described in Section II.47 of the Tariff and Schedule 16 of the OATT.

**Blackstart Service Commitment** is the commitment by a Blackstart Owner for its resource to provide Blackstart Service and the acceptance of that commitment by the ISO, in the manner detailed in ISO New England Operating Procedure No. 11 – Designated Blackstart Resource Administration (OP 11), and which includes a commitment to provide Blackstart Service established under Operating Procedure 11 – Designated Blackstart Resource Administration (OP11).

**Blackstart Service Minimum Criteria** are the minimum criteria that a Blackstart Owner and its resource must meet in order to establish and maintain a resource as a Designated Blackstart Resource.

**Blackstart Standard Rate Payment** is the formulaic rate of monthly compensation, as calculated pursuant to Section 5 of Schedule 16 to the OATT, paid to a Blackstart Owner for the provision of Blackstart Service from a Designated Blackstart Resource.

**Blackstart Station** is comprised of (i) a single Designated Blackstart Resource or (ii) two or more Designated Blackstart Resources that share Blackstart Equipment.

**Blackstart Station-specific Rate Payment** is the Commission-approved compensation, as calculated pursuant to Section 5.2 of Schedule 16 to the OATT, paid to a Blackstart Owner on a monthly basis for the provision of Blackstart Service by Designated Blackstart Resources located at a specific Blackstart Station.

**Blackstart Station-specific Rate Capital Payment** is a component of the Blackstart Station-specific Rate Payment that reflects a Blackstart Station's capital Blackstart Equipment costs associated with the provision of Blackstart Service (excluding the capital costs associated with compliance with NERC Critical Infrastructure Protection Reliability Standards as part of Blackstart Service).

**Block** is defined as follows: (1) With respect to Bilateral Contracts, a Bilateral Contract administered by the ISO for an hour; (2) with respect to Supply Offers administered by the ISO, a quantity with a related price for Energy (Supply Offers for Energy may contain multiple sets of quantity and price pairs for each hour); (3) with respect to Demand Bids administered by the ISO, a quantity with a related price for Energy (Demand Bids for Energy may contain multiple sets of quantity and price pairs for each hour); (4) with respect to Increment Offers administered by the ISO, a quantity with a related price for Energy (Increment Offers for Energy may contain multiple sets of quantity and price pairs for each hour); (5) with respect to Decrement Bids administered by the ISO, a quantity with a related price for Energy (Decrement Bids for Energy may contain multiple sets of quantity and price pairs for each hour); (6) with respect to Asset Related Demand bids administered by the ISO, a quantity with a related price for Energy (Asset Related Demand bids may contain multiple sets of quantity and price pairs for each hour); and (7) with respect to Demand Reduction Offers administered by the ISO, a quantity of reduced demand with a related price (Demand Reduction Offers may contain multiple sets of quantity and price pairs for the day).

**Block-Hours** are the number of Blocks administered for a particular hour.

**Budget and Finance Subcommittee** is a subcommittee of the Participants Committee, the responsibilities of which are specified in Section 8.4 of the Participants Agreement.

**Business Day** is any day other than a Saturday or Sunday or ISO holidays as posted by the ISO on its website.

**Cancelled Start NCPC Credit** is an NCPC Credit calculated pursuant to Appendix F to Market Rule 1.

**Capability Demonstration Year** is the one year period from September 1 through August 31.

**Capacity Acquiring Resource** is a resource that is seeking to acquire a Capacity Supply Obligation through: (1) a Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral, as described in Section III.13.5.1, or; (2) an annual or monthly reconfiguration auction, as described in Section III.13.4.

**Capacity Balancing Ratio** is a ratio used in calculating the Capacity Performance Payment in the Forward Capacity Market, as described in Section III.13.7.2.3 of Market Rule 1.

**Capacity Base Payment** is the portion of revenue received in the Forward Capacity Market as described in Section III.13.7.1 of Market Rule 1.

**Capacity Capability Interconnection Standard** has the meaning specified in Schedule 22, Schedule 23, and Schedule 25 of the OATT.

**Capacity Clearing Price** is the clearing price for a Capacity Zone for a Capacity Commitment Period resulting from the Forward Capacity Auction conducted for that Capacity Commitment Period, as determined in accordance with Section III.13.2.7 of Market Rule 1.

**Capacity Commitment Period** is the one-year period from June 1 through May 31 for which obligations are assumed and payments are made in the Forward Capacity Market.

**Capacity Cost (CC)** is one of four forms of compensation that may be paid to resources providing VAR Service under Schedule 2 of the OATT.

**Capacity Export Through Import Constrained Zone Transaction** is defined in Section III.1.10.7(f)(i) of Market Rule 1.

**Capacity Load Obligation** is the quantity of capacity for which a Market Participant is financially responsible as described in Section III.13.7.5.2 of Market Rule 1.

**Capacity Load Obligation Acquiring Participant** is a load serving entity or any other Market Participant seeking to acquire a Capacity Load Obligation through a Capacity Load Obligation Bilateral, as described in Section III.13.5.2 of Market Rule 1.

**Capacity Network Import Capability (CNI Capability)** is as defined in Section I of Schedule 25 of the OATT.

**Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service (CNI Interconnection Service)** is as defined in Section I of Schedule 25 of the OATT.

**Capacity Load Obligation Bilateral** is a bilateral contract through which a Market Participant may transfer all or a portion of its Capacity Load Obligation to another entity, as described in Section III.13.5 of Market Rule 1.

**Capacity Load Obligation Transferring Participant** is an entity that has a Capacity Load Obligation and is seeking to shed such obligation through a Capacity Load Obligation Bilateral, as described in Section III.13.5.2 of Market Rule 1.

**Capacity Network Resource (CNR)** is defined in Section I of Schedule 22 and Attachment 1 to Schedule 23 of the OATT.

**Capacity Network Resource Interconnection Service (CNR Interconnection Service)** is defined in Section I of Schedule 22 and Attachment 1 to Schedule 23 of the OATT.

**Capacity Performance Bilateral** is a transaction for transferring Capacity Performance Score, as described in Section III.13.5.3 of Market Rule 1.

**Capacity Performance Payment** is the performance-dependent portion of revenue received in the Forward Capacity Market, as described in Section III.13.7.2 of Market Rule 1.

**Capacity Performance Payment Rate** is a rate used in calculating Capacity Performance Payments, as described in Section III.13.7.2.5 of Market Rule 1.

**Capacity Performance Score** is a figure used in determining Capacity Performance Payments, as described in Section III.13.7.2.4 of Market Rule 1.

**Capacity Rationing Rule** addresses whether offers and bids in a Forward Capacity Auction may be rationed, as described in Section III.13.2.6 of Market Rule 1.

**Capacity Scarcity Condition** is a period during which performance is measured in the Forward Capacity Market, as described in Section III.13.7.2.1 of Market Rule 1.

**Capacity Scarcity Condition** is a period during which performance is measured in the Forward Capacity Market, as described in Section III.13.7.2.1 of Market Rule 1.

**Capacity Supply Obligation** is an obligation to provide capacity from a resource, or a portion thereof, to satisfy a portion of the Installed Capacity Requirement that is acquired through a Forward Capacity Auction in accordance with Section III.13.2, a reconfiguration auction in accordance with Section III.13.4, or a Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral in accordance with Section III.13.5.1 of Market Rule 1.

**Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral** is a bilateral contract through which a Market Participant may transfer all or a part of its Capacity Supply Obligation to another entity, as described in Section III.13.5.1 of Market Rule 1.

**Capacity Transfer Rights (CTRs)** are calculated in accordance with Section III.13.7.5.4.

**Capacity Transferring Resource** is a resource that has a Capacity Supply Obligation and is seeking to shed such obligation, or a portion thereof, through: (1) a Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral, as described in Section III.13.5.1, or; (2) an annual or monthly reconfiguration auction, as described in Section III.13.4.

**Capacity Zone** is a geographic sub-region of the New England Control Area as determined in accordance with Section III.12.4 of Market Rule 1.

**Capacity Zone Demand Curves** are the demand curves used in the Forward Capacity Market for a Capacity Zone as specified in Sections III.13.2.2.2 and III.13.2.2.3.

**Capital Funding Charge (CFC)** is defined in Section IV.B.2 of the Tariff.

**CARL Data** is Control Area reliability data submitted to the ISO to permit an assessment of the ability of an external Control Area to provide energy to the New England Control Area in support of capacity offered to the New England Control Area by that external Control Area.

**Category B Designated Blackstart Resource** has the same meaning as Designated Blackstart Resource.

**Charge** is a sum of money due from a Covered Entity to the ISO, either in its individual capacity or as billing and collection agent for NEPOOL pursuant to the Participants Agreement.

**CLAIM10** is the value, expressed in megawatts, calculated pursuant to Section III.9.5.3 of the Tariff.

**CLAIM30** is the value, expressed in megawatts, calculated pursuant to Section III.9.5.3 of the Tariff.

**Claimed Capability Audit** is performed to determine the real power output capability of a Generator Asset or the demand reduction capability of a Demand Response Resource.

**Cluster Enabling Transmission Upgrade (CETU)** has the meaning specified in Section I of Schedule 22, Attachment 1 to Schedule 23, and Section I of Schedule 25 of the OATT.

**Cluster Enabling Transmission Upgrade Regional Planning Study (CRPS)** has the meaning specified in Section I of Schedule 22, Attachment 1 to Schedule 23, and Section I of Schedule 25 of the OATT.

**Cluster Entry Deadline** has the meaning specified in Section I of Schedule 22, Attachment 1 to Schedule 23, and Section I of Schedule 25 of the OATT.

**Cluster Interconnection System Impact Study (CSIS)** has the meaning specified in Section I of Schedule 22, Attachment 1 to Schedule 23, and Section I of Schedule 25 of the OATT.

**Clustering** has the meaning specified in Section I of Schedule 22, Attachment 1 to Schedule 23, and Section I of Schedule 25 of the OATT.

**CNR Capability** is defined in Section I of Schedule 22 and Attachment 1 to Schedule 23 of the OATT.

**Coincident Peak Contribution** is a Market Participant's share of the New England Control Area coincident peak demand for the prior calendar year as determined prior to the start of each Capacity Commitment Period, which reflects the sum of the prior year's annual coincident peak contributions of the customers served by the Market Participant at each Load Asset. Daily Coincident Peak Contribution values shall be submitted by the Assigned Meter Reader or Host Participant by the meter reading deadline to the ISO.

**Commercial Capacity** is capacity that has achieved FCM Commercial Operation.

**Commission** is the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.

**Commitment Period** is (i) for a Day-Ahead Energy Market commitment, a period of one or more contiguous hours for which a Resource is cleared in the Day-Ahead Energy Market, and (ii) for a Real-Time Energy Market commitment, the period of time for which the ISO indicates the Resource is being committed when it issues the Dispatch Instruction. If the ISO does not indicate the period of time for which the Resource is being committed in the Real-Time Energy Market, then the Commitment Period is the Minimum Run Time for an offline Resource and one hour for an online Resource.

**Common Costs** are those costs associated with a Station that are avoided only by the clearing of the Static De-List Bids, the Permanent De-List Bids, or the Retirement De-List Bids of all the Existing Generating Capacity Resources comprising the Station.

**Completed Application** is an Application that satisfies all of the information and other requirements of the OATT, including any required deposit.

**Compliance Effective Date** is the date upon which the changes in the predecessor NEPOOL Open Access Transmission Tariff which have been reflected herein to comply with the Commission's Order of April 20, 1998 became effective.

**Composite FCM Transaction** is a transaction for separate resources seeking to participate as a single composite resource in a Forward Capacity Auction in which multiple Designated FCM Participants provide capacity, as described in Section III.13.1.5 of Market Rule 1.

**Conditional Qualified New Resource** is defined in Section III.13.1.1.2.3(f) of Market Rule 1.

**Confidential Information** is defined in Section 2.1 of the ISO New England Information Policy, which is Attachment D to the Tariff.

**Confidentiality Agreement** is Attachment 1 to the ISO New England Billing Policy.

**Congestion** is a condition of the New England Transmission System in which transmission limitations prevent unconstrained regional economic dispatch of the power system. Congestion is the condition that results in the Congestion Component of the Locational Marginal Price at one Location being different from the Congestion Component of the Locational Marginal Price at another Location during any given hour of the dispatch day in the Day-Ahead Energy Market or Real-Time Energy Market.

**Congestion Component** is the component of the nodal price that reflects the marginal cost of congestion at a given Node or External Node relative to the reference point. When used in connection with Zonal Price and Hub Price, the term Congestion Component refers to the Congestion Components of the nodal prices that comprise the Zonal Price and Hub Price weighted and averaged in the same way that nodal prices are weighted to determine Zonal Price and averaged to determine the Hub Price.

**Congestion Cost** is the cost of congestion as measured by the difference between the Congestion Components of the Locational Marginal Prices at different Locations and/or Reliability Regions on the New England Transmission System.

**Congestion Paying LSE** is, for the purpose of the allocation of FTR Auction Revenues to ARR Holders as provided for in Appendix C of Market Rule 1, a Market Participant or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer that is responsible for paying for Congestion Costs as a Transmission Customer paying for Regional Network Service under the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff, unless such Transmission Customer has transferred its obligation to supply load in accordance with ISO New England System Rules, in which case the Congestion Paying LSE shall be the Market Participant supplying the



transferred load obligation. The term Congestion Paying LSE shall be deemed to include, but not be limited to, the seller of internal bilateral transactions that transfer Real-Time Load Obligations under the ISO New England System Rules.

**Congestion Revenue Fund** is the amount available for payment of target allocations to FTR Holders from the collection of Congestion Cost.

**Congestion Shortfall** means congestion payments exceed congestion charges during the billing process in any billing period.

**Continuous Storage ATRR** is an ATRR that participates in the New England Markets as part of a Continuous Storage Facility, as described in Section III.1.10.6 of Market Rule 1.

**Continuous Storage DARD** is a DARD that participates in the New England Markets as part of a Continuous Storage Facility, as described in Section III.1.10.6 of Market Rule 1.

**Continuous Storage Generator Asset** is a Generator Asset that participates in the New England Markets as part of a Continuous Storage Facility, as described in Section III.1.10.6 of Market Rule 1.

**Continuous Storage Facility** is a type of Electric Storage Facility, as described in Section III.1.10.6 of Market Rule 1.

**Control Agreement** is the document posted on the ISO website that is required if a Market Participant's cash collateral is to be invested in BlackRock funds.

**Control Area** is an electric power system or combination of electric power systems to which a common automatic generation control scheme is applied in order to:

- (1) match, at all times, the power output of the generators within the electric power system(s) and capacity and energy purchased from entities outside the electric power system(s), with the load within the electric power system(s);
- (2) maintain scheduled interchange with other Control Areas, within the limits of Good Utility Practice;

- (3) maintain the frequency of the electric power system(s) within reasonable limits in accordance with Good Utility Practice and the criteria of the applicable regional reliability council or the North American Electric Reliability Corporation; and
- (4) provide sufficient generating capacity to maintain operating reserves in accordance with Good Utility Practice.

**Controllable Behind-the-Meter Generation** means generation whose output can be controlled located at the same facility as a DARD or a Demand Response Asset, excluding: (1) generators whose output is separately metered and reported and (2) generators that cannot operate electrically synchronized to, and that are operated only when the facility loses its supply of power from, the New England Transmission System, or when undergoing related testing.

**Coordinated External Transaction** is an External Transaction at an external interface for which the enhanced scheduling procedures in Section III.1.10.7.A are implemented. A transaction to wheel energy into, out of or through the New England Control Area is not a Coordinated External Transaction.

**Coordinated Transaction Scheduling** means the enhanced scheduling procedures set forth in Section III.1.10.7.A.

**Correction Limit** means the date that is one hundred and one (101) calendar days from the last Operating Day of the month to which the data applied. As described in Section III.3.6.1 of Market Rule 1, this will be the period during which meter data corrections must be submitted unless they qualify for submission as a Requested Billing Adjustment under Section III.3.7 of Market Rule 1.

**Cost of Energy Consumed (CEC)** is one of four forms of compensation that may be paid to resources providing VAR Service under Schedule 2 of the OATT.

**Cost of Energy Produced (CEP)** is one of four forms of compensation that may be paid to resources providing VAR Service under Schedule 2 of the OATT.

**Cost of New Entry (CONE)** is the estimated cost of new entry (\$/kW-month) for a capacity resource that is determined by the ISO for each Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to Section III.13.2.4.

**Counterparty** means the status in which the ISO acts as the contracting party, in its name and own right and not as an agent, to an agreement or transaction with a Customer (including assignments involving Customers) involving sale to the ISO, and/or purchase from the ISO, of Regional Transmission Service and market and other products and services, and other transactions and assignments involving Customers, all as described in the Tariff.

**Covered Entity** is defined in the ISO New England Billing Policy.

**Credit Coverage** is third-party credit protection obtained by the ISO in the form of credit insurance coverage.

**Credit Qualifying** means a Rated Market Participant that has an Investment Grade Rating and an Unrated Market Participant that satisfies the Credit Threshold.

**Credit Threshold** consists of the conditions for Unrated Market Participants outlined in Section II.B.2 of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**Critical Energy Infrastructure Information (CEII)** is defined in Section 3.0(j) of the ISO New England Information Policy, which is Attachment D to the Tariff.

**Current Ratio** is, on any date, all of a Market Participant's or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer's current assets divided by all of its current liabilities, in each case as shown on the most recent financial statements provided by such Market Participant or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer to the ISO.

**Curtailement** is a reduction in the dispatch of a transaction that was scheduled, using transmission service, in response to a transfer capability shortage as a result of system reliability conditions.

**Customer** is a Market Participant, a Transmission Customer or another customer of the ISO.

**Data Reconciliation Process** means the process by which meter reconciliation and data corrections that are discovered by Governance Participants after the Invoice has been issued for a particular month or that are discovered prior to the issuance of the Invoice for the relevant month but not included in that Invoice

or in the other Invoices for that month and are reconciled by the ISO on an hourly basis based on data submitted to the ISO by the Host Participant Assigned Meter Reader or Assigned Meter Reader.

**Day-Ahead** is the calendar day immediately preceding the Operating Day.

**Day-Ahead Adjusted Load Obligation** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(a) of Market Rule 1.

**Day-Ahead Congestion Revenue** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(i) of Market Rule 1.

**Day-Ahead Demand Reduction Obligation** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(a) of Market Rule 1.

**Day-Ahead Energy Market** means the schedule of commitments for the purchase or sale of energy, purchase of demand reductions, payment of Congestion Costs, payment for losses developed by the ISO as a result of the offers and specifications submitted in accordance with Section III.1.10 of Market Rule 1.

**Day-Ahead Energy Market Congestion Charge/Credit** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(f) of Market Rule 1.

**Day-Ahead Energy Market Energy Charge/Credit** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(f) of Market Rule 1.

**Day-Ahead Energy Market Loss Charge/Credit** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(f) of Market Rule 1.

**Day-Ahead Energy Market NCPC Credit** is an NCPC Credit calculated pursuant to Appendix F to Market Rule 1.

**Day-Ahead External Transaction Export and Decrement Bid NCPC Credit** is an NCPC Credit calculated pursuant to Appendix F to Market Rule 1.

**Day-Ahead External Transaction Import and Increment Offer NCPC Credit** is an NCPC Credit calculated pursuant to Appendix F to Market Rule 1.

**Day-Ahead Generation Obligation** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(a) of Market Rule 1.

**Day-Ahead Load Obligation** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(a) of Market Rule 1.

**Day-Ahead Locational Adjusted Net Interchange** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(a) of Market Rule 1.

**Day-Ahead Loss Charges or Credits** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(k) of Market Rule 1.

**Day-Ahead Loss Revenue** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(j) of Market Rule 1.

**Day-Ahead Prices** means the Locational Marginal Prices resulting from the Day-Ahead Energy Market.

**DDP Dispatchable Resource** is any Dispatchable Resource that the ISO dispatches using Desired Dispatch Points in the Resource's Dispatch Instructions.

**Debt-to-Total Capitalization Ratio** is, on any date, a Market Participant's or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer's total debt (including all current borrowings) divided by its total shareholders' equity plus total debt, in each case as shown on the most recent financial statements provided by such Market Participant or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer to the ISO.

**Decrement Bid** means a bid to purchase energy at a specified Location in the Day-Ahead Energy Market which is not associated with a physical load. An accepted Decrement Bid results in scheduled load at the specified Location in the Day-Ahead Energy Market.

**Default Amount** is all or any part of any amount due to be paid by any Covered Entity that the ISO, in its reasonable opinion, believes will not or has not been paid when due (other than in the case of a payment dispute for any amount due for transmission service under the OATT).

**Default Period** is defined in Section 3.3.h(i) of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

**Delivering Party** is the entity supplying capacity and/or energy to be transmitted at Point(s) of Receipt under the OATT.

**Demand Bid** means a request to purchase an amount of energy, at a specified Location, or an amount of energy at a specified price, that is associated with a physical load. A cleared Demand Bid in the Day-

Ahead Energy Market results in scheduled load at the specified Location. Demand Bids submitted for use in the Real-Time Energy Market are specific to Dispatchable Asset Related Demands only.

**Demand Bid Block-Hours** are the Block-Hours assigned to the submitting Customer for each Demand Bid.

**Demand Bid Cap** is \$2,000/MWh.

**Demand Capacity Resource** means an Existing Demand Capacity Resource or a New Demand Capacity Resource. There are three Demand Capacity Resource types: Active Demand Capacity Resources, On-Peak Demand Resources, and Seasonal Peak Demand Resources.

**Demand Designated Entity** is the entity designated by a Market Participant to receive Dispatch Instructions for Demand Response Resources in accordance with the provisions set forth in ISO New England Operating Procedure No. 14.

**Demand Reduction Offer** is an offer by a Market Participant with a Demand Response Resource to reduce demand.

**Demand Reduction Offer Block-Hours** are Block-Hours assigned to the Lead Market Participant for each Demand Reduction Offer. Blocks of the Demand Reduction Offer in effect for each hour will be totaled to determine the quantity of Demand Reduction Offer Block-Hours for a given day. In the case that a Resource has a Real-Time unit status of “unavailable” for the entire day, that day will not contribute to the quantity of Demand Reduction Offer Block-Hours. However, if the Resource has at least one hour of the day with a unit status of “available,” the entire day will contribute to the quantity of Demand Reduction Offer Block-Hours.

**Demand Reduction Threshold Price** is a minimum offer price calculated pursuant to Section III.1.10.1A(f).

**Demand Resource On-Peak Hours** are hours ending 1400 through 1700, Monday through Friday on non-Demand Response Holidays during the months of June, July, and August and hours ending 1800

through 1900, Monday through Friday on non-Demand Response Holidays during the months of December and January.

**Demand Resource Seasonal Peak Hours** are those hours in which the actual, real-time hourly load, as measured using real-time telemetry (adjusted for transmission and distribution losses, and excluding load associated with Exports and Storage DARDs) for Monday through Friday on non-Demand Response Holidays, during the months of June, July, August, December, and January, as determined by the ISO, is equal to or greater than 90% of the most recent 50/50 system peak load forecast, as determined by the ISO, for the applicable summer or winter season.

**Demand Response Asset** is an asset comprising the demand reduction capability of an individual end-use customer at a Retail Delivery Point or the aggregated demand reduction capability of multiple end-use customers from multiple delivery points (as described in Section III.8.1.1(f)) that has been registered in accordance with III.8.1.1.

**Demand Response Available** is the capability of the Demand Response Resource, in whole or in part, at any given time, to reduce demand in response to a Dispatch Instruction.

**Demand Response Baseline** is the expected baseline demand of an individual end-use metered customer or group of end-use metered customers as determined pursuant to Section III.8.2.

**Demand Response Holiday** is New Year's Day, Memorial Day, Independence Day, Labor Day, Veterans Day, Thanksgiving Day, and Christmas Day. If the holiday falls on a Saturday, the holiday will be observed on the preceding Friday; if the holiday falls on a Sunday, the holiday will be observed on the following Monday.

**Demand Response Resource** is an individual Demand Response Asset or aggregation of Demand Response Assets within a DRR Aggregation Zone that has been registered in accordance with Section III.8.1.2.

**Demand Response Resource Notification Time** is the period of time between the receipt of a startup Dispatch Instruction and the time the Demand Response Resource starts reducing demand.

**Demand Response Resource Ramp Rate** is the average rate, expressed in MW per minute, at which the Demand Response Resource can reduce demand.

**Demand Response Resource Start-Up Time** is the period of time between the time a Demand Response Resource starts reducing demand at the conclusion of the Demand Response Resource Notification Time and the time the resource can reach its Minimum Reduction and be ready for further dispatch by the ISO.

**Designated Agent** is any entity that performs actions or functions required under the OATT on behalf of the ISO, a Transmission Owner, a Schedule 20A Service Provider, an Eligible Customer, or a Transmission Customer.

**Designated Blackstart Resource** is a resource that meets the eligibility requirements specified in Schedule 16 of the OATT, which includes any resource referred to previously as a Category B Designated Blackstart Resource.

**Designated Entity** is the entity designated by a Market Participant to receive Dispatch Instructions for a Generator Asset and/or Dispatchable Asset Related Demand in accordance with the provisions set forth in ISO New England Operating Procedure No. 14.

**Designated FCM Participant** is any Lead Market Participant, including any Provisional Member that is a Lead Market Participant, transacting in any Forward Capacity Auction, reconfiguration auctions or Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral for capacity that is otherwise required to provide additional financial assurance under the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**Designated FTR Participant** is a Market Participant, including FTR-Only Customers, transacting in the FTR Auction that is otherwise required to provide additional financial assurance under the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**Desired Dispatch Point (DDP)** means the control signal, expressed in megawatts, transmitted to direct the output, consumption, or demand reduction level of each Generator Asset, Dispatchable Asset Related Demand, or Demand Response Resource dispatched by the ISO in accordance with the asset's Offer Data.



**Direct Assignment Facilities** are facilities or portions of facilities that are constructed for the sole use/benefit of a particular Transmission Customer requesting service under the OATT or a Generator Owner requesting an interconnection. Direct Assignment Facilities shall be specified in a separate agreement among the ISO, Interconnection Customer and Transmission Customer, as applicable, and the Transmission Owner whose transmission system is to be modified to include and/or interconnect with the Direct Assignment Facilities, shall be subject to applicable Commission requirements, and shall be paid for by the Customer in accordance with the applicable agreement and the Tariff.

**Directly Metered Assets** are specifically measured by OP-18 compliant metering as currently described in Section IV (Metering and Recording for Settlements) of OP-18. Directly Metered Assets include all Tie-Line Assets, all Generator Assets, as well as some Load Assets. Load Assets for which the Host Participant is not the Assigned Meter Reader are considered Directly Metered Assets. In addition, the Host Participant Assigned Meter Reader determines which additional Load Assets are considered Directly Metered Assets and which ones are considered Profiled Load Assets based upon the Host Participant Assigned Meter Reader reporting systems and process by which the Host Participant Assigned Meter Reader allocates non-PTF losses.

**Disbursement Agreement** is the Rate Design and Funds Disbursement Agreement among the PTOs, as amended and restated from time to time.

**Dispatch Instruction** means directions given by the ISO to Market Participants, which may include instructions to start up, shut down, raise or lower generation, curtail or restore loads from Demand Response Resources, change External Transactions, or change the status or consumption of a Dispatchable Asset Related Demand in accordance with the Supply Offer, Demand Bid, or Demand Reduction Offer parameters. Such instructions may also require a change to the operation of a Pool Transmission Facility. Such instructions are given through either electronic or verbal means.

**Dispatch Zone** means a subset of Nodes located within a Load Zone established by the ISO for each Capacity Commitment Period pursuant to Section III.12.4A.

**Dispatchable Asset Related Demand (DARD)** is an Asset Related Demand that is capable of having its energy consumption modified in Real-Time in response to Dispatch Instructions. A DARD must be capable of receiving and responding to electronic Dispatch Instructions, must be able to increase or

decrease energy consumption between its Minimum Consumption Limit and Maximum Consumption Limit in accordance with Dispatch Instructions, and must meet the technical requirements specified in the ISO New England Operating Procedures and Manuals.

**Dispatchable Resource** is any Generator Asset, Dispatchable Asset Related Demand, Demand Response Resource, or, with respect to the Regulation Market only, Alternative Technology Regulation Resource, that, during the course of normal operation, is capable of receiving and responding to electronic Dispatch Instructions in accordance with the parameters contained in the Resource's Supply Offer, Demand Bid, Demand Reduction Offer or Regulation Service Offer. A Resource that is normally classified as a Dispatchable Resource remains a Dispatchable Resource when it is temporarily not capable of receiving and responding to electronic Dispatch Instructions.

**Dispute Representatives** are defined in 6.5.c of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

**Disputed Amount** is a Covered Entity's disputed amount due on any fully paid monthly Invoice and/or any amount believed to be due or owed on a Remittance Advice, as defined in Section 6 of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

**Disputing Party**, for the purposes of the ISO New England Billing Policy, is any Covered Entity seeking to recover a Disputed Amount.

**Distributed Generation** means generation directly connected to end-use customer load and located behind the end-use customer's Retail Delivery Point that reduces the amount of energy that would otherwise have been produced on the electricity network in the New England Control Area, provided that the facility's Net Supply Capability is (i) less than 5 MW or (ii) less than or equal to the Maximum Facility Load, whichever is greater.

**DRR Aggregation Zone** is a Dispatch Zone entirely within a single Reserve Zone or Rest of System or, where a Dispatch Zone is not entirely within a single Reserve Zone or Rest of System, each portion of the Dispatch Zone demarcated by the Reserve Zone boundary.

**Do Not Exceed (DNE) Dispatchable Generator** is any Generator Asset that is dispatched using Do Not Exceed Dispatch Points in its Dispatch Instructions and meets the criteria specified in Section III.1.11.3(e). Do Not Exceed Dispatchable Generators are Dispatchable Resources.

**Do Not Exceed Dispatch Point** is a Dispatch Instruction indicating a maximum output level that a DNE Dispatchable Generator must not exceed.

**Dynamic De-List Bid** is a bid that may be submitted by Existing Generating Capacity Resources, Existing Import Capacity Resources, and Existing Demand Capacity Resources in the Forward Capacity Auction below the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold, as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(d) of Market Rule 1.

**Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold** is the price specified in Section III.13.1.2.3.1.A of Market Rule 1 associated with the submission of Dynamic De-List Bids in the Forward Capacity Auction.

**EA Amount** is defined in Section IV.B.2.2 of the Tariff.

**Early Amortization Charge (EAC)** is defined in Section IV.B.2 of the Tariff.

**Early Amortization Working Capital Charge (EAWCC)** is defined in Section IV.B.2 of the Tariff.

**Early Payment Shortfall Funding Amount (EPSF Amount)** is defined in Section IV.B.2.4 of the Tariff.

**Early Payment Shortfall Funding Charge (EPSFC)** is defined in Section IV.B.2 of the Tariff.

**EAWW Amount** is defined in Section IV.B.2.3 of the Tariff.

**EBITDA-to-Interest Expense Ratio** is, on any date, a Market Participant's or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer's earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization in the most recent fiscal quarter divided by that Market Participant's or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer's expense for interest in that fiscal quarter, in each case as shown on the most recent financial statements provided by such Market Participant or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer to the ISO.

**Economic Dispatch Point** is the output, reduction, or consumption level to which a Resource would have been dispatched, based on the Resource's Supply Offer, Demand Reduction Offer, or Demand Bid and the Real-Time Price, and taking account of any operating limits, had the ISO not dispatched the Resource to another Desired Dispatch Point.

**Economic Maximum Limit or Economic Max** is the maximum available output, in MW, of a Generator Asset that a Market Participant offers to supply in the Day-Ahead Energy Market or Real-Time Energy Market, as reflected in the Generator Asset's Offer Data. This represents the highest MW output a Market Participant has offered for a Generator Asset for economic dispatch. A Market Participant must maintain an up-to-date Economic Maximum Limit (and where applicable, must provide the ISO with any telemetry required by ISO New England Operating Procedure No. 18 to allow the ISO to maintain an updated Economic Maximum Limit) for all hours in which a Generator Asset has been offered into the Day-Ahead Energy Market or Real-Time Energy Market.

**Economic Minimum Limit or Economic Min** is (a) for a Generator Asset with an incremental heat rate, the maximum of: (i) the lowest sustainable output level as specified by physical design characteristics, environmental regulations or licensing limits; and (ii) the lowest sustainable output level at which a one MW increment increase in the output level would not decrease the incremental cost, calculated based on the incremental heat rate, of providing an additional MW of output, and (b) for a Generator Asset without an incremental heat rate, the lowest sustainable output level that is consistent with the physical design characteristics of the Generator Asset and with meeting all environmental regulations and licensing limits, and (c) for a Generator Asset undergoing Facility and Equipment Testing or auditing, the level to which the Generator Asset requests and is approved to operate or is directed to operate for purposes of completing the Facility and Equipment Testing or auditing, and (d) for Non-Dispatchable Resources the output level at which a Market Participant anticipates its Non-Dispatchable Resource will be available to operate based on fuel limitations, physical design characteristics, environmental regulations or licensing limits.

**Economic Study** is defined in Section 4.1(b) of Attachment K to the OATT.

**Effective Offer** is the Supply Offer, Demand Reduction Offer, or Demand Bid that is used for NCPC calculation purposes as specified in Section III.F.1(a).

**EFT** is electronic funds transfer.

**Elective Transmission Upgrade** is defined in Section I of Schedule 25 of the OATT.

**Elective Transmission Upgrade Interconnection Customer** is defined in Schedule 25 of the OATT.

**Electric Reliability Organization (ERO)** is defined in 18 C.F.R. § 39.1.

**Electric Storage Facility** is a storage facility that participates in the New England Markets as described in Section III.1.10.6 of Market Rule 1.

**Eligible Customer** is: (i) Any entity that is engaged, or proposes to engage, in the wholesale or retail electric power business is an Eligible Customer under the OATT. (ii) Any electric utility (including any power marketer), Federal power marketing agency, or any other entity generating electric energy for sale or for resale is an Eligible Customer under the OATT. Electric energy sold or produced by such entity may be electric energy produced in the United States, Canada or Mexico. However, with respect to transmission service that the Commission is prohibited from ordering by Section 212(h) of the Federal Power Act, such entity is eligible only if the service is provided pursuant to a state requirement that the Transmission Owner with which that entity is directly interconnected or the distribution company having the service territory in which that entity is located (if that entity is a retail customer) offer the unbundled transmission service or Local Delivery Service, or pursuant to a voluntary offer of such service by the Transmission Owner with which that entity is directly interconnected or the distribution company having the service territory in which that entity is located (if that entity is a retail customer). (iii) Any end user taking or eligible to take unbundled transmission service or Local Delivery Service pursuant to a state requirement that the Transmission Owner with which that end user is directly interconnected or the distribution company having the service territory in which that entity is located (if that entity is a retail customer) offer the transmission service or Local Delivery Service, or pursuant to a voluntary offer of such service by the Transmission Owner with which that end user is directly interconnected, or the distribution company having the service territory in which that entity is located (if that entity is a retail customer) is an Eligible Customer under the OATT.

**Eligible FTR Bidder** is an entity that has satisfied applicable financial assurance criteria, and shall not include the auctioneer, its Affiliates, and their officers, directors, employees, consultants and other representatives.

**Emergency** is an abnormal system condition on the bulk power systems of New England or neighboring Control Areas requiring manual or automatic action to maintain system frequency, or to prevent the involuntary loss of load, equipment damage, or tripping of system elements that could adversely affect the reliability of an electric system or the safety of persons or property; or a fuel shortage requiring departure from normal operating procedures in order to minimize the use of such scarce fuel; or a condition that requires implementation of Emergency procedures as defined in the ISO New England Manuals.

**Emergency Condition** means an Emergency has been declared by the ISO in accordance with the procedures set forth in the ISO New England Manuals and ISO New England Administrative Procedures.

**Emergency Energy** is energy transferred from one control area operator to another in an Emergency.

**Emergency Minimum Limit or Emergency Min** means the minimum output, in MWs, that a Generator Asset can deliver for a limited period of time without exceeding specified limits of equipment stability and operating permits.

**EMS** is energy management system.

**End-of-Round Price** is the lowest price associated with a round of a Forward Capacity Auction, as described in Section III.13.2.3.1 of Market Rule 1.

**End User Participant** is defined in Section 1 of the Participants Agreement.

**Energy** is power produced in the form of electricity, measured in kilowatthours or megawatthours.

**Energy Administration Service (EAS)** is the service provided by the ISO, as described in Schedule 2 of Section IV.A of the Tariff.

**Energy Component** means the Locational Marginal Price at the reference point.

**Energy Efficiency** is installed measures (e.g., products, equipment, systems, services, practices and/or strategies) on end-use customer facilities that reduce the total amount of electrical energy needed, while delivering a comparable or improved level of end-use service. Such measures include, but are not limited to, the installation of more energy efficient lighting, motors, refrigeration, HVAC equipment and control systems, envelope measures, operations and maintenance procedures, and industrial process equipment.

**Energy Imbalance Service** is the form of Ancillary Service described in Schedule 4 of the OATT.

**Energy Market** is, collectively, the Day-Ahead Energy Market and the Real-Time Energy Market.

**Energy Non-Zero Spot Market Settlement Hours** are the sum of the hours for which the Customer has a positive or negative Real-Time System Adjusted Net Interchange or for which the Customer has a positive or negative Real-Time Demand Reduction Obligation as determined by the ISO settlement process for the Energy Market.

**Energy Offer Floor** is negative \$150/MWh.

**Energy Transaction Units (Energy TUs)** are the sum for the month for a Customer of Bilateral Contract Block-Hours, Demand Bid Block-Hours, Asset Related Demand Bid Block-Hours, Supply Offer Block-Hours, Demand Reduction Offer Block-Hours, and Energy Non-Zero Spot Market Settlement Hours.

**Equipment Damage Reimbursement** is the compensation paid to the owner of a Designated Blackstart Resource as specified in Section 5.5 of Schedule 16 to the OATT.

**Equivalent Demand Forced Outage Rate (EFORD)** means the portion of time a unit is in demand, but is unavailable due to forced outages.

**Estimated Capacity Load Obligation** is, for the purposes of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy, a Market Participant's share of Zonal Capacity Obligation from the latest available month, adjusted as appropriate to account for any relevant Capacity Load Obligation Bilaterals, HQICCs, and Self-Supplied FCA Resource designations for the applicable month.

**Establish Claimed Capability Audit** is the audit performed pursuant to Section III.1.5.1.2.

**Excepted Transaction** is a transaction specified in Section II.40 of the Tariff for the applicable period specified in that Section.

**Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline** is a deadline, specified in Section III.13.1.10 of Market Rule 1, for submission of certain qualification materials for the Forward Capacity Auction, as discussed in Section III.13.1 of Market Rule 1.

**Existing Capacity Qualification Package** is information submitted for certain existing resources prior to participation in the Forward Capacity Auction, as described in Section III.13.1 of Market Rule 1.

**Existing Capacity Resource** is any resource that does not meet any of the eligibility criteria to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Capacity Resource.

**Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline** is a deadline, specified in Section III.13.1.10 of Market Rule 1, for submission of certain qualification materials for the Forward Capacity Auction, as discussed in Section III.13.1 of Market Rule 1.

**Existing Capacity Retirement Package** is information submitted for certain existing resources prior to participation in the Forward Capacity Auction, as described in Section III.13.1 of Market Rule 1.

**Existing Demand Capacity Resource** is a type of Demand Capacity Resource participating in the Forward Capacity Market, as defined in Section III.13.1.4.2 of Market Rule 1.

**Existing Generating Capacity Resource** is a type of resource participating in the Forward Capacity Market, as defined in Section III.13.1.2.1 of Market Rule 1.

**Existing Import Capacity Resource** is a type of resource participating in the Forward Capacity Market, as defined in Section III.13.1.3.1 of Market Rule 1.

**Expedited Study Request** is defined in Section II.34.7 of the OATT.



**Export-Adjusted LSR** is as defined in Section III.12.4(b)(ii).

**Export Bid** is a bid that may be submitted by certain resources in the Forward Capacity Auction to export capacity to an external Control Area, as described in Section III.13.1.2.3.1.3 of Market Rule 1.

**Exports** are Real-Time External Transactions, which are limited to sales from the New England Control Area, for exporting energy out of the New England Control Area.

**External Elective Transmission Upgrade (External ETU)** is defined in Section I of Schedule 25 of the OATT.

**External Market Monitor** means the person or entity appointed by the ISO Board of Directors pursuant to Section III.A.1.2 of Appendix A of Market Rule 1 to carry out the market monitoring and mitigation functions specified in Appendix A and elsewhere in Market Rule 1.

**External Node** is a proxy bus or buses used for establishing a Locational Marginal Price for energy received by Market Participants from, or delivered by Market Participants to, a neighboring Control Area or for establishing Locational Marginal Prices associated with energy delivered through the New England Control Area by Non-Market Participants for use in calculating Non-Market Participant Congestion Costs and loss costs.

**External Resource** means a generation resource located outside the metered boundaries of the New England Control Area.

**External Transaction** is the import of external energy into the New England Control Area by a Market Participant or the export of internal energy out of the New England Control Area by a Market Participant in the Day-Ahead Energy Market and/or Real-Time Energy Market, or the wheeling of external energy through the New England Control Area by a Market Participant or a Non-Market Participant in the Real-Time Energy Market.

**External Transaction Cap** is \$2,000/MWh for External Transactions other than Coordinated External Transactions and \$1,000/MWh for Coordinated External Transactions.

**External Transaction Floor** is the Energy Offer Floor for External Transactions other than Coordinated External Transactions and negative \$1,000/MWh for Coordinated External Transactions.

**External Transmission Project** is a transmission project comprising facilities located wholly outside the New England Control Area and regarding which an agreement has been reached whereby New England ratepayers will support all or a portion of the cost of the facilities.

**Facilities Study** is an engineering study conducted pursuant to the OATT by the ISO (or, in the case of Local Service or interconnections to Local Area Facilities as defined in the TOA, by one or more affected PTOs) or some other entity designated by the ISO in consultation with any affected Transmission Owner(s), to determine the required modifications to the PTF and Non-PTF, including the cost and scheduled completion date for such modifications, that will be required to provide a requested transmission service or interconnection on the PTF and Non-PTF.

**Facility and Equipment Testing** means operation of a Resource to evaluate the functionality of the facility or equipment utilized in the operation of the facility.

**Failure to Maintain Blackstart Capability** is a failure of a Blackstart Owner or Designated Blackstart Resource to meet the Blackstart Service Minimum Criteria or Blackstart Service obligations, but does not include a Failure to Perform During a System Restoration event.

**Failure to Perform During a System Restoration** is a failure of a Blackstart Owner or Designated Blackstart Resource to follow ISO or Local Control Center dispatch instructions or perform in accordance with the dispatch instructions or the Blackstart Service Minimum Criteria and Blackstart Service obligations, described within the ISO New England Operating Documents, during a restoration of the New England Transmission System.

**Fast Start Demand Response Resource** is a Demand Response Resource that meets the following criteria: (i) Minimum Reduction Time does not exceed one hour; (ii) Minimum Time Between Reductions does not exceed one hour; (iii) Demand Response Resource Start-Up Time plus Demand Response Resource Notification Time does not exceed 30 minutes; (iv) has personnel available to respond to Dispatch Instructions or has automatic remote response capability; and (v) is capable of receiving and acknowledging a Dispatch Instruction electronically.

**Fast Start Generator** means a Generator Asset that the ISO can dispatch to an on-line or off-line state through electronic dispatch and that meets the following criteria: (i) Minimum Run Time does not exceed one hour; (ii) Minimum Down Time does not exceed one hour; (iii) cold Notification Time plus cold Start-Up Time does not exceed 30 minutes; (iv) available for dispatch (when it is either in an on-line or off-line state) and manned or has automatic remote dispatch capability; and (v) capable of receiving and acknowledging a start-up or shut-down Dispatch Instruction electronically.

**FCA Cleared Export Transaction** is defined in Section III.1.10.7(f)(ii) of Market Rule 1.

**FCA Qualified Capacity** is the Qualified Capacity that is used in a Forward Capacity Auction.

**FCM Capacity Charge Requirements** are calculated in accordance with Section VII.C of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**FCM Charge Rate** is calculated in accordance with Section VII.C of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**FCM Commercial Operation** is defined in Section III.13.3.8 of Market Rule 1.

**FCM Deposit** is calculated in accordance with Section VII.B.1 of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**FCM Financial Assurance Requirements** are described in Section VII of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**Final Forward Reserve Obligation** is calculated in accordance with Section III.9.8(a) of Market Rule 1.

**Financial Assurance Default** results from a Market Participant or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer's failure to comply with the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**Financial Assurance Obligations** relative to the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy are determined in accordance with Section III.A(v) of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**Financial Transmission Right (FTR)** is a financial instrument that evidences the rights and obligations specified in Sections III.5.2.2 and III.7 of the Tariff.

**Firm Point-To-Point Service** is service which is arranged for and administered between specified Points of Receipt and Delivery in accordance with Part II.C of the OATT.

**Firm Transmission Service** is Regional Network Service, Through or Out Service, service for Excepted Transactions, firm MTF Service, firm OTF Service, and firm Local Service.

**Flexible DNE Dispatchable Generator** is any DNE Dispatchable Generator that meets the following criteria: (i) Minimum Run Time does not exceed one hour; (ii) Minimum Down Time does not exceed one hour; and (iii) cold Notification Time plus cold Start-Up Time does not exceed 30 minutes.

**Force Majeure** - An event of Force Majeure means any act of God, labor disturbance, act of the public enemy or terrorists, war, invasion, insurrection, riot, fire, storm or flood, ice, explosion, breakage or accident to machinery or equipment, any curtailment, order, regulation or restriction imposed by governmental military or lawfully established civilian authorities, or any other cause beyond the control of the ISO, a Transmission Owner, a Schedule 20A Service Provider, or a Customer, including without limitation, in the case of the ISO, any action or inaction by a Customer, a Schedule 20A Service Provider, or a Transmission Owner, in the case of a Transmission Owner, any action or inaction by the ISO, any Customer, a Schedule 20A Service Provider, or any other Transmission Owner, in the case of a Schedule 20A Service Provider, any action or inaction by the ISO, any Customer, a Transmission Owner, or any other Schedule 20A Service Provider, and, in the case of a Transmission Customer, any action or inaction by the ISO, a Schedule 20A Service Provider, or any Transmission Owner.

**Forward Capacity Auction (FCA)** is the annual Forward Capacity Market auction process described in Section III.13.2 of Market Rule 1.

**Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price** is calculated in accordance with Section III.13.2.4 of Market Rule 1.

**Forward Capacity Market (FCM)** is the forward market for procuring capacity in the New England Control Area, as described in Section III.13 of Market Rule 1.

**Forward Energy Inventory Election** is the total MWh value for which a Market Participant elects to be compensated at the forward rate in the inventoried energy program as described in Section III.K.1(d) of Market Rule 1.

**Forward LNG Inventory Election** is the portion of a Market Participant's Forward Energy Inventory Election attributed to liquefied natural gas in the inventoried energy program as described in Section III.K.1(d) of Market Rule 1.

**Forward Reserve** means TMNSR and TMOR purchased by the ISO on a forward basis on behalf of Market Participants as provided for in Section III.9 of Market Rule 1.

**Forward Reserve Assigned Megawatts** is the amount of Forward Reserve, in megawatts, that a Market Participant assigns to eligible Forward Reserve Resources to meet its Forward Reserve Obligation as defined in Section III.9.4.1 of Market Rule 1.

**Forward Reserve Auction** is the periodic auction conducted by the ISO in accordance with Section III.9 of Market Rule 1 to procure Forward Reserve.

**Forward Reserve Auction Offers** are offers to provide Forward Reserve to meet system and Reserve Zone requirements as submitted by a Market Participant in accordance with Section III.9.3 of Market Rule 1.

**Forward Reserve Charge** is a Market Participant's share of applicable system and Reserve Zone Forward Reserve costs attributable to meeting the Forward Reserve requirement as calculated in accordance with Section III.9.9 of Market Rule 1.

**Forward Reserve Clearing Price** is the clearing price for TMNSR or TMOR, as applicable, for the system and each Reserve Zone resulting from the Forward Reserve Auction as defined in Section III.9.4 of Market Rule 1.

**Forward Reserve Credit** is the credit received by a Market Participant that is associated with that Market Participant's Final Forward Reserve Obligation as calculated in accordance with Section III.9.8 of Market Rule 1.

**Forward Reserve Delivered Megawatts** are calculated in accordance with Section III.9.6.5 of Market Rule 1.

**Forward Reserve Delivery Period** is defined in Section III.9.1 of Market Rule 1.

**Forward Reserve Failure-to-Activate Megawatts** are calculated in accordance with Section III.9.7.2(a) of Market Rule 1.

**Forward Reserve Failure-to-Activate Penalty** is the penalty associated with a Market Participant's failure to activate Forward Reserve when requested to do so by the ISO and is defined in Section III.9.7.2 of Market Rule 1.

**Forward Reserve Failure-to-Activate Penalty Rate** is specified in Section III.9.7.2 of Market Rule 1.

**Forward Reserve Failure-to-Reserve**, as specified in Section III.9.7.1 of Market Rule 1, occurs when a Market Participant's Forward Reserve Delivered Megawatts for a Reserve Zone in an hour is less than that Market Participant's Forward Reserve Obligation for that Reserve Zone in that hour. Under these circumstances the Market Participant pays a penalty based upon the Forward Reserve Failure-to-Reserve Penalty Rate and that Market Participant's Forward Reserve Failure-to-Reserve Megawatts.

**Forward Reserve Failure-to-Reserve Megawatts** are calculated in accordance with Section III.9.7.1(a) of Market Rule 1.

**Forward Reserve Failure-to-Reserve Penalty** is the penalty associated with a Market Participant's failure to reserve Forward Reserve and is defined in Section III.9.7.1 of Market Rule 1.

**Forward Reserve Failure-to-Reserve Penalty Rate** is specified in Section III.9.7.1(b)(ii) of Market Rule 1.

**Forward Reserve Fuel Index** is the index or set of indices used to calculate the Forward Reserve Threshold Price as defined in Section III.9.6.2 of Market Rule 1.

**Forward Reserve Heat Rate** is the heat rate as defined in Section III.9.6.2 of Market Rule 1 that is used to calculate the Forward Reserve Threshold Price.

**Forward Reserve Market** is a market for forward procurement of two reserve products, Ten-Minute Non-Spinning Reserve (TMNSR) and Thirty-Minute Operating Reserve (TMOR).

**Forward Reserve MWs** are those megawatts assigned to specific eligible Forward Reserve Resources which convert a Forward Reserve Obligation into a Resource-specific obligation.

**Forward Reserve Obligation** is a Market Participant's amount, in megawatts, of Forward Reserve that cleared in the Forward Reserve Auction and adjusted, as applicable, to account for bilateral transactions that transfer Forward Reserve Obligations.

**Forward Reserve Obligation Charge** is defined in Section III.10.4 of Market Rule 1.

**Forward Reserve Offer Cap** is \$9,000/megawatt-month.

**Forward Reserve Payment Rate** is defined in Section III.9.8 of Market Rule 1.

**Forward Reserve Procurement Period** is defined in Section III.9.1 of Market Rule 1.

**Forward Reserve Qualifying Megawatts** refer to all or a portion of a Forward Reserve Resource's capability offered into the Real-Time Energy Market at energy offer prices above the applicable Forward Reserve Threshold Price that are calculated in accordance with Section III.9.6.4 of Market Rule 1.

**Forward Reserve Resource** is a Resource that meets the eligibility requirements defined in Section III.9.5.2 of Market Rule 1 that has been assigned Forward Reserve Obligation by a Market Participant.

**Forward Reserve Threshold Price** is the minimum price at which assigned Forward Reserve Megawatts are required to be offered into the Real-Time Energy Market as calculated in Section III.9.6.2 of Market Rule 1.

**FTR Auction** is the periodic auction of FTRs conducted by the ISO in accordance with Section III.7 of Market Rule 1.

**FTR Auction Revenue** is the revenue collected from the sale of FTRs in FTR Auctions. FTR Auction Revenue is payable to FTR Holders who submit their FTRs for sale in the FTR Auction in accordance with Section III.7 of Market Rule 1 and to ARR Holders and Incremental ARR Holders in accordance with Appendix C of Market Rule 1.

**FTR Credit Test Percentage** is calculated in accordance with Section III.B.1(b) of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**FTR Financial Assurance Requirements** are described in Section VI of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**FTR Holder** is an entity that acquires an FTR through the FTR Auction to Section III.7 of Market Rule 1 and registers with the ISO as the holder of the FTR in accordance with Section III.7 of Market Rule 1 and applicable ISO New England Manuals.

**FTR-Only Customer** is a Market Participant that transacts in the FTR Auction and that does not participate in other markets or programs of the New England Markets. References in this Tariff to a “Non-Market Participant FTR Customers” and similar phrases shall be deemed references to an FTR-Only Customer.

**FTR Settlement Risk Financial Assurance** is an amount of financial assurance required by a Designated FTR Participant for each bid submission into an FTR Auction and for each bid awarded to the individual participant in an FTR Auction. This amount is calculated pursuant to Section VI.A of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.



**GADS Data** means data submitted to the NERC for collection into the NERC's Generating Availability Data System (GADS).

**Gap Request for Proposals (Gap RFP)** is defined in Section III.11 of Market Rule 1.

**Gas Day** means a period of 24 consecutive hours beginning at 0900 hrs Central Time.

**Generating Capacity Resource** means a New Generating Capacity Resource or an Existing Generating Capacity Resource.

**Generator Asset** is a device (or a collection of devices) that is capable of injecting real power onto the grid that has been registered as a Generator Asset in accordance with the Asset Registration Process.

**Generator Imbalance Service** is the form of Ancillary Service described in Schedule 10 of the OATT.

**Generator Interconnection Related Upgrade** is an addition to or modification of the New England Transmission System (pursuant to Section II.47.1, Schedule 22 or Schedule 23 of the OATT) to effect the interconnection of a new generating unit or an existing generating unit whose energy capability or capacity capability is being materially changed and increased whether or not the interconnection is being effected to meet the Capacity Capability Interconnection Standard or the Network Capability Interconnection Standard. As to Category A Projects (as defined in Schedule 11 of the OATT), a Generator Interconnection Related Upgrade also includes an upgrade beyond that required to satisfy the Network Capability Interconnection Standard (or its predecessor) for which the Generator Owner has committed to pay prior to October 29, 1998.

**Generator Owner** is the owner, in whole or part, of a generating unit whether located within or outside the New England Control Area.

**Good Utility Practice** means any of the practices, methods and acts engaged in or approved by a significant portion of the electric utility industry during the relevant time period, or any of the practices, methods and acts which, in the exercise of reasonable judgment in light of the facts known at the time the decision was made, could have been expected to accomplish the desired result at a reasonable cost consistent with good business practices, reliability, safety and expedition. Good Utility Practice is not

intended to be limited to the optimum practice, method, or act to the exclusion of all others, but rather includes all acceptable practices, methods, or acts generally accepted in the region, including those practices required by Federal Power Act Section 215(a)(4).

**Governance Only Member** is defined in Section 1 of the Participants Agreement.

**Governance Participant** is defined in the Participants Agreement.

**Governing Documents**, for the purposes of the ISO New England Billing Policy, are the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff and ISO Participants Agreement.

**Governing Rating** is the lowest corporate rating from any Rating Agency for that Market Participant, or, if the Market Participant has no corporate rating, then the lowest rating from any Rating Agency for that Market Participant's senior unsecured debt.

**Grandfathered Agreements (GAs)** is a transaction specified in Section II.45 for the applicable period specified in that Section.

**Grandfathered Intertie Agreement (GIA)** is defined pursuant to the TOA.

**Handy-Whitman Index of Public Utility Construction Costs** is the Total Other Production Plant index shown in the Cost Trends of Electric Utility Construction for the North Atlantic Region as published in the Handy-Whitman Index of Public Utility Construction Costs.

**Highgate Transmission Facilities (HTF)** are existing U. S.-based transmission facilities covered under the Agreement for Joint Ownership, Construction and Operation of the Highgate Transmission Interconnection dated as of August 1, 1984 including (1) the whole of a 200 megawatt high-voltage, back-to-back, direct-current converter facility located in Highgate, Vermont and (2) a 345 kilovolt transmission line within Highgate and Franklin, Vermont (which connects the converter facility at the U.S.-Canadian border to a Hydro-Quebec 120 kilovolt line in Bedford, Quebec). The HTF include any upgrades associated with increasing the capacity or changing the physical characteristics of these facilities as defined in the above stated agreement dated August 1, 1984 until the Operations Date, as defined in the TOA. The current HTF rating is a nominal 225 MW. The HTF are not defined as PTF. Coincident with

the Operations Date and except as stipulated in Schedules, 9, 12, and Attachment F to the OATT, HTF shall be treated in the same manner as PTF for purposes of the OATT and all references to PTF in the OATT shall be deemed to apply to HTF as well. The treatment of the HTF is not intended to establish any binding precedent or presumption with regard to the treatment for other transmission facilities within the New England Transmission System (including HVDC, MTF, or Control Area Interties) for purposes of the OATT.

**Host Participant or Host Utility** is a Market Participant or a Governance Participant transmission or distribution provider that reconciles the loads within the metering domain with OP-18 compliant metering.

**Hourly Charges** are defined in Section 1.3 of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

**Hourly PER** is calculated in accordance with Section III.13.7.1.2.1 of Market Rule 1.

**Hourly Requirements** are determined in accordance with Section III.A(i) of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**Hourly Shortfall NCPC Credit** is an NCPC Credit calculated pursuant to Appendix F to Market Rule 1.

**Hub** is a specific set of pre-defined Nodes for which a Locational Marginal Price will be calculated for the Day-Ahead Energy Market and Real-Time Energy Market and which can be used to establish a reference price for energy purchases and the transfer of Day-Ahead Adjusted Load Obligations and Real-Time Adjusted Load Obligations and for the designation of FTRs.

**Hub Price** is calculated in accordance with Section III.2.8 of Market Rule 1.

**HQ Interconnection Capability Credit (HQICC)** is a monthly value reflective of the annual installed capacity benefits of the Phase I/II HVDC-TF, as determined by the ISO, using a standard methodology on file with the Commission, in conjunction with the setting of the Installed Capacity Requirement. An appropriate share of the HQICC shall be assigned to an IRH if the Phase I/II HVDC-TF support costs are paid by that IRH and such costs are not included in the calculation of the Regional Network Service rate. The share of HQICC allocated to such an eligible IRH for a month is the sum in kilowatts of (1)(a) the

IRH's percentage share, if any, of the Phase I Transfer Capability times (b) the Phase I Transfer Credit, plus (2)(a) the IRH's percentage share, if any, of the Phase II Transfer Capability, times (b) the Phase II Transfer Credit. The ISO shall establish appropriate HQICCs to apply for an IRH which has such a percentage share.

**Import Capacity Resource** means an Existing Import Capacity Resource or a New Import Capacity Resource offered to provide capacity in the New England Control Area from an external Control Area.

**Inadvertent Energy Revenue** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(o) of Market Rule 1.

**Inadvertent Energy Revenue Charges or Credits** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(p) of Market Rule 1.

**Inadvertent Interchange** means the difference between net actual energy flow and net scheduled energy flow into or out of the New England Control Area.

**Increment Offer** means an offer to sell energy at a specified Location in the Day-Ahead Energy Market which is not associated with a physical supply. An accepted Increment Offer results in scheduled supply at the specified Location in the Day-Ahead Energy Market.

**Incremental ARR** is an ARR provided in recognition of a participant-funded transmission system upgrade pursuant to Appendix C of this Market Rule.

**Incremental ARR Holder** is an entity which is the record holder of an Incremental Auction Revenue Right in the register maintained by the ISO.

**Incremental Cost of Reliability Service** is described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5.2 of Market Rule 1.

**Independent Transmission Company (ITC)** is a transmission entity that assumes certain responsibilities in accordance with Section 10.05 of the Transmission Operating Agreement and Attachment M to the OATT, subject to the acceptance or approval of the Commission and a finding of the Commission that the transmission entity satisfies applicable independence requirements.

**Information Request** is a request from a potential Disputing Party submitted in writing to the ISO for access to Confidential Information.

**Initial Market Participant Financial Assurance Requirement** is calculated for new Market Participants and Returning Market Participants, other than an FTR-Only Customer or a Governance Only Member, according to Section IV of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**Installed Capacity Requirement** means the level of capacity required to meet the reliability requirements defined for the New England Control Area, as described in Section III.12 of Market Rule 1.

**Interchange Transactions** are transactions deemed to be effected under Market Rule 1.

**Interconnecting Transmission Owner** has the meaning specified in Section I of Schedule 22, Attachment 1 to Schedule 23, and Section I of Schedule 25 of the OATT.

**Interconnection Agreement** is the “Large Generator Interconnection Agreement”, the “Small Generator Interconnection Agreement”, or the “Elective Transmission Upgrade Interconnection Agreement” pursuant to Schedules 22, 23 or 25 of the ISO OATT or an interconnection agreement approved by the Commission prior to the adoption of the Interconnection Procedures.

**Interconnection Customer** has the meaning specified in Section I of Schedule 22, Attachment 1 to Schedule 23, and Section I of Schedule 25 of the OATT.

**Interconnection Feasibility Study Agreement** has the meaning specified in Section I of Schedule 22, Attachment 1 to Schedule 23, or Section I of Schedule 25 of the OATT.

**Interconnection Procedure** is the “Large Generator Interconnection Procedures”, the “Small Generator Interconnection Procedures”, or the “Elective Transmission Upgrade Interconnection Procedures” pursuant to Schedules 22, 23, and 25 of the ISO OATT.

**Interconnection Reliability Operating Limit (IROL)** has the meaning specified in the Glossary of Terms Used in NERC Reliability Standards.

**Interconnection Request** has the meaning specified in Section I of Schedule 22, Attachment 1 to Schedule 23, or Section I of Schedule 25 of the OATT.

**Interconnection Rights Holder(s) (IRH)** has the meaning given to it in Schedule 20A to Section II of this Tariff.

**Interconnection System Impact Study Agreement** has the meaning specified in Section I of Schedule 22, Attachment 1 to Schedule 23 and Section I of Schedule 25 of the OATT.

**Interest** is interest calculated in the manner specified in Section II.8.3.

**Interface Bid** is a unified real-time bid to simultaneously purchase and sell energy on each side of an external interface for which the enhanced scheduling procedures in Section III.1.10.7.A are implemented.

**Intermittent Power Resource** is a wind, solar, run of river hydro or other renewable resource that does not have control over its net power output.

**Internal Bilateral for Load** is an internal bilateral transaction under which the buyer receives a reduction in Real-Time Load Obligation and the seller receives a corresponding increase in Real-Time Load Obligation in the amount of the sale, in MWs. An Internal Bilateral for Load transaction is only applicable in the Real-Time Energy Market.

**Internal Bilateral for Market for Energy** is an internal bilateral transaction for Energy which applies in the Day-Ahead Energy Market and Real-Time Energy Market or just the Real-Time Energy Market under which the buyer receives a reduction in Day-Ahead Adjusted Load Obligation and Real-Time Adjusted Load Obligation and the seller receives a corresponding increase in Day-Ahead Adjusted Load Obligation and Real-Time Adjusted Load Obligation in the amount of the sale, in MWs.

**Internal Elective Transmission Upgrade (Internal ETU)** is defined in Section I of Schedule 25 of the OATT.

**Internal Market Monitor** means the department of the ISO responsible for carrying out the market monitoring and mitigation functions specified in Appendix A and elsewhere in Market Rule 1.

**Interregional Planning Stakeholder Advisory Committee (IPSAC)** is the committee described as such in the Northeast Planning Protocol.

**Interregional Transmission Project** is a transmission project located within the New England Control Area and one or more of the neighboring transmission planning regions.

**Interruption Cost** is the amount, in dollars, that must be paid to a Market Participant each time the Market Participant's Demand Response Resource is scheduled or dispatched in the New England Markets to reduce demand.

**Inventoried Energy Day** is an Operating Day that occurs in the months of December, January, or February during the winters of 2023-2024 and 2024-2025 (inventoried energy program) and for which the average of the high temperature and the low temperature on that Operating Day, as measured and reported by the National Weather Service at Bradley International Airport in Windsor Locks, Connecticut, is less than or equal to 17 degrees Fahrenheit, as described in Section III.K.3.1 of Market Rule 1.

**Investment Grade Rating**, for a Market (other than an FTR-Only Customer) or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer, is either (a) a corporate investment grade rating from one or more of the Rating Agencies, or (b) if the Market Participant or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer does not have a corporate rating from one of the Rating Agencies, then an investment grade rating for the Market Participant's or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer's senior unsecured debt from one or more of the Rating Agencies.

**Invoice** is a statement issued by the ISO for the net Charge owed by a Covered Entity pursuant to the ISO New England Billing Policy.

**Invoice Date** is the day on which the ISO issues an Invoice.

**ISO** means ISO New England Inc.

**ISO Charges**, for the purposes of the ISO New England Billing Policy, are both Non-Hourly Charges and Hourly Charges.

**ISO Control Center** is the primary control center established by the ISO for the exercise of its Operating Authority and the performance of functions as an RTO.

**ISO-Initiated Claimed Capability Audit** is the audit performed pursuant to Section III.1.5.1.4.

**ISO New England Administrative Procedures** means procedures adopted by the ISO to fulfill its responsibilities to apply and implement ISO New England System Rules.

**ISO New England Billing Policy** is Exhibit ID to Section I of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff.

**ISO New England Filed Documents** means the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff, including but not limited to Market Rule 1, the Participants Agreement, the Transmission Operating Agreement or other documents that affect the rates, terms and conditions of service.

**ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy** is Exhibit IA to Section I of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff.

**ISO New England Information Policy** is the policy establishing guidelines regarding the information received, created and distributed by Market Participants and the ISO in connection with the settlement, operation and planning of the System, as the same may be amended from time to time in accordance with the provisions of this Tariff. The ISO New England Information Policy is Attachment D to the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff.

**ISO New England Manuals** are the manuals implementing Market Rule 1, as amended from time to time in accordance with the Participants Agreement. Any elements of the ISO New England Manuals that substantially affect rates, terms, and/or conditions of service shall be filed with the Commission under Section 205 of the Federal Power Act.

**ISO New England Operating Documents** are the Tariff and the ISO New England Operating Procedures.



**ISO New England Operating Procedures (OPs)** are the ISO New England Planning Procedures and the operating guides, manuals, procedures and protocols developed and utilized by the ISO for operating the ISO bulk power system and the New England Markets.

**ISO New England Planning Procedures** are the procedures developed and utilized by the ISO for planning the ISO bulk power system.

**ISO New England System Rules** are Market Rule 1, the ISO New England Information Policy, the ISO New England Administrative Procedures, the ISO New England Manuals and any other system rules, procedures or criteria for the operation of the New England Transmission System and administration of the New England Markets and the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff.

**ITC Agreement** is defined in Attachment M to the OATT.

**ITC Rate Schedule** is defined in Section 3.1 of Attachment M to the OATT.

**ITC System** is defined in Section 2.2 of Attachment M to the OATT.

**ITC System Planning Procedures** is defined in Section 15.4 of Attachment M to the OATT.

**Joint ISO/RTO Planning Committee (JIPC)** is the committee described as such in the Northeastern Planning Protocol.

**Late Payment Account** is a segregated interest-bearing account into which the ISO deposits Late Payment Charges due from ISO Charges and interest owed from participants for late payments that are collected and not distributed to the Covered Entities, until the Late Payment Account Limit is reached, under the ISO New England Billing Policy and penalties collected under the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**Late Payment Account Limit** is defined in Section 4.2 of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

**Late Payment Charge** is defined in Section 4.1 of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

**Lead Market Participant**, for purposes other than the Forward Capacity Market, is the entity authorized to submit Supply Offers, Demand Bids or Demand Reduction Offers for a Resource and to whom certain Energy TUs are assessed under Schedule 2 of Section IV.A of the Tariff. For purposes of the Forward Capacity Market, the Lead Market Participant is the entity designated to participate in that market on behalf of an Existing Capacity Resource or a New Capacity Resource.

**Limited Energy Resource** means a Generator Asset that, due to design considerations, environmental restriction on operations, cyclical requirements, such as the need to recharge or refill or manage water flow, or fuel limitations, are unable to operate continuously at full output on a daily basis.

**Load Asset** means a physical load that has been registered in accordance with the Asset Registration Process. A Load Asset can be an Asset Related Demand, including a Dispatchable Asset Related Demand.

**Load Management** means measures (e.g., products, equipment, systems, services, practices and/or strategies) on end-use customer facilities that curtail electrical usage or shift electrical usage while delivering a comparable or acceptable level of end-use service. Such measures include, but are not limited to, energy management systems, load control end-use cycling, load curtailment strategies, and energy storage that curtails or shifts electrical usage by means other than generating electricity.

**Load Shedding** is the systematic reduction of system demand by temporarily decreasing load.

**Load-Side Relationship Certification** is a certification described in Section III.A.21.1.3 that a Project Sponsor submits as part of the New Capacity Qualification Package or New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package to demonstrate that the New Capacity Resource should not be subject to buyer-side market power review.

**Load Zone** is a Reliability Region, except as otherwise provided for in Section III.2.7 of Market Rule 1.

**Local Area Facilities** are defined in the TOA.

**Local Benefit Upgrade(s) (LBU)** is an upgrade, modification or addition to the transmission system that is: (i) rated below 115kV or (ii) rated 115kV or above and does not meet all of the non-voltage criteria for PTF classification specified in the OATT.

**Local Control Centers** are those control centers in existence as of the effective date of the OATT (including the CONVEX, REMVEC, Maine and New Hampshire control centers) or established by the PTOs in accordance with the TOA that are separate from the ISO Control Center and perform certain functions in accordance with the OATT and the TOA.

**Local Delivery Service** is the service of delivering electric energy to end users. This service is subject to state jurisdiction regardless of whether such service is provided over local distribution or transmission facilities. An entity that is an Eligible Customer under the OATT is not excused from any requirements of state law, or any order or regulation issued pursuant to state law, to arrange for Local Delivery Service with the Participating Transmission Owner and/or distribution company providing such service and to pay all applicable charges associated with such service, including charges for stranded costs and benefits.

**Local Network** is defined as the transmission facilities constituting a local network as identified in Attachment E, as such Attachment may be modified from time to time in accordance with the Transmission Operating Agreement.

**Local Network Load** is the load that a Network Customer designates for Local Network Service under Schedule 21 to the OATT.

**Local Network RNS Rate** is the rate applicable to Regional Network Service to effect a delivery to load in a particular Local Network, as determined in accordance with Schedule 9 to the OATT.

**Local Network Service (LNS)** is the network service provided under Schedule 21 and the Local Service Schedules to permit the Transmission Customer to efficiently and economically utilize its resources to serve its load.

**Local Point-To-Point Service (LPTP)** is Point-to-Point Service provided under Schedule 21 of the OATT and the Local Service Schedules to permit deliveries to or from an interconnection point on the PTF.

**Local Public Policy Transmission Upgrade** is any addition and/or upgrade to the New England Transmission System with a voltage level below 115kV that is required in connection with the construction of a Public Policy Transmission Upgrade approved for inclusion in the Regional System Plan pursuant to Attachment K to the ISO OATT or included in a Local System Plan in accordance with Appendix 1 to Attachment K.

**Local Resource Adequacy Requirement** is calculated pursuant to Section III.12.2.1.1.

**Local Second Contingency Protection Resources** are those Resources identified by the ISO on a daily basis as necessary for the provision of Operating Reserve requirements and adherence to NERC, NPCC and ISO reliability criteria over and above those Resources required to meet first contingency reliability criteria within a Reliability Region.

**Local Service** is transmission service provided under Schedule 21 and the Local Service Schedules thereto.

**Local Service Schedule** is a PTO-specific schedule to the OATT setting forth the rates, charges, terms and conditions applicable to Local Service.

**Local Sourcing Requirement (LSR)** is a value calculated as described in Section III.12.2.1 of Market Rule 1.

**Local System Planning (LSP)** is the process defined in Appendix 1 of Attachment K to the OATT.

**Localized Costs** are costs that the ISO, with advisory input from the Reliability Committee, determines in accordance with Schedule 12C of the OATT shall not be included in the Pool-Supported PTF costs recoverable under this OATT, or in costs allocated to Regional Network Load according to Section 6 of Schedule 12. If there are any Localized Costs, the ISO shall identify them in the Regional System Plan.

**Location** is a Node, External Node, Load Zone, DRR Aggregation Zone, or Hub.

**Locational Marginal Price (LMP)** is defined in Section III.2 of Market Rule 1. The Locational Marginal Price for a Node is the nodal price at that Node; the Locational Marginal Price for an External Node is the nodal price at that External Node; the Locational Marginal Price for a Load Zone, DRR Aggregation Zone or Reliability Region is the Zonal Price for that Load Zone, DRR Aggregation Zone or Reliability Region, respectively; and the Locational Marginal Price for a Hub is the Hub Price for that Hub.

**Long Lead Time Facility (Long Lead Facility)** has the meaning specified in Section I of Schedule 22 and Schedule 25 of the OATT.

**Long-Term** is a term of one year or more.

**Long-Term Transmission Outage** is a long-term transmission outage scheduled in accordance with ISO New England Operating Procedure No. 3.

**Loss Component** is the component of the nodal LMP at a given Node or External Node on the PTF that reflects the cost of losses at that Node or External Node relative to the reference point. The Loss Component of the nodal LMP at a given Node on the non-PTF system reflects the relative cost of losses at that Node adjusted as required to account for losses on the non-PTF system already accounted for through tariffs associated with the non-PTF. When used in connection with Hub Price or Zonal Price, the term Loss Component refers to the Loss Components of the nodal LMPs that comprise the Hub Price or Zonal Price, which Loss Components are averaged or weighted in the same way that nodal LMPs are averaged to determine Hub Price or weighted to determine Zonal Price.

**Loss of Load Expectation (LOLE)** is the probability of disconnecting non-interruptible customers due to a resource deficiency.

**Lost Opportunity Cost (LOC)** is one of four forms of compensation that may be paid to resources providing VAR Service under Schedule 2 of the OATT.

**LSE** means load serving entity.

**Lump Sum Blackstart Payment** is defined and calculated as specified in Section 5.4 of Schedule 16 to the OATT.

**Lump Sum Blackstart Capital Payment** is defined and calculated as specified in Section 5.4 of Schedule 16 to the OATT.

**Manual Response Rate** is the rate, in MW/Minute, at which the output of a Generator Asset, or the consumption of a Dispatchable Asset Related Demand, is capable of changing.

**Marginal Loss Revenue Load Obligation** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(b) of Market Rule 1.

**Marginal Reliability Impact** is the change, with respect to an increment of capacity supply, in expected unserved energy due to resource deficiency, as measured in hours per year.

**Market Credit Limit** is a credit limit for a Market Participant's Financial Assurance Obligations (except FTR Financial Assurance Requirements) established for each Market Participant in accordance with Section II.C of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**Market Credit Test Percentage** is calculated in accordance with Section III.B.1(a) of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**Market Efficiency Transmission Upgrade** is defined as those additions and upgrades that are not related to the interconnection of a generator, and, in the ISO's determination, are designed to reduce bulk power system costs to load system-wide, where the net present value of the reduction in bulk power system costs to load system-wide exceeds the net present value of the cost of the transmission addition or upgrade. For purposes of this definition, the term "bulk power system costs to load system-wide" includes, but is not limited to, the costs of energy, capacity, reserves, losses and impacts on bilateral prices for electricity.

**Market Participant** is a participant in the New England Markets (including a FTR-Only Customer) that has executed a Market Participant Service Agreement, or on whose behalf an unexecuted Market Participant Service Agreement has been filed with the Commission.

**Market Participant Financial Assurance Requirement** is defined in Section III of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**Market Participant Service Agreement (MPSA)** is an agreement between the ISO and a Market Participant, in the form specified in Attachment A or Attachment A-1 to the Tariff, as applicable.

**Market Rule 1** is ISO Market Rule 1 and appendices set forth in Section III of this ISO New England Inc. Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff, as it may be amended from time to time.

**Market Violation** is a tariff violation, violation of a Commission-approved order, rule or regulation, market manipulation, or inappropriate dispatch that creates substantial concerns regarding unnecessary market inefficiencies.

**Material Adverse Change** is any change in financial status including, but not limited to a downgrade to below an Investment Grade Rating by any Rating Agency, being placed on credit watch with negative implication by any Rating Agency if the Market Participant or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer does not have an Investment Grade Rating, a bankruptcy filing or other insolvency, a report of a significant quarterly loss or decline of earnings, the resignation of key officer(s), the sanctioning of the Market Participant or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer or any of its Principles imposed by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, the Securities Exchange Commission, any exchange monitored by the National Futures Association, or any state entity responsible for regulating activity in energy markets; the filing of a material lawsuit that could materially adversely impact current or future financial results; a significant change in the Market Participant's or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer's credit default spreads; or a significant change in market capitalization.

**Material Adverse Impact** is defined, for purposes of review of ITC-proposed plans, as a proposed facility or project will be deemed to cause a "material adverse impact" on facilities outside of the ITC System if: (i) the proposed facility or project causes non-ITC facilities to exceed their capabilities or exceed their thermal, voltage or stability limits, consistent with all applicable reliability criteria, or (ii) the proposed facility or project would not satisfy the standards set forth in Section I.3.9 of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff. This standard is intended to assure the continued service of all non-ITC firm load customers and the ability of the non-ITC systems to meet outstanding transmission service obligations.

**Maximum Capacity Limit** is a value calculated as described in Section III.12.2.2 of Market Rule 1.

**Maximum Consumption Limit** is the maximum amount, in MW, available for economic dispatch from a DARD and is based on the physical characteristics as submitted as part of the DARD's Offer Data. A Market Participant must maintain an up-to-date Maximum Consumption Limit (and where applicable, must provide the ISO with any telemetry required by ISO New England Operating Procedure No. 18 to allow the ISO to maintain an updated Maximum Consumption Limit) for all hours in which a DARD has been offered into the Day-Ahead Energy Market or Real-Time Energy Market.

**Maximum Daily Consumption Limit** is the maximum amount of megawatt-hours that a Storage DARD expects to be able to consume in the next Operating Day.

**Maximum Facility Load** is the highest demand of an end-use customer facility since the start of the prior calendar year (or, if unavailable, an estimate thereof), where the demand evaluated is established by adding metered demand measured at the Retail Delivery Point and the output of all generators located behind the Retail Delivery Point in the same time intervals.

**Maximum Interruptible Capacity** is an estimate of the maximum demand reduction and Net Supply that a Demand Response Asset can deliver, as measured at the Retail Delivery Point.

**Maximum Load** is the highest demand since the start of the prior calendar year (or, if unavailable, an estimate thereof), as measured at the Retail Delivery Point.

**Maximum Number of Daily Starts** is the maximum number of times that a Binary Storage DARD or a Generator Asset can be started or that a Demand Response Resource can be interrupted in the next Operating Day under normal operating conditions.

**Maximum Reduction** is the maximum available demand reduction, in MW, of a Demand Response Resource that a Market Participant offers to deliver in the Day-Ahead Energy Market or Real-Time Energy Market, as reflected in the Demand Response Resource's Demand Reduction Offer.



**Measure Life** is the estimated time an On-Peak Demand Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource measure will remain in place, or the estimated time period over which the facility, structure, equipment or system in which a measure is installed continues to exist, whichever is shorter. Suppliers of On-Peak Demand Resources or Seasonal Peak Demand Resources comprised of an aggregation of measures with varied Measures Lives shall determine and document the Measure Life either: (i) for each type of measure with a different Measure Life and adjust the aggregate performance based on the individual measure life calculation in the portfolio; or (ii) as the average Measure Life for the aggregated measures as long as the demand reduction capability of the resource is greater than or equal to the amount that cleared in the Forward Capacity Auction or reconfiguration auction for the entire Capacity Commitment Period, and the demand reduction capability for an Existing On-Peak Demand Resource or Existing Seasonal Peak Demand Resource is not over-stated in a subsequent Capacity Commitment Period. Measure Life shall be determined consistent with the resource's Measurement and Verification Plan, which shall be reviewed by the ISO to ensure consistency with the measurement and verification requirements of Market Rule 1 and the ISO New England Manuals.

**Measurement and Verification Documents** mean the measurement and verification documents described in Section 13.1.4.3.1 of Market Rule 1 that are submitted by On-Peak Demand Resources and Seasonal Peak Demand Resources, which include Measurement and Verification Plans, Updated Measurement and Verification Plans, Measurement and Verification Summary Reports, and Measurement and Verification Reference Reports.

**Measurement and Verification Plan** means the measurement and verification plan submitted by an On-Peak Demand Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource as part of the qualification process for the Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to the requirements of Section III.13.1.4.3 of Market Rule 1 and the ISO New England Manuals.

**Measurement and Verification Reference Reports** are optional reports submitted by On-Peak Demand Resources or Seasonal Peak Demand Resources during the Capacity Commitment Period subject to the schedule in the Measurement and Verification Plan and consistent with the schedule and reporting standards set forth in the ISO New England Manuals. Measurement and Verification Reference Reports update the prospective demand reduction capability of the On-Peak Demand Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource project based on measurement and verification studies performed during the Capacity Commitment Period.

**Measurement and Verification Summary Report** is the monthly report submitted by an On-Peak Demand Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource with the monthly settlement report for the Forward Capacity Market, which documents the total demand reduction capability for all On-Peak Demand Resources and Seasonal Peak Demand Resources in operation as of the end of the previous month.

**MEPCO Grandfathered Transmission Service Agreement (MG TSA)** is a MEPCO long-term firm point-to-point transmission service agreement with a POR or POD at the New Brunswick border and a start date prior to June 1, 2007 where the holder has elected, by written notice delivered to MEPCO within five (5) days following the filing of the settlement agreement in Docket Nos. ER07-1289 and EL08-56 or by September 1, 2008 (whichever is later), MG TSA treatment as further described in Section II.45.1.

**Merchant Transmission Facilities (MTF)** are the transmission facilities owned by MTOs, defined and classified as MTF pursuant to Schedule 18 of the OATT, over which the ISO shall exercise Operating Authority in accordance with the terms set forth in a MTOA or Attachment K to the OATT, rated 69 kV or above and required to allow energy from significant power sources to move freely on the New England Transmission System.

**Merchant Transmission Facilities Provider (MTF Provider)** is an entity as defined in Schedule 18 of the OATT.

**Merchant Transmission Facilities Service (MTF Service)** is transmission service over MTF as provided for in Schedule 18 of the OATT.

**Merchant Transmission Operating Agreement (MTOA)** is an agreement between the ISO and an MTO with respect to its MTF.

**Merchant Transmission Owner (MTO)** is an owner of MTF.

**Meter Data Error** means an error in meter data, including an error in Coincident Peak Contribution values, on an Invoice issued by the ISO after the completion of the Data Reconciliation Process as described in the ISO New England Manuals and in Section III.3.8 of Market Rule 1.

**Meter Data Error RBA Submission Limit** means the date thirty 30 calendar days after the issuance of the Invoice containing the results of the Data Reconciliation Process as described in the ISO New England Manuals and in Section III.3.6 of Market Rule 1.

**Metered Quantity For Settlement** is defined in Section III.3.2.1.1 of Market Rule 1.

**Minimum Consumption Limit** is (a) the lowest consumption level, in MW, available for economic dispatch from a DARD and is based on the physical characteristics as submitted as part of the DARD's Offer Data, and (b) for a DARD undergoing Facility and Equipment Testing or auditing, the level to which the DARD requests and is approved to operate or is directed to operate for purposes of completing the Facility and Equipment Testing or auditing.

**Minimum Down Time** is the number of hours that must elapse after a Generator Asset or Storage DARD has been released for shutdown at or below its Economic Minimum Limit or Minimum Consumption Limit before the Generator Asset or Storage DARD can be brought online and be released for dispatch at its Economic Minimum Limit or Minimum Consumption Limit.

**Minimum Generation Emergency** means an Emergency declared by the ISO in which the ISO anticipates requesting one or more Generator Assets to operate at or below Economic Minimum Limit in order to manage, alleviate, or end the Emergency.

**Minimum Generation Emergency Credits** are those Real-Time Dispatch NCPC Credits calculated pursuant to Appendix F of Market Rule 1 for resources within a reliability region that are dispatched during a period for which a Minimum Generation Emergency has been declared.

**Minimum Reduction** is the minimum available demand reduction, in MW, of a Demand Response Resource that a Market Participant offers to deliver in the Day-Ahead Energy Market or Real-Time Energy Market, as reflected in the Demand Response Resource's Demand Reduction Offer.

**Minimum Reduction Time** is the minimum number of hours of demand reduction at or above the Minimum Reduction for which the ISO must dispatch a Demand Response Resource to reduce demand.

**Minimum Run Time** is the number of hours that a Generator Asset must remain online after it has been scheduled to reach its Economic Minimum Limit before it can be released for shutdown from its Economic Minimum Limit or the number of hours that must elapse after a Storage DARD has been scheduled to consume at its Minimum Consumption Limit before it can be released for shutdown.

**Minimum Time Between Reductions** is the number of hours that must elapse after a Demand Response Resource has received a Dispatch Instruction to stop reducing demand before the Demand Response Resource can achieve its Minimum Reduction after receiving a Dispatch Instruction to start reducing demand.

**Minimum Total Reserve Requirement**, which does not include Replacement Reserve, is the combined amount of TMSR, TMNSR, and TMOR required system-wide as described in Section III.2.7A and ISO New England Operating Procedure No. 8.

**Monthly Blackstart Service Charge** is the charge made to Transmission Customers pursuant to Section 6 of Schedule 16 to the OATT.

**Monthly Capacity Payment** is the Forward Capacity Market payment described in Section III.13.7.3 of Market Rule 1.

**Monthly Peak** is defined in Section II.21.2 of the OATT.

**Monthly PER** is calculated in accordance with Section III.13.7.1.2.2 of Market Rule 1.

**Monthly Real-Time Demand Reduction Obligation** is the absolute value of a Customer's hourly Real-Time Demand Reduction Obligation summed for all hours in a month, in MWhs.

**Monthly Real-Time Generation Obligation** is the sum, for all hours in a month, at all Locations, of a Customer's Real-Time Generation Obligation, in MWhs.

**Monthly Real-Time Load Obligation** is the absolute value of a Customer's hourly Real-Time Load Obligation summed for all hours in a month, in MWhs.

**Monthly Regional Network Load** is defined in Section II.21.2 of the OATT.

**Monthly Statement** is the first weekly Statement issued on a Monday after the tenth of a calendar month that includes both the Hourly Charges for the relevant billing period and Non-Hourly Charges for the immediately preceding calendar month.

**MRI Transition Period** is the period specified in Section III.13.2.2.1.

**MUI** is the market user interface.

**Municipal Market Participant** is defined in Section II of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**MW** is megawatt.

**MWh** is megawatt-hour.

**Native Load Customers** are the wholesale and retail power customers of a Transmission Owner on whose behalf the Transmission Owner, by statute, franchise, regulatory requirement, or contract, has undertaken an obligation to construct and operate its system to meet the reliable electric needs of such customers.

**NCPC Charge** means the charges to Market Participants calculated pursuant to Appendix F to Market Rule 1.

**NCPC Credit** means the credits to Market Participants calculated pursuant to Appendix F to Market Rule 1.

**Needs Assessment** is defined in Section 4.1 of Attachment K to the OATT.

**NEMA**, for purposes of Section III of the Tariff, is the Northeast Massachusetts Reliability Region.

**NEMA Contract** is a contract described in Appendix C of Market Rule 1 and listed in Exhibit 1 of Appendix C of Market Rule 1.

**NEMA Load Serving Entity (NEMA LSE)** is a Transmission Customer or Congestion Paying LSE Entity that serves load within NEMA.

**NEMA or Northeast Massachusetts Upgrade**, for purposes of Section II of the Tariff, is an addition to or modification of the PTF into or within the Northeast Massachusetts Reliability Region that was not, as of December 31, 1999, the subject of a System Impact Study or application filed pursuant to Section I.3.9 of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff; that is not related to generation interconnections; and that will be completed and placed in service by June 30, 2004. Such upgrades include, but are not limited to, new transmission facilities and related equipment and/or modifications to existing transmission facilities and related equipment. The list of NEMA Upgrades is contained in Schedule 12A of the OATT.

**NEPOOL** is the New England Power Pool, and the entities that collectively participated in the New England Power Pool.

**NEPOOL Agreement** is the agreement among the participants in NEPOOL.

**NEPOOL GIS** is the generation information system.

**NEPOOL GIS Administrator** is the entity or entities that develop, administer, operate and maintain the NEPOOL GIS.

**NEPOOL GIS API Fees** are the one-time on-boarding fees and annual maintenance fees charged to NEPOOL by the NEPOOL GIS Administrator for each NEPOOL Participant or Market Participant that accesses the NEPOOL GIS through an application programming interface pursuant to Rule 3.9(b) of the operating rules of the NEPOOL GIS.

**NEPOOL Participant** is a party to the NEPOOL Agreement.

**NERC** is the North American Electric Reliability Corporation or its successor organization.

**NESCOE** is the New England States Committee on Electricity, recognized by the Commission as the regional state committee for the New England Control Area.

**Net Commitment Period Compensation (NCPC)** is the compensation methodology for Resources that is described in Appendix F to Market Rule 1.

**Net CONE** is an estimate of the Cost of New Entry, net of non-capacity market revenues, for a reference technology resource type and is intended to equal the amount of capacity revenue the reference technology resource would require to be economically viable given reasonable expectations of the energy and ancillary services revenues under long-term equilibrium conditions.

**Net Regional Clearing Price** is described in Section III.13.7.5 of Market Rule 1.

**Net Supply** is energy injected into the transmission or distribution system at a Retail Delivery Point.

**Net Supply Capability** is the maximum Net Supply a facility is physically and contractually able to inject into the transmission or distribution system at its Retail Delivery Point.

**Network Capability Interconnection Standard** has the meaning specified in Section I of Schedule 22, Attachment 1 to Schedule 23, and Section I of Schedule 25 of the OATT.

**Network Customer** is a Transmission Customer receiving RNS or LNS.

**Network Import Capability (NI Capability)** is defined in Section I of Schedule 25 of the OATT.

**Network Import Interconnection Service (NI Interconnection Service)** is defined in Section I of Schedule 25 of the OATT.

**Network Resource** is defined as follows: (1) With respect to Market Participants, (a) any generating resource located in the New England Control Area which has been placed in service prior to the Compliance Effective Date (including a unit that has lost its capacity value when its capacity value is

restored and a deactivated unit which may be reactivated without satisfying the requirements of Section II.46 of the OATT in accordance with the provisions thereof) until retired; (b) any generating resource located in the New England Control Area which is placed in service after the Compliance Effective Date until retired, provided that (i) the Generator Owner has complied with the requirements of Sections II.46 and II.47 and Schedules 22 and 23 of the OATT, and (ii) the output of the unit shall be limited in accordance with Sections II.46 and II.47 and Schedules 22 and 23, if required; and (c) any generating resource or combination of resources (including bilateral purchases) located outside the New England Control Area for so long as any Market Participant has an Ownership Share in the resource or resources which is being delivered to it in the New England Control Area to serve Regional Network Load located in the New England Control Area or other designated Regional Network Loads contemplated by Section II.18.3 of the OATT taking Regional Network Service. (2) With respect to Non-Market Participant Transmission Customers, any generating resource owned, purchased or leased by the Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer which it designates to serve Regional Network Load.

**New Brunswick Security Energy** is defined in Section III.3.2.6A of Market Rule 1.

**New Capacity Offer** is an offer in the Forward Capacity Auction to provide capacity from a New Generating Capacity Resource, New Import Capacity Resource or New Demand Capacity Resource.

**New Capacity Qualification Deadline** is a deadline, specified in Section III.13.1.10 of Market Rule 1, for submission of certain qualification materials for the Forward Capacity Auction, as discussed in Section III.13.1 of Market Rule 1.

**New Capacity Qualification Package** is information submitted by certain new resources prior to participation in the Forward Capacity Auction, as described in Section III.13.1 of Market Rule 1.

**New Capacity Resource** is a resource (i) that never previously received any payment as a capacity resource including any capacity payment pursuant to the market rules in effect prior to June 1, 2010 and that has not cleared in any previous Forward Capacity Auction; or (ii) that is otherwise eligible to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Capacity Resource.

**New Capacity Show of Interest Form** is described in Section III.13.1.1.2.1 of Market Rule 1.



**New Capacity Show of Interest Submission Window** is the period of time during which a Project Sponsor may submit a New Capacity Show of Interest Form or a New Demand Capacity Resource Show of Interest Form, as described in Section III.13.1.10 of Market Rule 1.

**New Demand Capacity Resource** is a type of Demand Capacity Resource participating in the Forward Capacity Market, as defined in Section III.13.1.4.1 of Market Rule 1.

**New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package** is the information that a Project Sponsor must submit, in accordance with Section III.13.1.4.1.1.2 of Market Rule 1, for each resource that it seeks to offer in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Demand Capacity Resource.

**New Demand Capacity Resource Show of Interest Form** is described in Section III.13.1.4.1.1.1 of Market Rule 1.

**New England Control Area** is the Control Area for New England, which includes PTF, Non-PTF, MTF and OTF. The New England Control Area covers Connecticut, Rhode Island, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Vermont, and part of Maine (i.e., excluding the portions of Northern Maine and the northern portion of Eastern Maine which are in the Maritimes Control Area).

**New England Markets** are markets or programs for the purchase of energy, capacity, ancillary services, demand response services or other related products or services (including Financial Transmission Rights) that are delivered through or useful to the operation of the New England Transmission System and that are administered by the ISO pursuant to rules, rates, or agreements on file from time to time with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.

**New England System Restoration Plan** is the plan that is developed by ISO, in accordance with NERC Reliability Standards, NPCC regional criteria and standards, ISO New England Operating Documents and ISO operating agreements, to facilitate the restoration of the New England Transmission System following a partial or complete shutdown of the New England Transmission System.

**New England Transmission System** is the system of transmission facilities, including PTF, Non-PTF, OTF and MTF, within the New England Control Area under the ISO's operational jurisdiction.

**New Generating Capacity Resource** is a type of resource participating in the Forward Capacity Market, as described in Section III.13.1.1.1 of Market Rule 1.

**New Import Capacity Resource** is a type of resource participating in the Forward Capacity Market, as defined in Section III.13.1.3.4 of Market Rule 1.

**New Resource Offer Floor Price** is defined in Section III.A.21.~~32~~.

**NMPTC** means Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer.

**NMPTC Credit Threshold** is described in Section V.A.2 of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**NMPTC Financial Assurance Requirement** is an amount of additional financial assurance for Non-Market Participant Transmission Customers described in Section V.D of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**Node** is a point on the New England Transmission System at which LMPs are calculated.

**No-Load Fee** is the amount, in dollars per hour, for a Generator Asset that must be paid to Market Participants with an Ownership Share in the Generator Asset for being scheduled in the New England Markets, in addition to the Start-Up Fee and price offered to supply energy, for each hour that the Generator Asset is scheduled in the New England Markets.

**Nominated Consumption Limit** is the consumption level specified by the Market Participant for a Dispatchable Asset Related Demand as adjusted in accordance with the provisions of Section III.13.7.5.1.3.

**Non-Commercial Capacity** is the capacity of a New Capacity Resource or an Existing Capacity Resource, or portion thereof, that has not achieved FCM Commercial Operation.

**Non-Commercial Capacity Cure Period** is the time period described in Section VII.D of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**Non-Commercial Capacity Financial Assurance Amount (Non-Commercial Capacity FA Amount)** is the financial assurance amount held on Non-Commercial Capacity cleared in a Forward Capacity Auction as calculated in accordance with Section VII.B.2 of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**Non-Designated Blackstart Resource Study Cost Payments** are the study costs reimbursed under Section 5.3 of Schedule 16 of the OATT.

**Non-Dispatchable Resource** is any Resource that does not meet the requirements to be a Dispatchable Resource.

**Non-Hourly Charges** are defined in Section 1.3 of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

**Non-Hourly Requirements** are determined in accordance with Section III.A(ii) of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy, which is Exhibit 1A of Section I of the Tariff.

**Non-Incumbent Transmission Developer** is a Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor that: (i) is not currently a PTO; (ii) has a transmission project listed in the RSP Project List; and (iii) has executed a Non-Incumbent Transmission Developer Operating Agreement. “Non-Incumbent Transmission Developer” also includes a PTO that proposes the development of a transmission facility not located within or connected to its existing electric system; however, because such a PTO is a party to the TOA, it is not required to enter into a Non-Incumbent Transmission Developer Operating Agreement.

**Non-Incumbent Transmission Developer Operating Agreement (or NTDOA)** is an agreement between the ISO and a Non-Incumbent Transmission Developer in the form specified in Attachment O to the OATT that sets forth their respective rights and responsibilities to each other with regard to proposals for and construction of certain transmission facilities.

**Non-Market Participant** is any entity that is not a Market Participant.

**Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer** is any entity which is not a Market Participant but is a Transmission Customer.

**Non-Municipal Market Participant** is defined in Section II of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**Non-PTF Transmission Facilities (Non-PTF)** are the transmission facilities owned by the PTOs that do not constitute PTF, OTF or MTF.

**Non-Qualifying** means a Market Participant that is not a Credit Qualifying Market Participant.

**Notice of RBA** is defined in Section 6.3.2 of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

**Notification Time** is the time required for a Generator Asset to synchronize to the system from the time a startup Dispatch Instruction is received from the ISO.

**Northeastern Planning Protocol** is the Amended and Restated Northeastern ISO/RTO Planning Coordination Protocol on file with the Commission and posted on the ISO website at the following URL: [www.iso-ne.com/static-assets/documents/2015/07/northeastern\\_protocol\\_dmeast.doc](http://www.iso-ne.com/static-assets/documents/2015/07/northeastern_protocol_dmeast.doc).

**NPCC** is the Northeast Power Coordinating Council.

**Obligation Month** means a time period of one calendar month for which capacity payments are issued and the costs associated with capacity payments are allocated.

**Offer Data** means the scheduling, operations planning, dispatch, new Resource, and other data, including Generator Asset, Dispatchable Asset Related Demand, and Demand Response Resource operating limits based on physical characteristics, and information necessary to schedule and dispatch Generator Assets, Dispatchable Asset Related Demands, and Demand Response Resources for the provision or consumption of energy, the provision of other services, and the maintenance of the reliability and security of the transmission system in the New England Control Area, and specified for submission to the New England Markets for such purposes by the ISO.

~~**Offer Review Trigger Prices** are the prices specified in Section III.A.21.1 of Market Rule 1 associated with the submission of New Capacity Offers in the Forward Capacity Auction.~~

**Offered CLAIM10** is a Supply Offer value or a Demand Reduction Offer value between 0 and the CLAIM10 of the resource that represents the amount of TMNSR available either from an off-line Fast Start Generator or from a Fast Start Demand Response Resource that has not been dispatched.

**Offered CLAIM30** is a Supply Offer value or a Demand Reduction Offer value between 0 and the CLAIM30 of the resource that represents the amount of TMOR available either from an off-line Fast Start Generator or from a Fast Start Demand Response Resource that has not been dispatched.

**On-Peak Demand Resource** is a type of Demand Capacity Resource and means installed measures (e.g., products, equipment, systems, services, practices and/or strategies) on end-use customer facilities that reduce the total amount of electrical energy consumed during Demand Resource On-Peak Hours, while delivering a comparable or acceptable level of end-use service. Such measures include Energy Efficiency, Load Management, and Distributed Generation.

**Open Access Same-Time Information System (OASIS)** is the ISO information system and standards of conduct responding to requirements of 18 C.F.R. §37 of the Commission's regulations and all additional requirements implemented by subsequent Commission orders dealing with OASIS.

**Open Access Transmission Tariff (OATT)** is Section II of the ISO New England Inc. Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff.

**Operating Authority** is defined pursuant to a MTOA, an OTOA, the TOA or the OATT, as applicable.

**Operating Data** means GADS Data, data equivalent to GADS Data, CARL Data, metered load data, or actual system failure occurrences data, all as described in the ISO New England Operating Procedures.

**Operating Day** means the calendar day period beginning at midnight for which transactions on the New England Markets are scheduled.

**Operating Reserve** means Ten-Minute Spinning Reserve (TMSR), Ten-Minute Non-Spinning Reserve (TMNSR) and Thirty-Minute Operating Reserve (TMOR).

**Operations Date** is February 1, 2005.

**OTF Service** is transmission service over OTF as provided for in Schedule 20.

**Other Transmission Facility (OTF)** are the transmission facilities owned by Transmission Owners, defined and classified as OTF pursuant to Schedule 20, over which the ISO shall exercise Operating Authority in accordance with the terms set forth in the OTOA, rated 69 kV or above, and required to allow energy from significant power sources to move freely on the New England Transmission System. OTF classification shall be limited to the Phase I/II HVDC-TF.

**Other Transmission Operating Agreements (OTOA)** is the agreement(s) between the ISO, an OTO and/or the associated service provider(s) with respect to an OTF, which includes the HVDC Transmission Operating Agreement and the Phase I/II HVDC-TF Transmission Service Administration Agreement. With respect to the Phase I/II HVDC-TF, the HVDC Transmission Operating Agreement covers the rights and responsibilities for the operation of the facility and the Phase I/II HVDC-TF Transmission Service Administration Agreement covers the rights and responsibilities for the administration of transmission service.

**Other Transmission Owner (OTO)** is an owner of OTF.

**Ownership Share** is a right or obligation, for purposes of settlement, to a percentage share of all credits or charges associated with a Generator Asset or a Load Asset, where such facility is interconnected to the New England Transmission System.

**Participant Expenses** are defined in Section 1 of the Participants Agreement.

**Participant Required Balance** is defined in Section 5.3 of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

**Participant Vote** is defined in Section 1 of the Participants Agreement.

**Participants Agreement** is the agreement among the ISO, the New England Power Pool and Individual Participants, as amended from time to time, on file with the Commission.

**Participants Committee** is the principal committee referred to in the Participants Agreement.

**Participating Transmission Owner (PTO)** is a transmission owner that is a party to the TOA.

**Passive DR Audit** is the audit performed pursuant to Section III.13.6.1.5.4.

**Passive DR Auditing Period** is the summer Passive DR Auditing Period (June 1 to August 31) or winter Passive DR Auditing Period (December 1 to January 31) applicable to On-Peak Demand Resources and Seasonal Peak Demand Resources.

**Payment** is a sum of money due to a Covered Entity from the ISO.

**Payment Default Shortfall Fund** is defined in Section 5.1 of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

**Peak Energy Rent (PER)** is described in Section III.13.7.1.2 of Market Rule 1.

**PER Proxy Unit** is described in Section III.13.7.1.2.1 of Market Rule 1.

**Permanent De-list Bid** is a bid that may be submitted by an Existing Generating Capacity Resource, Existing Import Capacity Resource, or Existing Demand Capacity Resource in the Forward Capacity Auction to permanently remove itself from the capacity market, as described in Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5 of Market Rule 1.

**Phase I Transfer Credit** is 40% of the HQICC, or such other fraction of the HQICC as the ISO may establish.

**Phase I/II HVDC-TF** is defined in Schedule 20A to Section II of this Tariff.

**Phase I/II HVDC-TF Transfer Capability** is the transfer capacity of the Phase I/II HVDC-TF under normal operating conditions, as determined in accordance with Good Utility Practice. The “Phase I

Transfer Capability” is the transfer capacity under normal operating conditions, as determined in accordance with Good Utility Practice, of the Phase I terminal facilities as determined initially as of the time immediately prior to Phase II of the Phase I/II HVDC-TF first being placed in service, and as adjusted thereafter only to take into account changes in the transfer capacity which are independent of any effect of Phase II on the operation of Phase I. The “Phase II Transfer Capability” is the difference between the Phase I/II HVDC-TF Transfer Capability and the Phase I Transfer Capability. Determinations of, and any adjustment in, Phase I/II HVDC-TF Transfer Capability shall be made by the ISO, and the basis for any such adjustment shall be explained in writing and posted on the ISO website.

**Phase One Proposal** is a first round submission, as defined in Section 4.3 of Attachment K of the OATT, of a proposal for a Reliability Transmission Upgrade or Market Efficiency Transmission Upgrade, as applicable, by a Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor.

**Phase II Transfer Credit** is 60% of the HQICC, or such other fraction of the HQICC as the ISO may establish.

**Phase Two Solution** is a second round submission, as defined in Section 4.3 of Attachment K of the OATT, of a proposal for a Reliability Transmission Upgrade or Market Efficiency Transmission Upgrade by a Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor.

**Planning Advisory Committee** is the committee described in Attachment K of the OATT.

**Planning and Reliability Criteria** is defined in Section 3.3 of Attachment K to the OATT.

**Planning Authority** is an entity defined as such by the North American Electric Reliability Corporation.

**Point(s) of Delivery (POD)** is point(s) of interconnection where capacity and/or energy transmitted by a Transmission Customer will be made available to the Receiving Party under the OATT.

**Point of Interconnection** shall have the same meaning as that used for purposes of Schedules 22, 23 and 25 of the OATT.



**Point(s) of Receipt (POR)** is point(s) of interconnection where capacity and/or energy transmitted by a Transmission Customer will be made available by the Delivering Party under the OATT.

**Point-To-Point Service** is the transmission of capacity and/or energy on either a firm or non-firm basis from the Point(s) of Receipt to the Point(s) of Delivery under the OATT pursuant to Local Point-To-Point Service or OTF Service or MTF Service; and the transmission of capacity and/or energy from the Point(s) of Receipt to the Point(s) of Delivery under the OATT pursuant to Through or Out Service.

**Pool-Planned Unit** is one of the following units: New Haven Harbor Unit 1 (Coke Works), Mystic Unit 7, Canal Unit 2, Potter Unit 2, Wyman Unit 4, Stony Brook Units 1, 1A, 1B, 1C, 2A and 2B, Millstone Unit 3, Seabrook Unit 1 and Waters River Unit 2 (to the extent of 7 megawatts of its Summer capability and 12 megawatts of its Winter capability).

**Pool PTF Rate** is the transmission rate determined in accordance with Schedule 8 to the OATT.

**Pool RNS Rate** is the transmission rate determined in accordance with paragraph (2) of Schedule 9 of Section II of the Tariff.

**Pool-Scheduled Resources** are described in Section III.1.10.2 of Market Rule 1.

**Pool Supported PTF** is defined as: (i) PTF first placed in service prior to January 1, 2000; (ii) Generator Interconnection Related Upgrades with respect to Category A and B projects (as defined in Schedule 11), but only to the extent not paid for by the interconnecting Generator Owner; and (iii) other PTF upgrades, but only to the extent the costs therefore are determined to be Pool Supported PTF in accordance with Schedule 12.

**Pool Transmission Facility (PTF)** means the transmission facilities owned by PTOs which meet the criteria specified in Section II.49 of the OATT.

**Posting Entity** is any Market Participant or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer providing financial security under the provisions of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**Posture** means an action of the ISO to deviate from the jointly optimized security constrained economic dispatch for Energy and Operating Reserves solution for a Resource produced by the ISO's technical software for the purpose of maintaining sufficient Operating Reserve (both online and off-line) or for the provision of voltage or VAR support.

**Posturing Credits** are the Real-Time Posturing NCPC Credits for Generators (Other Than Limited Energy Resources) Postured for Reliability and the Real-Time Posturing NCPC Credit for Limited Energy Resources Postured for Reliability.

**Power Purchaser** is the entity that is purchasing the capacity and/or energy to be transmitted under the OATT.

**Principal** is (i) the sole proprietor of a sole proprietorship; (ii) a general partner of a partnership; (iii) a president, chief executive officer, chief operating officer or chief financial officer (or equivalent position) of an organization; (iv) a manager, managing member or a member vested with the management authority for a limited liability company or limited liability partnership; (v) any person or entity that has the power to exercise a controlling influence over an organization's activities that are subject to regulation by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, any exchange monitored by the National Futures Association, or any state entity responsible for regulating activity in energy markets; or (vi) any person or entity that: (a) is the direct owner of 10% or more of any class of an organization's equity securities; or (b) has directly contributed 10% or more of an organization's capital.

**Profiled Load Assets** include all Load Assets that are not directly metered by OP-18 compliant metering as currently described in Section IV (Metering and Recording for Settlements) of OP18, and some Load Assets that are measured by OP-18 compliant metering (as currently described in Section IV of OP-18) to which the Host Participant Assigned Meter Reader allocates non-PTF losses.

**Project Sponsor** is an entity seeking to have a New Generating Capacity Resource, New Import Capacity Resource or New Demand Capacity Resource participate in the Forward Capacity Market, as described in Section III.13.

**Proxy De-List Bid** is a type of bid used in the Forward Capacity Market.

**Provisional Member** is defined in Section I.68A of the Restated NEPOOL Agreement.

**PTO Administrative Committee** is the committee referred to in Section 11.04 of the TOA.

**Public Policy Requirement** is a requirement reflected in a statute enacted by, or a regulation promulgated by, the federal government or a state or local (e.g., municipal or county) government.

**Public Policy Transmission Study** is a study conducted by the ISO pursuant to the process set out in Section 4A.3 of Attachment K of the OATT, and consists of two phases: (i) an initial phase to produce a rough estimate of the costs and benefits of concepts that could meet transmission needs driven by public policy requirements; and (ii) a follow-on phase designed to produce more detailed analysis and engineering work on transmission concepts identified in the first phase.

**Public Policy Local Transmission Study** is a study conducted by a PTO pursuant to the process set out in Section 1.6 of Attachment K Appendix 1 of the OATT, and consists of two phases: (i) an initial phase to produce an estimate of the costs and benefits of concepts that could meet transmission needs driven by public policy requirements; and (ii) a follow-on phase designed to produce more detailed analysis and engineering work on transmission concepts identified in the first phase.

**Public Policy Transmission Upgrade** is an addition and/or upgrade to the New England Transmission System that meets the voltage and non-voltage criteria for Public Policy Transmission Upgrade PTF classification specified in the OATT, and has been included in the Regional System Plan and RSP Project List as a Public Policy Transmission Upgrade pursuant to the procedures described in Section 4A of Attachment K of the OATT.

**Publicly Owned Entity** is defined in Section I of the Restated NEPOOL Agreement.

**Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit** is described in Section III.13.1.9.3 of Market Rule 1.

**Qualified Capacity** is the amount of capacity a resource may provide in the summer or winter in a Capacity Commitment Period, as determined in the Forward Capacity Market qualification processes.

**Qualified Generator Reactive Resource(s)** is any generator source of dynamic reactive power that meets the criteria specified in Schedule 2 of the OATT.

**Qualified Non-Generator Reactive Resource(s)** is any non-generator source of dynamic reactive power that meets the criteria specified in Schedule 2 of the OATT.

**Qualified Reactive Resource(s)** is any Qualified Generator Reactive Resource and/or Qualified Non-Generator Reactive Resource that meets the criteria specified in Schedule 2 of the OATT.

**Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor** is defined in Sections 4B.2 and 4B.3 of Attachment K of the OATT.

**Queue Position** has the meaning specified in Section I of Schedule 22, Attachment 1 to Schedule 23, and Section I of Schedule 25 of the OATT.

**Rapid Response Pricing Asset** is: (i) a Fast Start Generator; (ii) a Flexible DNE Dispatchable Generator; or (iii) a Binary Storage DARD with Offer Data specifying a Minimum Run Time and a Minimum Down Time not exceeding one hour each. A Rapid Response Pricing Asset shall also include a Fast Start Demand Response Resource for which the Market Participant's Offer Data meets the following criteria: (i) Minimum Reduction Time does not exceed one hour; and (ii) Demand Response Resource Notification Time plus Demand Response Resource Start-Up Time does not exceed 30 minutes.

**Rapid Response Pricing Opportunity Cost** is the NCPC Credit described in Section III.F.2.3.10.

**Rated** means a Market Participant that receives a credit rating from one or more of the Rating Agencies, or, if such Market Participant is not rated by one of the Rating Agencies, then a Market Participant that has outstanding unsecured debt rated by one or more of the Rating Agencies.

**Rating Agencies** are Standard and Poor's (S&P), Moody's, and Fitch.

**Rationing Minimum Limit** is the MW quantity for a New Generating Capacity Resource or Existing Generating Capacity Resource below which an offer or bid may not be rationed in the Forward Capacity

Auction, but shall not apply to supply offers or demand bids in a substitution auction as specified in Section III.13.2.8.2 and Section III.13.2.8.3.

**RBA Decision** is a written decision provided by the ISO to a Disputing Party and to the Chair of the NEPOOL Budget and Finance Subcommittee accepting or denying a Requested Billing Adjustment within twenty Business Days of the date the ISO distributes a Notice of RBA, unless some later date is agreed upon by the Disputing Party and the ISO.

**Reactive Capability Audit** is an audit that measures the ability of a Reactive Resource to provide or absorb reactive power to or from the transmission system at a specified real power output or consumption.

**Reactive Resource** is a device that dynamically adjusts reactive power output automatically in Real-Time over a continuous range, taking into account control system response bandwidth, within a specified voltage bandwidth in response to grid voltage changes. These resources operate to maintain a set-point voltage and include, but are not limited to, Generator Assets, Dispatchable Asset Related Demands that are part of an Electric Storage Facility, and dynamic transmission devices.

**Reactive Supply and Voltage Control Service** is the form of Ancillary Service described in Schedule 2 of the OATT.

**Real-Time** is a period in the current Operating Day for which the ISO dispatches Resources for energy and Regulation, designates Resources for Regulation and Operating Reserve and, if necessary, commits additional Resources.

**Real-Time Adjusted Load Obligation** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(b) of Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time Adjusted Load Obligation Deviation** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(d) of Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time Commitment NCPC Credit** is an NCPC Credit calculated pursuant to Appendix F to Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time Congestion Revenue** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(i) of Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time Demand Reduction Obligation** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(c) of Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time Demand Reduction Obligation Deviation** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(e) of Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time Dispatch NCPC Credit** is an NCPC Credit calculated pursuant to Appendix F to Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time Energy Inventory** is a component of the spot payment that a Market Participant may receive through the inventoried energy program, as described in Section III.K.3.2.1 of Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time Energy Market** means the purchase or sale of energy, purchase of demand reductions, payment of Congestion Costs, and payment for losses for quantity deviations from the Day-Ahead Energy Market in the Operating Day and designation of and payment for provision of Operating Reserve in Real-Time.

**Real-Time Energy Market Deviation Congestion Charge/Credit** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(g) of Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time Energy Market Deviation Energy Charge/Credit** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(g) of Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time Energy Market Deviation Loss Charge/Credit** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(g) of Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time Energy Market NCPC Credits** are the Real-Time Commitment NCPC Credit and the Real-Time Dispatch NCPC Credit.

**Real-Time External Transaction NCPC Credit** is an NCPC Credit calculated pursuant to Appendix F to Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time Generation Obligation** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(b) of Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time Generation Obligation Deviation** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(d) of Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time High Operating Limit** is the maximum output, in MW, of a Generator Asset that could be achieved, consistent with Good Utility Practice, in response to an ISO request for Energy (including pursuant to Section III.13.6.4 of Market Rule 1), for each hour of the Operating Day, as reflected in the Generator Asset's Offer Data. This value is based on real-time operating conditions and the physical operating characteristics and operating permits of the facility and must be submitted for all Generator Assets (other than Settlement Only Resources).

**Real-Time Load Obligation** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(b) of Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time Load Obligation Deviation** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(d) of Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time Locational Adjusted Net Interchange** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(b) of Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time Locational Adjusted Net Interchange Deviation** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(d) of Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time Loss Revenue** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(l) of Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time Loss Revenue Charges or Credits** are defined in Section III.3.2.1(m) of Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time NCP Load Obligation** is the maximum hourly value, during a month, of a Market Participant's Real-Time Load Obligation summed over all Locations, excluding exports, in kilowatts.

**Real-Time Offer Change** is a modification to a Supply Offer pursuant to Section III.1.10.9(b).

**Real-Time Posturing NCPC Credit for Generators (Other Than Limited Energy Resources) Postured for Reliability** is an NCPC Credit calculated pursuant to Appendix F to Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time Posturing NCPC Credit for Limited Energy Resources Postured for Reliability** is an NCPC Credit calculated pursuant to Appendix F to Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time Prices** means the Locational Marginal Prices resulting from the ISO's dispatch of the New England Markets in the Operating Day.

**Real-Time Reserve Charge** is a Market Participant's share of applicable system and Reserve Zone Real-Time Operating Reserve costs attributable to meeting the Real-Time Operating Reserve requirement as calculated in accordance with Section III.10 of Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time Reserve Clearing Price** is the Real-Time TMSR, TMNSR or TMOR clearing price, as applicable, for the system and each Reserve Zone that is calculated in accordance with Section III.2.7A of Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time Reserve Credit** is a Market Participant's compensation associated with that Market Participant's Resources' Reserve Quantity For Settlement as calculated in accordance with Section III.10 of Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time Reserve Designation** is the amount, in MW, of Operating Reserve designated to a Resource in Real-Time by the ISO as described in Section III.1.7.19 of Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time Reserve Opportunity Cost** is defined in Section III.2.7A(b) of Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time Synchronous Condensing NCPC Credit** is an NCPC Credit calculated pursuant to Appendix F to Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time System Adjusted Net Interchange** means, for each hour, the sum of Real-Time Locational Adjusted Net Interchange for a Market Participant over all Locations, in kilowatts.

**Receiving Party** is the entity receiving the capacity and/or energy transmitted to Point(s) of Delivery under the OATT.

**Reference Level** is defined in Section III.A.5.7 of Appendix A of Market Rule 1.

**Regional Benefit Upgrade(s) (RBU)** means a Transmission Upgrade that: (i) is rated 115kV or above; (ii) meets all of the non-voltage criteria for PTF classification specified in the OATT; and



(iii) is included in the Regional System Plan as either a Reliability Transmission Upgrade or a Market Efficiency Transmission Upgrade identified as needed pursuant to Attachment K of the OATT. The category of RBU shall not include any Transmission Upgrade that has been categorized under any of the other categories specified in Schedule 12 of the OATT (e.g., an Elective Transmission Upgrade shall not also be categorized as an RBU). Any upgrades to transmission facilities rated below 115kV that were PTF prior to January 1, 2004 shall remain classified as PTF and be categorized as an RBU if, and for so long as, such upgrades meet the criteria for PTF specified in the OATT.

**Regional Network Load** is the load that a Network Customer designates for Regional Network Service under Part II.B of the OATT. The Network Customer's Regional Network Load shall include all load designated by the Network Customer (including losses). A Network Customer may elect to designate less than its total load as Regional Network Load but may not designate only part of the load at a discrete Point of Delivery. Where a Transmission Customer has elected not to designate a particular load at discrete Points of Delivery as Regional Network Load, the Transmission Customer is responsible for making separate arrangements under Part II.C of the OATT for any Point-To-Point Service that may be necessary for such non-designated load. A Network Customer's Monthly Regional Network Load shall be calculated in accordance with Section II.21.2 of the OATT.

**Regional Network Service (RNS)** is the transmission service over the PTF described in Part II.B of the OATT, including such service which is used with respect to Network Resources or Regional Network Load that is not physically interconnected with the PTF.

**Regional Planning Dispute Resolution Process** is described in Section 12 of Attachment K to the OATT.

**Regional System Plan (RSP)** is the plan developed under the process specified in Attachment K of the OATT.

**Regional Transmission Service (RTS)** is Regional Network Service and Through or Out Service as provided over the PTF in accordance with Section II.B, Section II.C, Schedule 8 and Schedule 9 of the OATT.

**Regulation** is the capability of a specific Resource with appropriate telecommunications, control and response capability to respond to an AGC SetPoint.

**Regulation and Frequency Response Service** is the form of Ancillary Service described in Schedule 3 of the OATT. The capability of performing Regulation and Frequency Response Service is referred to as automatic generation control (AGC).

**Regulation Capacity** is the lesser of five times the Automatic Response Rate and one-half of the difference between the Regulation High Limit and the Regulation Low Limit of a Resource capable of providing Regulation.

**Regulation Capacity Requirement** is the amount of Regulation Capacity required to maintain system control and reliability in the New England Control Area as calculated and posted on the ISO website.

**Regulation Capacity Offer** is an offer by a Market Participant to provide Regulation Capacity.

**Regulation High Limit** is an offer parameter that establishes the upper bound for AGC SetPoints and is used in the determination of a Resource's Regulation Capacity.

**Regulation Low Limit** is an offer parameter that establishes the lower bound for AGC SetPoints and is used in the determination of a Resource's Regulation Capacity.

**Regulation Market** is the market described in Section III.14 of Market Rule 1.

**Regulation Resources** are those Alternative Technology Regulation Resources, Generator Assets, and Dispatchable Asset Related Demands that satisfy the requirements of Section III.14.2. Regulation Resources are eligible to participate in the Regulation Market.

**Regulation Service** is the change in output or consumption made in response to changing AGC SetPoints.

**Regulation Service Requirement** is the estimated amount of Regulation Service required to maintain system control and reliability in the New England Control Area as calculated and posted on the ISO website.

**Regulation Service Offer** is an offer by a Market Participant to provide Regulation Service.

**Related Person** is defined pursuant to Section 1.1 of the Participants Agreement.

**Related Transaction** is defined in Section III.1.4.3 of Market Rule 1.

**Reliability Administration Service (RAS)** is the service provided by the ISO, as described in Schedule 3 of Section IV.A of the Tariff, in order to administer the Reliability Markets and provide other reliability-related and informational functions.

**Reliability Committee** is the committee whose responsibilities are specified in Section 8.2.3 of the Participants Agreement.

**Reliability Markets** are, collectively, the ISO's administration of Regulation, the Forward Capacity Market, and Operating Reserve.

**Reliability Region** means any one of the regions identified on the ISO's website. Reliability Regions are intended to reflect the operating characteristics of, and the major transmission constraints on, the New England Transmission System.

**Reliability Transmission Upgrade** means those additions and upgrades not required by the interconnection of a generator that are nonetheless necessary to ensure the continued reliability of the New England Transmission System, taking into account load growth and known resource changes, and include those upgrades necessary to provide acceptable stability response, short circuit capability and system voltage levels, and those facilities required to provide adequate thermal capability and local voltage levels that cannot otherwise be achieved with reasonable assumptions for certain amounts of generation being unavailable (due to maintenance or forced outages) for purposes of long-term planning studies. Good Utility Practice, applicable reliability principles, guidelines, criteria, rules, procedures and standards of ERO and NPCC and any of their successors, applicable publicly available local reliability

criteria, and the ISO System Rules, as they may be amended from time to time, will be used to define the system facilities required to maintain reliability in evaluating proposed Reliability Transmission Upgrades. A Reliability Transmission Upgrade may provide market efficiency benefits as well as reliability benefits to the New England Transmission System.

**Remittance Advice** is an issuance from the ISO for the net Payment owed to a Covered Entity where a Covered Entity's total Payments exceed its total Charges in a billing period.

**Remittance Advice Date** is the day on which the ISO issues a Remittance Advice.

**Renewable Technology Resource** is a Generating Capacity Resource or an On-Peak Demand Resource that satisfies the requirements specified in Section III.13.1.1.1.7.

**Re-Offer Period** is the period that normally occurs between the posting of the of the Day-Ahead Energy Market results and 2:00 p.m. on the day before the Operating Day during which a Market Participant may submit revised Supply Offers, revised External Transactions, or revised Demand Bids associated with Dispatchable Asset Related Demands or, revised Demand Reduction Offers associated with Demand Response Resources.

**Replacement Reserve** is described in Part III, Section VII of ISO New England Operating Procedure No. 8.

**Request for Alternative Proposals (RFAP)** is the request described in Attachment K of the OATT.

**Requested Billing Adjustment (RBA)** is defined in Section 6.1 of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

**Required Balance** is an amount as defined in Section 5.3 of the Billing Policy.

**Reseller** is a MGTSA holder that sells, assigns or transfers its rights under its MGTSA, as described in Section II.45.1(a) of the OATT.

**Reserve Adequacy Analysis** is the analysis performed by the ISO to determine if adequate Resources are committed to meet forecasted load, Operating Reserve, and security constraint requirements for the current and next Operating Day.

**Reserve Constraint Penalty Factors (RCPFs)** are rates, in \$/MWh, that are used within the Real-Time dispatch and pricing algorithm to reflect the value of Operating Reserve shortages and are defined in Section III.2.7A(c) of Market Rule 1.

**Reserve Quantity For Settlement** is defined in Section III.10.1 of Market Rule 1.

**Reserve Zone** is defined in Section III.2.7 of Market Rule 1.

**Reserved Capacity** is the maximum amount of capacity and energy that is committed to the Transmission Customer for transmission over the New England Transmission System between the Point(s) of Receipt and the Point(s) of Delivery under Part II.C or Schedule 18, 20 or 21 of the OATT, as applicable. Reserved Capacity shall be expressed in terms of whole kilowatts on a sixty-minute interval (commencing on the clock hour) basis, or, in the case of Reserved Capacity for Local Point-to-Point Service, in terms of whole megawatts on a sixty-minute interval basis.

**Resource** means a Generator Asset, a Dispatchable Asset Related Demand, an External Resource, an External Transaction, or a Demand Response Resource.

**Restated New England Power Pool Agreement (RNA)** is the Second Restated New England Power Pool Agreement, which restated for a second time by an amendment dated as of August 16, 2004 the New England Power Pool Agreement dated September 1, 1971, as the same may be amended and restated from time to time, governing the relationship among the NEPOOL members.

**Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone** is a single Capacity Zone made up of the adjacent Load Zones that are neither export-constrained nor import-constrained.

**Rest of System** is an area established under Section III.2.7(d) of Market Rule 1.

**Retail Delivery Point** is the point on the transmission or distribution system at which the load of an end-use facility, which is metered and assigned a unique account number by the Host Participant, is measured to determine the amount of energy delivered to the facility from the transmission and distribution system. If an end-use facility is connected to the transmission or distribution system at more than one location, the Retail Delivery Point shall consist of the metered load at each connection point, summed to measure the net energy delivered to the facility in each interval.

**Retirement De-List Bid** is a bid to retire an Existing Generating Capacity Resource, Existing Import Capacity Resource, or Existing Demand Capacity Resource from all New England Markets, as described in Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.

**Returning Market Participant** is a Market Participant, other than an FTR-Only Customer or a Governance Only Member, whose previous membership as a Market Participant was involuntarily terminated due to a Financial Assurance Default or a payment default and, since returning, has been a Market Participant for less than six consecutive months.

**Revenue Requirement** is defined in Section IV.A.2.1 of the Tariff.

**Reviewable Action** is defined in Section III.D.1.1 of Appendix D of Market Rule 1.

**Reviewable Determination** is defined in Section 12.4(a) of Attachment K to the OATT.

**RSP Project List** is defined in Section 1 of Attachment K to the OATT.

**RTEP02 Upgrade(s)** means a Transmission Upgrade that was included in the annual NEPOOL Transmission Plan (also known as the “Regional Transmission Expansion Plan” or “RTEP”) for the year 2002, as approved by ISO New England Inc.’s Board of Directors, or the functional equivalent of such Transmission Upgrade, as determined by ISO New England Inc. The RTEP02 Upgrades are listed in Schedule 12B of the OATT.

**RTO** is a regional transmission organization or comparable independent transmission organization that complies with Order No. 2000 and the Commission’s corresponding regulation.

**Same Reserve Zone Export Transaction** is defined in Section III.1.10.7(f)(iii) of Market Rule 1.

**Schedule, Schedules, Schedule 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5** are references to the individual or collective schedules to Section IV.A. of the Tariff.

**Schedule 20A Service Provider (SSP)** is defined in Schedule 20A to Section II of this Tariff.

**Scheduling Service**, for purposes of Section IV.A and Section IV.B of the Tariff, is the service described in Schedule 1 to Section IV.A of the Tariff.

**Scheduling, System Control and Dispatch Service**, for purposes of Section II of the Tariff, is the form of Ancillary Service described in Schedule 1 of the OATT.

**Seasonal Claimed Capability** is the summer or winter claimed capability of a Generator Asset or Generating Capacity Resource, and represents the maximum dependable load carrying ability of the asset or resource, excluding capacity required for station use.

**Seasonal Claimed Capability Audit** is the Generator Asset audit performed pursuant to Section III.1.5.1.3.

**Seasonal DR Audit** is the Demand Response Resource audit performed pursuant to Section III.1.5.1.3.1.

**Seasonal Peak Demand Resource** is a type of Demand Capacity Resource and shall mean installed measures (e.g., products, equipment, systems, services, practices and/or strategies) on end-use customer facilities that reduce the total amount of electrical energy consumed during Demand Resource Seasonal Peak Hours, while delivering a comparable or acceptable level of end-use service. Such measures include Energy Efficiency, Load Management, and Distributed Generation.

**Section III.1.4 Transactions** are defined in Section III.1.4.2 of Market Rule 1.

**Section III.1.4 Conforming Transactions** are defined in Section III.1.4.2 of Market Rule 1.

**Security Agreement** is Attachment 1 to the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**Selected Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor** is the Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor that proposed the Phase Two or Stage Two Solution that has been identified by the ISO as the preferred Phase Two or Stage Two Solution.

**Selected Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor Agreement** is the agreement between the ISO and a Selected Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor. The Selected Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor Agreement is provided in Attachment P to the OATT.

**Self-Schedule** is the action of a Market Participant in committing its Generator Asset or DARD, in accordance with applicable ISO New England Manuals, to provide service in an hour, whether or not in the absence of that action the Generator Asset or DARD would have been committed by the ISO to provide the service. For a Generator Asset, Self-Schedule is the action of a Market Participant in committing a Generator Asset to provide Energy in an hour at its Economic Minimum Limit, whether or not in the absence of that action the Generator Asset would have been committed by the ISO to provide the Energy. For a DARD, Self-Schedule is the action of a Market Participant in committing a DARD to consume Energy in an hour at its Minimum Consumption Limit, whether or not in the absence of that action the DARD would have been committed by the ISO to consume Energy. For an External Transaction, a Self-Schedule is a request by a Market Participant for the ISO to select the External Transaction regardless of the LMP. Demand Response Resources are not permitted to Self-Schedule.

**Self-Supplied FCA Resource** is described in Section III.13.1.6 of Market Rule 1.

**Senior Officer** means an officer of the subject entity with the title of vice president (or similar office) or higher, or another officer designated in writing to the ISO by that officer.

**Service Agreement** is a Transmission Service Agreement or an MPSA.

**Service Commencement Date** is the date service is to begin pursuant to the terms of an executed Service Agreement, or the date service begins in accordance with the sections of the OATT addressing the filing of unexecuted Service Agreements.

**Services** means, collectively, the Scheduling Service, EAS and RAS; individually, a Service.



**Settlement Financial Assurance** is an amount of financial assurance required from a Designated FTR Participant awarded a bid in an FTR Auction. This amount is calculated pursuant to Section VI.C of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**Settlement Only Resources** are generators of less than 5 MW of maximum net output when operating at any temperature at or above zero degrees Fahrenheit, that meet the metering, interconnection and other requirements in ISO New England Operating Procedure No. 14 and that have elected Settlement Only Resource treatment as described in the ISO New England Manual for Registration and Performance Auditing.

**Shortfall Funding Arrangement**, as specified in Section 5.1 of the ISO New England Billing Policy, is a separate financing arrangement that can be used to make up any non-congestion related differences between amounts received on Invoices and amounts due for ISO Charges in any bill issued.

**Short-Term** is a period of less than one year.

**Significantly Reduced Congestion Costs** are defined in Section III.G.2.2 of Appendix G to Market Rule 1.

**SMD Effective Date** is March 1, 2003.

**Solar High Limit** is the estimated power output (MW) of a solar Generator Asset given the Real-Time solar and weather conditions, taking into account equipment outages, and absent any self-imposed reductions in power output or any reduction in power output as a result of a Dispatch Instruction, calculated in the manner described in the ISO Operating Documents.

**Solar Plant Future Availability** is the forecasted Real-Time High Operating Limit of a solar Generator Asset, calculated in the manner described in the ISO Operating Documents.

**Solutions Study** is described in Section 4.2(b) of Attachment K to the OATT.

**Special Constraint Resource (SCR)** is a Resource that provides Special Constraint Resource Service under Schedule 19 of the OATT.

**Special Constraint Resource Service** is the form of Ancillary Service described in Schedule 19 of the OATT.

**Specified-Term Blackstart Capital Payment** is the annual compensation level, as calculated pursuant to Section 5.1 of Schedule 16 of the OATT, for a Designated Blackstart Resource's capital Blackstart Equipment costs associated with the provision of Blackstart Service (except for capital costs associated with adhering to NERC Critical Infrastructure Protection Reliability Standards as part of Blackstart Service).

**Sponsored Policy Resource** is a New Capacity Resource that: receives a revenue source, other than revenues from ISO-administered markets, that is supported by a government-regulated rate, charge, or other regulated cost recovery mechanism, and; qualifies as a renewable, clean, zero carbon, or alternative energy resource under a renewable energy portfolio standard, clean energy standard, decarbonization or net-zero carbon standard, alternative energy portfolio standard, renewable energy goal, clean energy goal, or decarbonization or net-zero carbon goal enacted by federal or New England state statute, regulation, or executive or administrative order and as a result of which the resource receives the revenue source.

**Stage One Proposal** is a first round submission, as defined in Sections 4A.5 of Attachment K of the OATT, of a proposal for a Public Policy Transmission Upgrade by a Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor.

**Stage Two Solution** is a second round submission, as defined in Section 4A.5 of Attachment K of the OATT, of a proposal for a Public Policy Transmission Upgrade by a Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor.

**Standard Blackstart Capital Payment** is the annual compensation level, as calculated pursuant to Section 5.1 of Schedule 16 of the OATT, for a Designated Blackstart Resource's capital Blackstart Equipment costs associated with the provision of Blackstart Service (except for capital costs associated with adhering to NERC Critical Infrastructure Protection Reliability Standards as part of Blackstart Service).

**Start-of-Round Price** is the highest price associated with a round of a Forward Capacity Auction as described in Section III.13.2.3.1 of Market Rule 1.

**Start-Up Fee** is the amount, in dollars, that must be paid for a Generator Asset to Market Participants with an Ownership Share in the Generator Asset each time the Generator Asset is scheduled in the New England Markets to start-up.

**Start-Up Time** is the time it takes the Generator Asset, after synchronizing to the system, to reach its Economic Minimum Limit and, for dispatchable Generator Assets, be ready for further dispatch by the ISO.

**State Estimator** means the computer model of power flows specified in Section III.2.3 of Market Rule 1.

**Statements**, for the purpose of the ISO New England Billing Policy, refer to both Invoices and Remittance Advices.

**Static De-List Bid** is a bid that may be submitted by an Existing Generating Capacity Resource, Existing Import Capacity Resource, or Existing Demand Capacity Resource in the Forward Capacity Auction to remove itself from the capacity market for a one year period, as described in Section III.13.1.2.3.1.1 of Market Rule 1.

**Station** is one or more Existing Generating Capacity Resources consisting of one or more assets located within a common property boundary.

**Station Going Forward Common Costs** are the net costs associated with a Station that are avoided only by the clearing of the Static De-List Bids, the Permanent De-List Bids or the Retirement De-List Bids of all the Existing Generating Capacity Resources comprising the Station.

**Station-level Blackstart O&M Payment** is defined and calculated as specified in Section 5.1.2 of Schedule 16 to the OATT.

**Station-level Specified-Term Blackstart Capital Payment** is defined and calculated as specified in Section 5.1.2 of Schedule 16 to the OATT.

**Station-level Standard Blackstart Capital Payment** is defined and calculated as specified in Section 5.1.2 of Schedule 16 to the OATT.

**Storage DARD** is a DARD that participates in the New England Markets as part of an Electric Storage Facility, as described in Section III.1.10.6 of Market Rule 1.

**Summer ARA Qualified Capacity** is described in Section III.13.4.2.1.2.1.1.1 of Market Rule 1.

**Summer Capability Period** means one of two time periods defined by the ISO for the purposes of rating and auditing resources pursuant to Section III.9. The time period associated with the Summer Capability Period is the period of June 1 through September 30.

**Summer Intermittent Reliability Hours** are defined in Section III.13.1.2.2.2.1(c) of Market Rule 1.

**Supply Offer** is a proposal to furnish energy at a Node or Regulation from a Resource that meets the applicable requirements set forth in the ISO New England Manuals submitted to the ISO by a Market Participant with authority to submit a Supply Offer for the Resource. The Supply Offer will be submitted pursuant to Market Rule 1 and applicable ISO New England Manuals, and include a price and information with respect to the quantity proposed to be furnished, technical parameters for the Resource, timing and other matters. A Supply Offer is a subset of the information required in a Market Participant's Offer Data.

**Supply Offer Block-Hours** are Block-Hours assigned to the Lead Market Participant for each Supply Offer. Blocks of the Supply Offer in effect for each hour will be totaled to determine the quantity of Supply Offer Block-Hours for a given day. In the case that a Resource has a Real-Time unit status of "unavailable" for the entire day, that day will not contribute to the quantity of Supply Offer Block-Hours. However, if the Resource has at least one hour of the day with a unit status of "available," the entire day will contribute to the quantity of Supply Offer Block-Hours.

**Synchronous Condenser** is a generator that is synchronized to the grid but supplying no energy for the purpose of providing Operating Reserve or VAR or voltage support.

**System Condition** is a specified condition on the New England Transmission System or on a neighboring system, such as a constrained transmission element or flowgate, that may trigger Curtailment of Long-Term Firm MTF or OTF Service on the MTF or the OTF using the curtailment priority pursuant to Section II.44 of the Tariff or Curtailment of Local Long-Term Firm Point-to-Point Transmission Service on the non-PTF using the curtailment priority pursuant to Schedule 21 of the Tariff. Such conditions must be identified in the Transmission Customer's Service Agreement.

**System Impact Study** is an assessment pursuant to Part II.B, II.C, II.G, Schedule 21, Schedule 22, Schedule 23, or Schedule 25 of the OATT of (i) the adequacy of the PTF or Non-PTF to accommodate a request for the interconnection of a new or materially changed generating unit or a new or materially changed interconnection to another Control Area or new Regional Network Service or new Local Service or an Elective Transmission Upgrade, and (ii) whether any additional costs may be required to be incurred in order to provide the interconnection or transmission service.

**System Operator** shall mean ISO New England Inc. or a successor organization.

**System Operating Limit (SOL)** has the meaning specified in the Glossary of Terms Used in NERC Reliability Standards.

**System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve** is the demand curve used in the Forward Capacity Market as specified in Section III.13.2.2.

**TADO** is the total amount due and owing (not including any amounts due under Section 14.1 of the RNA) at such time to the ISO, NEPOOL, the PTOs, the Market Participants and the Non-Market Participant Transmission Customers, by all PTOs, Market Participants and Non-Market Participant Transmission Customers.

**Tangible Net Worth** is the value, determined in accordance with international accounting standards or generally accepted accounting principles in the United States, of all of that entity's assets less the following: (i) assets the ISO reasonably believes to be restricted or potentially unavailable to settle a

claim in the event of a default (e.g., regulatory assets, restricted assets, and Affiliate assets), net of any matching liabilities, to the extent that the result of that netting is a positive value; (ii) derivative assets, net of any matching liabilities, to the extent that the result of that netting is a positive value; (iii) the amount at which the liabilities of the entity would be shown on a balance sheet in accordance with international accounting standards or generally accepted accounting principles in the United States; (iv) preferred stock; (v) non-controlling interest; and (vi) all of that entity's intangible assets (e.g., patents, trademarks, franchises, intellectual property, goodwill and any other assets not having a physical existence), in each case as shown on the most recent financial statements provided by such entity to the ISO.

**Technical Committee** is defined in Section 8.2 of the Participants Agreement.

**Ten-Minute Non-Spinning Reserve (TMNSR)** is a form of ten-minute reserve capability, determined pursuant to Section III.1.7.19.2.

**Ten-Minute Non-Spinning Reserve Service** is the form of Ancillary Service described in Schedule 6 of the OATT.

**Ten-Minute Reserve Requirement** is the combined amount of TMSR and TMNSR required system-wide as described in Section III.2.7A and ISO New England Operating Procedure No. 8.

**Ten-Minute Spinning Reserve (TMSR)** is a form of ten-minute reserve capability, determined pursuant to Section III.1.7.19.2.

**Ten-Minute Spinning Reserve Requirement** is the amount of TMSR required system-wide as described in Section III.2.7A and ISO New England Operating Procedure No. 8.

**Ten-Minute Spinning Reserve Service** is the form of Ancillary Service described in Schedule 5 of the OATT.

**Third-Party Sale** is any sale for resale in interstate commerce to a Power Purchaser that is not designated as part of Regional Network Load or Local Network Load under the Regional Network Service or Local Network Service, as applicable.

**Thirty-Minute Operating Reserve (TMOR)** is a form of thirty-minute reserve capability, determined pursuant to Section III.1.7.19.2.

**Thirty-Minute Operating Reserve Service** is the form of Ancillary Service described in Schedule 7 of the OATT.

**Through or Out Rate (TOUT Rate)** is the rate per hour for Through or Out Service, as defined in Section II.25.2 of the OATT.

**Through or Out Service (TOUT Service)** means Point-To-Point Service over the PTF provided by the ISO with respect to a transaction that goes through the New England Control Area, as, for example, a single transaction where energy or capacity is transmitted into the New England Control Area from New Brunswick and subsequently out of the New England Control Area to New York, or a single transaction where energy or capacity is transmitted into the New England Control Area from New York through one point on the PTF and subsequently flows over the PTF prior to passing out of the New England Control Area to New York, or with respect to a transaction which originates at a point on the PTF and flows over the PTF prior to passing out of the New England Control Area, as, for example, from Boston to New York.

**Tie-Line Asset** is a physical transmission tie-line, or an inter-state or intra-state border arrangement created according to the ISO New England Manuals and registered in accordance with the Asset Registration Process.

**Total Available Amount** is the sum of the available amount of the Shortfall Funding Arrangement and the balance in the Payment Default Shortfall Fund.

**Total Blackstart Capital Payment** is the annual compensation calculated under either Section 5.1 or Section 5.2 of Schedule 16 of the OATT, as applicable.

**Total Blackstart Service Payments** is monthly compensation to Blackstart Owners or Market Participants, as applicable, and as calculated pursuant to Section 5.6 of Schedule 16 to the OATT.

**Total Reserve Requirement**, which includes Replacement Reserve, is the combined amount of TMSR, TMNSR, and TMOR required system-wide as described in Section III.2.7A and ISO New England Operating Procedure No. 8.

**Total System Capacity** is the aggregate capacity supply curve for the New England Control Area as determined in accordance with Section III.13.2.3.3 of Market Rule 1.

**Transaction Unit (TU)** is a type of billing determinant under Schedule 2 of Section IV.A of the Tariff used to assess charges to Customers.

**Transition Period:** The six-year period commencing on March 1, 1997.

**Transmission Charges**, for the purposes of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy and the ISO New England Billing Policy, are all charges and payments under Schedules 1, 8 and 9 of the OATT.

**Transmission Congestion Credit** means the allocated share of total Transmission Congestion Revenue credited to each holder of Financial Transmission Rights, calculated and allocated as specified in Section III.5.2 of Market Rule 1.

**Transmission Congestion Revenue** is defined in Section III.5.2.5(a) of Market Rule 1.

**Transmission Constraint Penalty Factors** are described in Section III.1.7.5 of Market Rule 1.

**Transmission Credit Limit** is a credit limit, not to be used to meet FTR Requirements, established for each Market Participant in accordance with Section II.D and each Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer in accordance with Section V.B.2 of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**Transmission Credit Test Percentage** is calculated in accordance with Section III.B.1(c) of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**Transmission Customer** is any Eligible Customer that (i) executes, on its own behalf or through its Designated Agent, an MPSA or TSA, or (ii) requests in writing, on its own behalf or through its Designated Agent, that the ISO, the Transmission Owner, or the Schedule 20A Service Provider, as



applicable, file with the Commission, a proposed unexecuted MPSA or TSA containing terms and conditions deemed appropriate by the ISO (in consultation with the applicable PTO, OTO or Schedule 20A Service Provider) in order that the Eligible Customer may receive transmission service under Section II of this Tariff. A Transmission Customer under Section II of this Tariff includes a Market Participant or a Non-Market Participant taking Regional Network Service, Through or Out Service, MTF Service, OTF Service, Ancillary Services, or Local Service.

**Transmission Default Amount** is all or any part of any amount of Transmission Charges due to be paid by any Covered Entity that the ISO, in its reasonable opinion, believes will not or has not been paid when due.

**Transmission Default Period** is defined in Section 3.4.f of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

**Transmission Late Payment Account** is defined in Section 4.2 of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

**Transmission Late Payment Account Limit** is defined in Section 4.2 of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

**Transmission Late Payment Charge** is defined in Section 4.1 of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

**Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff (Tariff)** is the ISO New England Inc. Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff, as amended from time to time.

**Transmission Obligations** are determined in accordance with Section III.A(vi) of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**Transmission Operating Agreement (TOA)** is the Transmission Operating Agreement between and among the ISO and the PTOs, as amended and restated from time to time.

**Transmission Owner** means a PTO, MTO or OTO.

**Transmission Provider** is the ISO for Regional Network Service and Through or Out Service as provided under Section II.B and II.C of the OATT; Cross-Sound Cable, LLC for Merchant Transmission

Service as provided under Schedule 18 of the OATT; the Schedule 20A Service Providers for Phase I/II HVDC-TF Service as provided under Schedule 20A of the OATT; and the Participating Transmission Owners for Local Service as provided under Schedule 21 of the OATT.

**Transmission Requirements** are determined in accordance with Section III.A(iii) of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**Transmission Security Analysis Requirement** shall be determined pursuant to Section III.12.2.1.2.

**Transmission Service Agreement (TSA)** is the initial agreement and any amendments or supplements thereto: (A) in the form specified in either Attachment A or B to the OATT, entered into by the Transmission Customer and the ISO for Regional Network Service or Through or Out Service; (B) entered into by the Transmission Customer with the ISO and PTO in the form specified in Attachment A to Schedule 21 of the OATT; (C) entered into by the Transmission Customer with an OTO or Schedule 20A Service Provider in the appropriate form specified under Schedule 20 of the OATT; or (D) entered into by the Transmission Customer with a MTO in the appropriate form specified under Schedule 18 of the OATT. A Transmission Service Agreement shall be required for Local Service, MTF Service and OTF Service, and shall be required for Regional Network Service and Through or Out Service if the Transmission Customer has not executed a MPSA.

**Transmission Upgrade(s)** means an upgrade, modification or addition to the PTF that becomes subject to the terms and conditions of the OATT governing rates and service on the PTF on or after January 1, 2004. This categorization and cost allocation of Transmission Upgrades shall be as provided for in Schedule 12 of the OATT.

**UDS** is unit dispatch system software.

**Unconstrained Export Transaction** is defined in Section III.1.10.7(f)(iv) of Market Rule 1.

**Uncovered Default Amount** is defined in Section 3.3(i) of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

**Uncovered Transmission Default Amounts** are defined in Section 3.4.f of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

**Unrated** means a Market Participant that is not a Rated Market Participant.

**Unsecured Covered Entity** is, collectively, an Unsecured Municipal Market Participant and an Unsecured Non-Municipal Covered Entity.

**Unsecured Municipal Default Amount** is defined in Section 3.3(i) of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

**Unsecured Municipal Market Participant** is defined in Section 3.3(h) of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

**Unsecured Municipal Transmission Default Amount** is defined in Section 3.4.f of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

**Unsecured Non-Municipal Covered Entity** is a Covered Entity that is not a Municipal Market Participant or a Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer and has a Market Credit Limit or Transmission Credit Limit of greater than \$0 under the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**Unsecured Non-Municipal Default Amount** is defined in Section 3.3(i) of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

**Unsecured Non-Municipal Transmission Default Amount** is defined in Section 3.3(i) of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

**Unsecured Transmission Default Amounts** are, collectively, the Unsecured Municipal Transmission Default Amount and the Unsecured Non-Municipal Transmission Default Amount.

**Unsettled FTR Financial Assurance** is an amount of financial assurance required from a Designated FTR Participant as calculated pursuant to Section VI.B of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**Updated Measurement and Verification Plan** is an optional Measurement and Verification Plan that may be submitted as part of a subsequent qualification process for a Forward Capacity Auction prior to the beginning of the Capacity Commitment Period of the On-Peak Demand Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Response project. The Updated Measurement and Verification Plan may include updated project specifications, measurement and verification protocols, and performance data as described in Section III.13.1.4.3.1.2 of Market Rule 1 and the ISO New England Manuals.

**VAR CC Rate** is the CC rate paid to Qualified Reactive Resources for VAR Service capability under Section IV.A of Schedule 2 of the OATT.

**VAR Payment** is the payment made to Qualified Reactive Resources for VAR Service capability under Section IV.A of Schedule 2 of the OATT.

**VAR Service** is the provision of reactive power voltage support to the New England Transmission System by a Qualified Reactive Resource or by other generators that are dispatched by the ISO to provide dynamic reactive power as described in Schedule 2 of the OATT.

**Virtual Cap** is \$2,000/MWh.

**Virtual Requirements** are determined in accordance with Section III.A(iv) of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**Volt Ampere Reactive (VAR)** is a measurement of reactive power.

**Volumetric Measure (VM)** is a type of billing determinant under Schedule 2 of Section IV.A of the Tariff used to assess charges to Customers under Section IV.A of the Tariff.

**Wind High Limit** is the estimated power output (MW) of a wind Generator Asset given the Real-Time weather conditions, taking into account equipment outages, and absent any self-imposed reductions in power output or any reduction in power output as a result of a Dispatch Instruction, calculated in the manner described in the ISO Operating Documents.

**Wind Plant Future Availability** is the forecasted Real-Time High Operating Limit of a wind Generator Asset, calculated in the manner described in the ISO Operating Documents.

**Winter ARA Qualified Capacity** is described in Section III.13.4.2.1.2.1.1.2 of Market Rule 1.

**Winter Capability Period** means one of two time periods defined by the ISO for the purposes of rating and auditing resources pursuant to Section III.9. The time period associated with the Winter Capability Period is the period October 1 through May 31.

**Winter Intermittent Reliability Hours** are defined in Section III.13.1.2.2.2.2(c) of Market Rule 1.

**Year** means a period of 365 or 366 days, whichever is appropriate, commencing on, or on the anniversary of March 1, 1997. Year One is the Year commencing on March 1, 1997, and Years Two and higher follow it in sequence.

**Zonal Price** is calculated in accordance with Section III.2.7 of Market Rule 1.

**Zonal Capacity Obligation** is calculated in accordance with Section III.13.7.5.2 of Market Rule 1.

**Zonal Reserve Requirement** is the combined amount of TMSR, TMNSR, and TMOR required for a Reserve Zone as described in Section III.2.7A and ISO New England Operating Procedure No. 8.

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### **III.13. Forward Capacity Market.**

The ISO shall administer a forward market for capacity (“Forward Capacity Market”) in accordance with the provisions of this Section III.13. For each one-year period from June 1 through May 31, starting with the period June 1, 2010 to May 31, 2011, for which Capacity Supply Obligations are assumed and payments are made in the Forward Capacity Market (“Capacity Commitment Period”), the ISO shall conduct a Forward Capacity Auction in accordance with the provisions of Section III.13.2 to procure the amount of capacity needed in the New England Control Area and in each modeled Capacity Zone during the Capacity Commitment Period, as determined in accordance with the provisions of Section III.12. To be eligible to assume a Capacity Supply Obligation for a Capacity Commitment Period through the Forward Capacity Auction, a resource must be accepted in the Forward Capacity Auction qualification process in accordance with the provisions of Section III.13.1.

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### **III.13.1. Forward Capacity Auction Qualification.**

Each resource, or portion thereof, must qualify as a New Generating Capacity Resource (Section III.13.1.1), an Existing Generating Capacity Resource (Section III.13.1.2), a New Import Capacity Resource or Existing Import Capacity Resource (Section III.13.1.3), or a New Demand Capacity Resource or Existing Demand Capacity Resource (Section III.13.1.4). Each resource must be at least 100 kW in size to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction, except for resources registered with the ISO prior to the earliest date that any portion of this Section III.13 becomes effective. An offer may be composed of separate resources, pursuant to the provisions of Section III.13.1.5. Pursuant to the provisions of this Section III.13.1, the ISO shall determine a summer Qualified Capacity and a winter Qualified Capacity for each resource, and an FCA Qualified Capacity for each Existing Generating Capacity Resource, Existing Import Capacity Resource, Existing Demand Capacity Resource, New Generating Capacity Resource, New Import Capacity Resource, and New Demand Capacity Resource.

All Project Sponsors must be Market Participants no later than 30 days prior to the deadline for submitting the FCM Deposit. The Lead Market Participant for a resource participating in a Forward Capacity Auction may not change in the 15 Business Days prior to, or during, that Forward Capacity Auction.

#### **III.13.1.1. New Generating Capacity Resources.**

To participate in a Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource, a resource or proposed resource must meet the requirements of this Section III.13.1.1.

##### **III.13.1.1.1. Definition of New Generating Capacity Resource.**

A resource or a portion of a resource that is not a New Import Capacity Resource or Existing Import Capacity Resource (as defined in Section III.13.1.3), or a New Demand Capacity Resource or Existing Demand Capacity Resource (as discussed in Section III.13.1.4) shall be considered a New Generating Capacity Resource for participation in a Forward Capacity Auction if either: (i) the resource has never previously been counted as a capacity resource as described in Section III.13.1.1.1.1; or (ii) the resource, or a portion thereof, meets one of the criteria in Section III.13.1.1.1.2.

##### **III.13.1.1.1.1. Resources Never Previously Counted as Capacity.**

(a) A resource, or a portion thereof, will be considered to have never been counted as a capacity resource if it has not cleared in any previous Forward Capacity Auction.

(b) [Reserved.]

(c) Where a New Capacity Generating Resource was accepted for participation in the qualification process for a previous Forward Capacity Auction, but cleared less than its summer Qualified Capacity in that previous Forward Capacity Auction and is having its critical path schedule monitored by the ISO in accordance with Section III.13.3, the portion of the resource that did not clear in the previous Forward Capacity Auction shall be a New Generating Capacity Resource in the subsequent Forward Capacity Auction. Such a New Generating Capacity Resource must satisfy all of the qualification process requirements applicable to a New Generating Capacity Resource as described in Section III.13.1.1.2, except that the Project Sponsor is not required to resubmit documentation demonstrating site control (Section III.13.1.1.2.2.1) or to resubmit a critical path schedule (Section III.13.1.1.2.2.2) or to provide a new Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit (Section III.13.1.1.2.1(e)).

**III.13.1.1.1.2. Resources Previously Counted as Capacity.**

A resource that has previously been counted as a capacity resource, including a deactivated or retired capacity resource, may elect to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource, as described in this Section III.13.1.1.1.2. The incremental expenditure required to reactivate a resource that previously has been deactivated or retired pursuant to Section I.3.9 of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff (or its predecessor provisions) may be included in the calculation of the dollar per kilowatt thresholds in this Section III.13.1.1.1.2. A resource accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to this Section III.13.1.1.1.2 shall participate in the Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.2(e). A Market Participant that elects to have a resource that has previously been counted as a capacity resource participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource, must notify the ISO when the existing resource ceases to operate and the New Generating Capacity Resource commences operation. If a Market Participant with a resource that has previously been counted as a capacity resource elects, pursuant to Section III.13.3.4(a)(iii), to have the resource that has previously been counted as a capacity resource cover the Capacity Supply Obligation of a New Generating Capacity Resource and the resource that has previously been counted as a capacity resource must take an outage in order for the New Generating Capacity Resource to commence Commercial Operation (as defined in Schedule 22, 23, or 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff), then the Market Participant must notify the ISO that the outage is for the purpose of the New Generating Capacity

Resource commencing Commercial Operation (as defined in Schedule 22, 23, or 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff). A resource shall be accepted for participation as a new resource if it complies with one of the following three subsections:

- (a) Where investment in the resource will result, by the commencement of the Capacity Commitment Period, in an increase in output by an amount exceeding the greater of: (i) 20 percent of the summer Qualified Capacity of the resource at the time of the qualification process for the Forward Capacity Auction; or (ii) 40 MW above the summer Qualified Capacity of the resource at the time of the qualification process for the Forward Capacity Auction, the whole resource shall participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource; or
- (b) Where investment in the resource subsequent to January 1, 2007 and prior to the conclusion of the first Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Capacity Supply Obligation for which treatment as a new resource may be applied, for the purposes of re-powering will be equal to or greater than \$200 per kilowatt of the whole resource's summer Qualified Capacity after re-powering, the owner of the resource may elect that the whole resource participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource. The \$200 threshold (in base year 2008 dollars) shall be adjusted annually in accordance with the Handy-Whitman Index of Public Utility Construction Costs reflecting data for the period ending January 1 of the year preceding the start of the qualification process for the relevant Forward Capacity Auction; or
- (c) Where investment in the resource subsequent to January 1, 2007 and prior to the conclusion of the first Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Capacity Supply Obligation for which treatment as a new resource may be applied, for the purpose of compliance with environmental regulations or permits will be equal to or greater than \$100 per kilowatt of the whole resource's summer Qualified Capacity after the investment, the owner of the resource may elect that the whole resource participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource. The \$100 threshold (in base year 2008 dollars) shall be adjusted annually in accordance with the Handy-Whitman Index of Public Utility Construction Costs reflecting data for the period ending January 1 of the year preceding the start of the qualification process for the relevant Forward Capacity Auction.

**III.13.1.1.1.3. Incremental Capacity of Resources Previously Counted as Capacity.**

The owner of a resource previously counted as a capacity resource may elect to have the incremental amount of capacity above the summer Qualified Capacity of the resource at the time of the qualification process participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource, where investment in the resource:

(a) will result, by the start of the Capacity Commitment Period, in an increase in output less than or equal to the greater of: (i) 20 percent of the summer Qualified Capacity of the resource at the time of the qualification process for the Forward Capacity Auction; or (ii) 40 MW; and

(b) will be equal to or greater than \$200 per kilowatt of the amount of the increase in summer Qualified Capacity resulting from the investment. The \$200 threshold (in base year 2008 dollars) shall be adjusted annually in accordance with the Handy-Whitman Index of Public Utility Construction Costs reflecting data for the period ending January 1 of the year preceding the start of the qualification process for the relevant Forward Capacity Auction. These investment costs may include the costs associated with reactivating a resource that was previously deactivated pursuant to Section I.3.9 of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff (or its predecessor provisions) and in which investment in the resource was undertaken prior to reactivation.

(c) A Project Sponsor or Lead Market Participant making an election pursuant to this Section III.13.1.1.1.3 must submit a New Capacity Show of Interest Form pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.1 and a New Capacity Qualification Package pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2 for the incremental amount.

**III.13.1.1.1.3.A. Treatment of New Incremental Capacity and Existing Generating Capacity at the Same Generating Resource.**

For incremental summer capacity seeking to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.1.3 or incremental winter capacity that meets the investment thresholds in Section III.13.1.1.1.3 as applied to the resource's winter Qualified Capacity, if the incremental summer or winter capacity does not span the entire Capacity Commitment Period, then the ISO shall match the incremental summer or winter capacity with excess existing winter or summer Qualified Capacity at that same resource, as appropriate, not to exceed the Qualified Capacity of the existing portion of the resource, in order to cover the entire Capacity Commitment Period. This provision shall not apply to Intermittent Power Resources.

**III.13.1.1.1.4. De-rated Capacity of Resources Previously Counted as Capacity.**

For purposes of the Forward Capacity Market, de-rated capacity of a resource shall be measured by the difference between the summer Qualified Capacity prior to the de-rating of the resource and the most recent summer demonstration of Seasonal Claimed Capability of a resource, as of the fifth Business Day of October. The owner of a resource previously counted as a capacity resource that has been de-rated by at least 2 percent of its summer Qualified Capacity (as an Existing Generating Capacity Resource) but by no more than the lesser of 20 percent of its summer Qualified Capacity (as an Existing Generating Capacity Resource) or 40 MW for three or more years at the time of the Forward Capacity Auction may elect to have the incremental amount of capacity above the capacity level established while de-rated treated as a New Generating Capacity Resource if it demonstrates that it will be reestablished prior to the start of the Capacity Commitment Period and that the investment in the resource for such purposes shall be equal to or greater than \$200 per kilowatt of the amount of the increase in summer Qualified Capacity resulting from the investment. The Project Sponsor must submit a New Capacity Show of Interest Form pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.1 and a New Capacity Qualification Package pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.2 for the incremental amount of capacity for the relevant Forward Capacity Auction. The \$200 threshold (in base year 2008 dollars) shall be adjusted annually in accordance with the Handy-Whitman Index of Public Utility Construction Costs reflecting data for the period ending January 1 of the year preceding the start of the qualification process for the relevant Forward Capacity Auction. The owner of a resource seeking to have the incremental amount of capacity counted as a New Generating Capacity Resource as provided in this Section, must demonstrate based on historical data that the resource previously operated at a level at least 2 percent above the de-rated amount.

**III.13.1.1.1.5. Treatment of Resources that are Partially New and Partially Existing.**

For purposes of this Section III.13.1, where only a portion of a single resource is treated as a New Generating Capacity Resource, either as a result of partial clearing in a previous Forward Capacity Auction or pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.1.3 or Section III.13.1.1.1.4, then except as otherwise indicated in this Section III.13.1, that portion of the resource shall be treated as a New Generating Capacity Resource, and the remainder of the resource shall be treated as an Existing Generating Capacity Resource.

**III.13.1.1.1.6. Treatment of Deactivated and Retired Units.**

(a) [Reserved.]

(b) A resource that previously has been deactivated or retired pursuant to Section I.3.9 of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff (or its predecessor provisions), as applicable, that submits to the ISO a reactivation plan demonstrating that the resource shall return to operation shall, subject to ISO review and acceptance of that reactivation plan, be treated as an Existing Generating Capacity Resource unless that resource satisfies the criteria under Section III.13.1.1.1.2 as a New Generating Capacity Resource. Such reactivation plans must be received by the ISO no later than 10 Business Days before the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline. A resource that previously has been deactivated or retired pursuant to Section I.3.9 of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff (or its predecessor provisions), as applicable, that submits to the ISO a reactivation plan demonstrating that the resource shall return to operation and having a material modification as described in Section I.3.9 of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff (or its predecessor provisions), as applicable, shall be subject to Section III.13.1.1.2.3 (Initial Interconnection Analysis).

#### **III.13.1.1.1.7 Renewable Technology Resources.**

To participate in the Forward Capacity Market as a Renewable Technology Resource, a Generating Capacity Resource or an On-Peak Demand Resource (including every Asset that is part of the On-Peak Demand Resource) must satisfy the following requirements:

- (a) qualify as a Sponsored Policy Resource;
- (b) participate in a Forward Capacity Auction for a Capacity Commitment Period beginning on or after June 1, 2026 as a New Generating Capacity Resource or New Demand Capacity Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1, and;
- (c) has been designated for treatment as a Renewable Technology Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.9.

An Export Bid or Administrative Export De-List Bid may not be submitted for Generating Capacity Resources that assumed a Capacity Supply Obligation by participating in a Forward Capacity Auction as a Renewable Technology Resource.

#### **III.13.1.1.2. Qualification Process for New Generating Capacity Resources.**

For a resource to qualify as a New Generating Capacity Resource, the resource's Project Sponsor must make two separate submissions to the ISO: First, the Project Sponsor must submit a New Capacity Show of Interest Form during the New Capacity Show of Interest Submission Window. Second, the Project Sponsor must submit a New Capacity Qualification Package no later than the New Capacity Qualification Deadline. Each of these submissions is described in more detail in this Section III.13.1.1.2. The Project Sponsor must also have, or in the case of an Import Capacity Resource seeking to qualify with an Elective Transmission Upgrade be associated with, a valid Interconnection Request under Schedules 22, 23 or 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff prior to submitting a New Capacity Show of Interest Form during the New Capacity Show of Interest Submission Window. Both the New Capacity Show of Interest Form and the New Capacity Qualification Package are required regardless of the status of the project under the interconnection procedures described in Schedules 22, 23 and 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff. Neither the New Capacity Show of Interest Form nor the New Capacity Qualification Package constitutes an Interconnection Request. A Project Sponsor may withdraw from the qualification process at any time prior to three Business Days before the submission of the FCM Deposit pursuant to Section III.13.1.9.1 by providing written notification of such withdrawal to the ISO. Any withdrawal, whether pursuant to this provision or as determined by the ISO (for example as described in Section III.13.1.1.2.1 or Section III.13.1.9.3), shall be irrevocable. The Project Sponsor of a withdrawn application is subject to reconciliation of its Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit described in Section III.13.1.9.3. None of the provisions of this Section III.13.1, including the initial interconnection analysis and the analysis of overlapping interconnection impacts, supersedes, replaces, or satisfies any of the requirements of Schedules 22, 23 and 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff, except as specifically provided thereunder. Determinations by the ISO pursuant to this Section III.13.1.1.2, including the initial interconnection analysis and the analysis of overlapping interconnection impacts, are for purposes of qualification for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction only, and do not constitute a right or approval to interconnect, and do not guarantee the ability to interconnect.

#### **III.13.1.1.2.1. New Capacity Show of Interest Form.**

Except as otherwise provided in this Section III.13.1.1.2.1, for each resource that a Project Sponsor seeks to offer in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource, the Project Sponsor must submit to the ISO a New Capacity Show of Interest Form as described in this Section III.13.1.1.2.1 during the New Capacity Show of Interest Submission Window. After submission of a New Capacity Show of Interest Form, Material Modification (as defined in Section 4.4 of Schedule 22, Section 1.5 of



Schedule 23, or Section 4.4 of Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff) may not be made to the information contained therein or the New Capacity Show of Interest Form shall be considered withdrawn. No change that may result in a reduction in capacity may be made to a project described in a New Capacity Show of Interest Form or New Capacity Qualification Package between the date that is 150 days before the start of the Forward Capacity Auction and the deadline for qualification determination notifications described in Section III.13.1.1.2.8.

(a) A completed New Capacity Show of Interest Form shall include the following information, to the extent the information is not already provided under an active Interconnection Request under Schedules 22, 23 and 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff, and other such information necessary to evaluate a project: the project name; the Project Sponsor's contact information; the Project Sponsor's ISO customer status; the date by which the project is expected to achieve Commercial Operation (as defined in Schedule 22, 23, or 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff); the project address or location, and if relevant, asset identification number; the status of the project under the interconnection procedures described in Schedules 22, 23 and 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff; whether the resource has ever previously had a Capacity Supply Obligation or previously received payment as a capacity resource pursuant to the market rules in effect prior to June 1, 2010; the capacity (in MW) of the New Generating Capacity Resource; a general description of the project's equipment configuration, including a description of the resource technology type ~~(such as those listed in the table in Section III.A.21 or some other type)~~; a simple location plan and a one-line diagram of the plant and station facilities, including any known transmission facilities; the location of the proposed interconnection; and other specific project data as set forth in the New Capacity Show of Interest Form. The ISO may waive the submission of any information not required for evaluation of a project. A completed New Capacity Show of Interest Form shall also specify the Queue Position associated with the project pursuant to Section 4.1 of Schedule 22, Section 1.5 of Schedule 23 or Section 4.1 of Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff. In the case of a resource that a Project Sponsor seeks to offer in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource that is supported by an Internal Elective Transmission Upgrade, all Queue Positions associated with the project must be submitted in the New Capacity Show of Interest Form. Submittal of the Interconnection Request may take place prior to the qualification process described here, but no later than the date on which the New Capacity Show of Interest Form is submitted to the ISO; however, the Interconnection Customer Interconnection Request must still be active and consistent with the project

described in the New Capacity Show of Interest Form as well as the New Capacity Qualification Package to be submitted as described in Section III.13.1.1.2.2.

(b) The Project Sponsor must submit with the New Capacity Show of Interest Form, documentation demonstrating that the Project Sponsor has already achieved control of the project site for the duration of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.2.1.

(c) In the New Capacity Show of Interest Form, the Project Sponsor must indicate if the New Generating Capacity Resource is incremental capacity associated with a resource that previously had a Capacity Supply Obligation or previously received payment as a capacity resource pursuant to the market rules in effect prior to June 1, 2010 as discussed in Section III.13.1.1.1.3, or if the New Generating Capacity Resource is incremental capacity associated with a resource previously listed as a capacity resource that has been de-rated for three or more years at the time of the Forward Capacity Auction, as discussed in Section III.13.1.1.1.4.

(d) [Reserved.]

(e) With the New Capacity Show of Interest Form, the Project Sponsor must submit the Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit, as described in Section III.13.1.9.3.

#### **III.13.1.1.2.2. New Capacity Qualification Package.**

For each resource that a Project Sponsor seeks to offer in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource, the Project Sponsor must submit a New Capacity Qualification Package no later than the New Capacity Qualification Deadline, described in Section III.13.1.10. Except as otherwise provided in this Section III.13.1, the New Capacity Qualification Package shall conform to the requirements of this Section III.13.1.1.2.2. The ISO may waive the submission of any information not required for evaluation of a project. No change that may result in a reduction in capacity may be made to a project described in a New Capacity Show of Interest Form or New Capacity Qualification Package between the date that is 150 days before the start of the Forward Capacity Auction and the deadline for qualification determination notifications described in Section III.13.1.1.2.8.

##### **III.13.1.1.2.2.1. Site Control.**

For all Forward Capacity Auctions and reconfiguration auctions, the Project Sponsor must achieve, prior to the close of the New Capacity Show of Interest Submission Window, control of the project site for the duration of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period, which shall be as defined in Section 4.1 of Schedule 22, Section 1.5 of Schedule 23 or Section 4.1 of Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff.

#### **III.13.1.1.2.2.2. Critical Path Schedule.**

In the New Capacity Qualification Package, the Project Sponsor must provide a critical path schedule for the project with sufficient detail to allow the ISO to evaluate the feasibility of the project being built and the feasibility that the project will meet the requirement that the project achieve all its critical path schedule milestones no later than the start of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period. The critical path schedule shall include, at a minimum, the dates on which the following milestones have or are expected to occur:

- (a) **Major Permits.** In the New Capacity Qualification Package, the Project Sponsor must list all major permits required for the project, and for each major permit, the Project Sponsor must list the agency requiring the permit, the date on which application for the permit is expected to be made, and the expected date of approval. Major permits shall include, but are not limited to: (i) all federal and state permits; and (ii) local, regional, and town permits. The permitting and installation process associated with any major ancillary infrastructure (such as new gas pipelines, new water supply systems, or large storage tanks) should be included in this portion of the New Capacity Qualification Package.
- (b) **Project Financing Closing.** In the New Capacity Qualification Package, the Project Sponsor shall provide (i) the estimated dollar amount of required project financing; (ii) the expected sources of that financing; and (iii) the expected closing date(s) for the project financing.
- (c) **Major Equipment Orders.** In the New Capacity Qualification Package, the Project Sponsor must provide a list of all of the major components necessary for the project, and the date or dates on which all major components necessary for the project have been or are expected to be ordered. Although the specific technology will determine the list of major components to be included, the list shall include, to the extent applicable: (i) electric generators which may include equipment such as fuel cells or solar photovoltaic equipment; (ii) turbines; (iii) step-up transformers; (iv) relay panels (v) distributed control systems; and (vi) any other single piece of equipment or system such as a cooling water system, steam

generation, steam handling system, water treatment system, fuel handling system or emissions control system that is not included as a sub-component of other equipment listed in this Section III.13.1.1.2.2.2(c) and that accounts for more than five percent of the total project cost. For an Import Capacity Resource associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade that has not yet achieved Commercial Operation as defined in Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff, major components shall also include, to the extent applicable, transmission facilities and associated substation equipment.

(d) **Substantial Site Construction.** In the New Capacity Qualification Package, the Project Sponsor must provide the approximate date on which the amount of money expended on construction activities occurring on the project site is expected to exceed 20 percent of construction financing costs.

(e) **Major Equipment Delivery.** In the New Capacity Qualification Package, the Project Sponsor must provide the dates on which the major equipment described in subsection (d) above has been or is scheduled to be delivered to the project site.

(f) **Major Equipment Testing.** In the New Capacity Qualification Package, the Project Sponsor must provide the date or dates on which each piece of major equipment described in subsection (c) above is scheduled to undergo testing, including major systems testing, as appropriate for the specific technology to establish its suitability to allow, in conjunction with other major equipment, subsequent operation of the project in accordance with the design capacity of the resource and in accordance with Good Utility Practice. The test(s) shall include those conducted at the point at which the operation of the major equipment will be determined to be in compliance with the requirements of the engineering or purchase specifications.

(g) **Commissioning.** In the New Capacity Qualification Package, the Project Sponsor must provide the date on which the project is expected to have demonstrated the level of performance specified in the New Capacity Show of Interest Form and in the New Capacity Qualification Package.

(h) **Commercial Operation.** In the New Capacity Qualification Package, the Project Sponsor must provide the date by which the project is expected to achieve Commercial Operation (as defined in Schedule 22, 23, or 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff) and/or the date by which the Project Sponsor expects to be ready to demonstrate to the ISO that the Demand Capacity Resource described in the New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package has achieved its full

demand reduction value. This date must be no later than the start of the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction.

### **III.13.1.1.2.2.3. Offer Information.**

(a) ~~For a All~~ New Generating Capacity Resources that ~~might submit offers in the Forward Capacity Auction at prices below the relevant Offer Review Trigger Price does not satisfy the conditions described in Sections III.A.21.1.1 based on the information submitted at the time of the New Capacity Qualification Package, and for which the Project Sponsor does not provide a Load-Side Relationship Certification described in Section III.A.21.1.3, the Project Sponsor~~ must include in the New Capacity Qualification Package the lowest price at which the resource requests to offer capacity in the Forward Capacity Auction and ~~supporting documentation justifying that price as competitive in light of the resource's costs (as described in Section III.A.21)~~ sufficient documentation and information for a buyer-side market power review pursuant to Section III.A.21.2. Such documentation and information includes all financial estimates, projected revenues, and cost projections for the project, including the project's pro-forma financing support data and anticipated out-of-market revenues (as defined in Section III.A.21.3(b)(i)). For a New Generating Capacity Resource that has achieved commercial operation prior to the New Capacity Qualification Deadline, such documentation should also include all financial data of actual incurred capital costs, actual operating costs, and actual revenues since the date of commercial operation. ~~This price is subject to review by the Internal Market Monitor pursuant to Section III.A.21.2 and must include the additional documentation described in that Section.~~

A Project Sponsor that submits a Load-Side Relationship Certification as part of the New Capacity Qualification Package pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.2.7 must be prepared to provide both (1) the lowest price at which the resource requests to offer capacity in the Forward Capacity Auction and (2) the documentation and information described in this subsection (a), in the event that the ISO determines that the Load-Side Relationship Certification does not meet the requirements of Section III.A.21.1.3.

(b) The Project Sponsor for a New Generating Capacity Resource must indicate in the New Capacity Qualification Package if an offer from the New Generating Capacity Resource may be rationed. A Project Sponsor may specify a Rationing Minimum Limit to which offers may be rationed. Without such indication, offers will only be accepted or rejected in whole. This rationing election shall apply for the entire Forward Capacity Auction.

(c) By submitting a New Capacity Qualification Package, the Project Sponsor certifies that an offer from the New Generating Capacity Resource will not include any anticipated revenues the resource is expected to receive for its capacity cost as a Qualified Generator Reactive Resource pursuant to Schedule 2 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff.

**III.13.1.1.2.2.4. Capacity Commitment Period Election.**

Project Sponsors shall be required to specify whether they are making the election set forth in this Section III.13.1.1.2.2.4 for each Forward Capacity Auction up to and including the auction held in February 2021 for the June 1, 2024 through May 31, 2025 Capacity Commitment Period, and no election shall be permitted thereafter.

For each Forward Capacity Auction occurring up to and including the February 2021 auction, in the New Capacity Qualification Package, the Project Sponsor must specify whether, if its New Capacity Offer clears in the Forward Capacity Auction, the associated Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price (indexed for inflation) shall continue to apply after the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction in which the offer clears, for up to six additional and consecutive Capacity Commitment Periods, in whole Capacity Commitment Period increments only. For incremental capacity qualified pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.1.3.A, this election shall apply to both the incremental amount of capacity and the existing Qualified Capacity matched to the incremental capacity at the same generating resource. If no such election is made in the New Capacity Qualification Package, the Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price associated with the New Capacity Offer shall apply only for the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction in which the New Capacity Offer clears. If a New Capacity Offer clears in the Forward Capacity Auction, the capacity associated with the resulting Capacity Supply Obligation may not be subject to any type of de-list or export bid in subsequent Forward Capacity Auctions for Capacity Commitment Periods for which the Project Sponsor elected to have the Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price continue to apply pursuant to this Section III.13.1.1.2.2.4.

**III.13.1.1.2.2.5. Additional Requirements for Resources Previously Counted As Capacity.**

In addition to the information described elsewhere in this Section III.13.1.1.2.2:

(a) For each resource seeking to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.1.2 (re-powering), Section III.13.1.1.1.3 (incremental capacity), or Section III.13.1.1.1.4 (de-rated capacity), the Project Sponsor must include in the New

Capacity Qualification Package documentation of the costs associated with the project in sufficient detail to allow the ISO to determine that the relevant cost threshold (described in Sections III.13.1.1.1.2(b), III.13.1.1.1.3(b), and III.13.1.1.1.4) will be met.

(b) For each resource seeking to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.1.2(c) (environmental compliance), the Project Sponsor must include in the New Capacity Qualification Package: (i) a detailed description of the specific regulations that it is seeking to comply with and the permits that it must obtain; and (ii) documentation of the costs associated with the project in sufficient detail to allow the ISO to determine that the relevant cost threshold (described in Section III.13.1.1.1.2(c)) will be met.

(c) For each resource seeking to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to Sections III.13.1.1.1.2, III.13.1.1.1.3, or III.13.1.1.1.4, the Project Sponsor must include in the New Capacity Qualification Package detailed information showing how and when the resource will shed its Capacity Supply Obligation to accommodate necessary work on the facility, if necessary. The Project Sponsor must also include the shedding of its Capacity Supply Obligation as an additional milestone in the critical path schedule described in Section III.13.1.1.2.2.2.

**III.13.1.1.2.2.6. Additional Requirements for New Generating Capacity Resources that are Intermittent Power Resources.**

In addition to the information described elsewhere in this Section III.13.1.1.2.2, for each Intermittent Power Resource that a Project Sponsor seeks to offer in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource, the Project Sponsor must include in the New Capacity Qualification Package:

- (a) a claimed summer Qualified Capacity and a claimed winter Qualified Capacity based on the data described in Section III.13.1.1.2.2.6(b);
- (b) measured and recorded site-specific summer and winter data relevant to the expected performance of the Intermittent Power Resource (including wind speed data for wind resources, water flow data for run-of-river hydropower resources, and irradiance data for solar resources) that, with the other information provided in the New Capacity Qualification Package, will enable the ISO to confirm the

summer and winter Qualified Capacity that the Project Sponsor claims for the Intermittent Power Resource.

**III.13.1.1.2.2.7. Load-Side Interests.**

If the Project Sponsor seeks to demonstrate one of the qualifying circumstances described in Section III.A.21.1.3 with regard to its New Generating Capacity Resource, the Project Sponsor must provide the Load-Side Relationship Certification in the New Capacity Qualification Package.

**III.13.1.1.2.3. Initial Interconnection Analysis.**

(a) For each New Generating Capacity Resource, the ISO shall perform an initial interconnection analysis, including an analysis of overlapping interconnection impacts, based on the information provided in the New Capacity Show of Interest Form and shall determine the amount of capacity that the resource could provide by the start of the associated Capacity Commitment Period. The initial interconnection analysis shall be performed consistent with the criteria and conditions described in ISO New England Planning Procedures, and will include, but will not be limited to, a power flow analysis and a short circuit analysis. No initial interconnection analysis is required where the total requested Qualified Capacity of a New Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to Sections III.13.1.1.2, III.13.1.1.3, III.13.1.1.4, or III.13.1.1.6 can be realized without a Material Modification (as defined in Section 4.4 of Schedule 22, Section 1.5 of Schedule 23 and Section 4.4 of Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff). The ISO will perform the initial interconnection analysis in the form of a group study that will (i) include all the projects that have submitted a New Capacity Show of Interest Form to participate in the same Capacity Commitment Period (as described in Section 4.1 of Schedule 22 and Section 1.5 of Schedule 23 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff) and (ii) exclude any existing capacity that will be retired as of the start of the same Capacity Commitment Period. Participation in an initial interconnection analysis is a requirement for obtaining Capacity Network Resource Interconnection Service or Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service in a manner that meets the Capacity Capability Interconnection Standard in accordance with the provisions in Schedules 22, 23 and 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff.

(b) If as a result of the initial interconnection analysis, the ISO determines that the interconnection facilities and upgrades identified in the qualification process that are necessary to enable the New Generating Capacity Resource to provide the entire amount of capacity indicated in the New Capacity Show of Interest Form can not be implemented before the start of the Capacity Commitment Period, the



New Generating Capacity Resource's Qualified Capacity values may be adjusted accordingly, as described in Section III.13.1.1.2.5.

(c) If as a result of the initial interconnection analysis, the ISO determines that the interconnection facilities and upgrades identified in the qualification process that are necessary to enable the New Generating Capacity Resource to provide capacity indicated in the New Capacity Show of Interest Form can not be implemented before the start of the Capacity Commitment Period and the New Generating Capacity Resource can not provide any capacity without those facilities and upgrades, the resource shall not be accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction. In this case, the ISO will provide an explanation of its determination in the qualification determination notification, discussed in Section III.13.1.1.2.8.

(d) If as a result of the initial interconnection analysis, the ISO determines that the New Generating Capacity Resource can provide all or some of the capacity indicated in the New Capacity Show of Interest Form by the start of the Capacity Commitment Period, and if the New Generating Capacity Resource is accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction in accordance with the other provisions and requirements of this Section III.13.1, then in the qualification determination notification, discussed in Section III.13.1.1.2.8, the ISO, after consultation with the applicable Transmission Owner(s) or Elective Transmission Upgrade Interconnection Customer as appropriate, shall include a list of the facilities that may be required to complete the interconnection and time required to construct those facilities by the start of the associated Capacity Commitment Period.

(e) Where, as a result of the initial interconnection analysis, the ISO concludes, after consultation with the Project Sponsor and the applicable Transmission Owner(s) or Elective Transmission Upgrade Interconnection Customer, as appropriate, that the capacity indicated in the New Capacity Show of Interest Form can not be interconnected by the commencement of the Capacity Commitment Period, the Forward Capacity Market qualification process for that resource shall be terminated and the ISO will notify the Project Sponsor of such termination.

(f) Where, as a result of the initial interconnection analysis, the ISO determines that because of overlapping interconnection impacts, New Generating Capacity Resources that are otherwise accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction in accordance with the other provisions and requirements of this Section III.13.1 cannot provide the full amount of capacity that they each would otherwise be able

to provide (in the absence of the other relevant Existing Generating Capacity Resources and New Generating Capacity Resources seeking to qualify for the Forward Capacity Auction), those New Generating Capacity Resources will be accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction on the basis of their Queue Position, as described in Schedules 22, 23 and 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff, with priority given to resources that entered the queue earlier. Resources with lower priority in the queue may be accepted partially. Starting with the fourth auction, a New Generating Capacity Resource that meets the requirements of this Section III.13.1, but that would not be accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction as a result of overlapping interconnection impacts with another resource having a higher priority in the queue may be accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction as a Conditional Qualified New Resource, as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(f), provided that the resource having a higher priority in the queue is not a resource offering capacity into the Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.2(e).

**III.13.1.1.2.4. Evaluation of New Capacity Qualification Package.**

The ISO shall review a New Generating Capacity Resource's New Capacity Qualification Package consistent with the dates set forth in Section III.13.1.10, and shall determine whether the package is complete and whether, based on the information provided, the New Generating Capacity Resource is accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction. In making these determinations, the ISO may consider, but is not limited to considering, the following:

- (a) whether the New Capacity Qualification Package contains all of the elements required by this Section III.13.1.1.2;
- (b) whether the critical path schedule includes all necessary elements and is sufficiently developed;
- (c) whether the milestones in the critical path schedule are reasonable and likely to be met;
- (d) whether, in the case of a resource previously counted as a capacity resource, the requirements for treatment as a New Generating Capacity Resource are satisfied; and
- (e) whether, in the case of an Intermittent Power Resource, sufficient data for confirming the resource's claimed summer and winter Qualified Capacity is provided, and whether the data provided reasonably supports the claimed summer and winter Qualified Capacity.

**III.13.1.1.2.5. Qualified Capacity for New Generating Capacity Resources.**

**III.13.1.1.2.5.1. New Generating Capacity Resources Other Than Intermittent Power Resources.**

The summer Qualified Capacity and winter Qualified Capacity of a New Generating Capacity Resource that is not an Intermittent Power Resource that has cleared in the Forward Capacity Auction shall be based on the data provided to the ISO during the qualification process, subject to ISO review and verification, and possibly as modified pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.3(b). The FCA Qualified Capacity for such a resource shall be the lesser of the resource's summer Qualified Capacity and winter Qualified Capacity, as adjusted to account for applicable offers composed of separate resources.

**III.13.1.1.2.5.2. [Reserved]**

**III.13.1.1.2.5.3. New Generating Capacity Resources that are Intermittent Power Resources.**

The summer Qualified Capacity and winter Qualified Capacity of a New Generating Capacity Resource that is an Intermittent Power Resource shall be the summer Qualified Capacity and winter Qualified Capacity claimed by the Project Sponsor pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.2.6, as confirmed by the ISO pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.4(e). The FCA Qualified Capacity for such a resource shall be equal to the resource's summer Qualified Capacity, as adjusted to account for applicable offers composed of separate resources.

**III.13.1.1.2.5.4. New Generating Capacity Resources Partially Clearing in a Previous Forward Capacity Auction.**

Where, as discussed in Section III.13.1.1.1(c), a New Generating Capacity Resource was accepted for participation in a previous Forward Capacity Auction, but cleared less than its summer or winter Qualified Capacity in that previous Forward Capacity Auction and is having its critical path schedule monitored by the ISO as described in Section III.13.3, its summer and winter Qualified Capacity as a New Generating Capacity Resource in the instant Forward Capacity Auction shall be the summer and winter Qualified Capacity from the previous Forward Capacity Auction minus the amount of capacity clearing from the New Generating Capacity Resource in the previous Forward Capacity Auction. The FCA Qualified Capacity for such a resource shall be the lesser of the resource's summer Qualified Capacity and winter Qualified Capacity, as adjusted to account for applicable offers composed of separate resources. The amount of capacity clearing in a Forward Capacity Auction from a New Generating

Capacity Resource shall be treated as an Existing Generating Capacity Resource in subsequent Forward Capacity Auctions.

**III.13.1.1.2.6. [Reserved.]**

**III.13.1.1.2.7. Opportunity to Consult with Project Sponsor.**

In its review of a New Capacity Show of Interest Form or a New Capacity Qualification Package, the ISO may consult with the Project Sponsor to seek clarification, to gather additional necessary information, or to address questions or concerns arising from the materials submitted. At the discretion of the ISO, the ISO may consider revisions or additions to the qualification materials resulting from such consultation; provided, however, that in no case shall the ISO consider revisions or additions to the qualification materials if the ISO believes that such consideration cannot be properly accomplished within the time periods established for the qualification process. In addition, the ISO or the Project Sponsor may confer to seek clarification, to gather additional necessary information, or to address questions or concerns prior to the ISO's final determination and notification of qualification.

**III.13.1.1.2.8. Qualification Determination Notification for New Generating Capacity Resources.**

No later than 127 days before the Forward Capacity Auction, the ISO shall send notification to Project Sponsors or Market Participants, as applicable, for each New Generating Capacity Resource indicating:

- (a) whether the New Generating Capacity Resource has been accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction as a result of the initial interconnection analysis made pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.3, and if not accepted, an explanation of the reasons the New Generating Capacity Resource was not accepted in the initial interconnection analysis;
- (b) whether the New Generating Capacity Resource has been accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction as a result of the New Capacity Qualification Package evaluation made pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.4, and if not accepted, an explanation of the reasons the New Generating Capacity Resource's New Capacity Qualification Package was not accepted;
- (c) if accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction, a list of the facilities that may be required to complete the interconnection for purposes of providing capacity and time required to construct

those facilities by the start of the associated Capacity Commitment Period, as discussed in Section III.13.1.1.2.3(d);

(d) if accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction, the New Generating Capacity Resource's summer Qualified Capacity and winter Qualified Capacity, as determined pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.5;

(e) if accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction, but subject to the provisions of Section III.13.1.1.2.3(f) (where not all New Generating Capacity Resources can be interconnected due to their combined effects on the New England Transmission System), a description of how the New Generating Capacity Resource shall participate in the Forward Capacity Auction, including, for the fourth and future auctions: (i) whether the resource shall participate as a Conditional Qualified New Resource; (ii) for the notification to a Conditional Qualified New Resource, the Queue Position of the associated resource with higher queue priority; and (iii) for the notification to a resource with higher queue priority than a Conditional Qualified New Resource, the Queue Position of the Conditional Qualified New Resource; ~~and~~

(f) if accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction, the ISO's determination as to whether the New Generating Capacity Resource satisfies any of the conditions described in Section III.A.21.1 and the basis for such determination; and

~~(gf) if accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction and requesting to submit offers at prices below the relevant Offer Review Trigger Price pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.2.3 subject to buyer-side market power review pursuant to Section III.A.21.2, the Internal Market Monitor's determinations regarding whether the New Generating Capacity Resource's requested lowest offer price, submitted pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.2.3(a), is consistent with the long-run average costs of that New Generating Capacity Resource must be mitigated, as described in Section III.A.21.2.3. The ISO shall not disclose to the Project Sponsor any information regarding the potential impact of any offer from the Project Sponsor on Capacity Clearing Prices.~~

### III.13.1.1.2.9

### Renewable Technology Resource Election.

A Project Sponsor or Market Participant may not elect Renewable Technology Resource treatment for the FCA associated with a Capacity Commitment Period beginning on or after June 1, 2028.

A Project Sponsor or Market Participant electing Renewable Technology Resource treatment for the FCA Qualified Capacity of a New Generating Capacity Resource or New Demand Capacity Resource shall submit a Renewable Technology Resource election form no later than two Business Days after the date on which the ISO provides qualification determination notifications pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.8 or Section III.13.1.4.1.1.6. Only the portion of the FCA Qualified Capacity of the resource that meets the requirements of Section III.13.1.1.1.7 is eligible for treatment as a Renewable Technology Resource.

Renewable Technology Resource elections may not be modified or withdrawn after the deadline for submission of the Renewable Technology Resource election form.

The submission of a Renewable Technology Resource election that satisfies the requirements of Section III.13.1.1.1.7 will invalidate a prior multi-year Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price election for the same resource made pursuant to Section III.13.1.4.1.1.2.7 or Section III.13.1.1.2.2.4 for a Forward Capacity Auction.

**III.13.1.1.2.10                      Determination of Renewable Technology Resource Qualified Capacity.**

- (a) If the total FCA Qualified Capacity of Renewable Technology Resources exceeds the cap specified in subsections (b) and (c) the qualified capacity value of each resource shall be prorated by the ratio of the cap divided by the total FCA Qualified Capacity. The ISO shall notify the Project Sponsor or Market Participant, as applicable, of the Qualified Capacity value of its resource no more than five Business Days after the deadline for submitting Renewable Technology Resource elections.
- (b) The cap for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2026 is 300 MW.
- (c) The cap for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2027 is 400 MW, minus the amount of Capacity Supply Obligations acquired through the Substitution Auction, as described in Section III.13.2.8, for the seventeenth Forward Capacity Auction (associated with the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2026).

**III.13.1.2.                              Existing Generating Capacity Resources.**

An Existing Generating Capacity Resource, as defined in Section III.13.1.2.1, may participate in the Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to the provisions of this Section III.13.1.2.

**III.13.1.2.1. Definition of Existing Generating Capacity Resource.**

Any resource that does not satisfy the criteria for participating in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource (Section III.13.1.1), as an Existing Import Capacity Resource or New Import Capacity Resource (Section III.13.1.3), or as a New Demand Capacity Resource or Existing Demand Capacity Resource (Section III.13.1.4) shall be an Existing Generating Capacity Resource.

**III.13.1.2.1.1. Attributes of Existing Generating Capacity Resources.**

For purposes of Forward Capacity Auction qualification, a Market Participant may not change any Existing Generating Capacity Resource attribute (including but not limited to the resource's status as an Intermittent Power Resource) in the period beginning 20 Business Days prior to the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline and ending with the conclusion of the Forward Capacity Auction. Outside of this period, any such change must be accompanied by documentation justifying the change.

**III.13.1.2.1.2 Rationing Minimum Limit.**

No later than 120 days before the Forward Capacity Auction Market Participants may specify a Rationing Minimum Limit for an Existing Generating Capacity Resource.

**III.13.1.2.2. Qualified Capacity for Existing Generating Capacity Resources.**

**III.13.1.2.2.1. Existing Generating Capacity Resources Other Than Intermittent Power Resources.**

**III.13.1.2.2.1.1. Summer Qualified Capacity.**

The summer Qualified Capacity of an Existing Generating Capacity Resource that is not an Intermittent Power Resource shall be equal to the median of that Existing Generating Capacity Resource's summer Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings from the most recent five years, as of the fifth Business Day in October of each year, with only positive summer ratings included in the median calculation. For the first Forward Capacity Auction, the summer Qualified Capacity of an Existing Generating Capacity Resource shall be equal to the median of that Existing Generating Capacity Resource's summer Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings from the most recent four years, as of the fifth Business Day in October of each year,

with only positive summer ratings included in the median calculation. Where an Existing Generating Capacity Resource has fewer than five summer Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings, or in the case of the first Forward Capacity Auction, fewer than four summer Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings, then the summer Qualified Capacity for that Existing Generating Capacity Resource shall be equal to the median of all of that Existing Generating Capacity Resource's previous summer Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings, as of the fifth Business Day in October of each year, with only positive summer ratings included in the median calculation. If for an Existing Generating Capacity Resource there are no previous positive summer Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings because the Existing Generating Capacity Resource had not yet achieved FCM Commercial Operation, then the Existing Generating Capacity Resource's summer Qualified Capacity shall be equal to the amount of capacity clearing from the resource as a New Generating Capacity Resource in previous Forward Capacity Auctions.

#### **III.13.1.2.2.1.2. Winter Qualified Capacity.**

The winter Qualified Capacity of an Existing Generating Capacity Resource that is not an Intermittent Power Resource shall be equal to the median of that Existing Generating Capacity Resource's winter Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings from the most recent five years, as of the fifth Business Day in June of each year, with only positive winter ratings included in the median calculation. For the first Forward Capacity Auction, the winter Qualified Capacity of an Existing Generating Capacity Resource shall be equal to the median of that Existing Generating Capacity Resource's winter Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings from the most recent four years, as of the fifth Business Day in June of each year, with only positive winter ratings included in the median calculation. Where an Existing Generating Capacity Resource has fewer than five winter Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings, or in the case of the first Forward Capacity Auction, fewer than four winter Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings, then the winter Qualified Capacity for that Existing Generating Capacity Resource shall be equal to the median of all of that Existing Generating Capacity Resource's previous winter Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings, as of the fifth Business Day in June of each year, with only positive winter ratings included in the median calculation. If for an Existing Generating Capacity Resource there are no previous positive winter Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings because the Existing Generating Capacity Resource had not yet achieved FCM Commercial Operation, then the Existing Generating Capacity Resource's winter Qualified Capacity shall be equal to the amount of capacity clearing from the resource as a New Generating Capacity Resource in previous Forward Capacity Auctions.



**III.13.1.2.2.2. Existing Generating Capacity Resources that are Intermittent Power Resources.**

The summer and winter Qualified Capacity for an Existing Generating Capacity Resource that is an Intermittent Power Resource shall be calculated as follows:

**III.13.1.2.2.2.1. Summer Qualified Capacity for an Intermittent Power Resource.**

- (a) With regard to any Forward Capacity Auction qualification process, for each of the previous five summer periods, the ISO shall determine the median of the Intermittent Power Resource's net output in the Summer Intermittent Reliability Hours. If there are less than five full summer periods since the Intermittent Power Resource achieved FCM Commercial Operation, the ISO shall determine the median of the Intermittent Power Resource's net output in each of the previous summer periods, or portion thereof, since the Intermittent Power Resource achieved FCM Commercial Operation.
- (b) The Intermittent Power Resource's summer Qualified Capacity shall be the average of the median numbers determined in Section III.13.1.2.2.2.1(a).
- (c) The Summer Intermittent Reliability Hours shall be hours ending 1400 through 1800 each day of the summer period (June through September) and all summer period hours in which there was a system-wide Capacity Scarcity Condition and if the Intermittent Power Resource was in an import-constrained Capacity Zone, all Capacity Scarcity Conditions in that Capacity Zone.
- (d) If for an Existing Generating Capacity Resource that is an Intermittent Power Resource there are no previous positive summer Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings because the Existing Generating Capacity Resource had not yet achieved FCM Commercial Operation, then the Existing Generating Capacity Resource's summer Qualified Capacity shall be equal to the amount of capacity clearing from the resource as a New Generating Capacity Resource in previous Forward Capacity Auctions.

**III.13.1.2.2.2.2. Winter Qualified Capacity for an Intermittent Power Resource.**

- (a) With regard to any Forward Capacity Auction qualification process, for each of the previous five winter periods, the ISO shall determine the median of the Intermittent Power Resource's net output in the Winter Intermittent Reliability Hours. If there are less than five full winter periods since the Intermittent Power Resource achieved FCM Commercial Operation, the ISO shall determine the median of the

Intermittent Power Resource's net output in each of the previous winter periods, or portion thereof, since the Intermittent Power Resource achieved FCM Commercial Operation.

(b) The Intermittent Power Resource's winter Qualified Capacity shall be the average of the median numbers determined in Section III.13.1.2.2.2(a).

(c) The Winter Intermittent Reliability Hours shall be hours ending 1800 and 1900 each day of the winter period (October through May) and all winter period hours in which there was a system-wide Capacity Scarcity Condition and if the Intermittent Power Resource was in an import-constrained Capacity Zone, all Capacity Scarcity Conditions in that Capacity Zone.

(d) If for an Existing Generating Capacity Resource that is an Intermittent Power Resource there are no previous positive winter Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings because the Existing Generating Capacity Resource had not yet achieved FCM Commercial Operation, then the Existing Generating Capacity Resource's winter Qualified Capacity shall be equal to the amount of capacity clearing from the resource as a New Generating Capacity Resource in previous Forward Capacity Auctions.

**III.13.1.2.2.3. Qualified Capacity Adjustment for Partially New and Partially Existing Resources.**

(a) Where an Existing Generating Capacity Resource is associated with a New Generating Capacity Resource that was accepted for participation in a previous Forward Capacity Auction qualification process and that cleared in a previous Forward Capacity Auction, then in each subsequent Forward Capacity Auction until the New Generating Capacity Resource achieves FCM Commercial Operation the summer Qualified Capacity of that Existing Generating Capacity Resource shall be the sum of [the median of that Existing Generating Capacity Resource's positive summer Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings from the most recent five years, as of the fifth Business Day of October of each year, calculated in a manner consistent with Section III.13.1.2.2.1.1] plus [the amount of the New Generating Capacity Resource's capacity clearing in previous Forward Capacity Auctions]. After the New Generating Capacity Resource achieves FCM Commercial Operation, the Existing Generating Capacity Resource's summer Qualified Capacity shall be calculated as described in Section III.13.1.2.2.1.1, except that no data from the time period prior to the New Generating Capacity Resource's FCM Commercial Operation date shall be used to determine the summer Qualified Capacity associated with the Existing Generating Capacity Resource.

(b) Where an Existing Generating Capacity Resource is associated with a New Generating Capacity Resource that was accepted for participation in a previous Forward Capacity Auction qualification process and that cleared in a previous Forward Capacity Auction, then in each subsequent Forward Capacity Auction until the New Generating Capacity Resource achieves FCM Commercial Operation the winter Qualified Capacity of that Existing Generating Capacity Resource shall be the sum of [the median of that Existing Generating Capacity Resource's positive winter Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings from the most recent five years, as of the fifth Business Day of June of each year, calculated in a manner consistent with Section III.13.1.2.2.1.2] plus [the amount of the New Generating Capacity Resource's capacity clearing in previous Forward Capacity Auctions]. After the New Generating Capacity Resource achieves FCM Commercial Operation, the Existing Generating Capacity Resource's winter Qualified Capacity shall be calculated as described in Section III.13.1.2.2.1.2, except that no data from the time period prior to the New Generating Capacity Resource's FCM Commercial Operation date shall be used to determine the winter Qualified Capacity associated with the Existing Generating Capacity Resource.

**III.13.1.2.2.4. Adjustment for Significant Decreases in Capacity Prior to the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline.**

Where the most recent summer Seasonal Claimed Capability, as of the fifth Business Day in October, of an Existing Generating Capacity Resource (other than a Settlement Only Resource or an Intermittent Power Resource) is below its summer Qualified Capacity, as determined pursuant to Section

III.13.1.2.2.1.1, by:

- (1) for Capacity Commitment Periods beginning prior to June 1, 2023, more than the lesser of 20 percent of that summer Qualified Capacity or 40 MW;
- (2) for Capacity Commitment Periods beginning on or after June 1, 2023, more than the lesser of:
  - (i) the greater of 10 percent of that summer Qualified Capacity or two MW, or;
  - (ii) 10 MW;

then the Lead Market Participant must elect one of the two treatments described in this Section III.13.1.2.2.4 by the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline. If the Lead Market Participant makes no election, or elects treatment pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.2.4(c) and fails to meet the associated requirements, then the treatment described in Section III.13.1.2.2.4(a) shall apply.

(a) A Lead Market Participant may elect, for the purposes of the Forward Capacity Auction only, to have the Existing Generating Capacity Resource's summer Qualified Capacity set to the most recent

summer Seasonal Claimed Capability as of the fifth Business Day in October, provided that the Lead Market Participant has furnished evidence regarding the cause of the de-rating.

(b) [Reserved.]

(c) A Lead Market Participant may elect: (i) to submit a critical path schedule as described in Section III.13.1.1.2.2.2, modified as appropriate, describing the measures that will be taken and showing that the Existing Generating Capacity Resource will be able to provide an amount of capacity consistent with the summer Qualified Capacity as calculated pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.2.1.1 by the start of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period; and (ii) to have the Existing Generating Capacity Resource's summer Qualified Capacity remain as calculated pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.2.1.1 for the Forward Capacity Auction. For an Existing Generating Capacity Resource subject to this election, the critical path schedule monitoring provisions of Section III.13.3 shall apply.

#### **III.13.1.2.2.5. Adjustment for Certain Significant Increases in Capacity.**

Where an Existing Generating Capacity Resource (other than a Settlement Only Resource) meets the requirements of Section III.13.1.1.1.3(a) but not the requirements of Section III.13.1.1.1.3(b), the Lead Market Participant may elect to have the Existing Generating Capacity Resource's summer Qualified Capacity be the sum of [the median of that Existing Generating Capacity Resource's positive summer Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings from the most recent five years, as of the fifth Business Day in October of each year, calculated in a manner consistent with Section III.13.1.2.2.1.1] plus [the amount of incremental capacity as described in Section III.13.1.1.1.3(a)]; provided, however, that the Lead Market Participant must abide by all other provisions of this Section III.13 applicable to a resource that is a New Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.1.3. Such an election must be made in writing and must be received by the ISO no later than the close of the New Capacity Show of Interest Submission Window. If the incremental amount of capacity seeking to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction meets the requirements of this Section, but the incremental amount of capacity does not span the entire Capacity Commitment Period, then the ISO shall match the incremental amount of capacity with excess Qualified Capacity at that same resource, not to exceed the Qualified Capacity of the existing portion of the resource, in order to cover the entire Capacity Commitment Period. This provision shall not apply to Intermittent Power Resources.

**III.13.1.2.2.5.1. [Reserved.]**

**III.13.1.2.2.5.2. Requirements for an Existing Generating Capacity Resource, Existing Demand Capacity Resource or Existing Import Capacity Resource Having a Higher Summer Qualified Capacity than Winter Qualified Capacity.**

Where an Existing Generating Capacity Resource, Existing Demand Capacity Resource, or Existing Import Capacity Resource (other than an Intermittent Power Resource) has a summer Qualified Capacity that exceeds its winter Qualified Capacity, both as calculated pursuant to this Section III.13.1.2.2, then that resource must either: (i) offer its summer Qualified Capacity as part of an offer composed of separate resources, as discussed in Section III.13.1.5; or (ii) have its FCA Qualified Capacity administratively set by the ISO to the lesser of its summer Qualified Capacity and winter Qualified Capacity.

**III.13.1.2.3. Qualification Process for Existing Generating Capacity Resources.**

(a) For each Existing Generating Capacity Resource, no later than 15 Business Days before the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline, the ISO will notify the resource's Lead Market Participant of the resource's summer Qualified Capacity and winter Qualified Capacity and the Load Zone in which the Existing Generating Capacity Resource is located.

(b) If the Lead Market Participant believes that the ISO has made a mathematical error in calculating the summer Qualified Capacity or winter Qualified Capacity for an Existing Generating Capacity Resource as described in Section III.13.1.2.2, then the Lead Market Participant must notify the ISO within five Business Days of receipt of the Qualified Capacity notification.

(c) The ISO shall notify the Lead Market Participant of the outcome of any such challenge no later than five Business Days before the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline. If an Existing Generating Capacity Resource does not submit a Static De-List Bid, an Export Bid, an Administrative Export De-List Bid, a Permanent De-List Bid, or a Retirement De-List Bid in the Forward Capacity Auction qualification process, then the resource shall be entered into the Forward Capacity Auction as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(c).

**III.13.1.2.3.1. Existing Capacity Retirement Package and Existing Capacity Qualification Package.**

A resource that previously has been deactivated pursuant to Section I.3.9 of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff (or its predecessor provisions) and seeks to reactivate and participate in the Forward

Capacity Market as an Existing Generating Capacity Resource must submit a reactivation plan no later than 10 Business Days before the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline, as described in Section III.13.1.1.1.6(b). All Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids in the Forward Capacity Auction must be detailed in an Existing Capacity Retirement Package submitted to the ISO no later than the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline. All Static De-List Bids, Export Bids and Administrative Export De-List Bids in the Forward Capacity Auction must be detailed in an Existing Capacity Qualification Package submitted to the ISO no later than the Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline. Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids may not be modified or withdrawn after the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline, except as provided for in Section III.13.1.2.4.1. All Static De-List Bids, Export Bids, and Administrative Export De-List Bids submitted in the qualification process may not be modified or withdrawn after the Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline, except as provided for in Section III.13.1.2.3.1.1. An Existing Generating Capacity Resource may not submit a Static De-List Bid, Export Bid, Administrative Export De-List Bid, Permanent De-List Bid, or Retirement De-List Bid for an amount of capacity greater than its summer Qualified Capacity, unless the submittal is for the entire resource. Where a resource elected pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.2.4 or Section III.13.1.4.1.1.2.7 to have the Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price continue to apply after the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction in which the offer clears, the capacity associated with any resulting Capacity Supply Obligation may not be subject to any type of de-list or export bid in subsequent Forward Capacity Auctions for Capacity Commitment Periods for which the Project Sponsor elected to have the Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price continue to apply. For a single resource, a Lead Market Participant may combine a Static De-List Bid, an Export Bid, and an Administrative Export De-List Bid; neither a Permanent De-List Bid nor a Retirement De-List Bid may be combined with any other type of de-list or export bid.

Static De-List Bids and Export Bids may elect to be rationed (as described in Section III.13.2.6, however, an Export Bid is always subject to potential rationing where the associated external interface binds). Where a Lead Market Participant submits any combination of Static De-List Bid and Export Bid for a single resource, each of those bids must have the same rationing election. Where a Lead Market Participant submits any combination of Static De-List Bid, Export Bid, and Administrative Export De-List Bid for a single resource, none of the prices in a set of price-quantity pairs associated with a bid may be the same as any price in any other set of price-quantity pairs associated with another bid for the same resource.

### **III.13.1.2.3.1.A Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold.**

For the fifteenth Forward Capacity Auction (for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning June 1, 2024), the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold is \$4.30/kW-month. For each Forward Capacity Auction thereafter, the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold shall be calculated as described below in this Section III.13.1.2.3.1.A, and shall be published to the ISO's website no later than 5 Business Days before the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline. This publication shall include the preliminary value calculated pursuant to subsection (a) below, whether the preliminary value was constrained by either of the limitations described in subsection (b) below, the margin value as calculated pursuant to subsection (c) below, and the final value as calculated pursuant to subsection (d) below.

(a) Subject to the limitations described in subsection (b) below, a preliminary value of the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold shall be calculated as the average of: (i) the Capacity Clearing Price for the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone from the immediately preceding Forward Capacity Auction (provided, however, that if there is a second run of the primary auction-clearing process pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.1(d), the resulting Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone clearing price from that run shall be used instead); and (ii) the price at which the total amount of capacity clearing in the immediately preceding Forward Capacity Auction intersects the estimated System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve for the upcoming Forward Capacity Auction. For this purpose, the estimated System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve shall be constructed, in the same manner as described in Section III.13.2.2.1, using the system-wide Marginal Reliability Impact values from the immediately preceding Forward Capacity Auction, the most recent estimate of the Installed Capacity Requirement (net of HQICCs) for the upcoming Forward Capacity Auction, and the Net CONE and Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price for the upcoming Forward Capacity Auction.

(b) The preliminary value of the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold shall not be higher than 75 percent of the Net CONE value for the upcoming Forward Capacity Auction. The preliminary value of the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold shall not be lower than 75 percent of the clearing price applicable pursuant to (a)(i) of this Section III.13.1.2.3.1.A, except as needed to ensure that it is not higher than 75 percent of the Net CONE value for the upcoming Forward Capacity Auction.

(c) A margin value shall be calculated using the following formula:

$$Margin = \$1/kW-month \times \left[ \frac{(75\% \times Net\ CONE_{upcoming\ FCA}) - DDBT_{preliminary}}{(75\% \times Net\ CONE_{upcoming\ FCA})} \right]$$

(d) The final value of the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold for the upcoming Forward Capacity Auction shall be equal to the preliminary value of the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold calculated pursuant to Sections III.13.1.2.3.1.A(a) and III.13.1.2.3.1.A(b) plus the margin value calculated pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.A(c).

**III.13.1.2.3.1.1. Static De-List Bids.**

A Lead Market Participant with an Existing Capacity Resource, or a portion thereof, seeking to specify a price below which it would not accept a Capacity Supply Obligation for that resource, or a portion thereof, at prices at or above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold during a single Capacity Commitment Period may submit a Static De-List Bid in the associated Forward Capacity Auction qualification process. A Static De-List Bid may not result in a resource's Capacity Supply Obligation being less than its Rationing Minimum Limit except where the resource submits de-list and export bids totaling the resource's full summer Qualified Capacity. Each Static De-List Bid must be detailed in an Existing Capacity Qualification Package submitted to the ISO no later than the Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline, and must be in the form of a curve (up to five price-quantity pairs). The curve may in no case increase the quantity offered as the price decreases. All Static De-List Bids are subject to a reliability review as described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5. Static De-List Bids are subject to review by the Internal Market Monitor pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2 and must include the additional documentation described in that section. With the submission of a Static De-List Bid, the Lead Market Participant must notify the ISO if the Existing Capacity Resource will not be participating in the energy and ancillary services markets during the Capacity Commitment Period (except for necessary audits or tests).

No later than seven days after the issuance by the ISO of the qualification determination notification described in Section III.13.1.2.4(b), a Lead Market Participant that submitted a Static De-List Bid may: (a) lower the price of any price-quantity pair of a Static De-List Bid, provided that the revised price is greater than or equal to the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold, or; (b) withdraw any price-quantity pair of a Static De-List Bid.

**III.13.1.2.3.1.2. [Reserved.]**

**III.13.1.2.3.1.3. Export Bids.**

An Existing Generating Capacity Resource within the New England Control Area, other than an Intermittent Power Resource or a Renewable Technology Resource, seeking to export all or part of its



capacity during a Capacity Commitment Period may submit an Export Bid in the associated Forward Capacity Auction qualification process. An Export Bid may not result in a resource's Capacity Supply Obligation being less than its Rationing Minimum Limit except where the resource submits de-list and export bids totaling the resource's full summer Qualified Capacity. All Export Bids are subject to a reliability review as described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5. Export Bids at or above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold are subject to review by the Internal Market Monitor pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2 and must include the additional information described in that Section. Each Export Bid must be detailed in an Existing Capacity Qualification Package submitted to the ISO no later than the Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline, and must be in the form of a curve (up to five price-quantity pairs) associated with a specific Existing Generating Capacity Resource. The curve may in no case increase the quantity offered as the price decreases. Each price-quantity pair must be less than the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price. The Existing Capacity Qualification Package for each Export Bid must also specify the interface over which the capacity will be exported. Export Bids shall be entered into the Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.2(b).

#### **III.13.1.2.3.1.4. Administrative Export De-List Bids.**

An Existing Generating Capacity Resource other than an Intermittent Power Resource or a Renewable Technology Resource subject to a multiyear contract to sell capacity outside of the New England Control Area during the Capacity Commitment Period that either: (i) cleared as an Export Bid in a previous Forward Capacity Auction for a Capacity Commitment Period within the duration of the contract; or (ii) entered into a contract prior to April 30, 2007 to sell capacity outside of the New England Control Area during the Capacity Commitment Period, may submit an Administrative Export De-List Bid in the associated Forward Capacity Auction qualification process. An Administrative Export De-List Bid may not result in a resource's Capacity Supply Obligation being less than its Rationing Minimum Limit except where the resource submits de-list and export bids totaling the resource's full summer Qualified Capacity. Unless reviewed as an Export Bid in a previous Forward Capacity Auction, an Administrative Export De-List Bid is subject to a reliability review prior to clearing in a Forward Capacity Auction, as described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5, and is subject to review by the Internal Market Monitor in the first Forward Capacity Auction in which it participates, pursuant to Section III.13.1.7. Both the reliability review and the review by the Internal Market Monitor shall be conducted once and shall remain valid for the multiyear contract period. Each Administrative Export De-List Bid must be detailed in an Existing Capacity Qualification Package submitted to the ISO no later than the Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline, must be associated with a specific Existing Generating Capacity Resource, and must indicate

the quantity of capacity subject to the bid. The Existing Capacity Qualification Package for each Administrative Export De-List Bid must also specify the interface over which the capacity will be exported, and must include documentation demonstrating a contractual obligation to sell capacity outside of the New England Control Area during the whole Capacity Commitment Period. Administrative Export De-List Bids shall be entered into the Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.4.

**III.13.1.2.3.1.5. Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids.**

(a) A Lead Market Participant with an Existing Capacity Resource seeking to specify a price at or below which it would not accept a Capacity Supply Obligation permanently for all or part of a Generating Capacity Resource beginning at the start of a particular Capacity Commitment Period may submit a Permanent De-List Bid in the associated Forward Capacity Auction qualification process.

(b) A Lead Market Participant with an Existing Capacity Resource seeking to specify a price at or below which it would retire all or part of a Generating Capacity Resource from all New England Markets beginning at the start of a particular Capacity Commitment Period may submit a Retirement De-List Bid in the associated Forward Capacity Auction qualification process.

(c) No Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid may result in a resource's Capacity Supply Obligation being less than its Rationing Minimum Limit unless the Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid is for the entire resource. Each Permanent De-List Bid and Retirement De-List Bid must be detailed in an Existing Capacity Retirement Package submitted to the ISO no later than the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline, and must be in the form of a curve (up to five price-quantity pairs) associated with a specific Existing Capacity Resource. The curve may in no case increase the quantity offered as the price decreases. Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids are subject to review by the Internal Market Monitor pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1 and must include the additional documentation described in that section. Once submitted, no Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid may be withdrawn, except as provided in Section III.13.1.2.4.1.

**III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1. Reliability Review of Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids During the Qualification Process.**

During the qualification process, the ISO will review the following de-list bids to determine if the resource is needed for reliability: (1) Internal Market Monitor-accepted Permanent De-List Bids and Internal Market Monitor-accepted Retirement De-List Bids that are at or above the Forward Capacity

Auction Starting Price; and (2) Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids for which the Lead Market Participant has opted to have the resource reviewed for reliability as described in Section III.13.1.2.4.1(a) or Section III.13.1.2.4.1(b). The reliability review will be conducted according to Section III.13.2.5.2.5, except as follows:

- (a) Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids that cannot be priced (for example, due to the expiration of an operating license) will be reviewed first.
- (b) System needs associated with Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids for resources found needed for reliability reasons pursuant to this Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1 will be reviewed with the Reliability Committee during the month of August following the issuance of retirement determination notifications pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4(a). The Lead Market Participant shall be notified as soon as practicable following the ISO's consultation with the Reliability Committee that the capacity associated with a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid is needed for reliability reasons.
- (c) If the capacity associated with a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid is needed for reliability reasons pursuant to this Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1, the de-list bid shall be rejected and the resource shall be entered into the Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.2(c) and compensated according to Section III.13.2.5.2.5, unless the resource declines to be retained for reliability, as provided in Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1(d).
- (d) No later than the fifth Business Day in the month of September following the review of system needs with the Reliability Committee per (b) above, a Lead Market Participant may notify the ISO that it declines to provide the associated capacity for reliability. Such an election will be binding. A resource for which a Lead Market Participant has made such an election will not be eligible for compensation pursuant to Sections III.13.2.5.2.5.1 or III.13.2.5.2.5.2.
- (e) Where a resource is determined not to be needed for reliability or where a Lead Market Participant notifies the ISO that it declines to provide capacity for reliability pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1(d), the capacity associated with the Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid will be treated as follows:

- (i) For a Retirement De-List Bid at or above the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price, or a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid for which a Lead Market Participant has elected to retire the resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(a), the portion of the resource subject to the de-list bid will be retired as permitted by applicable law coincident with the commencement of the Capacity Commitment Period for which the de-list bid was submitted, as described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3(a).
- (ii) For a Permanent De-List Bid at or above the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price for which a Lead Market Participant has not elected to retire the resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(a), the portion of the resource subject to the de-list bid will be permanently de-listed coincident with the commencement of the Capacity Commitment Period for which the de-list bid was submitted, as described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3(b).
- (iii) For a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid for which a Lead Market Participant has elected conditional treatment pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(b), the de-list bid will continue to receive conditional treatment as described in Section III.13.1.2.4.1(b), Section III.13.2.3.2(b)(ii), and Section III.13.2.5.2.1.

**III.13.1.2.3.1.6. Static De-List Bids, Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids for Existing Generating Capacity Resources at Stations having Common Costs.**

Where Existing Generating Capacity Resources at a Station having Common Costs elect to submit Static De-List Bids, Permanent De-List Bids, or Retirement De-List Bids, the provisions of this Section III.13.1.2.3.1.6 shall apply.

**III.13.1.2.3.1.6.1. Submission of Cost Data.**

In addition to the information required elsewhere in this Section III.13.1.2.3, Static De-List Bids, Permanent De-List Bids, or Retirement De-List Bids submitted by an Existing Generating Capacity Resource that is associated with a Station having Common Costs and seeking to delist must include detailed cost data to allow the ISO to determine the Asset-Specific Going Forward Costs for each asset associated with the Station and the Station Going Forward Common Costs.

**III.13.1.2.3.1.6.2. [Reserved.]**

**III.13.1.2.3.1.6.3. Internal Market Monitor Review of Stations having Common Costs.**

The Internal Market Monitor will review each Static De-List Bid, Permanent De-List Bid and Retirement De-List Bids from an Existing Generating Capacity Resource that is associated with a Station having Common Costs pursuant to the following methodology:

- (i) Calculate the average Asset-Specific Going Forward Costs of each asset at the Station.
- (ii) Order the assets from highest average Asset-Specific Going Forward Costs to lowest average Asset-Specific Going Forward Costs; this is the preferred de-list order.
- (iii) Calculate and assign to each asset a station cost that is equal to the average cost of the assets remaining at the Station, including Station Going Forward Common Costs, assuming the successive de-listing of each individual asset in preferred de-list order.
- (iv) Calculate a set of composite costs that is equal to the maximum of the cost associated with each asset as calculated in (i) and (iii) above.

The Internal Market Monitor will adjust the set of composite costs to ensure a monotonically non-increasing set of bids as follows: any asset with a composite cost that is greater than the composite cost of the asset with the lowest composite cost and that has average Asset-Specific Going Forward Costs that are less than its composite costs will have its composite cost set equal to that of the asset with the lowest composite cost. The bids of the asset with the lowest composite cost and of any assets whose composite costs are so adjusted will be considered a single non-rationable bid for use in the Forward Capacity Auction.

The Internal Market Monitor will compare a de-list bid developed using the adjusted composite costs to the de-list bid submitted by the Existing Generating Capacity Resource that is associated with a Station having Common Costs. If the Internal Market Monitor determines that the submitted de-list bid is less than or equal to the bid developed using the adjusted composite costs, then the bid shall be entered into the Forward Capacity Auction as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(b). If the Internal Market Monitor determines that the submitted de-list bid is greater than the bid developed using the adjusted composite costs or is not consistent with the submitted supporting cost data, then the Internal Market Monitor will

establish an Internal Market Monitor-determined or Internal Market Monitor– accepted price for the bid as described in Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.

**III.13.1.2.3.2. Review by Internal Market Monitor of Bids from Existing Capacity Resources.**

The Internal Market Monitor shall review bids for Existing Capacity Resources as follows.

**III.13.1.2.3.2.1. Static De-List Bids and Export Bids, Permanent De-List Bids, and Retirement De-List Bids at or Above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold.**

The Internal Market Monitor shall review each Static De-List Bid and each Export Bid at or above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold to determine whether the bid is consistent with: (1) the Existing Capacity Resource’s net going forward costs (as determined pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.2.A); (2) reasonable expectations about the resource’s Capacity Performance Payments (as determined pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.3); (3) reasonable risk premium assumptions (as determined pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.4); and (4) the resource’s reasonable opportunity costs (as determined pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.5).

The Internal Market Monitor shall review each Permanent De-List Bid greater than 20 MW that is at or above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold and each Retirement De-List Bid greater than 20 MW that is at or above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold to determine whether the bid is consistent with: (1) the net present value of the resource’s expected cash flows (as determined pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.2.B); (2) reasonable expectations about the resource’s Capacity Performance Payments (as determined pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.3); and (3) the resource’s reasonable opportunity costs (as determined pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.5). If more than one Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid is submitted by a single Lead Market Participant or its Affiliates (as used in Section III.A.24), the Internal Market Monitor shall review each such bid at or above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold if the sum of all such bids at or above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold is greater than 20 MW. The Internal Market Monitor shall review each Permanent De-List Bid and each Retirement De-List Bid submitted at any price pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.1(b) if the sum of the Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids submitted by the Lead Market Participant or its Affiliates (as used in Section III.A.24) is greater than 20 MW. Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids that are not reviewed by the Internal Market Monitor shall be included in the retirement determination notification

described in Section III.13.1.2.4(a) and in the filing made to the Commission as described in Section III.13.8.1(a).

Sufficient documentation and information about each bid component must be included in the Existing Capacity Retirement Package or the Existing Capacity Qualification Package to allow the Internal Market Monitor to make the requisite determinations. If a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid is submitted pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.1(b), all relevant updates to previously submitted documentation and information must be provided to support the newly submitted price and allow the Internal Market Monitor to make updated determinations. The updated information may include a request to discontinue the Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid such that it will not be entered into the Forward Capacity Auction, in which case the update must include sufficient supporting information on the nature of resource investments that were undertaken, or other materially changed circumstances, to allow the Internal Market Monitor to determine whether discontinuation is appropriate.

The entire de-list submittal shall be accompanied by an affidavit executed by a corporate officer attesting to the accuracy of its content, including reported costs, the reasonableness of the estimates and adjustments of costs that would otherwise be avoided if the resource were not required to meet the obligations of a listed resource, and the reasonableness of the expectations and assumptions regarding Capacity Performance Payments, cash flows, opportunity costs, and risk premiums, and shall be subject to audit upon request by the ISO.

#### **III.13.1.2.3.2.1.1. Internal Market Monitor Review of De-List Bids.**

The Internal Market Monitor may seek additional information from the Lead Market Participant (including information about the other existing or potential new resources controlled by the Lead Market Participant) after the qualification deadline to address any questions or concerns regarding the data submitted, as appropriate. The Internal Market Monitor shall review all relevant information (including data, studies, and assumptions) to determine whether the bid is consistent with the resource's net going forward costs, reasonable expectations about the resource's Capacity Performance Payments, reasonable risk premium assumptions, and reasonable opportunity costs. In making this determination, the Internal Market Monitor shall consider, among other things, industry standards, market conditions (including published indices and projections), resource-specific characteristics and conditions, portfolio size, and consistency of assumptions across that portfolio.

**III.13.1.2.3.2.1.1.1. Review of Static De-List Bids and Export Bids.**

The Internal Market Monitor shall review Static De-List Bids and Export Bids and, after due consideration and consultation with the Lead Market Participant, as appropriate, shall develop an Internal Market Monitor-accepted Static De-List Bid or an Internal Market Monitor-accepted Export Bid. The Internal Market Monitor-accepted Static De-List Bid and Internal Market Monitor-accepted Export Bid shall be equal to the Static De-List Bid or Export Bid submitted by the Lead Market Participant unless the de-list bid price(s) submitted by the Lead Market Participant are more than 10% greater than the Internal Market Monitor-accepted de-list bid price(s) for the same de-list bid. If the de-list bid price(s) submitted by the Lead Market Participant are more than 10% greater than the Internal Market Monitor-accepted de-list bid price(s), the Internal Market Monitor shall calculate an Internal Market Monitor-accepted Static De-List Bid or Internal Market-Monitor-accepted Export Bid that is consistent with the sum of the resource's net going forward costs plus reasonable expectations about the resource's Capacity Performance Payments plus reasonable risk premium assumptions plus reasonable opportunity costs.

If an Internal Market Monitor-determined price is established for a Static De-List Bid or an Export Bid, both the qualification determination notification described in Section III.13.1.2.4 and the informational filing made to the Commission as described in Section III.13.8.1(c) shall include an explanation of the Internal Market Monitor-determined price based on the Internal Market Monitor review and the resource's net going forward costs, reasonable expectations about the resource's Capacity Performance Payments, reasonable risk premium assumptions, and reasonable opportunity costs as determined by the Internal Market Monitor.

**III.13.1.2.3.2.1.1.2. Review of Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids.**

The Internal Market Monitor shall review those Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids identified in Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1 and, after due consideration and consultation with the Lead Market Participant, as appropriate, shall develop an Internal Market Monitor-accepted Permanent De-List Bid or an Internal Market Monitor-accepted Retirement De-List Bid. The Internal Market Monitor-accepted Permanent De-List Bid and Internal Market Monitor-accepted Retirement De-List Bid shall be equal to the Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid submitted by the Lead Market Participant unless the de-list bid price(s) submitted by the Lead Market Participant are more than 10% greater than the Internal Market Monitor-accepted de-list bid price(s) for the same de-list bid. If the de-list bid price(s) submitted by the Lead Market Participant are more than 10% greater than the Internal Market Monitor-accepted de-list bid price(s), the Internal Market Monitor shall calculate an Internal Market Monitor-



accepted Permanent De-List Bid or Internal Market-Monitor-accepted Retirement De-List Bid that is consistent with the sum of the net present value of the resource's expected cash flows plus reasonable expectations about the resource's Capacity Performance Payments plus reasonable opportunity costs.

The retirement determination notification described in Section III.13.1.2.4(a) and the filing made to the Commission as described in Section III.13.8.1(a) shall include an explanation of the Internal Market Monitor-accepted price and the Internal Market Monitor determination on any request to discontinue the Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid.

**III.13.1.2.3.2.1.2.A. Static De-List Bid and Export Bid Net Going Forward Costs.**

The Lead Market Participant for an Existing Capacity Resource that submits a Static De-List Bid or an Export Bid at or above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold that is to be reviewed by the Internal Market Monitor shall report expected net going forward costs for the applicable Capacity Commitment Period in a manner and format specified by the Internal Market Monitor, and may supplement this information with other evidence. A Static De-List Bid or Export Bid at or above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold shall be considered consistent with the Existing Capacity Resource's net going forward costs based on a review of the data submitted in the following formula.

*Net Going Forward Costs =*

$$\frac{(GFC - IMR) \times InfIndex}{(CQ_{Summer, kw}) \times (12 months)}$$

Where:

GFC = annual going forward costs, in dollars. These are the expected costs and capital expenditures that might otherwise be avoided or not incurred if the resource were not subject to the obligations of a resource with a Capacity Supply Obligation during the Capacity Commitment Period (i.e., maintaining a constant condition of being ready to respond to commitment and dispatch orders). Costs that are not avoidable in a single Capacity Commitment Period and costs associated with the production of energy are not to be included. Service of debt is not a going forward cost. Staffing, maintenance, capital expenses, and other normal expenses that would be avoided only in the absence of a Capacity Supply Obligation may be included. Staffing, maintenance, capital expenses, and other normal expenses that would be avoided only if the resource were not participating in the energy and ancillary services markets may not

be included, except in the case of a resource that has indicated in the submission of a Static De-List Bid that the resource will not be participating in the energy and ancillary services markets during the Capacity Commitment Period.

$CQ_{\text{Summer}}^{\text{kW}}$  = capacity seeking to de-list in kW. In no case shall this value exceed the resource's summer Qualified Capacity.

IMR = expected annual infra-marginal rents, in dollars. In the case of a resource that has indicated in the submission of a Static De-List Bid that the resource will not be participating in the energy and ancillary services markets during the Capacity Commitment Period, this value shall be calculated by subtracting all submitted cost data representing the cumulative expected cost of production (total expenses related to the production of energy, e.g. fuel, actual consumables such as chemicals and water, and, if quantified, incremental labor and maintenance) from the Existing Generating Capacity Resource's total ISO market revenues. In the case of a resource that has indicated in the submission of a Static De-List Bid that the resource will be participating in the energy and ancillary services markets during the Capacity Commitment Period, this value shall be \$0.00.

InfIndex = inflation index.  $\text{infIndex} = (1 + i)^4$

Where: "i" is the most recent reported 4- Year expected inflation number published by the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland at the beginning of the qualification period. The specific value to be used shall be specified by the ISO and available to the Lead Market Participant.

### **III.13.1.2.3.2.1.2.B Permanent De-List Bid and Retirement De-List Bid Net Present Value of Expected Cash Flows.**

The Lead Market Participant for an Existing Capacity Resource that submits a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid that is to be reviewed by the Internal Market Monitor shall report all expected costs, revenues, prices, discount rates and capital expenditures in a manner and format specified by the Internal Market Monitor, and may supplement this information with other evidence. The Internal Market Monitor will review the Lead Market Participant's submitted data to ensure that it is consistent with overall market conditions and reflects expected values.

The Internal Market Monitor will adjust any data that are inconsistent with overall market conditions or

do not reflect expected values. The Internal Market Monitor shall enter all relevant expected costs, revenues, prices, discount rates and capital expenditures into a capital budgeting model and shall determine the net present value of the Existing Capacity Resource's expected cash flows as follows:

The net present value of the Existing Capacity Resource's expected cash flows is equal to (i) the net present value of the Existing Capacity Resource's net annual expected cash flows over the resource's remaining economic life (as determined pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.2.C) plus the net present value of the resource's expected terminal value, using the resource's discount rate, divided by (ii) the product of the resource's Qualified Capacity (in kilowatts) and 12 months.

The Existing Capacity Resource's net annual expected cash flow for the first Capacity Commitment Period of the resource's remaining economic life is the resource's expected annual net operating profit excluding expected capacity revenues less its expected capital expenditures in the Capacity Commitment Period.

The Existing Capacity Resource's net annual expected cash flow for each of the subsequent Capacity Commitment Periods of the resource's remaining economic life is the resource's expected annual net operating profit less its expected capital expenditures in the Capacity Commitment Period.

Where:

**Expected net operating profit**, in dollars, is the Lead Market Participant's expected annual profit that might otherwise be avoided or not accrued if the resource were not subject to the obligations of a listed capacity resource during the Capacity Commitment Period. Expected labor, maintenance, taxes, insurance, administrative and other normal expenses that can be avoided or not incurred if the resource is retired or permanently de-listed may be included. Service of debt is not an avoidable cost and may not be included.

**Expected capacity revenues**, in dollars, are the forecasted annual expected capacity revenues based on the Lead Market Participant's forecasted expected capacity prices for each of the subsequent Capacity Commitment Periods of the resource's remaining economic life. The Lead Market Participant shall provide the Internal Market Monitor with documentation supporting the forecasted expected capacity prices. The supporting documentation must include a detailed description and sources of the Lead Market

Participant's assumptions about expected resource additions, resource retirements, estimated Installed Capacity Requirements, estimated Local Sourcing Requirements, expected market conditions, and any other assumptions used to develop the forecasted expected capacity price in each Capacity Commitment Period.

If the Internal Market Monitor determines the Lead Market Participant has not provided adequate supporting documentation for the forecasted expected capacity prices, the Internal Market Monitor will replace the Lead Market Participant's forecasted expected capacity prices with the Internal Market Monitor's estimate thereof in each of the subsequent Capacity Commitment Periods of the resource's remaining economic life.

**Expected capital expenditures**, in dollars, are the Lead Market Participant's expected capital investments that might otherwise be avoided or not incurred if the resource were not subject to the obligations of a listed capacity resource during the Capacity Commitment Periods.

**Expected terminal value**, in dollars, for resources with five years or less of remaining economic life, is the Lead Market Participant's expected revenue less expected costs associated with retiring or permanently de-listing the resource. For resources with more than five years of remaining economic life, the expected terminal value in the fifth year of the evaluation period is the Lead Market Participant's expected revenue less expected costs associated with retiring or permanently de-listing the resource at the end of the resource's economic life plus the net present value of the Existing Capacity Resource's net annual expected cash flows from the sixth year of the evaluation period through the end of the resource's remaining economic life, using the resource's discount rate.

**Discount rate** is a value reflecting the Lead Market Participant's weighted average cost of capital for the Existing Capacity Resource adjusted to reflect the risk to cash flows calculated pursuant to the net present value of expected cash flows analysis in this Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.2.B.

The Lead Market Participant shall provide the Internal Market Monitor with documentation supporting the weighted average cost of capital for the Existing Capacity Resource adjusted for risk.

The supporting documentation must include a detailed description and sources of the Lead Market Participant's assumptions associated with the cost of capital, risks and any other assumptions used to develop the weighted average cost of capital for the Existing Capacity Resource adjusted for risk.

If the Internal Market Monitor determines the Lead Market Participant has not provided adequate supporting documentation for the weighted average cost of capital for the Existing Capacity Resource adjusted for risk, the Lead Market Participant has included risks not associated with cash flows calculated pursuant to the net present value of expected cash flows analysis in this Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.2.B or the Lead Market Participant has submitted costs, revenues, capital expenditures or prices that are not reflective of expected values, the Internal Market Monitor will replace the Lead Market Participant's discount rate with a value determined by the Internal Market Monitor.

**III.13.1.2.3.2.1.2.C      Permanent De-List Bid and Retirement De-List Bid Calculation of Remaining Economic Life.**

The Internal Market Monitor shall calculate the Existing Capacity Resource's remaining economic life, using evaluation periods ranging from one to five years. For each evaluation period, the Internal Market Monitor will calculate the net present value of (a) the annual expected net operating profit minus annual expected capital expenditures assuming the Capacity Clearing Price for the first year is equal to the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price and (b) the expected terminal value of the resource at the end of the given evaluation period. The economic life is the maximum evaluation period in which a resource's net present value is non-negative. However, effective April 9, 2020, beginning with the sixteenth Forward Capacity Auction, the economic life is the evaluation period in which a resource's net present value is maximized.

**III.13.1.2.3.2.1.3.      Expected Capacity Performance Payments.**

The Lead Market Participant for an Existing Capacity Resource that submits a Static De-List Bid or an Export Bid, Permanent De-List Bid, or Retirement De-List Bid at or above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold that is to be reviewed by the Internal Market Monitor shall also provide documentation separately detailing the expected Capacity Performance Payments for the resource. This documentation must include expectations regarding the applicable Capacity Balancing Ratio, the number of hours of reserve deficiency, and the resource's performance during reserve deficiencies.

**III.13.1.2.3.2.1.4.      Risk Premium.**

The Lead Market Participant for an Existing Capacity Resource that submits a Static De-List Bid, or an Export Bid at or above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold that is to be reviewed by the Internal Market Monitor shall also provide documentation separately detailing any risk premium included in the bid. This

documentation should address all components of physical and financial risk reflected in the bid, including, for example, catastrophic events, a higher than expected amount of reserve deficiencies, and performing scheduled maintenance during reserve deficiencies. Any risk that can be quantified and analytically supported and that is not already reflected in the formula for net going forward costs described in Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.2.A may be included in this risk premium component. In support of the resource's risk premium, the Lead Market Participant may also submit an affidavit from a corporate officer attesting that the risk premium submitted is the minimum necessary to ensure that the overall level of risk associated with the resource's participation in the Forward Capacity Market is consistent with the participant's corporate risk management practices.

**III.13.1.2.3.2.1.5. Opportunity Costs.**

To the extent that an Existing Capacity Resource submitting a Static De-List Bid or an Export Bid, Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid at or above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold has additional opportunity costs that are not reflected in the net going forward costs, net present value of expected cash flows, expected Capacity Performance Payments, discount rate, or risk premium components of the bid, the Lead Market Participant must include in the Existing Capacity Qualification Package evidence supporting such costs. Opportunity costs associated with major repairs necessary to restore decreases in capacity as described in Section III.13.1.2.2.4, capital projects required to operate the plant as a capacity resource or other uses of the resource shall be considered, provided such costs are substantiated by evidence of a repair plan, documented business plan and fundamental market analysis, or other independent and transparent trading index or indices as applicable. Substantiation of opportunity costs relying on sales in reconfiguration auctions or risk aversion premiums shall not be considered sufficient justification.

**III.13.1.2.3.2.2. [Reserved.]**

**III.13.1.2.3.2.3. Administrative Export De-List Bids.**

The Internal Market Monitor shall review each Administrative Export De-List Bid associated with a multi-year contract entered into prior to April 30, 2007 in the first Forward Capacity Auction in which it clears. An Administrative Export De-List Bid shall be rejected if the Internal Market Monitor determines that the bid may be an attempt to manipulate the Forward Capacity Auction, and the matter will be referred to the Commission in accordance with the protocols set forth in Appendix A to the Commission's Market Monitoring Policy Statement (111 FERC ¶ 61,267 (2005)).

**III.13.1.2.3.2.4. Static De-List Bids for Reductions in Ratings Due to Ambient Air Conditions.**

A Lead Market Participant may submit a Static De-List Bid for up to the megawatt amount that the Lead Market Participant expects will not be physically available due to the difference between the summer Qualified Capacity at 90 degrees and the expected rating of the resource at 100 degrees. The ISO shall verify during the qualification process that the rating is accurate. Such Static De-List Bids may be entered into the Forward Capacity Market at prices up to and including the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price, subject to validation of the physical limit. Static De-List Bids for reductions in ratings due to ambient air conditions shall not be subject to the review described in Section III.13.1.2.3.2 and need not include documentation for that purpose.

**III.13.1.2.3.2.5. Static De-List Bid Incremental Capital Expenditure Recovery Schedule.**

Except as described below, the Internal Market Monitor shall review all Static De-List Bids using the following cost recovery schedule for incremental capital expenditures, which assumes an annual pre-tax weighted average cost of capital of 10 percent.

<b>Age of Existing Resource (years)</b>	<b>Remaining Life (years)</b>	<b>Annual Rate of Capital Cost Recovery</b>
1 to 5	30	0.106
6 to 10	25	0.110
11 to 15	20	0.117
16 to 20	15	0.131
21 to 25	10	0.163
25 plus	5	0.264

A Market Participant may request that a different pre-tax weighted average cost of capital be used to determine the resource's annual rate of capital cost recovery by submitting the request, along with supporting documentation, in the Existing Capacity Qualification Package. The Internal Market Monitor shall review the request and supporting documentation and may, at its sole discretion, replace the annual rate of capital cost recovery from the table above with a resource-specific value based on an adjusted pre-tax weighted average cost of capital. If the Internal Market Monitor uses an adjusted pre-tax weighted

average cost of capital for the resource, then the resource's annual rate of capital cost recovery will be determined according to the following formula:

$$\frac{\text{Cost Of Capital}}{(1 - (1 + \text{CostOfCapital})^{-\text{RemainingLife}})}$$

Where:

Cost Of Capital = the adjusted pre-tax weighted average cost of capital.

Remaining Life = the remaining life of the existing resource, based on the age of the resource, as indicated in the table above.

**III.13.1.2.4. Retirement Determination Notification for Existing Capacity and Qualification Determination Notification for Existing Capacity.**

(a) No later than five Business Days before the Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline, the ISO shall send notification to the Lead Market Participant that submitted each Permanent De-List Bid and Retirement De-List Bid concerning the result of the Internal Market Monitor's review conducted pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2. This retirement determination notification shall not include the results of the reliability review pursuant to Sections III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1 or III.13.2.5.2.5.

(b) No later than 127 days before the Forward Capacity Auction, the ISO shall send notification to the Lead Market Participant that submitted each Static De-List Bid and Export Bid concerning the result of the Internal Market Monitor's de-list bid review conducted pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2. The qualification determination shall not include the results of the reliability review pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5.

**III.13.1.2.4.1. Participant-Elected Retirement or Conditional Treatment.**

No later than five Business Days after the issuance by the ISO of the retirement determination notification described in Section III.13.1.2.4(a), a Lead Market Participant that submitted a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid may make an election pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(a) or Section III.13.1.2.4.1(b). If the Lead Market Participant does not make an election pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(a) or Section III.13.1.2.4.1(b), the prices provided by the Internal Market Monitor in the retirement determination notifications shall be the finalized prices used in the Forward Capacity Auction as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(b) (unless otherwise directed by the Commission).



(a) A Lead Market Participant may elect to retire the resource, or portion thereof, for which it has submitted a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid. The capacity associated with a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid subject to this election will not be subject to reliability review and will be retired pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3(a); provided, however, that when making the retirement election pursuant to this Section III.13.1.2.4.1(a) the Lead Market Participant may opt to have the resource reviewed for reliability pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1, in which case the Lead Market Participant may have the opportunity (but will not be obligated) to provide capacity from the resource if the ISO determines that the resource is needed for reliability reasons, as described in Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1(d).

(b) A Lead Market Participant may elect conditional treatment for the Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid. The capacity associated with a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid subject to this election will be treated as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(b)(ii), Section III.13.2.5.2.1, and Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3; provided, however, that in making this election the Lead Market Participant may opt to have the resource reviewed for reliability pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1, in which case the Lead Market Participant may have the opportunity (but will not be obligated) to provide capacity from the resource if the ISO determines that the resource is needed for reliability reasons, as described in Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1(d).

**III.13.1.2.5. Optional Existing Capacity Qualification Package for New Generating Capacity Resources Previously Counted as Capacity.**

A resource seeking to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.1.2 (resources previously counted as capacity resources) may elect to submit an Existing Capacity Qualification Package in addition to the New Capacity Show of Interest Form and New Capacity Qualification Package that it is required to submit pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2. The bids contained in an Existing Capacity Qualification Package submitted pursuant to this Section III.13.1.2.5 must clearly indicate which New Generating Capacity Resource the Existing Capacity Qualification Package is associated with, and if accepted in accordance with Section III.13.1.2.3, would only be entered into the Forward Capacity Auction where: (i) the new resource is not accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2; or (ii) no offer from that New Generating Capacity Resource clears in the Forward

Capacity Auction, as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(e). An Existing Capacity Qualification Package submitted pursuant to this Section III.13.1.2.5 must conform in all other respects to the requirements of this Section III.13.1.2.

### **III.13.1.3. Import Capacity.**

The qualification requirements for import capacity shall depend on whether the import capacity is an Existing Import Capacity Resource or a New Import Capacity Resource. Both Existing Import Capacity Resources and New Import Capacity Resources clearing in the Forward Capacity Auction must be backed by one or more External Resources or by an external Control Area throughout the relevant Capacity Commitment Period. An external demand resource may not be an Existing Import Capacity Resource or a New Import Capacity Resource. External nodes shall be established and mapped to Capacity Zones pursuant to the provisions in Attachment K to Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff.

An Elective Transmission Upgrade with an Interconnection Request for Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service under Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff shall be included in the FCM (1) after it has established a contractual association with an Import Capacity Resource and that Import Capacity Resource has met the Forward Capacity Market qualification requirements or (2) after it has met the requirements of an Elective Transmission Upgrade with Long Lead Time Facility treatment pursuant to Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff. An external node for such an Elective Transmission Upgrade will be modeled for participation in the Forward Capacity Market after the Import Capacity Resource meets the requirements to participate in the FCA. The Qualified Capacity of an Import Capacity Resource associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade shall not exceed the Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service Interconnection Request. In order for an Elective Transmission Upgrade to maintain its Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service, an associated Import Capacity Resource must meet the Forward Capacity Market qualification requirements and offer into each Forward Capacity Auction. Otherwise, the Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service will revert to Network Import Interconnection Service for the portion of the Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service for which no Import Capacity Resource is offered into the Forward Capacity Auction and the Elective Transmission Upgrade's Interconnection Agreement will be revised. The provisions in Sections III.13.1.3.5.4, permitting a Capacity Commitment Period Election, and in Section III.13.1.3.5.8, permitting a rationing election, shall apply to a New Import Capacity Resource associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade seeking to reestablish Capacity

Network Import Interconnection Service if the threshold to be treated as a new resource in Section III.13.1.1.1.4 is met. If the threshold to be treated as a new increment in Section III.13.1.1.1.3 is met, only the increment will be eligible for the provisions in Sections III.13.1.3.5.4, permitting a Capacity Commitment Period Election, and in Section III.13.1.3.5.8, permitting a rationing election.

**III.13.1.3.1. Definition of Existing Import Capacity Resource.**

Capacity associated with a multi-year contract entered into before the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline to provide capacity in the New England Control Area from outside of the New England Control Area for a period including the whole Capacity Commitment Period, or capacity from an External Resource that is owned or directly controlled by the Lead Market Participant and which is committed for at least two whole consecutive Capacity Commitment Periods by the Lead Market Participant in the New Capacity Qualification Package, shall participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as an Existing Import Capacity Resource, except that if that Existing Import Capacity Resource has not cleared in a previous Forward Capacity Auction, then the import capacity shall participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Import Capacity Resource.

**III.13.1.3.2. Qualified Capacity for Existing Import Capacity Resources.**

The summer Qualified Capacity and winter Qualified Capacity of an Existing Import Capacity Resource shall be based on the data provided to the ISO during the qualification process, subject to ISO review and verification.

The qualified capacity for the Existing Import Capacity Resources associated with the VJO and NYPA contracts listed in Section III.13.1.3.3.A(c) as of the Capacity Commitment Period beginning June 1, 2014 shall be equal to the lesser of the stated amount in Section III.13.1.3.3.A(c) or the median amount of the energy delivered from the Existing Import Capacity Resource during the New England system coincident peak over the previous five Capacity Commitment Periods at the time of qualification.

**III.13.1.3.3.A Qualification Process for Existing Import Capacity Resources that are not associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade with Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service.**

Existing Import Capacity Resources shall be subject to the same qualification process as Existing Generating Capacity Resources, as described in Section III.13.1.2.3, except as follows:

- (a) The Qualified Capacity shall be the lesser of the multi-year contract values as documented in the new resource qualification determination notification and the capacity clearing in the Forward Capacity Auction to which the new resource qualification determination notification applied.
- (b) The rationing election described in Section III.13.1.2.3.1 shall not apply.
- (c) The Existing Import Capacity Resources associated with contracts listed in the table below may qualify to receive the treatment described in Section III.13.2.7.3A for the duration of the contracts as listed. For each Forward Capacity Auction after the first Forward Capacity Auction, in order for an Existing Import Capacity Resource associated with a contract listed below to qualify for the treatment described in Section III.13.2.7.3A, no later than 10 Business Days prior to the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline, the Market Participant submitting the Existing Import Capacity Resource must also submit to the ISO documentation verifying that the contract will remain in effect throughout the Capacity Commitment Period and that it has not been amended. For the first Forward Capacity Auction, Existing Import Capacity Resources associated with contracts listed in the table below are qualified to receive the treatment described in Section III.13.2.7.3A.

<b>Contract Description</b>	<b>MW</b>	<b>Contract End Date</b>
NYPA: NY — NE: CMEEC	13.2	8/31/2025
NYPA: NY — NE: MMWEC	53.3	8/31/2025
NYPA: NY — NE: Pascoag	2.3	8/31/2025
NYPA: NY— NE: VELCO	15.3	8/31/2025
	84.1	
VJO: Highgate — NE	Up to 225	10/31/2016
VJO: Highgate — NE (extension) (beginning 11/01/2016)	Up to 6	October 2020
VJO: Phase I/II — NE	Up to 110	10/31/2016

- (d) In addition to the review described in Section III.13.1.2.3.2, the Internal Market Monitor shall review each bid from Existing Import Capacity Resources. A bid from an Existing Import Capacity Resource shall be rejected if the Internal Market Monitor determines that the bid may be an attempt to manipulate the Forward Capacity Auction, and the matter will be referred to the Commission in

accordance with the protocols set forth in Appendix A to the Commission's Market Monitoring Policy Statement (111 FERC ¶ 61,267 (2005)).

**III.13.1.3.3.B. Qualification Process for Existing Import Capacity Resources that are associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade with Capacity Import Interconnection Service.**

Existing Import Capacity Resources associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade with Capacity Import Interconnection Service pursuant to Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff shall be subject to the same qualification process as Existing Generating Capacity Resources as described in Section III.13.1.2.3, except the Qualified Capacity shall be the lesser of the multi-year contract values as documented in the new resource qualification determination notification and the capacity clearing in the Forward Capacity Auction to which the new resource qualification determination notification applied.

**III.13.1.3.4. Definition of New Import Capacity Resource.**

Capacity not associated with a multi-year contract entered into before the New Capacity Qualification Deadline to provide capacity in the New England Control Area from outside the New England Control Area for the whole Capacity Commitment Period, but that meets the requirements of Section III.13.1.3.5.1, shall participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Import Capacity Resource. For capacity associated with a multi-year contract entered into before the New Capacity Qualification Deadline to provide capacity in the New England Control Area from outside the New England Control Area for a period including the whole Capacity Commitment Period, or capacity from an External Resource that is owned or directly controlled by the Lead Market Participant and which is committed for at least two whole consecutive Capacity Commitment Periods by the Lead Market Participant in the New Capacity Qualification Package, if the import capacity has not cleared in a previous Forward Capacity Auction, then the import capacity shall participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Import Capacity Resource.

**III.13.1.3.5. Qualification Process for New Import Capacity Resources.**

The qualification process for a New Import Capacity Resource, whether backed by a new External Resource, by one or more existing External Resources, or by an external Control Area, shall be the same as the qualification process for a New Generating Capacity Resource, as described in Section III.13.1.1.2, except as follows:

#### **III.13.1.3.5.1. Documentation of Import.**

(a) For each New Import Capacity Resource, the Project Sponsor submitting the import capacity must also submit: (i) documentation of a one-year contract entered into before the New Capacity Qualification Deadline to provide capacity in the New England Control Area from outside of the New England Control Area for the entire Capacity Commitment Period, including documentation of the MW value of the contract; (ii) documentation of a multi-year contract entered into before the New Capacity Qualification Deadline to provide capacity in the New England Control Area from outside of the New England Control Area for the contract period including the entire Capacity Commitment Period, including documentation of the MW value of the contract; (iii) proof of ownership or direct control over one or more External Resources that will be used to back the New Import Capacity Resource during the Capacity Commitment Period, including information to establish the summer and winter ratings of the resource(s) backing the import; or (iv) documentation for system-backed import capacity that the import capacity will be supported by the Control Area and that the energy associated with that system-backed import capacity will be afforded the same curtailment priority as that Control Area's native load. For each New Import Capacity Resource, the Project Sponsor must specify the interface over which the capacity will be imported. The Project Sponsor must indicate whether the import is associated with any investment in transmission that increases New England's import capability or is associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade with an Interconnection Request for Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service pursuant to Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff that has not yet achieved Commercial Operation as defined in Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff. The Project Sponsor must submit a contract confirming its association with the Elective Transmission Upgrade Interconnection Customer and the ISO will confirm that relationship. If the import will be backed by a single new External Resource, the Project Sponsor submitting the import capacity must also submit a general description of the project's equipment configuration, including a description of the resource technology type ~~(such as those listed in the table in Section III.A.21.1 or some other type).~~

(b) To qualify for Capacity Commitment Periods prior to the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction for which the import capacity is qualifying, the Project Sponsor must submit documentation of one or more one-year contracts for each prior Capacity Commitment Period, entered into before the New Capacity Qualification Deadline to provide capacity in the New England Control Area from outside of the New England Control Area for the entire Capacity Commitment Period, including documentation of the MW value of the contract(s); the Project Sponsor

must also satisfy the relevant requirements of Sections III.13.1.3.5.1(a) , III.13.1.3.5.2, III.13.1.9, and III.13.3.1.1.

**III.13.1.3.5.2. Import Backed by Existing External Resources.**

If the New Import Capacity Resource will be backed by one or more External Resources existing at the time of the Forward Capacity Auction and the capacity will be imported over an interface that has achieved Commercial Operation as defined in Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff, the provisions regarding site control (Section III.13.1.1.2.2.1) and critical path schedule (Section III.13.1.1.2.2.2) shall not apply, and the Project Sponsor shall instead submit a description of how the New Import Capacity Resource will meet its Capacity Supply Obligation in the Capacity Commitment Period(s) for which it seeks to qualify.

If the New Import Capacity Resource will be backed by one or more External Resources existing at the time of the Forward Capacity Auction and the capacity will be imported over an interface that has not achieved Commercial Operation as defined in Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets, the provisions regarding site control (Section III.13.1.1.2.2.1) and critical path schedule (Section III.13.1.1.2.2.2) shall apply in addition to the requirement that the Project Sponsor submit a description of how the New Import Capacity Resource will meet its Capacity Supply Obligation in the Capacity Commitment Period(s) for which it seeks to qualify.

The description must indicate specifically which External Resources will back the New Import Capacity Resource during the Capacity Commitment Period, and if those External Resources are not owned or controlled directly by the Project Sponsor, the description must include a commitment that the External Resources will have sufficient capacity that is not obligated outside the New England Control Area to fully satisfy the New Import Capacity Resource's potential Capacity Supply Obligation during the Capacity Commitment Period and demonstrate how that commitment will be met.

**III.13.1.3.5.3. Imports Backed by an External Control Area.**

If the New Import Capacity Resource will be backed by an external Control Area and the capacity will be imported over an interface that has achieved Commercial Operation as defined in Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff, the provisions regarding site control (Section III.13.1.1.2.2.1) and critical path schedule (Section III.13.1.1.2.2.2) shall not apply, and the Project Sponsor shall instead submit system load and capacity projections for the external Control Area showing

sufficient excess capacity during the Capacity Commitment Period to back the New Import Capacity Resource.

If the New Import Capacity Resource will be backed by an external Control Area and the capacity will be imported over an Elective Transmission Upgrade and the capacity will be imported over an interface that has not achieved Commercial Operation as defined in Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff, the provisions regarding site control (Section III.13.1.1.2.2.1) and critical path schedule (Section III.13.1.1.2.2.2) shall apply in addition to the requirement that the Project Sponsor submit system load and capacity projections for the external Control Area showing sufficient excess capacity during the Capacity Commitment Period to back the New Import Capacity Resource for the length of the multi-year contract.

#### **III.13.1.3.5.3.1. Imports Crossing Intervening Control Areas.**

The preceding rules define requirements associated with the import of capacity from a Control Area, or resources located in a Control Area, directly adjacent to the New England Control Area. Imports of capacity from a Control Area or resources located in a Control Area where such import crosses an intervening Control Area or Control Areas shall comply with the following additional requirements: (1) For imports crossing a single intervening Control Area, the Project Sponsor entering the import contract shall demonstrate, as detailed in the ISO New England Manuals, that the remote Control Area will afford the energy export to the adjacent intervening Control Area the same curtailment priority as its native load, that the adjacent intervening Control Area has procedures in place to explicitly recognize the linkage between the import and re-export of energy in support of the import contract, and that the energy export to the ISO will not be curtailed (except pro-rata with a curtailment of native load) so long as the linked import is flowing. (2) For imports crossing more than one intervening Control Area, in addition to the requirements above, the Project Sponsor entering the import contract shall demonstrate, as detailed in the ISO New England Manuals, by the New Capacity Qualification Deadline, that explicit market and operating procedures exist among the intervening Control Areas to ensure that the energy required to be delivered to the New England Control Area will be guaranteed the same curtailment priority as the intervening native loads, and that none of the intervening Control Areas will curtail the transaction except in conjunction with a curtailment of native load. (3) The Project Sponsor entering the import contract shall demonstrate that capacity it supplies to the New England Control Area will not be recalled or curtailed to satisfy the load of the external Control Area, or that the external Control Area in which it is



located will afford New England Control Area load the same curtailment priority that it affords its own Control Area native load.

#### **III.13.1.3.5.4. Capacity Commitment Period Election.**

The provisions regarding Capacity Commitment Period election (Section III.13.1.1.2.2.4) shall only apply to a New Import Capacity Resource associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade with a Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service Interconnection Request. All other New Import Capacity Resources clearing in the Forward Capacity Auction shall have a Capacity Supply Obligation and shall receive payments only for the one-year Capacity Commitment Period associated with that Forward Capacity Auction.

#### **III.13.1.3.5.5. Initial Interconnection Analysis.**

The provisions regarding initial interconnection analysis (Section III.13.1.1.2.3) shall not apply unless the capacity will be imported over an Elective Transmission Upgrade pursuing Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service pursuant to Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff that has not achieved Commercial Operation as defined in Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff.

#### **III.13.1.3.5.5.A. ~~Cost Offer~~ Information.**

(a) A New Import Capacity Resource that is not subject to the pivotal supplier test in Section III.A.23 is subject to the same offer information submission requirements for a New Generating Capacity Resource that are described in Section III.13.1.1.2.2.3.

(b) A New Import Capacity Resource that is subject to the pivotal supplier test in Section III.A.23 and seeks to specify a price below which it would not accept a Capacity Supply Obligation for that resource, or a portion thereof, that is at or above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold must submit the lowest price at which the resource requests to offer capacity in the Forward Capacity Auction and documentation and information supporting such lowest price, which should include the documentation and information listed in Section III.13.1.1.2.2.3(a) and the expected costs of purchasing power outside the New England Control Area (including transaction costs and supported by forward power price index values or a power price forecast for the applicable Capacity Commitment Period), expected transmission costs outside the New England Control Area, and expected transmission costs associated with importing to the New England Control Area, and may also include reasonable opportunity costs and risk

adjustments. The offer information ~~described in Section III.13.1.1.2.2.3 and Section III.A.21.2~~ may be submitted in the form of a curve (up to five price-quantity pairs) associated with a specific New Import Capacity Resource. The curve may in no case increase the quantity offered as the price decreases. Each price is subject to review by the Internal Market Monitor pursuant to Section III.A.21.2~~43~~ and must include the additional documentation described in that Section.

**III.13.1.3.5.6. Review by Internal Market Monitor of Offers from New Import Capacity Resources.**

In addition to the review described in ~~Section III.13.1.1.2.2.3 and~~ Section III.A.21, the Internal Market Monitor shall review each offer from New Import Capacity Resources. An offer from a New Import Capacity Resource shall be rejected if the Internal Market Monitor determines that the bid may be an attempt to manipulate the Forward Capacity Auction, and the matter will be referred to the Commission in accordance with the protocols set forth in ~~Appendix Section III.A.19 of Market Rule 1 to the Commission's Market Monitoring Policy Statement (111 FERC ¶ 61,267 (2005)).~~

**III.13.1.3.5.7. Qualification Determination Notification for New Import Capacity Resources.**

For New Import Capacity Resources, the qualification determination notification described in Section III.13.1.1.2.8 shall be modified to reflect the differences in the qualification process described in this Section III.13.1.3.5.

No later than seven days after the issuance by the ISO of the qualification determination notification described in Section III.13.1.1.2.8, a Lead Market Participant with a New Import Capacity Resource that is subject to the pivotal supplier test in Section III.A.23 ~~(other than a New Import Capacity Resource that is (i) backed by a single new External Resource and associated with an investment in transmission that increases New England's import capability, or (ii) associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade) and~~ that submitted a request to submit offers in the Forward Capacity Auction ~~at prices that are below the relevant Offer Review Trigger Price as described in Sections III.13.1.1.2.2.3 and III.13.1.3.5~~ pursuant to Section III.13.1.3.5.5.A(b) may: (a) lower the requested offer price of any price-quantity pair submitted to the ISO ~~pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.2.3~~, provided that the revised price is greater than or

equal to the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold, or (b) withdraw any price-quantity pair of a requested offer price.

#### **III.13.1.3.5.8.            Rationing Election.**

New Import Capacity Resources are subject to rationing except New Import Capacity Resource associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade with a Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service Interconnection Request, which are eligible for the rationing election described in Section III.13.1.1.2.2.3(b).

#### **III.13.1.4.                Demand Capacity Resources.**

To participate in a Forward Capacity Auction as a Demand Capacity Resource, a resource must meet the requirements of this Section III.13.1.4. Each Demand Capacity Resource shall be a minimum of 100 kW. An Active Demand Capacity Resource comprises one or more Demand Response Resources located in a single Dispatch Zone. An On-Peak Demand Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource comprises one or more Assets located in a single Load Zone. An On-Peak Demand Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource may consist of Load Management measures, Distributed Generation measures, or a combination thereof, or may consist solely of Energy Efficiency measures. A Demand Capacity Resource may include an end-use customer facility with a Net Supply Capability of 5 MW or more only if the facility's Net Supply Capability does not exceed its Maximum Facility Load. Demand Capacity Resources must comply with all applicable federal, state, and local regulatory, siting, and tariff requirements, including interconnection tariff requirements related to siting, interconnection, and operation of the Demand Capacity Resource. Demand Capacity Resources are not permitted to submit import or export bids or Administrative Export De-List Bids.

#### **III.13.1.4.1.            Definition of New Demand Capacity Resource.**

A New Demand Capacity Resource is an Active Demand Capacity Resource that has not cleared in a previous Forward Capacity Auction, and On-Peak Demand Resource consisting of measures that have not been in service prior to the Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline of the applicable Forward Capacity Auction, or a Seasonal Peak Demand Resource consisting of measures that have not been in service prior to the Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline of the applicable Forward Capacity Auction. A Demand Capacity Resource that has previously been defined as an Existing Demand Capacity Resource shall be considered a New Demand Capacity Resource if it meets one of the conditions listed in Section III.13.1.1.1.2.

**III.13.1.4.1.1. Qualification Process for New Demand Capacity Resources.**

For Forward Capacity Auctions a New Demand Capacity Resource shall have a summer Qualified Capacity and winter Qualified Capacity based on the resource's estimated demand reduction value as submitted and reviewed pursuant to this Section III.13.1.4. The FCA Qualified Capacity for a New Demand Capacity Resource shall be the lesser of the resource's summer Qualified Capacity and winter Qualified Capacity, as adjusted to account for applicable offers composed of separate resources.

(a) For a resource to qualify as a New Demand Capacity Resource, the resource's Project Sponsor must make two separate submissions to the ISO: First, the Project Sponsor must submit estimated demand reduction values and supporting information in the New Demand Capacity Resource Show of Interest Form as described in Section III.13.1.4.1.1.1. Second, the Project Sponsor must submit a New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package as described in Section III.13.1.4.1.1.2.

(b) For a resource to qualify as a New Demand Capacity Resource that is an On-Peak Demand Resource or a Seasonal Peak Demand Resource, the Project Sponsor must in addition submit, as part of the New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package, a Measurement and Verification Plan providing the documentation, analysis, studies and methodologies used to support the estimates described in this Section III.13.1.4.1.1, which shall be reviewed by the ISO to ensure consistency with the measurement and verification requirements pursuant to Section III.13.1.4.3 and the ISO New England Manuals.

**III.13.1.4.1.1.1. New Demand Capacity Resource Show of Interest Form.**

For each resource that a Project Sponsor seeks to offer in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Demand Capacity Resource, the Project Sponsor must submit to the ISO a New Demand Capacity Resource Show of Interest Form as described in this Section III.13.1.4.1.1.1 during the New Capacity Show of Interest Submission Window, as described in Section III.13.1.10. A New Demand Capacity Resource Show of Interest Form for a resource composed of Energy Efficiency measures must represent a resource with a new and unique resource identification number. The ISO may waive the submission of any information not required for evaluation of a project.

A completed New Demand Capacity Resource Show of Interest Form shall include, but is not limited to, the following information: project name; Load Zone within which the Demand Capacity Resource will be

located; the Dispatch Zone within which an Active Demand Capacity Resource will be located; estimated summer and winter demand reduction values (MW) per measure and/or per customer facility (measured at the customer meter and not including losses); estimated total summer and winter demand reduction value of the Demand Capacity Resource (for an Active Demand Capacity Resource, this estimate must be consistent with the baseline calculation methodology in Section III.8.2); supporting documentation (e.g., engineering estimates or documentation of verified savings from comparable projects) to substantiate the reasonableness of the estimated demand reduction values; Demand Capacity Resource type (Active Demand Capacity Resource, On-Peak Demand Resource, or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource); brief Demand Capacity Resource project description including measure type (i.e., Energy Efficiency, Load Management, and/or Distributed Generation); types of facilities at which the measures will be implemented; customer classes and end-uses served; the date by which the Project Sponsor expects to be ready to demonstrate to the ISO that the Demand Capacity Resource described in the Project Sponsor's New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package has achieved its full demand reduction value; ISO Market Participant status and ISO customer identification (if applicable); status under Schedules 22 or 23 of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff (if applicable); project/technical and credit/financial contacts; for individual Distributed Generation projects and Demand Capacity Resource projects from a single facility with a demand reduction value equal to or greater than 5 MW, the Pnode and service address at which the end-use facility is located; capability and experience of the Project Sponsor.

**III.13.1.4.1.1.2. New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package.**

For each resource that a Project Sponsor seeks to offer in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Demand Capacity Resource, the Project Sponsor must submit a New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package no later than the New Capacity Qualification Deadline. The New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package shall conform to the requirements of this Section

III.13.1.4.1.1.2. The ISO may waive the submission of any information not required for evaluation of a project.

**III.13.1.4.1.1.2.1. Source of Funding.**

The Project Sponsor must provide in the New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package the source of funding, which includes, but is not limited to, the following: the source(s) of public benefits funding or private financing, or a funding plan supplemented by information on how previous projects were funded; and a completed ISO credit application.

**III.13.1.4.1.1.2.2. Measurement and Verification Plan.**

For On-Peak Demand Resources and Seasonal Peak Demand Resources, the Project Sponsor must provide in the New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package a Measurement and Verification Plan that complies with the ISO's measurement and verification requirements pursuant to Section III.13.1.4.3 and the ISO New England Manuals.

**III.13.1.4.1.1.2.3. Customer Acquisition Plan.**

(a) A Project Sponsor with more than a single customer must include in the New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package a description of its plan to acquire customers that includes, but is not limited to, the following information: a description of proposed customer market; the estimated size of target market and supporting documentation; a marketing plan with supporting documentation describing the manner in which customers will be recruited; and evidence supporting the viability of the marketing plan.

(b) A Project Sponsor for a New Demand Capacity Resource that includes one or more end-use customer facilities with behind-the-meter generation must include in the New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package information demonstrating that each facility's Net Supply Capability will be less than 5 MW or less than or equal to the facility's Maximum Facility Load.

**III.13.1.4.1.1.2.4. Critical Path Schedule for a Demand Capacity Resource with a Demand Reduction Value of at Least 5 MW at a Single Retail Delivery Point.**

The Project Sponsor of a Demand Capacity Resource with a demand reduction value of at least 5 MW at a single Retail Delivery Point shall provide in the New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package a critical path schedule as set forth in Section III.13.1.1.2.2.2.

**III.13.1.4.1.1.2.5. Critical Path Schedule for a Demand Capacity Resource with All Retail Delivery Points Having a Demand Reduction Value of Less Than 5 MW.**

The Project Sponsor of a Demand Capacity Resource with all Retail Delivery Points having a demand reduction value of less than 5 MW shall provide in the New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package a critical path schedule comprised of a delivery schedule of the share of total offered demand reduction value achieved as of target dates, as follows: (i) the cumulative percentage of total demand reduction value achieved on target date 1 occurring five weeks prior to the first annual Forward Capacity

Auction after the Forward Capacity Auction in which the Project Sponsor's capacity award was made; (ii) the cumulative percentage of total demand reduction value achieved on target date 2 occurring five weeks prior to the second annual Forward Capacity Auction after the Forward Capacity Auction in which the Project Sponsor's capacity award was made; and (iii) target date 3 which is the date by which the Project Sponsor expects to be ready to demonstrate to the ISO that the Demand Capacity Resource described in the Project Sponsor's New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package has achieved its full demand reduction value, which must be on or before the first day of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period and by which date 100% of total demand reduction value must be complete.

**III.13.1.4.1.1.2.6. [Reserved.]**

**III.13.1.4.1.1.2.7. Capacity Commitment Period Election.**

Project Sponsors shall be required to specify whether they are making the election set forth in this Section III.13.1.4.1.1.2.7 for each Forward Capacity Auction up to and including the auction held in February 2021 for the June 1, 2024 through May 31, 2025 Capacity Commitment Period, and no election shall be permitted thereafter.

For each Forward Capacity Auction occurring up to and including the February 2021 auction, in the New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package, the Project Sponsor must specify whether, if its New Demand Capacity Resource offer clears in the Forward Capacity Auction, the associated Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price (indexed for inflation) shall continue to apply after the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction in which the offer clears, for up to six additional and consecutive Capacity Commitment Periods, in whole Capacity Commitment Period increments only. If no such election is made in the New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package, the Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price associated with the New Demand Capacity Resource offer shall apply only for the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction in which the New Demand Capacity Resource offer clears. If the Project Sponsor elects to have the Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price continue to apply after the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction in which the offer clears, then the Project Sponsor may not change the Demand Capacity Resource type as long as that Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price continue to apply. If an offer from a New Demand Capacity Resource clears in the Forward Capacity Auction, the capacity associated with the resulting Capacity Supply Obligation may not be subject to any type of de-list or export bid in subsequent Forward Capacity Auctions for Capacity Commitment Periods for which the Project Sponsor elected to

have the Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price continue to apply pursuant to this Section III.13.1.4.1.1.2.7.

**III.13.1.4.1.1.2.8. Offer Information ~~f~~From New Demand Capacity Resources.**

(a) ~~For a All New Demand Capacity Resources that might submit offers in the Forward Capacity Auction at prices below the relevant Offer Review Trigger Price does not satisfy any of the conditions described in Sections III.A.21.1.1 or III.A.21.1.2 based on the information submitted at the time of the New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package, and for which the Project Sponsor does not provide a Load-Side Relationship Certification described in Section III.A.21.1.3, the Project Sponsor must include in the New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package the lowest price at which the resource requests to offer capacity in the Forward Capacity Auction and ~~supporting documentation justifying that price as competitive in light of the resource's costs (as described in Section III.A.21)~~ sufficient documentation and information for a buyer-sider market power review pursuant to Section III.A.21.2. Such documentation and information includes all financial estimates, projected revenues, and cost projections for the project, including the project's pro-forma financing support data and anticipated out-of-market revenues (as defined in Section III.A.21.3(b)(i)). For a New Demand Capacity Resource that has achieved commercial operation prior to the New Capacity Qualification Deadline, such documentation should also include all financial data of actual incurred capital costs, actual operating costs, and actual revenues since the date of commercial operation. ~~This price is subject to review by the Internal Market Monitor pursuant to Section III.A.21.2 and must include the additional documentation described in that section.~~~~

A Project Sponsor that submits a Load-Side Relationship Certification as part of the New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package pursuant to Section III.13.1.4.1.1.2.9 must be prepared to provide both (1) the lowest price at which the resource requests to offer capacity in the Forward Capacity Auction and (2) the documentation and information described in this subsection (a), in the event that the ISO determines that the Load-Side Relationship Certification does not meet the requirements of Section III.A.21.1.3.

(b) The Project Sponsor for a New Demand Capacity Resource must indicate in the New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package if an offer from the New Demand Capacity Resource may be rationed. A Project Sponsor may specify a single MW quantity to which offers may be rationed. Without



such indication, offers will only be accepted or rejected in whole. This rationing election shall apply for the entire Forward Capacity Auction.

**III.13.1.4.1.2.9. Load-Side Interests.**

If the Project Sponsor seeks to demonstrate one of the qualifying circumstances described in Section III.A.21.1.3 with regard to its New Demand Capacity Resource, the Project Sponsor must provide the Load-Side Relationship Certification in the New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package.

**III.13.1.4.1.1.3. Initial Analysis for Active Demand Capacity Resources.**

For each New Demand Capacity Resource that is an Active Demand Capacity Resource, the ISO shall perform an analysis based on the information provided in the New Demand Capacity Resource Show of Interest Form to determine the amount of capacity that the resource could provide by the start of the associated Capacity Commitment Period. This analysis shall be performed consistent with the criteria and conditions described in ISO New England Planning Procedures. Where, as a result of this analysis, the ISO determines that because of overlapping interconnection impacts, such a New Demand Capacity Resource that is otherwise accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction in accordance with the other provisions and requirements of this Section III.13.1 cannot deliver any of the capacity that it would otherwise be able to provide (in the absence of the other relevant Existing Capacity Resources), then that New Demand Capacity Resource will not be accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction.

**III.13.1.4.1.1.4. Consistency of the New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package and New Demand Capacity Resource Show of Interest Form.**

The ISO shall review the Project Sponsor's New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package for consistency with its New Demand Capacity Resource Show of Interest Form. The New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package may not contain material changes relative to the New Demand Capacity Resource Show of Interest Form. A material change may include, but is not limited to the following: (i) a change in the designation of the Demand Capacity Resource type; (ii) a change in the Project Sponsor, subject to review by the ISO of the capability and experience of the new Project Sponsor; (iii) a change in the Load Zone within which the project is located, and a change in the Dispatch Zone within which the Active Demand Capacity Resource is located; (iv) a change in the total summer or winter demand reduction value of the project by more than 30 percent; (v) a change in the general type of

measure being implemented (e.g., Energy Efficiency, Load Management, Distributed Generation); or (vi) a misrepresentation of the interconnection status of a Distributed Generation project.

**III.13.1.4.1.1.5. Evaluation of New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Materials.**

The ISO shall review the information submitted by New Demand Capacity Resources and shall determine whether the information submitted complies with the requirements set forth in this Section III.13.1.4 and whether, based on the information provided, the Demand Capacity Resource is accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction. In making these determinations, the ISO may consider, but is not limited to consideration of, the following:

- (a) whether the information submitted by New Demand Capacity Resources is accurate and contains all of the elements required by this Section III.13.1.4;
- (b) whether the critical path schedule submitted by New Demand Capacity Resources includes all necessary elements and is sufficiently developed;
- (c) whether the milestones in the critical path schedule submitted by New Demand Capacity Resources are reasonable and likely to be met;
- (d) whether, in the case of a resource previously counted as a capacity resource, the requirements for treatment as a New Demand Capacity Resource are satisfied; and
- (e) whether, in the case of a New Demand Capacity Resource that is an On-Peak Demand Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource, the Measurement and Verification Plan complies with the ISO's measurement and verification requirements pursuant to Section III.13.1.4.3 and the ISO New England Manuals.

**III.13.1.4.1.1.6. Qualification Determination Notification for New Demand Capacity Resources.**

No later than 127 days prior to the relevant Forward Capacity Auction, the ISO shall send notification to Project Sponsors for each New Demand Capacity Resource indicating whether the New Demand Capacity Resource has been accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction.

(a) For a New Demand Capacity Resource accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction, the notification will specify the Demand Capacity Resource type and the Demand Capacity Resource's summer and winter Qualified Capacity, which shall be the ISO-determined summer and winter demand reduction value increased by average avoided peak transmission and distribution losses (that is, eight percent).

(b) For a New Demand Capacity Resource accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction, the notification will provide the ISO's determination as to whether the New Demand Capacity Resource satisfies any of the conditions described in Section III.A.21.1 and the basis for such determination.

(c) For a New Demand Capacity Resource accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction and subject to buyer-side market power review pursuant to Section III.A.21.2, the notification will provide the Internal Market Monitor's determinations regarding whether the New Demand Capacity Resource's requested lowest offer price, submitted pursuant to Section III.13.1.4.1.1.2.8(a), must be mitigated, as described in Section III.A.21.2.3.- The ISO shall not disclose to the Project Sponsor any information regarding the potential impact of any offer from the Project Sponsor on Capacity Clearing Prices.

(d) For a New Demand Capacity Resource not accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction, the notification will provide an explanation as to why the resource did not meet the requirements set forth in this Section III.13.1.4 and was not accepted.

#### **III.13.1.4.2. Definition of Existing Demand Capacity Resources.**

Demand Capacity Resources that previously have been in service and registered with the ISO, and which are not otherwise New Demand Capacity Resources, shall be Existing Demand Capacity Resources. Existing Demand Capacity Resources shall include and are limited to Demand Capacity Resources that have been in service and registered with the ISO to fulfill a Capacity Supply Obligation created by clearing in a past Forward Capacity Auction before the Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline of the applicable Forward Capacity Auction. Except as specified in this Section III.13.1.4, Existing Demand Capacity Resources shall be subject to the same qualification process as Existing Generating Capacity Resources, as described in Section III.13.1.2.3. Existing Demand Capacity Resources shall be subject to Section III.13.1.2.2.5.2. An On-Peak Demand Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource may not

include in its summer or winter demand reduction value an Energy Efficiency measure whose Measure Life will expire before the beginning of the applicable season of the associated Capacity Commitment Period.

**III.13.1.4.2.A                      Qualified Capacity for Existing Demand Capacity Resources.**

(a) For Existing Demand Capacity Resources composed of Energy Efficiency measures, the summer (or winter, as applicable) Qualified Capacity shall equal the lesser of: (i) the sum of the summer (or winter, as applicable) demand reduction values of the installed Energy Efficiency measures as of the Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline (excluding any capacity that will retire or permanently de-list, or whose Measure Life will expire, prior to start of the applicable season of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period, and increased by average avoided peak transmission and distribution losses) and any summer (or winter, as applicable) capacity that has cleared in a Forward Capacity Auction and has not yet achieved FCM Commercial Operation (provided that such capacity is being monitored by the ISO pursuant to the provisions of Section III.13.3, is expected to achieve all its critical path schedule milestones prior to the start of the applicable season of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period, and for which the Lead Market Participant or Project Sponsor has met all relevant financial assurance requirements as described in Section III.13.1.9 and in the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy) and (ii) the amount of summer (or winter, as applicable) capacity that cleared in a Forward Capacity Auction as a New Demand Capacity Resource.

(b) For Existing Demand Capacity Resources other than those composed of Energy Efficiency measures, the summer and winter Qualified Capacity shall equal the summer and winter demand reduction value, respectively, increased by average avoided peak transmission and distribution losses.

**III.13.1.4.2.1.                      Qualified Capacity Notification for Existing Demand Capacity Resources.**

(a) For each Existing Demand Capacity Resource, the ISO will notify the Resource's Lead Market Participant no later than 15 Business Days before the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline of: the Demand Capacity Resource type; summer and winter Qualified Capacity; the Load Zone in which the Demand Capacity Resource is located; and, for Active Demand Capacity Resources, the Dispatch Zone in which the resource is located.

(b) If the Lead Market Participant believes that the ISO's assessment of the Qualified Capacity is inaccurate, the Market Participant must notify the ISO within five Business Days of receipt of the Qualified Capacity notification.

(c) If a Market Participant with an Existing On-Peak Demand Resource or Existing Seasonal Peak Demand Resource wishes to change its Demand Capacity Resource type, the Market Participant must submit an Updated Measurement and Verification Plan to reflect the change in its resource type. Updated Measurement and Verification Plans must be received by the ISO no later than five Business Days after receipt of the Qualified Capacity notification. Designation of the Demand Capacity Resource type may not be changed during the Capacity Commitment Period.

(d) A Market Participant with an Existing On-Peak Demand Resource or Existing Seasonal Peak Demand Resource may provide an Updated Measurement and Verification Plan as described in Section III.13.1.4.3.1.2 that complies with the ISO's measurement and verification requirements pursuant to Section III.13.1.4.3 and the ISO New England Manuals. Updated Measurement and Verification Plans must be received by the ISO no later than five Business Days after receipt of the Qualified Capacity notification.

(e) If an Existing Demand Capacity Resource is not submitting a Static De-List Bid, Permanent De-List Bid, or Retirement De-List Bid for the Forward Capacity Auction, then no further submissions or actions for that resource are necessary, and the resource shall participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(c) with Qualified Capacity as indicated in the ISO's notification.

#### **III.13.1.4.2.2. Existing Demand Capacity Resource De-List Bids.**

An Existing Demand Capacity Resource may submit a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid pursuant to the provisions of Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5 no later than the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline or a Static De-List Bid pursuant to the provisions of Section III.13.1.2.3.1.1 no later than the Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline, provided, however, that no de-list bid shall be used as a mechanism to inappropriately qualify Assets associated with Existing Demand Capacity Resources as New Demand Capacity Resources.

#### **III.13.1.4.3. Measurement and Verification Applicable to On-Peak Demand Resources and Seasonal Peak Demand Resources.**

To demonstrate the demand reduction value of an On-Peak Demand Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource, the Project Sponsor or Market Participant of such a resource participating in the Forward Capacity Auction, Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals, or reconfiguration auctions shall submit to the ISO the Measurement and Verification Documents in accordance with this Section III.13.1.4.3 and the ISO New England Manuals. The ISO shall review such Measurement and Verification Documents to determine whether they are consistent with the measurement and verification requirements set forth in this Section III.13.1.4.3 and the ISO New England Manuals.

**III.13.1.4.3.1. Measurement and Verification Documents.**

Measurement and Verification Documents must demonstrate both availability and performance of an On-Peak Demand Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource in reducing demand coincident with Demand Resource On-Peak Hours or Demand Resource Seasonal Peak Hours such that the reported monthly demand reduction value shall achieve at least a ten percent relative precision and an eighty percent confidence interval as described and applied in the ISO New England Manuals and ISO New England Operating Procedures. The Measurement and Verification Documents shall serve as the basis for the claimed demand reduction value of an On-Peak Demand Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource. The Measurement and Verification Documents shall document the measurement and verification performed to verify the achieved demand reduction value of the On-Peak Demand Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource. The Measurement and Verification Documents shall contain a projection of the On-Peak Demand Resource's or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource's demand reduction value for each month of the Capacity Commitment Period and over the expected Measure Lives associated with the Demand Capacity Resources. An On-Peak Demand Resource's or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource's Measurement and Verification Documents must describe the methodology used to calculate electrical energy load reduction or output during Demand Resource On-Peak Hours, or Demand Resource Seasonal Peak Hours. If an On-Peak Demand Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource includes Distributed Generation, the Measurement and Verification Documents must describe the individual metering or metering protocol used to monitor and verify the output of the Distributed Generation, consistent with the measurement and verification requirements set forth in Market Rule 1 and the ISO New England Manuals.

The Measurement and Verification Documents shall include a Measurement and Verification Plan submitted in the Forward Capacity Auction Qualification, as described in Section III.13.1.4.3 and a monthly Measurement and Verification Summary Report during the Capacity Commitment Period. The

monthly Measurement and Verification Summary Reports shall reference the measurement and verification protocols and performance data documented in the Measurement and Verification Plan or the Measurement and Verification Reference Report(s). Such monthly Measurement and Verification Summary Reports will document the Project Sponsor's total demand reduction value from eligible pre-existing measures and new measures, and the Project Sponsor's total demand reduction value from both eligible pre-existing measures and new measures, for all measures it had in operation as of the end of the previous month. The monthly Measurement and Verification Summary Reports shall be based on Measurement and Verification Documents determined in accordance with Market Rule 1 and the ISO New England Manuals, and shall be the basis for monthly settlement with Project Sponsors. All Measurement and Verification Documents shall conform to the ISO's specifications with respect to content, format and delivery methodology, and shall be submitted in accordance with the timelines and deadlines set forth in Market Rule 1 and the ISO New England Manuals.

**III.13.1.4.3.1.1. Optional Measurement and Verification Reference Reports.**

At the option of the Project Sponsor, the Measurement and Verification Documents for an On-Peak Demand Resource or a Seasonal Peak Demand Resource may also include one or more Measurement and Verification Reference Report(s) submitted during the Capacity Commitment Period subject to the schedule in the Measurement and Verification Plan and consistent with the schedule and reporting standards set forth in the ISO New England Manuals. Measurement and Verification Reference Reports shall update the prospective demand reduction value of the On-Peak Demand Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource based on measurement and verification studies performed during the Capacity Commitment Period.

**III.13.1.4.3.1.2. Updated Measurement and Verification Documents.**

At the option of the Project Sponsor, an Updated Measurement and Verification Plan for an On-Peak Demand Resource or a Seasonal Peak Demand Resource may be submitted during a subsequent Forward Capacity Auction qualification process prior to the beginning of the Capacity Commitment Period of the Demand Capacity Resource project. The Updated Measurement and Verification Plan may include updated project specifications, measurement and verification protocols, and performance data. However, the Updated Measurement and Verification Plan shall not modify for the duration of the Capacity Commitment Period the total claimed demand reduction value or the Demand Capacity Resource type from the applicable Forward Capacity Auction in which the Project Sponsor's offer cleared. Additionally, the Updated Measurement and Verification Plan shall provide measurement and verification consistent

with the requirements specified in the ISO New England Manuals, and shall be comparable to the quality of the original Measurement and Verification Plan accepted during the Forward Capacity Auction qualification process in which the Demand Capacity Resource project cleared the Forward Capacity Auction.

**III.13.1.4.3.1.3. Annual Certification of Accuracy of Measurement and Verification Documents.**

Project Sponsors for On-Peak Demand Resources and Seasonal Peak Demand Resources shall submit no less frequently than once per year, a statement certifying that the Demand Capacity Resource projects for which the Project Sponsor is requesting compensation continue to perform in accordance with the submitted Measurement and Verification Documents reviewed by the ISO. One such statement must be received by the ISO no later than 10 Business Days before the Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline.

**III.13.1.4.3.1.4. Record Requirement of Retail Customers Served.**

For On-Peak Demand Resources and Seasonal Peak Demand Resources targeting customer facilities with greater than or equal to 10 kW of demand reduction value per facility, Project Sponsors shall maintain records of retail customers served including, at a minimum, the retail customer's address, the customer's utility distribution company, utility distribution company account identifier, measures installed, and corresponding monthly demand reduction values. For On-Peak Demand Resources and Seasonal Peak Demand Resources targeting customer facilities with under 10 kW of demand reduction value per facility, the Project Sponsor shall maintain records as described above for customer facilities with greater than or equal to 10 kW of demand reduction value per facility, or shall maintain records of aggregated demand reduction value and measures installed by Load Zone and meter domain. Project Sponsors shall maintain such records until the end of the Measure Life, or until the Demand Capacity Resource is permanently delisted from the Forward Capacity Market, and shall submit such records to the ISO upon request in a readable electronic format.

**III.13.1.4.3.2. ISO Review of Measurement and Verification Documents.**

The ISO shall review the Measurement and Verification Documents and complete such review and identify any necessary modifications in accordance with the Forward Capacity Auction qualification process as described in Section III.13.1 and pursuant to the ISO New England Manuals. In its review of the Measurement and Verification Documents, the ISO may consult with the Project Sponsor or Lead Market Participant to seek clarification, to gather additional necessary information, or to address



questions or concerns arising from the materials submitted. At the discretion of the ISO, the ISO may consider revisions or additions to the Measurement and Verification Documents resulting from such consultation; provided, however, that in no case shall the ISO consider revisions or additions to the Measurement and Verification Documents if the ISO believes that such consideration cannot be properly accomplished within the time periods established for the qualification process.

### **III.13.1.5. Offers Composed of Separate Resources.**

Separate resources seeking to participate together in a Forward Capacity Auction shall submit a composite offer form no later than 10 Business Days after the date on which the ISO provides qualification determination notifications, as described in Section III.13.1.1.2.8, Section III.13.1.2.4, and Section III.13.1.4.1.1.6. Offers composed of separate resources may not be modified or withdrawn after the deadline for submission of the composite offer form. Separate resources may together participate in a Forward Capacity Auction as a single resource if the following conditions are met:

(a) In all months of the summer period (June through September where the summer resource is not a Demand Capacity Resource, April through November where the summer resource is a Demand Capacity Resource) of the Capacity Commitment Period, only one resource may be used to supply the amount of capacity offered during the entire summer period. In all months of the winter period (October through May where the summer resource is not a Demand Capacity Resource, December through March where the summer resource is a Demand Capacity Resource) of the Capacity Commitment Period, multiple resources may be combined to supply the amount of capacity offered, provided that: (i) the resources together meet the amount of the offer in all months of the winter period; and (ii) to combine for a month, that month must be considered a winter month for both the summer resource and the resource combining with that summer resource in that month.

(b) Each resource that is part of an offer composed of separate resources must qualify in accordance with all of the provisions of this Section III.13.1.5 applicable to that resource type. An offer composed of separate resources participates in the Forward Capacity Auction in accordance with the resource type of the resource providing capacity in the summer period. A resource electing (pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.2.4 or Section III.13.1.4.1.1.2.7) to have the Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price continue to apply after the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction in which its New Capacity Offer clears shall not be eligible to participate in an offer composed of separate resources as the resource providing capacity in the summer period in the Forward

Capacity Auction in which the resource is a New Generating Capacity Resource or New Demand Capacity Resource.

(c) The summer Qualified Capacity of an offer composed of separate resources shall be the summer Qualified Capacity of the single resource that will provide the Capacity Supply Obligation during the summer period. If the summer Qualified Capacity of an offer composed of separate resources is greater than the winter capacity for any month, then the provisions of Section III.13.1.2.2.5.2 shall apply, even where any of the resources comprising the offer composed of separate resources is an Intermittent Power Resource. If the winter capacity of the offer composed of separate resources in any month is higher than the summer Qualified Capacity, then the capacity offered from the winter resources will be reduced pro-rata to equal the summer Qualified Capacity.

(d) Offers composed of separate resources are subject to the locational restrictions specified in the following table:

		Location of Summer Resource			
		Import-Constrained Capacity Zone	Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone	Export-Constrained Capacity Zone	Nested Export-Constrained Capacity Zone
<b>Location of Winter Resource</b>	Import-Constrained Capacity Zone	Eligible (within same Capacity Zone)	Eligible	Eligible	Eligible
	Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone	Ineligible	Eligible	Eligible	Eligible
	Export-Constrained Capacity Zone	Ineligible	Ineligible	Eligible (within same Capacity Zone)	Eligible (within same Capacity Zone where nested export-constrained Capacity Zone is located)
	Nested Export-Constrained Capacity Zone	Ineligible	Ineligible	Ineligible	Eligible (within same Capacity Zone)

(e) A Renewable Technology Resource may only participate in an offer composed of separate resources if its FCA Qualified Capacity has not been prorated pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.10.

**III.13.1.5.A. Notification of FCA Qualified Capacity.**

No later than five Business Days after the deadline for submission of offers composed of separate resources, the ISO shall notify the Project Sponsor or Lead Market Participant for each New Generating Capacity Resource, New Import Capacity Resource, and New Demand Capacity Resource of the resource's final FCA Qualified Capacity for the Forward Capacity Auction. Such notification will detail the resource's financial assurance requirements in accordance with Section III.13.1.9.

**III.13.1.6. Self-Supplied FCA Resources.**

Where a Project Sponsor elects to designate all or a portion of a New Generating Capacity Resource or an Existing Generating Capacity Resource as a Self-Supplied FCA Resource, the Project Sponsor must make such designation in writing to the ISO no later than the date by which the Project Sponsor is required to submit the FCM Deposit and, if the Project Sponsor is not also the associated load serving entity, the Project Sponsor must at that time provide written confirmation from the load serving entity regarding the Self-Supplied FCA Resource designation. A New Import Capacity Resource or Existing Import Capacity Resource may be designated as a Self-Supplied FCA Resource. All Self-Supplied FCA Resources shall be subject to the eligibility and locational requirements in this Section III.13.1.6. If designated as a Self-Supplied FCA Resource and otherwise accepted in the qualification process, the resource will clear in the Forward Capacity Auction as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(c) and, with the exception of demand programs for Self-Supplied FCA Resources, shall offset an equal amount of the load serving entity's Capacity Load Obligation in the Capacity Commitment Period. A load serving entity seeking to self-supply using a Demand Capacity Resource shall realize the benefit through the actual reduction in its annual system coincident peak load, shall not receive credit for a resource and, therefore, is not required to participate in the qualification process described in this Section III.13.1. All designations as a Self-Supplied FCA Resource in the Forward Capacity Auction qualification process are binding.

**III.13.1.6.1. Self-Supplied FCA Resource Eligibility.**

Where all or a portion of a resource is designated as a Self-Supplied FCA Resource, it shall also maintain its status as a New Generating Capacity Resource, Existing Generating Capacity Resource, New Import Capacity Resource or Existing Import Capacity Resource, and must satisfy the Forward Capacity Auction

qualification process requirements set forth in the remainder of Section III.13.1 applicable to that resource type, in addition to the requirements of this Section III.13.1.6. Where an offer composed of separate resources is designated as a Self-Supplied FCA Resource, all of the requirements and deadlines specified in Section III.13.1.5 shall apply to that offer, in addition to the requirements of this Section III.13.1.6. The total quantity of capacity that an load serving entity designates as Self-Supplied FCA Resources may not exceed the load serving entity's projected share of the Installed Capacity Requirement during the Capacity Commitment Period which shall be calculated by determining the load serving entity's most recent percentage share of the Installed Capacity Requirement multiplied by the projected Installed Capacity Requirement for the commitment year. No resource may be designated as a Self-Supplied FCA Resource for more MW than the lesser of that resource's summer Qualified Capacity and winter Qualified Capacity.

**III.13.1.6.2. Locational Requirements for Self-Supplied FCA Resources.**

In order to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a Self-Supplied FCA Resource for a load in an import-constrained Capacity Zone, the Self-Supplied FCA Resource must be located in the same Capacity Zone as the associated load, unless the Self-Supplied FCA Resource is a pool-planned unit or other unit with a special allocation of Capacity Transfer Rights. In order to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a Self-Supplied FCA Resource in an export-constrained Capacity Zone for a load outside that export-constrained Capacity Zone, the Self-Supplied FCA Resource must be a pool-planned unit or other unit with a special allocation of Capacity Transfer Rights.

**III.13.1.7. Internal Market Monitor Review of Offers and Bids.**

In addition to the other provisions of this Section III.13.1, the Internal Market Monitor shall have the authority to review in the qualification process each resource's summer and winter Seasonal Claimed Capability if it is significantly lower than historical values, and if the Internal Market Monitor determines that it may be an attempt to exercise physical withholding, the matter will be referred to the Commission in accordance with the protocols set forth in Appendix A to the Commission's Market Monitoring Policy Statement (111 FERC ¶ 61,267 (2005)). Where an entity submits: (i) an offer as a New Generating Capacity Resource, a New Import Capacity Resource or a New Demand Capacity Resource; and (ii) a Static De-List Bid, a Permanent De-List Bid, a Retirement De-List Bid, an Export Bid or an Administrative Export De-List Bid in the same Forward Capacity Auction, the Internal Market Monitor shall take appropriate steps to ensure that the resource bid to de-list, retire or export in the Forward Capacity Auction is not inappropriately replaced by that new capacity in a subsequent reconfiguration

auction or Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral. In its review of any offer or bid pursuant to this Section III.13.1.7, the Internal Market Monitor may consult with the Project Sponsor or Market Participant, as appropriate, to seek clarification, or to address questions or concerns regarding the materials submitted.

**III.13.1.8. Publication of Offer and Bid Information.**

- (a) Resource name, quantity and Load Zone (or interface, as applicable) in which the resource is located about each Permanent De-list Bid and Retirement De-List Bid will be posted no later than 15 days after the Forward Capacity Auction is conducted.
- (b) The quantity and Load Zone (or interface, as applicable) in which the resource is located of each Static De-List Bid will be posted no later than 15 days after the Forward Capacity Auction is conducted.
- (c) Name of submitter, quantity, and interface of Export Bids and Administrative Export Bids shall be published no later than 15 days after the Forward Capacity Auction is conducted.
- (d) Name of submitter, quantity, and interface about offers from New Import Capacity Resources shall be published no later than 15 days after the Forward Capacity Auction is conducted.
- (e) No later than three Business Days after the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline, the ISO shall post on its website information concerning Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids.
- (f) The name of each Lead Market Participant submitting Static De-List Bids, Export Bids, and Administrative Export De-List Bids, as well as the number and type of such de-list bids submitted by each Lead Market Participant, shall be published no later than three Business Days after the ISO issues the qualification determination notifications described in Sections III.13.1.1.2.8, III.13.1.2.4(b), and III.13.1.3.5.7. Authorized Persons of Authorized Commissions will be provided confidential access to full information about posted Static De-list Bids, Permanent De-List Bids, and Retirement De-List Bids upon request pursuant to Section 3.3 of the ISO New England Information Policy.
- (g) No later than five Business Days after the close of the New Capacity Show of Interest Submission Window, the ISO shall post on its website the aggregate quantity of supply offers and demand bids that have been elected to participate in the substitution auction by Capacity Zone (where the zones used are

those being studied for inclusion in the associated Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to Section III.12.4).

**III.13.1.9. Financial Assurance.**

Except as noted in this Section III.13.1.9, all financial assurance requirements associated with Forward Capacity Auctions and annual reconfiguration auctions and other payments and charges resulting from the Forward Capacity Market shall be governed by the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**III.13.1.9.1. Financial Assurance for New Generating Capacity Resources and New Demand Capacity Resources Participating in the Forward Capacity Auction.**

In order to participate in any Forward Capacity Auction, New Generating Capacity Resources (including Conditional Qualified New Resources) and New Demand Capacity Resources shall be required to meet the financial assurance requirements as described in the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy. Timely payment of the FCM Deposit by the Project Sponsor for a New Generating Capacity Resource or New Demand Capacity Resource accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction constitutes a commitment to offer the full FCA Qualified Capacity of that New Generating Capacity Resource or New Demand Capacity Resource in the Forward Capacity Auction at the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price. If the FCM Deposit is not received within the timeframe specified in the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy, the New Generating Capacity Resource or New Demand Capacity Resource shall not be permitted to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction. If capacity offered by the New Generating Capacity Resource or New Demand Capacity Resource clears in the Forward Capacity Auction, financial assurance required prior to the auction pursuant to FAP shall be applied toward the resource's financial assurance obligation, as described in the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy. If no capacity offered by that New Generating Capacity Resource or New Demand Capacity Resource clears in the Forward Capacity Auction, the financial assurance required prior to the auction pursuant to FAP will be released pursuant to the terms of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**III.13.1.9.2. Financial Assurance for New Generating Capacity Resources and New Demand Capacity Resources Clearing in a Forward Capacity Auction.**

Where a New Generating Capacity Resource's offer or a New Demand Capacity Resource's offer is accepted in a Forward Capacity Auction, that resource must provide financial assurance as described in the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**III.13.1.9.2.1. Failure to Provide Financial Assurance or to Meet Milestone.**

If a New Generating Capacity Resource or New Demand Capacity Resource: (i) fails to provide the required financial assurance as described in the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy or (ii) has its Capacity Supply Obligation terminated by the ISO pursuant to Section III.13.3.4A, it shall lose its Capacity Supply Obligation and its right to any payments associated with that Capacity Supply Obligation, and it shall forfeit any financial assurance provided with respect to that Capacity Supply Obligation.

**III.13.1.9.2.2. Release of Financial Assurance.**

Once a New Generating Capacity Resource or New Demand Capacity Resource achieves FCM Commercial Operation, its financial assurance obligation shall be released pursuant to the terms of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy and it shall have the same financial assurance requirements as an Existing Generating Capacity Resource, as governed by the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy. If a New Generating Capacity Resource or New Demand Capacity Resource is only capable of delivering less than the amount of capacity that cleared in the Forward Capacity Auction, then the portion of its financial assurance associated with the shortfall shall be forfeited.

**III.13.1.9.2.2.1. [Reserved.]**

**III.13.1.9.2.3. Forfeit of Financial Assurance.**

Where any financial assurance is forfeited pursuant to the provisions of Section III.13, there shall be no further coverage for such forfeit under the ISO New England Billing Policy. Any financial assurance that is forfeited pursuant to Section III.13 shall be used to reduce charges incurred by load in the relevant Capacity Zone.

**III.13.1.9.2.4. Financial Assurance for New Import Capacity Resources.**

A New Import Capacity Resource that is backed by a new External Resource or will be delivered over an Elective Transmission Upgrade with a Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service Interconnection Request pursuant to Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff shall be

subject to the same financial assurance requirements as a New Generating Capacity Resource, as described in Section III.13.1.9.1 and Section III.13.1.9.2. Once the new External Resource or the Elective Transmission Upgrade achieves FCM Commercial Operation, the New Import Capacity Resource shall be subject to the same financial assurance requirements as an Existing Generating Capacity Resource, as described in Section III.13.1.9. A New Import Capacity Resource that is backed by one or more existing External Resources or by an external Control Area shall be subject to the same financial assurance requirements as an Existing Generating Capacity Resource, as governed by the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

### **III.13.1.9.3. Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit.**

For each New Capacity Show of Interest Form and New Demand Capacity Resource Show of Interest Form submitted for the purposes of qualifying for either a Forward Capacity Auction or reconfiguration auction, the Project Sponsor must submit to the ISO a refundable deposit in the amount shown in the table below (“Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit”). The Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit must be received in accordance with the ISO New England Billing Policy. Such deposit shall be used for costs incurred by the ISO and its consultants, including the documented and reasonably-incurred costs of the affected Transmission Owners, associated with the qualification process described in Section III.13.1 and with the critical path schedule monitoring described in Section III.13.3. An additional Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit is not required if: (i) the Project Sponsor is actively seeking qualification for another Forward Capacity Auction or annual reconfiguration auction, or is having the project’s critical path schedule monitored pursuant to Section III.13.3; and (ii) the costs already incurred in the qualification process and critical path schedule monitoring do not equal or exceed 90 percent of the amount of the previously-submitted Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit(s). The ISO shall provide the Project Sponsor with an annual statement in writing of the costs incurred by the ISO and its consultants, including the documented and reasonably-incurred costs of the affected Transmission Owner(s), associated with the qualification process and critical path schedule monitoring. In any case where resources are aggregated or disaggregated, the associated Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposits will be adjusted as appropriate. After aggregation or disaggregation of resources, historical data regarding the costs already incurred in the qualification process of the original resources will no longer be provided. Coincident with the issuance of the annual statement, where incurred costs are equal to or greater than 90 percent of the Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit(s) previously submitted, the ISO will issue an invoice in the amount determined pursuant to the Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit table contained in



Section III.13.1.9.3.1 plus any excess of costs incurred to date by the ISO and its consultants, including the documented and reasonably-incurred costs of the affected Transmission Owners, associated with the qualification process described in Section III.13.1 and with the critical path schedule monitoring described in Section III.13.3. Any refunds that may result from aggregation of resources will be issued coincident with the annual statement. Payment on the invoice must be received in accordance with the ISO New England Billing Policy. If the Project Sponsor fails to pay the amount due by the stated due date, the ISO will consider the resources that were invoiced withdrawn by the Project Sponsor. Such a withdrawal shall be irrevocable, and payment on the invoice after the due date will not remedy the failure to pay or the withdrawal.

### **III.13.1.9.3.1. Partial Waiver Of Deposit.**

A portion of the deposit shall be waived when there is an active Interconnection Request and an executed Interconnection Feasibility Study Agreement or Interconnection System Impact Study Agreement under Schedule 22, 23 or 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff or where a resource modification does not require a revision to the Interconnection Agreement.

<b>New Generating Capacity Resources <math>\geq</math> 20 MW or an Import Capacity Resource associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade that has not achieved Commercial Operation as defined in Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff</b>	<b>New Generating Capacity Resources <math>&lt;</math> 20 MW and <math>\geq</math> 2 MW</b>	<b>Imports and New Demand Capacity Resources</b>		<b>New Generating Capacity Resources <math>&lt;</math> 2 MW</b>
<i>Including Up-rates, Re-powering, Environmental Compliance &amp; Intermittent Power Resources</i>	<i>Including Up-rates, Re-powering, Environmental Compliance &amp; Intermittent Power Resources</i>			
\$25,000	\$7,500	\$1,000		\$500

<i>With Executed Interconnection Feasibility Study Agreement or System Impact Study Agreement</i>	<i>With Executed Interconnection Feasibility Study Agreement or System Impact Study Agreement</i>			
\$15,000	\$6,500	n/a		n/a

### **III.13.1.9.3.2. Settlement of Costs.**

#### **III.13.1.9.3.2.1. Settlement Of Costs Associated With Resources Participating In A Forward Capacity Auction Or Reconfiguration Auction.**

Upon the latter of: (i) the first day of the Capacity Commitment Period for which a resource offers into the Forward Capacity Market or (ii) the date on which the entire resource is accepted by the ISO for FCM Commercial Operation, the ISO shall provide the Project Sponsor with a statement in writing of the costs incurred by the ISO and its consultants, including the documented and reasonably-incurred costs of the affected Transmission Owner(s), associated with the qualification process and critical path schedule monitoring. If any portion of the Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit exceeds the costs incurred by the ISO and its consultants, including the documented and reasonably-incurred costs of the affected Transmission Owner(s) associated with the qualification process and critical path schedule monitoring, the ISO shall refund to the Project Sponsor the excess including interest calculated in accordance with 18 CFR § 35.19a(a)(2). If the costs incurred by the ISO and its consultants, including the documented and reasonably-incurred costs of the affected Transmission Owner(s), associated with the qualification process and critical path schedule monitoring exceed the Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit, the Project Sponsor shall pay such excess, including interest calculated in accordance with 18 CFR § 35.19a(a)(2) – For Demand Capacity Resources, the ISO shall provide all of the above concurrently with the annual statement required under Section III.13.1.9.3.

#### **III.13.1.9.3.2.2. Settlement Of Costs Associated With Resources That Withdraw From A Forward Capacity Auction Or Reconfiguration Auction.**

Upon the withdrawal or failure to meet the requirements of the qualification process set forth in Section III.13.1, the ISO shall provide the Project Sponsor with a statement in writing of the costs incurred by the ISO and its consultants, including the documented and reasonably-incurred costs of affected Transmission Owner(s), associated with the qualification process and critical path schedule monitoring. A Project Sponsor that withdraws or is deemed to have withdrawn its request for qualification shall pay to the ISO

all costs prudently incurred by the ISO and its consultants, including the documented and reasonably-incurred costs of affected Transmission Owner(s), associated with the qualification process and critical path schedule monitoring. The ISO shall refund to the Project Sponsor any portion of the Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit that exceeds the costs associated with the qualification process and critical path schedule monitoring incurred by the ISO and its consultants, including the documented and reasonably-incurred costs of affected Transmission Owner(s), including interest calculated in accordance with 18 CFR § 35.19a(a)(2). The ISO shall charge the Project Sponsor the amount of such costs incurred by the ISO and its consultants, including the documented and reasonably-incurred costs of affected Transmission Owner(s), that exceeds the Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit, including interest calculated in accordance with 18 CFR § 35.19a(a)(2). For Demand Capacity Resources, the ISO shall provide all of the above concurrently with the annual statement required under Section III.13.1.9.3.

**III.13.1.9.3.2.3.                      Crediting Of Reimbursements.**

Cost reimbursements received (excluding amounts passed through to the ISO's consultants and to affected Transmission Owner(s)) by the ISO pursuant to this Section III.13.1.9.3.2 shall be credited against revenues received by the ISO pursuant to Section IV.A.6.1 of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff.

**III.13.1.10.                      Forward Capacity Auction Qualification Schedule.**

Beginning with the timeline for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2017 (the eighth Forward Capacity Auction), and for each Capacity Commitment Period thereafter, the deadlines will be consistent for each Capacity Commitment Period, as follows:

- (a) each Capacity Commitment Period shall begin in June;
- (b) the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline will be in March, approximately four years and three months before the beginning of the Capacity Commitment Period;
- (c) the New Capacity Show of Interest Submission Window will be in April, approximately four years and two months before the beginning of the Capacity Commitment Period;
- (d) the Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline will be 90 days after the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline, approximately four years before the beginning of the Capacity Commitment Period;

(e) the New Capacity Qualification Deadline will be in June or July that is just under four years before the beginning of the Capacity Commitment Period; and

(f) the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period will begin in February approximately three years and four months before the beginning of the Capacity Commitment Period.

**III.13.1.11 Opt-Out for Resources Electing Multiple-Year Treatment.**

Beginning in the qualification process for the ninth Forward Capacity Auction (for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning June 1, 2018), any resource that had elected in a Forward Capacity Auction prior to the ninth Forward Capacity Auction (pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.2.4 or Section III.13.1.4.1.1.2.7) to have the Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price continue to apply after the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction in which its New Capacity Offer cleared may, by submitting a written notification to the ISO no later than the Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline (or, in the case of the ninth Forward Capacity Auction, no later than September 19, 2014), opt-out of the remaining years of the resource's multiple-year election. A decision to so opt-out shall be irrevocable. A resource choosing to so opt-out will participate in subsequent Forward Capacity Auctions in the same manner as other Existing Capacity Resources.

### **III.13.2. Annual Forward Capacity Auction.**

#### **III.13.2.1. Timing of Annual Forward Capacity Auctions.**

Each Forward Capacity Auction will be conducted beginning on the first Monday in the February that is approximately three years and four months before the beginning of the associated Capacity Commitment Period (unless, no later than the immediately preceding December 1, an alternative date is announced by the ISO), or, where exigent circumstances prevent the start of the Forward Capacity Auction at that time, as soon as possible thereafter.

#### **III.13.2.2. Amount of Capacity Cleared in Each Forward Capacity Auction.**

The total amount of capacity cleared in each Forward Capacity Auction shall be determined using the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve and the Capacity Zone Demand Curves for the modeled Capacity Zones pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.3.

##### **III.13.2.2.1. System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve.**

The MRI Transition Period is the period from the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning June 1, 2020 through the earlier of:

- (i) the Forward Capacity Auction for which the amount of the Installed Capacity Requirement (net of HQICCs) that is filed by the ISO with the Commission pursuant to Section III.12.3 for the upcoming Forward Capacity Auction is greater than or equal to the sum of: 34,151 MW, and: (a) 722 MW (for the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning June 1, 2020); (b) 375 MW (for the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning June 1, 2021), or; (c) 150 MW (for the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning June 1, 2022);
- (ii) the Forward Capacity Auction for which the product of the system-wide Marginal Reliability Impact value, calculated pursuant to Section III.12.1.1, and the scaling factor specified in Section III.13.2.2.4, specifies a quantity at \$7.03/kW-month in excess of the MW value determined under the applicable subsection (2)(b), (2)(c), or (2)(d), below, or;

- (iii) the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning June 1, 2022.

During the MRI Transition Period, the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve shall consist of the following three segments:

- (1) at prices above \$7.03/kW-month and below the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price, the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve shall specify a price for system capacity quantities based on the product of the system-wide Marginal Reliability Impact value, calculated pursuant to Section III.12.1.1, and the scaling factor specified in Section III.13.2.2.4;
- (2) at prices below \$7.03/kW-month, the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve shall be linear between \$7.03/kW-month and \$0.00/kW-month and determined by the following quantities:
  - (a) At the price of \$0.00/kW-month, the quantity specified by the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve shall be 1616 MW plus the MW value determined under the applicable provision in (b), (c), or (d) of this subsection.
  - (b) for the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning June 1, 2020, at \$7.03/kW-month, the quantity shall be the lesser of:
    - 1. 35,437 MW; and
    - 2. 722 MW plus the quantity at which the product of the system-wide Marginal Reliability Impact value and the scaling factor yield a price of \$7.03/kW-month;
  - (c) for the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning June 1, 2021, at \$7.03/kW-month, the quantity shall be the lesser of:
    - 1. 35,090 MW; and
    - 2. 375 MW plus the quantity at which the product of the system-wide Marginal Reliability Impact value and the scaling factor yield a price of \$7.03/kW-month;
  - (d) for the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning June 1, 2022, at \$7.03/kW-month, the quantity shall be the lesser of:
    - 1. 34,865 MW; and
    - 2. 150 MW plus the quantity at which the product of the system-wide Marginal Reliability Impact value and the scaling factor yield a price of \$7.03/kW-month

(3) a price of \$7.03/kW-month for all quantities between those curves segments.

In addition to the foregoing, the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve shall not specify a price in excess of the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price.

Following the MRI Transition Period, the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve shall specify a price for system capacity quantities based on the product of the system-wide Marginal Reliability Impact value, calculated pursuant to Section III.12.1.1, and the scaling factor specified in Section III.13.2.2.4. For any system capacity quantity greater than 110% of the Installed Capacity Requirement (net of HQICCs), the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve shall specify a price of zero. The System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve shall not specify a price in excess of the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price.

#### **III.13.2.2.2. Import-Constrained Capacity Zone Demand Curves.**

For each import-constrained Capacity Zone, the Capacity Zone Demand Curve shall specify a price for all Capacity Zone quantities based on the product of the import-constrained Capacity Zone's Marginal Reliability Impact value, calculated pursuant to Section III.12.2.1.3, and the scaling factor specified in Section III.13.2.2.4. The prices specified by an import-constrained Capacity Zone Demand Curve shall be non-negative. At all quantities greater than the truncation point, which is the amount of capacity for which the Capacity Zone Demand Curve specifies a price of \$0.01/kW-month, the Capacity Zone Demand Curve shall specify a price of zero. The Capacity Zone Demand Curve shall not specify a price in excess of the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price.

#### **III.13.2.2.3. Export-Constrained Capacity Zone Demand Curves.**

For each export-constrained Capacity Zone, the Capacity Zone Demand Curve shall specify a price for all Capacity Zone quantities based on the product of the export-constrained Capacity Zone's Marginal Reliability Impact value, calculated pursuant to Section III.12.2.2.1, and the scaling factor specified in Section III.13.2.2.4. The prices specified by an export-constrained Capacity Zone Demand Curve shall be non-positive. At all quantities less than the truncation point, which is the amount of capacity for which the Capacity Zone Demand Curve specifies a price of negative \$0.01/kW-month, the Capacity Zone Demand Curve shall specify a price of zero.

#### **III.13.2.2.4. Capacity Demand Curve Scaling Factor.**

The demand curve scaling factor shall be set at the value such that, at the quantity specified by the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve at a price of Net CONE, the Loss of Load Expectation is 0.1 days per year.

**III.13.2.3. Conduct of the Forward Capacity Auction.**

The Forward Capacity Auction shall include a descending clock auction, which will determine, subject to the provisions of Section III.13.2.7, the Capacity Clearing Price for each Capacity Zone modeled in that Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to Section III.12.4, and the Capacity Clearing Price for certain offers from New Import Capacity Resources and Existing Import Capacity Resources pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.3(d). The Forward Capacity Auction shall determine the outcome of all offers and bids accepted during the qualification process and submitted during the auction. The descending clock auction shall be conducted as a series of rounds, which shall continue (for up to five consecutive Business Days, with up to eight rounds per day, absent extraordinary circumstances) until the Forward Capacity Auction is concluded for all modeled Capacity Zones in accordance with the provisions of Section III.13.2.3.3. Each round of the Forward Capacity Auction shall consist of the following steps, which shall be completed simultaneously for each Capacity Zone included in the round:

**III.13.2.3.1. Step 1: Announcement of Start-of-Round Price and End-of-Round Price.**

For each round, the auctioneer shall announce a single Start-of-Round Price (the highest price associated with a round of the Forward Capacity Auction) and a single (lower) End-of-Round Price (the lowest price associated with a round of the Forward Capacity Auction). In the first round, the Start-of-Round Price shall equal the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price for all modeled Capacity Zones. In each round after the first round, the Start-of-Round Price shall equal the End-of-Round Price from the previous round.

**III.13.2.3.2. Step 2: Compilation of Offers and Bids.**

The auctioneer shall compile all of the offers and bids for that round, as follows:

**(a) Offers from New Generating Capacity Resources, New Import Capacity Resources, and New Demand Capacity Resources.**

- (i) The Project Sponsor for any New Generating Capacity Resource, New Import Capacity Resource that is backed by a single new External Resource and that is associated with an investment in transmission that increases New England's import capability, New Import Capacity



Resource that is associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade, or New Demand Capacity Resource accepted in the qualification process for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction may submit a New Capacity Offer indicating the quantity of capacity that the Project Sponsor would commit to provide from the resource during the Capacity Commitment Period at that round's prices. A New Capacity Offer shall be defined by the submission of one to five prices, each strictly less than the Start-of-Round Price but greater than or equal to the End-of-Round Price, and an associated quantity in the applicable Capacity Zone. Each price shall be expressed in units of dollars per kilowatt-month to an accuracy of at most three digits to the right of the decimal point, and each quantity shall be expressed in units of MWs to an accuracy of at most three digits to the right of the decimal point. A New Capacity Offer shall imply a supply curve indicating quantities offered at all of that round's prices, pursuant to the convention of Section III.13.2.3.2(a)(iii).

(ii) If the Project Sponsor of a New Generating Capacity Resource, New Import Capacity Resource that is backed by a single new External Resource and that is associated with an investment in transmission that increases New England's import capability, New Import Capacity Resource that is associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade, or New Demand Capacity Resource elects to offer in a Forward Capacity Auction, the Project Sponsor must offer the resource's full FCA Qualified Capacity at the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price in the first round of the auction. A New Capacity Offer for a resource may in no event be for greater capacity than the resource's full FCA Qualified Capacity at any price. A New Capacity Offer for a resource may not be for less capacity than the resource's Rationing Minimum Limit at any price, except where the New Capacity Offer is for a capacity quantity of zero.

(iii) Let the Start-of-Round Price and End-of-Round Price for a given round be  $P_S$  and  $P_E$ , respectively. Let the  $m$  prices ( $1 \leq m \leq 5$ ) submitted by a Project Sponsor for a modeled Capacity Zone be  $p_1, p_2, \dots, p_m$ , where  $P_S > p_1 > p_2 > \dots > p_m \geq P_E$ , and let the associated quantities submitted for a New Capacity Resource be  $q_1, q_2, \dots, q_m$ . Then the Project Sponsor's supply curve, for all prices strictly less than  $P_S$  but greater than or equal to  $P_E$ , shall be taken to be:

$$S(p) = \begin{cases} q_0, & \text{if } p > p_1, \\ q_1, & \text{if } p_2 < p \leq p_1, \\ q_2, & \text{if } p_3 < p \leq p_2, \\ \dots & \dots, \\ q_m, & \text{if } p \leq p_m. \end{cases}$$

where, in the first round,  $q_0$  is the resource's full FCA Qualified Capacity and, in subsequent rounds,  $q_0$  is the resource's quantity offered at the lowest price of the previous round.

(iv)- ~~Except for Renewable Technology Resources and except as provided in Section III.13.2.3.2(a)(v)–The amount of capacity included in each New Capacity Offer at each price shall be included in the aggregate supply curves at that price as described in Section III.13.2.3.3. If the Internal Market Monitor has determined that a New Capacity Resource must use a New Resource Offer Floor Price pursuant to Section III.A.21.2.3; such a~~ New Capacity Resource may not include any capacity in a New Capacity Offer during the Forward Capacity Auction at any price below the resource's New Resource Offer Floor Price. ~~The amount of capacity included in each New Capacity Offer at each price shall be included in the aggregate supply curves at that price as described in Section III.13.2.3.3.~~

(v) Capacity associated with a New Import Capacity Resource (other than a New Import Capacity Resource that is backed by a single new External Resource and that is associated with an investment in transmission that increases New England's import capability or a New Import Capacity Resource that is associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade) shall be automatically included in the aggregate supply curves as described in Section III.13.2.3.3 at prices at or above the resource's offer prices (as ~~they may be established or~~ modified pursuant to Section III.A.21.42) and shall be automatically removed from the aggregate supply curves at prices below the resource's offer prices (as ~~they may be established or~~ modified pursuant to Section III.A.21.42), except under the following circumstances:

In any round of the Forward Capacity Auction in which prices are below the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold, the Project Sponsor for a New Import Capacity Resource (other than a New Import Capacity Resource that is backed by a single new External Resource and that is associated with an investment in transmission that increases New England's import capability or a New Import Capacity Resource that is associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade) with offer

prices (as ~~they may be established or~~ modified pursuant to Section III.A.21.42) that are less than the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold may submit a New Capacity Offer indicating the quantity of capacity that the Project Sponsor would commit to provide from the resource during the Capacity Commitment Period at that round's prices. Such an offer shall be defined by the submission of one to five prices, each less than the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold (or the Start-of-Round Price, if lower than the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold) but greater than or equal to the End-of-Round Price, and a single quantity associated with each price. Such an offer shall be expressed in the same form as specified in Section III.13.2.3.2(a)(i) and shall imply a curve indicating quantities at all of that round's relevant prices, pursuant to the convention of Section III.13.2.3.2(a)(iii). The curve may not increase the quantity offered as the price decreases.

(b) **Bids from Existing Capacity Resources**

(i) Static De-List Bids, Permanent De-List Bids, Retirement De-List Bids, and Export Bids from Existing Generating Capacity Resources, Existing Import Capacity Resources, and Existing Demand Capacity Resources, as finalized in the qualification process or as otherwise directed by the Commission shall be automatically bid into the appropriate rounds of the Forward Capacity Auction, such that each such resource's FCA Qualified Capacity will be included in the aggregate supply curves as described in Section III.13.2.3.3 until any Static De-List Bid, Permanent De-List Bid, Retirement D-List Bid, or Export Bid clears in the Forward Capacity Auction, as described in Section III.13.2.5.2, and is removed from the aggregate supply curves. In the case of a Commission-approved Permanent De-List Bid or Commission-approved Retirement De-List Bid at or above the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price, or where a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid is subject to an election under Section III.13.1.2.4.1(a), the resource's FCA Qualified Capacity will be reduced by the quantity of the de-list bid (unless the resource was retained for reliability pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1) and the Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid shall not be included in the Forward Capacity Auction. Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids subject to an election under Section III.13.1.2.4.1(a) or Section III.13.1.2.4.1(b) shall not be included in the Forward Capacity Auction and shall be treated according to Section III.13.2.3.2(b)(ii). In the case of a Static De-List Bid, if the Market Participant revised the bid pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.1, then the revised bid shall be used in place of the submitted bid; if the Market Participant withdrew the bid pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.1, then the capacity associated with the withdrawn bid shall be entered into the auction pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.2(c). If the amount of capacity associated with Export Bids

for an interface exceeds the transfer limit of that interface (minus any accepted Administrative De-List Bids over that interface), then the set of Export Bids associated with that interface equal to the interface's transfer limit (minus any accepted Administrative De-List Bids over that interface) having the highest bid prices shall be included in the auction as described above; capacity for which Export Bids are not included in the auction as a result of this provision shall be entered into the auction pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.2(c).

(ii) For Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids, the ISO will enter a Proxy De-List Bid into the appropriate rounds of the Forward Capacity Auction in the following circumstances: (1) if the Lead Market Participant has elected pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(a) to retire the resource or portion thereof, the resource has not been retained for reliability pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1, the price specified in the Commission-approved de-list bid is less than the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price, and the Internal Market Monitor has found a portfolio benefit pursuant to Section III.A.24; or (2) if the Lead Market Participant has elected conditional treatment pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(b), the resource has not been retained for reliability pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1, and the price specified in the Commission-approved de-list bid is less than the price specified in the de-list bid submitted by the Lead Market Participant and less than the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price. The Proxy De-List Bid shall be non-rationable and shall be equal in price and quantity to, and located in the same Capacity Zone as, the Commission-approved Permanent De-List Bid or Commission-approved Retirement De-List Bid, and shall be entered into the appropriate rounds of the Forward Capacity Auction such that the capacity associated with the Proxy De-List Bid will be included in the aggregate supply curves as described in Section III.13.2.3.3 until the Proxy De-List Bid clears in the Forward Capacity Auction, as described in Section III.13.2.5.2, and is removed from the aggregate supply curves. If the Lead Market Participant has elected conditional treatment pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(b), the resource has not been retained for reliability pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1, and the Commission-approved Permanent De-List Bid or Commission-approved Retirement De-List Bid is equal to or greater than the de-list bid submitted by the Lead Market Participant, no Proxy De-List Bid shall be used and the Commission-approved de-list bid shall be entered in the Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.2(b)(i).

(iii) For purposes of this subsection (b), if an Internal Market Monitor-determined price has been established for a Static De-List Bid and the associated resource's capacity is pivotal pursuant to Sections III.A.23.1 and III.A.23.2, then (unless otherwise directed by the

Commission) the lower of the Internal Market Monitor-determined price and any revised bid that is submitted pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.1 will be used in place of the initially submitted bid; provided, however, that if the bid was withdrawn pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.1, then the capacity associated with the withdrawn bid shall be entered into the auction pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.2(c). If an Internal Market Monitor-determined price has been established for an Export Bid and the associated resource's capacity is pivotal pursuant to Sections III.A.23.1 and III.A.23.2, then the Internal Market Monitor-determined price (or price directed by the Commission) will be used in place of the submitted bid.

Any Static De-List Bid for ambient air conditions that has not been verified pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2.4 shall not be subject to the provisions of this subsection (b).

(c) **Existing Capacity Resources Without De-List or Export Bids and Self-Supplied FCA Resources.** Each Existing Generating Capacity Resource, Existing Import Capacity Resource, and Existing Demand Capacity Resource without a Static De-List Bid, a Permanent De-List Bid, a Retirement De-List Bid, an Export Bid or an Administrative Export De-List Bid in its Existing Capacity Qualification Package, and each existing Self-Supplied FCA Resource shall be automatically entered into each round of the Forward Capacity Auction at its FCA Qualified Capacity, such that the resource's FCA Qualified Capacity will be included in the aggregate supply curves as described in Section III.13.2.3.3, except where such resource, if permitted, submits an appropriate Dynamic De-List Bid, as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(d). Each new Self-Supplied FCA Resource shall be automatically entered into each round of the Forward Capacity Auction at its designated self-supplied quantity, such that the resource's designated self-supply quantity will be included in the aggregate supply curves as described in Section III.13.2.3.3. If the Internal Market Monitor has determined that a new Self-Supplied FCA Resource must use a New Resource Offer Floor Price pursuant to Section III.A.21.2.34, the new resource's self-supplied quantity shall be entered into each round of the Forward Capacity Auction at prices at or above the ~~resource's~~ New Resource Offer Floor Price, ~~such that the resource's designated self-supply quantity will be included in the aggregate supply curves as described in Section III.13.2.3.3.~~

(d) **Dynamic De-List Bids.** In any round of the Forward Capacity Auction in which prices are below the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold, any Existing Generating Capacity Resource, Existing Import Capacity Resource, or Existing Demand Capacity Resource (but not any Self-Supplied FCA Resources) may submit a Dynamic De-List Bid at prices below the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold. Such a bid shall be defined by the submission of one to five prices, each less than the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold (or

the Start-of-Round Price, if lower than the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold) but greater than or equal to the End-of-Round Price, and a single quantity associated with each price. Such a bid shall be expressed in the same form as specified in Section III.13.2.3.2(a)(i) and shall imply a curve indicating quantities at all of that round's relevant prices, pursuant to the convention of Section III.13.2.3.2(a)(iii). The curve may in no case increase the quantity offered as the price decreases. A dynamic De-List Bid may not offer less capacity than the resource's Rationing Minimum Limit at any price, except where the amount of capacity offered is zero. All Dynamic De-List Bids are subject to a reliability review as described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5, and if not rejected for reliability reasons, shall be included in the round in the same manner as Static De-List Bids as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(b). Where a resource elected pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.2.4 or Section III.13.1.4.1.1.2.7 to have the Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price continue to apply after the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction in which the offer clears, the capacity associated with any resulting Capacity Supply Obligation may not be subject to a Dynamic De-List Bid in subsequent Forward Capacity Auctions for Capacity Commitment Periods for which the Project Sponsor elected to have the Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price continue to apply. Where a Lead Market Participant submits any combination of Dynamic De-List Bid, Static De-List Bid, Export Bid, and Administrative Export De-List Bid for a single resource, none of the prices in a set of price-quantity pairs associated with a bid may be the same as any price in any other set of price-quantity pairs associated with another bid for the same resource.

(e) **Repowering.** Offers and bids associated with a resource participating in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.1.2 (resources previously counted as capacity resources) shall be addressed in the Forward Capacity Auction in accordance with the provisions of this Section III.13.2.3.2(e). The Project Sponsor shall offer such a New Generating Capacity Resource into the Forward Capacity Auction in the same manner and pursuant to the same rules as other New Generating Capacity Resources, as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(a). As long as any capacity is offered from the New Generating Capacity Resource, the amount of capacity offered is the amount that the auctioneer shall include in the aggregate supply curve at the relevant prices, and the quantity of capacity offered from the associated Existing Generating Capacity Resource shall not be included in the aggregate supply curve. If any portion of the New Generating Capacity Resource clears in the Forward Capacity Auction, the associated Existing Generating Capacity Resource shall be permanently de-listed as of the start of the associated Capacity Commitment Period. If at any price, no capacity is offered from the New Generating Capacity Resource, then the auctioneer shall include capacity from the associated Existing Generating Capacity Resource at that price, subject to any bids submitted and accepted in the

qualification process for that Existing Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.5. Bids submitted and accepted in the qualification process for an Existing Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.5 shall only be entered into the Forward Capacity Auction after the associated New Generating Capacity Resource is fully withdrawn (that is, the Forward Capacity Auction reaches a price at which the resource's New Capacity Offer is zero capacity), and shall only then be subject to the reliability review described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5.

(f) **Conditional Qualified New Resources.** Offers associated with a resource participating in the Forward Capacity Auction as a Conditional Qualified New Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.3(f) shall be addressed in the Forward Capacity Auction in accordance with the provisions of this Section III.13.2.3.2(f). The Project Sponsor shall offer such a Conditional Qualified New Resource into the Forward Capacity Auction in the same manner and pursuant to the same rules as other New Generating Capacity Resources, as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(a). An offer from at most one resource at a Conditional Qualified New Resource's location will be permitted to clear (receive a Capacity Supply Obligation for the associated Capacity Commitment Period) in the Forward Capacity Auction. As long as a positive quantity is offered at the End-of-Round Price in the final round of the Forward Capacity Auction by the resource having a higher queue priority at the Conditional Qualified New Resource's location, as described in Section III.13.1.1.2.3(f), then no capacity from the Conditional Qualified New Resource shall clear. If at any price greater than or equal to the End-of-Round Price in the final round of the Forward Capacity Auction, zero quantity is offered from the resource having higher queue priority at the Conditional Qualified New Resource's location, as described in Section III.13.1.1.2.3(f), then the auctioneer shall consider capacity offered from the Conditional Qualified New Resource in the determination of clearing, including the application of Section III.13.2.7.

(g) **Mechanics.** Offers and bids that may be submitted during a round of the Forward Capacity Auction must be received between the starting time and ending time of the round, as announced by the auctioneer in advance. The ISO at its sole discretion may authorize a participant in the auction to complete or correct its submission after the ending time of a round, but only if the participant can demonstrate to the ISO's satisfaction that the participant was making reasonable efforts to complete a valid offer submission before the ending time of the round, and only if the ISO determines that allowing the completion or correction will not unreasonably disrupt the auction process. All decisions by the ISO concerning whether or not a participant may complete or correct a submission after the ending time of a round are final.

**III.13.2.3.3. Step 3: Determination of the Outcome of Each Round.**

The auctioneer shall use the offers and bids for the round as described in Section III.13.2.3.2 to determine the aggregate supply curves for the New England Control Area and for each modeled Capacity Zone included in the round.

The aggregate supply curve for the New England Control Area, the Total System Capacity, shall reflect at each price the sum of the following:

- (1) the amount of capacity offered in all Capacity Zones modeled as import-constrained Capacity Zones at that price (excluding capacity offered from New Import Capacity Resources and Existing Import Capacity Resources);
- (2) the amount of capacity offered in the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone at that price (excluding capacity offered from New Import Capacity Resources and Existing Import Capacity Resources);
- (3) for each Capacity Zone modeled as an export-constrained Capacity Zone, the lesser of:
  - (i) the amount of capacity offered in the Capacity Zone at that price (including the amount of capacity offered from New Import Capacity Resources and Existing Import Capacity Resources for each interface between the New England Control Area and an external Control Area mapped to the export-constrained Capacity Zone up to that interface's approved capacity transfer limit (net of tie benefits)), or;
  - (ii) the amount of capacity determined by the Capacity Zone Demand Curve at zero minus that price, and;
- (4) for each interface between the New England Control Area and an external Control Area mapped to an import-constrained Capacity Zone or the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone, the lesser of:
  - (i) that interface's approved capacity transfer limit (net of tie benefits), or;
  - (ii) the amount of capacity offered from New Import Capacity Resources and Existing Import Capacity Resources.

In computing the Total System Capacity, capacity associated with any New Capacity Offer at any price greater than the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price will not be included in the tally of total capacity at the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price for that Capacity Zone. On the basis of these aggregate supply curves, the auctioneer shall determine the outcome of the round for each modeled Capacity Zone as follows:



(a) **Import-Constrained Capacity Zones.**

For a Capacity Zone modeled as an import-constrained Capacity Zone, if either of the following two conditions is met during the round:

- (1) the aggregate supply curve for the import-constrained Capacity Zone, adjusted as necessary in accordance with Section III.13.2.6 (Capacity Rationing Rule), equals or is less than the quantity determined by the Capacity Zone Demand Curve at the difference between the End-of-Round Price and the price specified by the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve (at a quantity no less than Total System Capacity at the Start-of-Round Price), or;
- (2) the Forward Capacity Auction is concluded for the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone;

then the Forward Capacity Auction for that Capacity Zone is concluded and such Capacity Zone will not be included in further rounds of the Forward Capacity Auction.

The Capacity Clearing Price for that Capacity Zone shall be set at the greater of: (1) the sum of the price specified by the Capacity Zone Demand Curve at the amount of capacity equal to the total amount that is awarded a Capacity Supply Obligation in the import-constrained Capacity Zone, and the Capacity Clearing Price for the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone, or; (2) the highest price of any offer or bid for a resource in the Capacity Zone that is awarded a Capacity Supply Obligation, subject to the other provisions of this Section III.13.2.

If neither of the two conditions above are met in the round, then that Capacity Zone will be included in the next round of the Forward Capacity Auction.

(b) **Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone.**

If the Total System Capacity at the End-of-Round Price, adjusted as necessary in accordance with Section III.13.2.6 (Capacity Rationing Rule), and adjusted to include the additional supply in the import-constrained Capacity Zone that may be cleared at a higher price, equals or is less than the amount of capacity determined by the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve, then the Forward Capacity Auction

for the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone is concluded and the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone will not be included in further rounds of the Forward Capacity Auction.

The Capacity Clearing Price for the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone shall be set at the highest price at which the Total System Capacity is less than or equal to the amount of capacity determined by the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve, subject to the other provisions of this Section III.13.2.

If the Forward Capacity Auction for the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone is not concluded then the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone will be included in the next round of the Forward Capacity Auction, and the auctioneer shall publish the Total System Capacity at the End-of-Round Price, adjusted to include the additional supply in the import-constrained Capacity Zone that may be cleared at a higher price, less the amount of capacity determined by the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve at the End-of-Round Price.

(c) **Export-Constrained Capacity Zones.**

For a Capacity Zone modeled as an export-constrained Capacity Zone, if all of the following conditions are met during the round:

- (1) the aggregate supply curve for the export-constrained Capacity Zone, adjusted as necessary in accordance with Section III.13.2.6 (Capacity Rationing Rule), is equal to or less than the maximum amount of capacity determined by the Capacity Zone Demand Curve at a price of zero;
- (2) in the case of a nested Capacity Zone, the Forward Capacity Auction is concluded for the Capacity Zone within which the nested Capacity Zone is located, and;
- (3) the Forward Capacity Auction is concluded for the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone;

then the Forward Capacity Auction for that Capacity Zone is concluded and such Capacity Zone will not be included in further rounds of the Forward Capacity Auction.

The Capacity Clearing Price for an export-constrained Capacity Zone that is not a nested export-constrained Capacity Zone shall be set at the greater of:

- (1) the sum of:
    - (i) the price specified by the Capacity Zone Demand Curve at the amount of capacity equal to the total amount that is awarded a Capacity Supply Obligation in that Capacity Zone; and
    - (ii) the Capacity Clearing Price for the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone.
- or;

- (2) the highest price of any offer or bid for a resource in the Capacity Zone that is awarded a Capacity Supply Obligation, and subject to the other provisions of this Section III.13.2.

The Capacity Clearing Price for a nested export-constrained Capacity Zone shall be set at the greater of:

- (1) the sum of:
  - (i) the price specified by the Capacity Zone Demand Curve at the amount of capacity equal to the total amount that is awarded a Capacity Supply Obligation in that Capacity Zone; and
  - (ii) the Capacity Clearing Price for the Capacity Zone in which the nested Capacity Zone is located,
- or;
- (2) the highest price of any offer or bid for a resource in the Capacity Zone that is awarded a Capacity Supply Obligation, subject to the other provisions of this Section III.13.2.

If all of the conditions above are not satisfied in the round, then the auctioneer shall publish the quantity of excess supply in the export-constrained Capacity Zone at the End-of-Round Price (the amount of capacity offered at the End-of-Round Price in the export-constrained Capacity Zone minus the maximum amount of capacity determined by the Capacity Zone Demand Curve at a price of zero) and that Capacity Zone will be included in the next round of the Forward Capacity Auction.

(d) **Treatment of Import Capacity.** Where the amount of capacity offered from New Import Capacity Resources and Existing Import Capacity Resources over an interface between the New England Control Area and an external Control Area is less than or equal to that interface's approved capacity transfer limit (net of tie benefits, or net of HQICC in the case of the Phase I/II HVDC-TF), then the capacity offers from those resources shall be treated as capacity offers in the modeled Capacity Zone associated with that interface. Where the amount of capacity offered from New Import Capacity Resources and Existing Import Capacity Resources over an interface between the New England Control Area and an external Control Area is greater than that interface's approved capacity transfer limit (net of tie benefits, or net of HQICC in the case of the Phase I/II HVDC-TF), then the following provisions shall apply (separately for each such interface):

- (i) For purposes of determining which capacity offers from the New Import Capacity Resources and Existing Import Capacity Resources over the interface shall clear and at what price, the offers over the interface shall be treated in the descending-clock auction as if they comprised a separately-modeled export-constrained capacity zone, with an aggregate supply

curve consisting of the offers from the New Import Capacity Resources and Existing Import Capacity Resources over the interface.

(ii) The amount of capacity offered over the interface that will be included in the aggregate supply curve of the modeled Capacity Zone associated with the interface shall be the lesser of the following two quantities: the amount of capacity offered from New Import Capacity Resources and Existing Import Capacity Resources over the interface; and the interface's approved capacity transfer limit (net of tie benefits, or net of HQICC in the case of the Phase I/II HVDC-TF).

(iii) The Forward Capacity Auction for New Import Capacity Resources and Existing Import Capacity Resources over the interface is concluded when the following two conditions are both satisfied: the amount of capacity offered from New Import Capacity Resource and Existing Import Capacity Resources over the interface is less than or equal to the interface's approved capacity transfer limit (net of tie benefits, or net of HQICC in the case of the Phase I/II HVDC-TF); and the Forward Capacity Auction is concluded in the modeled Capacity Zone associated with the interface.

(e) **Treatment of Export Capacity.** Any Export Bid or any Administrative Export De-List Bid that is used to export capacity through an export interface connected to an import-constrained Capacity Zone from another Capacity Zone, or through an export interface connected to the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone from an export-constrained Capacity Zone in the Forward Capacity Auction will be modeled in the Capacity Zone where the export interface that is identified in the Existing Capacity Qualification Package is located. The Export Bid or Administrative Export De-List Bid clears in the Capacity Zone where the Export Bid or Administrative Export De-List Bid is modeled.

(i) Then the MW quantity equal to the relevant Export Bid or Administrative Export De-List Bid from the resource associated with the Export Bid or Administrative Export De-List Bid will be de-listed in the Capacity Zone where the resource is located. If the export interface is connected to an import-constrained Capacity Zone, the MW quantity procured will be in addition to the amount of capacity determined by the Capacity Zone Demand Curve for the import-constrained Capacity Zone.

- (ii) If the Export Bid or Administrative Export De-List Bid does not clear, then the resource associated with the Export Bid or Administrative Export De-List Bid will not be de-listed in the Capacity Zone where the resource is located.

#### **III.13.2.3.4. Determination of Final Capacity Zones.**

(a) For all Forward Capacity Auctions up to and including the sixth Forward Capacity Auction (for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning June 1, 2015), after the Forward Capacity Auction is concluded for all modeled Capacity Zones, the final set of distinct Capacity Zones that will be used for all purposes associated with the relevant Capacity Commitment Period, including for the purposes of reconfiguration auctions and Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals, shall be those having distinct Capacity Clearing Prices as a result of constraints between modeled Capacity Zones binding in the running of the Forward Capacity Auction. Where a modeled constraint does not bind in the Forward Capacity Auction, and as a result adjacent modeled Capacity Zones clear at the same Capacity Clearing Price, those modeled Capacity Zones shall be a single Capacity Zone used for all purposes of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period, including for the purposes of reconfiguration auctions and Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals.

(b) For all Forward Capacity Auctions beginning with the seventh Forward Capacity Auction (for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning June 1, 2016) the final set of distinct Capacity Zones that will be used for all purposes associated with the relevant Capacity Commitment Period, including for the purposes of reconfiguration auctions and Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals, shall be those described in Section III.12.4.

#### **III.13.2.4. ~~Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price and the Cost of New Entry.~~**

##### **III.13.2.4.1 Calculation of Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price, CONE, and Net CONE.**

The Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price is max [1.6 multiplied by Net CONE, CONE]. References in this Section III.13 to the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price shall mean the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price for the Forward Capacity Auction associated with the relevant Capacity Commitment Period.

CONE for the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2025 is \$12.400/kW-month.

Net CONE for the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2025 is \$7.468/kW-month.

CONE and Net CONE shall be recalculated no less often than once every three years. Whenever these values are recalculated, the ISO will review the results of the recalculation with stakeholders and the new values will be filed with the Commission prior to the Forward Capacity Auction in which the new value is to apply.

#### **III.13.2.4.2 Interim Year Adjustments to CONE and Net CONE.**

~~Between recalculations, CONE and Net CONE will be adjusted for each Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to Section III.A.21.1.2(e) (except that the bonus tax depreciation adjustment described in Section III.A.21.1.2(e)(5) shall not apply).~~

~~For years in which no full recalculation is performed pursuant to Section III.13.2.4.1, CONE and Net CONE will be adjusted for each Forward Capacity Auction with the following updates to the capital budgeting model used to calculate the CONE and Net CONE values set forth above in this Section III.13.2.4. Prior to applying the annual adjustment for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2019, Net CONE will be reduced by \$0.43/kW-month to reflect the elimination of the PER adjustment. The adjusted CONE and Net CONE values will be published on the ISO's web site.~~

(1) Each line item associated with capital costs that is included in the capital budgeting model will be updated to reflect changes in the Bureau of Labor Statistics Producer Price Index for Machinery and Equipment: General Purpose Machinery and Equipment (WPU114).

(2) For each line item in (1) above, the ISO shall calculate a multiplier that is equal to the average of values published during the most recent 12 month period available at the time of making the adjustment divided by the average of the most recent 12 month period available at the time of establishing the CONE and Net CONE values set forth in Section III.13.2.4.1. The value of each line item associated with capital costs in the capital budgeting model will be adjusted by the relevant multiplier.

(3) The energy and ancillary services offset values in the capital budgeting model shall be adjusted by inputting to the capital budgeting model the Henry Hub natural gas futures prices, the

Algonquin Citygates Basis natural gas futures prices and the Massachusetts Hub Day-Ahead Peak electricity prices, as published by ICE for the first five trading days in February, for each month of the Capacity Commitment Period to which the updated value will apply.

(4) The CONE and Net CONE values adjusted pursuant to this Section III.13.2.4.2 will be published on the ISO's web site.

(5) If any of the values required for the calculations described in this Section III.13.2.4.2 are unavailable, then comparable values, prices or sources shall be used.

### **III.13.2.5. Treatment of Specific Offer and Bid Types in the Forward Capacity Auction.**

#### **III.13.2.5.1. Offers from New Generating Capacity Resources, New Import Capacity Resources, and New Demand Capacity Resources.**

A New Capacity Offer (other than one from a Conditional Qualified New Resource) clears (receives a Capacity Supply Obligation for the associated Capacity Commitment Period) in the Forward Capacity Auction if the Capacity Clearing Price is greater than or equal to the price specified in the offer, except possibly as a result of the Capacity Rationing Rule described in Section III.13.2.6. An offer from a Conditional Qualified New Resource clears (receives a Capacity Supply Obligation for the associated Capacity Commitment Period) in the Forward Capacity Auction, except possibly as a result of the Capacity Rationing Rule described in Section III.13.2.6, if all of the following conditions are met: (i) the Capacity Clearing Price is greater than or equal to the price specified in the offer; (ii) capacity from that resource is considered in the determination of clearing as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(f); and (iii) such offer minimizes the costs for the associated Capacity Commitment Period, subject to Section III.13.2.7.7(c).

The amount of capacity that receives a Capacity Supply Obligation through the Forward Capacity Auction shall not exceed the quantity of capacity offered from the New Generating Capacity Resource, New Import Capacity Resource, or New Demand Capacity Resource at the Capacity Clearing Price.

#### **III.13.2.5.2. Bids and Offers from Existing Generating Capacity Resources, Existing Import Capacity Resources, and Existing Demand Capacity Resources.**

**III.13.2.5.2.1. Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids.**

(a) Except as provided in Section III.13.2.5.2.5, a Permanent De-List Bid, Retirement De-List Bid or Proxy De-List Bid clears in the Forward Capacity Auction (does not receive a Capacity Supply Obligation) if the Capacity Clearing Price is less than or equal to the price specified in the bid, except possibly as a result of the Capacity Rationing Rule described in Section III.13.2.6.

(b) Unless the capacity has been retained for reliability pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5, if all or part of a resource with a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid does not clear in the Forward Capacity Auction (receives a Capacity Supply Obligation), the Lead Market Participant shall enter the uncleared portion of the bid into the qualification process for the following Forward Capacity Auction as described in Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.

(c) If the Capacity Clearing Price is greater than the price specified in a de-list bid submitted by a Lead Market Participant that elected conditional treatment for the de-list bid pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(b), and there is an associated Proxy De-List Bid that does not clear (receives a Capacity Supply Obligation), the resource will receive a Capacity Supply Obligation at the Capacity Clearing Price.

(d) The process by which the primary auction is cleared (but not the compilation of offers and bids pursuant to Sections III.13.2.3.1 and III.13.2.3.2) will be repeated after the substitution auction is completed if one of the following conditions is met: (1) if any Proxy De-List Bid entered as a result of a Lead Market Participant electing to retire pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(a) does not clear (receives a Capacity Supply Obligation) in the first run of the primary auction-clearing process and retains some portion of its Capacity Supply Obligation in the substitution auction; or (2) if any Proxy De-List Bid entered as a result of a Lead Market Participant electing conditional treatment pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(b) does not clear (receives a Capacity Supply Obligation) in the first run of the primary auction-clearing process, the de-list bid submitted by the Lead Market Participant is at or above the Capacity Clearing Price, and the Proxy De-List Bid retains some portion of its Capacity Supply Obligation in the substitution auction. The second run of the primary auction-clearing process: (i) excludes all Proxy De-List Bids, (ii) includes the offers and bids of resources compiled pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.2 that did not receive a Capacity Supply Obligation in the first run of the primary auction-clearing process, excluding the offers, or portion thereof, associated with resources that acquired a Capacity Supply Obligation in the substitution auction, and (iii) includes the capacity of resources, or portion thereof, that retain a Capacity Supply Obligation after the first run of the primary auction-clearing



process and the substitution auction. The second run of the primary auction-clearing process shall not affect the Capacity Clearing Price of the Forward Capacity Auction (which is established by the first run of the primary auction-clearing process).

(e) Resources (other than those still subject to a multi-year Capacity Commitment Period election as described in Sections III.13.1.1.2.2.4 and III.13.1.4.1.1.2.7) that receive a Capacity Supply Obligation as a result of the first run of the primary auction-clearing process shall be paid the Capacity Clearing Price during the associated Capacity Commitment Period. Where the second run of the primary auction-clearing process procures additional capacity, the resulting price, paid during the associated Capacity Commitment Period (and subsequent Capacity Commitment Periods, as elected pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.2.4 or Section III.13.1.4.1.1.2.7) to the additionally procured capacity, shall be equal to or greater than the adjusted price resulting from the first run of the primary auction-clearing process for that Capacity Zone.

#### **III.13.2.5.2.2. Static De-List Bids and Export Bids.**

Except as provided in Section III.13.2.5.2.5, a Static De-List Bid or an Export Bid clears in the Forward Capacity Auction (does not receive a Capacity Supply Obligation for the associated Capacity Commitment Period) if the Capacity Clearing Price is less than or equal to the price specified in the bid, except possibly as a result of the Capacity Rationing Rule described in Section III.13.2.6.

#### **III.13.2.5.2.3. Dynamic De-List Bids.**

A Dynamic De-List Bid clears in the Forward Capacity Auction (does not receive a Capacity Supply Obligation for the associated Capacity Commitment Period) if the Capacity Clearing Price is less than or equal to the price specified in the bid, except possibly as a result of the Capacity Rationing Rule described in Section III.13.2.6. If more Dynamic De-List Bids are submitted at a price than are needed to clear the market, such Dynamic De-List Bids shall be cleared pro-rata, but in no case less than a resource's Rationing Minimum Limit.

#### **III.13.2.5.2.4. Administrative Export De-List Bids.**

An Administrative Export De-List Bid clears in the Forward Capacity Auction (does not receive a Capacity Supply Obligation for the associated Capacity Commitment Period) regardless of the Capacity Clearing Price.

#### **III.13.2.5.2.5. Reliability Review.**

The ISO shall review each Retirement De-List Bid, Permanent De-List Bid, Static De-List Bid, Export Bid, Administrative Export De-List Bid, Dynamic De-List Bid, and substitution auction demand bid to determine whether the capacity associated with that bid is needed for reliability reasons during the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction; Proxy De-List Bids shall not be reviewed.

(a) The reliability review of de-list bids will be conducted in descending price order using the price as finalized during qualification or as otherwise directed by the Commission. De-list bids with the same price will be reviewed in the order that produces the least negative impact to reliability; where bids are the same price and provide the same impact to reliability, they will be reviewed based on their submission time. If de-list bids with the same price are from a single generating station, they will be reviewed in an order that seeks to provide (1) the least-cost solution under Section III.13.2.5.2.5.1(d) and (2) the minimum aggregate quantity required for reliability from the generating station. The reliability review of substitution auction demand bids that would otherwise clear will be conducted in order beginning with the resource whose cleared bids contribute the greatest amount to social surplus. The capacity associated with a bid shall be deemed needed for reliability reasons if the absence of the capacity would result in the violation of any NERC or NPCC criteria, or ISO New England System Rules. Bids shall only be rejected pursuant to this Section III.13.2.5.2.5 for the sole purpose of addressing a local reliability issue, and shall not be rejected solely on the basis that acceptance of the bid may result in the procurement of less capacity than the Installed Capacity Requirement (net of HQICCs) or the Local Sourcing Requirement for a Capacity Zone.

(b) If a Retirement De-List Bid, Permanent De-List Bid, Static De-List Bid, Export Bid, Administrative Export De-List Bid, or Dynamic De-List Bid would otherwise clear in the Forward Capacity Auction, but the ISO has determined that some or all of the capacity associated with the de-list bid is needed for reliability reasons, then the de-list bid having capacity needed for reliability will not clear in the Forward Capacity Auction. If the ISO has determined that some or all of the capacity associated with a substitution auction demand bid that would otherwise clear is needed for reliability reasons, then the entire demand bid will not be further included in the substitution auction.

(c) The Lead Market Participant shall be notified that its bid did not clear for reliability reasons at the later of: (i) immediately after the end of the Forward Capacity Auction round in which the auction price reaches the price of the de-list bid; or (ii) as soon as practicable after the time at which the ISO has determined that the bid must be rejected for reliability reasons. In no event, however, shall a Lead Market

Participant be notified that a bid submitted pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.5 and accepted in the qualification process for an Existing Generating Capacity Resource did not clear for reliability reasons if the associated New Generating Capacity Resource remains in the Forward Capacity Auction. In such a case, the Lead Market Participant shall be notified that its bid did not clear for reliability reasons at the later of: (i) immediately after the end of the Forward Capacity Auction round in which the auction price reaches the price of the bid; (ii) immediately after the end of the Forward Capacity Auction round in which the associated New Generating Capacity Resource is fully withdrawn (that is, the Forward Capacity Auction reaches a price at which the resource's New Capacity Offer is zero capacity); or (iii) as soon as practicable after the time at which the ISO has determined that the bid must be rejected for reliability reasons.

(d) A resource that has a de-list bid rejected for reliability reasons shall be compensated pursuant to the terms set out in Section III.13.2.5.2.5.1 and shall have a Capacity Supply Obligation as described in Section III.13.6.1.

(e) The ISO shall review the results of each annual reconfiguration auction and determine whether the reliability need which caused the ISO to reject the de-list bid has been met through the annual reconfiguration auction. The ISO may also attempt to address the reliability concern through other reasonable means (including transmission enhancements).

(f) If the reliability need that caused the ISO to reject a de-list bid is met through a reconfiguration auction or other means, the resource shall retain its Capacity Supply Obligation through the end of the Capacity Commitment Period for which it was retained for reliability (provided that resources that have Permanent De-List Bids or Retirement De-List Bids rejected for reliability shall be permanently de-listed or retired as of the first day of the subsequent Capacity Commitment Period (or earlier if the resource sheds the entirety of the Capacity Supply Obligation as described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3(a)(ii) or Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3(b)(ii))).

(g) If a Permanent De-List Bid or a Retirement De-List Bid is rejected for reliability reasons, and the reliability need is not met through a reconfiguration auction or other means, that resource, or portion thereof, as applicable, is no longer eligible to participate as an Existing Capacity Resource in any reconfiguration auction, Forward Capacity Auction or Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral for that and subsequent Capacity Commitment Periods. If the resource, or portion thereof, continues to be needed for

reliability reasons, it shall be counted as capacity in the Forward Capacity Auction and shall be compensated as described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5.1.

(h) The ISO shall review with the Reliability Committee (i) the status of any prior rejected de-list bids reported to the Commission in an FCA results filing pursuant to Section 13.8.2, and (ii) the status of any Retirement De-List Bid or Permanent De-List Bid that has been rejected for reliability reasons and has elected to continue to operate, prior to the New Capacity Qualification Deadline in accordance with Section 4.1(c) of Attachment K of the ISO OATT.

If an identified reliability need results in the rejection of a Retirement De-List Bid, Permanent De-List Bid, Export Bid, Administrative Export De-List Bid, Static De-List Bid, or Dynamic De-List Bid while executing an FCA, the ISO shall (i) review each specific reliability need with the Reliability Committee in accordance with the timing provided for in the ISO New England Operating Documents and, (ii) update the current system Needs Assessments pursuant to Section 4.1(c) of Attachment K of the ISO OATT. This review and update will follow ISO's filing of the FCA results with the Commission pursuant to Section 13.8.2.

#### **III.13.2.5.2.5A Fuel Security Reliability Review**

(a) This Section III.13.2.5.2.5A will remain in effect for the 2022/23, 2023/24 and 2024/25 Capacity Commitment Period, after which this Section III.13.2.5.2.5A will sunset.

(b) This Section III.13.2.5.2.5A will apply to (i) Retirement De-List Bids, (ii) substitution auction demand bids, and (iii) bilateral transactions and reconfiguration auctions demand bids submitted by an Existing Generating Capacity Resource that has been identified as being needed for fuel security during a Forward Capacity Auction. Terms set out in this Section III.13.2.5.2.5A will apply only for the period and resources described within this Section III.13.2.5.2.5A. Where the terms and conditions in this Section III.13.2.5.2.5A differ from terms otherwise set out in Section III.13, the terms of this Section III.13.2.5.2.5A will control for the period and circumstances described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5A.

(c) A fuel security reliability review for the Forward Capacity Market will be performed pursuant to Appendix L to Section III of the Tariff, and in accordance with the inputs and methodology set out to establish the fuel security reliability standard in Appendix I of Planning Procedure No. 10.

(d) For fuel security reliability reviews performed for the primary Forward Capacity Auction, the fuel security reliability review will be performed after the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline and conducted in descending price order using the price as submitted in the Retirement De-List Bids. Bids with the same price will be reviewed in the order that produces the least negative impact to reliability. Where multiple bids have the same price and the retirement of the Existing Generating Capacity Resources would have the same impact to reliability, they will be reviewed based on their submission time. If bids with the same price are from a single generating station, they will be reviewed in an order that seeks to provide (1) the least-cost solution under Section III.13.2.5.2.5.1(d), and (2) the minimum aggregate quantity required for reliability from the generating station. An Existing Generating Capacity Resource may be needed for both fuel security and for transmission security pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5. The fuel security reliability review will be performed in advance of the reliability review for transmission security. Where an Existing Generating Capacity Resource is needed for both fuel security reasons pursuant to this Section III.13.2.5.2.5A, and transmission security reliability reasons pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5, the generator will be retained for fuel security for purposes of cost allocation.

(e) If an Existing Generating Capacity Resource is identified as being needed for fuel security reasons, and the reliability need is not met through a reconfiguration auction or other means, that resource, or portion thereof, as applicable may not participate in Annual Reconfiguration Auctions for the Capacity Commitment Period(s) for which it is needed for fuel security, or earlier 2022/23, 2023/24 and 2024/25 Capacity Commitment Periods. Such an Existing Generating Capacity Resource that is identified as being needed for fuel security may participate in monthly bilateral transactions and monthly reconfiguration auctions, but may not submit monthly bilateral transactions for December, January or February, or demand bids for the December, January, or February monthly reconfiguration auctions for any period for which they have been identified as being needed for fuel security.

(f) Participants that have submitted a Retirement De-List Bid will be notified by ISO New England if their resource is needed for fuel security reliability reasons no later than 90 days after the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline. Participants that have submitted a substitution auction demand bid, and where the demand bid has been rejected for reliability reasons, will be notified after the relevant Forward Capacity Auction has been completed.

(g) Where a Retirement De-List Bid would otherwise clear in the Forward Capacity Auction, but the ISO has determined that some or all of the capacity associated with the de-list bid is needed for fuel security reliability reasons, the provisions of III.13.2.5.2.5(b) shall apply.

(h) Existing Generating Capacity Resources that have had their Retirement De-list Bid rejected for fuel security reliability reasons and that do not elect to unconditionally or conditionally retire shall be eligible for compensation pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5.1, except that the difference between payments based on resource de-list bids or cost-of-service compensation as detailed in Section III.13.2.5.2.5.1 and payments based on the Capacity Clearing Price for the Forward Capacity Market under this Section III.13.2.5.2.5.1 shall be allocated on a regional basis to Real Time Load Obligation, excluding Real-Time Load Obligation associated with Dispatchable Asset Related Demand Resources (DARD Pumps and other electric storage based DARDs) and Real-Time Load Obligation associated with Coordinated External Transactions, allocated and collected over a 12 month period. Resources that are identified as needed for fuel security reliability reasons will have their capacity entered into the Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to III.13.2.5.2.5(g) and III.13.2.3.2(b).

(i) Where an Existing Generating Capacity Resource elects a cost-of-service agreement pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5.1 to address a fuel security reliability need, the term of such a cost-of-service agreement may not exceed two years, including renewal through evergreen provisions. A cost-of-service agreement entered into for the 2024/2025 Capacity Commitment Period shall be limited to a total duration of one year.

(j) The ISO shall perform an annual reevaluation of any Existing Generating Capacity Resources retained for reliability under this provision. If a resource associated with a Retirement De-List Bid that was rejected for reliability reasons pursuant to this section, is found to no longer be needed for fuel security, and is not needed for another reliability reason pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5, the resource will be retired from the system as described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3(a)(1). In no case will a resource retained for fuel security be retained for fuel security beyond June 1, 2025.

(k) The ISO will review Retirement De-List Bids rejected for fuel security reliability reasons with the Reliability Committee in the same manner as described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5(h).

**III.13.2.5.2.5.1. Compensation for Bids Rejected for Reliability Reasons.**

(a) In cases where a Static De-List Bid, Export Bid, Administrative Export De-List Bid, Dynamic De-List Bid, partial Permanent De-List Bid, or partial Retirement De-List Bid has been rejected for reliability reasons pursuant to Sections III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1 or III.13.2.5.2.5, the resource will be paid by the ISO in the same manner as all other capacity resources, except that payment shall be made on the basis of its de-list bid as accepted for the Forward Capacity Auction for the relevant Capacity Commitment Period instead of the Forward Capacity Market Clearing Price. Under this Section, accepted Dynamic De-List Bids filed with the Commission as part of the FCA results filing are subject to review and approval by the Commission pursuant to the “just and reasonable” standard of Section 205 of the Federal Power Act. If a resource with a partial Permanent De-List Bid or partial Retirement De-List Bid continues to be needed for reliability in Capacity Commitment Periods following the Capacity Commitment Period for which the partial Permanent De-List Bid or partial Retirement De-List Bid was rejected, payment will continue to be pursuant to this Section III.13.2.5.2.5.1(a).

(b) In cases where a Permanent De-List Bid or a Retirement De-List Bid for the capacity of an entire resource has been rejected for reliability reasons pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1 or III.13.2.5.2.5, the resource will be paid either (i) in the same manner as all other capacity resources, except that payment shall be made on the basis of its Commission-approved Permanent De-List Bid or Commission-approved Retirement De-List Bid for the relevant Capacity Commitment Period instead of the Forward Capacity Market Clearing Price or (ii) under the terms of a cost-of-service agreement pursuant to Section III, Appendix I. Resources must notify the ISO of their election within six months after the ISO files the results of the relevant Forward Capacity Auction with the Commission. A resource that has had a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid rejected for reliability reasons and does not notify the ISO of its election as described in this paragraph will be paid on the basis of the resource’s Commission-approved Permanent De-List Bid or Commission-approved Retirement De-List Bid. Cost-of-service agreements must be filed with and approved by the Commission, and cost-of-service compensation may not commence until the Commission has approved the use of cost-of-service rates for the unit in question or has accepted the use of the cost-of-service rates subject to refund while the rate is reviewed. In no event will payment under the cost-of-service agreement start prior to the start of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period for which the Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid was submitted. If a resource continues to be needed for reliability in Capacity Commitment Periods following the Capacity Commitment Period for which the Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid was rejected, payment will continue to be pursuant to this Section III.13.2.5.2.5.1(b). Resources that elect payment based on the Commission-approved Permanent De-List Bid or Commission-approved Retirement De-List Bid may file with the Commission pursuant to Section 205 of the Federal Power Act to update its

Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid if the unit is retained for reliability for a period longer than the Capacity Commitment Period for which the Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid was originally submitted.

(c) The difference between payments based on resource de-list bids or cost-of-service compensation as detailed in this Section III.13.2.5.2.5.1 and payments based on the market clearing price for the Forward Capacity Market under this Section III.13.2.5.2.5.1 shall be allocated to Regional Network Load within the affected Reliability Region.

(d) **Compensation for Existing Generating Capacity Resources at Stations with Common Costs that are Retained for Reliability.** If a Static De-List Bid, Permanent De-List Bid, or Retirement De-List Bid from an Existing Generating Capacity Resource that is associated with a Station having Common Costs is rejected for reliability reasons, the Existing Generating Capacity Resource will be paid as follows: (i) if one or more Existing Generating Capacity Resources at the Station assume a Capacity Supply Obligation through the normal clearing of the Forward Capacity Auction and one or more Existing Generating Capacity Resources are retained for reliability, then the Existing Generating Capacity Resources retained for reliability will be paid the sum of the Asset-Specific Going Forward Costs for the assets comprising that Existing Generating Capacity Resource; or (ii) if no Existing Generating Capacity Resources at the Station assumes a Capacity Supply Obligation through the normal clearing of the Forward Capacity Auction and one or more Existing Generating Capacity Resources are retained for reliability, then each Existing Generating Capacity Resource retained for reliability will be paid the sum of the Asset-Specific Going Forward Costs for the assets associated with that Existing Generating Capacity Resource plus a portion of the Station Going Forward Common Costs (such that the full amount of Station Going Forward Common Costs are allocated to the Existing Generating Capacity Resources retained for reliability).

(e) If ISO-NE is a party to a cost-of-service agreement filed after January 1, 2019 that changes any resource performance-related obligations contained in Section III, Appendix I (provided that those obligations are different than the obligations of an Existing Generating Capacity Resource with a Capacity Supply Obligation), no later than 30 days after such agreement is filed with the Commission, ISO-NE shall provide to stakeholders quantitative and qualitative information on the need for, and the impacts of, the proposed changes.



**III.13.2.5.2.5.2. Incremental Cost of Reliability Service From Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid Resources.**

In cases where an Existing Generating Capacity Resource or Existing Demand Capacity Resource has had a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid for the entire resource rejected for reliability reasons pursuant to Sections III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1 or III.13.2.5.2.5, does not elect to retire pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1(d), and must make a capital improvement to the unit to remain in operation in order to continue to operate to meet the reliability need identified by the ISO, the resource may make application to the Commission pursuant to Section 205 of the Federal Power Act to receive just and reasonable compensation of the capital investment pursuant to the following:

(a) **Notice to State Utility Commissions, the ISO and Stakeholder Committees of Expectation that a Capital Expense will be Necessary to Meet the Reliability Need Identified by the ISO:** A resource seeking to avail itself of the recovery mechanism provided in this Section must notify the state utility commissions in the states where rate payers will fund the capital improvement, the ISO, and the Participants Committee of its intent to make the capital expenditure and the need for the expenditure. This notification must be made at least 120 days prior to the resource making the capital expenditure.

(b) **Required Showing Made to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission:** In order to receive just and reasonable compensation for a capital expenditure under this Section, a resource must file an explanation of need with the Commission that explains why the capital expenditure is necessary in order to meet the reliability need identified by the ISO. This showing must demonstrate that the expenditure is reasonably determined to be the least-cost commercially reasonable option consistent with Good Utility Practice to meet the reliability need identified by the ISO. If the resource elects cost-of-service treatment pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5.1(b), the Incremental Cost of Reliability Service filing described in this Section must be made separately from and may be made in advance of the resource's cost-of-service filing.

(c) **Allocation:** Costs of capital expenditures approved by the Commission under this provision shall be allocated to Regional Network Load within the affected Reliability Region.

**III.13.2.5.2.5.3. Retirement and Permanent De-Listing of Resources.**

(a)(i) A resource, or portion thereof, will be retired coincident with the commencement of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period, or earlier as described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3(a)(ii), if the resource: (1) submitted a Retirement De-List Bid at or above the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price and was not

retained for reliability pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1; (2) submitted a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid, elected to retire pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(a), and was not retained for reliability pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1; (3) elected conditional treatment pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(b) for a Retirement De-List Bid with a submitted price at or above the Capacity Clearing Price and was not retained for reliability pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1; or (4) had a Commission-approved Retirement De-List Bid clear in the Forward Capacity Auction. In the case of a Retirement De-List Bid rejected for reliability, if the reliability need that resulted in the rejection for reliability is met, the resource, or portion thereof, will be retired coincident with the end of Capacity Supply Obligation (or earlier as described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3(a)(ii)) unless the Commission directs that the obligation to retire be removed or the retirement date extended as part of an Incremental Cost of Reliability Service filing made pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5.2. The interconnection rights, or relevant portion thereof, for the resource will terminate and the status of the resource, or portion thereof, will be converted to retired on the date of retirement, consistent with the provisions of Schedules 22 and 23 of the OATT.

(a)(ii) A resource, or portion thereof, that is to be retired pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3(a)(i) may retire the resource, or portion thereof, earlier than the Capacity Commitment Period for which its Retirement De-List Bid was submitted if it is able to transfer the relevant Capacity Supply Obligation of the resource to another resource through one or more approved Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral transactions as described in Section III.13.5.1 or reconfiguration auctions as described in Section III.13.4.1. A resource, or portion thereof, electing to retire pursuant to this provision must notify the ISO in writing of its election to retire and the date of retirement. The interconnection rights, or relevant portion thereof, for the resource will terminate and the status of the resource, or portion thereof, will be converted to retired on the date of retirement, consistent with the provisions of Schedules 22 and 23 of the OATT.

(b)(i) A resource, or portion thereof, will be permanently de-listed from the Forward Capacity Market as of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period, or earlier as described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3(b)(ii), if the resource: (1) submitted an Internal Market Monitor-approved Permanent De-List Bid at or above the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price and was not retained for reliability pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1; (2) elected conditional treatment pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(b) for a Permanent De-List Bid with a submitted price at or above the Capacity Clearing Price and was not retained for reliability pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1; or (3) had a Commission-approved Permanent De-List Bid clear in the Forward Capacity Auction. The CNR Capability interconnection rights, or relevant portion thereof, for the resource will be adjusted downward to reflect the Permanent De-List Bid, consistent with the provisions of Schedules 22 and 23 of the OATT. A resource that permanently de-lists

pursuant to this Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3(b)(i) is precluded from subsequent participation in the Forward Capacity Market unless it qualifies as a New Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.1.2.

(b)(ii) A resource, or portion thereof, that is to be permanently de-listed pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3(b)(i) may be permanently de-listed earlier than the Capacity Commitment Period for which its Permanent De-List Bid was submitted if it is able to transfer the entire Capacity Supply Obligation of the resource to another resource through one or more approved Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral transactions as described in Section III.13.5.1 or reconfiguration auctions as described in Section III.13.4.

(c) A resource that has never been counted as a capacity resource may retire the asset by notifying the ISO in writing of its election to retire and the date of retirement. The date specified for retirement is subject to the limit for resource inactivity set out in Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3(d). The interconnection rights for the resource will terminate and the status of the resource will be converted to retired on the date of retirement.

(d) A resource that does not operate commercially for a period of three calendar years will be deemed by the ISO to be retired. The interconnection rights for the unit will terminate and the status of the unit will be converted to retired on the date of retirement. Where a generator has submitted an application to repower under Schedule 22 or 23 of the OATT, the current interconnection space will be maintained beyond the three years unless the application under Schedule 22 or 23 is withdrawn voluntarily or by the operation of those provisions. Where an application is withdrawn under Schedule 22 or 23, the three year period will be calculated from the last day of commercial operation of the resource.

### **III.13.2.6. Capacity Rationing Rule.**

Except for Dynamic De-List Bids, Export Bids, and offers from New Import Capacity Resources that are subject to rationing pursuant to Section III.13.1.3.5.8 and Existing Import Capacity Resources that are subject to rationing pursuant to Section III.13.1.3.3.A, offers and bids in the Forward Capacity Auction must clear or not clear in whole, unless the offer or bid specifically indicates that it may be rationed. A resource may elect to be rationed to its Rationing Minimum Limit pursuant to Sections III.13.1.1.2.2.3 and III.13.1.2.1.2. Offers from New Import Capacity Resources and Existing Import Capacity Resources will not be rationed where such rationing would violate any applicable physical minimum flow requirements on the associated interface. Export Bids may elect to be rationed generally, but regardless of

such election will always be subject to potential rationing where the associated external interface binds. If more Dynamic De-List Bids are submitted at a price than are needed to clear the market, the bids shall be cleared pro-rata, subject to honoring the Rationing Minimum Limit of the resources. Where an offer or bid may be rationed, such rationing may not result in procuring an amount of capacity that is below the associated resource's Rationing Minimum Limit.

### **III.13.2.7. Determination of Capacity Clearing Prices.**

The Capacity Clearing Price in each Capacity Zone shall be the price established by the descending clock auction as described in Section III.13.2.3, subject to the other provisions of this Section III.13.2.7. The Capacity Clearing Price for the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone and the Capacity Clearing Price for each import-constrained Capacity Zone shall not exceed the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price. The Capacity Clearing Price for an export-constrained Capacity Zone shall not be less than zero.

#### **III.13.2.7.1. Import-Constrained Capacity Zone Capacity Clearing Price Floor.**

The Capacity Clearing Price in an import-constrained Capacity Zone shall not be lower than the Capacity Clearing Price in the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone. If after the Forward Capacity Auction is conducted, the Capacity Clearing Price in an import-constrained Capacity Zone is less than the Capacity Clearing Price in the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone, all resources clearing in the import-constrained Capacity Zone shall be paid based on the Capacity Clearing Price in the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone during the associated Capacity Commitment Period.

#### **III.13.2.7.2. Export-Constrained Capacity Zone Capacity Clearing Price Ceiling.**

The Capacity Clearing Price in an export-constrained Capacity Zone shall not be higher than the Capacity Clearing Price in the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone.

The Capacity Clearing Price in a nested Capacity Zone shall not be higher than the Capacity Clearing Price in the Capacity Zone within which it is located.

#### **III.13.2.7.3. [Reserved.]**

#### **III.13.2.7.3A. Treatment of Imports.**

At the Capacity Clearing Price, if the amount of capacity offered from New Import Capacity Resources and Existing Import Capacity Resources over an interface between an external Control Area and the New

England Control Area is greater than that interface's approved capacity transfer limit (net of tie benefits, or net of HQICC in the case of the Phase I/II HVDC-TF):

(a) the full amount of capacity offered at that price from Existing Import Capacity Resources associated with contracts listed in Section III.13.1.3.3.A(c) shall clear, unless that amount of capacity is greater than the interface's approved capacity transfer limit (net of tie benefits, or net of HQICC in the case of the Phase I/II HVDC-TF), in which case the capacity offered at that price from Existing Import Capacity Resources associated with contracts listed in Section III.13.1.3.3.A(c) shall be rationed such that the interface's approved capacity transfer limit (net of tie benefits, or net of HQICC in the case of the Phase I/II HVDC-TF) is not exceeded; and

(b) if there is space remaining over the interface after the allocation described in subsection (a) above, then the capacity offered at that price from New Import Capacity Resources and Existing Import Capacity Resources other than Existing Import Capacity Resources associated with the contracts listed in Section III.13.1.3.3.A(c) will be rationed such that the interface's approved capacity transfer limit (net of tie benefits, or net of HQICC in the case of the Phase I/II HVDC-TF) is not exceeded. If the capacity offered at that price by any single New Import Capacity Resource or Existing Import Capacity Resource that is not associated with the contracts listed in Section III.13.1.3.3.A(c) is greater than the interface's approved capacity transfer limit (net of tie benefits, or net of HQICC in the case of the Phase I/II HVDC-TF), then the capacity offered by that resource that is above the interface's approved capacity transfer limit (net of tie benefits, or net of HQICC in the case of the Phase I/II HVDC-TF) shall not be included in the rationing.

#### **III.13.2.7.4. Effect of Capacity Rationing Rule on Capacity Clearing Price.**

Where the requirement that offers and bids clear or not clear in whole (Section III.13.2.6) prohibits the descending clock auction in its normal progression from clearing one or more Capacity Zones at the precise amount of capacity determined by the Capacity Zone Demand Curves specified in Section III.13.2.2, then the auctioneer shall analyze the aggregate supply curve to determine cleared capacity offers and Capacity Clearing Prices that seek to maximize social surplus for the associated Capacity Commitment Period. The clearing algorithm may result in offers below the Capacity Clearing Price not clearing, and in de-list bids below the Capacity Clearing Price clearing.

**III.13.2.7.5. Effect of Decremental Repowerings on the Capacity Clearing Price.**

Where the effect of accounting for certain repowering offers and bids (as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(e)) results in the auction not clearing at the lowest price for the required quantity of capacity, then the auctioneer will conduct additional auction rounds of the Forward Capacity Auction as necessary to minimize capacity costs.

**III.13.2.7.6. Minimum Capacity Award.**

Each offer (excluding offers from Conditional Qualified New Resources that do not satisfy the conditions specified in Sections III.13.2.5.1(i)-(iii)) clearing in the Forward Capacity Auction shall be awarded a Capacity Supply Obligation at least as great as the amount of capacity offered at the End-of-Round Price in the final round of the Forward Capacity Auction. For Intermittent Power Resources, the Capacity Supply Obligation for months in the winter period (as described in Section III.13.1.5) shall be adjusted based on its winter Qualified Capacity as determined pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.2.6 and Section III.13.1.2.2.2.

**III.13.2.7.7. Tie-Breaking Rules.**

Where the provisions in this Section III.13.2 for clearing the Forward Capacity Auction (system-wide or in a single Capacity Zone) result in a tie – that is, where two or more resources offer sufficient capacity at prices that would clear the auction at the same minimum costs – the auctioneer shall apply the following rules (in sequence, as necessary) to determine clearing:

- (a) [Reserved.]
- (b) If multiple projects may be rationed, they will be rationed proportionately.
- (c) Where clearing either the offer associated with a resource with a higher queue priority at a Conditional Qualified New Resource's location or the offer associated with the Conditional Qualified New Resource would result in equal costs, the offer associated with the resource with the higher queue priority shall clear.
- (d) The offer associated with the Project Sponsor having the lower market share in the capacity auction (including Existing Generating Capacity Resources, Existing Import Capacity Resources, and Existing Demand Capacity Resources) shall be cleared.

### **III.13.2.8. Capacity Substitution Auctions.**

The final substitution auction shall take place for the Forward Capacity Auction associated with the June 1, 2027 to May 31, 2028 Capacity Commitment Period, and no substitution auctions shall be conducted thereafter. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the provisions of Section III.12 of Market Rule 1 and Attachment K to the OATT addressing the manner in which Capacity Supply Obligations acquired or shed through the substitution auction are accounted for in the calculation of the Installed Capacity Requirement and related values and in carrying out the regional system planning process shall continue to have full force and effect.

#### **III.13.2.8.1. Administration of Substitution Auctions.**

Following the completion of the primary auction-clearing process of the Forward Capacity Auction as provided for in Section III.13.2, the ISO shall conduct a substitution auction, using a static double auction to clear supply offers (offers to assume a Capacity Supply Obligation) and demand bids (bids to shed a Capacity Supply Obligation). Supply offers and demand bids will be modeled in the Capacity Zone where the associated resources are electrically interconnected.

##### **III.13.2.8.1.1. Substitution Auction Clearing and Awards.**

The substitution auction shall maximize total social surplus as specified by the demand bids and supply offers used in the auction. The maximization is constrained as follows:

- (i) By the external interface limits modeled in the primary auction-clearing process.
- (ii) Such that the net cleared Capacity Supply Obligations (total acquired less total shed) in the substitution auction is equal to zero.
- (iii) Such that, for each import-constrained Capacity Zone, if the zone's total Capacity Supply Obligations awarded in the primary auction-clearing process of the Forward Capacity Auction is less than the zone threshold quantity specified below, then the zone's net cleared Capacity Supply Obligations (total acquired less total shed) in the substitution auction is equal to zero; otherwise, the sum of the zone's total Capacity Supply Obligations awarded in the primary auction-clearing process and the zone's net cleared Capacity Supply Obligations (total acquired less total shed) in the substitution auction is greater than or equal to the zone threshold quantity specified below.
- (iv) Such that, for each export-constrained Capacity Zone, if the zone's total Capacity Supply Obligations awarded in the primary auction-clearing process of the Forward Capacity

Auction is greater than the zone threshold quantity specified below, then the zone's net cleared Capacity Supply Obligations (total acquired less total shed) in the substitution auction is equal to zero; otherwise, the sum of the zone's total Capacity Supply Obligations awarded in the primary auction-clearing process and the zone's net cleared Capacity Supply Obligations (total acquired less total shed) in the substitution auction is less than or equal to the zone threshold quantity specified below.

In applying constraint (iii), the zone threshold quantity for an import-constrained Capacity Zone shall be equal to the sum of its Capacity Zone Demand Curve truncation point quantity specified in Section III.13.2.2.2 and the total quantity of any Export Bids and any Administrative Export De-List Bids for which the exporting resource is located outside the import-constrained Capacity Zone, that are used to export capacity across an external interface connected to the import-constrained Capacity Zone, and that cleared in the primary auction-clearing process of the Forward Capacity Auction.

In applying constraint (iv), the zone threshold quantity for an export-constrained Capacity Zone shall be equal to its Capacity Zone Demand Curve truncation point quantity specified in Section III.13.2.2.3 less the total quantity of any Export Bids and any Administrative Export De-List Bids for which the exporting resource is located in the export-constrained Capacity Zone, including any Export Bids and any Administrative Export De-List Bids in an associated nested export-constrained Capacity Zone, that are used to export capacity across an external interface connected to another Capacity Zone, and that cleared in the primary auction-clearing process of the Forward Capacity Auction.

In applying constraints (iii) and (iv), a zone's total Capacity Supply Obligations awarded in the primary auction-clearing process of the Forward Capacity Auction and net cleared Capacity Supply Obligations (total acquired less total shed) in the substitution auction shall include the Capacity Supply Obligations of Import Capacity Resources at each external interface connected to the Capacity Zone.

In applying constraints (iii) and (iv), a zone's total Capacity Supply Obligations awarded in the primary auction-clearing process of the Forward Capacity Auction shall include the Capacity Supply Obligations awarded to Proxy De-List Bids within the zone, and the zone's net cleared Capacity Supply Obligations (total acquired less total shed) in the substitution auction shall include the Capacity Supply Obligations shed from demand bids associated with Proxy De-List Bids within the zone.



In cases in which there are multiple clearing outcomes that would each maximize the substitution auction's objective, the following tie-breaking rules will apply in the following sequence: (i) non-rationable demand bids associated with Lead Market Participants having the largest total FCA Qualified Capacity of Existing Capacity Resources will be cleared first; and (ii) rationable supply offers will be cleared in proportion to their offer quantity.

For Intermittent Power Resources, other than those participating as the summer resource in a Composite FCM Transaction, the cleared award for supply offers and demand bids shall be adjusted for the months in the winter period (as described in Section III.13.1.5) using the ratio of the resource's cleared offer or bid amount divided by its FCA Qualified Capacity multiplied by its winter Qualified Capacity as determined pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.2.6 and Section III.13.1.2.2.2 after removing any portion of the resource's winter Qualified Capacity that is participating in a Composite FCM Transaction.

The cleared offer amount awarded to a Composite FCM Transaction in the substitution auction will be assigned to the summer and winter resources for their respective obligation months during the Capacity Commitment Period as described in Section III.13.1.5.

If, after the substitution auction, a resource has a Capacity Supply Obligation below its Economic Minimum Limit, it must meet the requirements of Section III.13.6.1.1.1.

#### **III.13.2.8.1.2. Substitution Auction Pricing.**

The substitution auction will specify clearing prices for Capacity Zones and external interfaces as follows.

For each import-constrained Capacity Zone, if the sum of the zone's total Capacity Supply Obligations awarded in the primary auction-clearing process of the Forward Capacity Auction and the zone's net cleared Capacity Supply Obligations (total acquired less total shed) in the substitution auction is greater than its zone threshold quantity specified in Section III.13.2.8.1.1, then supply offers and demand bids in the substitution auction in the import-constrained Capacity Zone shall be treated as offers and bids in the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone for purposes of determining substitution auction clearing prices.

For each export-constrained Capacity Zone,

- (i) if the sum of the zone's total Capacity Supply Obligations, including Capacity Supply Obligations in a nested Capacity Zone, awarded in the primary auction-clearing process of the Forward Capacity Auction and the zone's net cleared Capacity Supply Obligations

(total acquired less total shed) in the substitution auction including net cleared Capacity Supply Obligations in the nested Capacity Zone is less than its zone threshold quantity specified in Section III.13.2.8.1.1, then supply offers and demand bids in the substitution auction in the export-constrained Capacity Zone (excluding supply offers and demand bids in the nested Capacity Zone that are not treated as offers and bids in the export-constrained Capacity Zone pursuant to Section III.13.2.8.1.2(ii)) shall be treated as offers and bids in the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone for purposes of determining substitution auction clearing prices.

- (ii) if the sum of a nested Capacity Zone's Capacity Supply Obligations awarded in the primary auction-clearing process of the Forward Capacity Auction and the nested Capacity Zone's net cleared Capacity Supply Obligations (total acquired less total shed) in the substitution auction is less than its zone threshold quantity specified in Section III.13.2.8.1.1, then supply offers and demand bids in the substitution auction in the nested Capacity Zone shall be treated as offers and bids in the export-constrained Capacity Zone within which the nested Capacity Zone is located, for purposes of determining substitution auction clearing prices.

The substitution auction clearing prices for the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone and for any constrained zones pooled with the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone for pricing purposes shall be determined by the price of the demand bid or supply offer that is marginal. If a demand bid associated with a Proxy De-List Bid is marginal, then the substitution auction clearing prices shall be set equal to the Capacity Clearing Prices.

The substitution auction clearing price for a constrained Capacity Zone that is not pooled with the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone for pricing purposes shall be determined by the price of the demand bid or supply offer associated with the separately-priced constrained Capacity Zone that is marginal. If a demand bid associated with a Proxy De-List Bid is marginal, then the substitution auction clearing price shall be set equal to the Capacity Clearing Price for the constrained Capacity Zone.

The substitution auction clearing price for a nested export-constrained Capacity Zone that is not pooled with the export-constrained Capacity Zone in which it is located for pricing purposes shall be determined by the price of the demand bid or supply offer that is marginal in the nested export-constrained Capacity Zone. If a demand bid associated with a Proxy De-List Bid is marginal, then the substitution auction clearing price for the nested export-constrained Capacity Zone shall be equal to the Capacity Clearing Price for that nested export-constrained Capacity Zone.

If the net quantity of Capacity Supply Obligations awarded in the primary Forward Capacity Auction and substitution auction over an interface between the New England Control Area and an external Control Area is less than that interface's approved capacity transfer limit (net of tie benefits, or net of HQICC in the case of the Phase I/II HVDC-TF), then supply offers and demand bids in the substitution auction at the interface shall be treated as offers and bids in the modeled Capacity Zone associated with that interface for purposes of determining substitution auction clearing prices.

If the net quantity of Capacity Supply Obligations awarded in the primary Forward Capacity Auction and substitution auction over an interface between the New England Control Area and an external Control Area is equal to that interface's approved capacity transfer limit (net of tie benefits, or net of HQICC in the case of the Phase I/II HVDC-TF), then the substitution auction clearing price for that interface will be determined by the demand bid or supply offer that is marginal at that interface. If a cleared demand bid associated with a Proxy De-List Bid is marginal at the external interface, then the substitution auction clearing price for that interface shall be set equal to the Capacity Clearing Price for that interface.

The substitution auction clearing price for an import-constrained Capacity Zone where the total Capacity Supply Obligations awarded in the primary action-clearing process of the Forward Capacity Auction are greater than or equal to the zone's threshold quantity specified in Section III.13.2.8.1.1 shall not be lower than the substitution auction clearing price for the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone.

The substitution auction clearing price for an export-constrained Capacity Zone that is not a nested export-constrained Capacity Zone, where the total Capacity Supply Obligations awarded in the primary auction-clearing process of the Forward Capacity Auction are less than or equal to the zone's threshold quantity specified in Section III.13.2.8.1.1 shall not exceed the substitution auction clearing price for the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone.

The substitution auction clearing price for a nested export-constrained Capacity Zone where the total Capacity Supply Obligations awarded in the primary auction-clearing process of the Forward Capacity Auction are less than or equal to the zone's threshold quantity specified in Section III.13.2.8.1.1 shall not exceed the substitution auction clearing price for the Capacity Zone within which it is located.

The substitution auction clearing price at an external interface shall not exceed the substitution auction clearing price in the Capacity Zone connected to the external interface.

If, pursuant to the rules specified above, the substitution auction clearing price for any Capacity Zone or external interface would exceed the Capacity Clearing Price for that location, the substitution auction clearing price for that location only is set equal to its Capacity Clearing Price.

The substitution auction clearing price for any Capacity Zone or external interface cannot be less than negative one multiplied by the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price.

#### **III.13.2.8.2. Supply Offers in the Substitution Auction.**

##### **III.13.2.8.2.1. Supply Offers.**

To participate as supply in the substitution auction, a Project Sponsor for a New Capacity Resource must meet the following criteria:

- (a) The Project Sponsor and the New Capacity Resource must meet all the requirements for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction specified in Section III.13.1.
- (b) The Project Sponsor must elect to have the resource participate in the substitution auction during the New Capacity Show of Interest Window. Pursuant to an election, the resource's total amount of FCA Qualified Capacity that qualifies as a New Capacity Resource will be obligated to participate in the substitution auction, including any capacity of a Renewable Technology Resource that was not qualified due to proration pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.10(a), and subject to the other provisions of this Section III.13.2.8.2.
- (c) The Project Sponsor must certify that the New Capacity Resource is a Sponsored Policy Resource as part of the submission of the New Capacity Qualification Package.

Substitution auction supply offers are rationable.

A resource participating in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2 (resources previously counted as capacity resources) is not eligible to participate as supply in the substitution auction. A resource is not eligible to participate as supply in the substitution auction if it has submitted a demand bid for the substitution auction.

A Composite FCM Transaction comprised of a summer resource that is a Sponsored Policy Resource is eligible to participate as supply in the substitution auction.

A Conditional Qualified New Resource may participate in the substitution auction provided that the resource with which it has overlapping interconnection impacts: (i) did not receive a Capacity Supply Obligation, fully or partially, in the primary auction-clearing process, and: (ii) is not eligible to participate in the substitution auction. A resource having a higher priority in the queue than a Conditional Qualified New Resource with which it has overlapping interconnection impact may participate in the substitution auction provided that the Conditional Qualified New Resource did not receive a Capacity Supply Obligation, fully or partially, in the primary auction-clearing process.

#### **III.13.2.8.2.2. Supply Offer Prices.**

Project Sponsors must submit substitution auction supply offer prices no later than five Business Days after the deadline for submission of offers composed of separate resources.

A substitution auction supply offer must be in the form of a curve (with up to five price-quantity pairs). The curve may not decrease in quantity as the price increases. A supply offer price for the substitution auction may not be greater than the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price or lower than negative one multiplied by the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price.

If the offer quantity does not equal the resource's FCA Qualified Capacity, the quantity for which no offer price was submitted will be assigned a price equal to the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price.

#### **III.13.2.8.2.3. Supply Offers Entered into the Substitution Auction**

Supply offers for resources that satisfy all of the criteria in Section III.13.2.8.2.1 to participate in the substitution auction may be adjusted prior to conducting the substitution auction-clearing process using the following adjustments:

- (a) Any portion of a resource's FCA Qualified Capacity that was cleared (received a Capacity Supply Obligation) in the primary auction-clearing process will be removed from the resource's substitution auction supply offer beginning with the lowest priced price-quantity pairs.

(b) After performing the adjustment specified in Section III.13.2.8.2.3(a), any price-quantity pairs in a resource's substitution auction supply offer with a price greater than the Capacity Clearing Price for the resource's Capacity Zone or external interface are removed from the offer.

### **III.13.2.8.3. Demand Bids in the Substitution Auction.**

#### **III.13.2.8.3.1. Demand Bids.**

Market Participants with Existing Generating Capacity Resources or Existing Import Capacity Resources associated with External Elective Transmission Upgrades may elect to submit demand bids for the substitution auction for those resources by the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline. The election must specify the total amount of the resource's Qualified Capacity that will be associated with its demand bid.

A resource, including any portion of an existing resource that qualifies as a New Capacity Resource, must have achieved FCM Commercial Operation no later than seven days after the issuance by the ISO of the qualification determination notification described in Section III.13.1.2.4(b) in order to participate as demand in the substitution auction.

Regardless of whether an election is made, a demand bid is required for any portion of a resource that is associated with a Retirement De-List Bid, provided that the entire resource has achieved FCM Commercial Operation no later than seven days after the issuance by the ISO of the qualification determination notification described in Section III.13.1.2.4(b).

A resource for which a demand bid election has been made cannot participate in a Composite FCM Transaction, cannot be designated as a Self-Supplied FCA Resource, and will not have incremental summer or winter capacity that does not span the entire Capacity Commitment Period subjected to the treatment specified in Section III.13.1.1.1.3.A.

Demand bids are non-rationable.

A demand bid will be entered into the substitution auction for the portion of the resource that receives a Capacity Supply Obligation in the primary auction-clearing process, subject to the other provisions of this Section III.13.2.8.3. A resource, or portion thereof, associated with a cleared demand bid shall be retired from all New England Markets at the start of the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction.

#### **III.13.2.8.3.2. Demand Bid Prices.**

Market Participants must submit substitution auction demand bid prices no later than five Business Days after the deadline for submission of offers composed of separate resources.

A substitution auction demand bid must be in the form of a curve (with up to five price-quantity pairs). The curve may not decrease in quantity as the price decreases. A demand bid price for the substitution auction may not be greater than the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price or lower than negative one multiplied by the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price.

If the bid quantity does not equal the total bid amount submitted by the Market Participant or required for a Retirement De-List Bid pursuant to Section III.13.2.8.3.1, the quantity for which no bid price was specified will be assigned a price equal to negative one multiplied by the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price.

For auctions associated with a Capacity Commitment Period that begins on or after June 1, 2023, Market Participants may elect either of the demand bid adjustment methods specified in Section III.13.2.8.3.3(b) for the resource by no later than five Business Days after the deadline for submission of offers composed of separate resources. If no such election is made, the adjustment applied shall be the method specified in Section III.13.2.8.3.3(b)(i).

#### **III.13.2.8.3.3. Demand Bids Entered into the Substitution Auction.**

If a resource is determined to be needed for reliability pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5, then any demand bid associated with the resource will not be further included in the substitution auction.

Demand bids for resources that satisfy all of the criteria in Section III.13.2.8.3.1 to participate in the substitution auction will be adjusted prior to conducting the substitution auction-clearing process using the following adjustments:

- (a) For the substitution auction associated with the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2022, any portion of a resource's demand bid that exceeds its Capacity Supply Obligation awarded in

the primary auction-clearing process will be removed from the substitution auction demand bid beginning with the highest priced price-quantity pairs.

(b) For substitution auctions associated with a Capacity Commitment Period that begins on or after June 1, 2023, a resource's demand bid will be adjusted using one of the following methods as elected pursuant to Section III.13.2.8.3.2:

(i) The portion of a resource's capacity that did not receive a Capacity Supply Obligation in the primary auction-clearing process will be removed from the substitution auction demand bid beginning with the highest priced price-quantity pair.

(ii) Any portion of a resource's demand bid that exceeds its Capacity Supply Obligation awarded in the primary auction-clearing process will be removed from the substitution auction demand bid beginning with the lowest priced price-quantity pair.

(c) After performing the modification specified in Sections III.13.2.8.3.3(a) or III.13.2.8.3.3(b), any price-quantity pairs in a resource's substitution auction demand bid with a price greater than the Capacity Clearing Price for the resource's Capacity Zone or external interface will have its price reduced to the Capacity Clearing Price for the resource's Capacity Zone or external interface.

Except as provided in Section III.13.2.5.2.1(c), a rationable demand bid will be entered into the substitution auction on behalf of any Proxy De-List Bid associated with a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid. The demand bid quantity will equal the portion of the Proxy De-List Bid that was not cleared (received a Capacity Supply Obligation) in the first run of the primary auction-clearing process. The demand bid will have priority to clear before non-rationable demand bids.



### **III.13.3. Critical Path Schedule Monitoring.**

#### **III.13.3.1. Resources Subject to Critical Path Schedule Monitoring.**

##### **III.13.3.1.1. New Resources Electing Critical Path Schedule Monitoring.**

A Project Sponsor that submits a critical path schedule for a New Capacity Resource in the qualification process may request that the ISO monitor that resource's compliance with its critical path schedule in accordance with the provisions of this Section III.13.3. The ISO will monitor the New Capacity Resource's compliance from the time the ISO approves the request until the resource achieves FCM Commercial Operation, loses its Capacity Supply Obligation pursuant to Section III.13.3.4A, or withdraws from critical path schedule monitoring pursuant to Section III.13.3.6.

In addition, a Lead Market Participant with a New Import Capacity Resource backed by one or more existing External Resources seeking to qualify for Capacity Commitment Period(s) prior to the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction for which it is qualifying must request monitoring under this Section III.13.3.1.1.

A request under this Section III.13.3.1.1 must be made in writing no later than five Business Days after the deadline for submission of the FCM Deposit pursuant to Section III.13.1.9.1.

##### **III.13.3.1.2. New Resources Clearing in the Forward Capacity Auction.**

For each new resource required to submit a critical path schedule in the qualification process, including but not limited to a New Generating Capacity Resource (pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.2), a New Import Capacity Resource backed by a new External Resource (pursuant to Section III.13.1.3.5), or a New Demand Capacity Resource (pursuant to Section III.13.1.4), if capacity from that resource clears in the Forward Capacity Auction, then the ISO shall monitor that resource's compliance with its critical path schedule in accordance with the provisions of this Section III.13.3 (regardless of whether the Project Sponsor requested monitoring pursuant to Section III.13.3.1.1) from the time that the Forward Capacity Auction is conducted until the resource achieves FCM Commercial Operation, loses its Capacity Supply Obligation pursuant to Section III.13.3.4A, or withdraws from critical path schedule monitoring pursuant to Section III.13.3.6.

**III.13.3.1.3. New Resources Not Offering or Not Clearing in the Forward Capacity Auction.**

If no capacity from a new resource that was required to submit a critical path schedule in the qualification process clears in the Forward Capacity Auction, or if such a resource does not submit an offer in the Forward Capacity Auction, then the ISO shall not monitor that resource's compliance with its critical path schedule after the Forward Capacity Auction unless the Project Sponsor previously requested pursuant to Section III.13.3.1.1 that the ISO continue to monitor that resource's compliance with its critical path schedule. However, if a New Generating Capacity Resource participated but did not clear in the Forward Capacity Auction either as: (i) a Conditional Qualified New Resource, or (ii) a New Generating Capacity Resource with a higher priority in the queue and overlapping interconnection impacts with a Conditional Qualified New Resource, the ISO will not continue to monitor that resource's compliance with its critical path schedule even if that resource requested critical path schedule monitoring pursuant to Section III.13.3.1.1.

**III.13.3.2. Quarterly Critical Path Schedule Reports.**

For each new resource that is being monitored for compliance with its critical path schedule, the Project Sponsor for that resource must provide a written critical path schedule report to the ISO no later than five Business Days after the end of each calendar quarter. If the Project Sponsor does not provide a written critical path schedule report to the ISO by the fifth Business Day after the end of the calendar quarter, then the ISO shall issue a notice thereof to the Project Sponsor. If the Project Sponsor fails to provide the critical path schedule report within five Business Days of issuance of that notice, then the resource will be subject to termination pursuant to Section III.13.3.4A. Each critical path schedule report shall include the following:

**III.13.3.2.1. Updated Critical Path Schedule.**

The critical path schedule report must include a complete updated version of the critical path schedule as described in Section III.13.1.1.2.2.2, dated contemporaneously with the submission of the critical path schedule report. The updated critical path schedule should clearly indicate if the Project Sponsor is proposing to change any of the milestones or dates from the previously submitted version of the critical path schedule, and must include an explanation of any such proposed changes. In the critical path schedule report, the Project Sponsor should also explain in detail any proposed changes to the project design and the potential impact of such changes on the amount of capacity the resource will be able to provide.

**III.13.3.2.2. Documentation of Milestones Achieved.**

(a) For all new resources except for Demand Capacity Resources installed at multiple facilities and Demand Capacity Resources from a single facility with a demand reduction value of less than 5 MW (discussed in Section III.13.3.2.2(b)), for each critical path schedule milestone achieved since the submission of the previous critical path schedule report, the Project Sponsor must include in the critical path schedule report documentation demonstrating that the milestone has been achieved by the date indicated and as otherwise described in the critical path schedule, as follows:

(i) **Major Permits.** For each major permit described in the critical path schedule, the Project Sponsor shall provide documentation showing that the permit was applied for and obtained as described in the critical path schedule. For permit applications, this documentation could include a dated copy of the permit application or cover letter requesting the permit. For approved permits, this documentation could include a dated copy of the approved permit or letter granting the permit from the permitting authority.

(ii) **Project Financing Closing.** The Project Sponsor shall provide documentation showing that the sources of financing identified in the critical path schedule have committed to provide the amount of financing described in the critical path schedule. This documentation could include copies of commitment letters from the sources of financing.

(iii) **Major Equipment Orders.** For each major component described in the critical path schedule, the Project Sponsor shall provide documentation showing that the equipment was ordered as described in the critical path schedule. This documentation should include a copy of a dated confirmation of the order from the manufacturer or supplier. This documentation should confirm scheduled delivery dates consistent with milestone Section III.13.3.2.2(a)(vi).

(iv) **Substantial Site Construction.** The Project Sponsor shall provide documentation showing that the amount of money expended on construction activities occurring on the project site has exceeded 20 percent of the construction financing costs.

(v) **Major Equipment Delivery.** For each major component described in the critical path schedule, the Project Sponsor shall provide documentation showing that the equipment was delivered to the project site and received as preliminarily acceptable as described in the critical

path schedule. This documentation should include a copy of a dated confirmation of delivery to the project site.

(vi) **Major Equipment Testing.** For each major component described in the critical path schedule, the Project Sponsor shall provide documentation showing that the component was tested, including major systems testing as appropriate for the specific technology as described in the critical path schedule, and that the test results demonstrate the equipment's suitability to allow, in conjunction with other major components, subsequent operation of the project in accordance with the amount of capacity obligated from the resource in the Capacity Commitment Period in accordance with Good Utility Practice. This documentation could include a dated copy of the satisfactory test results.

(vii) **Commissioning.** The Project Sponsor shall provide documentation showing that the resource has demonstrated a level of performance equal to or greater than the amount of capacity obligated from the resource in the Capacity Commitment Period. This documentation should include a copy of a dated letter of confirmation from the applicable manufacturer, contractor, or installer.

(viii) **Commercial Operation.** The Project Sponsor is not required to provide documentation of Commercial Operation (as defined in Schedule 22, 23, or 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff) to the ISO as part of the ISO's critical path schedule monitoring. The ISO shall confirm that the resource has achieved Commercial Operation (as defined in Schedule 22, 23, or 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff) as described in the critical path schedule through the resource's compliance with the other relevant requirements of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff and the ISO New England System Rules.

(ix) **Transmission Upgrades.** If during the qualification process it was determined that transmission upgrades (including any upgrades identified in a re-study pursuant to Section 3.2.1.3 of Schedule 22, Section 1.7.1.3 of Schedule 23, or Section 3.2.1.3 of Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff) are needed for the new resource to complete its interconnection, then the Project Sponsor shall provide documentation showing that the transmission upgrades have been completed.

(b) For Demand Capacity Resources installed at multiple facilities and Demand Capacity Resources from a single facility with a demand reduction value of less than 5 MW, for each critical path schedule milestone achieved since the submission of the previous critical path schedule report, the Project Sponsor must include in the critical path schedule report documentation demonstrating that the milestone has been achieved by the date indicated and as otherwise described in the critical path schedule, as follows:

(i) **Substantial Project Completion.** The Project Sponsor shall provide documentation showing the total offered demand reduction value achieved as of target dates which are: (a) the cumulative percentage of total demand reduction value achieved on target date 1 occurring five weeks prior to the first Forward Capacity Auction after the Forward Capacity Auction in which the Demand Capacity Resource supplier's capacity award was made; (b) the cumulative percentage of total demand reduction value achieved on target date 2 occurring five weeks prior to the second Forward Capacity Auction after the Forward Capacity Auction in which the Demand Capacity Resource supplier's capacity award was made; and (c) target date 3 which is the date the resource is expected to be ready to demonstrate to the ISO that the Demand Capacity Resource described in the Project Sponsor's New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package has achieved its full demand reduction value, which must be on or before the first day of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period and by which date 100 percent of the total demand reduction value must be complete.

(ii) **Additional Requirements.** For each customer and each prospective customer the Project Sponsor shall provide: name, location, MW amount, and description of stage of negotiation. If the customer's Asset has been registered with the ISO, then the Project Sponsor shall also provide the Asset identification number.

#### **III.13.3.2.3. Additional Relevant Information.**

The Project Sponsor must include in the critical path schedule report any other information regarding the status or progress of the project or any of the project milestones that might be relevant to the ISO's evaluation of the feasibility of the project being built in accordance with the critical path schedule or the feasibility that the project will achieve all its critical path schedule milestones no later than the start of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period.

#### **III.13.3.2.4. Additional Information for Resources Previously Counted As Capacity.**

For each resource participating in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to Sections III.13.1.1.1.2, III.13.1.1.1.3, or III.13.1.1.1.4 or New Demand Capacity Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.4.1 and clearing in that auction, the Project Sponsor must provide information in the critical path schedule report demonstrating: (a) the shedding of the resource's Capacity Supply Obligation in accordance with the provisions of Section III.13.1.1.2.2.5(c); and (b) that the relevant cost threshold (described in Sections III.13.1.1.1.2, III.13.1.1.1.3, and III.13.1.1.1.4) is being met.

#### **III.13.3.3. Failure to Meet Critical Path Schedule.**

If the ISO determines that any critical path schedule milestone date has been missed, or if the Project Sponsor proposes a change to any milestone date in a quarterly critical path schedule report (as described in Section III.13.3.2.1), then the ISO shall consult with the Project Sponsor to determine the impact of the missed milestone or proposed revision, and shall determine a revised date for the milestone and for any other milestones affected by the change. If a milestone date is revised for any reason, the ISO may require the Project Sponsor to submit a written report to the ISO on the fifth Business Day of each month until the revised milestone is achieved detailing the progress toward meeting the revised milestone. If the Project Sponsor does not provide a written critical path schedule report to the ISO on the fifth Business Day of a month, then the ISO shall issue a notice thereof to the Project Sponsor. If the Project Sponsor fails to provide the critical path schedule report within five Business Days of issuance of that notice, then the resource will be subject to termination pursuant to Section III.13.3.4A. Such a monthly reporting requirement, if imposed, shall be in addition to the quarterly critical path schedule reports described in Section III.13.3.2.

#### **III.13.3.4. Covering Capacity Supply Obligations.**

(a) If a capacity supplier determines that a resource may not be able to demonstrate its ability to deliver the full amount of its Capacity Supply Obligation, the capacity supplier may take actions to cover all or part of the Capacity Supply Obligation for any portion of the Capacity Commitment Period, as follows:

- (i) A capacity supplier may cover its Capacity Supply Obligation through reconfiguration auctions as described in Section III.13.4.
- (ii) A capacity supplier may cover its Capacity Supply Obligation through one or more Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals, subject to the satisfaction of the requirements in Section III.13.5.

- (iii) A capacity supplier that has qualified a resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.1.2 may cover its Capacity Supply Obligation by electing, no later than ten Business Days prior to the offer and bid deadline for the third annual reconfiguration auction prior to the start of the applicable Capacity Commitment Period, to have the resource that was previously counted as a capacity resource cover the Capacity Supply Obligation of the New Generating Capacity Resource for up to two Capacity Commitment Periods. If an election is made to have the resource that was previously counted as a capacity resource cover the Capacity Supply Obligation of the New Generating Capacity Resource, the capacity supplier with the resource that was previously counted as a capacity resource shall be required to comply with the requirements set forth in Section III.13.6.1 so long as it continues to cover for the New Generating Capacity Resource.
- (b) During a Capacity Commitment Period, a failure to cover charge will apply to any capacity resource that has not demonstrated the ability to deliver the full amount of its Capacity Supply Obligation by the end of an Obligation Month. The failure to cover charge is the difference between a resource's monthly Capacity Supply Obligation and its Maximum Demonstrated Output, multiplied by the Failure to Cover Charge Rate, where:

**Maximum Demonstrated Output Period**

Maximum Demonstrated Output Period is the period beginning six years prior to the start of the applicable Capacity Commitment Period and ending with the most recently completed calendar month in the Capacity Commitment Period, including all prior months in the Capacity Commitment Period.

Provided that, for a resource that has previously been counted as a capacity resource and for which an election has been made to participate as a New Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.1.2, and for which a cover election has been made pursuant to Section III.13.3.4(a)(iii), then: (1) the Maximum Demonstrated Output Period will be the Maximum Demonstrated Output Period of the resource that has been previously counted as capacity, and; (2) the Maximum Demonstrated Output Period of the New Generating Capacity Resource will begin on the earlier of: (i) the date that the resource that has previously been counted as a capacity resource began any outage as provided in Section III.13.1.1.1.2, and; (ii) the date that the New

Generating Capacity Resource commenced Commercial Operation (as defined in Schedule 22, 23, or 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff).

### **Failure to Cover Charge Rate**

For Capacity Commitment Periods beginning prior to June 1, 2022, the Failure to Cover Charge Rate for a Capacity Zone is the higher of the Capacity Clearing Price and the clearing price in any annual reconfiguration auction for that Capacity Commitment Period.

For Capacity Commitment Periods beginning on or after June 1, 2022, the Failure to Cover Charge Rate for a Capacity Zone is the price determined by a second clearing of the third annual reconfiguration auction prior to the start of the Capacity Commitment Period in which the aggregated zonal quantities of undemonstrated Capacity Supply Obligation, as of the completion of the third annual reconfiguration auction, and as determined pursuant to Section III.13.3.4 (b), are included as demand bids at the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price for each applicable Capacity Zone.

Provided that, if an existing resource is covering for a New Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to Section III.13.3.4(a)(iii), then the undemonstrated Capacity Supply Obligation for the New Generating Capacity Resource is the difference between the existing resource's Maximum Demonstrated Output and the new resource's Capacity Supply Obligation.

### **Maximum Demonstrated Output**

The Maximum Demonstrated Output is the sum of the highest output levels achieved by each Generator Asset associated with a Generating Capacity Resource, each Demand Response Asset associated with an Active Demand Capacity Resources, and assets associated with a Seasonal Peak Demand Resource or On-Peak Demand Resource, during the Maximum Demonstrated Output Period as specified below. The minimum Maximum Demonstrated Output for all assets is zero.

Provided that, if a resource that was previously counted as capacity is covering for a New Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to Section III.13.3.4(a)(iii), then the Maximum Demonstrated Output is the sum of the highest aggregate output level achieved by each asset associated with the resource that has previously been counted as capacity during the Maximum Demonstrated Output Period.



At the asset level, Maximum Demonstrated Output is calculated as follows:

**Demand Response Assets associated with an Active Demand Capacity Resource:** The Maximum Demonstrated Output for dates occurring prior to June 1, 2018 is the highest audit value in the Maximum Demonstrated Output Period increased by average avoided peak transmission and distribution losses. The Maximum Demonstrated Output for dates occurring on or after to June 1, 2018 will be equal to the highest demand reduction calculated, pursuant to Section III.8.4, in the Maximum Demonstrated Output Period increased by average avoided peak transmission and distribution losses for non-Net Supply.

**Distributed Generation associated with a Seasonal Peak Demand Resource or an On-Peak Demand Resource:** The Maximum Demonstrated Output is the highest hourly metered output in the Maximum Demonstrated Output Period after the resource has completed testing and has achieved commercial operation, increased by average avoided peak transmission and distribution losses for non-Net Supply.

**Load Management associated with a Seasonal Peak Demand Resource or an On-Peak Demand Resource:** The Maximum Demonstrated Output is the highest hourly demand reduction value in the Maximum Demonstrated Output Period increased by average avoided peak transmission and distribution losses for non-Net Supply.

**Energy Efficiency associated with a Seasonal Peak Demand Resource or an On-Peak Demand Resource:** The Maximum Demonstrated Output is the highest reported monthly performance value in the Maximum Demonstrated Output Period increased by average avoided peak transmission and distribution losses.

**Generator Assets:** The Maximum Demonstrated Output for dates occurring prior to March 1, 2017 is the highest hourly Revenue Quality Metering in the Maximum Demonstrated Output Period beginning on or after Commercial Operation (as defined in Schedule 22, 23, or 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff). The Maximum Demonstrated Output for dates occurring on or after March 1, 2017 is the highest Metered Quantity for Settlement in the Maximum Demonstrated Output Period beginning on or after Commercial

Operation (as defined in Schedule 22, 23, or 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff).

If a single Generator Asset is split into two or more new Generator Assets, the Maximum Demonstrated Output associated with the single Generation Asset will be prorated among the new assets based on their summer maximum net output. If multiple Generator Assets are consolidated to fewer assets, the Maximum Demonstrated Output of the Generator Assets that are being consolidated will be allocated to the consolidated assets based on the summer maximum net output.

**Import Capacity Resources:** For an Import Capacity Resource that is backed by external generation that has not achieved commercial operation at the time of qualification, in part or entirely, the Maximum Demonstrated Output is the highest revenue quality metered output for a five-minute or greater interval after the resource has completed testing and has achieved commercial operation. Provided that, the Maximum Demonstrated Output of an Import Capacity Resource associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade may be limited by the highest demonstrated capability of the Elective Transmission Upgrade after the Elective Transmission Upgrade has completed testing and has achieved commercial operation.

#### **III.13.3.4A Termination of Capacity Supply Obligations.**

If a Project Sponsor fails to comply with the requirements of Sections III.13.3.2 or III.13.3.3, or if a Project Sponsor covers a Capacity Supply Obligation for two Capacity Commitment Periods, or if, as a result of milestone date revisions, the date by which a resource will have achieved all its critical path schedule milestones is more than two years after the beginning of the Capacity Commitment Period for which the resource first received a Capacity Supply Obligation, then the ISO, after consultation with the Project Sponsor, shall have the right, through a filing with the Commission, to terminate the resource's Capacity Supply Obligation for any future Capacity Commitment Periods and the resource's right to any payments associated with that Capacity Supply Obligation in the Capacity Commitment Period, and to adjust the resource's qualified capacity for participation in the Forward Capacity Market; provided that, where a Project Sponsor voluntarily withdraws its resource from critical path schedule monitoring in accordance with Section III.13.3.6, no filing with the Commission shall be necessary to terminate the resource's Capacity Supply Obligation. Upon Commission ruling, the Project Sponsor shall forfeit any financial assurance provided with respect to that Capacity Supply Obligation. If in these circumstances, however, the ISO does not take steps to terminate the resource's Capacity Supply Obligation and instead

permits the Project Sponsor to continue to cover its Capacity Supply Obligation, such continuation shall be subject to the ISO's right to revoke that permission and to file with the Commission to terminate the resource's Capacity Supply Obligation, and subject to continued reporting by the Project Sponsor as described in this Section III.13.3.

If a resource's Capacity Supply Obligation that was acquired in a substitution auction at a negative price is withdrawn or terminated, the Project Sponsor shall remain obligated for any settlement charges associated with the terminated Capacity Supply Obligation for the Capacity Commitment Period.

**III.13.3.5. Termination of Interconnection Agreement.**

If the ISO terminates, or files with the Commission to terminate, a resource's Capacity Supply Obligation as described in Section III.13.3.4A, the ISO shall have the right to terminate the Interconnection Agreement with that resource through a filing with the Commission and upon Commission ruling. If the Project Sponsor continues to cover all of its Capacity Supply Obligations while challenging such termination before the Commission, it shall retain its Queue Position.

**III.13.3.6. Withdrawal from Critical Path Schedule Monitoring.**

A Project Sponsor may withdraw its resource from critical path schedule monitoring by the ISO at any time by submitting a written request to the ISO. The ISO also may deem a resource withdrawn from critical path schedule monitoring if the Project Sponsor does not adhere to the requirements of this Section III.13.3. Any resource withdrawn from critical path schedule monitoring shall be subject to the provisions of Section III.13.3.4A.

**III.13.3.7 Request to Defer Capacity Supply Obligation**

A resource that has not yet achieved FCM Commercial Operation and that is subject to critical path schedule monitoring by the ISO pursuant to this Section III.13.3 may seek to defer the applicability of its entire Capacity Supply Obligation by one year pursuant to the provisions of this Section III.13.3.7.

A Project Sponsor seeking such a deferral must notify the ISO in writing no later than the first Business Day in September of the year prior to the third annual reconfiguration auction for the Capacity Commitment Period in which the resource has a Capacity Supply Obligation. If, after consultation with the Project Sponsor, the ISO determines that the absence of the capacity in the first Capacity Commitment Period in which the resource has a Capacity Supply Obligation, as well as in the subsequent Capacity Commitment Period, would result in the violation of any NERC or NPCC (or their successors) criteria or

of the ISO New England System Rules, not solely that it may result in the procurement of less capacity than the Installed Capacity Requirement (net of HQICCs) or the Local Sourcing Requirement for the Capacity Zone, then the ISO will review the specific reliability need with and seek feedback from the Reliability Committee and provide the Project Sponsor with a written determination to that effect within 30 days of the Project Sponsor's notification to the ISO.

If the ISO provides such a written determination, then the Project Sponsor may file with the Commission, no later than the first Business Day in November of the year prior to the third annual reconfiguration auction, a request to defer the applicability of its Capacity Supply Obligation by one year. Any such filing must include the ISO's written determination, and must also demonstrate that the deferral is critical to the resource's ability to achieve FCM Commercial Operation and that the reasons for the deferral are beyond the control of the Project Sponsor.

If the Commission approves the request, all of the rights, obligations, payments, and charges associated with the Capacity Supply Obligation described in Sections III.13.3.4(b), III.13.6 and III.13.7 shall only apply beginning one year after the start of the Capacity Commitment Period in which the resource has a Capacity Supply Obligation. Notwithstanding any other provision of this Section III.13, if the resource achieves FCM Commercial Operation prior to the deferred date, it will not be eligible to receive revenue in the Forward Capacity Market until the deferred date. Beginning on the deferred date, all of the rights, obligations, payments, and charges associated with the Capacity Supply Obligation shall apply, and the Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price (indexed using the Handy-Whitman Index of Public Utility Construction Costs in effect as of December 31 of the year preceding the Capacity Commitment Period) associated with the Forward Capacity Auction in which the resource cleared as a new resource shall apply for the full duration of the Capacity Supply Obligation (including multi-year elections made pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.2.4 or Section III.13.1.4.1.1.2.7). A Project Sponsor will not take actions to cover the resource's Capacity Supply Obligation for the deferral period as described in Section III.13.3.4(a), but the other requirements of III.13.3, including all reporting requirements and the ISO's right to seek termination, shall continue to apply during the deferral period. Upon Commission approval of the deferral, the resource may not participate in any reconfiguration auctions or Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals for any portion of the deferral period. Beginning at 8:00 a.m. (Eastern Time) 30 days after Commission approval of the request, the Project Sponsor shall be required to provide an additional amount of financial assurance as described in Section VII.B.2.c of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

Notwithstanding any other provision of this Section III.13, if any of the resource's Capacity Supply Obligation in the deferral period was shed in a reconfiguration auction or Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral prior to Commission approval of the deferral request, then the resource's settlements shall be adjusted by the ISO to ensure that the resource does not receive any payments associated with that transaction in excess of the charges associated with that transaction; the resource will be responsible for any charges in excess of payments.

#### **III.13.3.8 FCM Commercial Operation.**

A resource (or portion thereof) achieves FCM Commercial Operation when (1) the ISO has determined that the resource (or portion thereof) has achieved all its critical path schedule milestones, including completion of any transmission upgrades necessary for the resource to obtain the requisite interconnection service; and (2) the ISO verifies the resource's (or a portion of the resource's) summer capacity rating (or, for a resource with winter capacity only, its winter capacity rating).

(a) For a Generating Capacity Resource (or portion thereof) that has achieved all its critical path schedule milestones, the ISO shall confirm FCM Commercial Operation as soon as practicable following the ISO's verification of the resource's summer capacity rating (or, for a resource with winter capacity only, its winter capacity rating), which may take place in any month of the year. The ISO shall verify the summer capacity rating of a Generating Capacity Resource that is an Intermittent Power Resource following no fewer than 30 consecutive calendar days of operation (for periods from October 1 through May 31, a Market Participant must request such verification).

(b) For a Demand Capacity Resource (or portion thereof) that has achieved all its critical path schedule milestones, the ISO shall confirm FCM Commercial Operation upon verifying that the Demand Capacity Resource described in the New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package has achieved its full demand reduction value, subject to the requirements of Section III.13.6.1.5.3(b).

(c) For an Import Capacity Resource (or portion thereof) that has achieved all its critical path schedule milestones, the ISO shall confirm FCM Commercial Operation upon demonstration that the Import Capacity Resource described in the New Capacity Qualification Package has achieved its full Qualified Capacity.

### **III.13.4. Reconfiguration Auctions.**

For each Capacity Commitment Period, the ISO shall conduct annual and monthly reconfiguration auctions as described in this Section III.13.4. Reconfiguration auctions only permit the trading of Capacity Supply Obligations; load obligations are not traded in reconfiguration auctions. Each reconfiguration auction shall use a static double auction (respecting the interface limits and capacity requirements modeled as specified in Sections III.13.4.5 and III.13.4.7) to clear supply offers (i.e., offers to assume a Capacity Supply Obligation) and demand bids (i.e., bids to shed a Capacity Supply Obligation) for each Capacity Zone included in the reconfiguration auction. Supply offers and demand bids will be modeled in the Capacity Zone where the associated resources are electrically interconnected. Resources that are able to meet the requirements in other Capacity Zones shall be allowed to clear to meet such requirements, subject to the constraints modeled in the auction.

#### **III.13.4.1. Capacity Zones Included in Reconfiguration Auctions.**

Each reconfiguration auction associated with a Capacity Commitment Period shall include each of, and only, the final Capacity Zones and external interfaces as determined through the Forward Capacity Auction for that Capacity Commitment Period, as described in Section III.13.2.3.4.

#### **III.13.4.2. Participation in Reconfiguration Auctions.**

Each supply offer and demand bid in a reconfiguration auction must be associated with a specific resource, and must satisfy the requirements of this Section III.13.4.2. All resource types may submit supply offers and demand bids in reconfiguration auctions. In accordance with Section III.A.9.2 of *Appendix A* of this Market Rule 1, supply offers and demand bids submitted for reconfiguration auctions shall not be subject to mitigation by the Internal Market Monitor. A supply offer or demand bid submitted for a reconfiguration auction shall not be limited by the associated resource's Economic Minimum Limit. Offers composed of separate resources may not participate in reconfiguration auctions. Participation in any reconfiguration auction is conditioned on full compliance with the applicable financial assurance requirements as provided in the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy at the time of the offer and bid deadline. For annual reconfiguration auctions, the offer and bid deadline will be announced by the ISO no later than 30 days prior to that deadline. No later than 15 days before the offer and bid deadline for an annual reconfiguration auction, the ISO shall notify each resource of the amount of capacity that it may offer or bid in that auction, as calculated pursuant to this Section III.13.4.2. For monthly reconfiguration auctions, the offer and bid deadline will be announced by the ISO no later than 10 Business Days prior to that deadline. Upon issuance of the monthly bilateral results for the associated

Obligation Month, the ISO shall notify each resource of the amount of capacity that it may offer or bid in that monthly auction, as calculated pursuant to this Section III.13.4.2. For monthly reconfiguration auctions in which the most recently approved Winter Seasonal Claimed Capability established as of the fifth Business Day in June of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period is greater than the Winter ARA Qualified Capacity for the third annual reconfiguration auction, the ISO shall apply the greater of these two values to offer limits starting with the first monthly reconfiguration auction in the winter delivery period for the relevant Capacity Commitment Period, limited, as applicable, by the resource's CNR Capability.

**III.13.4.2.1. Supply Offers.**

Submission of supply offers in reconfiguration auctions shall be governed by this Section III.13.4.2.1. All supply offers in reconfiguration auctions shall be submitted by the Project Sponsor or Lead Market Participant, and shall specify the resource, the amount of capacity offered in MW, and the price, in dollars per kW/month. In no case may capacity associated with a Retirement De-List Bid or a Permanent De-List Bid that cleared in the Forward Capacity Auction, or a demand bid that cleared in a substitution auction, for a Capacity Commitment Period be offered in a reconfiguration auction for that, or any subsequent, Capacity Commitment Period, or any portion thereof. In no case may capacity associated with an Export Bid or an Administrative Export De-List Bid that cleared in the Forward Capacity Auction for a Capacity Commitment Period be offered in a reconfiguration auction for that Capacity Commitment Period, or any portion thereof.

**III.13.4.2.1.1. Amount of Capacity That May Be Submitted in a Supply Offer in an Annual Reconfiguration Auction.**

For each month of the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the annual reconfiguration auction, the ISO shall calculate the difference between the Summer ARA Qualified Capacity or Winter ARA Qualified Capacity, as applicable, and the amount of capacity from that resource that is already subject to a Capacity Supply Obligation for the month. The minimum of these 12 values shall be the amount of capacity up to which a resource may submit a supply offer in the annual reconfiguration auction.

**III.13.4.2.1.2. Calculation of Summer ARA Qualified Capacity and Winter ARA Qualified Capacity.**

**III.13.4.2.1.2.1. First Annual Reconfiguration Auction and Second Annual Reconfiguration Auction.**

### **III.13.4.2.1.2.1.1. Generating Capacity Resources Other than Intermittent Power Resources.**

#### **III.13.4.2.1.2.1.1.1. Summer ARA Qualified Capacity.**

For the first and second annual reconfiguration auctions associated with a Capacity Commitment Period, the Summer ARA Qualified Capacity of a Generating Capacity Resource that is not an Intermittent Power Resource shall be the sum of the values determined pursuant to subsections (a) and (b) below, limited, as applicable, by the resource's CNR Capability and any relevant overlapping interconnection impacts as described in Section III.13.1.1.2.3(f):

(a) For capacity that has achieved FCM Commercial Operation, the higher of the resource's summer Qualified Capacity as calculated for the Forward Capacity Auction for that Capacity Commitment Period and any summer Seasonal Claimed Capability values for summer periods completed after the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline for the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period and before the start of the Capacity Commitment Period. The amount of capacity described in this Section III.13.4.2.1.2.1.1.1(a) shall be zero, however, where the resource cleared in the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period as a new resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2 and where the project has not achieved FCM Commercial Operation.

(b) Any amount of capacity that has not yet achieved FCM Commercial Operation but: (i) is being monitored by the ISO pursuant to the provisions of Section III.13.3; (ii) is expected to achieve all its critical path schedule milestones prior to the start of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period; and (iii) for which the Lead Market Participant or Project Sponsor has met all relevant financial assurance requirements as described in Section III.13.1.9 and in the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

#### **III.13.4.2.1.2.1.1.2. Winter ARA Qualified Capacity.**

For the first and second annual reconfiguration auctions associated with a Capacity Commitment Period, the Winter ARA Qualified Capacity of a Generating Capacity Resource that is not an Intermittent Power Resource shall be the sum of the values determined pursuant to subsections (a) and (b) below, limited, as applicable, by the resource's CNR Capability and any relevant overlapping interconnection impacts as described in Section III.13.1.1.2.3(f):

(a) For capacity that has achieved FCM Commercial Operation, the higher of the resource's winter Qualified Capacity as calculated for the Forward Capacity Auction for that Capacity Commitment Period



and any winter Seasonal Claimed Capability values for winter periods completed after the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline for the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period and before the start of the Capacity Commitment Period. The amount of capacity described in this Section III.13.4.2.1.2.1.1.2(a) shall be zero, however, where the resource cleared in the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period as a new resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.1.2 and where the project has not achieved FCM Commercial Operation.

(b) Any amount of capacity that has not yet achieved FCM Commercial Operation but: (i) is being monitored by the ISO pursuant to the provisions of Section III.13.3; (ii) is expected to achieve all its critical path schedule milestones prior to the start of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period; and (iii) for which the Lead Market Participant or Project Sponsor has met all relevant financial assurance requirements as described in Section III.13.1.9 and in the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

#### **III.13.4.2.1.2.1.2. Intermittent Power Resources.**

##### **III.13.4.2.1.2.1.2.1. Summer ARA Qualified Capacity.**

For the first and second annual reconfiguration auctions associated with a Capacity Commitment Period, the Summer ARA Qualified Capacity of an Intermittent Power Resource shall be the sum of the values determined pursuant to subsections (a) and (b) below, limited, as applicable, by the resource's CNR Capability and any relevant overlapping interconnection impacts as described in Section III.13.1.1.2.3(f):

(a) For capacity that has achieved FCM Commercial Operation, the resource's most recently-determined summer Qualified Capacity. The amount of capacity described in this Section III.13.4.2.1.2.1.2.1(a) shall be zero, however, where the resource cleared in the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period as a new resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.1.2 and the project has not achieved FCM Commercial Operation.

(b) Any amount of capacity that has not yet achieved FCM Commercial Operation but: (i) is being monitored by the ISO pursuant to the provisions of Section III.13.3; (ii) is expected to achieve all its critical path schedule milestones prior to the start of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period; and (iii) for which the Lead Market Participant or Project Sponsor has met all relevant financial assurance requirements as described in Section III.13.1.9 and in the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

##### **III.13.4.2.1.2.1.2.2. Winter ARA Qualified Capacity.**

For the first and second annual reconfiguration auctions associated with a Capacity Commitment Period, the Winter ARA Qualified Capacity of an Intermittent Power Resource shall be the sum of the values determined pursuant to subsections (a) and (b) below, limited, as applicable, by the resource's CNR Capability and any relevant overlapping interconnection impacts as described in Section III.13.1.1.2.3(f):

(a) For capacity that has achieved FCM Commercial Operation, the resource's most recently-determined winter Qualified Capacity. The amount of capacity described in this Section III.13.4.2.1.2.1.2.2(a) shall be zero, however, where the resource cleared in the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period as a new resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.1.2 and the project has not achieved FCM Commercial Operation.

(b) Any amount of capacity that has not yet achieved FCM Commercial Operation but: (i) is being monitored by the ISO pursuant to the provisions of Section III.13.3; (ii) is expected to achieve all its critical path schedule milestones prior to the start of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period; and (iii) for which the Lead Market Participant or Project Sponsor has met all relevant financial assurance requirements as described in Section III.13.1.9 and in the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**III.13.4.2.1.2.1.3. Import Capacity Resources Backed By an External Control Area.**

For the first and second annual reconfiguration auctions associated with a Capacity Commitment Period, the Summer ARA Qualified Capacity and Winter ARA Qualified Capacity of an Import Capacity Resource shall be equal to its summer Qualified Capacity and winter Qualified Capacity, respectively, as determined for the Forward Capacity Auction for that Capacity Commitment Period.

**III.13.4.2.1.2.1.3.1. Import Capacity Resources Backed by One or More External Resources.**

For the first and second annual reconfiguration auctions associated with a Capacity Commitment Period, the Summer ARA Qualified Capacity and Winter ARA Qualified Capacity of an Import Capacity Resource backed by one or more External Resources shall be the greater of:

(a) the summer Qualified Capacity and winter Qualified Capacity, respectively, as determined for the Forward Capacity Auction for that Capacity Commitment Period; and

(b) the amount of capacity available to back the import, if submitted by the Lead Market Participant and approved by the ISO by the fifth Business Day in October and, if submitted for a New Import Capacity Resource backed by one or more External Resources, also subject to the satisfaction of the requirements

in Sections III.13.1.3.5.1(b), III.13.1.3.5.2, and III.13.3.1.1 and the relevant financial assurance requirements as described in Section III.13.1.9 and the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**III.13.4.2.1.2.1.4. Demand Capacity Resources.**

**III.13.4.2.1.2.1.4.1. Summer ARA Qualified Capacity.**

For the first and second annual reconfiguration auctions associated with a Capacity Commitment Period, the Summer ARA Qualified Capacity of a Demand Capacity Resource shall be determined as follows.

(a) For Demand Capacity Resources other than those composed of Energy Efficiency measures, the sum of the values determined pursuant to subsections (i) and (ii) below:

(i) For capacity that has achieved FCM Commercial Operation, the resource's most recently-determined summer Qualified Capacity.

(ii) Any amount of capacity that has not yet achieved FCM Commercial Operation but: (1) is being monitored by the ISO pursuant to the provisions of Section III.13.3; (2) is expected to achieve all its critical path schedule milestones prior to the start of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period; and (3) for which the Lead Market Participant or Project Sponsor has met all relevant financial assurance requirements as described in Section III.13.1.9 and in the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

(b) For Demand Capacity Resources composed of Energy Efficiency measures, the lesser of the values determined pursuant to subsections (i) and (ii) below:

(i) The sum of the most recently-determined summer demand reduction values of the resource's installed Energy Efficiency measures (excluding any capacity that will retire or permanently de-list, or whose Measure Life will expire, prior to the start of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period, and increased by average avoided peak transmission and distribution losses) and any summer capacity that has not yet achieved FCM Commercial Operation that satisfies the criteria found in subsection (a)(ii) above.

(ii) The amount of summer capacity that qualified for the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Demand Capacity Resource (excluding any capacity that is terminated or that will retire or

permanently de-list prior to the start of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period) that is expected to achieve all its critical path schedule milestones prior to the start of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period.

**III.13.4.2.1.2.1.4.2. Winter ARA Qualified Capacity.**

For the first and second annual reconfiguration auctions associated with a Capacity Commitment Period, the Winter ARA Qualified Capacity of a Demand Capacity Resource shall be determined as follows.

(a) For Demand Capacity Resources other than those composed of Energy Efficiency measures, the sum of the values determined pursuant to subsections (i) and (ii) below:

(i) For capacity that has achieved FCM Commercial Operation, the resource's most recently-determined winter Qualified Capacity.

(ii) Any amount of capacity that has not yet achieved FCM Commercial Operation but: (1) is being monitored by the ISO pursuant to the provisions of Section III.13.3; (2) is expected to achieve all its critical path schedule milestones prior to the start of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period; and (3) for which the Lead Market Participant or Project Sponsor has met all relevant financial assurance requirements as described in Section III.13.1.9 and in the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

(b) For Demand Capacity Resources composed of Energy Efficiency measures, the lesser of the values determined pursuant to subsections (i) and (ii) below:

(i) The sum of the most recently-determined winter demand reduction values of the resource's installed Energy Efficiency measures (excluding any capacity that will retire or permanently de-list, or whose Measure Life will expire, prior to the start of the winter period of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period, and increased by average avoided peak transmission and distribution losses) and any winter capacity that has not yet achieved FCM Commercial Operation that satisfies the criteria found in subsection (a)(ii) above.

(ii) The amount of winter capacity that qualified for the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Demand Capacity Resource (excluding any capacity that is terminated or that will retire or permanently de-list prior to the start of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period) that is

expected to achieve all its critical path schedule milestones prior to the start of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period.

**III.13.4.2.1.2.2. Third Annual Reconfiguration Auction.**

**III.13.4.2.1.2.2.1. Generating Capacity Resources other than Intermittent Power Resources.**

**III.13.4.2.1.2.2.1.1. Summer ARA Qualified Capacity.**

For the third annual reconfiguration auction associated with a Capacity Commitment Period, the Summer ARA Qualified Capacity of a Generating Capacity Resource that is not an Intermittent Power Resource shall be the sum of the values determined pursuant to subsections (a) and (b) below, limited, as applicable, by the resource's CNR Capability and any relevant overlapping interconnection impacts as described in Section III.13.1.1.2.3(f):

(a) For capacity that has achieved FCM Commercial Operation, the resource's summer Seasonal Claimed Capability value in effect after the most recently completed summer period. The amount of capacity described in this Section III.13.4.2.1.2.2.1.1(a) shall be zero, however, where the resource cleared in the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period as a new resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2 and the project has not achieved FCM Commercial Operation.

(b) Any amount of capacity that has not yet achieved FCM Commercial Operation but: (i) is being monitored by the ISO pursuant to the provisions of Section III.13.3; (ii) is expected to achieve all its critical path schedule milestones prior to the start of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period; and (iii) for which the Lead Market Participant or Project Sponsor has met all relevant financial assurance requirements as described in Section III.13.1.9 and in the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**III.13.4.2.1.2.2.1.2. Winter ARA Qualified Capacity.**

For the third annual reconfiguration auction associated with a Capacity Commitment Period, the Winter ARA Qualified Capacity of a Generating Capacity Resource that is not an Intermittent Power Resource shall be the sum of the values determined pursuant to subsections (a) and (b) below, limited, as applicable, by the resource's CNR Capability and any relevant overlapping interconnection impacts as described in Section III.13.1.1.2.3(f):

(a) For capacity that has achieved FCM Commercial Operation, the resource's winter Seasonal Claimed Capability value in effect after the most recently completed winter period. The amount of capacity described in this Section III.13.4.2.1.2.2.1.2(a) shall be zero, however, where the resource cleared in the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period as a new resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.1.2 and the project has not achieved FCM Commercial Operation.

(b) Any amount of capacity that has not yet achieved FCM Commercial Operation but: (i) is being monitored by the ISO pursuant to the provisions of Section III.13.3; (ii) is expected to achieve all its critical path schedule milestones prior to the start of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period; and (iii) for which the Lead Market Participant or Project Sponsor has met all relevant financial assurance requirements as described in Section III.13.1.9 and in the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

#### **III.13.4.2.1.2.2.2. Intermittent Power Resources.**

##### **III.13.4.2.1.2.2.2.1. Summer ARA Qualified Capacity.**

For the third annual reconfiguration auction associated with a Capacity Commitment Period, the Summer ARA Qualified Capacity of an Intermittent Power Resource shall be the sum of the values determined pursuant to subsections (a) and (b) below, limited, as applicable, by the resource's CNR Capability and any relevant overlapping interconnection impacts as described in Section III.13.1.1.2.3(f):

(a) For capacity that has achieved FCM Commercial Operation, the lesser of its most recently-determined summer Qualified Capacity and its summer Seasonal Claimed Capability value in effect after the most recently competed summer period. The amount of capacity described in this Section III.13.4.2.1.2.2.2.1(a) shall be zero, however, where the resource cleared in the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period as a new resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.1.2 and the project has not achieved FCM Commercial Operation.

(b) Any amount of capacity that has not yet achieved FCM Commercial Operation but: (i) is being monitored by the ISO pursuant to the provisions of Section III.13.3; (ii) is expected to achieve all its critical path schedule milestones prior to the start of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period; and (iii) for which the Lead Market Participant or Project Sponsor has met all relevant financial assurance requirements as described in Section III.13.1.9 and in the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

##### **III.13.4.2.1.2.2.2.2. Winter ARA Qualified Capacity.**

For the third annual reconfiguration auction associated with a Capacity Commitment Period, the Winter ARA Qualified Capacity of an Intermittent Power Resource shall be the sum of the values determined pursuant to subsections (a) and (b) below, limited, as applicable, by the resource's CNR Capability and any relevant overlapping interconnection impacts as described in Section III.13.1.1.2.3(f):

(a) For capacity that has achieved FCM Commercial Operation, the lesser of its most recently-determined winter Qualified Capacity and its winter Seasonal Claimed Capability value in effect after the most recently completed winter period. The amount of capacity described in this Section III.13.4.2.1.2.2.2(a) shall be zero, however, where the resource cleared in the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period as a new resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2 and the project has not achieved FCM Commercial Operation.

(b) Any amount of capacity that has not yet achieved FCM Commercial Operation but: (i) is being monitored by the ISO pursuant to the provisions of Section III.13.3; (ii) is expected to achieve all its critical path schedule milestones prior to the start of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period; and (iii) for which the Lead Market Participant or Project Sponsor has met all relevant financial assurance requirements as described in Section III.13.1.9 and in the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

#### **III.13.4.2.1.2.2.3. Import Capacity Resources.**

##### **III.13.4.2.1.2.2.3.1 Import Capacity Resources Backed by an External Control Area.**

For the third annual reconfiguration auction associated with a Capacity Commitment Period, the Summer ARA Qualified Capacity of an Import Capacity Resource shall be equal to the lesser of its summer Qualified Capacity as determined for the Forward Capacity Auction for that Capacity Commitment Period and the amount of capacity available to back the import, if submitted by the Lead Market Participant and approved by the ISO by the fifth Business Day in October. For the third annual reconfiguration auction associated with a Capacity Commitment Period, the Winter ARA Qualified Capacity of an Import Capacity Resource shall be equal to the lesser of its winter Qualified Capacity as determined for the Forward Capacity Auction for that Capacity Commitment Period and the amount of capacity available to back the import, if submitted by the Lead Market Participant and approved by the ISO by the fifth Business Day in October.

##### **III.13.4.2.1.2.2.3.2. Import Capacity Resources Backed by One or More External Resources.**

For the third annual reconfiguration auction associated with a Capacity Commitment Period, the Summer ARA Qualified Capacity and Winter ARA Qualified Capacity of an Import Capacity Resource backed by one or more External Resources shall be the lesser of:

(a) the summer Qualified Capacity and winter Qualified Capacity, respectively, as determined by the most recent Forward Capacity Auction that does not reflect a change to the Import Capacity Resource applicable to that Capacity Commitment Period; and

(b) the amount of capacity available to back the import, if submitted by the Lead Market Participant and approved by the ISO by the fifth Business Day in October and, if submitted for a New Import Capacity Resource backed by one or more External Resources, also subject to the satisfaction of the requirements in Sections III.13.1.3.5.1(b), III.13.1.3.5.2, and III.13.3.1.1 and the relevant financial assurance requirements as described in Section III.13.1.9 and the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

#### **III.13.4.2.1.2.2.4. Demand Capacity Resources.**

##### **III.13.4.2.1.2.2.4.1. Summer ARA Qualified Capacity.**

For the third annual reconfiguration auction associated with a Capacity Commitment Period, the Summer ARA Qualified Capacity of a Demand Capacity Resource shall be determined as follows.

(a) For Demand Capacity Resources other than those composed of Energy Efficiency measures, the sum of the values determined pursuant to subsections (i) and (ii) below:

(i) For capacity that has achieved FCM Commercial Operation, the lesser of: (1) its most recently-determined summer Qualified Capacity and (2) its summer Seasonal DR Audit value or summer Passive DR Audit value in effect at the time of qualification for the third annual reconfiguration auction.

(ii) Any amount of capacity that has not yet achieved FCM Commercial Operation but: (1) is being monitored by the ISO pursuant to the provisions of Section III.13.3; (2) is expected to achieve all its critical path schedule milestones prior to the start of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period; and (3) for which the Lead Market Participant or Project Sponsor has met all relevant financial assurance requirements as described in Section III.13.1.9 and in the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.



(b) For Demand Capacity Resources composed of Energy Efficiency measures, the lesser of the values determined pursuant to subsections (i) and (ii) below:

(i) The sum of the most recently-determined summer demand reduction values of the resource's installed Energy Efficiency measures (excluding any capacity that will retire or permanently de-list, or whose Measure Life will expire, prior to the start of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period, and increased by average avoided peak transmission and distribution losses) and any summer capacity that has not yet achieved FCM Commercial Operation that satisfies the criteria found in subsection (a)(ii) above.

(ii) The amount of summer capacity that qualified for the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Demand Capacity Resource (excluding any capacity that will retire or permanently de-list prior to the start of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period) provided that the resource is expected to achieve all its critical path schedule milestones prior to the start of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period.

#### **III.13.4.2.1.2.2.4.2. Winter ARA Qualified Capacity.**

For the third annual reconfiguration auction associated with a Capacity Commitment Period, the Winter ARA Qualified Capacity of a Demand Capacity Resource shall be determined as follows.

(a) For Demand Capacity Resources other than those composed of Energy Efficiency measures, the sum of the values determined pursuant to subsections (i) and (ii) below:

(i) For capacity that has achieved FCM Commercial Operation, the lesser of: (1) its most recently-determined winter Qualified Capacity and (2) its winter Seasonal DR Audit value or winter Passive DR Audit value in effect at the time of qualification for the third annual reconfiguration auction.

(ii) Any amount of capacity that has not yet achieved FCM Commercial Operation but: (1) is being monitored by the ISO pursuant to the provisions of Section III.13.3; (2) is expected to achieve all its critical path schedule milestones prior to the start of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period; and (3) for which the Lead Market Participant or Project Sponsor has met

all relevant financial assurance requirements as described in Section III.13.1.9 and in the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

(b) For Demand Capacity Resources composed of Energy Efficiency measures, the lesser of the values determined pursuant to subsections (i) and (ii) below:

(i) The sum of the most recently-determined winter demand reduction values of the resource's installed Energy Efficiency measures (excluding any capacity that will retire or permanently de-list, or whose Measure Life will expire, prior to the start of the winter period of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period and increased by average avoided peak transmission and distribution losses) and any winter capacity that has cleared in a Forward Capacity Auction and not yet achieved FCM Commercial Operation that satisfies the criteria found in subsection (a)(ii) above.

(ii) The amount of winter capacity that qualified for the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Demand Capacity Resource (excluding any capacity that will retire or permanently de-list prior to the start of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period) provided that the resource is expected to achieve all its critical path schedule milestones prior to the start of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period.

#### **III.13.4.2.1.3. Adjustment for Significant Decreases in Capacity.**

For each month of the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the third annual reconfiguration auction, for each resource that has achieved FCM Commercial Operation, the ISO shall subtract the resource's Summer ARA Qualified Capacity or Winter ARA Qualified Capacity, as applicable, from the amount of capacity from the resource that is subject to a Capacity Supply Obligation for the month. For the month associated with the greatest of these 12 values (for Capacity Commitment Periods beginning on or before June 1, 2019) or the least of these 12 values (for Capacity Commitment Periods beginning on or after June 1, 2020), if the resource's Summer ARA Qualified Capacity or Winter ARA Qualified Capacity (as applicable) is below the amount of capacity from that resource that is subject to a Capacity Supply Obligation for that month by:

(1) for Capacity Commitment Periods beginning on or before June 1, 2019, more than the lesser of:

(i) 20 percent of the amount of capacity from that resource that is subject to a Capacity Supply Obligation for that month or;

- (ii) 40 MW;
- (2) for Capacity Commitment Periods beginning on June 1, 2020, June 1, 2021 and June 1, 2022, more than the lesser of:
  - (i) the greater of 20 percent of the amount of capacity from that resource that is subject to a Capacity Supply Obligation for that month or two MW, or;
  - (ii) 40 MW;
- (3) for Capacity Commitment Periods beginning on or after June 1, 2023, more than the lesser of:
  - (i) the greater of 10 percent of the amount of capacity from that resource that is subject to a Capacity Supply Obligation for that month or two MW, or;
  - (ii) 10 MW;

then the following provisions shall apply:

(a) The Lead Market Participant may submit a written plan to the ISO with any necessary supporting documentation describing the measures that will be taken and demonstrating that the resource will be able to provide an amount of capacity consistent with its total Capacity Supply Obligation for the Capacity Commitment Period by the start of all months in that Capacity Commitment Period in which the resource has a Capacity Supply Obligation. If submitted, such a plan must be received by the ISO no later than 10 Business Days after the ISO has notified the Lead Market Participant of its Summer ARA Qualified Capacity and Winter ARA Qualified Capacity for the third annual reconfiguration auction.

(b) If no such plan as described in Section III.13.4.2.1.3(a) is timely submitted to the ISO, or if such a plan is timely submitted but the ISO determines that the plan does not demonstrate that the resource will be able to provide the necessary amount of capacity by the start of all months in the Capacity Commitment Period in which the resource has a Capacity Supply Obligation, then the ISO shall enter a demand bid at the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price on behalf of the resource (with all payments, charges, rights, obligations, and other results associated with such bid applying to the resource as if the resource itself had submitted the bid) in the third annual reconfiguration auction in an amount equal to:

- (1) for Capacity Commitment Periods beginning prior to June 1, 2020, the greatest of the 12 monthly values determined pursuant to this Section III.13.4.2.1.3;
- (2) for Capacity Commitment Periods beginning on June 1, 2020, June 1, 2021 and June 1, 2022, where the Capacity Supply Obligation and Qualified Capacity values are those for the month in which the values as determined pursuant to Section III.13.4.2.1.3 vary the least, the greater of:
  - (i) the resource's Capacity Supply Obligation minus (Qualified Capacity divided by 0.8),
  - and;

(ii) the resource's Capacity Supply Obligation minus Qualified Capacity minus 40 MW;  
(3) for Capacity Commitment Periods beginning on or after June 1, 2023, where the Capacity Supply Obligation and Qualified Capacity values are those for the month in which the values as determined pursuant to Section III.13.4.2.1.3 vary the least, the greater of:

- (i) the resource's Capacity Supply Obligation minus (Qualified Capacity divided by 0.9),  
and;
- (ii) the resource's Capacity Supply Obligation minus Qualified Capacity minus 10 MW.

**III.13.4.2.1.4. Amount of Capacity That May Be Submitted in a Supply Offer in a Monthly Reconfiguration Auction.**

A resource may not submit a supply offer for a monthly reconfiguration auction unless it is expected to achieve FCM Commercial Operation prior to the end of the relevant Obligation Month, unless the resource has a negative Capacity Supply Obligation, in which case it may submit a supply offer for that reconfiguration auction in an amount up to the absolute value of its Capacity Supply Obligation. A resource may not submit a supply offer for a monthly reconfiguration auction if it is on an approved outage during that month. The amount of capacity up to which a resource may submit a supply offer in a monthly reconfiguration auction shall be the difference (but in no case less than zero) between the values determined pursuant to subsections (a) and (b) below:

- (a) The resource's Summer ARA Qualified Capacity or Winter ARA Qualified Capacity as adjusted pursuant to Section III.13.4.2, as applicable, for the auction month for the third annual reconfiguration auction for the relevant Capacity Commitment Period or, where the resource did not qualify for the third annual reconfiguration auction for the relevant Capacity Commitment Period, the quantity of MW either being monitored by the ISO in accordance with Section III.13.3 (provided that all applicable Financial Assurance requirements have been met and the resource is expected to achieve all its critical path schedule milestones prior to the end of the relevant Obligation Month in accordance with posted schedules) or the amount of capacity that achieved all its critical path schedule milestones after the third annual reconfiguration qualification deadline; provided that the value determined pursuant to this subsection (a) shall be limited by the resource's CNR Capability and any relevant overlapping interconnection impacts as described in Section III.13.1.1.2.3(f) or, for a Demand Capacity Resource, the amount of Qualified Capacity for the relevant Capacity Commitment Period.
- (b) The amount of capacity from that resource that is already subject to a Capacity Supply Obligation for that month.

#### **III.13.4.2.1.5. ISO Review of Supply Offers.**

Supply offers in reconfiguration auctions shall be reviewed by the ISO to ensure the regional and local adequacy achieved through the Forward Capacity Auction and other reliability needs are maintained. The ISO's reviews will consider the location and operating and rating limitations of resources associated with cleared supply offers to ensure reliability standards will remain satisfied if the offer is accepted. The ISO shall reject supply offers that would otherwise clear in a reconfiguration auction that will result in a violation of any NERC or NPCC criteria, or ISO New England System Rules during the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the reconfiguration auction. The ISO's reliability reviews will assess such offers, beginning with the marginal resource, based on operable capacity needs while considering any approved or interim approved transmission outage information and any approved Generator Asset or Demand Response Resource outage information, and will include transmission security studies. Supply offers that cannot meet the applicable reliability needs will be rejected in their entirety and the resource will not be rejected in part. Rejected resources will not be further included in clearing the reconfiguration auction and the Lead Market Participant or Project Sponsor, as appropriate, shall be notified as soon as practicable after the reconfiguration auction of the rejection and of the reliability need prompting such rejection.

#### **III.13.4.2.2. Demand Bids in Reconfiguration Auctions.**

Submission of demand bids in reconfiguration auctions shall be governed by this Section III.13.4.2.2. All demand bids in reconfiguration auctions shall be submitted by the Project Sponsor or Lead Market Participant, and shall specify the amount of capacity bid in MW, and the price, in dollars per kW/month.

- (a) To submit a demand bid in a reconfiguration auction, a resource must have a Capacity Supply Obligation for the Capacity Commitment Period (or portion thereof, as applicable) associated with that reconfiguration auction. Where capacity associated with a Self-Supplied FCA Resource that cleared in the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period is offered in a reconfiguration auction for that Capacity Commitment Period, or any portion thereof, a resource acquiring a Capacity Supply Obligation shall not as a result become a Self-Supplied FCA Resource.
- (b) Each demand bid submitted to the ISO for reconfiguration auction shall be no greater than the amount of the resource's capacity that is already obligated for the Capacity Commitment Period (or portion thereof, as applicable) as of the offer and bid deadline for the reconfiguration auction.

(c) All demand bids in reconfiguration auctions shall be reviewed by the ISO to ensure the regional and local adequacy achieved through the Forward Capacity Auction and other reliability needs are maintained. The ISO's reviews will consider the location and operating and rating limitations of resources associated with demand bids that would otherwise clear to ensure reliability standards will remain satisfied if the committed capacity is withdrawn. The ISO shall reject demand bids that would otherwise clear in a reconfiguration auction that will result in a violation of any NERC or NPCC criteria or ISO New England System Rules during the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the reconfiguration auction, provided that for annual reconfiguration auctions associated with a Capacity Commitment Period that begins on or after June 1, 2018, the ISO shall not reject a demand bid solely on the basis that acceptance of the demand bid may result in the procurement of less capacity than the Installed Capacity Requirement (net of HQICCs). For monthly reconfiguration auctions, the ISO shall obtain and consider information from the Local Control Center regarding whether the capacity associated with demand bids that would otherwise clear from resources with a Capacity Supply Obligation is needed for local system conditions. The ISO's reliability reviews will assess such bids, beginning with the marginal resource, based on operable capacity needs while considering any approved or interim approved transmission outage information and any approved Generator Asset or Demand Response Resource outage information, and will include transmission security studies. Where the applicable reliability needs cannot be met if a Demand Bid is cleared, such Demand Bids will be rejected in their entirety and the resource will not be rejected in part. Demand Bids from rejected resources will not be further included in clearing the reconfiguration auction, and the Lead Market Participant or Project Sponsor, as appropriate, shall be notified as soon as practicable after the reconfiguration auction of the rejection and of the reliability need prompting such rejection.

**III.13.4.3. [Reserved.]**

**III.13.4.4. Clearing Offers and Bids in Reconfiguration Auctions.**

All supply offers and demand bids may be cleared in whole or in part in all reconfiguration auctions. If after clearing, a resource has a Capacity Supply Obligation below its Economic Minimum Limit, it must meet the requirements of Section III.13.6.1.1.1.

**III.13.4.5. Annual Reconfiguration Auctions.**

Except as provided below, after the Forward Capacity Auction for a Capacity Commitment Period, and before the start of that Capacity Commitment Period, the ISO shall conduct three annual reconfiguration auctions for capacity commitments covering the whole of that Capacity Commitment Period. For each

annual reconfiguration auction, the capacity demand curves, New England Control Area and Capacity Zone capacity requirements and external interface limits, as updated pursuant to Section III.12, shall be modeled in the auction consistent with the Forward Capacity Auction for the associated Capacity Commitment Period. For purposes of the annual reconfiguration auctions, the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price used to define the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve shall be the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price associated with the Forward Capacity Auction for the same Capacity Commitment Period addressed by the reconfiguration auction.

**III.13.4.5.1.                    Timing of Annual Reconfiguration Auctions.**

The first annual reconfiguration auction for the Capacity Commitment Period shall be held in the month of June that is approximately 24 months before the start of the Capacity Commitment Period. The second annual reconfiguration auction for the Capacity Commitment Period shall be held in the month of August that is approximately 10 months before the start of the Capacity Commitment Period. The third annual reconfiguration auction for the Capacity Commitment Period shall be held in the month of March that is approximately 3 months before the start of the Capacity Commitment Period.

**III.13.4.5.2.                    Acceleration of Annual Reconfiguration Auction.**

If the difference between the forecasted Installed Capacity Requirement (net of HQICCs) for a Capacity Commitment Period and the amount of capacity obligated for that Capacity Commitment Period is sufficiently large, then the ISO may, upon reasonable notice to Market Participants, conduct an annual reconfiguration auction as much as six months earlier than its normally-scheduled time.

**III.13.4.6.                    [Reserved.]**

**III.13.4.7.                    Monthly Reconfiguration Auctions.**

Prior to each month in the Capacity Commitment Period, the ISO shall conduct a monthly reconfiguration auction for whole-month capacity commitments during that month. For each monthly reconfiguration auction for Capacity Commitment Periods beginning before June 1, 2020, the Local Sourcing Requirement and Maximum Capacity Limit applicable for each Capacity Zone and external interface limits, as updated pursuant to Section III.12, shall be modeled as constraints in the auction. For each monthly reconfiguration auction for Capacity Commitment Periods beginning or after June 1, 2020, the truncation points for import-constrained Capacity Zones and export-constrained Capacity Zones specified in Section III.13.2.2.2 and Section III.13.2.2.3, and external interface limits, as updated pursuant to

Section III.12, shall be modeled as constraints in the auction. The System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve is not modeled in monthly reconfiguration auctions.

**III.13.4.8. Adjustment to Capacity Supply Obligations.**

For each supply offer that clears in a reconfiguration auction, the resource's Capacity Supply Obligation for the relevant Capacity Commitment Period (or portion thereof, as applicable) shall be increased by the amount of capacity that clears. For each demand bid that clears in a reconfiguration auction, the resource's Capacity Supply Obligation for the relevant Capacity Commitment Period (or portion thereof, as applicable) shall be decreased by the amount of capacity that clears.



### **III.13.5. Bilateral Contracts in the Forward Capacity Market.**

Market Participants shall be permitted to enter into Annual Reconfiguration Transactions, Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals, Capacity Load Obligation Bilaterals and Capacity Performance Bilaterals in accordance with this Section III.13.5, with the ISO serving as Counterparty in each such transaction. Market Participants may not offset a Capacity Load Obligation with a Capacity Supply Obligation.

#### **III.13.5.1. Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals.**

Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals are available for monthly periods. The qualification of resources subject to a Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral is determined in the same manner as the qualification of resources is determined for reconfiguration auctions as specified in Section III.13.4.2.

A resource having a Capacity Supply Obligation seeking to shed that obligation (Capacity Transferring Resource) may enter into a bilateral transaction to transfer its Capacity Supply Obligation, in whole or in part (Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral), to a resource, or portion thereof, having Qualified Capacity for that Capacity Commitment Period that is not already obligated (Capacity Acquiring Resource), subject to the following limitations.

- (a) A Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral must be coterminous with a calendar month.
- (b) A Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral may not transfer a Capacity Supply Obligation amount that is greater than the monthly Capacity Supply Obligation of the Capacity Transferring Resource. A Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral may not transfer a Capacity Supply Obligation amount that is greater than the amount of unobligated Qualified Capacity (that is, Qualified Capacity as determined in the most recent Forward Capacity Auction or reconfiguration auction qualification process that is not subject to a Capacity Supply Obligation) of the Capacity Acquiring Resource during the month covered by the Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral, as determined in the qualification process for the most recent Forward Capacity Auction or annual reconfiguration auction prior to the submission of the Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral to the ISO.
- (c) A Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral may not transfer a Capacity Supply Obligation to a Capacity Acquiring Resource where that Capacity Acquiring Resource's unobligated Qualified Capacity is unobligated as a result of an Export Bid or Administrative Export De-List Bid that cleared in the Forward Capacity Auction.

(d) [Reserved.]

(e) [Reserved.]

(f) [Reserved.]

(g) [Reserved.]

(h) A resource, or a portion thereof, that has been designated as a Self-Supplied FCA Resource may transfer the self-supplied portion of its Capacity Supply Obligation by means of Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral. In such a case, however, the Capacity Acquiring Resource shall not become a Self-Supplied FCA Resource as a result of the transaction.

(i) A monthly Capacity Supply Obligation may not be acquired by any resource on an approved outage for the relevant Obligation Month.

(j) A resource that is not expected to achieve FCM Commercial Operation prior to the end of a given Obligation Month in accordance with posted schedules may not submit a transaction as a Capacity Acquiring Resource for that month, unless the resource has a negative Capacity Supply Obligation, in which case it may submit a Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral in an amount up to the absolute value of its Capacity Supply Obligation.

#### **III.13.5.1.1. Process for Approval of Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals.**

##### **III.13.5.1.1.1. Timing of Submission and Prior Notification to the ISO.**

The Lead Market Participant or Project Sponsor for either the Capacity Transferring Resource or the Capacity Acquiring Resource may submit a Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral to the ISO in accordance with posted schedules. The ISO will issue a schedule of the submittal windows for Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals as soon as practicable after the issuance of Forward Capacity Auction results. A Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral must be confirmed by the party other than the party submitting the Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral to the ISO no later than the end of the relevant submittal window.

##### **III.13.5.1.1.2. Application.**

The submission of a Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral to the ISO shall include the following: (i) the resource identification number of the Capacity Transferring Resource; (ii) the amount of the Capacity Supply Obligation being transferred in MW amounts up to three decimal places; (iii) the term of the transaction; and (iv) the resource identification number of the Capacity Acquiring Resource. If the parties to a Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral so choose, they may also submit a price, in \$/kW-month, to be used by the ISO in settling the Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral. If no price is submitted, the ISO shall use a default price of \$0.00/kW-month.

#### **III.13.5.1.1.3. ISO Review.**

(a) The ISO shall review the information provided in support of the Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral, and shall reject the Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral if any of the provisions of this Section III.13.5.1 are not met. For a Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral submitted before the relevant submittal window opens, this review shall occur once the submittal window opens. For a Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral submitted after the submittal window opens, this review shall occur upon submission.

(b) After the close of the relevant submittal window, each Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral shall be subject to a reliability review by the ISO to determine whether the transaction would result in a violation of any NERC or NPCC (or their successors) criteria, or ISO New England System Rules, during the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the transaction. Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals shall be reviewed by the ISO to ensure the regional and local adequacy achieved through the Forward Capacity Auction and other reliability needs are maintained. The ISO's review will consider the location and operating and rating limitations of resources associated with the Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral to ensure reliability standards will remain satisfied if the capacity associated with the Capacity Transferring Resource is withdrawn and the capacity associated with the Capacity Acquiring Resource is accepted. The ISO's reliability reviews will assess transactions based on operable capacity needs while considering any approved or interim approved transmission outage information and any approved Generator Asset or Demand Response Resource outage information, and will include transmission security studies. The ISO will review all confirmed Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals for each upcoming Obligation Month for reliability needs immediately preceding the monthly reconfiguration auction. The ISO shall obtain and consider information from the Local Control Center regarding whether the Capacity Supply Obligation of the Capacity Transferring Resource is needed for local system conditions and whether it is adequately replaced by the Acquiring Resource.

The ISO will approve or reject Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals based on the order in which they are confirmed. If multiple Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals are submitted between the same resources, they may be reviewed together as one transaction and the most recent confirmation time among the related transactions will be used to determine the review order of the grouped transaction. Transactions that cannot meet the applicable reliability needs will only be accepted or rejected in their entirety and the resources will not be accepted or rejected in part for purposes of that transaction. Where the ISO has determined that a Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral must be rejected for reliability reasons the Lead Market Participant or Project Sponsor, as appropriate, for the Capacity Transferring Resource and the Capacity Acquiring Resource shall be notified as soon as practicable of the rejection and of the reliability need prompting such rejection.

(c) Each Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral shall be subject to a financial assurance review by the ISO. If the Capacity Transferring Resource and the Capacity Acquiring Resource are not both in compliance with all applicable provisions of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy, including those regarding Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals, the ISO shall reject the Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral.

#### **III.13.5.1.1.4. Approval.**

Upon approval of a Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral, the Capacity Supply Obligation of the Capacity Transferring Resource shall be reduced by the amount set forth in the Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral, and the Capacity Supply Obligation of the Capacity Acquiring Resource shall be increased by the amount set forth in the Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral.

#### **III.13.5.2. Capacity Load Obligations Bilaterals.**

A Market Participant having a Capacity Load Obligation seeking to shed that obligation (“Capacity Load Obligation Transferring Participant”) may enter into a bilateral transaction to transfer all or a portion of its Capacity Load Obligation in a Capacity Zone (“Capacity Load Obligation Bilateral”) to any Market Participant seeking to acquire a Capacity Load Obligation (“Capacity Load Obligation Acquiring Participant”). A Capacity Load Obligation Bilateral must be in whole calendar month increments, may not exceed one year in duration, and must begin and end within the same Capacity Commitment Period. A Capacity Load Obligation Transferring Participant will be permitted to transfer, and a Capacity Load Obligation Acquiring Participant will be permitted to acquire, a Capacity Load Obligation if after entering into a Capacity Load Obligation Bilateral and submitting related information to the ISO within the specified submittal time period, the ISO approves such Capacity Load Obligation Bilateral.

### **III.13.5.2.1. Process for Approval of Capacity Load Obligation Bilaterals.**

#### **III.13.5.2.1.1. Timing.**

Either the Capacity Load Obligation Transferring Participant or the Capacity Load Obligation Acquiring Participant may submit a Capacity Load Obligation Bilateral to the ISO. All Capacity Load Obligation Bilaterals must be submitted to the ISO in accordance with resettlement provisions as described in ISO New England Manuals. However, to be included in the initial settlement of payments and charges associated with the Forward Capacity Market for the first month of the term of the Capacity Load Obligation Bilateral, a Capacity Load Obligation Bilateral must be submitted to the ISO no later than 12:00 pm on the second Business Day after the end of that month (though a Capacity Load Obligation Bilateral submitted at that time may be revised by the parties to the transaction throughout the resettlement process). A Capacity Load Obligation Bilateral must be confirmed by the party other than the party submitting the Capacity Load Obligation Bilateral to the ISO no later than the same deadline that applies to submission of the Capacity Load Obligation Bilateral.

#### **III.13.5.2.1.2. Application.**

The submission of a Capacity Load Obligation Bilateral to the ISO shall include the following : (i) the amount of the Capacity Load Obligation being transferred in MW amounts up to three decimal places; (ii) the term of the transaction; (iii) identification of the Capacity Load Obligation Transferring Participant and the Capacity Load Obligation Acquiring Participant; and (iv) the Capacity Zone in which the Capacity Load Obligation is being transferred is located.

#### **III.13.5.2.1.3. ISO Review.**

The ISO shall review the information provided in support of the Capacity Load Obligation Bilateral and shall reject the Capacity Load Obligation Bilateral if any of the provisions of this Section II.13.5.2 are not met.

#### **III.13.5.2.1.4. Approval.**

Upon approval of a Capacity Load Obligation Bilateral, the Capacity Load Obligation of the Capacity Load Obligation Transferring Participant in the Capacity Zone specified in the submission to the ISO shall be reduced by the amount set forth in the Capacity Load Obligation Bilateral and the Capacity Load Obligation of the Capacity Load Obligation Acquiring Participant in the specified Capacity Zone shall be increased by the amount set forth in the Capacity Load Obligation Bilateral.

### **III.13.5.3. Capacity Performance Bilaterals.**

A resource's Capacity Performance Score during a Capacity Scarcity Condition may be adjusted by entering into a Capacity Performance Bilateral as described in this Section III.13.5.3.

#### **III.13.5.3.1. Eligibility.**

If a resource has a Capacity Performance Score that is greater than zero in a five-minute interval that is subject to a Capacity Scarcity Condition, that resource may transfer all or some of that Capacity Performance Score to another resource for that same five-minute interval so long as both resources were subject to the same Capacity Scarcity Condition.

#### **III.13.5.3.2. Submission of Capacity Performance Bilaterals.**

The Lead Market Participant for a resource having a Capacity Performance Score that is greater than zero in a five-minute interval that is subject to a Capacity Scarcity Condition may submit a Capacity Performance Bilateral to the ISO assigning all or a portion of its Capacity Performance Score for that interval to another resource, subject to the eligibility requirements specified in Section III.13.5.3.1. The Capacity Performance Bilateral must be confirmed by the Lead Market Participant for the resource receiving the Capacity Performance Score.

##### **III.13.5.3.2.1. Timing.**

A Capacity Performance Bilateral must be submitted in accordance with resettlement provisions as described in ISO New England Manuals. However, to be included in the initial settlement of payments and charges associated with the Forward Capacity Market for the month associated with the Capacity Performance Bilateral, a Capacity Performance Bilateral must be submitted to the ISO no later than 12:00 pm on the second Business Day after the end of that month, or at such later deadline as specified by the ISO upon notice to Market Participants (though a Capacity Performance Bilateral may be revised by the parties to the transaction throughout the resettlement process).

##### **III.13.5.3.2.2. Application.**

The submission of a Capacity Performance Bilateral to the ISO shall include the following: (i) the resource identification number for the resource transferring its Capacity Performance Score; (ii) the resource identification number for the resource receiving the Capacity Performance Score; (iii) the MW amount of Capacity Performance Score being transferred; (iv) the specific five-minute interval or intervals for which the Capacity Performance Bilateral applies.

#### **III.13.5.3.2.3. ISO Review.**

The ISO shall review the information provided in submission of the Capacity Performance Bilateral, and shall reject the Capacity Performance Bilateral if any of the provisions of this Section III.13.5.3 are not met.

#### **III.13.5.3.3. Effect of Capacity Performance Bilateral.**

A Capacity Performance Bilateral does not affect in any way either party's Capacity Supply Obligation or the rights and obligations associated therewith. The sole effect of a Capacity Performance Bilateral is to modify the Capacity Performance Scores of the transferring and receiving resources for the Capacity Scarcity Conditions subject to the Capacity Performance Bilateral for purposes of calculating Capacity Performance Payments as described in Section III.13.7.2.

#### **III.13.5.4 Annual Reconfiguration Transactions.**

Annual Reconfiguration Transactions are available for annual reconfiguration auctions for Capacity Commitment Periods beginning on or after June 1, 2020, except that Annual Reconfiguration Transactions are not available for the first annual reconfiguration auction for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2020.

##### **III.13.5.4.1 Timing of Submission.**

The Lead Market Participant or Project Sponsor for either a Capacity Transferring Resource or a Capacity Acquiring Resource may submit an Annual Reconfiguration Transaction to the ISO in accordance with posted schedules. The ISO will issue a schedule of the submittal windows for Annual Reconfiguration Transactions as soon as practicable after the issuance of Forward Capacity Auction results. An Annual Reconfiguration Transaction must be confirmed by the party other than the party submitting the Annual Reconfiguration Transaction to the ISO no later than the end of the relevant submittal window.

##### **III.13.5.4.2 Components of an Annual Reconfiguration Transaction.**

The submission of an Annual Reconfiguration Transaction must include the following:

1. the resource identification number of the Capacity Transferring Resource;
2. the applicable Capacity Commitment Period;
- (3) the resource identification number of the Capacity Acquiring Resource, and;
3. a price (\$/kW-month), quantity (MW) and Capacity Zone, to be used in settling the Annual Reconfiguration Transaction.

The maximum quantity of an Annual Reconfiguration Transaction is the higher of:

- (1) the Capacity Transferring Resource's maximum demand bid quantity determined pursuant to Section III.13.4.2.2(b), less the quantity of any previously confirmed Annual Reconfiguration Transactions, and;
- (2) the Capacity Acquiring Resource's maximum supply offer quantity determined pursuant to Section III.13.4.2.1.1, less the quantity of any previously confirmed Annual Reconfiguration Transactions.

An Annual Reconfiguration Transaction may not be submitted unless the maximum demand bid quantity and maximum supply offer quantity are each greater than zero.

Each Annual Reconfiguration Transaction is limited to a single Capacity Acquiring Resource and a single Capacity Transferring Resource.

If any demand bid of a Capacity Transferring Resource or supply offer of a Capacity Acquiring Resource that is associated with an Annual Reconfiguration Transaction is rejected for reliability reasons pursuant to Section III.13.2.2(c) or Section III.13.4.2.1.5, respectively, the Annual Reconfiguration Transaction is cancelled.

#### **III.13.5.4.3 Settlement of Annual Reconfiguration Transactions.**

Annual Reconfiguration Transactions are settled on a monthly basis during the applicable Capacity Commitment Period. The monthly payment amount is equal to the transaction quantity multiplied by the difference between the annual reconfiguration auction clearing price and the transaction price. If the payment amount is positive, payment is made to the Lead Market Participant with the Capacity Transferring Resource and charged to the Lead Market Participant with the Capacity Acquiring Resource. If the payment amount is negative, payment is made to the Lead Market Participant with the Capacity Acquiring Resource and charged to the Lead Market Participant with the Capacity Transferring Resource.



### **III.13.6. Rights and Obligations.**

Resources assuming a Capacity Supply Obligation through a Forward Capacity Auction or resources assuming or shedding a Capacity Supply Obligation through a reconfiguration auction or a Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral shall comply with this Section III.13.6 for each Capacity Commitment Period. In the event a resource with a Capacity Supply Obligation assumed through a Forward Capacity Auction, reconfiguration auction, or Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral can not be allowed to shed its Capacity Supply Obligation due to system reliability considerations, the resource shall maintain the Capacity Supply Obligation until the resource can be released from its Capacity Supply Obligation. No additional compensation shall be provided through the Forward Capacity Market if the resource fails to be released from its Capacity Supply Obligation.

#### **III.13.6.1. Resources with Capacity Supply Obligations.**

A resource with a Capacity Supply Obligation assumed through a Forward Capacity Auction, reconfiguration auction, or a Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral shall comply with the requirements of this Section III.13.6.1 during the Capacity Commitment Period, or portion thereof, in which the Capacity Supply Obligation applies.

##### **III.13.6.1.1. Generating Capacity Resources with Capacity Supply Obligations.**

###### **III.13.6.1.1.1. Energy Market Offer Requirements.**

(a) A Generating Capacity Resource having a Capacity Supply Obligation shall be offered into both the Day-Ahead Energy Market and Real-Time Energy Market at a MW amount equal to or greater than its Capacity Supply Obligation whenever the resource is physically available. If the resource is physically available at a level less than its Capacity Supply Obligation, however, the resource shall be offered into both the Day-Ahead Energy Market and Real-Time Energy Market at that level. Day-Ahead Energy Market Supply Offers from such Generating Capacity Resources shall also meet one of the following requirements:

- (i) the sum of the Generating Capacity Resource's Notification Time plus Start-Up Time plus Minimum Run Time plus Minimum Down Time is less than or equal to 72 hours; or
- (ii) if the Generating Capacity Resource cannot meet the offer requirements in Section III.13.6.1.1.1(a)(i) due to physical design limits, then the resource shall be offered into the Day-Ahead Energy Market at a MW amount equal to or greater than its Economic Minimum Limit at

a price of zero or shall be self-scheduled in the Day-Ahead Energy Market at a MW amount equal to or greater than the resource's Economic Minimum Limit.

(b) Notwithstanding the foregoing, if the Generating Capacity Resource is a Settlement Only Resource, it may not submit Supply Offers into the Day-Ahead Energy Market or Real-Time Energy Market.

**III.13.6.1.1.2. Requirement that Offers Reflect Accurate Generating Capacity Resource Operating Characteristics.**

For each day, Day-Ahead Energy Market and Real-Time Energy Market offers for the listed portion of a resource must reflect the then-known unit-specific operating characteristics (taking into account, among other things, the physical design characteristics of the unit) consistent with Good Utility Practice.

Resources must re-declare to the ISO any changes to the offer parameters that occur in real time to reflect the known capability of the resource. A resource failing to comply with this requirement shall be subject to potential referral under Section III.A.19.

**III.13.6.1.1.3. [Reserved.]**

**III.13.6.1.1.4. [Reserved.]**

**III.13.6.1.1.5. Additional Requirements for Generating Capacity Resources.**

Generating Capacity Resources having a Capacity Supply Obligation are subject to the following additional requirements:

- (a) auditing and rating requirements as detailed in the ISO New England Manuals and ISO New England Operating Procedures;
- (b) Operating Data collection requirements as detailed in the ISO New England Manuals and Market Rule 1 and the requirement to provide to the ISO, upon request and as soon as practicable, confirmation of gas volume schedules sufficient to deliver the energy scheduled for each Generating Capacity Resource using natural gas;
- (c) outage requirements in accordance with the ISO New England Manuals and ISO New England Operating Procedures (except that Settlement Only Resources are not subject to outage requirements),

provided, however, that the portion of a resource having no Capacity Supply Obligation is not subject to the forced re-scheduling provisions for outages in accordance with the ISO New England Manuals and ISO New England Operating Procedures.

#### **III.13.6.1.2. Import Capacity Resources with Capacity Supply Obligations.**

##### **III.13.6.1.2.1. Energy Market Offer Requirements.**

A Market Participant with an Import Capacity Resource must offer one or more External Transactions to import energy in the Day-Ahead Energy Market and Real-Time Energy Market for every hour of each Operating Day at the same external interface that, in total, equal the resource's Capacity Supply Obligation, except that:

- (i) the offer requirement does not apply to any hour in which any External Resource associated with an Import Capacity Resource is on an outage;
- (ii) the Day-Ahead Energy Market offer requirement does not apply to any hour in which the import transfer capability of the external interface is 0 MW, and;
- (iii) the Real-Time Energy Market offer requirement does not apply to Import Capacity Resources with Capacity Supply Obligations at an external interface for which Coordinated Transaction Scheduling is implemented.

Each External Transaction submitted in the Day-Ahead Energy Market must reference the associated Import Capacity Resource.

Each External Transaction submitted in the Real-Time Energy Market in accordance with Section III.1.10.7 must reference the associated Import Capacity Resource.

In all cases an Import Capacity Resource is subject to the provisions in Section III.13.7 for the entire Capacity Supply Obligation of the Import Capacity Resource.

##### **III.13.6.1.2.2. Additional Requirements for Import Capacity Resources.**

A Market Participant with an Import Capacity Resource that is associated with an External Resource must:

- (i) comply with all offer, outage scheduling and operating requirements applicable to capacity resources in the External Resource's native Control Area, and;
- (ii) notify the ISO of all outages impacting the Capacity Supply Obligation of the Import Capacity Resource in accordance with the outage notification requirements in ISO New England Operating Procedure No. 5.

### **III.13.6.1.3. Intermittent Power Resources with Capacity Supply Obligations.**

#### **III.13.6.1.3.1. Energy Market Offer Requirements.**

(a) Market Participants with Intermittent Power Resources that are Dispatchable Resources and have a Capacity Supply Obligation are required to submit offers in the Day-Ahead Energy Market consistent with the Market Participant's expectation of the output of the resource in Real-Time. Market Participants with non-dispatchable Intermittent Power Resources with a Capacity Supply Obligation may submit, but are not required to submit, offers into the Day-Ahead Energy Market. Market Participants are required to submit offers for Intermittent Power Resources with a Capacity Supply Obligation for use in the Real-Time Energy Market consistent with the characteristics of the resource. Day-Ahead projections of output shall be submitted as detailed in the ISO New England Manuals. For purposes of calculating Real-Time NCPC Charges, Intermittent Power Resources shall have a generation deviation of zero.

(b) Notwithstanding the foregoing, an Intermittent Power Resource that is a Settlement Only Resource may not submit Supply Offers into the Day-Ahead Energy Market or Real-Time Energy Market.

#### **III.13.6.1.3.2. [Reserved.]**

#### **III.13.6.1.3.3. Additional Requirements for Intermittent Power Resources.**

Intermittent Power Resources are subject to the following additional requirements:

- (a) auditing and rating requirements as detailed in the ISO New England Manuals;
- (b) Operating Data collection requirements as detailed in the ISO New England Manuals;

(c) complying with outage requirements as outlined in the ISO New England Operating Procedures and ISO New England Manuals (except that Intermittent Power Resources that are Settlement Only Resources need not comply with outage requirements).

**III.13.6.1.4. [Reserved.]**

**III.13.6.1.5. Demand Capacity Resources with Capacity Supply Obligations.**

**III.13.6.1.5.1. Energy Market Offer Requirements.**

(a) A Market Participant with an Active Demand Capacity Resource having a Capacity Supply Obligation shall submit Demand Reduction Offers for its Demand Response Resources into the Day-Ahead Energy Market and Real-Time Energy Market in at least the MW amount described in this Section III.13.6.1.5.1; for purposes of the following comparisons, the portion of Demand Reduction Offers not associated with Net Supply shall be increased by average avoided peak transmission and distribution losses. The sum of the Demand Reduction Offers must be equal to or greater than the Active Demand Capacity Resource's Capacity Supply Obligation whenever the Demand Response Resources are physically available. If the Demand Response Resources are physically available at a level less than the Active Demand Capacity Resource's Capacity Supply Obligation, the sum of the Demand Reduction Offers will equal that level and shall be offered into both the Day-Ahead Energy Market and Real-Time Energy Market. Each Demand Reduction Offer from a Demand Response Resource made into the Day-Ahead Energy Market shall also meet the following requirement:

(i) the sum of the Demand Response Resource Notification Time plus Demand Response Resource Start-Up Time plus Minimum Reduction Time plus Minimum Time Between Reductions is less than or equal to 72 hours.

(b) Seasonal Peak Demand Resources and On-Peak Demand Resources may not submit Demand Reduction Offers into the Day-Ahead Energy Market or Real-Time Energy Market.

**III.13.6.1.5.2. Requirement that Offers Reflect Accurate Demand Response Resource Operating Characteristics.**

For each day, Demand Reduction Offers submitted into the Day-Ahead Energy Market and Real-Time Energy Market for a Demand Response Resource associated with an Active Demand Capacity Resource

must reflect the then-known operating characteristics of the resource. Consistent with Section III.1.10.9(d), Demand Response Resources must re-declare to the ISO any changes to offer parameters that occur in real time to reflect the operating characteristics of the resource. A resource failing to comply with this requirement shall be subject to potential referral under Section III.A.

**III.13.6.1.5.3. Additional Requirements for Demand Capacity Resources.**

- (a) A Market Participant may not associate an Asset with a non-commercial Demand Capacity Resource during a Capacity Commitment Period if the Asset can be associated with a commercial Demand Capacity Resource whose capability is less than its Capacity Supply Obligation during that Capacity Commitment Period.
- (b) An Energy Efficiency measure may be added to an On-Peak Demand Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource (other than one consisting of Load Management or Distributed Generation) until two years after the start of the Capacity Commitment Period for which the resource first received a Capacity Supply Obligation; provided, however, that a resource that qualified for a Forward Capacity Auction associated with a Capacity Commitment Period beginning on or before June 1, 2024 may install Energy Efficiency measures until May 31, 2027. Once an Energy Efficiency measure has been associated with an On-Peak Demand Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource, the measure may not be transferred to a different resource.
- (c) For purposes of confirming FCM Commercial Operation as described in Section III.13.3.8, the ISO shall use a summer Seasonal DR Audit value or summer Passive DR Audit value to verify the capacity rating of a Demand Capacity Resource with summer Qualified Capacity. A winter Seasonal DR Audit value or winter Passive DR Audit value may only be used to verify the winter commercial capacity of a Demand Capacity Resource. The summer and winter commercial capacity of a Demand Capacity Resource consisting of Energy Efficiency measures may be verified in any month of the year.
- (d) For Active Demand Capacity Resources, a summer Seasonal DR Audit value shall be established for use from April 1 through November 30 and a winter Seasonal DR Audit value shall be established for use from December 1 through March 31. The summer or winter Seasonal DR Audit value of an Active Demand Capacity Resource is equal to the sum of the like-season Seasonal DR Audit values of its constituent Demand Response Resources as determined pursuant to Section III.1.5.1.3.1. The Seasonal DR Audit value of an Active Demand Capacity Resource shall automatically update whenever a new

Seasonal DR Audit value is approved for a constituent Demand Response Resource or with changes to the makeup of the constituent Demand Response Resources.

(e) On-Peak Demand Resources and Seasonal Peak Demand Resources shall in addition: (i) comply with the ISO's measurement and verification requirements pursuant to Section III.13.1.4.3 and the ISO New England Manuals; and (ii) comply with the auditing and rating requirements as detailed in Sections III.13.6.1.5.4 and III.13.6.1.5.5 and the ISO New England Manuals.

(f) Active Demand Capacity Resources shall in addition: (i) comply with the measurement and verification requirements and the Operating Data collection requirements as detailed in the ISO New England Manuals and Market Rule 1, and with outage requirements in accordance with the ISO New England Manuals and ISO New England Operating Procedures, provided, however, that the portion of a resource having no Capacity Supply Obligation is not subject to the forced re-scheduling provisions for outages in accordance with the ISO New England Manuals and ISO New England Operating Procedures; and (ii) comply with the auditing and rating requirements as detailed in Section III.13.6.1.5.5 and the ISO New England Manuals.

**III.13.6.1.5.4. On-Peak Demand Resource and Seasonal Peak Demand Resource Auditing Requirements.**

(a) A summer Passive DR Audit value and a winter Passive DR Audit value must be established for each On-Peak Demand Resource and Seasonal Peak Demand Resource in every Capacity Commitment Period during which the On-Peak Demand Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource has an annual or monthly Capacity Supply Obligation.

(b) Summer Passive DR Audit values shall be determined based on data for one or more months of the summer Passive DR Auditing Period (June through August). Winter Passive DR Audit values shall be determined based on data for one or more months of the winter Passive DR Auditing Period (December through January).

(c) Passive DR Audit values will be made available to the Market Participant within 20 Business Days following the end of the period for which the audit value is determined by the ISO.

- (d) The audit value of an On-Peak Demand Resource is determined by evaluating the Average Hourly Output or Average Hourly Load Reduction of each Asset associated with the On-Peak Demand Resource during the Demand Resource On-Peak Hours.
- (e) The audit value of a Seasonal Peak Demand Resource is determined by evaluating the Average Hourly Output or Average Hourly Load Reduction of each Asset associated with the Seasonal Peak Demand Resource during the Demand Resource Seasonal Peak Hours. If there are no Demand Resource Seasonal Peak Hours in a month during the Passive DR Auditing Period, performance during Demand Resource On-Peak Hours in that month may be used.
- (f) Passive DR Audit values shall become effective one calendar day after being made available to the Market Participant and remain valid until the earlier of: (i) the next like-season Passive DR Audit value becomes effective or (ii) the end of the following Capability Demonstration Year.
- (g) For On-Peak Demand Resources consisting of Energy Efficiency measures and Seasonal Peak Demand Resources consisting of Energy Efficiency measures, the ISO will calculate a summer Passive DR Audit value and a winter Passive DR Audit value in each month of the year. For all other On-Peak Demand Resources and Seasonal Peak Demand Resources, a Market Participant may request that a summer or winter Passive DR Audit value be determined based on data for, respectively, a summer or winter month outside of the Passive DR Auditing Periods. (For Demand Capacity Resources, summer months are April through November; all other months are winter months.) Such an audit shall not satisfy the Passive DR Audit requirement.

#### **III.13.6.1.5.5. Additional Demand Capacity Resource Audits.**

The ISO may perform additional audits for a Demand Capacity Resource to establish or verify the capability of the Demand Capacity Resource and its underlying assets and measures. This additional auditing may consist of two levels.

- (a) Level 1 Audit: the ISO will establish the audit results by conducting a review of records of the Assets and measures to verify that the reported Assets and measures have been installed and are operational. The audit shall include, but is not limited to, reviewing project or program databases, invoices, installation reports, work orders, and field inspection reports. In addition, the audit may involve reviewing any independent inspections or evaluations conducted as part of program implementation and program evaluation.



(b) Level 2 Audit: the ISO will establish the audit results by initiating or conducting an on-site field audit to verify the installation and performance of the Assets and measures. Such an audit may include a random or select sample of facilities and measures.

A level 1 audit is not required to precede a level 2 audit. If the results of the audit indicate that the demand reduction capability of the Demand Capacity Resource is less than or greater than its most recent like-season Passive DR Audit value or Seasonal DR Audit value, then the Demand Capacity Resource's audit value shall be adjusted accordingly.

### **III.13.6.1.6. DNE Dispatchable Generator.**

#### **III.13.6.1.6.1. Energy Market Offer Requirements.**

Beginning on June 1, 2019, Market Participants with DNE Dispatchable Generators with a Capacity Supply Obligation must submit offers into the Day-Ahead Energy Market for the full amount of the resource's expected hourly physical capability as determined by the Market Participant. Market Participants with DNE Dispatchable Generators having a Capacity Supply Obligation must submit offers for the Real-Time Energy Market consistent with the characteristics of the resource. For purposes of calculating Real-Time NCPC Charges, DNE Dispatchable Generators shall have a generation deviation of zero.

#### **III.13.6.2. Resources without a Capacity Supply Obligation.**

A resource that does not have any Capacity Supply Obligation shall comply with the requirements in this Section III.13.6.2, and shall not be subject to the requirements set forth in Section III.13.6.1 during the Capacity Commitment Period, or portion thereof, for which the resource has no Capacity Supply Obligation.

### **III.13.6.2.1. Generating Capacity Resources without a Capacity Supply Obligation.**

#### **III.13.6.2.1.1. Energy Market Offer Requirements.**

A Generating Capacity Resource having no Capacity Supply Obligation is not required to offer into the Day-Ahead Energy Market or Real-Time Energy Market. A Generating Capacity Resource that is a Settlement Only Resource may not offer into the Day-Ahead Energy Market or Real-Time Energy Market.

**III.13.6.2.1.1.1. Day-Ahead Energy Market Participation.**

A Generating Capacity Resource having no Capacity Supply Obligation may submit an offer into the Day-Ahead Energy Market. If any portion of the offered energy clears in the Day-Ahead Energy Market, the entire Supply Offer, up to the Economic Maximum Limit offered into the Day-Ahead Energy Market, will be subject to all of the rules and requirements applicable to that market for the operating day, including the obligation to follow ISO Dispatch Instructions. Such a resource that clears shall be eligible for dispatch in the Real-Time Energy Market.

**III.13.6.2.1.1.2. Real-Time Energy Market Participation.**

A Generating Capacity Resource having no Capacity Supply Obligation may submit an offer into the Real-Time Energy Market. If any portion of the offered energy clears in the Real-Time Energy Market, the entire Supply Offer, up to the Economic Maximum Limit offered into the Real-Time Energy Market, will be subject to all of the rules and requirements applicable to that market for the Operating Day, including the obligation to follow ISO Dispatch Instructions. Such a resource shall be eligible for dispatch in the Real-Time Energy Market.

**III.13.6.2.1.2. Additional Requirements for Generating Capacity Resources Having No Capacity Supply Obligation.**

Generating Capacity Resources having no Capacity Supply Obligation are subject to the following additional requirements:

- (a) complying with the auditing and rating requirements as detailed in the ISO New England Manuals;
- (b) complying with the Operating Data collection requirements detailed in the ISO New England Manuals; and
- (c) complying with outage requirements as outlined in the ISO New England Operating Procedures and ISO New England Manuals. Generating Capacity Resources having no Capacity Supply Obligation are not subject to the forced re-scheduling provisions for outages in accordance with the ISO New England Manuals and ISO New England Operating Procedures.

**III.13.6.2.2. [Reserved.]**

**III.13.6.2.3. Intermittent Power Resources without a Capacity Supply Obligation.**

**III.13.6.2.3.1. Energy Market Offer Requirements.**

An Intermittent Power Resource having no Capacity Supply Obligation is not required to offer into the Day-Ahead Energy Market or Real-Time Energy Market. An Intermittent Power Resource that is a Settlement Only Resource may not offer into the Day-Ahead Energy Market or Real-Time Energy Market.

**III.13.6.2.3.2. Additional Requirements for Intermittent Power Resources.**

Intermittent Power Resources are subject to the following additional requirements:

- (a) auditing and rating requirements as detailed in the ISO New England Manuals; and
- (b) Operating Data collection requirements as detailed in the ISO New England Manuals.

**III.13.6.2.4. [Reserved.]**

**III.13.6.2.5. Demand Capacity Resources without a Capacity Supply Obligation.**

**III.13.6.2.5.1. Energy Market Offer Requirements.**

A Market Participant with a Demand Response Resource associated with an Active Demand Capacity Resource without a Capacity Supply Obligation is not required to offer Demand Reduction Offers for the Demand Response Resource into the Day-Ahead Energy Market or Real-Time Energy Market.

Seasonal Peak Demand Resources and On-Peak Demand Resources may not submit Demand Reduction Offers into the Day-Ahead Energy Market or Real-Time Energy Market.

**III.13.6.2.5.1.1. Day-Ahead Energy Market Participation.**

A Market Participant with a Demand Response Resource associated with an Active Demand Capacity Resource without a Capacity Supply Obligation may submit a Demand Reduction Offer into the Day-Ahead Energy Market. If any portion of the Demand Reduction Offer clears in the Day-Ahead Energy Market, the entire Demand Reduction Offer, up to the Maximum Reduction offered into the Day-Ahead Energy Market, will be subject to all of the rules and requirements applicable to that market for the

Operating Day, including the obligation to follow Dispatch Instructions. Such a resource that clears shall be eligible for dispatch in the Real-Time Energy Market.

**III.13.6.2.5.1.2. Real-Time Energy Market Participation.**

A Market Participant with a Demand Response Resource associated with an Active Demand Capacity Resource without a Capacity Supply Obligation, that did not submit an offer into the Day-Ahead Energy Market or was offered into the Day-Ahead Energy Market and did not clear, may submit a Demand Reduction Offer in the Real-Time Energy Market and shall be subject to all of the requirements associated therewith. Such a resource shall be eligible for dispatch in the Real-Time Energy Market.

**III.13.6.2.5.2. Additional Requirements for Demand Capacity Resources Having No Capacity Supply Obligation.**

Demand Capacity Resources without a Capacity Supply Obligation are subject to the following additional requirements:

- (a) complying with Section III.13.6.1.5.3(a) and (b) and with the auditing and rating requirements described in Section III.13.6.1.5.5 and the ISO New England Manuals; and
- (b) for Active Demand Capacity Resources, complying with the Operating Data collection requirements detailed in the ISO New England Manuals; and
- (c) for Active Demand Capacity Resources, complying with outage requirements as outlined in the ISO New England Operating Procedures and ISO New England Manuals. Active Demand Capacity Resources having no Capacity Supply Obligation are not subject to the forced re-scheduling provisions for outages in accordance with the ISO New England Manuals and ISO New England Operating Procedures.

**III.13.6.3. Exporting Resources.**

A resource that is exporting capacity not subject to a Capacity Supply Obligation to an external Control Area shall comply with this Section III.13.6.3 and the ISO New England Manuals. Intermittent Power Resources and Demand Capacity Resources are not permitted to back a capacity export to an external Control Area. The portion of a resource without a Capacity Supply Obligation that will be used in Real-Time to support an External Transaction sale must comply with the energy market offer requirements of Section III.1.10.7.

**III.13.6.4. ISO Requests for Energy.**

The ISO may request that an Active Demand Capacity Resource or a Generating Capacity Resource having capacity that is not subject to a Capacity Supply Obligation provide energy for reliability purposes in the Real-Time Energy Market, but such resource shall not be obligated under Section III.13 of this Tariff by such a request to provide energy from that capacity. If such resource does provide energy from that capacity, the resource shall be paid based on its most recent offer and is eligible for NCPC.

**III.13.6.4.1. Real-Time High Operating Limit.**

For purposes of facilitating ISO requests for energy under Section III.13.6.4, a Market Participant must report an up-to-date Real-Time High Operating Limit value at all times for a Generating Capacity Resource.

### **III.13.7. Performance, Payments and Charges in the FCM.**

Revenue in the Forward Capacity Market for resources providing capacity shall be composed of Capacity Base Payments as described in Section III.13.7.1 and Capacity Performance Payments as described in Section III.13.7.2, adjusted as described in Section III.13.7.3 and Section III.13.7.4. Market Participants with a Capacity Load Obligation will be subject to charges as described in Section III.13.7.5.

In the event of a change in the Lead Market Participant for a resource that has a Capacity Supply Obligation, the Capacity Supply Obligation shall remain associated with the resource and the new Lead Market Participant for the resource shall be bound by all provisions of this Section III.13 arising from such Capacity Supply Obligation. The Lead Market Participant for the resource at the start of an Obligation Month shall be responsible for all payments and charges associated with that resource in that Obligation Month.

#### **III.13.7.1. Capacity Base Payments.**

Resources acquiring or shedding a Capacity Supply Obligation for the Obligation Month shall receive a Capacity Base Payment for the Obligation Month reflecting the payments and charges described in Section III.13.7.1.1, as adjusted to account for peak energy rents as described in Section III.13.7.1.2.

##### **III.13.7.1.1. Monthly Payments and Charges Reflecting Capacity Supply Obligations.**

Each resource that has: (i) cleared in a Forward Capacity Auction, except for the portion of resources designated as Self-Supplied FCA Resources; (ii) cleared in a reconfiguration auction; or (iii) entered into a Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral shall be entitled to a monthly payment or charge during the Capacity Commitment Period based on the following amounts:

(a) **Forward Capacity Auction.** For a resource whose offer has cleared in a Forward Capacity Auction, the monthly capacity payment shall equal the product of its cleared capacity and the Capacity Clearing Price in the Capacity Zone in which the resource is located as adjusted by applicable indexing for resources with additional Capacity Commitment Period elections pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.2.4 in the manner described below. For a resource that has elected to have the Capacity Clearing Price and the Capacity Supply Obligation apply for more than one Capacity Commitment Period, payments associated with the Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price (indexed using the Handy-Whitman Index of Public Utility Construction Costs in effect as of December 31 of the year preceding the Capacity Commitment Period) shall continue to apply after the Capacity Commitment Period associated

with the Forward Capacity Auction in which the offer clears, for up to six additional and consecutive Capacity Commitment Periods, in whole Capacity Commitment Period increments only.

(b) **Reconfiguration Auctions.** For a resource whose offer or bid has cleared in an annual or monthly reconfiguration auction, the monthly capacity payment or charge shall be equal to the product of its cleared capacity and the appropriate reconfiguration auction clearing price in the Capacity Zone in which the resource cleared.

(c) **Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals.** For resources that have acquired or shed a Capacity Supply Obligation through a Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral, the monthly capacity payment or charge shall be equal to the product of the Capacity Supply Obligation being assumed or shed and price associated with the Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral.

(d) **Substitution Auctions.** For a resource whose offer or bid has cleared in a substitution auction, the monthly capacity payment or charge shall be equal to the product of its cleared capacity and the substitution auction clearing price. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the monthly capacity charge for a demand bid cleared at a substitution auction clearing price above its bid price shall be calculated using its bid price.

#### **III.13.7.1.2 Peak Energy Rents.**

For Capacity Commitment Periods beginning prior to June 1, 2019, Capacity Base Payments to resources with Capacity Supply Obligations, except for (1) On-Peak Demand Resources, (2) Seasonal Peak Demand Resources, and (3) New Generating Capacity Resources that have cleared in the Forward Capacity Auction and have completed construction but due to a planned transmission facility (e.g., a radial interconnection) not being in service are not able to achieve FCM Commercial Operation, shall be decreased by Peak Energy Rents (“PER”) calculated in each Capacity Zone, as determined pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.4 in the Forward Capacity Auction, as provided below. The PER calculation shall utilize hourly integrated Real-Time LMPs. For each Capacity Zone in the Forward Capacity Auction, as determined pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.4, PER shall be computed based on the load-weighted Real-Time LMPs for each Capacity Zone, using the Real-Time Hub Price for the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone. Self-Supplied FCA Resources shall not be subject to a PER adjustment on the portion of the resource that is self-supplied.

### III.13.7.1.2.1 Hourly PER Calculations.

(a) For hours with a positive difference between the hourly Real-Time energy price and a strike price, the ISO shall compute PER for each hour ("Hourly PER") equal to this positive difference in accordance with one of the following formulas, which include scaling adjustments for system load and availability:

For hours within the period beginning September 30, 2016 through May 31, 2018:

$$\text{Hourly PER}(\$/\text{kW}) = [(\text{LMP} - \text{Adjusted Hourly PER Strike Price}) * [\text{Scaling Factor}] * [\text{Availability Factor}]]$$

Where:

$$\text{Adjusted Hourly PER Strike Price} = \text{Strike Price} + \text{Hourly PER Adjustment}$$

$$\text{Hourly PER Adjustment} = \text{average of Five-Minute PER Strike Price Adjustment values}$$

$$\text{Five-Minute PER Strike Price Adjustment} = \text{MAX} (\text{Thirty-Minute Operating Reserve clearing price} - \$500/\text{MWh}, 0) + \text{MAX} (\text{Ten-Minute Non-Spinning Reserve clearing price} - \text{Thirty-Minute Operating Reserve clearing price} - \$850/\text{MWh}, 0).$$

$$\text{Strike Price} = \text{as defined below}$$

$$\text{Scaling Factor} = \text{as defined below}$$

$$\text{Availability Factor} = \text{as defined below}$$

For all other hours:

$$\text{Hourly PER}(\$/\text{kW}) = [\text{LMP} - \text{Strike Price}] * [\text{Scaling Factor}] * [\text{Availability Factor}]$$

Where:

$$\text{Strike Price} = \text{the heat rate} \times \text{fuel cost of the PER Proxy Unit described below.}$$

$$\text{Scaling Factor} = \text{the ratio of actual hourly integrated system load (calculated as the sum of Real-Time Load Obligations for the system as calculated in the settlement of the Real-Time Energy}$$



Market and adjusted for losses and including imports delivered in the Real-Time Energy Market) and the 50/50 predicted peak system load reduced appropriately for Demand Capacity Resources, used in the most recent calculation of the Installed Capacity Requirement for that Capacity Commitment Period, capped at an hourly ratio of 1.0.

Availability Factor = 0.95.

(b) PER Proxy Unit characteristics shall be as follows:

(i) The PER Proxy Unit shall be indexed to the marginal fuel, which shall be the higher of the following, as determined on a daily basis: ultra low-sulfur No. 2 oil measured at New York Harbor plus a seven percent markup for transportation; or day-ahead gas measured at the AGT-CG (Non-G) hub;

(ii) The PER Proxy Unit shall be assumed to have no start-up, ramp rate or minimum run time constraints;

(iii) The PER Proxy Unit shall have a 22,000 Btu/kWh heat rate. This assumption shall be periodically reviewed after the first Capacity Commitment Period by the ISO to ensure that the heat rate continues to reflect a level slightly higher than the marginal generating unit in the region that would be dispatched as the system enters a scarcity condition. Any changes to the heat rate of the PER Proxy Unit shall be considered in the stakeholder process in consultation with the state utility regulatory agencies, shall be filed pursuant to Section 205 of the Federal Power Act, and shall be applied prospectively to the settlement of future Forward Capacity Auctions.

#### **III.13.7.1.2.2. Monthly PER Application.**

The Hourly PER shall be summed for each calendar month to determine the total PER for that month ("Monthly PER"). The ISO shall then calculate the Average Monthly PER earned by the proxy unit. The Average Monthly PER shall be equal to the average of the Monthly PER values for the 12 months prior to the Obligation Month. The PER deduction for each resource shall be calculated as the Average Monthly PER multiplied by the resource's Capacity Supply Obligation for the Obligation Month (less any Capacity Supply Obligation MW from any portion of a Self-Supplied FCA Resource); provided, however, that in no case shall a resource's PER deduction for an Obligation Month be less than zero or

greater than the product of the resource's Capacity Supply Obligation and the relevant Forward Capacity Auction Capacity Clearing Price.

### **III.13.7.1.3. Export Capacity.**

If there are any Export Bids or Administrative Export De-List Bids from resources located in an export-constrained Capacity Zone or in the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone that have cleared in the Forward Capacity Auction and if the resource is exporting capacity at an export interface that is connected to an import-constrained Capacity Zone or the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone that is different than the Capacity Zone in which the resource is located, then charges and credits are applied as follows (for the following calculation, the Capacity Clearing Price will be the value prior to PER adjustments).

Charge Amount to Resource Exporting = [Capacity Clearing Price<sub>location of the interface</sub> - Capacity Clearing Price<sub>location of the resource</sub>] x Cleared MWs of Export Bid or Administrative Export De-List Bid]

Credit Amount to Capacity Load Obligations in the Capacity Zone where the export interface is located = [Capacity Clearing Price<sub>location of the interface</sub> - Capacity Clearing Price<sub>location of the resource</sub>] x Cleared MWs of Export Bid or Administrative Export De-list Bid]

Credits and charges to load in the applicable Capacity Zones, as set forth above, shall be allocated in proportion to each LSE's Capacity Load Obligation as calculated in Section III.13.7.5.2.

### **III.13.7.1.4. [Reserved.]**

## **III.13.7.2 Capacity Performance Payments.**

### **III.13.7.2.1 Definition of Capacity Scarcity Condition.**

A Capacity Scarcity Condition shall exist in a Capacity Zone for any five-minute interval in which the Real-Time Reserve Clearing Price for that entire Capacity Zone is set based on the Reserve Constraint Penalty Factor pricing for: (i) the Minimum Total Reserve Requirement; (ii) the Ten-Minute Reserve Requirement; or (iii) the Zonal Reserve Requirement, each as described in Section III.2.7A(c); provided, however, that a Capacity Scarcity Condition shall not exist if the Reserve Constraint Penalty Factor pricing results only because of resource ramping limitations that are not binding on the energy dispatch.

### **III.13.7.2.2 Calculation of Actual Capacity Provided During a Capacity Scarcity Condition.**

For each five-minute interval in which a Capacity Scarcity Condition exists, the ISO shall calculate the Actual Capacity Provided by each resource, whether or not it has a Capacity Supply Obligation, in any Capacity Zone that is subject to the Capacity Scarcity Condition. For resources not having a Capacity Supply Obligation (including External Transactions), the Actual Capacity Provided shall be calculated using the provision below applicable to the resource type. Notwithstanding the specific provisions of this Section III.13.7.2.2, no resource shall have an Actual Capacity Provided that is less than zero.

(a) A Generating Capacity Resource's Actual Capacity Provided during a Capacity Scarcity Condition shall be the sum of the resource's output during the interval plus the resource's Reserve Quantity For Settlement during the interval; provided, however, that if the resource's output was limited during the Capacity Scarcity Condition as a result of a transmission system limitation, then the resource's Actual Capacity Provided may not be greater than the sum of the resource's Desired Dispatch Point during the interval, plus the resource's Reserve Quantity For Settlement during the interval. Where the resource is associated with one or more External Transaction sales submitted in accordance with Section III.1.10.7(f), the resource will have its hourly Actual Capacity Provided reduced by the hourly integrated delivered MW for the External Transaction sale or sales.

(b) An Import Capacity Resource's Actual Capacity Provided during a Capacity Scarcity Condition shall be the net energy delivered during the interval in which the Capacity Scarcity Condition occurred. Where a single Market Participant owns more than one Import Capacity Resource, then the difference between the total net energy delivered from those resources and the total of the Capacity Supply Obligations of those resources shall be allocated to those resources pro rata.

(c) An On-Peak Demand Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource's Actual Capacity Provided during a Capacity Scarcity Condition shall be the sum of the Actual Capacity Provided for each of its components, as determined below, where the MWhs of reduction, other than MWhs associated with Net Supply, are increased by average avoided peak transmission and distribution losses.

- (i) For Energy Efficiency measures, the Actual Capacity Provided shall be zero.
- (ii) For Distributed Generation measures submitting meter data for the full 24 hour calendar day during which the Capacity Scarcity Condition occurs, the Actual Capacity Provided

shall be equal to the submitted meter data, adjusted as necessary for the five-minute interval in which the Capacity Scarcity Condition occurs.

- (iii) For Load Management measures submitting meter data for the full 24 hour calendar day during which the Capacity Scarcity Condition occurs, the Actual Capacity Provided shall be equal to the submitted demand reduction data, adjusted as necessary for the five-minute interval in which the Capacity Scarcity Condition occurs.
  - (iv) Notwithstanding any other provision of this Section III.13.7.2.2(c), for any On-Peak Demand Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource that fails to provide the data necessary for the ISO to determine the Actual Capacity Provided as described in this Section III.13.7.2.2(c), the Actual Capacity Provided shall be zero.
- (d) An Active Demand Capacity Resource's Actual Capacity Provided during a Capacity Scarcity Condition shall be the sum of the Actual Capacity Provided by its constituent Demand Response Resources during the Capacity Scarcity Condition.
- (i) A Demand Response Resource's Actual Capacity Provided during a Capacity Scarcity Condition shall be: (1) the sum of the Real-Time demand reduction of its constituent Demand Response Assets (provided, however, that if the Demand Response Resource was limited during the Capacity Scarcity Condition as a result of a transmission system limitation, then the sum of the Real-Time demand reduction of its constituent Demand Response Assets may not be greater than its Desired Dispatch Point during the interval), plus (2) the Demand Response Resource's Reserve Quantity For Settlement, where the MW quantity, other than the MW quantity associated with Net Supply, is increased by average avoided peak transmission and distribution losses; provided, however, that a Demand Response Resource's Actual Capacity Provided shall not be less than zero.
  - (ii) The Real-Time demand reduction of a Demand Response Asset shall be calculated as described in Section III.8.4, except that: (1) in the case of a Demand Response Asset that is on a forced or scheduled curtailment as described in Section III.8.3, a Real-Time demand reduction shall also be calculated for intervals in which the associated Demand Response Resource does not receive a non-zero Dispatch Instruction; (2) in the case of a Demand Response Asset that is on a forced or scheduled curtailment as described in

Section III.8.3, the minuend in the calculation described in Section III.8.4 shall be the unadjusted Demand Response Baseline of the Demand Response Asset; and (3) the resulting MWhs of reduction, other than the MWhs associated with Net Supply, shall be increased by average avoided peak transmission and distribution losses.

### **III.13.7.2.3 Capacity Balancing Ratio.**

For each five-minute interval in which a Capacity Scarcity Condition exists, the ISO shall calculate a Capacity Balancing Ratio using the following formula:

$$(\text{Load} + \text{Reserve Requirement}) / \text{Total Capacity Supply Obligation}$$

(a) If the Capacity Scarcity Condition is a result of a violation of the Minimum Total Reserve Requirement such that the associated system-wide Reserve Constraint Penalty Factor pricing applies, then the terms used in the formula above shall be calculated as follows:

Load = the total amount of Actual Capacity Provided (excluding applicable Real-Time Reserve Designations) from all resources in the New England Control Area during the interval (with the Actual Capacity Provided of Energy Efficiency measures being zero, as specified in Section III.13.7.2.2(c)(i)).

Reserve Requirement = the Minimum Total Reserve Requirement during the interval.

Total Capacity Supply Obligation = the total amount of Capacity Supply Obligations in the New England Control Area during the interval, excluding the Capacity Supply Obligations associated with Energy Efficiency measures.

(b) If the Capacity Scarcity Condition is a result of a violation of the Ten-Minute Reserve Requirement such that the associated system-wide Reserve Constraint Penalty Factor pricing applies, then the terms used in the formula above shall be calculated as follows:

Load = the total amount of Actual Capacity Provided (excluding applicable Real-Time Reserve Designations) from all resources in the New England Control Area during the interval (with the Actual Capacity Provided of Energy Efficiency measures being zero, as specified in Section III.13.7.2.2(c)(i)).

Reserve Requirement = the Ten-Minute Reserve Requirement during the interval.

Total Capacity Supply Obligation = the total amount of Capacity Supply Obligations in the New England Control Area during the interval, excluding the Capacity Supply Obligations associated with Energy Efficiency measures.

(c) If the Capacity Scarcity Condition is a result of a violation of the Zonal Reserve Requirement such that the associated Reserve Constraint Penalty Factor pricing applies, then the terms used in the formula above shall be calculated as follows:

Load = the total amount of Actual Capacity Provided (excluding applicable Real-Time Reserve Designations) from all resources in the Capacity Zone during the interval plus the net amount of energy imported into the Capacity Zone from outside the New England Control Area during the interval (but not less than zero) (with the Actual Capacity Provided of Energy Efficiency measures being zero, as specified in Section III.13.7.2.2(c)(i)).

Reserve Requirement = the Zonal Reserve Requirement minus any reserve support coming into the Capacity Zone over the internal transmission interface.

Total Capacity Supply Obligation = the total amount of Capacity Supply Obligations in the Capacity Zone during the interval, excluding the Capacity Supply Obligations associated with Energy Efficiency measures.

(d) The following provisions shall be used to determine the applicable Capacity Balancing Ratio where more than one of the conditions described in subsections (a), (b), and (c) apply in a Capacity Zone.

(i) In any Capacity Zone subject to Reserve Constraint Penalty Factor pricing associated with both the Minimum Total Reserve Requirement and the Ten-Minute Reserve Requirement, but not the Zonal Reserve Requirement, the Capacity Balancing Ratio shall be calculated as described in Section III.13.7.2.3(a) for resources in that Capacity Zone.

(ii) In any Capacity Zone subject to Reserve Constraint Penalty Factor pricing associated with both the Ten-Minute Reserve Requirement and the Zonal Reserve Requirement, but not the Minimum Total Reserve Requirement, the Capacity Balancing Ratio for resources in that Capacity Zone shall be the higher of the Capacity Balancing Ratio calculated as described in

Section III.13.7.2.3(b) and the Capacity Balancing Ratio calculated as described in Section III.13.7.2.3(c).

(iii) In any Capacity Zone subject to Reserve Constraint Penalty Factor pricing associated with the Minimum Total Reserve Requirement and the Zonal Reserve Requirement (regardless of whether the Capacity Zone is also subject to Reserve Constraint Penalty Factor pricing associated with the Ten-Minute Reserve Requirement), the Capacity Balancing Ratio for resources in that Capacity Zone shall be the higher of the Capacity Balancing Ratio calculated as described in Section III.13.7.2.3(a) and the Capacity Balancing Ratio calculated as described in Section III.13.7.2.3(c).

#### **III.13.7.2.4 Capacity Performance Score.**

Each resource, whether or not it has a Capacity Supply Obligation, will be assigned a Capacity Performance Score for each five-minute interval in which a Capacity Scarcity Condition exists in the Capacity Zone in which the resource is located. A resource's Capacity Performance Score for the interval shall equal the resource's Actual Capacity Provided during the interval (with the Actual Capacity Provided of Energy Efficiency measures being zero, as specified in Section III.13.7.2.2(c)(i)) minus the product of the resource's Capacity Supply Obligation (which for this purpose shall not be less than zero) and the applicable Capacity Balancing Ratio; provided, however, that for an On-Peak Demand Resource or a Seasonal Peak Demand Resource, the Capacity Supply Obligation associated with any Energy Efficiency measures shall be excluded from the calculation of the resource's Capacity Performance Score. The resulting Capacity Performance Score may be positive, zero, or negative.

#### **III.13.7.2.5 Capacity Performance Payment Rate.**

For the three Capacity Commitment Periods beginning June 1, 2018 and ending May 31, 2021, the Capacity Performance Payment Rate shall be \$2000/MWh. For the three Capacity Commitment Periods beginning June 1, 2021 and ending May 31, 2024, the Capacity Performance Payment Rate shall be \$3500/MWh. For the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2024 and ending on May 31, 2025, the Capacity Performance Payment Rate shall be \$5455/MWh. For the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2025 and ending on May 31, 2026 and thereafter, the Capacity Performance Payment Rate shall be \$9337/MWh. The ISO shall review the Capacity Performance Payment Rate in the stakeholder process as needed and shall file with the Commission a new Capacity Performance Payment Rate if and as appropriate.

#### **III.13.7.2.6 Calculation of Capacity Performance Payments.**

For each resource, whether or not it has a Capacity Supply Obligation, the ISO shall calculate a Capacity Performance Payment for each five-minute interval in which a Capacity Scarcity Condition exists in the Capacity Zone in which the resource is located. A resource's Capacity Performance Payment for an interval shall equal the resource's Capacity Performance Score for the interval multiplied by the Capacity Performance Payment Rate. The resulting Capacity Performance Payment for an interval may be positive or negative.

#### **III.13.7.3 Monthly Capacity Payment and Capacity Stop-Loss Mechanism.**

Each resource's Monthly Capacity Payment for an Obligation Month, which may be positive or negative, shall be the sum of the resource's Capacity Base Payment for the Obligation Month plus the sum of the resource's Capacity Performance Payments for all five-minute intervals in the Obligation Month, except as provided in Section III.13.7.3.1 and Section III.13.7.3.2 below.

##### **III.13.7.3.1 Monthly Stop-Loss.**

If the sum of the resource's Capacity Performance Payments (excluding any Capacity Performance Payments associated with Actual Capacity Provided above the resource's Capacity Supply Obligation in any interval) for all five-minute intervals in the Obligation Month is negative, the amount subtracted from the resource's Capacity Base Payment for the Obligation Month will be limited to an amount equal to the product of the applicable Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price multiplied by the resource's Capacity Supply Obligation for the Obligation Month (or, in the case of a resource subject to a multi-year Capacity Commitment Period election made in a Forward Capacity Auction prior to the ninth Forward Capacity Auction as described in Sections III.13.1.1.2.2.4 and III.13.1.4.1.1.2.7, the amount subtracted from the resource's Capacity Base Payment for the Obligation Month will be limited to an amount equal to the product of the applicable Capacity Clearing Price (indexed for inflation) multiplied by the resource's Capacity Supply Obligation for the Obligation Month).

##### **III.13.7.3.2 Annual Stop-Loss.**

(a) For each Obligation Month, the ISO shall calculate a stop-loss amount equal to:

$$\text{MaxCSO} \times [3 \text{ months} \times (\text{FCAcp} - \text{FCAsp}) - (12 \text{ months} \times \text{FCAcp})]$$

Where:



MaxCSO = the resource's highest monthly Capacity Supply Obligation in the Capacity Commitment Period to date.

FCACP = the Capacity Clearing Price for the relevant Forward Capacity Auction.

FCASP = the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price for the relevant Forward Capacity Auction.

(b) For each Obligation Month, the ISO shall calculate each resource's cumulative Capacity Performance Payments as the sum of the resource's Capacity Performance Payments for all months in the Capacity Commitment Period to date, with those monthly amounts limited as described in Section III.13.7.3.1.

(c) If the sum of the resource's Capacity Performance Payments (excluding any Capacity Performance Payments associated with Actual Capacity Provided above the resource's Capacity Supply Obligation in any interval) for all five-minute intervals in the Obligation Month is negative, the amount subtracted from the resource's Capacity Base Payment for the Obligation Month will be limited to an amount equal to the difference between the stop-loss amount calculated as described in Section III.13.7.3.2(a) and the resource's cumulative Capacity Performance Payments as described in Section III.13.7.3.2(b).

#### **III.13.7.4 Allocation of Deficient or Excess Capacity Performance Payments.**

For each type of Capacity Scarcity Condition as described in Section III.13.7.2.1 and for each Capacity Zone, the ISO shall allocate deficient or excess Capacity Performance Payments as described in subsections (a) and (b) below. Where more than one type of Capacity Scarcity Condition applies, then the provisions below shall be applied in proportion to the duration of each type of Capacity Scarcity Condition.

(a) If the sum of all Capacity Performance Payments to all resources subject to the Capacity Scarcity Condition in the Capacity Zone in an Obligation Month is positive, the deficiency will be charged to resources in proportion to each such resource's Capacity Supply Obligation for the Obligation Month, excluding any resources subject to the stop-loss mechanism described in Section III.13.7.3 for the Obligation Month and excluding any resource, or portion thereof, consisting of Energy Efficiency measures. If the charge described in this Section III.13.7.4(a) causes a resource to reach the stop-loss limit

described in Section III.13.7.3, then the stop-loss cap described in Section III.13.7.3 will be applied to that resource, and the remaining deficiency will be further allocated to other resources in the same manner as described in this Section III.13.7.4(a).

(b) If the sum of all Capacity Performance Payments to all resources subject to the Capacity Scarcity Condition in the Capacity Zone in an Obligation Month is negative, the excess will be credited to all such resources (excluding any resource, or portion thereof, consisting of Energy Efficiency measures) in proportion to each resource's Capacity Supply Obligation for the Obligation Month. For a resource subject to the stop-loss mechanism described in Section III.13.7.3 for the Obligation Month, any such credit shall be reduced (though not to less than zero) by the amount not charged to the resource as a result of the application of the stop-loss mechanism described in Section III.13.7.3, and the remaining excess will be further allocated to other resources in the same manner as described in this Section III.13.7.4(b)

### **III.13.7.5. Charges to Market Participants with Capacity Load Obligations.**

#### **III.13.7.5.1. Calculation of Capacity Charges Prior to June 1, 2022.**

The provisions in this subsection apply to charges associated with Capacity Commitment Periods beginning prior to June 1, 2022. A load serving entity with a Capacity Load Obligation as of the end of the Obligation Month shall be subject to a charge equal to the product of: (a) its Capacity Load Obligation in the Capacity Zone; and (b) the applicable Net Regional Clearing Price. The Net Regional Clearing Price is defined as the sum of the total payments as defined in Section III.13.7 paid to resources with Capacity Supply Obligations in the Capacity Zone (excluding any capacity payments and charges made for Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals and excluding any Capacity Performance Payments), less PER adjustments for resources in the zone as defined in Section III.13.7.1.2, and including any applicable export charges or credits as determined pursuant to Section III.13.7.1.3 divided by the sum of all Capacity Supply Obligations (excluding (i) the quantity of capacity subject to Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals and (ii) the quantity of capacity clearing as Self-Supplied FCA Resources) assumed by resources in the zone. A load serving entity satisfying its Capacity Load Obligation by a Self-Supplied FCA Resource shall not receive a credit for any PER payment for its Capacity Load Obligation so satisfied. A load serving entity with a Capacity Load Obligation as of the end of the Obligation Month may also receive a failure to cover credit equal to the product of: (a) its Capacity Load Obligation in the Capacity Zone, and; (b) the sum of all failure to cover charges in the Capacity Zone calculated pursuant to Section III.13.3.4(b), divided by total Capacity Load Obligation in the Capacity Zone.

### **III.13.7.5.1.1. Calculation of Capacity Charges On and After June 1, 2022.**

The provisions in this subsection apply to charges associated with Capacity Commitment Periods beginning on or after June 1, 2022. For purposes of this Section III.13.7.5.1.1, Capacity Zone costs calculated for a Capacity Zone that contains a nested Capacity Zone shall exclude the Capacity Zone costs of the nested Capacity Zone. A Market Participant with a Capacity Load Obligation as of the end of the Obligation Month shall be subject to the following charges and adjustments:

#### **III.13.7.5.1.1.1 Forward Capacity Auction Charge.**

The FCA charge, for each Capacity Zone, is: (a) Capacity Load Obligation in the Capacity Zone; multiplied by (b) Capacity Zone FCA Costs divided by Zonal Capacity Obligation.

Where

Capacity Zone FCA Costs, for each Capacity Zone, are the Total FCA Costs multiplied by the Zonal Peak Load Allocator and divided by the Total Peak Load Allocator.

Total FCA Costs are the sum of, for all Capacity Zones, (i) Capacity Supply Obligations in each zone (the total obligation awarded to or shed by resources in the Forward Capacity Auction process for the Obligation Month in the zone, excluding any obligations awarded to Intermittent Power Resources that are the basis for the Intermittent Power Resource Capacity Adjustment specified in Section III.13.7.5.1.1.6 and excluding any obligations procured in the Forward Capacity Auction that are terminated pursuant to Section III.13.3.4A) multiplied by the applicable clearing price from the auction in which the obligation was awarded to (or shed by) the resource, and (ii) the difference between the bid price and the substitution auction clearing price that was not included in the capacity charge pursuant to the second sentence of Section III.13.7.1.1(d). Capacity Supply Obligations awarded to Proxy De-List Bids in the primary auction, or shed by demand bids entered into the substitution auction on behalf of a Proxy De-List Bid, are excluded from Total FCA Costs.

Zonal Peak Load Allocator is the Zonal Capacity Obligation multiplied by the zonal Capacity Clearing Price.

Total Peak Load Allocator is the sum of the Zonal Peak Load Allocators.

#### **III.13.7.5.1.1.2 Annual Reconfiguration Auction Charge.**

The total annual reconfiguration auction charge, for each Capacity Zone and each associated annual reconfiguration auction, is: (a) Capacity Load Obligation in the Capacity Zone; multiplied by (b) Capacity Zone Annual Reconfiguration Auction Costs divided by Zonal Capacity Obligation.

Where

Capacity Zone Annual Reconfiguration Auction Costs, for each Capacity Zone, are the Total Annual Reconfiguration Costs multiplied by the Zonal Peak Load Allocator and divided by the Total Peak Load Allocator.

Total Annual Reconfiguration Auction Costs are the sum, for all Capacity Zones and each associated annual reconfiguration auction, of the product of the Capacity Supply Obligations acquired through the annual reconfiguration auction in each zone (adjusted for any obligations procured in the annual reconfiguration auction that are subsequently terminated pursuant to Section III.13.3.4A) and the zonal annual reconfiguration auction clearing price, minus the sum, for all Capacity Zones, of the product of the amount of any Capacity Supply Obligation shed through the annual reconfiguration auction in each zone and the applicable annual reconfiguration auction clearing price.

Zonal Peak Load Allocator is the Zonal Capacity Obligation multiplied by the zonal annual reconfiguration auction clearing price.

Total Peak Load Allocator is the sum of the Zonal Peak Load Allocators.

#### **III.13.7.5.1.1.3. Monthly Reconfiguration Auction Charge.**

The monthly reconfiguration auction charge is: (a) total Capacity Load Obligation for all Capacity Zones; multiplied by (b) Total Monthly Reconfiguration Auction Costs divided by Total Zonal Capacity Obligation.

Where

Total Monthly Reconfiguration Auction Costs are the sum of, for all Capacity Zones, the product of Capacity Supply Obligations acquired through the monthly reconfiguration auction in each zone and the applicable monthly reconfiguration auction clearing price, minus the sum of, for all Capacity Zones, any Capacity Supply Obligations shed through the monthly reconfiguration auction in each zone and the applicable monthly reconfiguration auction clearing price.

Total Zonal Capacity Obligation is the total of the Zonal Capacity Obligation in all Capacity Zones.

**III.13.7.5.1.1.4. HQICC Capacity Charge.**

The HQICC capacity charge is: (a) total Capacity Load Obligation for all Capacity Zones; multiplied by (b) Total HQICC Credits divided by Total Capacity Load Obligation.

Where

Total HQICC credits are the product of HQICCs multiplied by the sum of the values calculated in Sections III.13.7.5.1.1.1(b), III.13.7.5.1.1.2(b), III.13.7.5.1.1.3(b), III.13.7.5.1.1.6(b), III.13.7.5.1.1.7(b), III.13.7.5.1.1.8(b), and III.13.7.5.1.1.9(b) in the Capacity Zone in which the HQ Phase I/II external node is located.

Total Capacity Load Obligation is the total Capacity Load Obligation in all Capacity Zones.

**III.13.7.5.1.1.5. Self-Supply Adjustment.**

The self-supply adjustment is: (a) Capacity Load Obligation in the Capacity Zone; multiplied by (b) the Self-Supply Variance divided by Total Capacity Load Obligation.

Where

Self-Supply Variance is the difference between foregone capacity payments and avoided capacity charges associated with designated self-supply quantities.

Foregone capacity payments to Self-Supplied FCA Resources are the sum, for all Capacity Zones, of the product of the zonal Capacity Supply Obligation (excluding any obligations procured in the Forward Capacity Auction that are terminated pursuant to Section III.13.3.4A) designated as self-supply, multiplied by the applicable clearing price from the auction in which the obligation was awarded.

Avoided capacity charges are the sum, for all Capacity Zones, of the product of any designated self-supply quantities multiplied by the sum of the values calculated in Sections III.13.7.5.1.1.1(b), III.13.7.5.1.1.2(b), III.13.7.5.1.1.3(b), III.13.7.5.1.1.6(b),

III.13.7.5.1.1.7(b), III.13.7.5.1.1.8(b), and III.13.7.5.1.1.9(b) in the Capacity Zone associated with the designated self-supply quantity.

Total Capacity Load Obligation is the total Capacity Load Obligation in all Capacity Zones.

**III.13.7.5.1.1.6. Intermittent Power Resource Capacity Adjustment.**

The Intermittent Power Resource capacity adjustment in a winter season for the Obligation Months from October through May is: (a) total Capacity Load Obligation for all Capacity Zones; multiplied by (b) the Intermittent Power Resource Seasonal Variance divided by Total Zonal Capacity Obligation.

Where

Intermittent Power Resource Seasonal Variance is the difference between the FCA payments for Intermittent Power Resource in the Obligation Month and the base FCA payments for Intermittent Power Resources.

FCA payments to Intermittent Power Resources are the sum, for all Capacity Zones, of the product of the Capacity Supply Obligations awarded to or shed by Intermittent Power Resources in the Forward Capacity Auction process for the Obligation Month pursuant to Section III.13.2.7.6 or Section III.13.2.8.1.1 (excluding any obligations procured in the Forward Capacity Auction that are terminated pursuant to Section III.13.3.4A), multiplied by the applicable clearing price from the auction in which the obligation was awarded.

Base FCA payments for Intermittent Power Resources are the sum, for all Capacity Zones, of the product of the FCA Qualified Capacity procured from or shed by Intermittent Power Resources in the Forward Capacity Auction process (excluding any obligations procured in the Forward Capacity Auction that are terminated pursuant to Section III.13.3.4A), multiplied by the applicable clearing price from the auction in which the obligation was awarded.

Total Zonal Capacity Obligation is the total Capacity Load Obligation in all Capacity Zones.

**III.13.7.5.1.1.7. Multi-Year Rate Election Adjustment.**

For multi-year rate elections made in the primary Forward Capacity Auction for Capacity Commitment Periods beginning on or after June 1, 2022, the multi-year rate election adjustment, for each Capacity

Zone, is: (a) Capacity Load Obligation in the Capacity Zone; multiplied by (b) Zonal Multi-Year Rate Election Costs divided by Zonal Capacity Obligation.

Where

Zonal Multi-Year Rate Election Costs is the sum, for each resource with a multi-year rate election in the Obligation Month, of the amount of Capacity Supply Obligation designated to receive the multi-year rate (excluding any obligations procured in the Forward Capacity Auction that are terminated pursuant to Section III.13.3.4A), multiplied by the difference in the applicable zonal Capacity Clearing Price for the Forward Capacity Auction in which the resource originally was awarded a Capacity Supply Obligation (indexed using the Handy-Whitman Index of Public Utility Construction Costs in effect as of December 31 of the year preceding the Capacity Commitment Period) and the applicable zonal Capacity Clearing Price for the current Capacity Commitment Period, multiplied by the Zonal Peak Load Allocator for the Forward Capacity Auction in which the resource originally was awarded a Capacity Supply Obligation and divided by the Total Peak Load Allocator for the Forward Capacity Auction in which the resource originally was awarded a Capacity Supply Obligation.

Zonal Peak Load Allocator is the Zonal Capacity Obligation multiplied by the zonal Capacity Clearing Price.

Total Peak Load Allocator is the sum of the Zonal Peak Load Allocators.

For multi-year rate elections made in the primary Forward Capacity Auction for Capacity Commitment Periods beginning prior to June 1, 2022, the multi-year rate election adjustment, for each Capacity Zone, is: (a) Capacity Load Obligation in the Capacity Zone; multiplied by (b) Zonal Multi-Year Rate Election Costs divided by Zonal Capacity Obligation.

Where

Zonal Multi-Year Rate Election Costs is the sum in each Capacity Zone, for each resource with a multi-year rate election in the Obligation Month, of the amount of Capacity Supply Obligation designated to receive the multi-year rate (excluding any obligations procured in the Forward Capacity Auction that are terminated pursuant to Section III.13.3.4A), multiplied by the difference in the applicable zonal Capacity Clearing Price for the Forward Capacity Auction in which the resource originally was awarded a Capacity Supply Obligation (indexed using the Handy-Whitman Index of Public Utility Construction Costs in effect as of December 31 of the

year preceding the Capacity Commitment Period) and the applicable zonal Capacity Clearing Price for the current Capacity Commitment Period.

**III.13.7.5.1.1.8 CTR Transmission Upgrade Charge.**

The CTR transmission upgrade charge is: (a) the Capacity Load Obligation in the Capacity Zones to which the applicable interface limits the transfer of capacity, multiplied by (b) Zonal CTR Transmission Upgrade Cost divided by Zonal Capacity Obligation.

Where

Zonal CTR Transmission Upgrade Cost for each Capacity Zone to which the interface limits the transfer of capacity is the amount calculated pursuant to Section III.13.7.5.4.4 (f), multiplied by the Zonal Capacity Obligation and divided by the sum of the Zonal Capacity Obligation for all Capacity Zones to which the interface limits the transfer of capacity.

**III.13.7.5.1.1.9 CTR Pool-Planned Unit Charge.**

The CTR Pool-Planned Unit charge is: (a) the Capacity Load Obligation in the Capacity Zone less the amount of any CTRs specifically allocated pursuant to Section III.13.7.5.4.5, multiplied by (b) CTR Pool-Planned Unit Cost divided by Total Zonal Capacity Obligation less the amount of any CTRs specifically allocated pursuant to Section III.13.7.5.4.5.

Where

The CTR Pool-Planned Unit Cost for each Capacity Zone is the sum of the amounts calculated pursuant to Section III.13.7.5.4.5 (b).

Total Zonal Capacity Obligation is the total of the Zonal Capacity Obligation in all Capacity Zones.

**III.13.7.5.1.1.10. Failure to Cover Charge Adjustment.**

The failure to cover charge adjustment, for each Capacity Zone, is (a) Capacity Load Obligation in the Capacity Zone; multiplied by (b) Zonal Failure to Cover Charges divided by Zonal Capacity Obligation.

Where:



Zonal Failure to Cover Charges are the product of: (1) the sum, for all Capacity Zones, of the failure to cover charges calculated pursuant to Section III.13.3.4(b), and; (2) the Zonal Peak Load Allocator and divided by the Total Peak Load Allocator.

Zonal Peak Load Allocator is the Zonal Capacity Obligation multiplied by the zonal annual reconfiguration auction clearing price as determined pursuant to Section III.13.3.4.

Total Peak Load Allocator is the sum of the Zonal Peak Load Allocators.

**III.13.7.5.2. Calculation of Capacity Load Obligation and Zonal Capacity Obligation.**

The ISO shall assign each Market Participant a share of the Zonal Capacity Obligation prior to the commencement of each Obligation Month for each Capacity Zone established in the Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.4. The Zonal Capacity Obligation of a Capacity Zone that contains a nested Capacity Zone shall exclude the Zonal Capacity Obligation of the nested Capacity Zone.

Zonal Capacity Obligation for each month and Capacity Zone shall equal the product of: (i) the total of the system-wide Capacity Supply Obligations (excluding the quantity of capacity subject to Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals for Capacity Commitment Periods beginning prior to June 1, 2022 and excluding any additional obligations awarded to Intermittent Power Resources pursuant to Section III.13.2.7.6 that exceed the FCA Qualified Capacity procured in the Forward Capacity Auction for Capacity Commitment Periods beginning on or after June 1, 2022) plus HQICCs; and (ii) the ratio of the sum of all load serving entities' annual coincident contributions to the system-wide annual peak load in that Capacity Zone from the calendar year two years prior to the start of the Capacity Commitment Period (for Capacity Commitment Periods beginning prior to June 1, 2022) and from the calendar year one year prior to the start of the Capacity Commitment Period (for Capacity Commitment Periods beginning on or after June 1, 2022) to the system-wide sum of all load serving entities' annual coincident contributions to the system-wide annual peak load from the calendar year two years prior to the start of the Capacity Commitment Period (for Capacity Commitment Periods beginning prior to June 1, 2022) and from the calendar year one year prior to the start of the Capacity Commitment Period (for Capacity Commitment Periods beginning on or after June 1, 2022).

The following loads are assigned a peak contribution of zero for the purposes of assigning obligations and tracking load shifts: load associated with the receipt of electricity from the grid by Storage DARDs for later injection of electricity back to the grid; Station service load that is modeled as a discrete Load Asset and the Resource is complying with the maintenance scheduling procedures of the ISO; load that is

modeled as a discrete Load Asset and is exclusively related to an Alternative Technology Regulation Resource following AGC Dispatch Instructions; and transmission losses associated with delivery of energy over the Control Area tie lines.

A Market Participant's share of Zonal Capacity Obligation for each month and Capacity Zone shall equal the product of: (i) the Capacity Zone's Zonal Capacity Obligation as calculated above and (ii) the ratio of the sum of the load serving entity's annual coincident contributions to the system-wide annual peak load in that Capacity Zone from the calendar year prior to the start of the Capacity Commitment Period to the sum of all load serving entities' annual coincident contributions to the system-wide annual peak load in that Capacity Zone from the calendar year prior to the start of the Capacity Commitment Period.

A Market Participant's Capacity Load Obligation shall be its share of Zonal Capacity Obligation for each month and Capacity Zone, adjusted as appropriate to account for any relevant Capacity Load Obligation Bilaterals, HQICCs, and Self-Supplied FCA Resource designations. A Capacity Load Obligation can be a positive or negative value.

A Market Participant's share of Zonal Capacity Obligation will not be reconstituted to include the demand reduction of a Demand Capacity Resource or Demand Response Resource.

#### **III.13.7.5.2.1. Charges Associated with Dispatchable Asset Related Demands.**

Dispatchable Asset Related Demand resources will not receive Forward Capacity Market payments, but instead each Dispatchable Asset Related Demand resource will receive an adjustment to its share of the associated Coincident Peak Contribution based on the ability of the Dispatchable Asset Related Demand resource to reduce consumption. The adjustment to a load serving entity's Coincident Peak Contribution resulting from Dispatchable Asset Related Demand resource reduction in consumption shall be based on the Nominated Consumption Limit submitted for the Dispatchable Asset Related Demand resource.

The Nominated Consumption Limit value of each Dispatchable Asset Related Demand resource is subject to adjustment as further described in the ISO New England Manuals, including adjustments based on the results of Nominated Consumption Limit audits performed in accordance with the ISO New England Manuals.

#### **III.13.7.5.3. Excess Revenues.**

(a) For Capacity Commitment Periods beginning prior to June 1, 2022, revenues collected from load serving entities in excess of revenues paid by the ISO to resources shall be paid by the ISO to the holders of Capacity Transfer Rights, as detailed in Section III.13.7.5.3.

(b) Any payment associated with a Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral that was to accrue to a Capacity Acquiring Resource for a Capacity Supply Obligation that is terminated pursuant to Section III.13.3.4A shall instead be allocated to Market Participants based on their pro rata share of all Capacity Load Obligations in the Capacity Zone in which the terminated resource is located.

#### **III.13.7.5.4. Capacity Transfer Rights.**

##### **III.13.7.5.4.1. Definition and Payments to Holders of Capacity Transfer Rights.**

This subsection applies to Capacity Commitment Periods beginning prior to June 1, 2022.

Capacity Transfer Rights are calculated for each internal interface associated with a Capacity Zone established in the Forward Capacity Auction (as determined pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.4). Based upon results of the Forward Capacity Auction and reconfiguration auctions, the total CTR fund will be calculated as the difference between the charges to load serving entities with Capacity Load Obligations and the payments to Capacity Resources as follows: The system-wide sum of the product of each Capacity Zone's Net Regional Clearing Price and absolute value of each Capacity Zone's Capacity Load Obligations, as calculated in Section III.13.7.5.1, minus the sum of the monthly capacity payments to Capacity Resources within each zone, as adjusted for PER.

Each Capacity Zone established in the Forward Capacity Auction (as determined pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.4) will be assigned its portion of the CTR fund.

For CTRs resulting from an export constrained zone, the assignment will be calculated as the product of:

(i) the Net Regional Clearing Price for the Capacity Zone to which the applicable interface limits the transfer of capacity minus the Net Regional Clearing Price for the Capacity Zone from which the applicable interface limits the transfer of capacity; and (ii) the difference between the absolute value of the total Capacity Supply Obligations obtained in the exporting Capacity Zone, adjusted for Capacity Supply Obligations associated with Self-Supplied FCA Resources, and the absolute value of the total Capacity Load Obligations in the exporting Capacity Zone.

For CTRs resulting from an import constrained zone, the assignment will be calculated as the product of:

(i) the Net Regional Clearing Price for the Capacity Zone to which the applicable interface limits the transfer of capacity minus the Net Regional Clearing Price for the absolute value of the Capacity Zone from which the applicable interface limits the transfer of capacity; and (ii) the difference between absolute value of the total Capacity Load Obligations in the importing Capacity Zone and the total Capacity Supply Obligations obtained in the importing Capacity Zone, adjusted for Capacity Supply Obligations associated with Self-Supplied FCA Resources.

#### **III.13.7.5.4.2. Allocation of Capacity Transfer Rights.**

This subsection applies to Capacity Commitment Periods beginning prior to June 1, 2022.

For Capacity Zones established in the Forward Capacity Auction as determined pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.4, the CTR fund shall be allocated among load serving entities using their Capacity Load Obligation (net of HQICCs) described in Section III.13.7.5.1. Market Participants with CTRs specifically allocated under Section III.13.7.5.3.6 will have their specifically allocated CTR MWs netted from their Capacity Load Obligation used to establish their share of the CTR fund.

(a) **Connecticut Import Interface.** The allocation of the CTR fund associated with the Connecticut Import Interface shall be made to load serving entities based on their Capacity Load Obligation in the Connecticut Capacity Zone.

(b) **NEMA/Boston Import Interface.** Except as provided in Section III.13.7.5.3.6 of Market Rule 1, the allocation of the CTR fund associated with the NEMA/Boston Import Interface shall be made to load serving entities based on their Capacity Load Obligation in the NEMA/Boston Capacity Zone.

#### **III.13.7.5.4.3. Allocations of CTRs Resulting From Revised Capacity Zones.**

This subsection applies to Capacity Commitment Periods beginning prior to June 1, 2022.

The portion of the CTR fund associated with revised definitions of Capacity Zones shall be fully allocated to load serving entities after deducting the value of applicable CTRs that have been specifically allocated. Allocations of the CTR fund among load serving entities will be made using their Capacity Load Obligations (net of HQICCs) as described in Section III.13.7.5.3.1. Market Participants with CTRs specifically allocated under Section III.13.7.5.3.6 will have their specifically allocated CTR MWs netted from the Capacity Load Obligation used to establish their share of the CTR fund.

(a) **Import Constraints.** The allocation of the CTR fund associated with newly defined import-constrained Capacity Zones restricting the transfer of capacity into a single adjacent import-constrained Capacity Zone shall be allocated to load serving entities with Capacity Load Obligations in that import-constrained Capacity Zone.

(b) **Export Constraints.** The allocation of the CTR fund associated with newly defined export-constrained Capacity Zones shall be allocated to load serving entities with Capacity Load Obligations on the import-constrained side of the interface.

**III.13.7.5.4.4. Specifically Allocated CTRs Associated with Transmission Upgrades.**

(a) A Market Participant that pays for transmission upgrades not funded through the Pool PTF Rate and which increase transfer capability across existing or potential Capacity Zone interfaces may request a specifically allocated CTR in an amount equal to the number of CTRs supported by that increase in transfer capability.

(b) The allocation of additional CTRs created through generator interconnections completed after February 1, 2009 shall be made in accordance with the provisions of the ISO generator interconnection or planning standards. In the event the ISO interconnection or planning standards do not address this issue, the CTRs created shall be allocated in the same manner as described in Section III.13.7.5.4.2.

(c) Specifically allocated CTRs shall expire when the Market Participant ceases to pay to support the transmission upgrades.

(d) CTRs resulting from transmission upgrades funded through the Pool PTF Rate shall not be specifically allocated but shall be allocated in the same manner as described in Section III.13.7.5.4.2.

(e) **Maine Export Interface.** Casco Bay shall receive specifically allocated CTRs of 325 MW across the Maine export interface for as long as Casco Bay continues to pay to support the transmission upgrades.

(f) The value of CTRs specifically allocated pursuant to this Section shall be calculated as the product of: (i) the Capacity Clearing Price to which the applicable interface limits the transfer of capacity

minus the Capacity Clearing Price from which the applicable interface limits the transfer of capacity; and  
(ii) the MW quantity of the specifically allocated CTRs across the applicable interface.

**III.13.7.5.4.5. Specifically Allocated CTRs for Pool-Planned Units.**

(a) In import-constrained Capacity Zones, in recognition of longstanding life of unit contracts, the municipal utility entitlement holder of a resource constructed as Pool-Planned Units shall receive an initial allocation of CTRs equal to the most recent seasonal claimed capability of the ownership entitlements in such unit, adjusted for any designated self-supply quantities as described in Section III.13.1.6.2. Municipal utility entitlements are set as shown in the table below and are not transferrable.

Millstone 3		Seabrook	Stonybrook GT 1A	Stonybrook GT 1B	Stonybrook GT 1C	Stonybrook 2A	Stonybrook 2B	Wyman 4	Summer (MW)	Winter (MW)
Nominal Summer (MW)	1155.001	1244.275	104.000	100.000	104.000	67.400	65.300	586.725		
Nominal Winter (MW)	1155.481	1244.275	119.000	116.000	119.000	87.400	85.300	608.575		
Danvers	0.2627%	1.1124%	8.4569%	8.4569%	8.4569%	11.5551%	11.5551%	0.0000%	58.26	63.73
Georgetown	0.0208%	0.0956%	0.7356%	0.7356%	0.7356%	1.0144%	1.0144%	0.0000%	5.04	5.55
Ipswich	0.0608%	0.1066%	0.2934%	0.2934%	0.2934%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	2.93	2.37
Marblehead	0.1544%	0.1351%	2.6840%	2.6840%	2.6840%	1.5980%	1.5980%	0.2793%	15.49	15.64
Middleton	0.0440%	0.3282%	0.8776%	0.8776%	0.8776%	1.8916%	1.8916%	0.1012%	10.40	11.07
Peabody	0.2969%	1.1300%	13.0520%	13.0520%	13.0520%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	57.69	60.26
Reading	0.4041%	0.6351%	14.4530%	14.4530%	14.4530%	19.5163%	19.5163%	0.0000%	82.98	92.77
Wakefield	0.2055%	0.3870%	3.9929%	3.9929%	3.9929%	6.3791%	6.3791%	0.4398%	30.53	32.64
Ashburnham	0.0307%	0.0652%	0.6922%	0.6922%	0.6922%	0.9285%	0.9285%	0.0000%	4.53	5.22
Boylston	0.0264%	0.0849%	0.5933%	0.5933%	0.5933%	0.9120%	0.9120%	0.0522%	4.71	5.35
Braintree	0.0000%	0.6134%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	7.63	7.63
Groton	0.0254%	0.1288%	0.8034%	0.8034%	0.8034%	1.0832%	1.0832%	0.0000%	5.81	6.61
Hingham	0.1007%	0.4740%	3.9815%	3.9815%	3.9815%	5.3307%	5.3307%	0.0000%	26.40	30.36
Holden	0.0726%	0.3971%	2.2670%	2.2670%	2.2670%	3.1984%	3.1984%	0.0000%	17.01	19.33
Holyoke	0.3194%	0.3096%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	2.8342%	2.8342%	0.6882%	15.34	16.63

Hudson	0.1056%	1.6745%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.3395%	24.05	24.12
Hull	0.0380%	0.1650%	1.4848%	1.4848%	1.4848%	2.1793%	2.1793%	0.1262%	10.70	12.28
Littleton	0.0536%	0.1093%	1.5115%	1.5115%	1.5115%	3.0607%	3.0607%	0.1666%	11.67	13.63
Mansfield	0.1581%	0.7902%	5.0951%	5.0951%	5.0951%	7.2217%	7.2217%	0.0000%	36.93	42.17
Middleborough	0.1128%	0.5034%	2.0657%	2.0657%	2.0657%	4.9518%	4.9518%	0.1667%	21.48	24.45
North Attleborough	0.1744%	0.3781%	3.2277%	3.2277%	3.2277%	5.9838%	5.9838%	0.1666%	25.58	29.49
Pascoag	0.0000%	0.1068%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	1.33	1.33
Paxton	0.0326%	0.0808%	0.6860%	0.6860%	0.6860%	0.9979%	0.9979%	0.0000%	4.82	5.53
Shrewsbury	0.2323%	0.5756%	3.9105%	3.9105%	3.9105%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.4168%	24.33	26.23
South Hadley	0.5755%	0.3412%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	10.89	10.90
Sterling	0.0294%	0.2044%	0.7336%	0.7336%	0.7336%	1.1014%	1.1014%	0.0000%	6.60	7.38
Taunton	0.0000%	0.1003%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	1.25	1.25
Templeton	0.0700%	0.1926%	1.3941%	1.3941%	1.3941%	2.3894%	2.3894%	0.0000%	10.67	12.27
Vermont Public Power Supply Authority	0.0000%	0.0000%	2.2008%	2.2008%	2.2008%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0330%	6.97	7.99
West Boylston	0.0792%	0.1814%	1.2829%	1.2829%	1.2829%	2.3041%	2.3041%	0.0000%	10.18	11.69
Westfield	1.1131%	0.3645%	9.0452%	9.0452%	9.0452%	13.5684%	13.5684%	0.7257%	67.51	77.27



This allocation of CTRs shall expire on December 31, 2040. If a resource listed in the table above retires prior to December 31, 2040, however, its allocation of CTRs shall expire upon retirement. In the event that the NEMA zone either becomes or is forecast to become a separate zone for Forward Capacity Auction purposes, National Grid agrees to discuss with Massachusetts Municipal Wholesale Electric Company ("MMWEC") and Wellesley Municipal Light Plant, Reading Municipal Light Plant and Concord Municipal Light Plant ("WRC") any proposal by National Grid to develop cost effective transmission improvements that would mitigate or alleviate the import constraints and to work cooperatively and in good faith with MMWEC and WRC regarding any such proposal. MMWEC and WRC agree to support any proposals advanced by National Grid in the regional system planning process to construct any such transmission improvements, provided that MMWEC and WRC determine that the proposed improvements are cost effective (without regard to CTRs) and will mitigate or alleviate the import constraints.

(b) The value of CTRs specifically allocated pursuant to this Section shall be calculated as the product of: (i) the Capacity Clearing Price for the Capacity Zone where the load of the municipal utility entitlement holder is located minus the Capacity Clearing Price for the Capacity Zone in which the Pool-Planned Unit is located, and; (ii) the MW quantity of the specifically allocated CTRs.

#### **III.13.7.5.5. Forward Capacity Market Net Charge Amount.**

The Forward Capacity Market net charge amount for each Market Participant as of the end of the Obligation Month shall be equal to the sum of: (a) its Capacity Load Obligation charges; (b) its revenues from any applicable specifically allocated CTRs; (c) its share of the CTR fund (for Capacity Commitment Periods beginning prior to June 1, 2022); and (d) any applicable export charges.

### **III.13.8. Reporting and Price Finality**

#### **III.13.8.1. Filing of Certain Determinations Made By the ISO Prior to the Forward Capacity Auction and Challenges Thereto.**

(a) For each Forward Capacity Auction, no later than 20 Business Days after the issuance of retirement determination notifications described in Section III.13.1.2.4(a), the ISO shall make a filing with the Commission pursuant to Section 205 of the Federal Power Act describing the Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids established pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2. The ISO will file the following information confidentially: the determinations made by the Internal Market Monitor with respect to each Permanent De-List Bid and Retirement De-List Bid, and supporting documentation for each such determination. The confidential filing shall indicate those resources that will permanently de-list or retire prior to the Forward Capacity Auction and those Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids for which a Lead Market Participant has made an election pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1.

(b) The Forward Capacity Auction shall be conducted using the determinations as approved by the Commission (unless the Commission directs otherwise), and challenges to Capacity Clearing Prices resulting from the Forward Capacity Auction shall be reviewed in accordance with the provisions of Section III.13.8.2(c).

(c) For each Forward Capacity Auction, no later than 90 days prior to the first day of the auction, the ISO shall make an informational filing with the Commission detailing the following determinations made by the ISO with respect to that Forward Capacity Auction, and providing supporting documentation for each such determination, provided, however, that the determinations in subsections (vi), (vii), ~~and (viii)~~, and (ix) below shall be filed confidentially with the Commission in the informational filing, except determinations on which new resources have been rejected due to overlapping interconnection impacts (the determinations in subsections (vi), (vii), ~~and (viii)~~, and (ix) shall be published by the ISO no later than 15 days after the Forward Capacity Auction), with the exception of ~~de-list bid price and offer~~ price information and submitted Load-Side Relationship Certifications, which shall remain confidential):

(i) which Capacity Zones shall be modeled in the Forward Capacity Auction;

(ii) the transmission interface limits as determined pursuant to Section III.12.5;

(iii) which existing and proposed transmission lines the ISO determines will be in service by the start of the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction;

(iv) the expected amount of installed capacity in each modeled Capacity Zone during the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction, and the Local Sourcing Requirement for each modeled import-constrained Capacity Zone and the Maximum Capacity Limit for each modeled export-constrained Capacity Zone;

(v) for each resource that submitted a Load-Side Relationship Certification, the following information: the resource technology type; which qualifying circumstance in Section III.A.21.1.3 was asserted in the Load-Side Relationship Certification; the relevant state policy asserted in the Load-Side Relationship Certification, if any; whether the ISO accepted or rejected the Load-Side Relationship Certification; and, consequently, whether the resource was subject to a review for the exercise of buyer-side market power~~reserved~~;

(vi) which new resources are accepted and rejected in the qualification process to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction;

(vii) which new resources were not reviewed for an exercise of buyer-side market power because of one of the conditions described in Sections III.A.21.1.1, III.A.21.1.2, or III.A.21.1.3; the condition met by each such resource; and, for new resources that submitted a Load-Side Relationship Certification, the Load-Side Relationship Certification submitted by the resource;

(viii) the Internal Market Monitor's determinations ~~regarding each requested offer price from made as part of any buyer-side market power review conducted pursuant to Section III.A.21.2 and any New Resource Offer Floor Price determinations made pursuant to Section III.A.21.3 with regard to a new resource, and the basis for any such determinations submitted pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.2.3 or Section III.13.1.4.1.1.2.8, including information regarding each of the elements considered in the Internal Market Monitor's determination of expected net revenues (other than revenues from ISO-administered markets) and whether that element was included or excluded in the determination of whether the offer is consistent with the resource's long-run average costs net of expected net revenues other than capacity revenues; for the avoidance of doubt, any information employed by the Internal Market Monitor in making these determinations related to the potential impact of a New Capacity Resource's offer on Capacity Clearing Prices, including~~

any such information filed by the ISO in response to a pleading filed with the Commission, shall be filed confidentially and shall not be released to any entity, including to the Project Sponsor whose offer is the subject of dispute;

~~(ixviii)~~ the Internal Market Monitor's determinations regarding offers or Static De-List Bids, Export Bids, and Administrative De-List Bids submitted during the qualification process made according to the provisions of this Section III.13, including an explanation of the Internal Market Monitor-determined prices established for any Static De-List Bids, Export Bids, and Administrative De-List Bids as described in Section III.13.1.2.3.2 based on the Internal Market Monitor review and the resource's net going forward costs, reasonable expectations about the resource's Capacity Performance Payments, reasonable risk premium assumptions, and reasonable opportunity costs as determined by the Internal Market Monitor. The filing shall identify to the extent possible the components of the bid which were accepted as justified, and shall also identify to the extent possible the components of the bid which were not justified and which resulted in the Internal Market Monitor establishing an Internal Market Monitor-determined price for the bid;

~~(ix)~~ which existing resources are qualified to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction (this information will include resource type, capacity zone, and qualified MW); and

~~(xi)~~ aggregate MW from new resources qualified to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction and aggregate de-list bid amounts; ~~and~~

~~(xi) — aggregate quantity of supply offers and demand bids qualified to participate in the substitution auction.~~

(d) Any comments or challenges to the determinations contained in the informational filing described in Section III.13.8.1(c) or in the qualification determination notifications described in Sections III.13.1.1.2.8, III.13.1.2.4(b) and III.13.1.3.5.7 must be filed with the Commission no later than 15 days after the ISO's submission of the informational filing. If the Commission does not issue an order within 75 days after the ISO's submission of the informational filing that directs otherwise, the determinations contained in the informational filing shall be used in conducting the Forward Capacity Auction, and challenges to Capacity Clearing Prices resulting from the Forward Capacity Auction shall be reviewed in accordance with the provisions of Section III.13.8.2(c). If within 75 days after the ISO's submission of

the informational filing, the Commission does issue an order modifying one or more of the ISO's determinations, then the Forward Capacity Auction shall be conducted no earlier than 15 days following that order using the determinations as modified by the Commission (unless the Commission directs otherwise), and challenges to Capacity Clearing Prices resulting from the Forward Capacity Auction shall be reviewed in accordance with the provisions of Section III.13.8.2(c).

**III.13.8.2. Filing of Forward Capacity Auction Results and Challenges Thereto.**

(a) As soon as practicable after the Forward Capacity Auction is complete, the ISO shall file the results of that Forward Capacity Auction with the Commission pursuant to Section 205 of the Federal Power Act, including the final set of Capacity Zones resulting from the auction, the Capacity Clearing Price in each of those Capacity Zones (and the Capacity Clearing Price associated with certain imports pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.3(d), if applicable), the substitution auction clearing prices and the total amount of payments associated with any demand bids cleared at a substitution auction clearing price above their demand bid prices, and a list of which resources received Capacity Supply Obligations in each Capacity Zone and the amount of those Capacity Supply Obligations. Upon completion of the fourth and future auctions, such list of resources that receive Capacity Supply Obligation shall also specify which resources cleared as Conditional Qualified New Resources. Upon completion of the fourth and future auctions, the filing shall also list each Long Lead Time Facility, as defined in Schedule 22 or Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff, that secured a Queue Position to participate as a New Generating Capacity Resource in the Forward Capacity Auction and each resource with lower queue priority that was selected in the Forward Capacity Auction subject to a Long Lead Time Facility with the higher queue priority. The filing shall also enumerate de-list bids rejected for reliability reasons pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5, and the reasons for those rejections.

(b) The filing of Forward Capacity Auction results made pursuant to this Section III.13.8.2 shall also include documentation regarding the competitiveness of the Forward Capacity Auction, which may include a certification from the auctioneer and the ISO that: (i) all entities offering and bidding in the Forward Capacity Auction were properly qualified in accordance with the provisions of Section III.13.1; and (ii) the Forward Capacity Auction was conducted in accordance with the provisions of Section III.13.

(c) Any objection to the Forward Capacity Auction results must be filed with the Commission within 45 days after the ISO's filing of the Forward Capacity Auction results. The filing of a timely objection with the Commission will be the exclusive means of challenging the Forward Capacity Auction results.

(d) Any change to the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff affecting the Forward Capacity Market or the Forward Capacity Auction that is filed after the results of a Forward Capacity Auction have been accepted or approved by the Commission shall not affect those Forward Capacity Auction results.

## **APPENDIX A**

### **MARKET MONITORING, REPORTING AND MARKET POWER MITIGATION**

## **APPENDIX A**

### **MARKET MONITORING, REPORTING AND MARKET POWER MITIGATION**

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## **MARKET MONITORING, REPORTING AND MARKET POWER MITIGATION**

### **III.A.1. Introduction and Purpose; Structure and Oversight: Independence.**

#### **III.A.1.1. Mission Statement.**

The mission of the Internal Market Monitor and External Market Monitor shall be (1) to protect both consumers and Market Participants by the identification and reporting of market design flaws and market power abuses; (2) to evaluate existing and proposed market rules, tariff provisions and market design elements to remove or prevent market design flaws and recommend proposed rule and tariff changes to the ISO; (3) to review and report on the performance of the New England Markets; (4) to identify and notify the Commission of instances in which a Market Participant's behavior, or that of the ISO, may require investigation; and (5) to carry out the mitigation functions set forth in this *Appendix A*.

#### **III.A.1.2. Structure and Oversight.**

The market monitoring and mitigation functions contained in this *Appendix A* shall be performed by the Internal Market Monitor, which shall report to the ISO Board of Directors and, for administrative purposes only, to the ISO Chief Executive Officer, and by an External Market Monitor selected by and reporting to the ISO Board of Directors. Members of the ISO Board of Directors who also perform management functions for the ISO shall be excluded from oversight and governance of the Internal Market Monitor and External Market Monitor. The ISO shall enter into a contract with the External Market Monitor addressing the roles and responsibilities of the External Market Monitor as detailed in this *Appendix A*. The ISO shall file its contract with the External Market Monitor with the Commission. In order to facilitate the performance of the External Market Monitor's functions, the External Market Monitor shall have, and the ISO's contract with the External Market Monitor shall provide for, access by the External Market Monitor to ISO data and personnel, including ISO management responsible for market monitoring, operations and billing and settlement functions. Any proposed termination of the contract with the External Market Monitor or modification of, or other limitation on, the External Market Monitor's scope of work shall be subject to prior Commission approval.

#### **III.A.1.3. Data Access and Information Sharing.**

The ISO shall provide the Internal Market Monitor and External Market Monitor with access to all market data, resources and personnel sufficient to enable the Internal Market Monitor and External Market Monitor to perform the market monitoring and mitigation functions provided for in this *Appendix A*.

This access shall include access to any confidential market information that the ISO receives from another independent system operator or regional transmission organization subject to the Commission's jurisdiction, or its market monitor, as part of an investigation to determine (a) if a Market Violation is occurring or has occurred, (b) if market power is being or has been exercised, or (c) if a market design flaw exists. In addition, the Internal Market Monitor and External Market Monitor shall have full access to the ISO's electronically generated information and databases and shall have exclusive control over any data created by the Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor. The Internal Market Monitor and External Market Monitor may share any data created by it with the ISO, which shall maintain the confidentiality of such data in accordance with the terms of the ISO New England Information Policy.

#### **III.A.1.4. Interpretation.**

In the event that any provision of any ISO New England Filed Document is inconsistent with the provisions of this *Appendix A*, the provisions of *Appendix A* shall control. Notwithstanding the foregoing, Sections III.A.1.2, III.A.2.2 (a)-(c), (e)-(h), Section III.A.2.3 (a)-(g), (i), (n) and Section III.A.17.3 are also part of the Participants Agreement and cannot be modified in either *Appendix A* or the Participants Agreement without a corresponding modification at the same time to the same language in the other document.

#### **III.A.1.5. Definitions.**

Capitalized terms not defined in this *Appendix A* are defined in the definitions section of Section I of the Tariff.

#### **III.A.2. Functions of the Market Monitor.**

##### **III.A.2.1. Core Functions of the Internal Market Monitor and External Market Monitor.**

The Internal Market Monitor and External Market Monitor will perform the following core functions:

- (a) Evaluate existing and proposed market rules, tariff provisions and market design elements, and recommend proposed rule and tariff changes to the ISO, the Commission, Market Participants, public utility commissioners of the six New England states, and to other interested entities, with the understanding that the Internal Market Monitor and External Market Monitor are not to effectuate any proposed market designs (except as specifically provided in Section III.A.2.4.4, Section III.A.9 and Section III.A.10 of this *Appendix A*). In the event the Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor believes broader dissemination could lead to exploitation, it shall limit distribution of its



identifications and recommendations to the ISO and to the Commission, with an explanation of why broader dissemination should be avoided at that time. Nothing in this Section III.A.2.1 (a) shall prohibit or restrict the Internal Market Monitor and External Market Monitor from implementing Commission accepted rule and tariff provisions regarding market monitoring or mitigation functions that, according to the terms of the applicable rule or tariff language, are to be performed by the Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor.

- (b) Review and report on the performance of the New England Markets to the ISO, the Commission, Market Participants, the public utility commissioners of the six New England states, and to other interested entities.
- (c) Identify and notify the Commission's Office of Enforcement of instances in which a Market Participant's behavior, or that of the ISO, may require investigation, including suspected tariff violations, suspected violations of Commission-approved rules and regulations, suspected market manipulation, and inappropriate dispatch that creates substantial concerns regarding unnecessary market inefficiencies.

### **III.A.2.2. Functions of the External Market Monitor.**

To accomplish the functions specified in Section III.A.2.1 of this *Appendix A*, the External Market Monitor shall perform the following functions:

- (a) Review the competitiveness of the New England Markets, the impact that the market rules and/or changes to the market rules will have on the New England Markets and the impact that the ISO's actions have had on the New England Markets. In the event that the External Market Monitor uncovers problems with the New England Markets, the External Market Monitor shall promptly inform the Commission, the Commission's Office of Energy Market Regulation staff, the ISO Board of Directors, the public utility commissions for each of the six New England states, and the Market Participants of its findings in accordance with the procedures outlined in Sections III.A.19 and III.A.20 of this *Appendix A*, provided that in the case of Market Participants and the public utility commissions, information in such findings shall be redacted as necessary to comply with the ISO New England Information Policy. Notwithstanding the foregoing, in the event the External Market Monitor believes broader dissemination could lead to exploitation, it shall limit distribution of its identifications to the ISO and to the Commission, with an explanation of why broader dissemination should be avoided at that time.
- (b) Perform independent evaluations and prepare annual and ad hoc reports on the overall competitiveness and efficiency of the New England Markets or particular aspects of the New England

Markets, including the adequacy of this *Appendix A*, in accordance with the provisions of Section III.A.17 of this *Appendix A*.

- (c) Conduct evaluations and prepare reports on its own initiative or at the request of others.
- (d) Monitor and review the quality and appropriateness of the mitigation conducted by the Internal Market Monitor. In the event that the External Market Monitor discovers problems with the quality or appropriateness of such mitigation, the External Market Monitor shall promptly inform the Commission, the Commission's Office of Energy Market Regulation staff, the ISO Board of Directors, the public utility commissions for each of the six New England states, and the Market Participants of its findings in accordance with the procedures outlined in Sections III.A.19 and/or III.A.20 of this *Appendix A*, provided that in the case of Market Participants and the public utility commissions, information in such findings shall be redacted as necessary to comply with the ISO New England Information Policy. Notwithstanding the foregoing, in the event the External Market Monitor believes broader dissemination could lead to exploitation, it shall limit distribution of its identifications to the ISO and to the Commission, with an explanation of why broader dissemination should be avoided at that time.
- (e) Prepare recommendations to the ISO Board of Directors and the Market Participants on how to improve the overall competitiveness and efficiency of the New England Markets or particular aspects of the New England Markets, including improvements to this *Appendix A*.
- (f) Recommend actions to the ISO Board of Directors and the Market Participants to increase liquidity and efficient trade between regions and improve the efficiency of the New England Markets.
- (g) Review the ISO's filings with the Commission from the standpoint of the effects of any such filing on the competitiveness and efficiency of the New England Markets. The External Market Monitor will have the opportunity to comment on any filings under development by the ISO and may file comments with the Commission when the filings are made by the ISO. The subject of any such comments will be the External Market Monitor's assessment of the effects of any proposed filing on the competitiveness and efficiency of the New England Markets, or the effectiveness of this *Appendix A*, as appropriate.
- (h) Provide information to be directly included in the monthly market updates that are provided at the meetings of the Market Participants.

### **III.A.2.3. Functions of the Internal Market Monitor.**

To accomplish the functions specified in Section III.A.2.1 of this *Appendix A*, the Internal Market Monitor shall perform the following functions:

- (a) Maintain **Appendix A** and consider whether **Appendix A** requires amendment. Any amendments deemed to be necessary by the Internal Market Monitor shall be undertaken after consultation with Market Participants in accordance with Section 11 of the Participants Agreement.
- (b) Perform the day-to-day, real-time review of market behavior in accordance with the provisions of this **Appendix A**.
- (c) Consult with the External Market Monitor, as needed, with respect to implementing and applying the provisions of this **Appendix A**.
- (d) Identify and notify the Commission's Office of Enforcement staff of instances in which a Market Participant's behavior, or that of the ISO, may require investigation, including suspected Tariff violations, suspected violations of Commission-approved rules and regulations, suspected market manipulation, and inappropriate dispatch that creates substantial concerns regarding unnecessary market inefficiencies, in accordance with the procedures outlined in Section III.A.19 of this **Appendix A**.
- (e) Review the competitiveness of the New England Markets, the impact that the market rules and/or changes to the market rules will have on the New England Markets and the impact that ISO's actions have had on the New England Markets. In the event that the Internal Market Monitor uncovers problems with the New England Markets, the Internal Market Monitor shall promptly inform the Commission, the Commission's Office of Energy Market Regulation staff, the ISO Board of Directors, the public utility commissions for each of the six New England states, and the Market Participants of its findings in accordance with the procedures outlined in Sections III.A.19 and III.A.20 of this **Appendix A**, provided that in the case of Market Participants and the public utility commissions, information in such findings shall be redacted as necessary to comply with the ISO New England Information Policy. Notwithstanding the foregoing, in the event the Internal Market Monitor believes broader dissemination could lead to exploitation, it shall limit distribution of its identifications to the ISO and to the Commission, with an explanation of why broader dissemination should be avoided at that time.
- (f) Provide support and information to the ISO Board of Directors and the External Market Monitor consistent with the Internal Market Monitor's functions.
- (g) Prepare an annual state of the market report on market trends and the performance of the New England Markets, as well as less extensive quarterly reports, in accordance with the provisions of Section III.A.17 of this **Appendix A**.
- (h) Make one or more of the Internal Market Monitor staff members available for regular conference calls, which may be attended, telephonically or in person, by Commission and state commission staff, by representatives of the ISO, and by Market Participants. The information to be provided in the

Internal Market Monitor conference calls is generally to consist of a review of market data and analyses of the type regularly gathered and prepared by the Internal Market Monitor in the course of its business, subject to appropriate confidentiality restrictions. This function may be performed through making a staff member of the Internal Market Monitor available for the monthly meetings of the Market Participants and inviting Commission staff and the staff of state public utility commissions to those monthly meetings.

- (i) Be primarily responsible for interaction with external Control Areas, the Commission, other regulators and Market Participants with respect to the matters addressed in this **Appendix A**.
- (j) Monitor for conduct whether by a single Market Participant or by multiple Market Participants acting in concert, including actions involving more than one Resource, that may cause a material effect on prices or other payments in the New England Markets if exercised from a position of market power, and impose appropriate mitigation measures if such conduct is detected and the other applicable conditions for the imposition of mitigation measures as set forth in this **Appendix A** are met. The categories of conduct for which the Internal Market Monitor shall perform monitoring for potential mitigation are:

- (i) *Economic withholding*, that is, submitting a Supply Offer for a Resource that is unjustifiably high and violates the economic withholding criteria set forth in Section III.A.5 so that (i) the Resource is not or will not be dispatched or scheduled, or (ii) the bid or offer will set an unjustifiably high market clearing price.
- (ii) *Uneconomic production from a Resource*, that is, increasing the output of a Resource to levels that would otherwise be uneconomic, absent an order of the ISO, in order to cause, and obtain benefits from, a transmission constraint.
- (iii) *Anti-competitive Increment Offers and Decrement Bids*, which are bidding practices relating to Increment Offers and Decrement Bids that cause Day-Ahead LMPs not to achieve the degree of convergence with Real-Time LMPs that would be expected in a workably competitive market, more fully addressed in Section III.A.11 of this **Appendix A**.
- (iv) *Anti-competitive Demand Bids*, which are addressed in Section III.A.10 of this **Appendix A**.
- (v) Other categories of conduct that have material effects on prices or NCPC payments in the New England Markets. The Internal Market Monitor, in consultation with the External Market Monitor, shall; (i) seek to amend **Appendix A** as may be appropriate to include any such conduct that would substantially distort or impair the competitiveness of any of

the New England Markets; and (ii) seek such other authorization to mitigate the effects of such conduct from the Commission as may be appropriate.

(k) Perform such additional monitoring as the Internal Market Monitor deems necessary, including without limitation, monitoring for:

- (i) Anti-competitive gaming of Resources;
- (ii) Conduct and market outcomes that are inconsistent with competitive markets;
- (iii) Flaws in market design or software or in the implementation of rules by the ISO that create inefficient incentives or market outcomes;
- (iv) Actions in one market that affect price in another market;
- (v) Other aspects of market implementation that prevent competitive market results, the extent to which market rules, including this *Appendix A*, interfere with efficient market operation, both short-run and long-run; and
- (vi) Rules or conduct that creates barriers to entry into a market.

The Internal Market Monitor will include significant results of such monitoring in its reports under Section III.A.17 of this *Appendix A*. Monitoring under this Section III.A.2.3(k) cannot serve as a basis for mitigation under III.A.11 of this *Appendix A*. If the Internal Market Monitor concludes as a result of its monitoring that additional specific monitoring thresholds or mitigation remedies are necessary, it may proceed under Section III.A.20.

- (l) Propose to the ISO and Market Participants appropriate mitigation measures or market rule changes for conduct that departs significantly from the conduct that would be expected under competitive market conditions but does not rise to the thresholds specified in Sections III.A.5, III.A.10, or III.A.11. In considering whether to recommend such changes, the Internal Market Monitor shall evaluate whether the conduct has a significant effect on market prices or NCPC payments as specified below. The Internal Market Monitor will not recommend changes if it determines, from information provided by Market Participants (or parties that would be subject to mitigation) or from other information available to the Internal Market Monitor, that the conduct and associated price or NCPC payments under investigation are attributable to legitimate competitive market forces or incentives.
- (m) Evaluate physical withholding of Supply Offers in accordance with Section III.A.4 below for referral to the Commission.

- (n) If and when established, participate in a committee of regional market monitors to review issues associated with interregional transactions, including any barriers to efficient trade and competition.

#### **III.A.2.4. Overview of the Internal Market Monitor's Mitigation Functions.**

##### **III.A.2.4.1. Purpose.**

The mitigation measures set forth in this *Appendix A* for mitigation of market power are intended to provide the means for the Internal Market Monitor to mitigate the market effects of any actions or transactions that are without a legitimate business purpose and that are intended to or foreseeably could manipulate market prices, market conditions, or market rules for electric energy or electricity products. Actions or transactions undertaken by a Market Participant that are explicitly contemplated in Market Rule 1 (such as virtual supply or load bidding) or taken at the direction of the ISO are not in violation of this *Appendix A*. These mitigation measures are intended to minimize interference with open and competitive markets, and thus to permit to the maximum extent practicable, price levels to be determined by competitive forces under the prevailing market conditions. To that end, the mitigation measures authorize the mitigation of only specific conduct that exceeds well-defined thresholds specified below. When implemented, mitigation measures affecting the LMP or clearing prices in other markets will be applied *ex ante*. Nothing in this *Appendix A*, including the application of a mitigation measure, shall be deemed to be a limitation of the ISO's authority to evaluate Market Participant behavior for potential referral under Section III.A.19.

##### **III.A.2.4.2. Conditions for the Imposition of Mitigation.**

- (a) Imposing Mitigation. To achieve the foregoing purpose and objectives, mitigation measures are imposed pursuant to Sections III.A.5, III.A.10, and III.A.11 below.

##### **III.A.2.4.3. Applicability.**

Mitigation measures may be applied to Supply Offers, Increment Offers, Demand Bids, and Decrement Bids, as well as to the scheduling or operation of a generation unit or transmission facility.

##### **III.A.2.4.4. Mitigation Not Provided for Under This *Appendix A*.**

The Internal Market Monitor shall monitor the New England Markets for conduct that it determines constitutes an abuse of market power but does not trigger the thresholds specified below for the imposition of mitigation measures by the Internal Market Monitor. If the Internal Market Monitor identifies any such conduct, and in particular conduct exceeding the thresholds specified in this *Appendix A*, it may make a filing under §205 of the Federal Power Act (“§205”) with the Commission requesting authorization to apply appropriate mitigation measures. Any such filing shall identify the particular conduct the Internal Market Monitor believes warrants mitigation, shall propose a specific mitigation measure for the conduct, and shall set forth the Internal Market Monitor’s justification for imposing that mitigation measure.

**III.A.2.4.5. Duration of Mitigation.**

Any mitigation measure imposed on a specific Market Participant, as specified below, shall expire not later than six months after the occurrence of the conduct giving rise to the measure, or at such earlier time as may be specified by the Internal Market Monitor or as otherwise provided in this *Appendix A*.

**III.A.3. Consultation Prior to Determination of Reference Levels for Physical and Financial Parameters of Resources; Fuel Price Adjustments.**

Upon request of a Market Participant or at the initiative of the Internal Market Monitor, the Internal Market Monitor shall consult with a Market Participant with respect to the information and analysis used to determine Reference Levels under Section III.A.7 for that Market Participant. In order for the Internal Market Monitor to revise Reference Levels or treat an offer as not violating applicable conduct tests specified in Section III.A.5.5 for an Operating Day for which the offer is submitted, all cost data and other information, other than automated index-based cost data received by the Internal Market Monitor from third party vendors, cost data and information calculated by the Internal Market Monitor, and cost data and information provided under the provisions of Section III.A.3.1 or Section III.A.3.2, must be submitted by a Market Participant, and all consultations must be completed, no later than 5:00 p.m. of the second business day prior to the Operating Day for which the Reference Level will be effective. Adjustments to fuel prices after this time must be submitted in accordance with the fuel price adjustment provisions in Section III.A.3.4.

**III.A.3.1. Consultation Prior to Offer.**

If an event occurs within the 24 hour period prior to the Operating Day that a Market Participant, including a Market Participant that is not permitted to submit a fuel price adjustment pursuant to Section

III.A.3.4(d) believes will cause the operating cost of a Resource to exceed the level that would violate one of the conduct tests specified in Section III.A.5 of this *Appendix A*, the Market Participant may contact the Internal Market Monitor to provide an explanation of the increased costs. In order for the information to be considered for the purposes of the Day-Ahead Energy Market, the Market Participant must contact the Internal Market Monitor at least 30 minutes prior to the close of the Day-Ahead Energy Market. In order for the information to be considered for purposes of the first commitment analysis performed following the close of the Re-Offer Period, the Market Participant must contact the Internal Market Monitor at least 30 minutes prior to the close of the Re-Offer Period. Cost information submitted thereafter shall be considered in subsequent commitment and dispatch analyses if received between 8:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m. and at least one hour prior to the close of the next hourly Supply Offer submittal period. If the Internal Market Monitor determines that there is an increased cost, the Internal Market Monitor will either update the Reference Level or treat an offer as not violating applicable conduct tests specified in Section III.A.5.5 for the Operating Day for which the offer is submitted. Any request and all supporting cost data and other verifiable supporting information must be submitted to the Internal Market Monitor prior to the Market participant's submission of the offer.

If a Market Participant believes that the fuel price determined under Section III.A.7.5(e) should be modified, it may contact the Internal Market Monitor to request a change to the fuel price and provide an explanation of the basis for the change. Any request to change the fuel price determined under Section III.A.7.5(e) must be received between the hours of 8:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m. on any day.

### **III.A.3.2. Dual Fuel Resources.**

In evaluating bids or offers under this *Appendix A* for dual fuel Resources, the Internal Market Monitor shall utilize the fuel type specified in the Supply Offer for the calculation of Reference Levels pursuant to Section III.A.7 below. If a Market Participant specifies a fuel type in the Supply Offer that, at the time the Supply Offer is submitted, is the higher cost fuel available to the Resource, then if the ratio of the higher cost fuel to the lower cost fuel, as calculated in accordance with the formula specified below, is greater than 1.75, the Market Participant must within five Business Days:

- (a) provide the Internal Market Monitor with written verification as to the cause for the use of the higher cost fuel.
- (b) provide the Internal Market Monitor with evidence that the higher cost fuel was used.



If the Market Participant fails to provide supporting information demonstrating the use of the higher-cost fuel within five Business Days of the Operating Day, then the Reference Level based on the lower cost fuel will be used in place of the Supply Offer for settlement purposes.

For purposes of this Section III.A.3.2, the ratio of the Resource's higher cost fuel to the lower cost fuel is calculated as, for the two primary fuels utilized in the dispatch of the Resource, the maximum fuel index price for the Operating Day divided by the minimum fuel index price for the Operating Day, using the two fuel indices that are utilized in the calculation of the Resource's Reference Levels for the Day-Ahead Energy Market for that Operating Day.

### **III.A.3.3. Market Participant Access to its Reference Levels.**

The Internal Market Monitor will make available to the Market Participant the Reference Levels applicable to that Market Participant's Supply Offers through the MUI. Updated Reference Levels will be made available whenever calculated. The Market Participant shall not modify such Reference Levels in the ISO's or Internal Market Monitor's systems.

### **III.A.3.4. Fuel Price Adjustments.**

(a) A Market Participant may submit a fuel price, to be used in calculating the Reference Levels for a Resource's Supply Offer, whenever the Market Participant's expected price to procure fuel for the Resource will be greater than that used by the Internal Market Monitor in calculating the Reference Levels for the Supply Offer. A fuel price may be submitted for Supply Offers entered in the Day-Ahead Energy Market, the Re-Offer Period, or for a Real-Time Offer Change. A fuel price is subject to the following conditions:

(i) In order for the submitted fuel price to be utilized in calculating the Reference Levels for a Supply Offer, the fuel price must be submitted prior to the applicable Supply Offer deadline,

(ii) The submitted fuel price must reflect the price at which the Market Participant expects to be able to procure fuel to supply energy under the terms of its Supply Offer, exclusive of resource-specific transportation costs. Modifications to Reference Levels based on changes to transportation costs must be addressed through the consultation process specified in Section III.A.3.1.

(iii) The submitted fuel price may be no lower than the lesser of (1) 110% of the fuel price used by the Internal Market Monitor in calculating the Reference Levels for the Resource's Supply Offer

or (2) the fuel price used by the Internal Market Monitor in calculating the Reference Levels for the Resource's Supply Offer plus \$2.50/MMbtu.

(b) Within five Business Days following submittal of a fuel price, a Market Participant must provide the Internal Market Monitor with documentation or analysis to support the submitted fuel price, which may include but is not limited to (i) an invoice or purchase confirmation for the fuel utilized or (ii) a quote from a named supplier or (iii) a price from a publicly available trading platform or price reporting agency, demonstrating that the submitted fuel price reflects the cost at which the Market Participant expected to purchase fuel for the operating period covered by the Supply Offer, as of the time that the Supply Offer was submitted, under an arm's length fuel purchase transaction. Any amount to be added to the quote from a named supplier, or to a price from a publicly available trading platform or price reporting agency, must be submitted and approved using the provision for consultations prior to the determination of Reference Levels in Section III.A.3. The submitted fuel price must be consistent with the fuel price reflected on the submitted invoice or purchase confirmation for the fuel utilized, the quote from a named supplier or the price from a publicly available trading platform or price reporting agency, plus any approved adder, or the other documentation or analysis provided to support the submitted fuel price.

(c) If, within a 12 month period, the requirements in sub-section (b) are not met for a Resource and, for the time period for which the fuel price adjustment that does not meet the requirements in sub-section (b) was submitted, (i) the Market Participant was determined to be pivotal according to the pivotal supplier test described in Section III.A.5.2.1 or (ii) the Resource was determined to be in a constrained area according to the constrained area test described in Section III.A.5.2.2 or (iii) the Resource satisfied any of the conditions described in Section III.A.5.5.6.1, then a fuel price adjustment pursuant to Section III.A.3.4 shall not be permitted for that Resource for up to six months. The following table specifies the number of months for which a Market Participant will be precluded from using the fuel price adjustment, based on the number of times the requirements in sub-section (b) are not met within the 12 month period. The 12 month period excludes any previous days for which the Market Participant was precluded from using the fuel price adjustment. The period of time for which a Market Participant is precluded from using the fuel price adjustment begins two weeks after the most-recent incident occurs.

Number of Incidents	Months Precluded (starting from most-recent incident)
1	2

2 or more	6
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#### **III.A.4. Physical Withholding.**

##### **III.A.4.1. Identification of Conduct Inconsistent with Competition.**

This section defines thresholds used to identify possible instances of physical withholding. This section does not limit the Internal Market Monitor's ability to refer potential instances of physical withholding to the Commission.

Generally, physical withholding involves not offering to sell or schedule the output of or services provided by a Resource capable of serving the New England Markets when it is economic to do so. Physical withholding may include, but is not limited to:

- (a) falsely declaring that a Resource has been forced out of service or otherwise become unavailable,
- (b) refusing to make a Supply Offer, or schedules for a Resource when it would be in the economic interest absent market power, of the withholding entity to do so,
- (c) operating a Resource in Real-Time to produce an output level that is less than the ISO Dispatch Rate, or
- (d) operating a transmission facility in a manner that is not economic, is not justified on the basis of legitimate safety or reliability concerns, and contributes to a binding transmission constraint.

##### **III.A.4.2. Thresholds for Identifying Physical Withholding.**

###### **III.A.4.2.1. Initial Thresholds.**

Except as specified in subsection III.A.4.2.4 below, the following initial thresholds will be employed by the Internal Market Monitor to identify physical withholding of a Resource:

- (a) Withholding that exceeds the lower of 10% or 100 MW of a Resource's capacity;
- (b) Withholding that exceeds in the aggregate the lower of 5% or 200 MW of a Market Participant's total capacity for Market Participants with more than one Resource; or

- (c) Operating a Resource in Real-Time at an output level that is less than 90% of the ISO's Dispatch Rate for the Resource.

#### **III.A.4.2.2. Adjustment to Generating Capacity.**

The amounts of generating capacity considered withheld for purposes of applying the foregoing thresholds shall include unjustified deratings, that is, falsely declaring a Resource derated, and the portions of a Resource's available output that are not offered. The amounts deemed withheld shall not include generating output that is subject to a forced outage or capacity that is out of service for maintenance in accordance with an ISO maintenance schedule, subject to verification by the Internal Market Monitor as may be appropriate that an outage was forced.

#### **III.A.4.2.3. Withholding of Transmission.**

A transmission facility shall be deemed physically withheld if it is not operated in accordance with ISO instructions and such failure to conform to ISO instructions causes transmission congestion. A transmission facility shall not be deemed withheld if it is subject to a forced outage or is out of service for maintenance in accordance with an ISO maintenance schedule, subject to verification by the Internal Market Monitor as may be appropriate that an outage was forced.

#### **III.A.4.2.4. Resources in Congestion Areas.**

Minimum quantity thresholds shall not be applicable to the identification of physical withholding by a Resource in an area the ISO has determined is congested.

#### **III.A.4.3. Hourly Market Impacts.**

Before evaluating possible instances of physical withholding for imposition of sanctions, the Internal Market Monitor shall investigate the reasons for the change in accordance with Section III.A.3. If the physical withholding in question is not explained to the satisfaction of the Internal Market Monitor, the Internal Market Monitor will determine whether the conduct in question causes a price impact in the New England Markets in excess of any of the thresholds specified in Section III.A.5, as appropriate.

#### **III.A.5. Mitigation.**

##### **III.A.5.1. Resources with Capacity Supply Obligations.**

Only Supply Offers associated with Resources with Capacity Supply Obligations will be evaluated for economic withholding in the Day-Ahead Energy Market. All Supply Offers will be evaluated for economic withholding in the Real-Time Energy Market.

#### **III.A.5.1.1. Resources with Partial Capacity Supply Obligations.**

Supply Offers associated with Resources with a Capacity Supply Obligation for less than their full capacity shall be evaluated for economic withholding and mitigation as follows:

- (a) all Supply Offer parameters shall be reviewed for economic withholding;
- (b) the energy price Supply Offer parameter shall be reviewed for economic withholding up to and including the higher of: (i) the block containing the Resource's Economic Minimum Limit, or; (ii) the highest block that includes any portion of the Capacity Supply Obligation;
- (c) if a Resource with a partial Capacity Supply Obligation consists of multiple assets, the offer blocks associated with the Resource that shall be evaluated for mitigation shall be determined by using each asset's Seasonal Claimed Capability value in proportion to the total of the Seasonal Claimed Capabilities for all of the assets that make up the Resource. The Lead Market Participant of a Resource with a partial Capacity Supply Obligation consisting of multiple assets may also propose to the Internal Market Monitor the offer blocks that shall be evaluated for mitigation based on an alternative allocation on a monthly basis. The proposal must be made at least five Business Days prior to the start of the month. A proposal shall be rejected by the Internal Market Monitor if the designation would be inconsistent with competitive behavior

#### **III.A.5.2. Structural Tests.**

There are two structural tests that determine which mitigation thresholds are applied to a Supply Offer:

- (a) if a supplier is determined to be pivotal according to the pivotal supplier test, then the thresholds in Section III.A.5.5.1 "General Threshold Energy Mitigation" and Section III.A.5.5.4 "General Threshold Commitment Mitigation" apply, and;
- (b) if a Resource is determined to be in a constrained area according to the constrained area test, then the thresholds in Section III.A.5.5.2 "Constrained Area Energy Mitigation" and Section III.A.5.5.4 "Constrained Area Commitment Mitigation" apply.

##### **III.A.5.2.1. Pivotal Supplier Test.**

The pivotal supplier test examines whether a Market Participant has aggregate energy Supply Offers (up to and including Economic Max) that exceed the supply margin in the Real-Time Energy Market. A Market Participant whose aggregate energy associated with Supply Offers exceeds the supply margin is a pivotal supplier.

The supply margin for an interval is the total energy Supply Offers from available Resources (up to and including Economic Max), less total system load (as adjusted for net interchange with other Control Areas, including Operating Reserve). Resources are considered available for an interval if they can provide energy within the interval. The applicable interval for the current operating plan in the Real-Time Energy Market is any of the hours in the plan. The applicable interval for UDS is the interval for which UDS issues instructions.

The pivotal supplier test shall be run prior to each determination of a new operating plan for the Operating Day, and prior to each execution of the UDS.

#### **III.A.5.2.2. Constrained Area Test.**

A Resource is considered to be within a constrained area if:

- (a) for purposes of the Real-Time Energy Market, the Resource is located on the import-constrained side of a binding constraint and there is a sensitivity to the binding constraint such that the UDS used to relieve transmission constraints would commit or dispatch the Resource in order to relieve that binding transmission constraint, or;
- (b) for purposes of the Day-Ahead Energy Market, the LMP at the Resource's Node exceeds the LMP at the Hub by more than \$25/MWh.

#### **III.A.5.3. Calculation of Impact Test in the Day-Ahead Energy Market.**

The price impact for the purposes of Section III.A.5.5.2 "Constrained Area Energy Mitigation" is equal to the difference between the LMP at the Resource's Node and the LMP at the Hub.

#### **III.A.5.4. Calculation of Impact Tests in the Real-Time Energy Market.**

The energy price impact test applied in the Real-Time Energy Market shall compare two LMPs at the Resource's Node. The first LMP will be calculated based on the Supply Offers submitted for all Resources. If a Supply Offer has been mitigated in a prior interval, the calculation of the first LMP shall be based on the mitigated value. The second LMP shall be calculated substituting Reference Levels for

Supply Offers that have failed the applicable conduct test. The difference between the two LMPs is the price impact of the conduct violation.

A Supply Offer shall be determined to have no price impact if the offer block that violates the conduct test is:

- (a) less than the LMP calculated using the submitted Supply Offers, and less than the LMP calculated using Reference Levels for Supply Offers that have failed the conduct test, or;
- (b) greater than the LMP calculated using the submitted Supply Offers, and greater than the LMP calculated using Reference Levels for Supply Offers that have failed the conduct test, and the Resource has not been dispatched into the offer block that exceeds the LMP.

### **III.A.5.5. Mitigation by Type.**

#### **III.A.5.5.1. General Threshold Energy Mitigation.**

##### **III.A.5.5.1.1. Applicability.**

Mitigation pursuant to this section shall be applied to all Supply Offers in the Real-Time Energy Market submitted by a Lead Market Participant that is determined to be a pivotal supplier in the Real-Time Energy Market.

##### **III.A.5.5.1.2. Conduct Test.**

A Supply Offer fails the conduct test for general threshold energy mitigation if any offer block price exceeds the Reference Level by an amount greater than 300% or \$100/MWh, whichever is lower. Offer block prices below \$25/MWh are not subject to the conduct test.

##### **III.A.5.5.1.3. Impact Test.**

A Supply Offer that fails the conduct test for general threshold energy mitigation shall be evaluated against the impact test for general threshold energy mitigation. A Supply Offer fails the impact test for general threshold energy mitigation if there is an increase in the LMP greater than 200% or \$100/MWh, whichever is lower as determined by the real-time impact test.

##### **III.A.5.5.1.4. Consequence of Failing Both Conduct and Impact Test.**

If a Supply Offer fails the general threshold conduct and impact tests, then the financial parameters of the Supply Offer shall be set to their Reference Levels, including all energy offer block prices and all types of Start-Up Fees and the No-Load Fee.

#### **III.A.5.5.2. Constrained Area Energy Mitigation.**

##### **III.A.5.5.2.1. Applicability.**

Mitigation pursuant to this section shall be applied to Supply Offers in the Day-Ahead Energy Market and Real-Time Energy Market associated with a Resource determined to be within a constrained area.

##### **III.A.5.5.2.2. Conduct Test.**

A Supply Offer fails the conduct test for constrained area energy mitigation if any offer block price exceeds the Reference Level by an amount greater than 50% or \$25/MWh, whichever is lower.

##### **III.A.5.5.2.3. Impact Test.**

A Supply Offer fails the impact test for constrained area energy mitigation if there is an increase greater than 50% or \$25/MWh, whichever is lower, in the LMP as determined by the day-ahead or real-time impact test.

##### **III.A.5.5.2.4. Consequence of Failing Both Conduct and Impact Test.**

If a Supply Offer fails the constrained area conduct and impact tests, then the financial parameters of the Supply Offer shall be set to their Reference Levels, including all energy offer blocks and all types of Start-Up Fees and the No-Load Fee.

#### **III.A.5.5.3. Manual Dispatch Energy Mitigation.**

##### **III.A.5.5.3.1. Applicability.**

Mitigation pursuant to this section shall be applied to Supply Offers associated with a Resource, when the Resource is manually dispatched above the Economic Minimum Limit value specified in the Resource's Supply Offer and the energy price parameter of its Supply Offer at the Desired Dispatch Point is greater than the Real-Time Price at the Resource's Node.



#### **III.A.5.5.3.2. Conduct Test.**

A Supply Offer fails the conduct test for manual dispatch energy mitigation if any offer block price divided by the Reference Level is greater than 1.10.

#### **III.A.5.5.3.3. Consequence of Failing the Conduct Test.**

If a Supply Offer for a Resource fails the manual dispatch energy conduct test, then the financial parameters of the Supply Offer shall be set to their Reference Levels, including all energy offer blocks and all types of Start-Up Fees and the No-Load Fee.

#### **III.A.5.5.4. General Threshold Commitment Mitigation.**

##### **III.A.5.5.4.1. Applicability.**

Mitigation pursuant to this section shall be applied to all Supply Offers in the Real-Time Energy Market submitted by a Lead Market Participant that is determined to be a pivotal supplier in the Real-Time Energy Market.

##### **III.A.5.5.4.2. Conduct Test.**

A Resource shall fail the conduct test for general threshold commitment mitigation if the low Load Cost at Offer divided by the Low Load Cost at Reference Level is greater than 3.00.

##### **III.A.5.5.4.3. Consequence of Failing Conduct Test.**

If a Resource fails the general threshold commitment conduct test, then all financial parameters of its Supply Offer are set to their Reference Levels.

#### **III.A.5.5.5. Constrained Area Commitment Mitigation.**

##### **III.A.5.5.5.1. Applicability.**

Mitigation pursuant to this section shall be applied to any Resource determined to be within a constrained area in the Real-Time Energy Market.

##### **III.A.5.5.5.2. Conduct Test.**

A Resource shall fail the conduct test for constrained area commitment mitigation if the Low Load Cost at Offer divided by the Low Load Cost at Reference Level is greater than 1.25.

#### **III.A.5.5.3. Consequence of Failing Test.**

If a Supply Offer fails the constrained area commitment conduct test, then all financial parameters of its Supply Offer are set to their Reference Levels.

#### **III.A.5.5.6. Reliability Commitment Mitigation.**

##### **III.A.5.5.6.1. Applicability.**

Mitigation pursuant to this section shall be applied to Supply Offers for Resources that are (a) committed to provide, or Resources that are required to remain online to provide, one or more of the following:

- i. local first contingency;
- ii. local second contingency;
- iii. VAR or voltage;
- iv. distribution (Special Constraint Resource Service);
- v. dual fuel resource auditing;

(b) otherwise manually committed by the ISO for reasons other than meeting anticipated load plus reserve requirements.

##### **III.A.5.5.6.2. Conduct Test.**

A Supply Offer shall fail the conduct test for local reliability commitment mitigation if the Low Load Cost at Offer divided by the Low Load Cost at Reference Level is greater than 1.10.

##### **III.A.5.5.6.3. Consequence of Failing Test.**

If a Supply Offer fails the local reliability commitment conduct test, it shall be evaluated for commitment based on an offer with all financial parameters set to their Reference Levels. This includes all offer blocks and all types of Start-Up Fees and the No-Load Fee. If a Resource is committed, then all financial parameters of its Supply Offer are set to their Reference Level.

#### **III.A.5.5.7. Start-Up Fee and No-Load Fee Mitigation.**

##### **III.A.5.5.7.1. Applicability.**

Mitigation pursuant to this section shall be applied to any Supply Offer submitted in the Day-Ahead Energy Market or Real-Time Energy Market if the resource is committed.

**III.A.5.5.7.2. Conduct Test.**

A Supply Offer shall fail the conduct test for Start-Up Fee and No-Load Fee mitigation if its Start-Up Fee or No-Load Fee divided by the Reference Level for that fee is greater than 3.

**III.A.5.5.7.3. Consequence of Failing Conduct Test.**

If a Supply Offer fails the conduct test, then all financial parameters of its Supply Offer shall be set to their Reference Levels.

**III.A.5.5.8. Low Load Cost.**

Low Load Cost, which is the cost of operating the Resource at its Economic Minimum Limit, is calculated as the sum of:

- (a) If the Resource is starting from an offline state, the Start-Up Fee;
- (b) The sum of the No Load Fees for the Commitment Period; and
- (c) The sum of the hourly values resulting from the multiplication of the price of energy at the Resource's Economic Minimum Limit times its Economic Minimum Limit, for each hour of the Commitment Period.

All Supply Offer parameter values used in calculating the Low Load Cost are the values in place at the time the commitment decision is made.

Low Load Cost at Offer equals the Low Load Cost calculated with financial parameters of the Supply Offer as submitted by the Lead Market Participant.

Low Load Cost at Reference Level equals the Low Load Cost calculated with the financial parameters of the Supply Offer set to Reference Levels.

For Low Load Cost at Offer, the price of energy is the energy price parameter of the Resource's Supply Offer at the Economic Minimum Limit offer block. For Low Load Cost at Reference Level, the price of energy is the energy price parameter of the Resource's Reference Level at the Economic Minimum Limit offer block.

### **III.A.5.6. Duration of Energy Threshold Mitigation.**

Any mitigation imposed pursuant to Sections III.A.5.5.1 “General Threshold Energy Mitigation” or III.A.5.5.2 “Constrained Area Energy Mitigation” is in effect for the following duration:

- (a) in the Real-Time Energy Market, mitigation starts when the impact test violation occurs and remains in effect until there is one complete hour in which:
  - i. for general threshold mitigation, the Market Participant whose Supply Offer is subject to mitigation is not a pivotal supplier; or,
  - ii. for constrained area energy mitigation, the Resource is not located within a constrained area.
- (b) in the Day-Ahead Energy Market (applicable only for Section III.A.5.5.2 “Constrained Area Energy Mitigation”), mitigation is in effect in each hour in which the impact test is violated.

Any mitigation imposed pursuant to Section III.A.5.5.3 “Manual Dispatch Energy Mitigation” is in effect for at least one hour until the earlier of either (a) the hour when manual dispatch is no longer in effect and the Resource returns to its Economic Minimum Limit, or (b) the hour when the energy price parameter of its Supply Offer at the Desired Dispatch Point is no longer greater than the Real-Time Price at the Resource’s Node.

### **III.A.5.7. Duration of Commitment Mitigation.**

Any mitigation imposed pursuant to Sections III.A.5.5.4 “General Threshold Commitment Mitigation”, III.A.5.5.5 “Constrained Area Commitment Mitigation”, or III.A.5.5.6 “Reliability Commitment Mitigation” is in effect for the duration of the Commitment Period.

### **III.A.5.8. Duration of Start-Up Fee and No-Load Fee Mitigation.**

Any mitigation imposed pursuant to Sections III.A.5.5.7 “Start-Up Fee and No-Load Fee Mitigation” is in effect for any hour in which the Supply Offer fails the conduct test in Section III.A.5.5.7.2.

### **III.A.5.9. Correction of Mitigation.**

If the Internal Market Monitor determines that there are one or more errors in the mitigation applied in an Operating Day due to data entry, system or software errors by the ISO or the Internal Market Monitor, the Internal Market Monitor shall notify the market monitoring contacts specified by the Lead Market Participant within five Business Days of the applicable Operating Day. The ISO shall correct the error as

part of the Data Reconciliation Process by applying the correct values to the relevant Supply Offer in the settlement process.

The permissibility of correction of errors in mitigation, and the timeframes and procedures for permitted corrections, are addressed solely in this section and not in those sections of Market Rule 1 relating to settlement and billing processes.

#### **III.A.5.10. Delay of Day-Ahead Energy Market Due to Mitigation Process.**

The posting of the Day-Ahead Energy Market results may be delayed if necessary for the completion of mitigation procedures.

#### **III.A.6. Physical and Financial Parameter Offer Thresholds.**

Physical parameters of a Supply Offer are limited to thresholds specified in this section. Physical parameters are limited by the software accepting offers, except those that can be re-declared in real time during the Operating Day. Parameters that exceed the thresholds specified here but are not limited through the software accepting offers are subject to Internal Market Monitor review after the Operating Day and possible referral to the Commission under Section III.A.19 of this Appendix.

##### **III.A.6.1. Time-Based Offer Parameters.**

Supply Offer parameters that are expressed in time (i.e., Minimum Run Time, Minimum Down Time, Start-Up Time, and Notification Time) shall have a threshold of two hours for an individual parameter or six hours for the combination of the time-based offer parameters compared to the Resource's Reference Levels. Offers may not exceed these thresholds in a manner that reduce the flexibility of the Resource. To determine if the six hour threshold is exceeded, all time-based offer parameters will be summed for each start-up state (hot, intermediate and cold). If the sum of the time-based offer parameters for a start-up state exceeds six hours above the sum of the Reference Levels for those offer parameters, then the six hour threshold is exceeded.

##### **III.A.6.2. Financial Offer Parameters.**

The Start-Up Fee and the No-Load Fee values of a Resource's Supply Offer may be no greater than three times the Start-Up Fee and No-Load Fee Reference Level values for the Resource. In the event a fuel price has been submitted under Section III.A.3.4, the Start-Up Fee and No-Load Fee for the associated Supply Offer shall be limited in a Real-Time Offer Change. The limit shall be the percent increase in the new fuel price, relative to the fuel price otherwise used by the Internal Market Monitor, multiplied by the

Start-Up Fee or No-Load Fee from the Re-Offer Period. Absent a fuel price adjustment, a Start-Up Fee or No-Load Fee may be changed in a Real-Time Offer Change to no more than the Start-Up Fee and No-Load Fee values submitted for the Re-Offer Period.

### **III.A.6.3. Other Offer Parameters.**

Non-financial or non-time-based offer parameters shall have a threshold of a 100% increase, or greater, for parameters that are minimum values, or a 50% decrease, or greater, for parameters that are maximum values (including, but not limited to, ramp rates, Economic Maximum Limits and maximum starts per day) compared to the Resource's Reference Levels.

Offer parameters that are limited by performance caps or audit values imposed by the ISO are not subject to the provisions of this section.

### **III.A.7. Calculation of Resource Reference Levels for Physical Parameters and Financial Parameters of Resources.**

Market Participants are responsible for providing the Internal Market Monitor with all the information and data necessary for the Internal Market Monitor to calculate up-to-date Reference Levels for each of a Market Participant's Resources.

#### **III.A.7.1. Methods for Determining Reference Levels for Physical Parameters.**

The Internal Market Monitor will calculate a Reference Level for each element of a bid or offer that is expressed in units other than dollars (such as time-based or quantity level bid or offer parameters) on the basis of one or more of the following:

- (a) Original equipment manufacturer (OEM) operating recommendations and performance data for all Resource types in the New England Control Area, grouped by unit classes, physical parameters and fuel types.
- (b) Applicable environmental operating permit information currently on file with the issuing environmental regulatory body.
- (c) Verifiable Resource physical operating characteristic data, including but not limited to facility and/or Resource operating guides and procedures, historical operating data and any verifiable documentation related to the Resource, which will be reviewed in consultation with the Market Participant.

#### **III.A.7.2. Methods for Determining Reference Levels for Financial Parameters of Offers.**

The Reference Levels for Start-Up Fees, No-Load Fees, Interruption Costs and offer blocks will be calculated separately and assuming no costs from one component are included in another component.

**III.A.7.2.1. Order of Reference Level Calculation.**

The Internal Market Monitor will calculate a Reference Level for each offer block of an offer according to the following hierarchy, under which the first method that can be calculated is used:

- (a) accepted offer-based Reference Levels pursuant to Section III.A.7.3;
- (b) LMP-based Reference Levels pursuant to Section III.A.7.4; and,
- (c) cost-based Reference Levels pursuant to Section III.A.7.5.

**III.A.7.2.2. Circumstances in Which Cost-Based Reference Levels Supersede the Hierarchy of Reference Level Calculation.**

In the following circumstances, cost-based Reference Levels shall be used notwithstanding the hierarchy specified in Section III.A.7.2.1.

- (a) When in any hour the cost-based Reference Level is higher than either the accepted offer-based or LMP-based Reference Level.
- (b) When the Supply Offer parameter is a Start-Up Fee or the No-Load Fee.
- (c) For any Operating Day for which the Lead Market Participant requests the cost-based Reference Level.
- (d) For any Operating Day for which, during the previous 90 days:
  - (i) the Resource has been flagged for VAR, SCR, or as a Local Second Contingency Protection Resource for any hour in the Day-Ahead Energy Market or the Real-Time Energy Market, and;
  - (ii) the ratio of the sum of the operating hours for days for which the Resource has been flagged during the previous 90 days in which the number of hours operated out of economic merit order in the Day-Ahead Energy Market and the Real-Time Energy Market exceed the number of hours operated in economic merit order in the Day-Ahead Energy Market and Real-Time Energy Market, to the total number of operating hours in the Day-Ahead Energy Market and Real-Time Energy Market during the previous 90 days is greater than or equal to 50 percent.
- (e) When in any hour the incremental energy parameter of an offer, including adjusted offers pursuant to Section III.2.4, is greater than \$1,000/MWh.

For the purposes of this subsection:

- i. A flagged day is any day in which the Resource has been flagged for VAR, SCR, or as a Local Second Contingency Protection Resource for any hour in either the Day-Ahead Energy Market or the Real-Time Energy Market.
  - ii. Operating hours are the hours in the Day-Ahead Energy Market for which a Resource has cleared output (MW) greater than zero and hours in the Real-Time Energy Market for which a Resource has metered output (MW) greater than zero. For days for which Real-time Energy Market metered values are not yet available in the ISO's or the Internal Market Monitor's systems, telemetered values will be used.
  - iii. Self-scheduled hours will be excluded from all of the calculations described in this subsection, including the determination of operating hours.
  - iv. The determination as to whether a Resource operated in economic merit order during an hour will be based on the energy offer block within which the Resource is operating.
- (e) The Market Participant submits a fuel price pursuant to Section III.A.3.4. When the Market Participant submits a fuel price for any hour of a Supply Offer in the Day-Ahead Energy Market or Re-Offer Period, then the cost-based Reference Level is used for the entire Operating Day. If a fuel price is submitted for a Supply Offer after the close of the Re-Offer Period for the next Operating Day or for the current Operating Day, then the cost-based Reference Level for the Supply Offer is used from the time of the submittal to the end of the Operating Day.
- (f) When the Market Participant submits a change to any of the following parameters of the Supply Offer after the close of the Re-Offer Period:
  - (i) hot, intermediate, or cold Start-Up Fee, or a corresponding fuel blend,
  - (ii) No-Load Fee or its corresponding fuel blends,
  - (iii) whether to include the Start-Up Fee and No-Load Fee in the Supply Offer,
  - (iv) the quantity or price value of any Block in the Supply Offer or its corresponding fuel blends, and
  - (v) whether to use the offer slope for the Supply Offer,

then, the cost-based Reference Level for the Supply Offer will be used from the time of the submittal to the end of the Operating Day.



### **III.A.7.3. Accepted Offer-Based Reference Level.**

The Internal Market Monitor shall calculate the accepted offer-based Reference Level as the lower of the mean or the median of a generating Resource's Supply Offers that have been accepted and are part of the seller's Day-Ahead Generation Obligation or Real-Time Generation Obligation in competitive periods over the previous 90 days, adjusted for changes in fuel prices utilizing fuel indices generally applicable for the location and type of Resource. For purposes of this section, a competitive period is an Operating Day in which the Resource is scheduled in economic merit order.

### **III.A.7.4. LMP-Based Reference Level.**

The Internal Market Monitor shall calculate the LMP-based Reference Level as the mean of the LMP at the Resource's Node during the lowest-priced 25% of the hours that the Resource was dispatched over the previous 90 days for similar hours (on-peak or off-peak), adjusted for changes in fuel prices.

### **III.A.7.5. Cost-Based Reference Level.**

The Internal Market Monitor shall calculate cost-based Reference Levels taking into account information on costs provided by the Market Participant through the consultation process prescribed in Section III.A.3.

The following criteria shall be applied to estimates of cost:

- (a) The provision of cost estimates by a Market Participant shall conform with the timing and requirements of Section III.A.3 "Consultation Prior to Determination of Reference Levels for Physical and Financial Parameters of Resources".
- (b) Costs must be documented.
- (c) All cost estimates shall be based on estimates of current market prices or replacement costs and not inventory costs wherever possible. All cost estimates, including opportunity cost estimates, must be quantified and analytically supported.
- (d) When market prices or replacement costs are unavailable, cost estimates shall identify whether the reported costs are the result of a product or service provided by an Affiliate of the Market Participant.
- (e) The Internal Market Monitor will evaluate cost information provided by the Market Participant in comparison to other information available to the Internal Market Monitor. Reference Levels associated with Resources for which a fuel price has been submitted under Section III.A.3.4 shall be calculated using the lower of the submitted fuel price or a price, calculated by the Internal Market Monitor, that takes account of the following factors and conditions:

- i. Fuel market conditions, including the current spread between bids and asks for current fuel delivery, fuel trading volumes, near-term price quotes for fuel, expected natural gas heating demand, and Market Participant-reported quotes for trading and fuel costs; and
- ii. Fuel delivery conditions, including current and forecasted fuel delivery constraints and current line pack levels for natural gas pipelines.

#### **III.A.7.5.1. Estimation of Incremental Operating Cost.**

The Internal Market Monitor's determination of a Resource's marginal costs shall include an assessment of the Resource's incremental operating costs in accordance with the following formulas,

Incremental Energy/Reduction:

$(\text{incremental heat rate} * \text{fuel costs}) + (\text{emissions rate} * \text{emissions allowance price}) + \text{variable operating and maintenance costs} + \text{opportunity costs}.$

Opportunity costs may include, but are not limited to, economic costs associated with complying with:

- (a) emissions limits;
- (b) water storage limits;
- (c) other operating permits that limit production of energy; and
- (d) reducing electricity consumption.

No-Load:

$(\text{no-load fuel use} * \text{fuel costs}) + (\text{no-load emissions} * \text{emission allowance price})$   
 $+ \text{no-load variable operating and maintenance costs} + \text{other no-load costs that are not fuel, emissions or variable and maintenance costs}.$

Start-Up/Interruption:

$(\text{start-up fuel use} * \text{fuel costs}) + (\text{start-up emissions} * \text{emission allowance price}) + \text{start-up variable and maintenance costs} + \text{other start-up costs that are not fuel, emissions or variable and maintenance costs}.$

**III.A.8. [Reserved.]**

**III.A.9. Regulation.**

The Internal Market Monitor will monitor the Regulation market for conduct that it determines constitutes an abuse of market power. If the Internal Market Monitor identifies any such conduct, it may make a filing under Section 205 of the Federal Power Act with the Commission requesting authorization to apply appropriate mitigation measures or to revise Market Rule 1 to address such conduct (or both). The Internal Market Monitor may make such a filing at any time it deems necessary, and may request expedited treatment from the Commission. Any such filing shall identify the particular conduct the Internal Market Monitor believes warrants mitigation or revisions to Market Rule 1 (or both), shall propose a specific mitigation measure for the conduct or revision to Market Rule 1 (or both), and shall set forth the Internal Market Monitor's justification for imposing that mitigation measure or revision to Market Rule 1 (or both).

**III.A.10. Demand Bids.**

The Internal Market Monitor will monitor the Energy Market as outlined below:

- (a) LMPs in the Day-Ahead Energy Market and Real-Time Energy Market shall be monitored to determine whether there is a persistent hourly deviation in any location that would not be expected in a workably competitive market.
- (b) The Internal Market Monitor shall compute the average hourly deviation between Day-Ahead Energy Market and Real-Time Energy Market LMPs, measured as:  $(LMP_{\text{real time}} / LMP_{\text{day ahead}}) - 1$ . The average hourly deviation shall be computed over a rolling four-week period or such other period determined by the Internal Market Monitor.
- (c) The Internal Market Monitor shall estimate and monitor the average percentage of each Market Participant's bid to serve load scheduled in the Day-Ahead Energy Market, using a methodology intended to identify a sustained pattern of under-bidding as accurately as deemed practicable. The average percentage will be computed over a specified time period determined by the Internal Market Monitor.

If the Internal Market Monitor determines that: (i) The average hourly deviation is greater than ten percent (10%) or less than negative ten percent (-10%), (ii) one or more Market Participants on behalf of one or more LSEs have been purchasing a substantial portion of their loads with purchases in the Real-Time Energy Market, (iii) this practice has contributed to an unwarranted divergence of LMPs between

the two markets, and (iv) this practice has created operational problems, the Internal Market Monitor may make a filing under Section 205 of the Federal Power Act with the Commission requesting authorization to apply appropriate mitigation measures or to revise Market Rule 1 to address such conduct (or both). The thresholds identified above shall not limit the Internal Market Monitor's authority to make such a filing. The Internal Market Monitor may make such a filing at any time it deems necessary, and may request expedited treatment from the Commission. Any such filing shall identify the particular conduct that the Internal Market Monitor believes warrants mitigation or revisions to Market Rule 1 (or both), shall propose a specific mitigation measure for the conduct or revision to Market Rule 1 (or both), and shall set forth the Internal Market Monitor's justification for imposing that mitigation measure or revision to Market Rule 1 (or both).

### **III.A.11. Mitigation of Increment Offers and Decrement Bids.**

#### **III.A.11.1. Purpose.**

The provisions of this section specify the market monitoring and mitigation measures applicable to Increment Offers and Decrement Bids. An Increment Offer is one to supply energy and a Decrement Bid is one to purchase energy, in either such case not being backed by physical load or generation and submitted in the Day-Ahead Energy Market in accordance with the procedures and requirements specified in Market Rule 1 and the ISO New England Manuals.

#### **III.A.11.2. Implementation.**

##### **III.A.11.2.1. Monitoring of Increment Offers and Decrement Bids.**

Day-Ahead LMPs and Real-Time LMPs in each Load Zone or Node, as applicable, shall be monitored to determine whether there is a persistent hourly deviation in the LMPs that would not be expected in a workably competitive market. The Internal Market Monitor shall compute the average hourly deviation between Day-Ahead LMPs and Real-Time LMPs, measured as:

$$(\text{LMP}_{\text{real time}} / \text{LMP}_{\text{day ahead}}) - 1.$$

The average hourly deviation shall be computed over a rolling four-week period or such other period determined by the Internal Market Monitor to be appropriate to achieve the purpose of this mitigation measure.

#### **III.A.11.3. Mitigation Measures.**

If the Internal Market Monitor determines that (i) the average hourly deviation computed over a rolling four week period is greater than ten percent (10%) or less than negative ten percent (-10%), and (ii) the bid and offer practices of one or more Market Participants has contributed to a divergence between LMPs in the Day-Ahead Energy Market and Real-Time Energy Market, then the following mitigation measure may be imposed:

The Internal Market Monitor may limit the hourly quantities of Increment Offers for supply or Decrement Bids for load that may be offered in a Location by a Market Participant, subject to the following provisions:

- (i) The Internal Market Monitor shall, when practicable, request explanations of the relevant bid and offer practices from any Market Participant submitting such bids.
- (ii) Prior to imposing a mitigation measure, the Internal Market Monitor shall notify the affected Market Participant of the limitation.
- (iii) The Internal Market Monitor, with the assistance of the ISO, will restrict the Market Participant for a period of six months from submitting any virtual transactions at the same Node(s), and/or electrically similar Nodes to, the Nodes where it had submitted the virtual transactions that contributed to the unwarranted divergence between the LMPs in the Day-Ahead Energy Market and Real-Time Energy Market.

#### **III.A.11.4. Monitoring and Analysis of Market Design and Rules.**

The Internal Market Monitor shall monitor and assess the impact of Increment Offers and Decrement Bids on the competitive structure and performance, and the economic efficiency of the New England Markets. Such monitoring and assessment shall include the effects, if any, on such bids and offers of any mitigation measures specified in this Market Rule 1.

#### **III.A.12. Cap on FTR Revenues.**

If a holder of an FTR between specified delivery and receipt Locations (i) had an Increment Offer and/or Decrement Bid that was accepted by the ISO for an applicable hour in the Day-Ahead Energy Market for delivery or receipt at or near delivery or receipt Locations of the FTR; and (ii) the result of the acceptance of such Increment Offer or Decrement Bid is that the difference in LMP in the Day-Ahead Energy Market between such delivery and receipt Locations is greater than the difference in LMP between such delivery and receipt Locations in the Real-Time Energy Market, then the Market Participant shall not receive any Transmission Congestion Credit associated with such FTR in such hour, in excess of one divided by the

number of hours in the applicable month multiplied by the amount originally paid for the FTR in the FTR Auction. A Location shall be considered at or near the FTR delivery or receipt Location if seventy-five % or more of the energy injected or withdrawn at that Location and which is withdrawn or injected at another Location is reflected in the constrained path between the subject FTR delivery and receipt Locations that were acquired in the FTR Auction.

### **III.A.13. Additional Internal Market Monitor Functions Specified in Tariff.**

#### **III.A.13.1. Review of Offers and Bids in the Forward Capacity Market.**

In accordance with the following provisions of Section III.13 of Market Rule 1, the Internal Market Monitor is responsible for reviewing certain bids and offers made in the Forward Capacity Market. Section III.13 of Market Rule 1 specifies the nature and detail of the Internal Market Monitor's review and the consequences that will result from the Internal Market Monitor's determination following such review.

- (a) [Reserved].
- (b) Section III.13.1.2.3.1.6.3 - Internal Market Monitor review of Static De-List Bids, Permanent De-List Bids, and Retirement De-List Bids from an Existing Generating Capacity Resource that is associated with a Station having Common Costs.
- (c) Section III.13.1.2.3.2 - Review by Internal Market Monitor of Bids from Existing Generating Capacity Resources.
- (d) Section III.13.1.3.3A(d) - Review by Internal Market Monitor of offers from Existing Import Capacity Resources.
- (e) Section III.13.1.3.5.6 - Review by Internal Market Monitor of Offers from New Import Capacity Resources.
- (f) Section III.13.1.7 - Internal Market Monitor review of summer and winter Seasonal Claimed Capability values.

#### **III.A.13.2. Supply Offers and Demand Bids Submitted for Reconfiguration Auctions in the Forward Capacity Market.**

Section III.13.4 of Market Rule 1 addresses reconfiguration auctions in the Forward Capacity Market. As addressed in Section III.13.4.2 of Market Rule 1, a supply offer or demand bid submitted for a reconfiguration auction shall not be subject to mitigation by the Internal Market Monitor.

### **III.A.13.3. Monitoring of Transmission Facility Outage Scheduling.**

*Appendix G* of Market Rule 1 addresses the scheduling of outages for transmission facilities. The Internal Market Monitor shall monitor the outage scheduling activities of the Transmission Owners. The Internal Market Monitor shall have the right to request that each Transmission Owner provide information to the Internal Market Monitor concerning the Transmission Owner's scheduling of transmission facility outages, including the repositioning or cancellation of any interim approved or approved outage, and the Transmission Owner shall provide such information to the Internal Market Monitor in accordance with the ISO New England Information Policy.

### **III.A.13.4. Monitoring of Forward Reserve Resources.**

The Internal Market Monitor will receive information that will identify Forward Reserve Resources, the Forward Reserve Threshold Price, and the assigned Forward Reserve Obligation. Prior to mitigation of Supply Offers or Demand Bids associated with a Forward Reserve Resource, the Internal Market Monitor shall consult with the Market Participant in accordance with Section III.A.3 of this *Appendix A*. The Internal Market Monitor and the Market Participant shall consider the impact on meeting any Forward Reserve Obligations in those consultations. If mitigation is imposed, any mitigated offers shall be used in the calculation of qualifying megawatts under Section III.9.6.4 of Market Rule 1.

### **III.A.14. Treatment of Supply Offers for Resources Subject to a Cost-of-Service Agreement.**

Article 5 of the form of Cost-of-Service Agreement in *Appendix I* to Market Rule 1 addresses the monitoring of resources subject to a cost-of-service agreement by the Internal Market Monitor and External Market Monitor. Pursuant to Section 5.2 of Article 5 of the Form of Cost-of-Service Agreement, after consultation with the Lead Market Participant, Supply Offers that exceed Stipulated Variable Cost as determined in the agreement are subject to adjustment by the Internal Market Monitor to Stipulated Variable Cost.

### **III.A.15. Request for Additional Cost Recovery.**

#### **III.A.15.1. Cost Recovery Request Following Capping.**

If as a result of an offer being capped under Section III.1.9, a Market Participant believes that it will not recover the fuel and variable operating and maintenance costs of the Resource, as reflected in the offer, for the hours of the Operating Day during which the offer was capped, the Market Participant may, within 20 days of the receipt of the first Invoice issued containing credits or charges for the applicable Operating Day, submit an additional cost recovery request to the Internal Market Monitor.

A request under this Section III.A.15 may seek recovery of additional costs incurred for the duration of the period of time for which the Resource was operated at the cap.

**III.A.15.1.1. Timing and Contents of Request.**

Within 20 days of the receipt of the first Invoice containing credits or charges for the applicable Operating Day, a Market Participant requesting additional cost recovery under this Section III.A.15.1 shall submit to the Internal Market Monitor a request in writing detailing: (i) the actual fuel and variable operating and maintenance costs for the Resource for the applicable Operating Days, with supporting data, documentation and calculations for those costs; and (ii) an explanation of why the actual costs of operating the Resource exceeded the capped costs.

**III.A.15.1.2. Review by Internal Market Monitor.**

To evaluate a Market Participant's request, the Internal Market Monitor shall use the data, calculations and explanations provided by the Market Participant to verify the actual fuel and variable operating and maintenance costs for the Resource for the applicable Operating Days, using the same standards and methodologies the Internal Market Monitor uses to evaluate requests to update Reference Levels under Section III.A.3 of Appendix A. To the extent the Market Participant's request warrants additional cost recovery, the Internal Market Monitor shall reflect that adjustment in the Resource's Reference Levels for the period covered by the request. The ISO shall then re-apply the cost verification and capping formulas in Section III.1.9 using the updated Reference Levels to re-calculate the adjustments to the Market Participant's offers required thereunder, and then shall calculate additional cost recovery using the adjusted offer values.

Within 20 days of the receipt of a completed submittal, the Internal Market Monitor shall provide a written response to the Market Participant's request, detailing (i) the extent to which it agrees with the request with supporting explanation, and (ii) a calculation of the additional cost recovery. Changes to credits and charges resulting from an additional cost recovery request shall be included in the Data Reconciliation Process.

**III.A.15.1.3. Cost Allocation.**

The ISO shall allocate charges to Market Participants for payment of any additional cost recovery granted under this Section III.A.15.1 in accordance with the cost allocation provisions of Market Rule 1 that



otherwise would apply to payments for the services provided based on the Resource's actual dispatch for the Operating Days in question.

### **III.A.15.2. Section 205 Filing Right.**

If either

- (a) as a result of mitigation applied to a Resource under this *Appendix A* for all or part of one or more Operating Days, or
- (b) in the absence of mitigation, as a result of a request under Section III.A.15.1 being denied in whole or in part,

a Market Participant believes that it will not recover the fuel and variable operating and maintenance costs of the Resource, as reflected in the offer, for the hours of the Operating Day during which the offer was mitigated or the Section III.A.15.1 request was denied, the Market Participant may submit a filing to the Commission seeking recovery of those costs pursuant to Section 205 of the Federal Power Act. For filings to address cost recovery under Section III.A.15.2(a), the filing must be made within sixty days of receipt of the first Invoice issued containing credits or charges for the applicable Operating Day. For filings to address cost recovery under Section III.A.15.2(b), the filing must be made within sixty days of receipt of the first Invoice issued that reflects the denied request for additional cost recovery under Section III.A.15.1.

A request under this Section III.A.15.2 may seek recovery of additional costs incurred during the following periods: (a) if as a result of mitigation, costs incurred for the duration of the mitigation event, and (b) if as a result of having a Section III.A.15.1 request denied, costs incurred for the duration of the period of time addressed in the Section III.A.15.1 request.

#### **III.A.15.2.1. Contents of Filing.**

Any Section 205 filing made pursuant to this section shall include: (i) the actual fuel and variable operating and maintenance costs for the Resource for the applicable Operating Days, with supporting data and calculations for those costs; (ii) an explanation of (a) why the actual costs of operating the Resource exceeded the Reference Level costs or, (b) in the absence of mitigation, why the actual costs of operating the Resource, as reflected in the original offer and to the extent not recovered under Section III.A.15.1, exceeded the costs as reflected in the capped offer; (iii) the Internal Market Monitor's written explanation provided pursuant to Section III.A.15.3; and (iv) all requested regulatory costs in connection with the filing.

#### **III.A.15.2.2. Review by Internal Market Monitor Prior to Filing.**

Within twenty days of the receipt of the applicable Invoice, a Market Participant that intends to make a Section 205 filing pursuant to this Section III.A.15.2 shall submit to the Internal Market Monitor the information and explanation detailed in Section III.A.15.2.1 (i) and (ii) that is to be included in the Section 205 filing. Within twenty days of the receipt of a completed submittal, the Internal Market Monitor shall provide a written explanation of the events that resulted in the Section III.A.15.2 request for additional cost recovery. The Market Participant shall include the Internal Market Monitor's written explanation in the Section 205 filing made pursuant to this Section III A.15.2.

#### **III.A.15.2.3. Cost Allocation.**

In the event that the Commission accepts a Market Participant's filing for cost recovery under this section, the ISO shall allocate charges to Market Participants for payment of those costs in accordance with the cost allocation provisions of Market Rule 1 that otherwise would apply to payments for the services provided based on the Resource's actual dispatch for the Operating Days in question.

#### **III.A.16. ADR Review of Internal Market Monitor Mitigation Actions.**

##### **III.A.16.1. Actions Subject to Review.**

A Market Participant may obtain prompt Alternative Dispute Resolution ("ADR") review of any Internal Market Monitor mitigation imposed on a Resource as to which that Market Participant has bidding or operational authority. A Market Participant must seek review pursuant to the procedure set forth in *Appendix D* to this Market Rule 1, but in all cases within the time limits applicable to billing adjustment requests. These deadlines are currently specified in the ISO New England Manuals. Actions subject to review are:

- Imposition of a mitigation remedy.
- Continuation of a mitigation remedy as to which a Market Participant has submitted material evidence of changed facts or circumstances. (Thus, after a Market Participant has unsuccessfully challenged imposition of a mitigation remedy, it may challenge the continuation of that mitigation in a subsequent ADR review on a showing of material evidence of changed facts or circumstances.)

##### **III.A.16.2. Standard of Review.**

On the basis of the written record and the presentations of the Internal Market Monitor and the Market Participant, the ADR Neutral shall review the facts and circumstances upon which the Internal Market Monitor based its decision and the remedy imposed by the Internal Market Monitor. The ADR Neutral shall remove the Internal Market Monitor's mitigation only if it concludes that the Internal Market Monitor's application of the Internal Market Monitor mitigation policy was clearly erroneous. In considering the reasonableness of the Internal Market Monitor's action, the ADR Neutral shall consider whether adequate opportunity was given to the Market Participant to present information, any voluntary remedies proposed by the Market Participant, and the need of the Internal Market Monitor to act quickly to preserve competitive markets.

### **III.A.17. Reporting.**

#### **III.A.17.1. Data Collection and Retention.**

Market Participants shall provide the Internal Market Monitor and External Market Monitor with any and all information within their custody or control that the Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor deems necessary to perform its obligations under this *Appendix A*, subject to applicable confidentiality limitations contained in the ISO New England Information Policy. This would include a Market Participant's cost information if the Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor deems it necessary, including start up, no-load and all other actual marginal costs, when needed for monitoring or mitigation of that Market Participant. Additional data requirements may be specified in the ISO New England Manuals. If for any reason the requested explanation or data is unavailable, the Internal Market Monitor and External Market Monitor will use the best information available in carrying out their responsibilities. The Internal Market Monitor and External Market Monitor may use any and all information they receive in the course of carrying out their market monitor and mitigation functions to the extent necessary to fully perform those functions.

Market Participants must provide data and any other information requested by the Internal Market Monitor that the Internal Market Monitor requests to determine:

- (a) the opportunity costs associated with Demand Reduction Offers;
- (b) the accuracy of Demand Response Baselines;
- (c) the method used to achieve a demand reduction, and;
- (d) the accuracy of metered demand reported to the ISO.

### **III.A.17.2. Periodic Reporting by the ISO and Internal Market Monitor.**

#### **III.A.17.2.1. Monthly Report.**

The ISO will prepare a monthly report, which will be available to the public both in printed form and electronically, containing an overview of the market's performance in the most recent period.

#### **III.A.17.2.2. Quarterly Report.**

The Internal Market Monitor will prepare a quarterly report consisting of market data regularly collected by the Internal Market Monitor in the course of carrying out its functions under this *Appendix A* and analysis of such market data. Final versions of such reports shall be disseminated contemporaneously to the Commission, the ISO Board of Directors, the Market Participants, and state public utility commissions for each of the six New England states, provided that in the case of the Market Participants and public utility commissions, such information shall be redacted as necessary to comply with the ISO New England Information Policy. The format and content of the quarterly reports will be updated periodically through consensus of the Internal Market Monitor, the Commission, the ISO, the public utility commissions of the six New England States and Market Participants. The entire quarterly report will be subject to confidentiality protection consistent with the ISO New England Information Policy and the recipients will ensure the confidentiality of the information in accordance with state and federal laws and regulations. The Internal Market Monitor will make available to the public a redacted version of such quarterly reports. The Internal Market Monitor, subject to confidentiality restrictions, may decide whether and to what extent to share drafts of any report or portions thereof with the Commission, the ISO, one or more state public utility commission(s) in New England or Market Participants for input and verification before the report is finalized. The Internal Market Monitor shall keep the Market Participants informed of the progress of any report being prepared pursuant to the terms of this *Appendix A*.

#### **III.A.17.2.3. Reporting on General Performance of the Forward Capacity Market.**

The performance of the Forward Capacity Market, including reconfiguration auctions, shall be subject to the review of the Internal Market Monitor. No later than 180 days after the completion of the second Forward Capacity Auction, the Internal Market Monitor shall file with the Commission and post to the ISO's website a full report analyzing the operations and effectiveness of the Forward Capacity Market. Thereafter, the Internal Market Monitor shall report on the

functioning of the Forward Capacity Market in its annual markets report in accordance with the provisions of Section III.A.17.2.4 of this *Appendix A*.

**III.A.17.2.4. Annual Review and Report by the Internal Market Monitor.**

The Internal Market Monitor will prepare an annual state of the market report on market trends and the performance of the New England Markets and will present an annual review of the operations of the New England Markets. The annual report and review will include an evaluation of the procedures for the determination of energy, reserve and regulation clearing prices, NCPC costs and the performance of the Forward Capacity Market and FTR Auctions. The review will include a public forum to discuss the performance of the New England Markets, the state of competition, and the ISO's priorities for the coming year. In addition, the Internal Market Monitor will arrange a non-public meeting open to appropriate state or federal government agencies, including the Commission and state regulatory bodies, attorneys general, and others with jurisdiction over the competitive operation of electric power markets, subject to the confidentiality protections of the ISO New England Information Policy, to the greatest extent permitted by law.

**III.A.17.3. Periodic Reporting by the External Market Monitor.**

The External Market Monitor will perform independent evaluations and prepare annual and ad hoc reports on the overall competitiveness and efficiency of the New England Markets or particular aspects of the New England Markets, including the adequacy of *Appendix A*. The External Market Monitor shall have the sole discretion to determine whether and when to prepare ad hoc reports and may prepare such reports on its own initiative or pursuant to requests by the ISO, state public utility commissions or one or more Market Participants. Final versions of such reports shall be disseminated contemporaneously to the Commission, the ISO Board of Directors, the Market Participants, and state public utility commissions for each of the six New England states, provided that in the case of the Market Participants and public utility commissions, such information shall be redacted as necessary to comply with the ISO New England Information Policy. Such reports shall, at a minimum, include:

- (i) Review and assessment of the practices, market rules, procedures, protocols and other activities of the ISO insofar as such activities, and the manner in which the ISO implements such activities, affect the competitiveness and efficiency of New England Markets.

- (ii) Review and assessment of the practices, procedures, protocols and other activities of any independent transmission company, transmission provider or similar entity insofar as its activities affect the competitiveness and efficiency of the New England Markets.
- (iii) Review and assessment of the activities of Market Participants insofar as these activities affect the competitiveness and efficiency of the New England Markets.
- (iv) Review and assessment of the effectiveness of **Appendix A** and the administration of **Appendix A** by the Internal Market Monitor for consistency and compliance with the terms of **Appendix A**.
- (v) Review and assessment of the relationship of the New England Markets with any independent transmission company and with adjacent markets.

The External Market Monitor, subject to confidentiality restrictions, may decide whether and to what extent to share drafts of any report or portions thereof with the Commission, the ISO, one or more state public utility commission(s) in New England or Market Participants for input and verification before the report is finalized. The External Market Monitor shall keep the Market Participants informed of the progress of any report being prepared.

#### **III.A.17.4. Other Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor Communications With Government Agencies.**

##### **III.A.17.4.1. Routine Communications.**

The periodic reviews are in addition to any routine communications the Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor may have with appropriate state or federal government agencies, including the Commission and state regulatory bodies, attorneys general, and others with jurisdiction over the competitive operation of electric power markets.

##### **III.A.17.4.2. Additional Communications.**

The Internal Market Monitor and External Market Monitor are not a regulatory or enforcement agency. However, they will monitor market trends, including changes in Resource ownership as well as market performance. In addition to the information on market performance and mitigation provided in the monthly, quarterly and annual reports the External Market Monitor or Internal Market Monitor shall:

- (a) Inform the jurisdictional state and federal regulatory agencies, as well as the Markets Committee, if the External Market Monitor or Internal Market Monitor determines that a

- market problem appears to be developing that will not be adequately remediable by existing market rules or mitigation measures;
- (b) If the External Market Monitor or Internal Market Monitor receives information from any entity regarding an alleged violation of law, refer the entity to the appropriate state or federal agencies;
  - (c) If the External Market Monitor or Internal Market Monitor reasonably concludes, in the normal course of carrying out its monitoring and mitigation responsibilities, that certain market conduct constitutes a violation of law, report these matters to the appropriate state and federal agencies; and,
  - (d) Provide the names of any companies subjected to mitigation under these procedures as well as a description of the behaviors subjected to mitigation and any mitigation remedies or sanctions applied.

**III.A.17.4.3. Confidentiality.**

Information identifying particular participants required or permitted to be disclosed to jurisdictional bodies under this section shall be provided in a confidential report filed under Section 388.112 of the Commission regulations and corresponding provisions of other jurisdictional agencies. The Internal Market Monitor will include the confidential report with the quarterly submission it provides to the Commission pursuant to Section III.A.17.2.2.

**III.A.17.5. Other Information Available from Internal Market Monitor and External Market Monitor on Request by Regulators.**

The Internal Market Monitor and External Market Monitor will normally make their records available as described in this paragraph to authorized state or federal agencies, including the Commission and state regulatory bodies, attorneys general and others with jurisdiction over the competitive operation of electric power markets (“authorized government agencies”). With respect to state regulatory bodies and state attorneys general (“authorized state agencies”), the Internal Market Monitor and External Market Monitor shall entertain information requests for information regarding general market trends and the performance of the New England Markets, but shall not entertain requests that are designed to aid enforcement actions of a state agency. The Internal Market Monitor and External Market Monitor shall promptly make available all requested data and information that they are permitted to disclose to authorized government agencies under the ISO New England Information Policy. Notwithstanding the foregoing, in the event an information request is unduly burdensome in terms of the demands it places on the time and/or resources of the Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor, the Internal Market Monitor or External

Market Monitor shall work with the authorized government agency to modify the scope of the request or the time within which a response is required, and shall respond to the modified request.

The Internal Market Monitor and External Market Monitor also will comply with compulsory process, after first notifying the owner(s) of the items and information called for by the subpoena or civil investigative demand and giving them at least ten Business Days to seek to modify or quash the compulsory process. If an authorized government agency makes a request in writing, other than compulsory process, for information or data whose disclosure to authorized government agencies is not permitted by the ISO New England Information Policy, the Internal Market Monitor and External Market Monitor shall notify each party with an interest in the confidentiality of the information and shall process the request under the applicable provisions of the ISO New England Information Policy. Requests from the Commission for information or data whose disclosure is not permitted by the ISO New England Information Policy shall be processed under Section 3.2 of the ISO New England Information Policy. Requests from authorized state agencies for information or data whose disclosure is not permitted by the ISO New England Information Policy shall be processed under Section 3.3 of the ISO New England Information Policy. In the event confidential information is ultimately released to an authorized state agency in accordance with Section 3.3 of the ISO New England Information Policy, any party with an interest in the confidentiality of the information shall be permitted to contest the factual content of the information, or to provide context to such information, through a written statement provided to the Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor and the authorized state agency that has received the information.

### **III.A.18. Ethical Conduct Standards.**

#### **III.A.18.1. Compliance with ISO New England Inc. Code of Conduct.**

The employees of the ISO that perform market monitoring and mitigation services for the ISO and the employees of the External Market Monitor that perform market monitoring and mitigation services for the ISO shall execute and shall comply with the terms of the ISO New England Inc. Code of Conduct, as amended from time to time and available on the ISO's website. Consistent with the ISO New England Inc. Code of Conduct, at a minimum each such monitoring unit and its employees: (a) must have no material affiliation with any Market Participant or Affiliate, (b) must have no material financial interest in any Market Participant or Affiliate with potential exceptions for mutual funds and non-directed investments, (c) must not engage in any market transactions other than the performance of their duties hereunder, (d) may not accept anything of value from a Market Participant in excess of a *de minimis*



amount, and (e) must advise a supervisor in the event they seek employment with a Market Participant, and must disqualify themselves from participating in any matter that would have an effect on the financial interest of the Market Participant.

### **III.A.18.2. Additional Ethical Conduct Standards.**

The employees of the ISO that perform market monitoring and mitigation services for the ISO and the employees of the External Market Monitor that perform market monitoring and mitigation services for the ISO shall also comply with the following additional ethical conduct standards. In the event of a conflict between one or more standards set forth below and one or more standards contained in the ISO New England Inc. Code of Conduct, the more stringent standard(s) shall control.

#### **III.A.18.2.1. Prohibition on Employment with a Market Participant.**

No such employee shall serve as an officer, director, employee or partner of a Market Participant.

#### **III.A.18.2.2. Prohibition on Compensation for Services.**

No such employee shall be compensated, other than by the ISO or, in the case of employees of the External Market Monitor, by the External Market Monitor, for any expert witness testimony or other commercial services, either to the ISO or to any other party, in connection with any legal or regulatory proceeding or commercial transaction relating to the ISO or the New England Markets.

#### **III.A.18.2.3. Additional Standards Applicable to External Market Monitor.**

In addition to the standards referenced in the remainder of this Section 18 of *Appendix A*, the employees of the External Market Monitor that perform market monitoring and mitigation services for the ISO are subject to conduct standards set forth in the External Market Monitor Services Agreement entered into between the External Market Monitor and the ISO, as amended from time-to-time. In the event of a conflict between one or more standards set forth in the External Market Monitor Services Agreement and one or more standards set forth above or in the ISO New England Inc. Code of Conduct, the more stringent standard(s) shall control.

### **III.A.19. Protocols on Referral to the Commission of Suspected Violations.**

(A) The Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor is to make a non-public referral to the Commission in all instances where the Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor has reason to believe that a Market Violation has occurred. While the Internal Market Monitor or

External Market Monitor need not be able to prove that a Market Violation has occurred, the Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor is to provide sufficient credible information to warrant further investigation by the Commission. Once the Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor has obtained sufficient credible information to warrant referral to the Commission, the Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor is to immediately refer the matter to the Commission and desist from independent action related to the alleged Market Violation. This does not preclude the Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor from continuing to monitor for any repeated instances of the activity by the same or other entities, which would constitute new Market Violations. The Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor is to respond to requests from the Commission for any additional information in connection with the alleged Market Violation it has referred.

- (B) All referrals to the Commission of alleged Market Violations are to be in writing, whether transmitted electronically, by fax, mail or courier. The Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor may alert the Commission orally in advance of the written referral.
- (C) The referral is to be addressed to the Commission's Director of the Office of Enforcement, with a copy also directed to both the Director of the Office of Energy Market Regulation and the General Counsel.
- (D) The referral is to include, but need not be limited to, the following information
  - (1) The name(s) of and, if possible, the contact information for, the entity(ies) that allegedly took the action(s) that constituted the alleged Market Violation(s);
  - (2) The date(s) or time period during which the alleged Market Violation(s) occurred and whether the alleged wrongful conduct is ongoing;
  - (3) The specific rule or regulation, and/or tariff provision, that was allegedly violated, or the nature of any inappropriate dispatch that may have occurred;
  - (4) The specific act(s) or conduct that allegedly constituted the Market Violation;
  - (5) The consequences to the market resulting from the acts or conduct, including, if known, an estimate of economic impact on the market;
  - (6) If the Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor believes that the act(s) or conduct constituted a violation of the anti-manipulation rule of Part 1c of the Commission's Rules and Regulations, 18 C.F.R. Part 1c, a description of the alleged manipulative effect on market prices, market conditions, or market rules;
  - (7) Any other information the Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor believes is relevant and may be helpful to the Commission.

- (E) Following a referral to the Commission, the Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor is to continue to notify and inform the Commission of any information that the Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor learns of that may be related to the referral, but the Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor is not to undertake any investigative steps regarding the referral except at the express direction of the Commission or Commission staff.

**III.A.20. Protocol on Referrals to the Commission of Perceived Market Design Flaws and Recommended Tariff Changes.**

- (A) The Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor is to make a referral to the Commission in all instances where the Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor has reason to believe market design flaws exist that it believes could effectively be remedied by rule or tariff changes. The Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor must limit distribution of its identifications and recommendations to the ISO and to the Commission in the event it believes broader dissemination could lead to exploitation, with an explanation of why further dissemination should be avoided at that time.
- (B) All referrals to the Commission relating to perceived market design flaws and recommended tariff changes are to be in writing, whether transmitted electronically, by fax, mail, or courier. The Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor may alert the Commission orally in advance of the written referral.
- (C) The referral should be addressed to the Commission's Director of the Office of Energy Market Regulation, with copies directed to both the Director of the Office of Enforcement and the General Counsel.
- (D) The referral is to include, but need not be limited to, the following information.
- (1) A detailed narrative describing the perceived market design flaw(s);
  - (2) The consequences of the perceived market design flaw(s), including, if known, an estimate of economic impact on the market;
  - (3) The rule or tariff change(s) that the Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor believes could remedy the perceived market design flaw;
  - (4) Any other information the Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor believes is relevant and may be helpful to the Commission.
- (E) Following a referral to the Commission, the Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor is to continue to notify and inform the Commission of any additional information regarding the perceived market design flaw, its effects on the market, any additional or modified observations concerning the rule or tariff changes that could remedy the perceived design flaw, any recommendations made by the

Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor to the regional transmission organization or independent system operator, stakeholders, market participants or state commissions regarding the perceived design flaw, and any actions taken by the regional transmission organization or independent system operator regarding the perceived design flaw.

### **III.A.21. Review of Offers ~~f~~From New Resources in the Forward Capacity Market.**

The Internal Market Monitor shall review offers from certain New Capacity Resources in the Forward Capacity Auction as described in this Section III.A.21. The provisions of Sections III.A.21.1 and III.A.21.2 are not applicable to offers from New Import Capacity Resources that are subject to the pivotal supplier test in Section III.A.23.

#### **III.A.21.1. Applicability of Buyer-Side Market Power Review.**

The Internal Market Monitor will not conduct a buyer-side market power review of New Capacity Resources that meet the criteria described in this Section III.A.21.1.

##### **III.A.21.1.1. Resources with Capacity Not Exceeding 5 MW.**

A New Capacity Resource will not be subject to the Internal Market Monitor's buyer-side market power review if the project's expected auction capacity (in MW) at the time of the qualification process for the Forward Capacity Auction does not exceed 5 MW.

If a New Capacity Resource's expected auction capacity exceeds 5 MW at the time of the qualification process for the Forward Capacity Auction, but the final FCA Qualified Capacity for the New Capacity Resource does not exceed 5 MW, an offer from the New Capacity Resource will not be mitigated pursuant to Section III.A.21.2.3, notwithstanding any buyer-side market review that may have been conducted at the time of the qualification process.

##### **III.A.21.1.2. Passive Demand Response Resources.**

New Demand Capacity Resources that consist solely of On-Peak Demand Resources or Seasonal Peak Demand Resources will not be subject to the Internal Market Monitor's buyer-side market power review.

##### **III.A.21.1.3. Resources Supported by a Qualifying Load-Side Relationship Certification.**

New Capacity Resources will not be subject to the Internal Market Monitor's buyer-side market power review if the Project Sponsor submits a Load-Side Relationship Certification, as described in this Section III.A.21.1.3, demonstrating one of the following qualifying circumstances:

(a) the Project Sponsor and its Affiliates or partners, if any, are not load serving entities and are neither receiving nor expecting to receive any revenues from a load serving entity, state, or political subdivision of a state that relate to the development, operation, control, or output of the New Capacity Resource (excepting any revenues earned through an ISO-administered market); or

(b) the New Capacity Resource is a Sponsored Policy Resource.

For the purpose of this Section III.A.21, a load serving entity is any entity that has or is the type of entity that could acquire a Capacity Load Obligation in the Forward Capacity Market.

To demonstrate such circumstances, the Project Sponsor must include as part of the Load-Side Relationship Certification a sworn affidavit from an officer or principal for the Project Sponsor that includes factual detail sufficient to explain the qualifying circumstances. The Project Sponsor must submit the Load-Side Relationship Certification with the New Capacity Qualification Package, described in Section III.13.1.1.2.2, or the New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package, described in Section III.13.1.4.1.1.2. If the ISO is unable to determine from the Load-Side Relationship Certification that one of the qualifying circumstances exists, the New Capacity Resource's offer shall be subject to buyer-side market power review pursuant to Section III.A.21.2.

#### **III.A.21.2. Review for the Exercise of Buyer-Side Market Power.**

With the exception of New Capacity Resources that meet the criteria described in Section III.A.21.1, the Internal Market Monitor shall review requested lowest offer prices from New Capacity Resources, as described in Sections III.13.1.1.2.2.3(a) and III.13.1.4.1.1.2.8(a), for the potential exercise of buyer-side market power following the process described in this Section III.A.21.2.

##### **III.A.21.2.1. Conduct Test.**

The Internal Market Monitor will perform a conduct test by reviewing the information described in Sections III.13.1.1.2.2.3(a) and III.13.1.4.1.1.2.8(a) and determining a New Resource Offer Floor Price, as described in Section III.A.21.3, for the New Capacity Resource. A requested lowest offer price from a New Capacity Resource fails the conduct test if the Internal Market Monitor determines that the New Resource Offer Floor Price exceeds the requested lowest offer price.

**III.A.21.2.2. Demonstration of Lack of Incentive to Exercise Buyer-Side Market Power.**

If the Project Sponsor does not submit a Load-Side Relationship Certification (or the ISO rejects the Project Sponsor's Load-Side Relationship Certification) because the Project Sponsor is or is affiliated with a load serving entity or because the Project Sponsor receives or expects to receive revenues outside of ISO-administered markets from a load serving entity, the Project Sponsor is entitled to submit documentation and information as part of the New Capacity Qualification Package or the New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification package to demonstrate that, notwithstanding such a relationship with a load serving entity with regard to the New Capacity Resource, such load serving entity would be unlikely to realize a material, net financial benefit from any reduction in Forward Capacity Auction clearing prices resulting from entry of the New Capacity Resource in the Forward Capacity Market. If, after consideration of such documentation and information, the Internal Market Monitor determines that a load serving entity as described in this Section III.A.21.2.2 would be unlikely to realize a material, net financial benefit from any reduction in Forward Capacity Auction clearing prices resulting from entry of the New Capacity Resource in the Forward Capacity Market, then the Internal Market Monitor will not subject the requested lowest offer price to the mitigation described in Section III.A.21.2.3. For the avoidance of doubt, a Project Sponsor may not utilize the provisions of this Section III.A.21.2.2 if it receives or expects to receive any revenues from a state, or from a political subdivision of a state that is not also a load serving entity, that relate to the development, operation, control, or output of the New Capacity Resource.

As part of the documentation and information the Project Sponsor submits pursuant to this Section III.A.21.2.2, the Project Sponsor must include in its documentation and information a disclosure of any and all direct or indirect relationships or arrangements with a load serving entity regarding the New Capacity Resource and any other information necessary for the Internal Market Monitor to make the determination described in this Section III.A.21.2.2.

**III.A.21.2.3. Consequence of Failing the Conduct Test and Failing to Rebut Presumed Incentive.**

If a requested lowest offer price from a New Capacity Resource fails the conduct test and the Internal Market Monitor does not determine the lack of a material financial net benefit to a load serving entity, as described in Section III.A.21.2.2, the New Resource Offer Floor Price calculated as part of the conduct test shall be used in the Forward Capacity Auction, as described in Section III.13.2.3.2.

As described in Section III.A.21.1.1, the mitigation described in this Section III.A.21.2.3 will not apply to a New Capacity Resource with an FCA Qualified Capacity that does not exceed the capacity threshold set forth in Section III.A.21.1.1, notwithstanding the results of any buyer-side market power review.

**~~III.A.21.1. — Offer Review Trigger Prices.~~**

~~For each new technology type, the Internal Market Monitor shall establish an Offer Review Trigger Price. Offers in the Forward Capacity Auction at prices that are equal to or above the relevant Offer Review Trigger Price will not be subject to further review by the Internal Market Monitor. A request to submit offers in the Forward Capacity Auction at prices that are below the relevant Offer Review Trigger Price must be submitted in advance of the Forward Capacity Auction as described in Sections III.13.1.1.2.2.3, III.13.1.3.5 or III.13.1.4.1.1.2.8 and shall be reviewed by the Internal Market Monitor as described in this Section III.A.21.~~

**~~III.A.21.1.1. — Offer Review Trigger Prices for the Forward Capacity Auction.~~**

~~For resources other than New Import Capacity Resources, the Offer Review Trigger Prices for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2025 shall be as follows:~~

<b>Generating Capacity Resources</b>	
<b>Technology Type</b>	<b>Offer Review Trigger Price (\$/kW-month)</b>
Simple Cycle Combustion Turbine	\$5.355
Combined Cycle Gas Turbine	\$9.811
On-Shore Wind	\$0.000
Energy Storage Device — Lithium-Ion Battery	\$2.601
Photovoltaic Solar	\$1.381

<b>Demand Capacity Resources</b>	
<b>Technology Type</b>	<b>Offer Review Trigger Price (\$/kW-month)</b>
Load Management (Commercial / Industrial)	\$0.750
Previously Installed Distributed Generation	\$0.750
New Distributed Generation	Based on generation technology type
On Peak Solar	\$5.414
Energy Efficiency	\$0.000

<del>Other Resources</del>	
<del>All other technology types</del>	<del>Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price</del>

~~Where a new resource is composed of assets having different technology types, the resource's Offer Review Trigger Price will be calculated in accordance with the weighted average formula in Section III.A.21.2(c).~~

~~For purposes of determining the Offer Review Trigger Price of a Demand Capacity Resource composed in whole or in part of Distributed Generation, the Distributed Generation is considered new, rather than previously installed, if (1) the Project Sponsor for the New Demand Capacity Resource has participated materially in the development, installation or funding of the Distributed Generation during the five years prior to commencement of the Capacity Commitment Period for which the resource is being qualified for participation, and (2) the Distributed Generation has not been assigned to a Demand Capacity Resource with a Capacity Supply Obligation in a prior Capacity Commitment Period.~~

~~For a New Import Capacity Resource that is backed by a single new External Resource and that is associated with an investment in transmission that increases New England's import capability, the Offer Review Trigger Prices in the table above shall apply, based on the technology type of the External Resource; provided that, if a New Import Capacity Resource is associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade, it shall have an Offer Review Trigger Price of the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price plus \$0.01/kW-month.~~

~~For any other New Import Capacity Resource, the Offer Review Trigger Price shall be the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price plus \$0.01/kW-month.~~

**~~III.A.21.1.2.—Calculation of Offer Review Trigger Prices.~~**

~~(a) The Offer Review Trigger Price for each of the technology types listed above shall be recalculated using updated data for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2025 and no less often than once every three years thereafter. Where any Offer Review Trigger Price is recalculated, the Internal Market Monitor will review the results of the recalculation with stakeholders and the new Offer Review~~



~~Trigger Price shall be filed with the Commission prior to the Forward Capacity Auction in which the Offer Review Trigger Price is to apply.~~

~~(b) For New Generating Capacity Resources, the methodology used to recalculate the Offer Review Trigger Price pursuant to subsection (a) above is as follows. Capital costs, expected non-capacity revenues and operating costs, assumptions regarding depreciation, taxes and discount rate are input into a capital budgeting model which is used to calculate the break-even contribution required from the Forward Capacity Market to yield a discounted cash flow with a net present value of zero for the project. The Offer Review Trigger Price is set equal to the year one capacity price output from the model. The model looks at 20 years of real dollar cash flows discounted at a rate (Weighted Average Cost of Capital) consistent with that expected of a project whose output is under contract (i.e., a contract negotiated at arm's length between two unrelated parties).~~

~~(c) For New Demand Capacity Resources comprised of Energy Efficiency, the methodology used to recalculate the Offer Review Trigger Price pursuant to subsection (a) above shall be the same as that used for New Generating Capacity Resources, with the following exceptions. First, the model takes account of all costs incurred by the utility and end-use customer to deploy the efficiency measure. Second, rather than energy revenues, the model recognizes end-use customer savings associated with the efficiency programs. Third, the model assumes that all costs are expensed as incurred. Fourth, the benefits realized by end-use customers are assumed to have no tax implications for the utility. Fifth, the model discounts cash flows over the Measure Life of the energy efficiency measure.~~

~~(d) For New Demand Capacity Resources other than Demand Capacity Resources comprised of Energy Efficiency, the methodology used to recalculate the Offer Review Trigger Price pursuant to subsection (a) above is the same as that used for New Generating Capacity Resources, except that the model discounts cash flows over the contract life. For Demand Capacity Resources (other than those comprised of Energy Efficiency) that are composed primarily of large commercial or industrial customers that use pre-existing equipment or strategies, incremental costs include new equipment costs and annual operating costs such as customer incentives and sales representative commissions. For Demand Capacity Resources (other than Demand Capacity Resources comprised of Energy Efficiency) primarily composed of residential or small commercial customers that do not use pre-existing equipment or strategies, incremental costs include equipment costs, customer incentives, marketing, sales, and recruitment costs, operations and maintenance costs, and software and network infrastructure costs.~~

~~(e) — For years in which no full recalculation is performed pursuant to subsection (a) above, the Offer Review Trigger Prices will be adjusted as follows:~~

~~(1) For the simple cycle combustion turbine and combined cycle gas turbine technology types, each line item associated with capital costs that is included in the capital budgeting model will be updated to reflect changes in the Bureau of Labor Statistics Producer Price Index for Machinery and Equipment: General Purpose Machinery and Equipment (WPU114). For all other Generating Capacity Resource technology types, each line item associated with capital costs that is included in the capital budgeting model will be updated to reflect changes in the levelized cost of energy for that technology as published by Bloomberg.~~

~~(2) For each line item in (1) above, the ISO shall calculate a multiplier that is equal to the average of values published during the most recent 12 month period available at the time of making the adjustment divided by the average of the most recent 12 month period available at the time of establishing the Offer Review Trigger Prices reflected in the table in Section III.A.21.1.1. The value of each line item associated with capital costs in the capital budgeting model for the FCA reflected in the table in Section A.21.1.1 will be adjusted by the relevant multiplier.~~

~~(3) The energy and ancillary services offset values for gas technology types in the capital budgeting model shall be adjusted by inputting to the capital budgeting model the Henry Hub natural gas futures prices, the Algonquin Citygates Basis natural gas futures prices and the Massachusetts Hub Day Ahead Peak electricity prices, as published by ICE for the first five trading days in February, for each month of the Capacity Commitment Period to which the updated value will apply.~~

~~The energy and ancillary services offset values for non-gas technology types in the capital budgeting model shall be adjusted by inputting to the capital budgeting model the Massachusetts Hub Day Ahead Peak electricity prices, as published by ICE for the first five trading days in February, for each month of the Capacity Commitment Period to which the updated value will apply.~~

~~(4) Renewable energy credit values in the capital budgeting model shall be updated based on the first MA Class 1 REC prices published in February for the five vintages closest to the first year of the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the relevant FCA as published by SNL Financial.~~

~~(5) The bonus tax depreciation adjustment included in the financial model for the Offer Review Trigger Prices (which is 40 percent for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2025), shall be 20~~

~~percent for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2026, and zero for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2027 and thereafter.~~

~~(6) The investment tax credit adjustment included in the capital budgeting model for the Offer Review Trigger Price for the photovoltaic solar Generating Capacity Resource technology type (which is 26 percent for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2025), shall be 26 percent for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2026, 22 percent for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2027, and 10 percent thereafter.~~

~~(7) The capital budgeting model and the Offer Review Trigger Prices adjusted pursuant to this subsection (e) will be published on the ISO's web site.~~

~~(8) If any of the values required for the calculations described in this subsection (e) are unavailable, then comparable values, prices or sources shall be used.~~

### **III.A.21.32. New Resource Offer Floor Prices ~~and Offer Prices.~~**

~~For every new resource participating in a Forward Capacity Auction~~ any New Capacity Resource for which the Internal Market Monitor is required to calculate a New Resource Offer Floor Price, the Internal Market Monitor shall ~~determine a New Resource Offer Floor Price or offer prices, as described in this Section III.A.21.2~~ use the calculation methodology described in this Section III.A.21.3.

~~(a) For a Lead Market Participant with a New Capacity Resource that does not submit a request to submit offers in the Forward Capacity Auction at prices that are below the relevant Offer Review Trigger Price as described in Sections III.13.1.1.2.2.3, III.13.1.3.5 or III.13.1.4.1.1.2.8, the New Resource Offer Floor Price shall be calculated as follows:~~

~~For a New Import Capacity Resource (other than a New Import Capacity Resource that is (i) backed by a single new External Resource and that is associated with an investment in transmission that increases New England's import capability or (ii) associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade) the New Resource Offer Floor Price shall be \$0.00/kW-month.~~

~~For a New Generating Capacity Resource, New Import Capacity Resource that is backed by a single new External Resource and that is associated with an investment in transmission that increases New England's import capability, New Import Capacity Resource that is associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade, and New Demand Capacity Resource, the New Resource Offer Floor Price shall be equal to the applicable Offer Review Trigger Price.~~

A resource having a New Resource Offer Floor Price determined pursuant to this Section III.A.21.3 that is higher than the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price shall not be included in the Forward Capacity Auction.

~~(b) For a Lead Market Participant with a New Capacity Resource that does submit a request to submit offers in the Forward Capacity Auction at prices that are below the relevant Offer Review Trigger Price as described in Sections III.13.1.1.2.2.3, III.13.1.3.5 and III.13.1.4.1.1.2.8, the resource's New Resource Offer Floor Price and offer prices in the case of a New Import Capacity Resource (other than a New Import Capacity Resource that is backed by a single new External Resource and that is associated with an investment in transmission that increases New England's import capability or a New Import Capacity Resource that is associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade) shall be calculated as follows:~~

~~For a New Import Capacity Resource that is subject to the pivotal supplier test in Section III.A.23 and is found not to be associated with a pivotal supplier as determined pursuant to Section III.A.23, the resource's New Resource Offer Floor Price and offer prices shall be equal to the lower of (i) the requested offer price submitted to the ISO as described in Sections III.13.1.1.2.2.3 and III.13.1.3.5; or (ii) the price revised pursuant to Section III.13.1.3.5.7.~~

(a) When calculating a New Resource Offer Floor Price ~~For any other New Capacity Resource, t~~The Internal Market Monitor shall enter all relevant resource capital and operating costs and non-capacity revenue data, as well as assumptions regarding depreciation, taxes, and discount rate into the capital budgeting model ~~used to develop the relevant Offer Review Trigger Price~~ and shall calculate the break-even contribution required from the Forward Capacity Market to yield a discounted cash flow with a net present value of zero for the project. The default model looks at 20 years of real-dollar cash flows

discounted at a rate (Weighted Average Cost of Capital) consistent with that expected of a project whose output is under contract (i.e., a contract negotiated at arm's length between two unrelated parties). The model horizon shall be longer or shorter than 20 years for a resource's New Resource Offer Floor Price calculation, if sufficiently documented in the offer information submitted pursuant to Sections III.13.1.1.2.2.3 or III.13.1.4.1.1.2.8. Adjustments to the model and calculation methodology will be made for certain types of New Demand Capacity Resources as described below in this subsection (a):

(i) For New Demand Capacity Resources, the Internal Market Monitor will model discounted cash flows over the contract life.

(ii) For New Demand Capacity Resources that are composed primarily of large commercial or industrial customers that use pre-existing equipment or strategies, the Internal Market Monitor will include new equipment costs and annual operating costs, such as customer incentives and sales representative commissions, as incremental costs.

(iii) For New Demand Capacity Resources primarily composed of residential or small commercial customers that do not use pre-existing equipment or strategies, the Internal Market Monitor will include equipment costs, customer incentives, marketing, sales, and recruitment costs, operations and maintenance costs, and software and network infrastructure costs as incremental costs.

(b) -The Internal Market Monitor shall compare the requested lowest offer price to the ~~is~~ capacity price estimate calculated pursuant to subsection (a), and the resource's New Resource Offer Floor Price ~~and offer prices~~ shall be determined as follows:

(i) The Internal Market Monitor will exclude any out-of-market revenue sources from the cash flows used to evaluate the requested offer price. Out-of-market revenues are any revenues that are: (a) not tradable throughout the New England Control Area or that are restricted to resources within a particular state or other geographic sub-region; or (b) not available to all resources of the same physical type within the New England Control Area, regardless of the resource owner. Expected revenues associated with economic development incentives that are offered broadly by state or local government and that are not expressly intended to reduce prices in the Forward

Capacity Market are not considered out-of-market revenues for this purpose. In submitting its requested offer price, the Project Sponsor shall indicate whether and which project cash flows are supported by a regulated rate, charge, or other regulated cost recovery mechanism. If the project is supported by a regulated rate, charge, or other regulated cost recovery mechanism, then that rate will be replaced with the Internal Market Monitor estimate of energy revenues. Where possible, the Internal Market Monitor will use like-unit historical production, revenue, and fuel cost data. Where such information is not available (e.g., there is no resource of that type in service), the Internal Market Monitor will use a forecast provided by a credible third party source. The Internal Market Monitor will review capital costs, discount rates, depreciation and tax treatment to ensure that it is consistent with overall market conditions. Any assumptions that are clearly inconsistent with prevailing market conditions will be adjusted.

(ii) For a New Demand Capacity Resource, the resource's costs shall include all expenses, including incentive payments, equipment costs, marketing and selling and administrative and general costs incurred to acquire and/or develop the Demand Capacity Resource. Revenues shall include all non-capacity payments expected from the ISO-administered markets made for services delivered from the associated Demand Response Resource, and expected costs avoided by the associated end-use customer as a direct result of the installation or implementation of the associated Asset(s).

(iii) For a New Capacity Resource that has achieved commercial operation prior to the New Capacity Qualification Deadline for the Forward Capacity Auction in which it seeks to participate, the relevant capital costs to be entered into the capital budgeting model will be the undepreciated original capital costs adjusted for inflation. For any such resource, the prevailing market conditions will be those that were in place at the time of the decision to construct the resource.

(iv) Sufficient documentation and information must be included in the resource's qualification package (as described in Sections III.13.1.1.2.2.3(a) and III.13.1.4.1.1.2.8(a)) to allow the Internal Market Monitor to make the determinations described in this subsection (b). Section III.A.21.3. ~~Such documentation should include all relevant financial estimates and cost projections for the project, including the project's pro-forma financing support data. For a New Import Capacity Resource, such documentation should also include the expected costs of purchasing power outside the New England Control Area (including transaction costs and supported by forward~~

~~power price index values or a power price forecast for the applicable Capacity Commitment Period), expected transmission costs outside the New England Control Area, and expected transmission costs associated with importing to the New England Control Area, and may also include reasonable opportunity costs and risk adjustments. For a new capacity resource that has achieved commercial operation prior to the New Capacity Qualification Deadline, such documentation should also include all relevant financial data of actual incurred capital costs, actual operating costs, and actual revenues since the date of commercial operation. If the supporting documentation and information required by this subsection (b) is deficient, the Internal Market Monitor, at its sole discretion, may consult with the Project Sponsor to gather further information as necessary to complete its analysis. If after consultation, the Project Sponsor does not provide sufficient documentation and information for the Internal Market Monitor to complete its analysis, then the resource's New Resource Offer Floor Price shall be equal to the Offer Review Trigger Price~~Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price.

(v) If the Internal Market Monitor determines that the requested offer prices ~~is~~are consistent with the Internal Market Monitor's capacity price estimate, then the resource's New Resource Offer Floor Price shall be equal to the requested offer price,~~subject to the provisions of subsection (vii) concerning New Import Capacity Resources.~~

(vi) If the Internal Market Monitor determines that the requested offer prices ~~are~~is not consistent with the Internal Market Monitor's capacity price estimate, then the ~~resource's offer prices~~New Resource Offer Floor Price shall be set to a level that is consistent with the capacity price estimate, as determined by the Internal Market Monitor. Any such determination will be explained in the resource's qualification determination notification and will be filed with the Commission as part of the filing described in Section III.13.8.1(c),~~subject to the provisions of subsection (vii) concerning New Import Capacity Resources.~~

~~(vii) For New Import Capacity Resources that have been found to be associated with a pivotal supplier as determined pursuant to Section III.A.23, if the supplier elects to revise the requested offer prices pursuant to Section III.13.1.3.5.7 to values that are below the Internal Market Monitor's capacity price estimate established pursuant to subsection (v) or (vi), then the resource's offer shall be equal to the revised offer prices.~~

~~(c) For a new capacity resource composed of assets having different technology types the Offer Review Trigger Price shall be the weighted average of the Offer Review Trigger Prices of the asset technology types of the assets that comprise the resource, based on the expected capacity contribution from each asset technology type. Sufficient documentation must be included in the resource's qualification package to permit the Internal Market Monitor to determine the weighted average Offer Review Trigger Price.~~

**III.A.21.4. Offer Prices for New Import Capacity Resources.**

(a) All New Import Capacity Resources (other than a New Import Capacity Resource that is backed by a single new External Resource and that is associated with an investment in transmission that increases New England's import capability or a New Import Capacity Resource that is associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade) shall be subject to the pivotal supplier test in Section III.A.23.

(b) For any New Import Capacity Resource that is subject to the pivotal supplier test in Section III.A.23 that does not seek to specify a price below which it would not accept a Capacity Supply Obligation that is at or above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold, the resource's offer price shall be \$0.00/kW-month, subject to the provisions of Section III.13.2.3.2(a)(v).

(c) For any New Import Capacity Resource that is subject to the pivotal supplier test in Section III.A.23 and seeks to specify a price below which it would not accept a Capacity Supply Obligation that is at or above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold, the Internal Market Monitor shall calculate an Internal Market Monitor-determined offer price for the resource using the methodology for calculating New Resource Offer Floor Prices set forth in Section III.A.21.3. For any New Import Capacity Resource that is not subject to the pivotal supplier test in Section III.A.23, the Internal Market Monitor shall calculate a New Resource Offer Floor Price using the methodology set forth in Section III.A.21.3, if such a calculation is required for the resource under Section III.A.21.2 above.

(d) For any New Import Capacity Resource that is subject to the pivotal supplier test in Section III.A.23 and is found to be associated with a pivotal supplier, if the supplier elects to revise the requested offer prices pursuant to Section III.13.1.3.5.7, the resource's offer prices shall be reduced to equal the lower of (1) the prices determined by the Internal Market Monitor pursuant to subsection (c); or (2) the offer prices as revised pursuant to Section III.13.1.3.5.7. For any New Import Capacity Resource that is subject to the pivotal supplier test and is found not to be associated with a pivotal supplier, if the supplier elects to revise the requested offer prices pursuant to Section III.13.1.3.5.7, the resource's offer prices shall be reduced to the prices revised pursuant to Section III.13.1.3.5.7.



**III.A.22. [Reserved.]**

**III.A.23. Pivotal Supplier Test for Existing Capacity Resources and New Import Capacity Resources in the Forward Capacity Market.**

**III.A.23.1. Pivotal Supplier Test.**

The pivotal supplier test is performed prior to the commencement of the Forward Capacity Auction at the system level and for each import-constrained Capacity Zone.

An Existing Capacity Resource or New Import Capacity Resource is associated with a pivotal supplier if, after removing all the supplier's FCA Qualified Capacity, the ability to meet the relevant requirement is less than the requirement. Only those New Import Capacity Resources that are not (i) backed by a single new External Resource and associated with an investment in transmission that increases New England's import capability, or (ii) associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade, are subject to the pivotal supplier test.

For the system level determination, the relevant requirement is the Installed Capacity Requirement (net of HQICCs). For each import-constrained Capacity Zone, the relevant requirement is the Local Sourcing Requirement for that import-constrained Capacity Zone.

At the system level, the ability to meet the relevant requirement is the sum of the following:

- (a) The total FCA Qualified Capacity from all Existing Generating Capacity Resources and Existing Demand Capacity Resources in the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone;
- (b) For each modeled import-constrained Capacity Zone, the greater of:
  - (1) the total FCA Qualified Capacity from all Existing Generating Capacity Resources and Existing Demand Capacity Resources within the import-constrained Capacity Zone plus, for each modeled external interface connected to the import-constrained Capacity Zone, the lesser of: (i) the capacity transfer limit of the interface (net of tie benefits), and; (ii) the total amount of FCA Qualified Capacity from Import Capacity Resources over the interface, and;
  - (2) the Local Sourcing Requirement of the import-constrained Capacity Zone;

- (c) For each modeled nested export-constrained Capacity Zone, the lesser of:
  - (1) the total FCA Qualified Capacity from all Existing Generating Capacity Resources and Existing Demand Capacity Resources within the nested export-constrained Capacity Zone plus, for each external interface connected to the nested export-constrained Capacity Zone, the lesser of: (i) the capacity transfer limit of the interface (net of tie benefits), and; (ii) the total amount of FCA Qualified Capacity from Import Capacity Resources over the interface, and;
  - (2) the Maximum Capacity Limit of the nested export-constrained Capacity Zone;
- (d) For each modeled export-constrained Capacity Zone that is not a nested export-constrained Capacity Zone, the lesser of:
  - (1) the total FCA Qualified Capacity from all Existing Generating Capacity Resources and Existing Demand Capacity Resources within the export-constrained Capacity Zone, excluding the total FCA Qualified Capacity from Existing Generating Capacity Resources and Existing Demand Capacity Resources within a nested export-constrained Capacity Zone, plus, for each external interface connected to the export-constrained Capacity Zone that is not included in any nested export-constrained Capacity Zone, the lesser of: (i) the capacity transfer limit of the interface (net of tie benefits), and; (ii) the total amount of FCA Qualified Capacity from Import Capacity Resources over the interface, excluding the contribution from any nested export-constrained Capacity Zone as determined pursuant to Section III.A.23.1(c), and;
  - (2) the Maximum Capacity Limit of the export-constrained Capacity Zone minus the contribution from any associated nested export-constrained Capacity Zone as determined pursuant to Section III.A.23.1(c), and;
- (e) For each modeled external interface connected to the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone, the lesser of:
  - (1) the capacity transfer limit of the interface (net of tie benefits), and;
  - (2) the total amount of FCA Qualified Capacity from Import Capacity Resources over the interface.

For each import-constrained Capacity Zone, the ability to meet the relevant requirement is the sum of the following:

- (1) The total FCA Qualified Capacity from all Existing Generating Capacity Resources and Existing Demand Capacity Resources located within the import-constrained Capacity Zone; and

- (2) For each modeled external interface connected to the import-constrained Capacity Zone, the lesser of: (1) the capacity transfer limit of the interface (net of tie benefits), and; (2) the total amount of FCA Qualified Capacity from Import Capacity Resources over the interface.

### **III.A.23.2. Conditions Under Which Capacity is Treated as Non-Pivotal.**

FCA Qualified Capacity of a supplier that is determined to be pivotal under Section III.A.23.1 is treated as non-pivotal under the following four conditions:

- (a) If the removal of a supplier's FCA Qualified Capacity in an export-constrained Capacity Zone or nested export-constrained Capacity Zone does not change the quantity calculated in Section III.A.23.1(c) for that export-constrained Capacity Zone or nested export-constrained Capacity Zone, then that capacity is treated as capacity of a non-pivotal supplier.
- (b) If the removal of a supplier's FCA Qualified Capacity in the form of Import Capacity Resources at an external interface does not change the quantity calculated in Section III.A.23.1(d) for that interface, then that capacity is treated as capacity of a non-pivotal supplier.
- (c) If the removal of a supplier's FCA Qualified Capacity in the form of Import Capacity Resources at an external interface connected to an import-constrained Capacity Zone does not change the quantity calculated in Section III.A.23.1(f) for that interface, then that capacity is treated as capacity of a non-pivotal supplier.
- (d) If a supplier whose only FCA Qualified Capacity is a single capacity resource with a bid that (i) is not subject to rationing under Section III.13.1.2.3.1 or III.13.2.6, and (ii) contains only one price-quantity pair for the entire FCA Qualified Capacity amount, then the capacity of that resource is treated as capacity of a non-pivotal supplier.

### **III.A.23.3. Pivotal Supplier Test Notification of Results.**

Results of the pivotal supplier test will be made available to suppliers no later than seven days prior to the start of the Forward Capacity Auction.

### **III.A.23.4. Qualified Capacity for Purposes of Pivotal Supplier Test.**

For purposes of the tests performed in Sections III.A.23.1 and III.A.23.2, the FCA Qualified Capacity of a supplier includes the capacity of Existing Generating Capacity Resources, Existing Demand Capacity Resources, Existing Import Capacity Resources, and New Import Capacity Resources (other than (i) a

New Import Capacity Resource that is backed by a single new External Resource and that is associated with an investment in transmission that increases New England's import capability; and (ii) a New Import Capacity Resource associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade) that is controlled by the supplier or its Affiliates.

For purposes of determining the ability to meet the relevant requirement under Section III.A.23.1, the FCA Qualified Capacity from New Import Capacity Resources does not include (i) any New Import Capacity Resource that is backed by a single new External Resource and that is associated with an investment in transmission that increases New England's import capability; and (ii) any New Import Capacity Resource associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade.

For purposes of determining the FCA Qualified Capacity of a supplier or its Affiliates under Section III.A.23.4, "control" or "controlled" means the possession, directly or indirectly, of the authority to direct the decision-making regarding how capacity is offered into the Forward Capacity Market, and includes control by contract with unaffiliated third parties. In complying with Section I.3.5 of the ISO Tariff, a supplier shall inform the ISO of all capacity that it and its Affiliates control under this Section III.A.23.4 and all capacity the control of which it has contracted to a third party.

#### **III.A.24. Retirement Portfolio Test for Existing Capacity Resources in the Forward Capacity Market.**

The retirement portfolio test is performed prior to the commencement of the Forward Capacity Auction for each Lead Market Participant submitting a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid. The test will be performed as follows:

If

- i. The annual capacity revenue from the Lead Market Participant's total FCA Qualified Capacity, not including the FCA Qualified Capacity associated with the Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid, is greater than
- ii. the annual capacity revenue from the Lead Market Participant's total FCA Qualified Capacity, including the FCA Qualified Capacity associated with the Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid, then
- iii. the Lead Market Participant will be found to have a portfolio benefit pursuant to the retirement portfolio test.

Where,

- iv. the Lead Market Participant's annual capacity revenue from the Lead Market Participant's total FCA Qualified Capacity not including the FCA Qualified Capacity associated with the Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid is calculated as the product of (a) the Lead Market Participant's total FCA Qualified Capacity not including the FCA Qualified Capacity associated with the Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid and (b) the Internal Market Monitor-estimated capacity clearing price not including the FCA Qualified Capacity associated with the Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid.
- v. The Lead Market Participant's annual capacity revenue from the Lead Market Participant's total FCA Qualified Capacity including the FCA Qualified Capacity associated with the Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid is calculated as the product of (a) the Lead Market Participant's total FCA Qualified Capacity including the FCA Qualified Capacity associated with the Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid and (b) the Internal Market Monitor-estimated capacity clearing price including the FCA Qualified Capacity associated with the Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid.
- vi. The Internal Market Monitor-estimated capacity clearing price, not to exceed the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price, is based on the parameters of the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve and Capacity Zone Demand Curves as specified in Section III.13.2.2.

For purposes of the test performed in this Section III.A.24, the FCA Qualified Capacity of a Lead Market Participant includes the capacity of Existing Capacity Resources that is controlled by the Lead Market Participant or its Affiliates.

For purposes of determining the FCA Qualified Capacity of a Lead Market Participant or its Affiliates under this Section III.A.24, "control" or "controlled" means the possession, directly or indirectly, of the authority to direct the decision-making regarding how capacity is offered into the Forward Capacity Market, and includes control by contract with unaffiliated third parties. In complying with Section I.3.5 of the ISO Tariff, a Lead Market Participant shall inform the ISO of all capacity that it and its Affiliates control under this Section III.A.4 and all capacity the control of which it has contracted to a third party.





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To: NEPOOL Participants Committee Members and Alternates

From: Francis Pullaro, Executive Director, RENEW Northeast

Date: February 1, 2022 (Revised February 2, 2022)

Subject: UCS Further Amendments to the Dynegy/Calpine/Nautilus Delay Amendment

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On January 26, 2022, ISO New England (ISO) sent a memo (January Memo)<sup>1</sup> to the Participants Committee stating its “support and preference” for the Dynegy/Calpine/Nautilus amendment (the “Delay Proposal”) that postpones the Minimum Offer Price Rule (MOPR) revisions for two years and, in the interim, modifies the Competitive Auctions with Sponsored Policy Resources (CASPR) Substitution Auction rules by eliminating the test price and re-introduces the Renewable Technology Resource (RTR) exemption. RENEW strongly opposes any delay to the MOPR rule revisions that were developed by ISO over the past nine months and strongly supports the unamended main motion that passed by 74.04 percent at the Markets Committee on January 11, 2022. However, should the NEPOOL Participants Committee vote in favor of the Delay Proposal, RENEW requests NEPOOL address two issues in the Tariff that would otherwise affect the ability of the Delay Proposal to operate as designed. RENEW has developed two amendments described below that would be offered by Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS) for the purpose of addressing these narrow concerns.

ISO, in its May 17, 2021, memo (May Memo) to the state public officials and NEPOOL, committed to make a filing with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) to eliminate the MOPR in time to conduct Forward Capacity Auction (FCA) 17.<sup>2</sup> It made good on that promise throughout the stakeholder process and discussions, and then a mere nine days before the February 3, 2022, Participants Committee meeting, it moved to delay MOPR elimination until FCA 19.

The ISO provided no quantitative support in its January Memo that deviating from its blueprint established nine months earlier to impose a delay will reduce reliability risks. The Delay Proposal is simply not justified. RENEW looks forward to discussing how to address any reliability issues, none of which are addressed by the Delay Proposal as is explained below, including through an immediate start to the stakeholder process on capacity accreditation. The ISO in its May Memo contemplated that resource accreditation would be addressed following the MOPR changes. RENEW urges ISO and NEPOOL to keep that plan on track.

As NEPOOL looks to the capacity accreditation initiative, RENEW offers its appreciation to the ISO for its commitment, articulated in its January Memo, to improve resource capacity accreditation in a single-stage effort. As RENEW has previously noted, given that the

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<sup>1</sup> Available at <https://www.iso-ne.com/static-assets/documents/2022/01/npc-2022-02-03-supplemental.pdf>

<sup>2</sup> Available at [https://www.iso-ne.com/static-assets/documents/2021/05/a0\\_memo\\_on\\_elimination\\_of\\_mopr.pdf](https://www.iso-ne.com/static-assets/documents/2021/05/a0_memo_on_elimination_of_mopr.pdf)

accreditation of each resource class under an ELCC-like approach is dependent on the accreditation of all other resource classes, it would not be possible to develop accurate accreditation for only a subset of resource classes in a two-staged effort. We appreciate ISO's consideration of this feedback and its plan for moving ahead with this critically important project in a single stage.

## **I. The Delay Proposal Does Not Address the Concerns Identified in the January Memo**

In its January Memo, ISO raises several reliability and pricing concerns related to new Sponsored Policy Resources (SPRs) entering the market and displacing existing dispatchable generation. The risks described in the memo could be triggered by *any* new entry into the market that displaces existing resources and are not specifically related to MOPR redesign. Therefore, the Delay Proposal does little, if anything, to mitigate the risks ISO described.

*ISO (January Memo): With or without the MOPR, the Forward Capacity Auctions – by design – will continue to clear where supply intersects demand, and thereby nominally satisfy the region's resource adequacy goals. However, the two-year, 700-MW transition should help quell a sudden, voluminous, and permanent shift that could otherwise occur between entering and exiting resources that may not equivalently contribute to reliability in the commitment period.*

ISO's statements about the reliability risk of new resources replacing existing resources without providing equivalent reliability benefits bring into sharp relief the core failure of the market today to ensure resource adequacy. This market failure should be addressed by the capacity accreditation project that is on the ISO's work plan. The ISO's statements here, boiled down, indicate a desire to slow down or prevent new entry into the market to protect existing generation until this core failure of the market can be remedied. However, the Delay Proposal does not guarantee this additional time.

While the Delay Proposal would set a cap of no more than 700 megawatts of SPRs clearing through the RTR exemption, it also eliminates the test price provisions from the CASPR Substitution Auction that, like ISO's original MOPR revision proposal, would also allow an unknown quantity of SPRs to displace existing generation in FCAs 17 and 18. Removing the test price provision would allow any existing resource to clear in the FCA and then attempt to retire through participation in the Substitution Auction to get a severance that would be paid for by the Sponsored Policy Resources gaining entry to the market. No cap exists on the number of megawatts that may transact in the Substitution Auction and, although the transactions would nominally result in a one-for-one replacement of the retiring capacity with new capacity, any such transactions would result in the same concerns ISO describes in its January Memo. In other words, an unknown quantity of SPRs could displace existing generation through this mechanism during the "transition" period.

In FCA 16, just over 1 gigawatt of existing generation submitted a Substitution Auction Demand Bid and just shy of 4 gigawatts of new SPRs submitted Substitution Auction supply



offers. If the test price is removed, the volumes that could clear in the Substitution Auction could eclipse the RTR exemption cap, leading to the same outcome ISO stated a desire to avoid, or perhaps even accelerating the problem by offering a payment to retiring resources that is limited to this two-year period. The ISO's support of the delay proposal appears to be predicated on the idea that it will prevent exactly these types of substitution transactions from occurring in large volumes in FCA 17 and 18, yet the Delay Proposal, if anything, appears to open the door wider for them to occur.

*ISO (January Memo): Furthermore, it is important to recognize the potential reliability risks arising due to delays in the development of the new resources. The challenges of building new infrastructure in the region are real, and it is now well-recognized that major new sponsored policy resources can encounter significant delays in their commercial development. When existing resources are displaced in the FCM by new sponsored resources, the existing resource retirements will occur by a date certain – but development delays in major new resources replacing them can create 'gaps' in the region's resource adequacy in the capacity commitment period.*

ISO, in the above excerpt, offers another justification for its support for the Delay Proposal based on “development delays in major new resources replacing them can create ‘gaps’ in the region’s resource adequacy in the capacity commitment period.” This risk, though, is not specific to SPR entry as it is equally present for a new, merchant fossil generator that clears and then is delayed (e.g., Footprint Power) or fails to be built at all (e.g., Clear River or Killingly). Rather than singling out SPRs by attempting to limit how many of these specific resources may enter the market, concerns about resources entering the market prematurely should be addressed systemically. The existing market rules create incentives for some resources to enter before they are ready, through provisions like the 3-year timeout in the interconnection procedures (discussed along with RENEW amendments below) or the non-commercial capacity financial assurance rules (as discussed recently by CPV at the Budget & Finance Sub-Committee and Markets Committee). Adjusting these rules could better address this concern than administratively limiting the entry of SPRs into the market for two years.

*ISO (January Memo): If a rapid entry of sponsored policy resources displaces existing generation that is able to operate in extended cold conditions, and at the same time, weather is uncooperative and renewable resources cannot run, then the region's winter reliability risks will be compounded. In essence, inefficient retirements, even if they achieve nominal resource adequacy goals, can still exacerbate energy security reliability risks.*

The reliability risks ISO describes above could be prompted by new gas-only generation without firm fuel supply in the winter (or a dual-fuel unit that does not fill its oil tank) that clears and displaces an existing unit that does have firm fuel supply in the winter. Or it could be caused by competitive entry of new solar PV or onshore wind, which both have very low Offer Review Trigger Prices (ORTPs). Nothing in the Delay Proposal would slow down these types of new market entry. The Delay Proposal arbitrarily singles out SPRs with high ORTPs for two years,

limiting their ability to enter the market unless they pay existing resources for the privilege of providing their capacity.

In short, while the reliability risks described in ISO's memo may be entirely real, they are not a symptom of the ISO's MOPR redesign proposal, and the Delay Proposal does not even address them. If ISO has such little confidence in the ability of its current market to ensure resource adequacy if new resources are allowed to participate and potentially displace existing resources, it should have begun work on the resource capacity accreditation project a year or more ago or should be filing an emergency proposal to limit the type of market exit they are concerned about until that project can be implemented.<sup>3</sup> The ISO provides no qualitative or quantitative support as to why SPRs with high ORTPs are the only new resources that create the described reliability risks and should have their market entry capped unless they pay a high enough fee.

## **II. Temporary Programs Have a Habit of Being Extended**

Though the Delay Proposal defers the ISO's MOPR reform by exactly two years, until FCA 19, temporary programs have a habit of being extended. The implementation of ISO's MOPR reform in FCA 19, following the two-year delay, is not proposed to be contingent upon approval of new capacity accreditation rules or Day Ahead reserves. Yet, even without that contingency in the Delay Proposal, these market design projects are being explicitly linked by the amendment sponsors and the ISO. It would not be difficult to envision a market participant—even other than the Delay Proposal sponsors or the ISO—seeking to extend the delay beyond two years should the accreditation or Day-Ahead reserves projects take longer than expected or not end up to its liking. During the January Markets Committee discussion of the delay amendment, supporters of the proposal were not able to make a commitment to oppose such a request for extension of the temporary program. The Delay Proposal, in the end, might simply become another example of a failure to accommodate SPRs leaving consumers to continue paying twice for capacity.

## **III. RENEW's Amendments**

While RENEW does not support the proposal to delay the implementation of the MOPR revisions until FCA19, it does recognize the possibility that the delay could be supported by NEPOOL at the Participants Committee, even though a majority of stakeholders at the Markets Committee opposed it. If the Participants Committee supports the Delay Proposal, RENEW will offer the following amendments to address the issues outlined below. If the delay amendment is not supported by the Participants Committee, RENEW will not offer these amendments.

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<sup>3</sup> See Pre-Conference Statement of Abigail Krich, President, Boreas Renewables, LLC, on behalf of RENEW Northeast, at 1–4 (May 25, 2021), Federal Energy Regulatory Commission Accession No. 20210526-4004.

**A. If the Delay Proposal Is Adopted, a Further Amendment Should Be Adopted to Allow Roll-Over of Unused RTR Megawatts from FCA 17 to FCA 18**

*ISO (January Memo): A clear and predictable Delay Proposal has been put forward that will allow 700 megawatts (MW) of capacity from sponsored resources to enter the capacity market through a renewed renewables exemption in FCA 17 and FCA 18.*

This is not accurate. The Delay Proposal would allow *as much as* 700 megawatts of capacity from SPRs to clear in FCAs 17 and 18 using the Renewable Technology Resource (RTR) exemption, but there is no guarantee that a full 700 megawatts of SPRs will be able to do so, even if at least 700 megawatts of SPRs would like to enter the market.

As RENEW raised to the Markets Committee in 2019,<sup>4</sup> the RTR exemption rules allow for potentially significant portions of the RTR cap to go unused should resources qualify for the RTR exemption and then, for whatever reason, not continue to clear in the FCA. RENEW proposed in 2019 that the RTR proration rules should be modified prior to FCA 14 to maximize use of the remaining RTR cap. ISO declined to support this concept at the time. As RENEW understands, the ISO's decision was that maximizing use of the RTR exemption was never a design goal and, as only two years of the RTR exemption remained, the change was not worth the effort involved. ISO is now suggesting that NEPOOL should support bringing back those same poorly designed RTR proration rules for another two years. Though it is *possible* 700 megawatts of SPRs could clear using the RTR exemption in FCAs 17 and 18, it is also entirely possible that the proposed rules will result in *significantly less than 700 megawatts* being able to clear.

RENEW's concern in 2019 was not just hypothetical. In FCA 14, the RTR cap was approximately 336 megawatts when 755 megawatts of RTRs qualified for the auction while only 317 megawatts of RTRs cleared. While the market had an ample supply of RTRs seeking to obtain entry, the cap was not fully utilized due to how the RTR proration rules were designed. Those unused RTR megawatts in FCA 14 rolled over to the next year and were almost entirely utilized in FCA 15. This would not happen under the current Delay Proposal. The RTR rules included with the Delay Proposal do not include any roll-over of unused RTR megawatts from FCA 17 to FCA 18. This means that if something similar were to happen in FCA 17 as what happened in FCA 14, that portion of the proposed total RTR cap of 700 megawatts would simply be unusable.

RENEW's first amendment changes Section III.13.1.1.2.10 to allow roll-over of unused RTR megawatts from FCA 17 to FCA 18 (as shown in blue markup to the Tariff language below). We are proposing this surgical change to remove any concerns about the ability to implement this amendment, as we recognize it has not had the benefit of a lengthy stakeholder or ISO review process. Though this would not fully address concerns with the RTR proration rules,

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<sup>4</sup> RENEW presented to the Markets Committee on this topic at its April 9 and 10, 2019, meeting ([https://www.iso-ne.com/static-assets/documents/2019/04/a4\\_renew\\_presentation\\_adjusting\\_mechanics\\_of\\_the\\_rtr\\_exemption.pptx](https://www.iso-ne.com/static-assets/documents/2019/04/a4_renew_presentation_adjusting_mechanics_of_the_rtr_exemption.pptx)) and at its May 7 and 8, 2019 meeting ([https://www.iso-ne.com/static-assets/documents/2019/05/a3\\_presentation\\_proration\\_of\\_rtrs.pptx](https://www.iso-ne.com/static-assets/documents/2019/05/a3_presentation_proration_of_rtrs.pptx))

and it would still be possible for a portion of the FCA 18 cap to go un-used, this amendment would help to alleviate some of the concerns with bringing back these old prorationing rules. **In Revision 1 of this memo, the redlines have been modified based on input from the ISO to reflect clarified language. The proposal and intent of how these redlines would be implemented is unchanged by this update. The modified language is highlighted in the enclosed redlines.**

**B. If the Delay Proposal Is Adopted, a Further Amendment Should Be Adopted to Prevent Prorated SPRs from Having the Remaining Capacity Portion of Their Queue Positions Time Out Prior to FCA 19**

*ISO (January Memo): The ISO wholly supports and prefers such a transition approach as it will logically create less risk than an immediate market change could evoke.*

The Delay Proposal significantly increases risk for SPRs desiring to enter the capacity market compared with allowing the ISO's proposal to be implemented in FCA 17. Beyond simply introducing the risk of a one- or two-year delay in the ability to receive full compensation for the capacity provided to the system, another potentially more significant risk the delay imposes on SPRs is due to the three-year capacity timeout rule.

The interconnection procedures specify that a project has approximately three years from the date that it submits its Interconnection Request until it must clear all its capacity in an FCA or else lose its queue position for purposes of FCA participation. If the RTR cap is reached in FCA 17 or 18 and SPRs have their qualified capacity prorated, the prorated portion of their capacity may lose its queue priority order in subsequent auctions. For those SPRs that are already in the interconnection queue, this raises significant risk that when these resources attempt to qualify their prorated capacity in FCA 18 or FCA 19 using a new and lower-priority queue position, they may be found to require significant upgrades in order to qualify or may even be unable to qualify at all (e.g., the Surowiec-South interface preventing a long list of new clean energy resources in Maine from qualifying for FCA 16).

RENEW's second amendment would modify the Interconnection Procedures in OATT Schedules 22, 23, and 25 such that any resource that cleared only a portion of its capacity after being prorated due to the RTR cap would not have the capacity portion of its queue position time out prior to FCA 19. **In Revision 1 of this memo, the redlines have been modified based on input from the ISO to reflect clarified language. The proposal and intent of how these redlines would be implemented is unchanged by this update. The modified language is highlighted in the enclosed redlines.**

This change would not fully resolve RENEW's concerns with the capacity timeout rule in relation to the risks created by the delay; it would still be possible for a resource to qualify its capacity in FCAs 17 or 18, be prorated, and then find in the qualification process for the next FCA that they would require additional upgrades despite keeping their queue position or that they are simply unable to qualify regardless of their queue position. However, as with the RTR

proration issue above, RENEW crafted this amendment to make it simple to implement and be a significant step in the right direction.

More broadly, beyond this amendment that addresses concerns specifically created by the Delay Proposal, RENEW believes ISO and NEPOOL should revisit the three-year timeout rules and consider whether they still serve the original purpose of preventing queue blocking or whether there may be other, better ways to address queue blocking concerns. The three-year timeout provisions create unnecessary risk for new resources seeking entry to the market, lead to situations where speculative projects that have yet to undergo any interconnection studies end up in a higher priority position in the FCM qualification process than projects that are construction ready or are already operating, and creates an undesirable incentive for new resources to enter the capacity market before they are confident they can deliver their project on time. Enhancements to the conditional qualification process would be one way to eliminate the need for the three-year timeout rule, though there are certainly others as well. This amendment addresses a specific risk created by the Delay Proposal, but it does not address the larger need to reconsider the three year timeout rule.

## **UCS Amendment 1 (Pro-ration)**

Modifications to this amendment since its initial distribution on February 1 are highlighted below.

### **III.13.1.1.2.10 ISO Determination of Renewable Technology Resource Qualified Capacity.**

- (a) If the total FCA Qualified Capacity of Renewable Technology Resources exceeds the cap specified in subsections (b) and (c), ~~(d) and (e)~~ the qualified capacity value of each resource shall be prorated by the ratio of the cap divided by the total FCA Qualified Capacity. The ISO shall notify the Project Sponsor or Market Participant, as applicable, of the Qualified Capacity value of its resource no more than five Business Days after the deadline for submitting Renewable Technology Resource elections.
- (b) The cap for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, ~~2018~~ 2026 is ~~3200 MW minus the amount of Capacity Supply Obligations acquired through the Substitution Auction, as described in Section III.13.2.8, for the sixteenth Forward Capacity Auction (associated with the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2025) by Renewable Technology Resources that are New Capacity Resources.~~
- (c) The cap for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, ~~2019~~ 2027 is (i) 400 MW, (ii) plus the difference between 300 MW and the amount of Capacity Supply Obligations acquired by Renewable Technology Resources in the seventeenth Forward Capacity Auction (associated with the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2026), and (iii) minus the amount of Capacity Supply Obligations acquired ~~through the Substitution Auction, as described in Section III.13.2.8, for the seventeenth Forward Capacity Auction (associated with the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2026) by Renewable Technology Resources that are New Capacity Resources pursuant to Section III.13.2 in the prior Capacity Commitment.~~ For clarification, the calculation in (ii) above shall only account for Capacity Supply Obligations acquired in the primary Forward Capacity Auction, and

shall not include any additional Capacity Supply Obligations for such a resource acquired through the substitution auction.

- ~~(d) The cap for each Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2020 or June 1, 2021 is 600 MW minus the amount of Capacity Supply Obligations acquired by Renewable Technology Resources that are New Capacity Resources pursuant to Section III.13.2 in the prior two Capacity Commitment Periods.~~
- ~~(e) The cap for each Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2022 or June 1, 2023 or June 1, 2024 is 514 MW minus the cumulative amount of Capacity Supply Obligations acquired by Renewable Technology Resources that are New Capacity Resources in the first or second run of the primary auction-clearing process pursuant to Section III.13.2 for each Capacity Commitment Period that begins on or after June 1, 2021.~~

(Red = Vistra/Calpine/Nautilus Amendment, Blue = RENEW Amendment 1)

## **UCS Amendment 2 (Capacity Time Out)**

Modifications to this amendment since its initial distribution on February 1 are highlighted below.

### **Section II, Schedule 22:**

#### **Section 4.4 Modifications.**

The Interconnection Customer shall submit to System Operator and Interconnecting Transmission Owner, in writing, modifications to any information provided in the Interconnection Request, including its attachments. The Interconnection Customer shall retain its Queue Position if the modifications are in accordance with Sections 4.4.1 or 4.4.4, or are determined not to be Material Modifications pursuant to Section 4.4.2. The System Operator will notify the Interconnecting Transmission Owner, and, when System Operator deems it appropriate in accordance with applicable codes of conduct and confidentiality requirements, it will notify any Affected Party of such modifications.

A request to: (1) increase the energy capability or capacity capability output of a Generating Facility above that specified in an Interconnection Request, an existing Interconnection Agreement (whether executed or filed in unexecuted form with the Commission), or as established pursuant to Section 5.2 of this LGIP shall require a new Interconnection Request for the incremental increase and such Interconnection Request will receive the lowest Queue Position available at that time for the purposes of cost allocation and study analysis; and (2) change from NR Interconnection Service to CNR Interconnection Service, at any time, shall require a new Interconnection Request for CNR Interconnection Service and such Interconnection Request will receive the lowest Queue Position available at that time for the purposes of cost allocation and study analysis. Notwithstanding the foregoing, an Interconnection Customer with an Interconnection Request for CNR Interconnection Service has until the Forward Capacity Auction for which the associated Capacity



Commitment Period begins on the later of a) June 1, 2028 in the case that only a portion of the megawatt amount for which CNR Interconnection Service that was requested clears due to the FCA Qualified Capacity being prorated in accordance with III.13.1.1.2.10 or b) less than seven (7) years (or the years agreed to pursuant to Section 3.4.1 or Section 4.4.5) from the date of the original Interconnection Request for CNR Interconnection Service to clear the entire megawatt amount for which CNR Interconnection Service was requested. A new Interconnection Request for CNR Interconnection Service will be required for the Generating Facility to participate in any subsequent auctions. Notwithstanding the foregoing, an Interconnection Customer with an Interconnection Request for CNR Interconnection Service that times out in the seventeenth or eighteenth Forward Capacity Auction (associated with the Capacity Commitment Periods beginning on June 1, 2026 and June 1, 2027, respectively), but only clears a portion of the megawatt amount for which it requested CNR Interconnection Service by the eighteenth Forward Capacity Auction due to the proration of the Generating Facility's FCA Qualified Capacity pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.10 of the Tariff, shall have until the nineteenth Forward Capacity Auction (associated with the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2028) to clear the remaining megawatt amount for which it requested CNR Interconnection Service.

During the course of the Interconnection Studies, either the System Operator, Interconnection Customer, Interconnecting Transmission Owner, or any Affected Party as deemed appropriate by the System Operator in accordance with applicable codes of conduct and confidentiality requirements, may identify changes to the planned interconnection that may improve the costs and benefits (including reliability) of the interconnection, and the ability of the proposed change to accommodate the Interconnection Request. To the extent the identified changes do not constitute a Material Modification and are acceptable to the Parties, such acceptance not to be unreasonably withheld, System Operator and the Interconnecting Transmission Owner shall modify the Point of

Interconnection and/or configuration in accordance with such changes and proceed with any re-studies necessary to do so in accordance with Section 6.4, Section 7.6 and Section 8.5 as applicable and Interconnection Customer shall retain its Queue Position.

**Section II, Schedule 23:**

**Section 1.5.5 Modifications.**

1.5.5 Modifications. Any modification to the Interconnection Request, including the information provided in the attachments, and to the machine data or equipment configuration or to the interconnection site of the Small Generating Facility not agreed to in writing by the System Operator, in consultation with the Interconnecting Transmission Owner, and the Interconnection Customer may be deemed a withdrawal of the Interconnection Request and may require submission of a new Interconnection Request, unless proper notification of each Party by the other and a reasonable time to cure the problems created by the change are undertaken. An Interconnection Customer may decrease the electrical output of a proposed Small Generating Facility after the Cluster Entry Deadline specified in Section 1.5.3.3.1 of this SGIP; however, the requesting Interconnection Customer remains responsible for costs corresponding to the megawatt quantity requested as of the Cluster Entry Deadline. A request to: (1) increase the energy capability or capacity capability output of or add energy storage capability to the Small Generating Facility above that specified in an Interconnection Request, an existing Interconnection Agreement (whether executed or filed in unexecuted form with the Commission), or as established pursuant to 1.6.4 of this SGIP shall require a new Interconnection Request for the incremental increase and such Interconnection Request will receive the lowest Queue Position available at that time for the purposes of cost allocation and study analysis; and (2) change from NR Interconnection Service to CNR Interconnection Service, at any time, shall require a new Interconnection Request for CNR Interconnection Service and

such Interconnection Request will receive the lowest Queue Position available at that time for the purposes of cost allocation and study analysis.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, an Interconnection Customer with an Interconnection Request for CNR Interconnection Service has until the Forward Capacity Auction for which the associated Capacity Commitment Period begins on the later of a) June 1, 2028 in the case that only a portion of the megawatt amount for which CNR Interconnection Service that was requested clears due to the FCA Qualified Capacity being prorated in accordance with III.13.1.1.2.10 or b) less than seven (7) years from the date of the original Interconnection Request for CNR Interconnection Service to clear the entire megawatt amount for which the CNR Interconnection Service was requested (or as that amount has been modified in accordance with this Section 1.5.5). A new Interconnection Request for CNR Interconnection Service will be required for the Generating Facility to participate in any subsequent auctions.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, an Interconnection Customer with an Interconnection Request for CNR Interconnection Service that times out in the seventeenth or eighteenth Forward Capacity Auction (associated with the Capacity Commitment Periods beginning on June 1, 2026 and June 1, 2027, respectively), but only clears a portion of the megawatt amount for which it requested CNR Interconnection Service by the eighteenth Forward Capacity Auction due to the proration of the Generating Facility's FCA Qualified Capacity pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.10 of the Tariff, shall have until the nineteenth Forward Capacity Auction (associated with the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2028) to clear the remaining megawatt amount for which it requested CNR Interconnection Service.

## **Section II, Schedule 25:**

### **Section 4.4 Modifications.**

The Interconnection Customer shall submit to System Operator and Interconnecting Transmission Owner, in writing, modifications to any information provided in the

Interconnection Request, including its attachments. The Interconnection Customer shall retain its Queue Position if the modifications are in accordance with Sections 4.4.1 or 4.4.4, or are determined not to be Material Modifications pursuant to Section 4.4.2. The System Operator will notify the Interconnecting Transmission Owner, and, when System Operator deems it appropriate in accordance with applicable codes of conduct and confidentiality requirements, it will notify any Affected Party of such modifications.

A new Interconnection Request shall be required to: (1) increase the capability of an Elective Transmission Upgrade above that specified in an Interconnection Request, or an existing Interconnection Agreement (whether executed or filed in unexecuted form with the Commission); (2) change from NI Interconnection Service to CNI Interconnection Service, in which case a new Interconnection Request for CNI Interconnection Service shall be required; or (3) change the objective specified in an Interconnection Request. Such new Interconnection Request will receive the lowest Queue Position available at the time the Interconnection Request is submitted for purposes of cost allocation and study analysis.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, an Interconnection Customer with an Interconnection Request for CNI Interconnection Service has until the Forward Capacity Auction for which the associated Capacity Commitment Period begins on the later of a) June 1, 2028 in the case that only a portion of the megawatt amount for which CNI Interconnection Service was requested clears due to the FCA Qualified Capacity being prorated in accordance with III.13.1.1.2.10 or b) less than seven (7) years (or the years agreed to pursuant to Section 3.3.1 or Section 4.4.5) from the date of the original Interconnection Request for CNI Interconnection Service for an Import Capacity Resource(s) associated with its Elective Transmission Upgrade to clear the entire megawatt amount for which CNI Interconnection Service was requested. A new Interconnection Request for CNI Interconnection Service will be required for the Elective Transmission Upgrade to enable the participation of an Import Capacity Resource in any subsequent auctions. Notwithstanding the foregoing, an Interconnection Customer with an Interconnection Request for CNI Interconnection Service that times out in the

seventeenth or eighteenth Forward Capacity Auction (associated with the Capacity Commitment Periods beginning on June 1, 2026 and June 1, 2027, respectively), but only clears a portion of the megawatt amount for which it requested CNI Interconnection Service by the eighteenth Forward Capacity Auction due to the proration of the Generating Facility's FCA Qualified Capacity pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.10 of the Tariff, shall have until the nineteenth Forward Capacity Auction (associated with the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2028) to clear the remaining megawatt amount for which it requested CNI Interconnection Service.

During the course of the Interconnection Studies, either the System Operator, Interconnection Customer, Interconnecting Transmission Owner, or any Affected Party as deemed appropriate by the System Operator in accordance with applicable codes of conduct and confidentiality requirements, may identify changes to the planned interconnection that may improve the costs and benefits (including reliability) of the interconnection, and the ability of the proposed change to accommodate the Interconnection Request. To the extent the identified changes do not constitute a Material Modification and are acceptable to the Parties, such acceptance not to be unreasonably withheld, System Operator and the Interconnecting Transmission Owner shall modify the Point of Interconnection and/or configuration in accordance with such changes and proceed with any re-studies necessary to do so in accordance with Section 6.4, Section 7.6 and Section 8.5 as applicable and Interconnection Customer shall retain its Queue Position.

(Red = Vistra/Calpine/Nautilus Amendment, Blue = RENEW Amendment 2)

**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**  
**Status Report of Current Regulatory and Legal Proceedings**  
**as of February 1, 2022**

The following activity, as more fully described in the attached litigation report, has occurred since the report dated January 4, 2022 (“last Report”) was circulated. New matters/proceedings since the last Report are preceded by an asterisk ‘\*’. Page numbers precede the matter description.

**COVID-19**

- |   |                                  |       |   |
|---|----------------------------------|-------|---|
| 1 | Remote ALJ Hearings<br>(AD20-12) | Jan 5 | “ <a href="#">Remote Hearing Guidance for Participants</a> ” revised and posted on FERC’s website |
|---|----------------------------------|-------|---|

**I. Complaints/Section 206 Proceedings**

- |   |   |                               |  |
|---|---|-------------------------------|--|
| 2 | 206 Investigation: ISO-NE Tariff<br>Schedule 25 and Section I.3.10<br>(EL21-94) | Jan 7<br><br>Jan 20<br>Jan 28 | <a href="#">NEPOOL</a> , <a href="#">NECEC/Avangrid</a> , <a href="#">NEPGA</a> , <a href="#">NextEra</a> file comments on the just & reasonableness of the ISO-NE Tariff<br><a href="#">NextEra</a> answers NECEC/Avangrid Jan 7 comments<br><a href="#">NECEC</a> answers NextEra’s Jan 20 answer; <a href="#">ISO-NE</a> answers NECEC’s Jan 7 comments |
| 3 | Green Development DAF Charges<br>Complaint Against National Grid<br>(EL21-47)   | Jan 20                        | FERC issues “Allegheny Order”, modifying the discussion in the <i>Green Development Complaint Order</i> and continuing to reach the same result  |

**II. Rate, ICR, FCA, Cost Recovery Filings**

- |   |  |                      |   |
|---|--|----------------------|---|
| 8 | ICR-Related Values and HQICCs –<br>Annual Reconfiguration Auctions<br>(ER22-556) | Jan 26               | FERC accepts ARA ICR-Related Values and HQICCs, eff. Jan 26, 2022   |
| 8 | FCA16 Qualification Informational<br>Filing (ER22-391)                           | Jan 21               | FERC accepts Informational Filing   |
| 9 | Mystic 8/9 Cost of Service<br>Agreement (ER18-1639)                              | Jan 18<br><br>Jan 18 | FERC issues a “Notice of Denial of Rehearing by Operation of Law and Providing for Further Consideration” of Mystic’s request for rehearing of the <i>Mystic ROE Allegheny Order</i><br>Mystic petitions the DC Circuit for review of the <i>Mystic ROE Allegheny Order</i> |

**III. Market Rule and Information Policy Changes, Interpretations and Waiver Requests**

- |      |   |  |  |
|------|---|--|--|
| * 11 | Waiver Request: Queue Position<br>Modifications (ConnectGen South<br>Wrentham) (ER22-864) | Jan 20   | ConnectGen South Wrentham requests waiver of Sched. 22, § 4.4 (Queue Position Modifications) to allow it to qualify for and bid into FCA17 with its existing queue position; comment deadline <b>Feb 10, 2022</b>  |
| 11   | CSO Termination: Killingly Energy<br>Center (ER22-355)                                    | Jan 11<br><br>Jan 18<br><br>Jan 20<br><br>Jan 28 | NTE CT files emergency motion for stay and request for rehearing of the <i>Killingly CSO Termination Order</i><br><a href="#">ISO-NE</a> and <a href="#">NEPGA</a> answer <a href="#">NTE CT’s emergency motion for stay and request for rehearing</a><br>NTE CT petitions DC Circuit for stay of the <i>Killingly CSO Termination Order</i> (see Section XVI)<br>FERC denies stay of the <i>Killingly CSO Termination Order</i> |
| 12   | Waiver Request: FCA16<br>Qualification (Andro Hydro)<br>(ER22-174)                        | Jan 7  | FERC denies Andro Hydro’s request for waiver of the FCM qualification rules to allow Andro Hydro’s Riley-Jay-Otis-Livermore hydro resource to participate in FCA16 at a reduced qualification level  |

**IV. OATT Amendments / TOAs / Coordination Agreements**

- |      |   |                                      |   |
|------|---|--------------------------------------|---|
| * 12 | Tariff Changes Associated with<br><i>Order 1000</i> Lessons Learned<br>(ER22-733) | Jan 10-18<br><br>Jan 18<br><br>Feb 1 | Champlain VT, Eversource, National Grid, NESCOE, the MA DPU and<br>RENEW Northeast intervene doc-less only<br>Public Systems submit comments; LS Power submits request for<br>clarification or protest<br>AEE supports LS Power's Jan 18 submission |
| * 13 | Attachment K Planning Changes<br>(ER22-727)                                       | Jan 15-18<br>Jan 18                  | Eversource, National Grid intervene<br><a href="#">AEE</a> , <a href="#">NESCOE</a> , <a href="#">Public Systems</a> file comments  |
| 13   | BTM Generation Proposal<br>(ER21-2337)  | Jan 3<br><br>Jan 18                  | NEPGA again files an amended protest and comments in response to<br>Deficiency Letter Response II<br>PTO AC answers NEPGA Jan 3 amended protest and comments  |

**V. Financial Assurance/Billing Policy Amendments**

- |      |  |                            |   |
|------|--|----------------------------|---|
| * 15 | Non-Commercial Capacity Trading<br>FA Changes (ER22-863) | Jan 21<br><br>Jan 24-Feb 2 | ISO-NE and NEPOOL jointly file changes;<br>comment deadline <b>Feb 11, 2022</b><br>Calpine, NRG intervene |
|------|--|----------------------------|---|

**VI. Schedule 20/21/22/23 Changes**

- |      |   |                     |   |
|------|---|---------------------|---|
| * 15 | Schedule 21-NEP: 3rd Revised RI<br>LSAs (ER22-927)          | Jan 31              | New England Power and ISO-NE submit 3rd revised LSAs with BIPCO<br>and Narragansett; comment deadline <b>Feb 22, 2022</b> |
| * 15 | Schedule 21-NEP: 2nd Revised<br>Narragansett LSA (ER22-707) | Jan 18-19<br>Jan 19 | SEIA, Lodestar Energy, Coalition for Community Solar Access intervene<br>Green Development files a protest                |

**VII. NEPOOL Agreement/Participants Agreement Amendments***No Activity to Report***VIII. Regional Reports**

- |      |  |                     |  |
|------|--|---------------------|--|
| * 17 | Transmission Projects Annual Info<br>Filing (ER13-193)                                       | Jan 31              | ISO-NE files annual informational filing of projects on the RSP project<br>list that had a year of need 3 years or less from the completion of the<br>Needs Assessment as required under OATT § 4.1(j)(iii)            |
| * 17 | <i>Order 2222</i> Stakeholder Process<br>Status Update; Voltus Tech Conf<br>Request (RM18-9) | Jan 7<br><br>Jan 18 | FERC issues notice of Voltus' request that FERC convene a tech conf on<br><i>Order 2222</i> -related issues, inviting comments on or before <b>Feb 7, 2022</b><br>Fermata LLC submits comments in support of tech conf |
| * 17 | LFTR Implementation: 53rd Quarterly<br>Status Report (ER07-476)                              | Jan 14              | ISO-NE files its 53rd quarterly report   |
| * 18 | IMM Quarterly Markets Reports -<br>2021 Fall (ZZ22-4)  | Jan 25              | IMM files Fall 2021 Report; to be reviewed at Feb 8 Markets<br>Committee meeting   |

**IX. Membership Filings**

- |      |   |        |  |
|------|---|--------|--|
| * 18 | February 2022 Membership Filing<br>(ER22-945) | Jan 31 | NEPOOL requests that the FERC accept (i) the membership of Sam<br>Mintz; (ii) the termination of the Participant status of the following 16<br>Participants: Farhad Aminpour; Dick Brooks, King Forest Industries;<br>Michael Kuser; PNE Energy Supply; Connecticut Jet Power; Devon<br>Power; Middletown Power; Montville Power; Ambit Northeast;<br>Connecticut Gas & Electric; Energy Rewards; Everyday Energy;<br>Massachusetts Gas and Electric; Public Power; and Viridian Energy;<br>and (iii) Constellation Energy Generation LLC's name change;<br>comment deadline <b>Feb 21, 2022</b> |
|------|---|--------|--|



18	December 2021 Membership Filing (ER22-502)	Jan 26	FERC accepts (i) the memberships of BP Retail Energy and PSEG Power Connecticut; (ii) the termination of the Participant status of CHI Power Marketing; J. F. Gray & Associates; Liberty Power Delaware; South Jersey Energy Company; and South Jersey Energy ISO3; and (iii) the name change of AES Renewable Holdings, LLC
* 19	Suspension Notice – NTE Connecticut, LLC (not docketed)	Jan 14	ISO-NE files notice of Jan 11 suspension of NTE Connecticut, LLC from the New England Markets
* 19	Suspension Notice – Sunwave USA Holdings Inc. (not docketed)	Jan 25	ISO-NE files notice of Jan 21 suspension of Sunwave USA Holdings Inc. from the New England Markets

**X. Misc. - ERO Rules, Filings; Reliability Standards**

* 19	NERC Annual Report on FFT & Compliance Exception Programs (RC11-6-014)	Jan 6	FERC issues notice of NERC's annual report on FFT and compliance exception programs; comment date <b>Jan 20, 2022</b>
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**XI. Misc. - of Regional Interest**

23	203 Application: Howard Wind / Greenbacker Wind (EC22-13)	Jan 11	FERC authorizes Greenbacker Wind acquisition of Howard Wind from Everpower
23	203 Application: Castleton Commodities/Atlas Power (GSP companies) (EC22-7)	Jan 7	Atlas and GSP Holdings file notice that Atlas has acquired the remaining interests in the upstream owner of the Granite Shore Power companies from an affiliate of Castleton Commodities Inc.
23	203 Application: Hull Street/CMEEC (EC22-3)	Jan 6	Hull Street provides notice that its Related Person (MPH) acquired CMEEC's 84 MW Wallingford generating facility on Dec 31, 2021
23	203 Application: PSEG/Generation Bridge II (ArcLight) (EC21-125)	Jan 31	Applicants renew their request for expedited consideration and FERC action on the application
24	203 Application: Exelon Generation (EC21-57)	Feb 1	Spin transaction consummated
* 24	D&E Agreement Cancellation: CL&P/UCONN (ER22-912)	Jan 28	CL&P submits notice of cancellation of D&E Agreement; comment deadline <b>Feb 18, 2022</b>
* 24	D&E Agreement Cancellation: NSTAR/Ocean State (ER22-911)	Jan 28	NSTAR submits notice of cancellation of D&E Agreement; comment deadline <b>Feb 18, 2022</b>
* 24	Cost Reimbursement Agreement: Narragansett/BIPCO (ER22-817)	Jan 13	National Grid files Cost Reimbursement Agreement; comment deadline <b>Feb 3, 2022</b>
25	IA Termination: CL&P/Sterling Property (ER21-2860)	Jan 10	FERC issues a "Notice of Denial of Rehearing by Operation of Law and Providing for Further Consideration" of CL&P and Brookfield requests for rehearing and/or clarification of the <i>Sterling IA Order</i>
26	Orders 864/864-A (Public Util. Trans. ADIT Rate Changes): New England Compliance Filings (various)	Jan 26	<i>ER20-2572 et al. (New England TOs (RNS))</i> . NEP requests clarification and/or rehearing of <i>TOs First Order 864 Compliance Filings Order ER20-2614 (NEP - AC Support Agreement)</i> . FERC accepts changes, eff. Jan 27, 2020
		Jan 26	<i>ER20-2610 (CL&amp;P - Phase II BECO AC Support Agreement; Millstone TSA)</i> . FERC accepts changes, eff. Jan 27, 2020
		Jan 26	<i>ER20-2609 (NSTAR-Phase II BECO AC Support Agreement)</i> . FERC accepts changes, eff. Jan 27, 2020
		Jan 26	<i>ER20-2608 (PSNH - Seabrook TSA)</i> . FERC accepts changes, eff. Jan 27, 2020
		Jan 26	<i>ER20-2607 (NEP/PSNH -Seabrook Transmission Support Agreement)</i> . FERC accepts changes, eff. Jan 27, 2020
		Jan 26	<i>ER20-1839 (VETCO)</i> . FERC accepts changes, eff. Jan 27, 2020



**XII. Misc. - Administrative & Rulemaking Proceedings**

29	Joint Federal-State Task Force on Electric Transmission (AD21-15)	Jan 24	NARUC nominates Chair Thad LeVar of the Utah PSC to represent the Western Conference region (to replace Commissioner Kate Raper, who resigned her position with the Idaho PSC on Jan 21, 2022); second public Task Force meeting, <b>Feb 16, 2022</b>
31	Reliability Tech Conf (Sep 30) (AD21-11)	Jan 7	FERC invites post-tech conf comments, either to address the questions raised in the Jan 7 notice or any other issues raised during the tech conf; comment deadline <b>Feb 22, 2022</b>
32	Modernizing Electricity Market Design - Energy and Ancillary Service Markets (AD21-10)	Feb 1	PJM Power Providers Group submits comments Post-tech conf comments initial deadline <b>Feb 4, 2022</b> ; reply comments deadline, <b>Mar 7, 2022</b>
32	Office of Public Participation (AD21-9)	Jan 5-20	Three sets of comments posted to eLibrary
* 33	Order 882: 2022 Civil Monetary Penalty Inflation Adjustments (RM22-6)	Jan 7	FERC issues <i>Order 882</i> , which increases the maximum civil monetary penalties that FERC may assess
33	NOI: Industry Assoc'n Dues & Expenses Rate Recovery, Reporting, and Acc'ting Treatment (RM22-5)	Jan 19	M. Mabee submits comments Initial comments deadline, <b>Feb 22, 2022</b> ; reply comments deadline <b>Mar 23, 2022</b>
34	ANOPR: Transmission Planning and Allocation and Generator Interconnection (RM21-17)	Jan 11-14	<a href="#">WIRES</a> files supplemental reply comments; <a href="#">former military leaders and former Department of Defense officials</a> file statement
35	Order 881: Managing Transmission Line Ratings (RM20-16)	Jan 18	ATC, EEI, ITC Holdings, MISO IMM, MISO TOs request rehearing and/or clarification of <i>Order 881</i>
35	NOPR: Electric Transmission Incentives Policy (RM20-10)	Jan 14-18	APPA, CAISO, Clean Energy Parties, EDF Renewables, EEI, IECA, National Grid, PJM IMM, TAPS file post-Oct 18 workshop comments

**XIII. FERC Enforcement Proceedings**

39	GreenHat (IN18-9)	Jan 5	FERC denies Kittell Estate's Oct 5, 2021 motion requesting that FERC drop all enforcement action against the Estate
40	Rover/ETP (CPCN Show Cause Order) (IN19-4)	Jan 20	FERC establishes hearings to determine whether Respondents violated section 157.5 of the FERC's regulations and to ascertain certain facts relevant for any application of the FERC's Penalty Guidelines
		Jan 25	Chief ALJ designates Deputy Chief ALJ Andrew Satten as the Presiding Judge for the hearings and establishes Track II procedural time standards
		Feb 1	Respondents request stay of ALJ proceedings
42	Total Gas & Power North America, Inc. et al. (IN12-17)	Jan 19	Presiding ALJ grants Respondents' request to extend the deadline to file a consolidated motion to compel production of documents and other materials
		Jan 26	Respondents submit motion to compel production
		Feb 1	OE replies to Jan 26 motion

**XIV. Natural Gas Proceedings**

43	Iroquois ExC Project (CP20-48)	Jan 27-28	Iroquois, ConEd and National Grid answer/reply to the Dec 20, 2021 comments on the EPA's final Environmental Impact Statement
43	Atlantic Bridge Project (CP16-9)	Jan 20	FERC issues order sustaining the <i>Authorization Order</i>

- |    |                                    |        |   |
|----|------------------------------------|--------|---|
| 45 | Northern Access Project (CP15-115) | Jan 28 | Applicants again request an additional extension of time, this time until Dec 31, 2024, to complete construction of the Project and enter service; comments deadline on that request, <b>Feb 16, 2022</b> |
|----|------------------------------------|--------|---|

### XV. State Proceedings & Federal Legislative Proceedings



*No Activity to Report*

### XVI. Federal Courts



- |      |   |  |  |
|------|---|--|--|
| * 47 | NTE CT Petition to Stay FERC Order<br>Accepting Killingly CSO Termination<br>(21-1011)                        | Jan 20<br>Jan 21<br>Jan 24<br>Jan 27<br>Jan 28<br>Jan 31<br>Feb 1                        | NTE CT petitions DC Circuit for stay of the <i>Killingly CSO Termination Order</i><br>Court orders FERC to respond by noon on Jan 31, 2022<br>ISO-NE moves to intervene<br>ISO-NE supplements the record<br>Court grants ISO-NE intervention<br>FERC responds to the Petition<br>NTE CT responds to the FERC's Jan 31 response   |
| 47   | CSC Request for Regulatory Asset<br>Recovery of Previously-Incurred CIP<br>IROL Costs (21-1275)               | Jan 28<br>Feb 2<br><br>Feb 2   | NESCOE intervenes<br>FERC moves to have the petition for review held in abeyance, including suspending the initial filing schedule, until the Commission issues an order addressing Petitioner's request for rehearing<br>CSC files docketing statement and statement of issues  |
| 48   | Mystic ROE (21-1198) (consol.)  | Jan 12<br><br>Jan 13<br><br>Jan 17<br>Jan 18<br>Jan 20<br><br>Jan 26<br>Jan 27<br>Jan 28 | Clerk consolidates 22-1001 into 21-1198 and directs CT Parties to file a Docketing Statement Form and Statement of Issues to be Raised by <b>Feb 11, 2022</b><br>Clerk orders that petitions for review in Nos. 21-1223 and 21-1224 can be amended, without prejudice to a determination by the merits panel whether a new petition for review, rather than an amended petition, was required<br>ENECOS and MA AG file amended petitions<br>Mystic appeals <i>Mystic ROE Allegheny Order</i> (22-1008)<br>Clerk consolidates 22-1008 into 21-1198 and directs Mystic to file a Docketing Statement Form and Statement of Issues to be Raised by <b>Feb 22, 2022</b><br>FERC asks for further 60-day extension of time, to Mar 29, 2022, to file the Certified Index to the Record<br>Mystic opposes the FERC's Jan 26 request<br>FERC answers Mystic's Jan 27 opposition |
| 48   | ISO-NE Implementation of <i>Order 1000</i><br>Exemptions for Immediate Need<br>Reliability Projects (20-1422) | Jan 27   | Oral argument held before Judges Rogers, Pillard, Randolph   |
| 49   | CIP IROL Cost Recovery Rules<br>(20-1389)   | Jan 28   | Court <b>denies</b> Cogentrix's and Vistra's Petition for Review   |

## M E M O R A N D U M

**TO:** NEPOOL Participants Committee Members and Alternates

**FROM:** Patrick M. Gerity, NEPOOL Counsel

**DATE:** February 2, 2022

**RE:** Status Report on Current Regional Wholesale Power and Transmission Arrangements Pending Before the Regulators, Legislatures and Courts

We have summarized below the status of key ongoing proceedings relating to NEPOOL matters before the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”),<sup>1</sup> state regulatory commissions, and the Federal Courts and legislatures through February 1, 2022. If you have questions, please contact us.

## COVID-19

- **Remote ALJ Hearings (AD20-12)**

All hearings before Administrative Law Judges (“ALJs”) are being held remotely through video conference software (WebEx and SharePoint) until further notice.<sup>2</sup> The Presiding Judge in each remote hearing will ensure that the participants have access to an “IT Day” prior to the hearing to allow all participants, witnesses, and the public who will attend the hearing to learn more about the remote hearing software and to get their technical questions answered by the appropriate FERC staff. Uniform Hearing Rules for all Office of the ALJ hearings were adopted effective September 15, 2020.<sup>3</sup> The “Remote Hearing Guidance for Participants” was revised on May 18, 2021 to make two additional changes.<sup>4</sup> The [Uniform Hearing Rules](#) and [Remote Hearing Guidance for Participants](#) are publicly available in this proceeding in eLibrary and on the [FERC’s Administrative Litigation webpage](#).

- **Extension of Filing Deadlines (AD20-11)**

On December 8, 2021, the waiver of FERC regulations that require that filings with the FERC be notarized or supported by sworn declarations was ***extended for an additional three months, through March 31, 2022***.<sup>5</sup> The December 8 notice extended the waiver first noticed in May, 2020<sup>6</sup> for a fourth time. As previously reported, Entities may also seek waiver of FERC orders, regulations, tariffs and rate schedules, including motions for waiver of regulations that govern the form of filings, as appropriate, to address needs resulting from steps they have taken in response to the coronavirus.<sup>7</sup> The FERC does not anticipate issuing any

<sup>1</sup> Capitalized terms used but not defined in this filing are intended to have the meanings given to such terms in the Second Restated New England Power Pool Agreement (the “Second Restated NEPOOL Agreement”), the Participants Agreement, or the ISO New England Inc. (“ISO” or “ISO-NE”) Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff (the “Tariff”).

<sup>2</sup> *Chief Administrative Law Judge’s Notices to the Public*, Docket No. AD20-12 (June 17, 2020).

<sup>3</sup> *Chief Administrative Law Judge’s Notices to the Public*, Docket No. AD20-12 (Sep. 1, 2020).

<sup>4</sup> *Chief Administrative Law Judge’s Notices to the Public*, Docket No. AD20-12 (May 18, 2021) (requiring that only attorneys may access Live Litigation (§VI(a)(vii)) and encouraging that privileged sessions be limited and revising guidance on privileged versus public session management (§VI(k)).

<sup>5</sup> *See Extension of Non-Statutory Deadlines*, Docket No. AD20-11-000 (Dec. 8, 2021) (“Fourth Extension”).

<sup>6</sup> *Extension of Non-Statutory Deadlines*, Docket No. AD20-11-000 (May 8, 2020) (“First Extension”); *Extension of Non-Statutory Deadlines*, Docket No. AD20-11-000 (Jan. 25, 2021) (“Second Extension”); *Extension of Non-Statutory Deadlines*, Docket No. AD20-11-000 (July 26, 2021) (“Third Extension”).

<sup>7</sup> *Extension of Non-Statutory Deadlines*, Docket No. AD20-11-000 (Apr. 2, 2020).

further blanket extensions after March 31, 2022, but is closely monitoring developments and will make that decision in light of conditions near the end of the Fourth Extension period.

- **Blanket Waiver of ISO/RTO Tariff In-Person Meeting and Notarization Requirements (EL20-37)**

In light of the continuing nature of the COVID-19 National Emergency, the FERC extended on December 8, 2021, *for an additional 3 months, through March 31, 2022*, the blanket waivers of ISO/RTO Tariff *in-person*<sup>8</sup> meeting and notarization requirements.<sup>9</sup> The July 26 order extended for a fourth time the blanket waivers first granted in the FERC's April 2, 2020 order and extended in orders issued August 20, 2020, January 25, 2021, and July 26, 2021.<sup>10</sup> The FERC does not anticipate issuing any further blanket extensions after March 31, 2022, but is closely monitoring developments and will make that decision in light of conditions near the end of this fourth extension.

## I. Complaints/Section 206 Proceedings

- **206 Investigation: ISO-NE Tariff Schedule 25 and Section I.3.10 (EL21-94)**

As previously reported, the FERC instituted on September 7, 2021 a proceeding under FPA Section 206 to consider whether Schedule 25 and Tariff section I.3.10 may be unjust and unreasonable.<sup>11</sup> This proceeding arises out of issues raised in the NECEC Transmission LLC ("NECEC")/Avangrid Complaint Against NextEra/Seabrook (related to the interconnection of the New England Clean Energy Connect transmission project ("NECEC Project")) summarized below (EL21-6). Specifically, the FERC identified a concern that "Schedule 25's definition of Affected Party and Tariff section I.3.10 may be unjust and unreasonable to the extent they may allow generating facilities and their components to be identified as facilities on which adverse impacts must be remedied before an elective transmission upgrade can interconnect to the ISO-NE transmission system, even though generators are not subject to the [FERC]'s open access transmission principles," and could result in upgrades identified on an Affected Party's system without any obligation for the Affected Party to construct the identified upgrades.<sup>12</sup>

Accordingly, the FERC directed ISO-NE to: (1) show cause as to why Schedule 25 and Tariff section I.3.10 remain just and reasonable or (2) explain what changes to Schedule 25 and/or Tariff section I.3.10 it believes would remedy the identified concerns if the FERC were to determine that Schedule 25 and/or Tariff section I.3.10 has become unjust and unreasonable and proceeds to establish a replacement rate. On September 8, 2021, the FERC issued a notice of the proceeding and of the refund effective date, which will be October 13, 2020 (the date the NECEC/Avangrid Complaint Against NextEra/Seabrook was filed). Those interested in participating in this proceeding were required to intervene on or before October 5, 2021.<sup>13</sup> NEPOOL, NESCOE, Brookfield, Calpine, Dominion, Eversource, HQ US, LS Power, MA AG, MMWEC, National Grid, NECEC Transmission, NEPGA, NextEra, NRG, CT DEEP, MA DOER, Pixelle Androscoggin (out-of-time), Vistra (out-of-time), American Clean Power Association ("ACPA"), EPSA, RENEW Northeast, and Public Citizen intervened.

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<sup>8</sup> The waiver only applies to a specific requirement that meetings be held *in person*. Other than the in-person requirement, such meetings must still be held consistent with the tariff, but should be conducted by other means (e.g. telephonically).

<sup>9</sup> *Temporary Action to Facilitate Social Distancing*, 177 FERC ¶ 61,174 (Dec. 8, 2021).

<sup>10</sup> *Temporary Action to Facilitate Social Distancing*, 171 FERC ¶ 61,004 (Apr. 2, 2020) (waiving notarization requirements through Sep. 1, 2020, contained in any tariff, rate schedule, service agreement, or contract subject to the FERC's jurisdiction under the Federal Power Act ("FPA"), the Natural Gas Act ("NGA"), or the Interstate Commerce Act); 172 FERC ¶ 61,151 (Aug. 20, 2020) (extending the waivers through Jan. 29, 2021); 174 FERC ¶ 61,047 (Jan. 25, 2021) (extending the waivers through July 31, 2021); 176 FERC ¶ 61,044 (July 26, 2021) (extending the waivers through Jan. 1, 2022).

<sup>11</sup> *NECEC Transmission LLC and Avangrid, Inc. v. NextEra Energy Resources, LLC et al. and ISO New England Inc.*, 176 FERC ¶ 61,148 (Sep. 7, 2021) ("Sep 7 Order").

<sup>12</sup> *Id.* at P 20.

<sup>13</sup> The Notice was published in the *Fed. Reg.* on Sep. 14, 2021 (Vol. 86, No. 175) p. 51,140.

**ISO-NE Answer.** On November 8, 2021, ISO-NE submitted its answer explaining why Schedule 25 and Tariff section I.3.10 remain just and reasonable. ISO-NE called for the FERC to “assist Affected Parties and Interconnection Customers in resolving any disputes pertaining to upgrades on Affected Systems—such as the dispute between NECEC Transmission and NextEra Energy Seabrook, LLC in Docket No. EL21-6—as quickly as possible.” Interested parties had until January 7, 2022 to address whether ISO-NE’s existing Tariff remains just and reasonable and if not, what changes to ISO-NE’s Tariff should be implemented as a replacement rate.

**Comments.** Comments were filed by the January 7 deadline by [NEPOOL](#), [NECEC/Avangrid](#), [NEPGA](#), [NextEra](#). On January 20 [NextEra](#) answered the NECEC/Avangrid comments. On January 28, [NECEC](#) answered NextEra’s January 20 answer and [ISO-NE](#) answered NECEC’s Jan 7 comments.

This matter is pending before the FERC. If you have any questions concerning this matter, please contact Eric Runge (617-345-4735; [ekrunge@daypitney.com](mailto:ekrunge@daypitney.com)).

- **Green Development DAF Charges Complaint Against National Grid (EL21-47)**

As previously reported, on September 23, 2021, the FERC denied in part, but granted in part, the complaint (“Complaint”)<sup>14</sup> by Green Development, LLC (“Green Development”) against New England Power Company (“NEP”) and Narragansett Electric Company (together with NEP, “National Grid” or “Grid”).<sup>15</sup> The *Complaint Order* partially denied the Complaint, finding that Green Development did not meet its burden of proof that the assignment of Direct Assignment Facility (“DAF”) charges violated the first part of the ISO-NE Tariff definition of Direct Assignment Facilities (requiring that the facilities be constructed for the sole use/benefit of a particular Transmission Customer requesting service under the ISO-NE Tariff).<sup>16</sup> However, the *Complaint Order* found that Green Development demonstrated a failure by National Grid to comply with the requirement that the facilities be “specified in a separate agreement among ISO-NE, the Interconnection Customer and the Transmission Customer, as applicable, and the Transmission Owner whose transmission system is to be modified.”<sup>17</sup> As a result, National Grid is not permitted, unless and until it complies with that part of the definition, to assess DAF charges to Narragansett in association with the upgrades necessary for the Projects.<sup>18</sup>

**Request for Partial Rehearing Denied by Operation of Law.** On November 26, 2021, the FERC issued a “Notice of Denial of Rehearings by Operation of Law and Providing for Further Consideration”.<sup>19</sup> The Notice confirmed that the 60-day period during which a petition for review of the *Green Development Complaint Order* could be filed with an appropriate federal court was triggered when the FERC did not act on Green Development’s request for partial rehearing of the *Complaint Order*.<sup>20</sup> The Notice also indicated that the FERC would address, as is its right, the rehearing requests in a future order, and may modify or set aside its orders, in whole or in part, “in such manner as it shall deem proper.”

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<sup>14</sup> The Complaint requested a finding that Grid’s assessment of Direct Assignment Facility (“DAF”) charges for Green Development’s projects is unauthorized under the ISO-NE Tariff (the “Complaint”).

<sup>15</sup> *Green Development, LLC v. New England Power Co. and Narragansett Elec. Co.*, 176 FERC ¶ 61,193 (Sep. 23, 2021) (“*Green Development Complaint Order*” or “*Complaint Order*”).

<sup>16</sup> *Id.* at PP 54-55, 59-60.

<sup>17</sup> *Id.* at PP 54, 61-62.

<sup>18</sup> *Id.* at P 62.

<sup>19</sup> Notice of Denial of Rehearing by Operation of Law and Providing for Further Consideration, *Green Development, LLC v. New England Power Co. and Narragansett Elec. Co.*, 177 FERC ¶ 62,099 (Nov. 26, 2021).

<sup>20</sup> On October 25, 2021, Green Development requested partial rehearing of the *Green Development Complaint Order*, asking the FERC to reverse its finding that Green Development did not meet its burden of proof that the assignment of DAF charges violated the first part of the ISO-NE Tariff definition of DAF (requiring that the facilities be constructed for the sole use/benefit of a particular Transmission Customer requesting service under the ISO-NE Tariff), and grant its Complaint in full.

**Green Development Complaint Allegheny Order.** As is its right under section 313(a) of the FPA, the FERC issued an order, on January 20, 2022, modifying the discussion in the *Complaint Order* but reaching the same result.<sup>21</sup> Challenges, if any, to the *Complaint Order* and the *Green Development Complaint Allegheny Order* would have had to have been filed in Federal Court on or before January 21, 2022. **No challenges having been filed in Federal Court, this matter is concluded.** If you have any questions concerning this proceeding, please contact Pat Gerity (860-275-0533; [pmgerity@daypitney.com](mailto:pmgerity@daypitney.com)).

- **NECEC/Avangrid Complaint Against NextEra/Seabrook (EL21-6)**

As previously reported, NECEC and Avangrid Inc. (together, “Avangrid”) filed a complaint (the “Complaint”) on October 13, 2020 requesting FERC action “to stop NextEra from unlawfully interfering with the interconnection of the NECEC Project and seeking, among other things, an initial, expedited order that would grant certain relief<sup>22</sup> and direct NextEra to immediately commence engineering, design, planning and procurement activities that are necessary for NextEra to construct the generator owned transmission upgrades during Seabrook Station’s Planned 2021 Outage. NextEra submitted an answer to the October 13 Complaint (requesting the FERC dismiss or deny the Complaint) and National Grid filed comments. Doc-less interventions were filed by Dominion, Eversource, Calpine, Exelon, HQ US, MA AG, MMWEC National Grid, NESCOE, NRG, and Public Citizen. Avangrid answered NextEra’s answer and NextEra answered Avangrid’s November 17 answer (“supplemental answer”), repeating its request that the FERC dismiss or deny the Complaint. Avangrid also answered the supplemental answer.

Avangrid amended the Complaint on March 26, 2021 to reflect that aspects of the relief originally requested in the Complaint are no longer feasible within the timeline previously sought. Avangrid continues to seek expeditious FERC action, requesting in its March 26 filing a FERC order on or before May 7, 2021 (which did not occur). On April 15, 2021, NextEra answered the amended Complaint. On April 20, 2021, Avangrid answered NextEra’s April 15 answer. On May 6, 2021, ISO-NE submitted a letter to express importance of prompt resolution of these matters. On May 17, Avangrid submitted a letter supporting ISO-NE’s May 6, 2021 letter.

**Additional Briefing.** On September 7, 2021, the FERC issued an order establishing additional briefing in this proceeding and instituted a broader Section 206 proceeding (see EL21-94 above).<sup>23</sup> Initial briefs<sup>24</sup> were due on or before October 7, 2021, and were filed by [ISO-NE](#), [Avangrid](#), [NextEra](#), [MA AG](#), [NEPGA/EPSC](#), [MA DOER](#). Reply briefs were due on or before October 22, 2021, and were filed by [Avangrid](#), [NextEra](#), [ISO-NE](#). Avangrid answered NextEra’s November 4 answer, NextEra moved to lodge a letter from a Branch Chief of the Nuclear Regulatory

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<sup>21</sup> *Green Development, LLC v. New England Power Co. and Narragansett Elec. Co.*, 178 FERC ¶ 61,036 (Jan. 20, 2022) (“*Green Development Complaint Allegheny Order*”)

<sup>22</sup> Directing NextEra to comply with the ISO-NE OATT, to comply with open access requirements, and to cease and desist unlawful interference with the NECEC Project; and to have the FERC temporarily revoke NextEra’s blanket waiver under Part 358 of the FERC’s regulations and to initiate an investigation and require NextEra to preserve and provide documents related to the interconnection of the NECEC Project.

<sup>23</sup> *NECEC Transmission LLC and Avangrid, Inc. v. NextEra Energy Resources, LLC et al. and ISO New England Inc.*, 176 FERC ¶ 61,148 (Sep. 7, 2021).

<sup>24</sup> The FERC requested additional briefing from the Parties, as well as from ISO-NE, on the following issues: (i) whether or not Seabrook’s breaker is properly identified as a part of Seabrook’s generating facility; (ii) if Seabrook’s breaker is part of Seabrook’s generating facility, under what authority, if any, Seabrook may be subject to the upgrade obligations imposed on Affected Parties under the ISO-NE Tariff; (iii) if Seabrook’s breaker is part of Seabrook’s generating facility, what obligations, if any, Seabrook has under its LGIA with respect to replacement of the breaker and whether or not ISO New England Operating Documents and Applicable Reliability Standards impose an obligation to replace the breaker. If Seabrook’s breaker is appropriately classified as a system protection facility, what obligations Seabrook has to replace the breaker. If the Seabrook LGIA obligates Seabrook to act, a description of the scope of Seabrook’s obligation under the LGIA; (iv) whether there exists any solution for the interconnection of the NECEC Project that may be implemented without the replacement of Seabrook’s breaker; and (v) If replacement of Seabrook’s breaker is necessary for the interconnection of the NECEC Project, whether there exists any interim solution for the interconnection of the NECEC Project that would allow energization of the NECEC Project prior to the replacement of Seabrook’s breaker.



Commission (“NRC”), including an Inspection Report for Seabrook Station for the time period from July 1, 2021 through September 30, 2021 (together, the “NRC Seabrook Report”), to directly refute a central claim of Avangrid (that Seabrook should have already replaced the Generation Breaker at issue in this proceeding), and Avangrid opposed that motion to lodge (asserting that the NRC Seabrook Report is outside the scope of these proceedings and will not assist the FERC in its decision making). With briefing complete, this matter is again before the FERC. If you have any questions concerning this matter, please contact Eric Runge (617-345-4735; [ekrunge@daypitney.com](mailto:ekrunge@daypitney.com)).

- **NextEra Energy Seabrook Declaratory Order Petition re: NECEC Elective Upgrade Costs Dispute (EL21-3)**

In a related matter, initiated a week earlier than the Avangrid Complaint, NextEra Energy Seabrook, LLC (“Seabrook”) filed a Petition for a Declaratory Order (“Petition”) “by which it seeks to understand the scope of its FERC-jurisdictional regulatory obligations with respect to the project (“NECEC Elective Upgrade”), and to resolve its dispute with NECEC”. Specifically, Seabrook asked the FERC to declare that: (1) Seabrook is not required to incur a financial loss to upgrade, for NECEC’s sole benefit, a 24.5 kV generator circuit breaker and ancillary equipment (“Generation Breaker”) at Seabrook Station; (2) “Good Utility Practice” for replacement of the nuclear plant Generation Breaker is defined in terms of the practices of the nuclear power industry, such that Seabrook’s proposed definition of that term is appropriate for use in a facilities agreement with NECEC; and (3) Seabrook will not be liable for consequential damages for the service it provides to NECEC under a facilities agreement (collectively, the “Requested Declarations”). Alternatively, Seabrook asked that the FERC declare that nothing in ISO-NE’s Tariff requires Seabrook to enter into an agreement to replace the Generation Breaker, and therefore, Seabrook and the Joint Owners are entitled to bargain for appropriate terms and conditions to recover their costs, to define Good Utility Practice, and to limit liability associated with providing the service (“Alternative Declaration”).

Comments on Seabrook’s Petition were filed by Eversource, MMWEC and NEPGA. Avangrid and NECEC Transmission (“Avangrid”) protested the Declaratory Order Petition. Doc-less interventions were filed by Avangrid, Dominion, Eversource, Calpine, Exelon, HQ US, National Grid, NESCOE, NRG, and Public Citizen. NextEra answered Avangrid’s protest and Avangrid answered NextEra’s answer. On May 6, 2021, ISO-NE submitted a letter in this proceeding, as well as in EL21-6, to express importance of prompt resolution of these matters. NextEra moved to lodge both an August 29, 2021 filing containing an executed Engineering and Procurement Agreement (“E&P Agreement”) between Seabrook and NECEC Transmission, LLC (“NECEC”) that was filed with the FERC on August 19, 2021 and the NRC Seabrook Report. Avangrid answered that motion, asserting that the NRC Seabrook Report was outside the scope of the proceeding and the motion to lodge should be denied. This matter remains pending before the FERC. If you have any questions concerning this matter, please contact Eric Runge (617-345-4735; [ekrunge@daypitney.com](mailto:ekrunge@daypitney.com)).

- **Base ROE Complaints I-IV: (EL11-66, EL13-33; EL14-86; EL16-64)**

There are four proceedings pending before the FERC in which consumer representatives seek to reduce the TOs’ return on equity (“Base ROE”) for regional transmission service.

- **Base ROE Complaint I (EL11-66).** In the first Base ROE Complaint proceeding, the FERC concluded that the TOs’ ROE had become unjust and unreasonable,<sup>25</sup> set the TOs’ Base ROE at 10.57% (reduced from 11.14%), capped the TOs’ total ROE (Base ROE *plus* transmission incentive adders) at 11.74%, and required implementation effective as of October 16, 2014 (the date of *Opinion*

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<sup>25</sup> The TOs’ 11.14% pre-existing Base ROE was established in *Opinion 489*. *Bangor Hydro-Elec. Co.*, Opinion No. 489, 117 FERC ¶ 61,129 (2006), *order on reh’g*, 122 FERC ¶ 61,265 (2008), *order granting clarif.*, 124 FERC ¶ 61,136 (2008), *aff’d sub nom.*, Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Util. Control v. FERC, 593 F.3d 30 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (“*Opinion 489*”).

531-A).<sup>26</sup> However, the FERC's orders were challenged, and in *Emera Maine*,<sup>27</sup> the DC Circuit vacated the FERC's prior orders, and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its order. The FERC's determinations in *Opinion 531* are thus no longer precedential, though the FERC remains free to re-adopt those determinations on remand as long as it provides a reasoned basis for doing so.

- **Base ROE Complaints II & III (EL13-33 and EL14-86) (consolidated).** The second (EL13-33)<sup>28</sup> and third (EL14-86)<sup>29</sup> ROE complaint proceedings were consolidated for purposes of hearing and decision, though the parties were permitted to litigate a separate ROE for each refund period. After hearings were completed, ALJ Sterner issued a 939-paragraph, 371-page *Initial Decision*, which lowered the base ROEs for the EL13-33 and EL14-86 refund periods from 11.14% to 9.59% and 10.90%, respectively.<sup>30</sup> The *Initial Decision* also lowered the ROE ceilings. Parties to these proceedings filed briefs on exception to the FERC, which has not yet issued an opinion on the ALJ's *Initial Decision*.
- **Base ROE Complaint IV (EL16-64).** The fourth and final ROE proceeding<sup>31</sup> also went to hearing before an ALJ, Judge Glazer, who issued his initial decision on March 27, 2017.<sup>32</sup> The *Base ROE IV Initial Decision* concluded that the currently-filed base ROE of 10.57%, which may reach a maximum ROE of 11.74% with incentive adders, was **not** unjust and unreasonable for the Complaint IV period, and hence was not unlawful under section 206 of the FPA.<sup>33</sup> Parties in this proceeding filed briefs on exception to the FERC, which has not yet issued an opinion on the *Base ROE IV Initial Decision*.

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<sup>26</sup> *Coakley Mass. Att'y Gen. v. Bangor Hydro-Elec. Co.*, 147 FERC ¶ 61,234 (2014) ("*Opinion 531*"), order on paper hearing, 149 FERC ¶ 61,032 (2014) ("*Opinion 531-A*"), order on reh'g, 150 FERC ¶ 61,165 (2015) ("*Opinion 531-B*").

<sup>27</sup> *Emera Maine v. FERC*, 854 F.3d 9 (D.C. Cir. 2017) ("*Emera Maine*"). *Emera Maine* vacated the FERC's prior orders in the Base ROE Complaint I proceeding, and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its order. The Court agreed with both the TOs (that the FERC did not meet the Section 206 obligation to first find the existing rate unlawful before setting the new rate) and "Customers" (that the 10.57% ROE was not based on reasoned decision-making, and was a departure from past precedent of setting the ROE at the midpoint of the zone of reasonableness).

<sup>28</sup> The 2012 Base ROE Complaint, filed by Environment Northeast (now known as Acadia Center), Greater Boston Real Estate Board, National Consumer Law Center, and the NEPOOL Industrial Customer Coalition ("NICC", and together, the "2012 Complainants"), challenged the TOs' 11.14% ROE, and seeks a reduction of the Base ROE to 8.7%.

<sup>29</sup> The 2014 Base ROE Complaint, filed July 31, 2014 by the Massachusetts Attorney General, together with a group of State Advocates, Publicly Owned Entities, End Users, and End User Organizations (together, the "2014 ROE Complainants"), seeks to reduce the current 11.14% Base ROE to 8.84% (but in any case no more than 9.44%) and to cap the Combined ROE for all rate base components at 12.54%. 2014 ROE Complainants state that they submitted this Complaint seeking refund protection against payments based on a pre-incentives Base ROE of 11.14%, and a reduction in the Combined ROE, relief as yet not afforded through the prior ROE proceedings.

<sup>30</sup> *Environment Northeast v. Bangor Hydro-Elec. Co. and Mass. Att'y Gen. v. Bangor Hydro-Elec. Co.*, 154 FERC ¶ 63,024 (Mar. 22, 2016) ("*2012/14 ROE Initial Decision*").

<sup>31</sup> The 4th ROE Complaint asked the FERC to reduce the TOs' current 10.57% return on equity ("Base ROE") to 8.93% and to determine that the upper end of the zone of reasonableness (which sets the incentives cap) is no higher than 11.24%. The FERC established hearing and settlement judge procedures (and set a refund effective date of April 29, 2016) for the 4th ROE Complaint on September 20, 2016. Settlement procedures did not lead to a settlement, were terminated, and hearings were held subsequently held December 11-15, 2017. The September 26, 2016 order was challenged on rehearing, but rehearing of that order was denied on January 16, 2018. *Belmont Mun. Light Dept. v. Central Me. Power Co.*, 156 FERC ¶ 61,198 (Sep. 20, 2016) ("*Base ROE Complaint IV Order*"), reh'g denied, 162 FERC ¶ 61,035 (Jan. 18, 2018) (together, the "*Base ROE Complaint IV Orders*"). The *Base ROE Complaint IV Orders*, as described in Section XVI below, have been appealed to, and are pending before, the DC Circuit.

<sup>32</sup> *Belmont Mun. Light Dept. v. Central Me. Power Co.*, 162 FERC ¶ 63,026 (Mar. 27, 2018) ("*Base ROE Complaint IV Initial Decision*").

<sup>33</sup> *Id.* at P 2.; Finding of Fact (B).



**October 16, 2018 Order Proposing Methodology for Addressing ROE Issues Remanded in Emera Maine and Directing Briefs.** On October 16, 2018, the FERC, addressing the issues that were remanded in *Emera Maine*, proposed a new methodology for determining whether an existing ROE remains just and reasonable.<sup>34</sup> The FERC indicated its intention that the methodology be its policy going forward, including in the four currently pending New England proceedings (*see, however, Opinion 569-A*<sup>35</sup> (EL14-12; EL15-45) in Section XI below). The FERC established a paper hearing on how its proposed methodology should apply to the four pending ROE proceedings.<sup>36</sup>

At highest level, the new methodology will determine whether (1) an existing ROE is unjust and unreasonable under the first prong of FPA section 206 and (2) if so, what the replacement ROE should be under the second prong of FPA section 206. In determining whether an existing ROE is unjust and under the first prong of Section 206, the FERC stated that it will determine a “composite” zone of reasonableness based on the results of three models: the Discounted Cash Flow (“DCF”), Capital Asset Pricing Model (“CAPM”), and Expected Earnings models. Within that composite zone, a smaller, “presumptively reasonable” zone will be established. Absent additional evidence to the contrary, if the utility's existing ROE falls within the presumptively reasonable zone, it is not unjust and unreasonable. Changes in capital market conditions since the existing ROE was established may be considered in assessing whether the ROE is unjust and unreasonable.

If the FERC finds an existing ROE unjust and unreasonable, it will then determine the new just and reasonable ROE using an averaging process. For a diverse group of average risk utilities, FERC will average four values: the midpoints of the DCF, CAPM and Expected Earnings models, and the results of the Risk Premium model. For a single utility of average risk, the FERC will average the medians rather than the midpoints. The FERC said that it would continue to use the same proxy group criteria it established in *Opinion 531* to run the ROE models, but it made a significant change to the manner in which it will apply the high-end outlier test.

The FERC provided preliminary analysis of how it would apply the proposed methodology in the Base ROE I Complaint, suggesting that it would affirm its holding that an 11.14% Base ROE is unjust and unreasonable. The FERC suggested that it would adopt a 10.41% Base ROE and cap any preexisting incentive-based total ROE at 13.08%.<sup>37</sup> The new ROE would be effective as of the date of *Opinion 531-A*, or October 16, 2014. Accordingly, the issue to be addressed in the Base ROE Complaint II proceeding is whether the ROE established on remand in the first complaint proceeding remained just and reasonable based on financial data for the six-month period September 2013 through February 2014 addressed by the evidence presented by the participants in the second proceeding. Similarly, briefing in the third and fourth complaints will have to address whether whatever ROE is in effect as a result of the immediately preceding complaint proceeding continues to be just and reasonable.

The FERC directed participants in the four proceedings to submit briefs regarding the proposed approaches to the FPA section 206 inquiry and how to apply them to the complaints (separate briefs for each

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<sup>34</sup> *Coakley v. Bangor Hydro-Elec. Co.*, 165 FERC ¶ 61,030 (Oct. 18, 2018) (“*Order Directing Briefs*” or “*Coakley*”).

<sup>35</sup> *Ass’n of Buss. Advocating Tariff Equity v. Midcontinent Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc.*, Opinion No. 569-A, 171 FERC ¶ 61,154 (2020) (“*Opinion 569-A*”). The refinements to the FERC’s ROE methodology included: (i) the use of the Risk Premium model instead of only relying on the DCF model and CAPM under both prongs of FPA Section 206; (ii) adjusting the relative weighting of long- and short-term growth rates, increasing the weight for the short-term growth rate to 80% and reducing to 20% the weight given to the long-term growth rate in the two-step DCF model; (iii) modifying the high-end outlier test to treat any proxy company as high-end outlier if its cost of equity estimated under the model in question is more than 200% of the median result of all the potential proxy group members in that model before any high- or low-end outlier test is applied, subject to a natural break analysis. This is a shift from the 150% threshold applied in *Opinion 569*; and (iv) calculating the zone of reasonableness in equal thirds, instead of using the quartile approach that was applied in *Opinion 569*.

<sup>36</sup> *Id.* at P 19.

<sup>37</sup> *Id.* at P 59.

proceeding). Additional financial data or evidence concerning economic conditions in any proceeding must relate to periods before the conclusion of the hearings in the relevant complaint proceeding. Following a FERC notice granting a request by the TOs and Customers<sup>38</sup> for an extension of time to submit briefs, the latest date for filing initial and reply briefs was extended to January 11 and March 8, 2019, respectively. On January 11, initial briefs were filed by EMCOS, Complainant-Aligned Parties, TOs, EEI, Louisiana PSC, Southern California Edison, and AEP. As part of their initial briefs, each of the Louisiana PSC, SEC and AEP also moved to intervene out-of-time. Those interventions were opposed by the TOs on January 24, 2019. The Louisiana PSC answered the TOs' January 24 motion on February 12. Reply briefs were due March 8, 2019 and were submitted by the TOs, Complainant-Aligned Parties, EMCOS, and FERC Trial Staff.

***TOs Request to Re-Open Record and file Supplemental Paper Hearing Brief.*** On December 26, 2019, the TOs filed a Supplemental Brief that addresses the consequences of the November 21 *MISO ROE Order*<sup>39</sup> and requested that the FERC re-open the record to permit that additional testimony on the impacts of the *MISO ROE Order*'s changes. On January 21, 2020, EMCOS and CAPs opposed the TOs' request and brief.

These matters remain pending before the FERC. If you have any questions concerning these matters, please contact Eric Runge (617-345-4735; [ekrunge@daypitney.com](mailto:ekrunge@daypitney.com)) or Joe Fagan (202-218-3901; [jfagan@daypitney.com](mailto:jfagan@daypitney.com)).

## II. Rate, ICR, FCA, Cost Recovery Filings

- **ICR-Related Values and HQICCs – Annual Reconfiguration Auctions (ER22-556)**

On January 26, 2022, the FERC accepted the materials that identify the Installed Capacity Requirement ("ICR"), Local Sourcing Requirements ("LSR"), Maximum Capacity Limits ("MCL"), Hydro Quebec Interconnection Capability Credits ("HQICCs"), and capacity requirement values for the System-Wide and Marginal Reliability Impact Capacity Demand Curves (collectively, the "ICR-Related Values") for the third annual reconfiguration auction ("ARA") for the 2022-23 Capability Year, the second ARA for the 2023-24 Capability Year, and the first ARA for the 2024-25 Capability Year.<sup>40</sup> The ICR-Related Values were accepted effective January 29, 2022, as requested. Unless the January 26 order is challenged, this proceeding will be concluded. If you have any questions concerning these matter, please contact Eric Runge (617-345-4735; [ekrunge@daypitney.com](mailto:ekrunge@daypitney.com)).

- **FCA16 Qualification Informational Filing (ER22-391)**

On January 21, 2022, the FERC accepted ISO-NE's informational filing (the "FCA16 Informational Filing") for qualification in FCA16.<sup>41</sup> As previously reported, the Informational Filing contained ISO-NE's determinations that four Capacity Zones will be modelled for FCA16 -- Southeastern New England ("SENE"), Northern New England ("NNE"), the Maine Capacity Zone ("Maine"), and Rest of Pool. SENE will again be modeled as import-constrained; NNE will be modeled as export-constrained. The Maine Load Zone will be modeled as a separate nested export-constrained Capacity Zone within NNE. The Informational Filing reported that there will be 33,356 MW of existing capacity in FCA16 competing with 5,246 MW of new capacity under a Net ICR of 31,645 MW (ICR minus HQICCs). ISO-NE reported also that there were a total of 503 MW of Static De-List Bids. A summary of the De-List Bids accepted and those rejected for reliability purposes was included in a privileged Attachment E to the FCA16 Informational Filing. ISO-NE qualified 15

<sup>38</sup> For purposes of the motion seeking clarification, "Customers" are CT PURA, MA AG and EMCOS.

<sup>39</sup> *Ass'n of Buss. Advocating Tariff Equity v. Midcontinent Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc.*, Opinion No. 569, 169 FERC ¶ 61,129 (Nov. 21, 2019) ("*MISO ROE Order*"), *order on reh'g*, Opinion No. 569-A, 171 FERC ¶ 61,154 (May 21, 2020).

<sup>40</sup> *ISO New England Inc. and New England Power Pool Participants Comm.*, Docket No. ER22-556-000 (Jan. 26, 2022) (unpublished letter order).

<sup>41</sup> *ISO New England Inc.*, 178 FERC ¶ 61,050 (Jan. 21, 2022) ("*FCA16 Qual Info Filing Order*").

demand bids, totaling 994 MW, and 193 supply offers, totaling 779 MW, to participate in the substitution auction.

In accepting the FCA16 Informational Filing, the FERC rejected protests filed by Borrego Solar Systems (“Borrego”) and jointly by Anbaric Development Partners, LLC (“Anbaric”) and Massachusetts Municipal Wholesale Electric Company (“MMWEC”), which had each protested the basis for the IMM’s mitigation of a storage resource.<sup>42</sup> The FERC dismissed Borrego’s protest as moot since the Build Back Better Act, upon which its request were contingent, had not yet become law.<sup>43</sup> With respect to the Anbaric/MMWEC protest, the FERC found that Anbaric and MMWEC did not provide sufficient documentation and information to support certain component values they used to calculate their proposed Offer Floor Price for the Westover Project and that the IMM was therefore authorized by, and acted consistently with, the Tariff when it set the final Offer Floor Price for the Project to the storage ORTP.<sup>44</sup> In addition, consistent with ISO-NE representations in the proceeding that it must make minor modifications to certain incorrect Qualified Capacity values, the FERC directed ISO-NE to modify the incorrect values for the identified resources on or before February 7, 2022.<sup>45</sup> Of note, Chairman Glick and Commissioner Clements, in a joint concurrence, wrote separately to explain their concerns with the Minimum Offer Price Rule (“MOPR”), encouraging ISO-NE to “promptly put forward a proposal that addresses [their concerns] and provides a path to a more durable approach to the issue of buyer-side market power”.<sup>46</sup>

Unless the *FCA16 Qual Info Filing Order* is challenged, with any challenges due on or before February 22, 2022, this proceeding will be concluded. If you have any questions concerning this matter, please contact Sebastian Lombardi (860-275-0663; [slombardi@daypitney.com](mailto:slombardi@daypitney.com)) or Rosendo Garza (860-275-0660; [rgarza@daypitney.com](mailto:rgarza@daypitney.com)).

- **Mystic 8/9 Cost of Service Agreement (ER18-1639)**

Each of the *July 17 Orders*<sup>47</sup> and the *Mystic ROE Order*,<sup>48</sup> which addressed in part or in whole the Cost-of-Service Agreement (“COS Agreement”)<sup>49</sup> among Constellation Mystic Power (“Mystic”), Exelon Generation Company (“ExGen”), have been appealed to the DC Circuit (*see* Section XVI below).

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<sup>42</sup> Borrego protested the mitigation to zero of an assumed 26.2% percent value for a storage Investment Tax Credit (“ITC”) included in the “Build Back Better Act” that had not yet, but has since, been passed; Anbaric/MMWEC protested the IMM’s rejection of project-specific offer components that rely on either documented competitive advantages enjoyed by each of Anbaric/MMWEC or on FERC-approved storage ORTP offer components.

<sup>43</sup> *Id.* at P 22.

<sup>44</sup> *Id.* at PP 36-37.

<sup>45</sup> *Id.* at P 18.

<sup>46</sup> *Id.*, Glick and Clements *concurring*, at P 6.

<sup>47</sup> The “*July 17 Orders*” are the *July 2018 Rehearing Order*, *Dec 2018 Rehearing Order* and the *July 17 Compliance Order*. *Constellation Mystic Power, LLC*, 164 FERC ¶ 61,022 (July 13, 2018) (“*July 2018 Order*”), *clarif. granted in part and denied in part, reh’g denied*, 172 FERC ¶ 61,043 (July 17, 2020) (“*July 2018 Rehearing Order*”); *Constellation Mystic Power, LLC*, 165 FERC ¶ 61,267 (Dec. 20, 2018) (“*Dec 2018 Order*”), *set aside in part, clarification granted in part and clarification denied in part*, 172 FERC ¶ 61,044 (July 17, 2020) (“*Dec 2018 Rehearing Order*”); *Constellation Mystic Power, LLC*, 172 FERC ¶ 61,045 (July 17, 2020) (“*July 17 Compliance Order*”) (order on compliance and directing further compliance).

<sup>48</sup> *Constellation Mystic Power, LLC*, 176 FERC ¶ 61,019 (July 15, 2021) (“*Mystic ROE Order*”) (setting the base ROE for the Mystic COS Agreement at 9.33%).

<sup>49</sup> The COS Agreement, submitted on May 16, 2018, is between Mystic, Exelon Generation Company, LLC (“ExGen”) and ISO-NE. The COS Agreement is to provide cost-of-service compensation to Mystic for continued operation of Mystic 8 & 9, which ISO-NE has requested be retained to ensure fuel security for the New England region, for the period of June 1, 2022 to May 31, 2024. The COS Agreement provides for recovery of Mystic’s fixed and variable costs of operating Mystic 8 & 9 over the 2-year term of the Agreement, which is based on the pro forma cost-of-service agreement contained in Appendix I to Market Rule 1, modified and updated to address

***Mystic ROE Allegheny Order.*** On November 18, 2021, the FERC issued an “Allegheny Order”<sup>50</sup> modifying the discussion in the *Mystic ROE Order* and setting aside that *Order*, in part.<sup>51</sup> In particular, agreeing with Connecticut Parties that “Otter Tail is properly excluded [as an outlier] from the [Discounted Cash Flow model (“DCF”)] under the natural break analysis”, the FERC found that the resulting average of the medians of the DCF, Capital Asset Pricing, and Risk Premium models (which sets the ROE) is 9.19%.<sup>52</sup> According the FERC directed Mystic to submit a compliance filing revising the Mystic Agreement to reflect a 9.19% (rather than a 9.33%) base ROE. The FERC also clarified that Avangrid’s exclusion from the proxy group was based on its controlled status (ownership stakes by a single entity greater than 50%) and not on the particulars of Iberdrola’s ownership or operations.<sup>53</sup> The FERC either disagreed with or dismissed as repetitive the remainder of the parties’ arguments on rehearing.

Mystic requested rehearing of the *Mystic ROE Allegheny Order* on December 18, 2021. On January 18, 2022, the FERC issued a “Notice of Denial of Rehearings by Operation of Law and Providing for Further Consideration”.<sup>54</sup> The Notice confirmed that the 60-day period during which a petition for review of the *Mystic ROE Allegheny Order* can be filed with an appropriate federal court was triggered when the FERC did not act on Mystic’s December 18, 2021 request for rehearing of the *Mystic ROE Allegheny Order*. As noted in Section XVI below, Mystic filed a petition for review of the *Mystic ROE Allegheny Order* with the DC Circuit Court of Appeals on January 18, 2022. The January 18 Notice also indicated that the FERC would address, as is its right, the rehearing requests in a future order, and may modify or set aside its orders, in whole or in part, “in such manner as it shall deem proper.”

***Revised ROE (Sixth) Compliance Filing (-014).*** On December 20, 2021, in response to the requirements of the *Mystic ROE Allegheny Order*, and subject to the outcome of the pending Federal Court appeals (see Section XVI), Mystic filed yet another revised COS Agreement. The sixth compliance filing revised (i) the Cost of Common Equity figures from 9.33% to 9.19%, for both Mystic 8&9 and Everett Marine Terminal (“Everett”), and (ii) the stated Annual Fixed Revenue Requirements for both the 2022/23 and 2023/24 Capacity Commitment Periods. Comments on the sixth compliance filing were due on or before January 10, 2022; none were filed. The Sixth Compliance Filing is pending before the FERC.

***First CapEx Info. Filing.*** On September 15, 2021, Mystic submitted, as required by orders in this proceeding and Sections I.B.1.i. and II.6.of Schedule 3A of the COS Agreement (“Protocols”), its informational filing to provide support for the capital expenditures and related costs that Mystic projects will be collected as an expense between June 1, 2022 to December 31, 2022 (“First CapEx Projects Info. Filing”). Formal challenges to the September 15 filing were submitted by the Eastern New England Customer-Owned Systems (“ENECOS”) and NESCOE. Comments on the formal challenges were due on or before November 17, 2021, and Mystic responded on November 17 asserting that that the challenges should be rejected without further procedures. ENECOS and

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Mystic’s unique circumstances, including the value placed on continued sourcing of fuel from the Distrigas liquefied natural gas (“LNG”) facility.

<sup>50</sup> An “Allegheny Order” is a merits rehearing order issued on or after the 31st day after receipt of a rehearing request, reflecting the FERC’s authority to “modify or set aside, in whole or in part,” its order until it files the record on appeal with a reviewing federal court. An Allegheny Order will use “modifying the discussion” if the FERC is providing a further explanation, but is not changing the outcome, of the underlying order; or “set aside” if the FERC is changing the outcome of the underlying order. Aggrieved parties have 60 days after a deemed denial to file a review petition, even if FERC has announced its intention to issue a further merits order.

<sup>51</sup> *Constellation Mystic Power, LLC*, 177 FERC ¶ 61,106 (Nov. 18, 2021) (“*Mystic ROE Allegheny Order*”) (re-setting Mystic’s ROE to 9.19%).

<sup>52</sup> *Id.* at P 15.

<sup>53</sup> *Id.* at P 21.

<sup>54</sup> *Constellation Mystic Power, LLC*, 178 FERC ¶ 62,028 (Jan. 18, 2022) (Notice of Denial of Reh’g by Operation of Law).

NESCOE replied to Mystic's November 17, 2021 reply on December 2 and December 6, respectively. The formal challenges are pending before the FERC.

If you have questions on any aspect of this proceeding, please contact Joe Fagan (202-218-3901; [jfagan@daypitney.com](mailto:jfagan@daypitney.com)) or Sebastian Lombardi (860-275-0663; [slombardi@daypitney.com](mailto:slombardi@daypitney.com)).

### III. Market Rule and Information Policy Changes, Interpretations and Waiver Requests

- **Waiver Request: Queue Position Modifications (ConnectGen South Wrentham) (ER22-864)**

On January 20, 2022, ConnectGen South Wrentham LLC ("South Wrentham") petitioned the FERC for a one-time, limited waiver of the requirements outlined in Schedule 22 section 4.4 of the Tariff (Queue Position Modifications). Specifically, the waiver request seeks an extension of the FCA resource clearing window under Schedule 22, Section 4.4, to allow South Wrentham to seek qualification for, and bid into, FCA17 with its existing queue position (QP877).<sup>55</sup> Absent the requested waiver, South Wrentham will be required to file a new Capacity Network Resource ("CNR")-only Interconnection Service application and be assigned a new queue position for purposes of participating in FCA 17. South Wrentham asserts that it has not had a meaningful opportunity to meet the Schedule 22, section 4.4 requirement to clear in an FCA under its current CNR Interconnection Service request given the "extensive, 420+ day delay in the completion of feasibility and system impact studies. Comments on South Wrentham's waiver request are due on or before February 10, 2022. If you have any questions concerning this matter, please contact Pat Gerity (860-275-0533; [pmgerity@daypitney.com](mailto:pmgerity@daypitney.com)).

- **CSO Termination: Killingly Energy Center (ER22-355)**

As previously reported, the FERC accepted ISO-NE's November 21, 2021 filing<sup>56</sup> to involuntarily terminate the CSO held by NTE Connecticut LLC ("NTE CT") as Project Sponsor for Resource No. 38633, the Killingly Energy Center on January 3, 2022.<sup>57</sup> In accepting the filing, the FERC found that the relevant condition for termination set forth in Tariff section III.13.3.4A was met,<sup>58</sup> and ISO-NE had fulfilled the requirement to consult with NTE CT before termination.<sup>59</sup> The CSO termination was accepted effective January 4, 2022. As a result of the CSO termination, ISO-NE will draw down the amount of financial assurance provided by NTE CT with respect to the Killingly CSO and Killingly will be ineligible to participate in FCA16.

Since the last Report, NTE CT not only requested rehearing of the *Killingly CSO Termination Order*, but also filed a motion for stay of that *Order*, in each case hoping to preserve Killingly's ability to participate in FCA16 on February 7, 2022. NTE CT's January 11, 2022 motion for stay was opposed by ISO-NE and NEPGA and was denied by the FERC on January 28, 2022.<sup>60</sup> In denying NTE CT's motion for stay, the FERC found that NTE was unable to demonstrate that it will suffer irreparable harm absent a stay, and found further that issuing the stay would substantially harm other market participants and was not in the public interest.<sup>61</sup> NTE CT's request of the FERC for rehearing is still pending, with FERC action required on or before February 11, 2022, or NTE CT's request will be

<sup>55</sup> South Wrentham is developing a 170 MW lithium-ion battery storage project to be located in Wrentham, Massachusetts.

<sup>56</sup> Comments on this filing were due Dec. 3, 2021, following a request by NTE CT for a one-week extension of time to respond to ISO-NE's filing (which the FERC granted on Dec. 3). NTE CT protested ISO-NE's filing on Dec. 3, 2021. ISO-NE answered NTE CT's protest on Dec. 20, 2021 and NTE CT answered ISO-NE's answer on Dec. 28, 2021. Doc-less interventions were filed by Calpine, Connecticut Light & Power ("CL&P"), Emera Energy Services, NEPGA, NESCOE, National Grid, CT AG, CT DEEP, EPSA, Gemma Power Systems, North Atlantic States Regional Council of Carpenters, Public Citizen, Sierra Club, Yankee Gas, CT OCC, and Mitsubishi Power Americas, Inc.

<sup>57</sup> *ISO New England Inc.*, 178 FERC ¶ 61,001 (Jan. 3, 2022), *reh'g requested* ("Killingly CSO Termination Order").

<sup>58</sup> *Id.* at P 25.

<sup>59</sup> *Id.* at P 27.

<sup>60</sup> *ISO New England Inc.*, 178 FERC ¶ 61,063 (Jan. 28, 2022) ("Order Denying Stay").

<sup>61</sup> *Id.* at PP 12-19.

deemed denied by operation of law. Particularly in light of the *Order Denying Stay*, it appears unlikely that there will be any further FERC order addressing the Killingly CSO termination prior to FCA16.

In addition, when the FERC didn't act on the motion for stay on the expedited basis requested by NTE CT, NTE CT also petitioned the DC Circuit for a stay of the *Killingly CSO Termination Order*. That request is pending before the Court (see Section XVI below).

If you have any questions concerning these matters, please contact Pat Gerity (860-275-0533; [pmgerity@daypitney.com](mailto:pmgerity@daypitney.com)) or Sebastian Lombardi (860-275-0663; [slombardi@daypitney.com](mailto:slombardi@daypitney.com)).

- **Waiver Request: FCA16 Qualification (Andro Hydro) (ER22-174)**

On January 7, 2022, the FERC denied the request by Andro Hydro LLC ("Andro Hydro") for a one-time waiver of the FCM qualification rules to allow Andro Hydro's Riley-Jay-Otis-Livermore hydroelectric generating resource to participate in the sixteenth Forward Capacity Auction ("FCA16") at a reduced qualification level (8 MW rather than 12.884 MW).<sup>62</sup> As previously reported, Andro Hydro stated that ISO-NE informed it of its determination just one day ahead of the Tariff deadline to reduce the capacity amount for which FCA16 qualification sought, insufficient time for it to understand and address ISO-NE's determination.<sup>63</sup> Andro Hydro sought the necessary waivers to allow it to lower the FCA16 MWs for its resource (avoiding any concerns regarding required upgrades), and participate in FCA16. In denying the request, the FERC found that Andro Hydro did not demonstrate that the waiver addressed a concrete problem, leaving unaddressed ISO-NE's claim that the waiver would not enable Andro Hydro to qualify to participate in FCA16 because the reduction of capacity would not resolve the fact that the Resource would overload the Surowiec South interface and the fact that a different resource with a higher priority queue position is the Conditional Qualified New Resource for FCA16.<sup>64</sup> Challenges, if any, to the January 7 order are due on or before February 7, 2022. If you have any questions concerning this matter, please contact Pat Gerity (860-275-0533; [pmgerity@daypitney.com](mailto:pmgerity@daypitney.com)).

#### IV. OATT Amendments / TOAs / Coordination Agreements

- **Tariff Changes Associated with *Order 1000 Lessons Learned* (ER22-733)**

On December 28, 2021, ISO-NE and NEPOOL filed proposed Tariff revisions, developed after a "lessons learned" process with stakeholders conducted shortly after the conclusion of the Boston RFP, intended to improve New England's competitive transmission planning process ("Transmission Planning Improvements"). An effective date of February 28, 2022 was requested for the Transmission Planning Improvements. The Participants Committee unanimously supported the Transmission Planning Improvements at its November 3, 2021 meeting (Consent Agenda Items # 3 & 4). Comments on this filing were due on or before January 18, 2022 and were filed by Public Systems<sup>65</sup> (highlighting that, while the revisions are incremental improvements, more needs to be done to ensure that New England is able to meet the region's ambitious policy mandates) and LS Power Grid Northeast, LLC ("LS Power") (requesting that the FERC either confirm that Section 4.3(a) permits a QTPS to include as part of its comprehensive proposal, elements that require the PTO to build new facilities not related to the interconnection of the proposal or, if not, reject the filing as unjust and unreasonable because "ISO New England failed to address its discriminatory policy of eliminating proposals from a nonincumbent [Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor ("QTPS")] that include requiring the PTO to build new facilities not related to the interconnection

<sup>62</sup> *Andro Hydro, LLC*, 178 FERC ¶ 61,007 (Jan. 7, 2022)

<sup>63</sup> ISO-NE determined that Andro Hydro's resource did not qualify to participate in FCA16 because a portion of the administered transmission system owned by CMP would require upgrades (not expected to be upgraded before the 2025-2026 Capacity Commitment Period ("CCP")) to allow the Resource to supply capacity.

<sup>64</sup> *Id.* at P 19.

<sup>65</sup> "Public Systems" are the Connecticut Municipal Electric Energy Coop. ("CMEEC"), Mass. Municipal Wholesale Elec. Co. ("MMWEC"), New Hampshire Elec. Coop., Inc. ("NHEC"), and Vermont Public Power Supply Authority ("VPPSA").



of the proposal”). On February 1, Advanced Energy Economy (“AEE”) submitted an answer in support of LS Power’s January 18 request for clarification or protest (stating that “LS Power points out a key remaining barrier resulting from ISO-NE’s interpretation of Section 4.3(a) of Attachment K” and urging the FERC to confirm that “a QTPS can submit a proposal that requires the incumbent Participating Transmission Owner (“PTO”) to build new facilities or that relies on property in which the PTO has an interest”). Champlain VT, Eversource, National Grid, NESCOE, the MA DPU and RENEW Northeast filed doc-less interventions only. This matter is pending before the FERC. If you have any questions concerning this matter, please contact Eric Runge (617-345-4735; [ekrunge@daypitney.com](mailto:ekrunge@daypitney.com)).

- **Attachment K Planning Changes (ER22-727)**

On December 27, 2021, ISO-NE and NEPOOL filed proposed Tariff revisions Tariff revisions to incorporate a supplementary transmission planning mechanism for ISO-NE to perform state-requested, scenario-based transmission analysis as a permanent feature of the Attachment K Regional System Planning Process (“RSP”) (the “Attachment K Planning Changes”) The Attachment K Planning Changes provide an additional option for the New England states to further their energy policy goals. The Participants Committee unanimously supported the Attachment K Planning Changes at its December 2, 2021 meeting (Agenda Item # 6A). Comments on this filing were also due on or before January 18, 2022. Comments supporting and urging acceptance of the Attachment K Planning Changes were filed by AEE, NESCOE and Public Systems (with AEE and Public Systems both highlighting their view that additional work will need to be undertaken to address the region’s policy mandates). Champlain VT, Eversource, NESCOE, Natural Resources Defense Council and the Sustainable FERC Project (together, “NRDC”), and RENEW Northeast filed doc-less interventions only. This matter is pending before the FERC. If you have any questions concerning this matter, please contact Eric Runge (617-345-4735; [ekrunge@daypitney.com](mailto:ekrunge@daypitney.com)).

- **BTM Generation Proposal (ER21-2337)**

On July 1, 2021, ISO-NE and the Participating Transmission Owners Administrative Committee (“PTO AC”) jointly filed revisions to Tariff sections I and II to clarify that the calculation of Monthly Regional Network Load excludes load served by behind-the-meter (“BTM”) generation, which does not participate in the New England wholesale markets as a Generator Asset, as well as the portions of a Generator Asset utilized to net load at the same retail meter (“BTM Generation Proposal”). The Participants Committee supported the BTM Generation Proposal at its June 3, 2021 meeting (Consent Agenda Items #3 and 4). Comments on this filing were due on or before July 22, 2021. Comments and protests were filed by [NEPOOL](#), [the ISO-NE IMM](#), [AEE](#), [IECG](#), [NECOS/ENE](#), [NEPGA](#), [Public Systems](#), [MPUC/CT PURA/MA DPU](#), and the [VT PUC](#). Doc-less interventions were filed by Calpine, EMI, IECG, National Grid, NESCOE, and NRG. The PTO AC answered the NEPGA protest on August 6, 2021. Answers to the PTO AC Answer were filed by NEPGA and the IMM on August 13 and August 16, respectively. IECG filed an answer to the NEPGA and IMM answers.

**Deficiency Letter I.** On August 20, 2021, the FERC issued a deficiency letter, directing ISO-NE to provide within 30 days additional information and clarifications. The responses to the Deficiency Letter were due and were filed by ISO-NE on September 20, 2021. Comments on ISO-NE’s deficiency letter responses were due on or before October 12, 2021, and NEPGA filed an amended protest and comments on that day. On October 27, 2021, the PTO AC answered NEPGA’s amended protest and comments.

**Deficiency Letter II.** On November 12, 2021, the FERC issued a second deficiency letter, directing ISO-NE to provide within 30 days further additional information.<sup>66</sup> The responses to the Deficiency Letter were due and were filed on December 13, 2021. The responses to the second deficiency letter re-set the 60-day deadline for FERC action on this matter to February 11, 2022. Comments on the responses to Deficiency Letter II were due on

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<sup>66</sup> Specifically, ISO-NE must (i) provide additional support or information regarding the current practices of TOs in calculating Monthly RNL and an illustrative example and a narrative explanation of how transmission costs would be reallocated among Network Customers as a result of the proposal; and (ii) an explanation as to how Filing Parties’ proposal is consistent with transmission planning practices with respect to the treatment of BTM generation.

or before January 3, 2022. On January 3, 2022, NEPGA amended its protest to include its comments on the response to Deficiency Letter II. On January 18, 2022, the PTO AC answered NEPGA's protest and comments as amended on January 3.

This matter is pending before the FERC, with FERC action required on or before February 11, 2022. If you have any questions concerning this matter, please contact Eric Runge (617-345-4735; [ekrunge@daypitney.com](mailto:ekrunge@daypitney.com)).

- **TOs Order 676-I Compliance Filing (ER21-2529)**

On July 27, 2021, the PTO AC, ISO-NE, Schedule 20A Service Providers, GMP, and VTransco filed revisions to ISO-NE Tariff Schedule 21-Common and Schedule 20A-Common in accordance with *Order 676-I*. The revisions include certain updated business practice standards (Version 003.2) adopted by the Wholesale Electric Quadrant ("WEQ") of the North American Energy Standards Board ("NAESB") and incorporated by reference in the FERC's regulations through *Order 676-I*. Comments on this filing were due on or before August 19, 2021; none were filed. National Grid filed a doc-less intervention on August 13, 2021.

**Amended Revisions (ER21-2529-001).** On October 22, 2021, the PTO AC submitted amendments to the July 27 compliance filing to include in Schedules 20A-Common and 21-Common revised and new WEQ standards identified in the FERC's March 3, 2020 errata notice to *Order 676-I* ("*Order 676-I Errata Notice*") but not included in the July 27, 2021 filing. Any comments on the errata filing were due on or before November 12, 2021; none were filed.

This matter remains pending before the FERC. If you have any questions concerning this matter, please contact Eric Runge (617-345-4735; [ekrunge@daypitney.com](mailto:ekrunge@daypitney.com)).

- **CSC Schedule 18 Order 676-I Compliance Filing (ER21-2509)**

On July 26, 2021, CSC and ISO-NE filed revisions to ISO-NE Tariff Schedule 18-Attachment Z in accordance with *Order 676-I*. The revisions include certain updated business practice standards (Version 003.2) adopted by NAESB's Wholesale Electric Quadrant and incorporated by reference in the FERC's regulations through *Order 676-I*. Comments on this filing were due on or before August 16, 2021; none were filed. National Grid and CSC filed doc-less interventions on August 13, 2021 and August 16, 2021, respectively.

**Amended Revisions (ER21-2509-001).** On October 27, 2021, ISO-NE and CSC submitted amendments to the July 26 compliance filing to include in Schedule 18 revised and new WEQ standards identified in the FERC's *Order 676-I Errata Notice* but not included in the July 26, 2021 filing. Any comments on the errata filing were due on or before November 17, 2021; none were filed.

This matter remains pending before the FERC. If you have any questions concerning this matter, please contact Eric Runge (617-345-4735; [ekrunge@daypitney.com](mailto:ekrunge@daypitney.com)).

- **ISO-NE/NEPOOL Order 676-I Compliance Filing (ER21-941)**

On January 26, 2021, ISO-NE and NEPOOL, in response to *Order 676-I*, jointly filed changes to incorporate by reference in Schedule 24 of the OATT the latest version (Version 003.2) of certain Standards for Business Practices and Communication Protocols for Public Utilities adopted by NAESB's Wholesale Electric Quadrant. The Participants Committee unanimously supported the *Order 676-I* revisions at its May 7, 2020 meeting. Comments on this filing were due on or before February 16, 2021; none were filed.

**Amended Revisions (ER21-941-001).** On October 22, 2021, ISO-NE and NEPOOL submitted amendments to the January 26 compliance filing to include in Schedule 24 revised and new WEQ standards identified in the *Order 676-I Errata Notice* but not included in the July 26, 2021 filing. Any comments on the errata filing were due on or before November 12, 2021; none were filed.



This matter remains pending before the FERC. If you have any questions concerning this matter, please contact Eric Runge (617-345-4735; [ekrunge@daypitney.com](mailto:ekrunge@daypitney.com)).

## V. Financial Assurance/Billing Policy Amendments

- **Non-Commercial Capacity Trading FA Changes (ER22-863)**

On January 21, 2022, ISO-NE and NEPOOL jointly filed changes to the ISO-NE Financial Assurance Policy (“FAP”) to make certain adjustments to the Non-Commercial Capacity (“NCC”) Trading Financial Assurance (“FA”) calculation (“NCC Trading FA Changes”). Specifically, the NCC Trading FA Changes (i) include the cash flow from any Annual Reconfiguration Transactions (“ARTs”) associated with NCC in the NCC Trading FA calculation; and (ii) (2) further refine the Capacity Supply Obligation (“CSO”) Bilateral price overwrite provisions in FA calculations. The NCC Trading FA Changes were unanimously approved at the May 6, 2021 Participants Committee meeting. ISO-NE requested a March 22, 2022 effective date for the NCC Trading FA Changes. Comments on the NCC Trading FA Changes are due on or before February 11, 2022. Thus far, doc-less interventions have been filed by Calpine and NRG. If you have any questions concerning this matter, please contact Paul Belval (860-275-0381; [pnbelval@daypitney.com](mailto:pnbelval@daypitney.com)).

## VI. Schedule 20/21/22/23 Changes

- **Schedule 21-NEP: 3rd Revised RI LSAs (ER22-927)**

On January 31, 2022, ISO-NE and National Grid filed third revised Local Service Agreement (“LSAs”), one among New England Power, ISO-NE, and The Narragansett Electric Company (“Narragansett”), the other among New England Power, ISO-NE, and Block Island Utility District d/b/a Block Island Power Company (“BIPCO”). The filing revises a surcharge in the LSAs for the recovery of costs for the Block Island transmission system from a carrying charge approach to a formula that uses actual costs in the year the surcharge is calculated, with a true-up mechanism. The revisions are expected to result in lower rates to Rhode Island (RI) customers. A January 1, 2022 effective was requested. Comments on this filing are due on or before February 22, 2022. If you have any questions concerning this matter, please contact Pat Gerity ([pmgerity@daypitney.com](mailto:pmgerity@daypitney.com); 860-275-0533).

- **Schedule 23: NSTAR/Berkshire Wind/ISO-NE SGIA (ER22-720)**

On December 23, 2021, ISO-NE and NSTAR filed a non-conforming Small Generation Interconnection Agreement (“SGIA”) with Berkshire Wind Power Cooperative Corporation (“Berkshire Wind”) to cover the continued interconnection of Berkshire Wind’s 19.6 MW Small Generating Facility at Brodie Mountain in Lanesborough and Hancock, MA. The SGIA, which replaces a 2014 SGIA, was filed as a result of a requested increase in Capacity Network Resource Interconnection Service (“CNRIS”), as well to update facility descriptions and certain milestones in Appendix B associated with two wind turbine additions, the merger into NSTAR of WMECO and update contact information, and incorporate other ministerial clean-up changes. The CNRIS increase required the filing of a new three-party SGIA, and the 2021 SGIA carries forward certain non-conforming provisions from the 2014 SGIA related to indemnification provisions. A notice of cancellation of the 2014 SGIA was also submitted. A November 23, 2021 effective date for the 2021 SGIA and cancellation of the 2014 SGIA was requested. Comments on this filing were due on or before January 13, 2022; none were filed. This matter is pending before the FERC. If you have any questions concerning this matter, please contact Pat Gerity ([pmgerity@daypitney.com](mailto:pmgerity@daypitney.com); 860-275-0533).

- **Schedule 21-NEP: 2nd Revised Narragansett LSA (ER22-707)**

On December 22, 2021, ISO-NE and National Grid filed a Local Service Agreement (“LSA”) among New England Power, The Narragansett Electric Company (“Narragansett”) and ISO-NE to reflect the construction of the new Iron Mine Hill Road Substation and related transmission modifications, and the assessment to Narragansett of a Direct Assignment Facilities Charge (“DAF Charge”) associated with the facilities. The Iron

Mine Hill Road Substation, a new 115 kV/34.5 kV substation (including modifications necessary to loop Narragansett's existing 115 kV H17 transmission line through the new substation) will connect to a new 34.5 kV distribution feeder, which will serve as the point of interconnection for several distributed generation projects being developed by Green Development, LLC ("Green Development"), located in North Smithfield, Rhode Island. A January 1, 2022 effective was requested. Following a request by Green Development for an extra week to respond to this filing, subsequently granted by the FERC on January 3, 2022, comments on this filing were due on or before January 19, 2022 and on that day Green Development filed a protest. Doc-less interventions only were received from Lodestar Energy, the Coalition for Community Solar Access and the Solar Energy Industries Association ("SEIA"). This matter is pending before the FERC. If you have any questions concerning this matter, please contact Pat Gerity ([pmgerity@daypitney.com](mailto:pmgerity@daypitney.com); 860-275-0533).

- **Schedule 21-VP: 2020 Annual Update Settlement Agreement (ER15-1434-005)**

On November 19, 2021, Versant Power submitted a joint offer of settlement between itself and the MPUC to resolve all issues raised by the MPUC in response to Versant's 2020 annual charges update filed, as previously reported, on June 15, 2020 (the "Versant 2020 Annual Update Settlement Agreement"). Under Part V of Attachment P-EM to Schedule 21-VP, "Interested Parties shall have the opportunity to conduct discovery seeking any information relevant to implementation of the [Attachment P-EM] Rate Formula. . . ." and follow a dispute resolution procedure set forth there. In accordance with those provisions, the MPUC identified certain disputes with the 2020 Annual Update, all of which are resolved by the Versant 2020 Annual Update Settlement Agreement. Comments on the Versant 2020 Annual Update Settlement Agreement were due on or before December 9, 2021; reply comments, December 19, 2021; none were filed. This matter is pending before the FERC. If you have any questions concerning this proceeding, please contact Pat Gerity (860-275-0533; [pmgerity@daypitney.com](mailto:pmgerity@daypitney.com)).

- **Schedule 21-VP: Recovery of Bangor Hydro/Maine Public Service Merger-Related Costs (ER15-1434-001 et al.)**

Still pending before the FERC is the MPS Merger Cost Recovery Settlement, filed by Emera Maine on May 8, 2018 to resolve all issues pending before the FERC in the consolidated proceedings set for hearing in the *MPS Merger-Related Costs Order*,<sup>67</sup> and certified by Settlement Judge Dring<sup>68</sup> to the Commission.<sup>69</sup> As previously reported, under this Settlement, permitted cost recovery over a period from June 1, 2018 to May 31, 2021 will be \$390,000 under Attachment P of the BHD OATT and \$260,000 under the MPD OATT. If you have any questions concerning this proceeding, please contact Pat Gerity (860-275-0533; [pmgerity@daypitney.com](mailto:pmgerity@daypitney.com)).

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<sup>67</sup> *Emera Maine and BHE Holdings*, 155 FERC ¶ 61,230 (June 2, 2016) ("MPS Merger-Related Costs Order"). In the *MPS Merger-Related Costs Order*, the FERC accepted, but established hearing and settlement judge procedures for, filings by Emera Maine seeking authorization to recover certain merger-related costs viewed by the FERC's Office of Enforcement's Division of Audits and Accounting ("DAA") to be subject to the conditions of the orders authorizing Emera Maine's acquisition of, and ultimate merger with, Maine Public Service ("Merger Conditions"). The Merger Conditions imposed a hold harmless requirement, and required a compliance filing demonstrating fulfillment of that requirement, should Emera Maine seek to recover transaction-related costs through any transmission rate. Following an audit of Emera Maine, DAA found that Emera Maine "inappropriately included the costs of four merger-related capital initiatives in its formula rate recovery mechanisms" and "did not properly record certain merger-related expenses incurred to consummate the merger transaction to appropriate non-operating expense accounts as required by [FERC] regulations [and] inappropriately included costs of merger-related activities through its formula rate recovery mechanisms" without first making a compliance filing as required by the merger orders. The *MPS Merger-Related Costs Order* set resolution of the issues of material fact for hearing and settlement judge procedures, consolidating the separate compliance filing dockets.

<sup>68</sup> ALJ John Dring was the settlement judge for these proceedings. There were five settlement conferences -- three in 2016 and two in 2017. With the Settlement pending before the FERC, settlement judge procedures, for now, have not been terminated.

<sup>69</sup> *Emera Maine and BHE Holdings*, 163 FERC ¶ 63,018 (June 11, 2018).

**VII. NEPOOL Agreement/Participants Agreement Amendments***No Activity to Report***VIII. Regional Reports**

- **Opinion 531-A Local Refund Report: FG&E (EL11-66)**

Fitchburg Gas & Electric's ("FG&E") June 29, 2015 refund report for its customers taking local service during *Opinion 531-A*'s refund period remains pending. If there are questions on this matter, please contact Pat Gerity (860-275-0533; [pmgerity@daypitney.com](mailto:pmgerity@daypitney.com)).

- **Opinions 531-A/531-B Regional Refund Reports (EL11-66)**

The TOs' November 2, 2015 refund report documenting resettlements of regional transmission charges by ISO-NE in compliance with *Opinions No. 531-A*<sup>70</sup> and *531-B*<sup>71</sup> also remains pending. If there are questions on this matter, please contact Pat Gerity (860-275-0533; [pmgerity@daypitney.com](mailto:pmgerity@daypitney.com)).

- **Opinions 531-A/531-B Local Refund Reports (EL11-66)**

The *Opinions 531-A and 531-B* refund reports filed by the following TOs for their customers taking local service during the refund period also remain pending before the FERC:

- |                       |                 |                       |
|-----------------------|-----------------|-----------------------|
| ◆ Central Maine Power | ◆ National Grid | ◆ United Illuminating |
| ◆ Emera Maine         | ◆ NHT           | ◆ VTransco            |
| ◆ Eversource          | ◆ NSTAR         |                       |

If there are questions on this matter, please contact Pat Gerity (860-275-0533; [pmgerity@daypitney.com](mailto:pmgerity@daypitney.com)).

- **Transmission Projects Annual Informational Filing (ER13-193)**

On January 31, 2022, ISO-NE filed, as required under Section 4.1(j)(iii) of the OATT, its annual informational filing of projects on the Regional System Plan ("RSP") project list that had a year of need three years or less from the completion of the Needs Assessment. The list of prior year designations is maintained on the ISO-NE website at <https://www.iso-ne.com/static-assets/documents/2022/01/2021-prior-year-projects-section-4-j-iii.pdf>. This filing will not be noticed for public comment by the FERC.

- **LFTR Implementation: 53<sup>rd</sup> Quarterly Status Report (ER07-476; RM06-08)**

ISO-NE filed the 53<sup>rd</sup> of its quarterly status reports regarding LFTR implementation on January 14, 2022. ISO-NE reported that it implemented monthly reconfiguration auctions (accepted in ER12-2122) beginning with the month of October 2019. ISO-NE further reported that, while it will continue to evaluate its as-filed LFTR design and financial assurance issues, including an ongoing evaluation of the FTR market and risk associated with FTRs and LFTRs, it is currently focused on higher priority market-design initiatives. ISO-NE concluded its report by describing the 18-month implementation that would be required once the LFTR financial assurance issues are resolved. These status reports are not noticed for public comment.

- **Order 2222 Stakeholder Process Status Update; Tech Conf Request (RM18-9)**

Pursuant to the FERC's order granting an extension of time for the filing of the region's *Order 2222* compliance filing,<sup>72</sup> ISO-NE filed on December 20, 2021 an update on the status of the stakeholder process and

<sup>70</sup> *Martha Coakley, Mass. Att'y Gen.*, 149 FERC ¶ 61,032 (Oct. 16, 2014) ("*Opinion 531-A*").

<sup>71</sup> *Martha Coakley, Mass. Att'y Gen.*, Opinion No. 531-B, 150 FERC ¶ 61,165 (Mar. 3, 2015) ("*Opinion 531-B*").

<sup>72</sup> *Participation of Distributed Energy Resource Aggregations in Mkts. Operated by RTOs and ISOs*, 175 FERC ¶ 61,156 at P 5 (May 24, 2021) ("*May 24 Order*").

its schedule for making the required compliance filing (due February 2, 2022). The Participants Committee will consider the proposed compliance filing changes at its January 6, 2022 meeting (Agenda Item #5). This filing is for informational purposes only and will not be noticed for public comment or subject to a FERC order.

***Voltus Petition for a FERC Technical Conference on Order 2222.*** On December 22, 2022, Voltus, Inc. (“Voltus”) requested that the FERC convene a technical conference regarding *Order 2222*-related issues sometime in the months of February or March, 2022. Specifically, Voltus requested the technical conference to allow for a collective discussion of key issues arising from the ISO/RTO *Order 2222* compliance proposals, including certain regional variability, roles of industry participants, narrowing perceived knowledge gaps, and subsequent FERC guidance, all of which Voltus asserts supports the request for a technical conference. On January 7, 2022, the FERC issued a notice of Voltus’ request, inviting comments on Voltus’ request on or before February 7, 2022. Thus far, one set of comments supporting Voltus’ request (from Fermata LLC) has been received.

- **IMM Quarterly Markets Reports – Fall 2021 (ZZ22-4)**

On November 15, 2021, the IMM filed with the FERC its Fall 2021 report of “market data regularly collected by [the IMM] in the course of carrying out its functions under ... Appendix A and analysis of such market data,” as required pursuant to Section 12.2.2 of Appendix A to Market Rule 1. These filings are not noticed for public comment by the FERC. The Fall 2021 Report will be discussed with the Markets Committee at the February 8, 2022 Markets Committee meeting.

## IX. Membership Filings

- **February 2022 Membership Filing (ER22-945)**

On January 31, 2022, NEPOOL requested that the FERC accept (i) the following Applicant’s membership in NEPOOL: Sam Mintz (End User Sector); (ii) the termination of the Participant status of the following 16 Participants: Aminpour, Farhad (End User Sector); Brooks, Richard (End User Sector); King Forest Industries, Inc. (End User Sector); Kuser, Michael (End User Sector); PNE Energy Supply LLC (Supplier Sector); Connecticut Jet Power LLC, Devon Power LLC, Middletown Power LLC, and Montville Power LLC [each Related Persons to Great River Hydro/Generation Bridge Companies (AR Sector; RG Sub-Sector)]; and Ambit Northeast LLC, Connecticut Gas & Electric, Inc., Energy Rewards, LLC, Everyday Energy, LLC, Massachusetts Gas and Electric, Inc., Public Power, LLC, and Viridian Energy, LLC [each Related Persons to Dynegy Marketing and Trade (Supplier Sector)]; and (iii) the name change of Constellation Energy Generation, LLC (f/k/a Exelon Generation Company, LLC) (Supplier Sector). Comments on this filing are due on or before February 21, 2022.

- **January 2022 Membership Filing (ER22-747)**

On December 30, 2021, NEPOOL requested that the FERC accept (i) the memberships of EnPowered USA Inc. (Supplier Sector); and Sheldon Energy LLC [Related Person to Invenergy Energy Management (Supplier Sector)]; and (ii) the termination of the Participant status of ENGIE Power & Gas [Related Person to ENGIE Energy Marketing NA (AR Sector, RG Sub-Sector)]. Comments on this filing were due on or before January 20, 2022; none were filed. This matter is pending before the FERC.

- **December 2021 Membership Filing (ER22-502)**

On January 26, 2021, the FERC accepted: (i) the memberships of BP Retail Energy LLC [Related Person to BP Energy Co. (Supplier Sector)]; and PSEG Power Connecticut LLC [Related Person to PSEG Energy Resources & Trade and PSEG New Haven (Supplier Sector)]; (ii) the termination of the Participant status of CHI Power Marketing, Inc. (Supplier Sector); J. F. Gray & Associates, LLC (End User Sector); Liberty Power Delaware LLC (Supplier Sector); South Jersey Energy Company and South Jersey Energy ISO3 (together “South Jersey”) (Supplier

Sector); and (iii) the name change of AES Renewable Holdings, LLC (f/k/a AES Distributed Energy, Inc.).<sup>73</sup> Unless the January 26 order is challenged, this proceeding will be concluded.

- **Suspension Notice (not docketed)**

Since the last Report, ISO-NE filed, pursuant to Section 2.3 of the Information Policy, a notice with the FERC noting that the following Market Participant was suspended from the New England Markets on the date indicated (at 8:30 a.m.) due to a Financial Assurance Default:

<i><b>Date of Suspension/ FERC Notice</b></i>	<i><b>Participant Name</b></i>	<i><b>Default Type</b></i>	<i><b>Date Reinstated</b></i>
Jan 11/14	NTE Connecticut, LLC	Financial Assurance	not yet
Jan 21/25	Sunwave USA Holdings Inc.	Payment Default	N/A

Suspension notices are for the FERC's information only and are not docketed or noticed for public comment.

## X. Misc. - ERO Rules, Filings; Reliability Standards<sup>74</sup>

Questions concerning any of the ERO Reliability Standards or related rule-making proceedings or filings can be directed to Pat Gerity (860-275-0533; [pmgerity@daypitney.com](mailto:pmgerity@daypitney.com)).

- **NERC Annual Report on FFT & Compliance Exception Programs (RC11-6-014)**

On November 17, 2021, NERC filed its annual report on Find, Fix, and Track ("FFT") and Compliance Exception programs, in accordance with prior FERC Orders.<sup>75</sup> In the report, NERC stated that the ERO Enterprise appropriately handles noncompliance posing a minimal or moderate risk through these programs and that the results of the annual report show consistent improvement in program implementation. The report also demonstrates, NERC suggests, significant alignment across the ERO Enterprise, particularly in the processing and understanding of the risk associated with individual noncompliance. Comments on the annual report are due on or before January 20, 2022.

- **CIP Standards Development: Informational Filings on Virtualization and Cloud Computing Services Projects (RD20-2)**

As previously reported, NERC is required to file on an informational basis quarterly status updates regarding the development of new or modified Reliability Standards pertaining to virtualization and cloud computing services. On December 15, 2021, NERC submitted an informational filing regarding one active CIP standard development project (Project 2016-02 – Modifications to CIP Standards ("Project 2016-02")).<sup>76</sup> Project 2016-02 focuses on modifications to the CIP Reliability Standards to incorporate applicable protections for virtualized environments. A revised schedule for Project 2016-02 calls for final balloting of revised standards in March 2022, NERC Board of Trustees Adoption in May 2022 and filing of the revised standards with the FERC in June 2022.

<sup>73</sup> *New England Power Pool Participants Comm.*, Docket No. ER22-502 (Jan. 26, 2022).

<sup>74</sup> Reporting on the following proceedings has been suspended since the last Report and will be continued if and when there is new activity to report: NOI: Enhancements to CIP Standards (RM20-12).

<sup>75</sup> See *N. Am. Elec. Rel. Corp.*, 138 FERC 61,193 (2012) ("March 2012 Order"); *N. Am. Elec. Rel. Corp.*, 143 FERC 61,253 (2013) ("June 2013 Order"); *N. Am. Elec. Rel. Corp.*, 148 FERC 61,214 (2014) ("September 2014 Order"); and *N. Am. Elec. Rel. Corp.*, Docket No. RC11-6-004 (Nov. 13, 2015) (unpublished letter order) ("November 2015 Order").

<sup>76</sup> The other project which had been addressed in prior updates, Project 2019-02, has concluded, and the FERC approved in RD21-6 the Reliability Standards revised as part of that project (CIP-004-7 and CIP-011-3) on Dec. 7, 2021.

- **Revised Reliability Standards (SOL Changes): FAC-003-5, 011-4, 014-3; IRO-008-3; PRC 002-3, 023-5, -026-2; and TOP-001-6 (RM21-19)**

On June 28, 2021, NERC filed for approval proposed changes to the following Reliability Standards related to establishing and communicating System Operating Limits (“SOLs”, and together the “SOL Changes”):

- ◆ FAC-011-4 (System Operating Limits Methodology for the Operations Horizon)
- ◆ FAC-014-3 (Establish and Communicate System Operating Limits)
- ◆ FAC-003-5 (Transmission Vegetation Management)
- ◆ IRO-008-3 (Reliability Coordinator Operational Analyses and Real-time Assessments)
- ◆ PRC-002-3 (Disturbance Monitoring and Reporting Requirements)
- ◆ PRC-023-5 (Transmission Relay Loadability)
- ◆ PRC-026-2 (Relay Performance During Stable Power Swings)
- ◆ TOP-001-6 (Transmission Operations)

NERC also requested the retirement of Reliability Standard FAC-010-3 (System Operating Limits Methodology for the Planning Horizon) and modifications to NERC’s Glossary of Terms to revise the definition for System Operating Limit and to include “System Voltage Limit”. The SOL Changes (NERC Project 2015-09) were developed in response to recommendations from a periodic review of the FAC-010, FAC-011, and FAC-014 Reliability Standards. NERC asked that revised Reliability Standards become effective (and the currently effective versions be retired) on the first day of the first calendar quarter that is 24 months following FERC approval. The SOL Changes have not yet been noticed for public comment.

- **NOI: Virtualization and Cloud Computing Services in BES Operations (RM20-8)**

On February 20, 2020, the FERC issued a NOI seeking comments on (i) the potential benefits and risks associated with the use of virtualization and cloud computing services in association with bulk electric system (“BES”) operations; and (ii) whether the CIP Reliability Standards impede the voluntary adoption of virtualization or cloud computing services.<sup>77</sup> On March 25, 2020, Joint Associations<sup>78</sup> requested an extension of time to submit comments and reply comments. On April 2, the FERC granted Joint Associations’ request and extended the deadline for initial comments on the NOI to July 1, 2020; the deadline for reply comments, July 31, 2020. Comments were filed by NERC, the IRC, Accenture, Amazon Web Services (“Amazon”), Bonneville, the Bureau of Reclamation, Barry Jones, Georgia System Operations, GridBright, Idaho Power, Microsoft, MISO, MISO Transmission Owners, Siemens Energy Management, Tri-State Generation and Transmission Association, VMware, Inc., AEE, American Association for Laboratory Accreditation (“A2LA”), APPA, Canadian Electricity Assoc., EEI, NRECA, and Waterfall Security Solutions. Reply comments were due on or before July 31, 2020, and were filed by AEE, Amazon and Microsoft.

**Dec 2021 Informational Filing.** In part in response to the comments filed, the FERC, in a December 17, 2020 order,<sup>79</sup> directed NERC to begin a formal process to assess, and to make an informational filing in a little over one year (January 1, 2022) that addresses, the feasibility of voluntarily conducting BES operations in the cloud in a secure manner, as well as the status and schedule for any plans to modify the standards. NERC submitted that informational filing on December 17, 2021. In that filing, NERC addressed the status of NERC’s formal process to assess the feasibility of voluntarily conducting BES operations in the cloud in a secure manner, evaluated potential modifications to the CIP Standards to facilitate expanded use of the cloud, and considered topic areas raised in comments to the NOI. NERC requested that the FERC accept the informational filing as consistent with the *Order Directing Info. Filing*. NERC committed to continue to consider ways to support industry in securely adopting evolving technologies as necessary, including conducting BES reliability operating services in the cloud. NERC

<sup>77</sup> *Virtualization and Cloud Computing Services*, 170 FERC ¶ 61,110 (Feb. 20, 2020).

<sup>78</sup> “Joint Associations” are for purposes of this proceeding: EEI, APPA, NRECA, and LPPC.

<sup>79</sup> *Virtualization and Cloud Computing Services*, 173 FERC ¶ 61,243 (Dec. 17, 2020) (“*Order Directing Info. Filing*”).



reported that there is no Standard Authorization Request (“SAR”) to initiate standards development or a field test, nor had it identified a reliability gap that would necessitate standards development to facilitate BES reliability operating services in the cloud.

- **Order 873 - Retirement of Reliability Standard Requirements (Standards Efficiency Review) (RM19-17; RM19-16)**

On September 17, 2020, the FERC approved the retirement of the 18 Reliability Standard requirements through the retirement of four Reliability Standards and the modification of five Reliability Standards,<sup>80</sup> concluding that the 18 requirements “(1) provide little or no reliability benefit; (2) are administrative in nature or relate expressly to commercial or business practices; or (3) are redundant with other Reliability Standards.”<sup>81</sup> The FERC also approved the associated violation risk factors, violation severity levels, implementation plan, and effective dates proposed by NERC. Because it was not persuaded by NERC’s justification for the retirement of FAC-008-4 requirement R8, the FERC remanded the retirement of requirements R7 and R8 to NERC for further consideration.<sup>82</sup>

The FERC left for another day its final action on the remaining 56 requirements for which the FERC proposed to approve retirement in the *Retirements NOPR*<sup>83</sup> (the “MOD A Reliability Standards”). The FERC intends to coordinate the effective dates for the retirement of the MOD A Reliability Standards with successor North American Energy Standards Board (“NAESB”) business practice standards (v. 003.3) that include Modeling business practices, which were accepted in *Order 676-J*.<sup>84</sup>

- **Rules of Procedure Changes (CMEP Risk-Based Approach Enhancements) (RR21-10)**

On September 29, 2021, NERC filed for approval changes to sections 400 (Compliance Monitoring and Enforcement) and 1500 (Confidential Information), Appendix 2 (Definitions) and Appendix 4C (Compliance Monitoring and Enforcement Program) of the NERC Rules of Procedure (“ROP”). The changes were proposed to further enhance the risk-based approach to the Compliance Monitoring and Enforcement Program (“CMEP”) whereby registered entities and the ERO Enterprise focus on the greatest risks to the reliability and security of the Bulk Power System (“BPS”). Comments on this filing were due on or before October 20, 2021. Comments were filed by Public Utility District No. 1 of Chelan County and jointly by APPA/LPPC/TAPS. This matter remains pending before the FERC.

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<sup>80</sup> *Elec. Rel. Org. Proposal to Retire Reqs. in Rel. Standards Under the NERC Standards Efficiency Review*, Order No. 873, 172 FERC ¶ 61,225 (Sep. 17, 2020) (“*Order 873*”). The four Reliability Standards being eliminated in their entirety are FAC-013-2 (Assessment of Transfer Capability for the Near-term Transmission Planning Horizon), INT-004-3.1 (Dynamic Transfers), INT-010-2.1 (Interchange Initiation and Modification for Reliability), MOD-020-0 (Providing Interruptible Demands and Direct Control Load Management Data to System Operations and Reliability Coordinators). The five modified Reliability Standards are INT-006-5 (Evaluation of Interchange Transactions), INT-009-3 (Implementation of Interchange) and PRC-004-6 (Protection System Misoperation Identification and Correction), IRO-002-7 (Reliability Coordination—Monitoring and Analysis), TOP-001-5 (Transmission Operations).

<sup>81</sup> *Order 873* at P 2.

<sup>82</sup> *Order 873* at P 5. Pursuant to FPA section 215(d)(4), if the FERC disapproves a modification to a Reliability Standard in whole or in part, it must remand the entire Reliability Standard to NERC for further consideration. Accordingly, although it was satisfied here with the justification for the retirement of R7, the FERC was required to remand both R7 and R8 so that its concerns with the retirement of Requirement R8 could be addressed.

<sup>83</sup> *Electric Reliability Organization Proposal to Retire Requirements in Rel. Standards Under the NERC Standards Efficiency Review*, 170 FERC ¶ 61,032 (Jan. 23, 2020) (“*Retirements NOPR*”) (proposing to approve the retirement of 74 of 77 Reliability Standard requirements requested to be retired by NERC in these two dockets in connection with the first phase of work under NERC’s Standards Efficiency Review, an initiative begun in 2017 that reviewed the body of NERC Reliability Standards to identify those Reliability Standards and requirements that were administrative in nature, duplicative to other standards, or provided no benefit to reliability). As previously reported, NERC withdrew its proposed changes to VAR-001-6 on May 14, 2020, reducing to 76 the number of requirements proposed to be retired.

<sup>84</sup> *Standards for Business Practices and Communication Protocols for Public Utilities*, Order No. 676-J, 175 FERC ¶ 61,139 (May 20, 2021) (“*Order 676-J*”).

- **Rules of Procedure Changes (Reliability Standards Development Revisions) (RR21-8)**

On August 18, 2021, NERC filed for approval revisions to sections 300 (Reliability Standards Development), Appendix 3B (Procedure for Election of Members of the Standards Committee) and Appendix 3D (Development of Registered Ballot Body Criteria) of the NERC Rules of Procedure (“ROP”), which are designed to update language, staff titles, and processes; remove unnecessary or duplicative obligations; and clarify roles and responsibilities related to the development of Reliability Standards (the “Reliability Standards Development ROP Revisions”). Comments on this filing were due on or before September 8, 2021; none were filed. This matter remains pending before the FERC.

- **Report of Comparisons of 2020 Budgeted to Actual Costs for NERC and the Regional Entities (RR21-5)**

On June 1, 2021, NERC filed comparisons of actual to budgeted costs for 2020 for NERC and the six Regional Entities operating in 2020, including NPCC. The Report includes comparisons of actual funding received and costs incurred, with explanations of significant actual cost-to-budget variances, audited financial statements, and tables showing metrics concerning NERC and Regional Entity administrative costs in their 2020 budgets and actual results. Comments on this filing were due on or before June 22, 2021; none were filed. On December 2, 2021, the FERC accepted the filing,<sup>85</sup> provided guidance to NERC on its future handling of certain financial decisions,<sup>86</sup> and directed NERC to make an informational filing.<sup>87</sup> NERC submitted that informational filing on December 23, 2021, and was not noticed for public comment. The December 2 order was not challenged and is final and unappealable.

- **FERC/NERC Joint Report on Review of Protection System Commissioning Programs (not docketed)**

On November 4, 2021, FERC staff, together with staff from NERC and its regional entities issued a report summarizing their review of, and outlining recommendations for, Protection System Commissioning (“PSC”) Programs. The review was initiated in 2019 after Misoperation Information Data Analysis System (“MIDAS”) data indicated that between 18 and 36 percent of misoperations in MIDAS could be attributed to issues that should have been detected through PSC. The goal of the review was to reduce misoperations attributable to PSC by identifying opportunities for improvement and developing recommendations and best practices for registered transmission and generator owners’ PSC programs. View the Report [here](#).

- **FERC/NERC Joint Report on the February 2021 Cold Weather Outages in Texas and the South Central United States (not docketed)**

On November 16, 2021, FERC staff, together with staff from NERC and its regional entities issued a report describing the severe cold weather event occurring between February 8 and 20, 2021 and how it impacted the reliability of the bulk electric system in Texas and the South Central United States. To prevent recurrence of just such an event, the report identifies 28 key recommendations, together with proposed timeframes for implementation, focused on revisions to the Reliability Standards, actions to prevent electric generating unit and natural gas infrastructure freezing issues, grid operations and gas-electric coordination measures for cold weather preparedness. View the Report [here](#).

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<sup>85</sup> *N. Amer. Elec. Rel. Corp.*, 177 FERC ¶ 61,163 (Dec. 2, 2021).

<sup>86</sup> *Id.* at P 14. The FERC directed NERC to submit for FERC approval a “paragraph 7(b)(ii) filing” when there is to be any redirections of previously budgeted funds and/or expenditure of operating reserves as required by its Working Capital and Operating Reserve Policy and the 2013 Settlement Agreement that requires NERC to file for FERC review and approval proposals to expend \$500,000 or more from its operating reserves for unforeseen contingencies. See *N. Amer. Elec. Rel. Corp.*, 142 FERC ¶ 61,042, at P 7 (2013) (“2013 Settlement Agreement”).

<sup>87</sup> *Id.* at P 13. NERC was directed to explain expenditures and amounts from the Cyber Risk Information Sharing Program (CRISP) Special Projects Reserve to fund the Operational Technology (OT) pilot program, and to explain if and how NERC plans on using \$243,549 remaining in the reserve at the end of 2021 in 2022.



**XI. Misc. - of Regional Interest**

- **203 Application: Howard Wind / Greenbacker Wind (EC22-13)**

On January 11, 2022, the FERC authorized Greenbacker Wind, LLC's acquisition of 100% of the equity interests in Howard Wind LLC from Everpower Wind Holdings, Inc. ("Everpower").<sup>88</sup> Pursuant to the December 6 order, Greenback Wind must file a notice within 10 days of consummation of the transaction, which as of the date of this Report has not yet occurred. If you have any questions concerning this matter, please contact Pat Gerity ([pmgerity@daypitney.com](mailto:pmgerity@daypitney.com); 860-275-0533).

- **203 Application: Castleton Commodities/Atlas Power (GSP companies) (EC22-7)**

On December 6, 2021, the FERC authorized the acquisition by ACR II Granite Shore Power Holdings LLC, an Atlas Capital Resources affiliate (together, "Atlas"), and 50% of owner of Granite Shore Power Holdings LLC ("GSP Holdings"), of the remaining 50% of GSP Holdings from CCI PAH II, an indirect subsidiary of Castleton Commodities International LLC ("CCI").<sup>89</sup> On January 7, 2022, Atlas and GSP Holdings filed a notice that the transaction was consummated. Accordingly, Atlas now wholly owns GSP Holdings, the indirect owner of NEPOOL members GSP Lost Nation LLC, GSP Merrimack LLC, GSP Newington LLC, GSP Schiller LLC, and GSP White Lake LLC, and those Participants will collectively participate as a voting members in the Generation Sector. This concludes reporting on this matter. If you have any questions concerning this matter, please contact Pat Gerity ([pmgerity@daypitney.com](mailto:pmgerity@daypitney.com); 860-275-0533).

- **203 Application: Hull Street/CMEEC (EC22-3)**

On January 6, 2022, Hull Street Energy provided notice that its affiliate, MPH AL Pierce, LLC ("MPH"), acquired, as previously authorized,<sup>90</sup> 100 % of the interests in CMEEC's 84 MW Wallingford electric generating facility. The transaction was consummated on December 31, 2021. This concludes reporting on this matter. If you have any questions concerning this matter, please contact Pat Gerity ([pmgerity@daypitney.com](mailto:pmgerity@daypitney.com); 860-275-0533).

- **203 Application: PSEG/Generation Bridge II (ArcLight) (EC21-125)**

On September 2, 2021, PSEG Project Companies<sup>91</sup> and Generation Bridge II, LLC ("Purchaser") requested authorization for a transaction pursuant to which 100% of the membership interests in the PSEG Project Companies will be sold to Generation Bridge II, a wholly-owned, indirect subsidiary of ArcLight Fund VII, which is itself affiliated with Great River Hydro. On September 28, 2021, applicants submitted revised pages of an affidavit included in the original filing to correct statements regarding the ownership of certain assets. Applicants stated that the correction did not affect the analysis or conclusions presented in the original filing. Comments on the correction were due on or before November 2, 2021; none were filed.

**Deficiency Letter.** On December 6, 2021, the FERC issued a deficiency letter directing the applicants to provide within 30 days additional information and clarifications. Responses to the Deficiency Letter were due and were filed on December 17, 2021. Comments on the deficiency letter responses were due on or before January 7, 2022; none were filed. On January 31, 2022, Applicants renewed their request for expedited consideration and requested that the FERC act on the pending applications as soon as possible. This matter is pending before the FERC. If you have any questions concerning this matter, please contact Pat Gerity ([pmgerity@daypitney.com](mailto:pmgerity@daypitney.com); 860-275-0533).

<sup>88</sup> *Howard Wind LLC*, 178 FERC ¶ 62,024 (Jan. 11, 2022)

<sup>89</sup> *ACR II Granite Sho.re Power Holdings LLC*, 177 FERC ¶ 62,129 (Dec. 6, 2021).

<sup>90</sup> *MPH AL Pierce, LLC*, 177 FERC ¶ 62,115 (Dec. 2, 2021).

<sup>91</sup> The "PSEG Project Companies" are: PSEG New Haven LLC ("PSEG New Haven"), PSEG Power Connecticut LLC ("PSEG Power CT"), PSEG Power New York LLC ("PSEG Power NY").

- **203 Application: PPL/Narragansett (EC21-87)**

On September 23, 2021, the FERC authorized a transaction pursuant to which a wholly-owned subsidiary of PPL Corporation will acquire 100% of the outstanding shares of common stock of The Narragansett Electric Company (“Narragansett”).<sup>92</sup> This transaction is now expected to close in the first quarter of 2022. Pursuant to the September 23 order, notice must be filed within 10 days of consummation of the transaction, which as of the date of this Report has not yet occurred. If you have any questions concerning this matter, please contact Pat Gerity ([pmgerity@daypitney.com](mailto:pmgerity@daypitney.com); 860-275-0533).

- **203 Application: Exelon Generation (EC21-57)**

On February 1, 2022, as previously authorized,<sup>93</sup> the ownership of the public utility subsidiaries (“ExGen Utility Subsidiaries”) of Exelon Generation Company, LLC (“ExGen”) intermediate holding company owner, HoldCo, were distributed to the shareholders of Applicants’ current ultimate upstream owner, Exelon Corporation (the “Transaction”). Accordingly, Exelon Corporation and its remaining subsidiaries retain no interest in, or affiliation with, Constellation Energy Generation or the Related Persons of Constellation that are NEPOOL Participants. As noted above (see ER22-945, Section IX above), Exelon Generation Company also changed its name to Constellation Energy Generation on February 1, 2022. This concludes reporting on this matter. If you have any questions concerning this matter, please contact Pat Gerity ([pmgerity@daypitney.com](mailto:pmgerity@daypitney.com); 860-275-0533).

- **D&E Agreement Cancellation: CL&P/UCONN (ER22-912)**

On January 28, 2022, CL&P filed a notice of cancellation of an Engineering, Design, and Procurement Agreement (“D&E Agreement”) with the University of Connecticut (“UCONN”). The D&E Agreement set forth the terms and conditions under which CL&P would undertake certain preliminary engineering and design activities for a proposed increase in capacity of its transmission interconnection service. The term of the Agreement ended on September 21, 2021. CL&P determined that the upgrades contemplated by the Agreement should be considered a capital project as a result of organic system load growth for customers Eversource is obligated to serve. CL&P fully refunded UConn for all charges under the Agreement. A January 28, 2022 effective date was requested. Comments on this filing are due on or before February 18, 2022. If you have any questions concerning this matter, please contact Pat Gerity ([pmgerity@daypitney.com](mailto:pmgerity@daypitney.com); 860-275-0533).

- **D&E Agreement Cancellation: NSTAR/Ocean State (ER22-911)**

Also on January 28, 2022, NSTAR filed a notice of cancellation of a D&E Agreement with Ocean State Power, LLC (“Ocean State”). The D&E Agreement set forth the terms and conditions under which NSTAR would undertake certain preliminary engineering and design activities consistent with Ocean State’s April 26, 2018 interconnection request (queue position #758) (for a proposed increase in capacity of its Large Generating Facility). The term of the Agreement ended on October 23, 2021. NSTAR completed all refunds and billing under the Agreement on January 4, 2022, and no further work will be done under the Agreement. A January 28, 2022 effective date was requested. Comments on this filing are due on or before February 18, 2022. If you have any questions concerning this matter, please contact Pat Gerity ([pmgerity@daypitney.com](mailto:pmgerity@daypitney.com); 860-275-0533).

- **Cost Reimbursement Agreement: Narragansett/BIPCO (ER22-817)**

On January 13, 2022, Narragansett filed a Cost Reimbursement Agreement with Block Island Utility District d/b/a Block Island Power Company (“BIPCO”). Under the agreement, Narragansett will perform certain work to modify its substation equipment in order to facilitate voltage modifications that Block Island plans to make to its distribution system. A November 29, 2021 effective date was requested. Comments on this filing are due on or before February 3, 2022. If you have any questions concerning this matter, please contact Pat Gerity ([pmgerity@daypitney.com](mailto:pmgerity@daypitney.com); 860-275-0533).

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<sup>92</sup> *PPL Corp. and The Narragansett Elec. Co.*, 176 FERC ¶ 61,175 (Sep. 23, 2021).

<sup>93</sup> *Exelon Generation Co., LLC*, 176 FERC ¶ 61,121 (Aug. 24, 2021).

- **Related Facilities Agreement: CL&P / Revolution Wind (ER22-697)**

As previously reported, on December 21, 2021, The Connecticut Light & Power Company ("CL&P") filed a Related Facilities Agreement ("RFA") between CL&P and Revolution Wind LLC. The RFA provides the terms and conditions governing CL&P's activities, and Revolution Wind's cost responsibility for, completing the Related Facilities required to interconnect Revolution Wind's facility to National Grid's 115 kV Davisville Substation in Washington County, Rhode Island. A December 21, 2021 effective date was requested. Comments on this filing were due on or before January 11, 2022; none were filed. New England Power and Narragansett and Revolution Wind submitted doc-less interventions. This matter is pending before the FERC. If there are questions on this matter, please contact Pat Gerity ([pmgerity@daypitney.com](mailto:pmgerity@daypitney.com); 860-275-0533).

- **Cost Reimbursement Agreement Cancellation: Narragansett / CV South Street Landing (ER22-612)**

On December 10, 2021, Narragansett filed a notice of cancellation of its Cost Reimbursement Agreement with CV South Street Landing, LLC ("South Street"). Performance under the Agreement, which related to work by National Grid to underground a 115 kV transmission line,<sup>94</sup> has been completed and all amounts due and owing have been paid in full. A February 9, 2022 effective date was requested. Comments on this filing were due on or before January 3, 2022; none were filed. This matter remains pending before the FERC. If you have any questions concerning this matter, please contact Pat Gerity ([pmgerity@daypitney.com](mailto:pmgerity@daypitney.com); 860-275-0533).

- **D&E Agreement Cancellation: CL&P/ NRG Middletown (ER22-599)**

On December 9, 2021, NSTAR filed a notice of cancellation of the Preliminary Engineering & Design Agreement ("D&E Agreement") with NRG Middletown Repowering LLC ("NRG Middletown"). The D&E Agreement set forth the terms and conditions under which CL&P was to undertake certain preliminary design and engineering activities on the Interconnection Facilities for NRG Middletown's proposed Large Generation Facility prior to the execution of an LGIA. On December 1, 2021, NRG Middletown provided written notice to CL&P that it was terminating the Agreement effective December 31, 2021. CL&P has finalized all billing and invoices and no further work is being done under the Agreement. A December 31, 2021 effective date was requested. Comments on this filing were due on or before December 30, 2021; none were filed. This matter remains pending before the FERC. If you have any questions concerning this matter, please contact Pat Gerity ([pmgerity@daypitney.com](mailto:pmgerity@daypitney.com); 860-275-0533).

- **IA Termination: CL&P / Sterling Property (ER21-2860)**

As previously reported, the FERC rejected the notice of termination filed by CL&P of a 2002 Interconnection Agreement ("IA") governing interconnection service to what CL&P characterized as a since-decommissioned 26 MW waste-tire fueled generator located in Sterling, Connecticut (the "Facility").<sup>95</sup> In rejecting the notice, the FERC found that CL&P had "not provided adequate justification demonstrating that the Facility has been decommissioned in order to terminate the Interconnection Agreement."<sup>96</sup> However, the FERC noted that its determination did not indicate that Sterling retains any interconnection rights under the IA, stating that there had been no interconnection rights associated with the facility since ISO-NE deemed the Facility retired in 2017.

**Requests for Rehearing and/or Clarification.** On January 10, 2022, the FERC issued a "Notice of Denial of Rehearings by Operation of Law and Providing for Further Consideration".<sup>97</sup> The Notice confirmed that the 60-day period during which a petition for review of the *Sterling IA Order* can be filed with an appropriate federal court was triggered when the FERC did not act on CL&P's and Brookfield's requests for

<sup>94</sup> See Filing of Cost Reimbursement Agreement with CV South Street Landing LLC, *The Narragansett Elec. Co.*, Docket No. ER16-986 (filed Feb. 22, 2016); accepted in *The Narragansett Elec. Co.*, Docket No. ER16-986 (Mar. 21, 2016).

<sup>95</sup> *The Connecticut Light and Power Co.*, 177 FERC ¶ 61,083 (Nov. 8, 2021) ("*Sterling IA Order*").

<sup>96</sup> *Id.* at P 23.

<sup>97</sup> *The Conn. Light & Power Co.*, 178 FERC ¶ 62,015 (Jan. 10, 2022).

rehearing of the *Sterling IA Order*.<sup>98</sup> The Notice also indicated that the FERC would address, as is its right, the rehearing requests in a future order, and may modify or set aside its orders, in whole or in part, “in such manner as it shall deem proper.” If you have any questions concerning this matter, please contact Pat Gerity ([pmgerity@daypitney.com](mailto:pmgerity@daypitney.com); 860-275-0533).

- **Versant Power MPD OATT Order 676-I Compliance Filing (ER21-2498)**

On July 23, 2021, Versant Power filed proposed revisions to Section 4 of the Versant Power Open Access Transmission Tariff for Maine Public District (the “MPD OATT”) to incorporate by reference certain of the revisions required by *Order 676-I* and requested waiver of certain of those standards that are not applicable to MPD and/or the MPD OATT. Comments on this filing were due on or before August 13, 2021; none were filed. Subsequently, on November 1, 2021, Versant submitted amendments to its July 23 compliance filing to include revised and new WEQ standards identified in the *Order 676-I* Errata Notice but not included in the July 23, 2021 filing. Comments on the amendment filing were due on or before December 1, 2021; none were filed. This matter is again pending before the FERC. If you have any questions concerning this matter, please contact Pat Gerity ([pmgerity@daypitney.com](mailto:pmgerity@daypitney.com); 860-275-0533).

- **Orders 864/864-A (Public Util. Trans. ADIT Rate Changes): New England Compliance Filings (various)**

In accordance with *Order 864*<sup>99</sup> and *Order 864-A*,<sup>100</sup> and extensions of time granted, New England’s transmission-owning public utilities submitted their *Order 864* compliance filings, with specific dockets and filing dates identified in the following table. The FERC has addressed a number of the compliance filings, with some yet to be acted on, as noted below:

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<sup>98</sup> CL&P and Brookfield each requested rehearing and/or clarification of the *Sterling IA Order* on Dec. 8, 2021.

<sup>99</sup> *Public Util. Trans. Rate Changes to Address Accumulated Deferred Income Taxes*, Order No. 864, 169 FERC ¶ 61,139 (Nov. 21, 2019), *reh’g denied and clarification granted in part*, 171 FERC ¶ 61,033 (Apr. 16, 2020) (“*Order 864*”). *Order 864* requires all public utility transmission providers with transmission rates under an OATT, a transmission owner tariff, or a rate schedule to revise those rates to account for changes caused by the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (“2017 Tax Law”). Specifically, for transmission formula rates, *Order 864* requires public utilities (i) to deduct excess Accumulated Deferred Income Taxes (“ADIT”) from or add deficient ADIT to their rate bases and adjust their income tax allowances by amortized excess or deficient ADIT; and (ii) to incorporate a new permanent worksheet into their transmission formula rates that will annually track ADIT information (“ADIT Worksheet”). The **ADIT Worksheet** must contain the following five specific categories of information: (i) how any ADIT accounts were re-measured and the excess or deficient ADIT contained therein (“**Category 1 Information**”); (ii) is the accounting for any excess or deficient amounts in Accounts 254 (Other Regulatory Liabilities) and 182.3 (Other Regulatory Assets) (“**Category 2 Information**”); (iii) whether the excess or deficient ADIT is protected (and thus subject to the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act’s normalization requirements) or unprotected (“**Category 3 Information**”); (iv) the accounts to which the excess or deficient ADIT are amortized (“**Category 4 Information**”); and (v) the amortization period of the excess or deficient ADIT being returned or recovered through the rates (“**Category 5 Information**”). In addition, the FERC stated that it expects public utilities to identify each specific source of the excess and deficient ADIT, classify the excess or deficient ADIT as protected or unprotected, and list the proposed amortization period associated with each classification or source.

<sup>100</sup> *Public Util. Trans. Rate Changes to Address Accumulated Deferred Income Taxes*, 171 FERC ¶ 61,033, Order No. 864-A (Apr. 16, 2020) (“*Order 864-A*”).

Docket(s)	Transmission Provider	Date Filed	Date Accepted
ER20-2572 ER21-1130	New England TOs (RNS)	Jul 30, 2020	Conditionally, Dec 22, 2021
ER20-2429	Central Maine Power ("CMP") (LNS)	Jul 15, 2020 Jul 6, 2021 Nov 8, 2021	Conditionally, Dec 22, 2021
ER21-1702	CMP (Schedule 1 Appendix A Implem. Rule)	Dec 20, 2021 Apr 16, 2021	Conditionally, Dec 30, 2021
ER21-1654	CL&P (LNS)	Dec 8, 2021 Apr 9, 2021	Dec 30, 2021
ER20-2610	CL&P (Phase II BECO AC Support Agreement; Millstone TSA)	Aug 26, 2021 Aug 5, 2020	Jan 26, 2021
ER21-1295	Eversource (CL&P, PSNH, NSTAR) (LNS; Schedule 21-ES)	Dec 1, 2021 Mar 8, 2021	Dec 30, 2021
ER21-1154	FG&E (LNS)	Dec 7, 2021 Feb 16, 2021	Dec 30, 2021
ER21-1694	Green Mountain Power	Dec 3, 2021 Apr 16, 2021	Dec 30, 2021
ER21-311	Green Mountain Power	Oct 30, 2020	Dec 30, 2021
ER20-1089	New England Elec. Trans. Corp.	Dec 11, 2020 Feb 26, 2020	pending
ER20-1087	New England Hydro Trans. Corp.	Dec 11, 2020 Feb 26, 2020	pending
ER20-1088	New England Hydro Trans. Elec. Co.	Dec 11, 2020 Feb 26, 2020	pending
ER21-1241	NEP (LNS)	Dec 7, 2021 Mar 1, 2021	Dec 30, 2021
ER20-2551	NEP (Schedule 21-NEP and TSA-NEP-22 Compliance Revisions)	Jul 30, 2020	pending
ER20-2219	NEP (Tariff No. 1)	Jun 29, 2020	pending
ER20-2614	NEP (AC Support Agreement)	Aug 5, 2020	Jan 26, 2022
ER20-2607	NEP/PSNH (Seabrook Transmission Support Agreement)	Aug 4, 2020	Jan 26, 2022
ER20-2553	NEP (MECO/Nantucket LSA)	Jul 30, 2020	pending
ER21-1325	NHT (LNS)	Mar 11, 2021	Dec 30, 2021
ER20-2609	NSTAR (Phase II BECO AC Support Agreement)	Aug 4, 2020	Jan 26, 2022
ER21-1650	NSTAR (Schedule 1 Appendix A Implem. Rule)	Dec 8, 2021 Apr 9, 2021	Dec 30, 2021
ER21-1293	NSTAR (LNS)	Nov 24, 2021 Mar 8, 2021	Dec 30, 2021
ER20-2608	PSNH (Seabrook TSA)	Aug 5, 2020	Jan 26, 2022
ER21-1709	VTransco (LNS)	Dec 3, 2021 Jul 31, 2020	Dec 30, 2021
ER20-2594	VTransco (1991 VTA)	Dec 3, 2021 Jul 31, 2020	Dec 30, 2021
ER20-1839	VETCO	Jan 22, 2021 Jan 7, 2021 May 18, 2020	Jan 26, 2022
ER20-2133 -001, -002	Versant Power	Nov 22, 2021 Mar 12, 2021 Jun 23, 2020	Pending

**Compliance Filings Accepted.** The FERC has accepted the following RNS and LNS-related *Order 864* compliance filings (with those accepted conditionally, subject to 60-day compliance filings, followed by an asterisk):

♦ **ER20-2572; ER21-1130 (New England Transmission Owners (“TOs”) - RNS).**\* The FERC conditionally accepted the *Order 864*-related changes to Tariff Attachment F and the Settlement Agreement attached thereto as Appendix A, subject to a further, 60-day compliance filing.<sup>101</sup> Areas the TOs must address in their compliance filing include: (i) changes to the Rate Base Adjustment and Income Tax Allowance Adjustment Mechanisms (TOs must adjust the Settled Formula Rate with respect to each mechanism to meet *Order 864* transparency requirements by specifying the source of the data used in those mechanisms); (ii) ADIT Worksheet Category 3 Information (TOs must clearly identify if excess and deficient ADIT is protected or unprotected); Category 4 Information (TOs must revise the Revised ADIT Worksheet to show amortized excess ADIT amounts included in Account 411.1 and amortized deficient ADIT amounts included in Account 410.1); Category 5 Information (TOs must correct discrepancies in the Revised ADIT Worksheet and the amortization periods; Versant Power must clarify which amortization method it will use; and UI, MEPCO, CMP, and VTransco must provide further justification for their proposed unprotected non-plant amortization periods). Also, the TOs were directed to file the Revised ADIT Worksheet in eTariff format. The Interim Period Formula Rate was accepted effective as of January 27, 2020; the Settled Formula Rate, January 1, 2022. The TOs filing in response to the requirements of the *TOs First Order 864 Compliance Filings Order* is due on or before February 22, 2022. Since the last Report, on January 20, 2022, New England Power (“NEP”) requested clarification and/or rehearing of the *TOs First Order 864 Compliance Filings Order*, seeking clarification (or rehearing if not) that the Order was intended to approve NEP’s proposed 10-year amortization period for unprotected non-plant related ADIT balances. The NEP request is pending, with FERC action required on or before February 22, 2022, or the request will be deemed denied by operation of law.

♦ **Various Dockets (TOs LNS Compliance Filings).** On December 30, 2021, the FERC accepted, with the exception of CMP’s filing in ER21-1702, which it conditionally accepted, subject to a further 60-day compliance filing, the TOs’ revisions to each of their currently effective local transmission formula rate templates under Schedule 21 of the ISO-NE Tariff.<sup>102</sup> The FERC also accepted revisions to certain TOs’ currently effective formula rate templates for scheduling, system control, and dispatch service for various transmission services under the respective Schedule 1 of the ISO-NE Tariff, and VTransco’s revisions to its formula rate under its grandfathered 1991 Vermont Transmission Agreement (“VTA”).

♦ **ER20-2429 (CMP - LNS).**\* The FERC conditionally accepted CMP’s proposed Tariff revisions, effective January 27, 2020,<sup>103</sup> subject to a further, 60-day compliance filing.<sup>104</sup> CMP must address in that compliance filing, due on or before February 22, 2022, the following aspects of its ADIT Worksheet: (i) Category 1 (provide sufficiently detailed information in the re-measurement portion of the ADIT Worksheets to permit interested parties to tie the amounts provided to the rest of the ADIT Worksheets); (ii) Category 4 (revise the ADIT Worksheets to show amortized excess ADIT amounts recorded to Account 411.1, and deficient ADIT amounts recorded to Account 410.1); and (iii) Category 5 (revise its proposal such that the amortization period for unprotected non-plant, deficient ADIT balances is the same amortization period as unprotected non-plant, excess ADIT balances or demonstrate how its deviation from this requirement is consistent with or superior to this

<sup>101</sup> *ISO New England Inc. et al.*, 177 FERC ¶ 61,219 (Dec. 22, 2021) (“*TOs First Order 864 Compliance Filings Order*”).

<sup>102</sup> *ISO New England Inc. et al.*, 177 FERC ¶ 61,239 (Dec. 30, 2021) (“*TOs Order 864 LNS Compliance Order*”). *Order 864* LNS compliance filings accepted were those by: FG&E (ER21-1154-001); NEP (ER21-1241-001); NSTAR (ER21-1293-001 and ER21-1650-001); Eversource (ER21-1295-001); NHT (ER21-1325-001); CL&P (ER21-1654-001); GMP (ER21-311-000; ER21-1694-001); CMP (ER21-1702-001); and VTransco (ER21-1709-001; ER20-2594-001).

<sup>103</sup> The FERC denied CMP’s request for a Jan. 1, 2018 effective date, which was earlier than the FERC is authorized under section 206 of the FPA to prescribe a rate ‘to be thereafter observed’. Rather, the FERC accepted this filing on the earliest possible date, or Jan. 20, 2020, the date the FERC in *Order 864* required parties to make changes to their tariffs.

<sup>104</sup> *ISO New England Inc. and Central Maine Power Co.*, 177 FERC ¶ 61,218 (Dec. 22, 2021) (“*CMP First Order 864 Compliance Filings Order*”).



requirement of *Order 864*; and revise note (g) of its ADIT Worksheet to make clear that it will amortize unprotected excess ADIT over a five-year period and unprotected deficient ADIT over a 10-year period).

**Other Order 864-related activity** since the last Report included:

♦ **ER20-2614 (NEP - AC Support Agreement).** Also on January 26, 2022, the FERC accepted NEP's proposed *Order 864* changes to its AC Support Agreement related to the Phase II arrangements, effective January 27, 2020, as requested.<sup>105</sup> Unless this January 26 order is challenged, this proceeding will be concluded.

♦ **ER20-2610 (CL&P - Phase II BECO AC Support Agreement; Millstone TSA).** On January 26, 2022, the FERC accepted CL&P's proposed *Order 864* changes to the Phase II BECO AC Support Agreement, effective January 27, 2020, as requested.<sup>106</sup> Unless this January 26 order is challenged, this proceeding will be concluded.

♦ **ER20-2609 (NSTAR-Phase II BECO AC Support Agreement).** Also on January 26, 2022, the FERC accepted the proposed *Order 864* changes to NSTAR's Phase II BECO AC Support Agreement, effective January 27, 2020, as requested.<sup>107</sup> Unless this January 26 order is challenged, this proceeding will be concluded.

♦ **ER20-2608 (PSNH-Seabrook TSA).** Also on January 26, 2022, the FERC accepted the proposed *Order 864* changes to PSNH's Seabrook TSA, effective January 27, 2020, as requested.<sup>108</sup> Unless this January 26 order is challenged, this proceeding will be concluded.

♦ **ER20-2607 (NEP/PSNH - Seabrook Transmission Support Agreement).** Also on January 26, 2022, the FERC accepted the proposed *Order 864* changes to the Seabrook Transmission Support Agreement, effective January 27, 2020, as requested.<sup>109</sup> Unless this January 26 order is challenged, this proceeding will be concluded.

♦ **ER20-1839 (VETCO).** Also on January 26, 2022, the FERC accepted the proposed *Order 864* changes to VETCO's Agreements Tariff, effective January 27, 2020, as requested.<sup>110</sup> Unless this January 26 order is challenged, this proceeding will be concluded.

## XII. Misc. - Administrative & Rulemaking Proceedings<sup>111</sup>

### • Joint Federal-State Task Force on Electric Transmission (AD21-15)

On June 17, 2021, the FERC established a Joint Federal-State Task Force on Electric Transmission ("Transmission Task Force").<sup>112</sup> The Transmission Task Force is comprised of all FERC Commissioners as well as representatives from 10 state commissions (two from each NARUC region). State commission representatives will serve one-year terms from the date of appointment by FERC and in no event will serve on the Task Force for more than three consecutive terms. The Transmission Task Force will convene multiple formal meetings annually, with FERC issuing orders fixing the time and place and agenda for each meeting, and the meetings will be open to the public for listening and observing and on the record. The Transmission Task Force will focus on "topics related to efficiently and fairly planning and paying for transmission, including transmission to facilitate generator

<sup>105</sup> *New England Power Co.*, Docket No. ER20-2614-001 (Jan. 26, 2022) (unpublished letter order).

<sup>106</sup> *The Conn. Power and Light Co.* [sic], Docket No. ER20-2610-001 (Jan. 26, 2022) (unpublished letter order).

<sup>107</sup> *NSTAR Electric Co.*, Docket No. ER20-2609-001 (Jan. 26, 2022) (unpublished letter order).

<sup>108</sup> *Public Service Co. of New Hampshire*, Docket No. ER20-2608-001 (Jan. 26, 2022) (unpublished letter order).

<sup>109</sup> *New England Power Co.*, Docket No. ER20-2607-001 (Jan. 26, 2022) (unpublished letter order).

<sup>110</sup> *VT Elec. Transmission Co., Inc.*, Docket No. ER20-1839-002 (Jan. 26, 2022) (unpublished letter order).

<sup>111</sup> Reporting on the following proceedings has been suspended since the last Report and will be continued if and when there is new activity to report: Electrification and the Grid of the Future (AD21-12); ISO/RTO Credit Principles and Practices (AD21-6); Offshore Wind Integration in RTOs/ISOs (AD20-18); Waiver of Tariff Requirements (PL20-7); FERC's ROE Policy for Natural Gas and Oil Pipelines (PL19-4); and NOI: Certification of New Interstate Natural Gas Facilities (PL18-1).

<sup>112</sup> *Joint Federal-State Task Force on Electric Transmission*, 175 FERC ¶ 61,224 (June 18, 2021).

interconnection, that provides benefits from a federal and state perspective.”<sup>113</sup> On July 19, 2021, NARUC nominated the 10 state commissioners to the Transmission Task Force, including New England Commissioners Riley Allen (VT PUC) and Matt Nelson (Chair, MA DPU). Since the last Report, Chair Thad LeVar of the Utah Public Service Commission was nominated to represent the Western Conference region (to replace Commissioner Kate Raper, who resigned her position with the Idaho PUC on January 21, 2022).

On August 30, 2021, the FERC issued an order listing the 10 state commissioner members (confirming the nominations of Commissioner Allen and Chairman Nelson), announcing the first public meeting of the Task Force (November 10, 2021) in Louisville, Kentucky, in conjunction with the NARUC meeting scheduled to be held there), and inviting agenda topics (all interested persons, including all state commissions, were invited to file on or before September 10, 2021 comments in this docket on agenda topics for the first public meeting).<sup>114</sup> Comments on the agenda were filed by [AEP](#), [APPA](#), the [Environmental Law and Policy Center and National Audubon Society](#), [ITC](#), [NYU’s Institute for Policy Integrity](#), [Shell](#), [Southern Company Services](#), and [Wires](#).

### **Public Meetings.**

- ♦ The first Joint Federal-State Task Force meeting, which focused on incorporating state perspectives into regional transmission planning, was convened on November 10, 2021. Comments on those issues were on or before December 22, 2021, and were filed by: [AEP](#), [LA PSC](#), [MI PSC](#), [PJM](#), and [Public Citizen](#).
- ♦ A second meeting is scheduled for February 16, 2022 in Washington, DC (Renaissance Downtown Hotel). Task Force members will consider suggested agenda topics, which were due on or before January 4, 2022, in developing the agenda for the second meeting. The one set of comments suggesting topics for the second meeting was filed by the Institute for Policy Integrity at the New York University School of Law (“Institute for Policy Integrity”), which encouraged the FERC and Task Force to explore how a *national perspective* could inform and improve the transmission development process, including by establishing a baseline set of nationally uniform informational inputs and parameters for scenario planning and modeling, as well as specifications of benefits and costs to inform project selection in all transmission planning regions. The public may attend the second meeting in person or via Webcast.

- **Climate Change, Extreme Weather, and Electric Sys. Reliability: Jun 1-2 Technical Conference (AD21-13)**

On June 1-2, 2021, FERC staff convened a technical conference to discuss issues surrounding the threat to electric system reliability posed by climate change and extreme weather events. This technical conference addressed (i) concerns that, because extreme weather events are increasing in frequency, intensity, geographic expanse, and duration, the number and severity of weather-induced events in the electric power industry may also increase; and (ii) specific challenges posed to electric system reliability by climate change and extreme weather, which may vary by region. The FERC seeks to understand the near, medium and long-term challenges facing the regions of the country; how decision makers in the regions are evaluating and addressing those challenges; and whether further FERC action is needed to help achieve an electric system that can withstand, respond to, and recover from extreme weather events. Pre-technical conference comments were due on or before April 15, 2021 and were filed by, among others, [ISO-NE](#), [AEE](#), [Dominion](#), [EDF](#), [Eversource](#), [Exelon](#), [LS Power](#),

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<sup>113</sup> Topics that the Task Force may consider include: (i) identifying barriers that inhibit planning and development of optimal transmission necessary to achieve federal and state policy goals, as well as potential solutions to those barriers; (ii) exploring potential bases for one or more states to use FERC-jurisdictional transmission planning processes to advance their policy goals, including multi-state goals; (iii) exploring opportunities for states to voluntarily coordinate in order to identify, plan, and develop regional transmission solutions; (iv) reviewing FERC rules and regulations regarding planning and cost allocation of transmission projects and potentially identifying recommendations for reforms; (v) examining barriers to the efficient and expeditious interconnection of new resources through the FERC-jurisdictional interconnection processes, as well as potential solutions to those barriers; and (vi) discussing mechanisms to ensure that transmission investment is cost effective, including approaches to enhance transparency and improve oversight of transmission investment including, potentially, through enhanced federal-state coordination.

<sup>114</sup> *Joint Federal-State Task Force on Electric Transmission*, 176 FERC ¶ 61,131 (Aug. 30, 2021).



[National Grid](#), [PSEG](#), [Vistra](#), [APPA](#), [Capital Power](#), [EEI](#), [NARUC](#), [NEI](#), [NERC](#), [NRECA](#), and the [R Street Institute](#). Speaker materials were posted in eLibrary on June 3, 2021; transcripts of the June 1-2 days, July 22, 2021.

On August 11, 2021, the FERC issued a [notice inviting post-technical conference comments](#). Comments could address the questions raised in the notice, as well as any other issues raised during the technical conference or identified in the Supplemental Notices of Technical Conference issued March 15 and May 21, 2021. Comments were due on or before September 27, 2021 and were filed by: [CAISO](#); [MISO](#); [NYISO](#); [PJM](#); [AEP](#); [City of New Orleans](#); [City of New York](#); [Columbia Law School's Sabin Center for Climate Change Law](#); [EDF and Sabin Center for Climate Change Law](#); [EEI](#); [EPSCA](#); [Eversource](#); [Exelon](#); [Jupiter Intelligence](#); [Louisville Gas and Electric Company and Kentucky Utilities Company](#); [MI PSC](#); [NRDC](#), [Sierra Club](#), [Sustainable FERC Project](#), and [UCS](#); [Old Dominion Electric Cooperative](#) ("ODEC"); [NERC](#); and [C. Wright](#). On October 14, [Entergy](#) answered the comments submitted by City of New Orleans. This matter is pending before the FERC.

- **Reliability Technical Conference (Sep 30) (AD21-11)**

On September 30, 2021, the FERC convened its annual Commissioner-led technical conference to discuss policy issues related to the reliability of the Bulk-Power System ("BPS"). Panel discussions addressed: (1) BPS reliability and security (current state, challenges and initiatives); (2) extreme weather, risks and challenges; (3) managing cyber risks in the electric power sector; and (4) maintaining electric reliability with changing resource mix. A detailed final agenda, identifying the presenters and panelists, is available [here](#). Speaker materials have been posted to eLibrary. A transcript of the September 30 technical conference was posted in eLibrary on November 16, 2021. On January 7, 2022, the FERC issued a notice inviting post-technical conference comments, either to address the questions raised in the January 7 notice or any other issues raised during the technical conference. Comments are due on or before February 22, 2022.

- **Modernizing Electricity Market Design - Resource Adequacy (AD21-10)**

**March 23 Tech Conf (PJM).** The FERC convened a Commissioner-led technical conference on March 23, 2021 to provide input to the Commission on resource adequacy in the evolving electricity sector. Speaker materials from the March 23 technical conference have been posted to eLibrary. On March 29, Ohio PUC Commission Dan Conway submitted written comments. On April 5, the FERC issued a notice inviting post-technical conference comments on specific PJM-specific questions. Initial comments were due on or before April 26, 2021; reply comments must be submitted on or before May 10, 2021. More than 45 sets of comments were filed, including by: [AEE](#), [Calpine](#), [Cogentrix](#), [Dominion](#), [Exelon](#), [FirstLight](#), [LS Power](#), [NESCOE](#), [NEPGA](#), [NRG](#), [PSEG](#), [Shell](#), [Vistra](#), [CT DEEP](#), [EEI](#), [EPSCA](#), and [NRECA/APPA](#), some of which addressed issues to be discussed in the May 25 New England technical conference (identified immediately below). On May 10, 2021, reply comments were filed by the [American Clean Power Association](#) ("ACPA"), [AEP](#), [EPSCA](#), [Exelon](#), [Joint Consumer Advocates](#), [LS Power](#), [Old Dominion Electric Cooperative](#) ("ODEC"), [PJM Power Providers](#) ("P3"), [Public Interest Organizations](#) ("PIOs"), and the [Retail Electric Supply Association](#) ("RESA").

**May 25 Tech Conf (New England).** On May 25, 2021, the FERC held a Commissioner-led technical conference regarding the wholesale markets administered by ISO New England Inc. Supplemental notices of the technical conference were issued on May 3 and May 17. The May 17 supplemental notice identified panelists and topics/questions for discussion for the technical conference. Panel discussions included: (1) a Commissioner-led discussion of the relationship between state policies and the New England Markets; (2) a Staff-led discussion of short-term options and complementary potential market changes to accommodate state policies in New England; and (3) a Staff-led discussion of long-term options and centralized procurement of clean energy.

**Post (New England) Tech Conf Comments.** On June 4, 2021, the FERC issued a notice inviting post-technical conference comments on the issues raised during the technical conference, including the questions listed in the May 17, 2021 supplemental notice. Post-technical conference comments were due on or before **July 19, 2021** and were filed by: [AEE](#), [Calpine](#), [CT Parties](#), [Dominion](#), [Eversource](#), [MMWEC](#), [NESCOE](#), [NEPGA](#), [NextEra](#), [NRG](#), [Public Interest Orgs](#), [Vistra](#), [AEMA](#), [EPSCA](#), [RENEW](#).

- **Modernizing Electricity Market Design - Energy and Ancillary Service Markets (AD21-10)**

**Tech Conferences.** As previously reported, the FERC held in the Fall of 2021 two staff-led technical conferences addressing ISO/RTO energy and ancillary services markets (including potential energy and ancillary services market reforms, such as market reforms to increase operational flexibility, that may be needed as the resource fleet and load profiles change over time).<sup>115</sup> The first technical conference was held September 14, 2021; the second, October 12, 2021. Transcripts of both technical conferences are posted in eLibrary.

**Post-Technical Conference Comments.** On December 6, 2021, the FERC invited all interested persons to file initial and reply comments on the topics discussed during each of the two technical conferences. Initial comments must be submitted on or before **February 4, 2022**; reply comments, **March 7, 2022**. Thus far, one set of comments from the PJM Power Providers Group has been submitted.

- **Office of Public Participation (AD21-9)**

On June 24, 2021, the FERC issued a report in which it detailed the forthcoming creation of the Office of Public Participation (“OPP”), which it intends to grow over the course of a four-year period before OPP reaches its full operating status by the close of Fiscal Year (“FY”) 2024. By the end of FY2021, the FERC plans to hire the OPP Director (which it has done – see below), as well as the Deputy Director and an administrative staff member. The FERC plans to assess OPP’s workload and reevaluate needed resources for additional growth into and beyond FY2024 to ensure meaningful and consistent compliance with FPA section 319. A report, prepared by M.J. Bradley & Associates for NRDC’s Sustainable FERC Project, summarizing stakeholder feedback provided to the FERC through listening sessions and written comments, was posted to the FERC’s eLibrary on August 3, 2021.

The FERC held, on October 7, 2021 a virtual workshop to discuss technical assistance in electric proceedings, solicit public input on their technical assistance needs, and explore ways OPP could work with external entities to facilitate technical assistance to interested parties. Further details on the agenda, including registration information, can be found on the U.S. Department of Energy’s (“DOE”) Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (“PNNL”) [website](#). Information on this technical workshop was also posted on the Calendar of Events on the FERC’s website, [www.ferc.gov](http://www.ferc.gov).

On October 12, 2021, FERC Chairman Glick announced that Elin Katz, the former head of the Connecticut Office of Consumer Counsel (“CT OCC”) and president of the National Association of State Utility Consumer Advocates (“NASUCA”), will lead OPP. Ms. Katz assumed her role as the Director of OPP in late November.

Since the last Report, three sets of comments were filed.

- **Hybrid Resources (AD20-9)**

As previously reported, the FERC convened a July 23, 2020 technical conference to discuss technical and market issues prompted by growing interest in projects that are comprised of more than one resource type at the same plant location (“hybrid resources”). The focus was on generation resources and electric storage resources paired together as hybrid resources. Speaker materials and a transcript of the technical conference have been posted to the FERC’s eLibrary. Post-technical conference comments were filed by ISO-NE, CAISO, MISO, NYISO, PJM, Enel, American Council on Renewable Energy, AWEA, EEI, EPRI, R Street Institute, Savion, and SEIA.

On January 19, 2021, the FERC issued an order directing each ISO/RTO to submit, within 6 months (or before July 19, 2021), a report that provides: (a) a description of its current practices related to each of the following four hybrid resource issues: (1) terminology; (2) interconnection; (3) market participation; and (4) capacity valuation (collectively, the “Issues”); (b) an update on the status of any ongoing efforts to develop

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<sup>115</sup> In advance of the technical conferences, in an effort to frame discussions at those technical conferences, FERC staff issued on Sept. 7, 2021, a White Paper entitled “[Energy and Ancillary Services Market Reforms to Address Changing System Needs](#)” summarizing recent energy and ancillary services markets reforms as well as reforms then under consideration.

reforms related to each of the Issues; and (c) responses to the specific requests for information contained in the order. The ISO/RTO Reports, including ISO-NE's, were filed on July 19, 2021. Public comments in response to the ISO/RTO reports were filed in September 20, 2021.<sup>116</sup>

**Hybrid Resources White Paper.** On May 26, 2021, the FERC issued a white paper that discusses the hybrid resources technical conference, as well as information learned in post-technical conference comments. Interested persons were invited to submit comments on the white paper and encouraged to jointly respond to both the white paper and RTO/ISO informational reports where applicable to avoid duplicate comments. Comments on the white paper will also be due on September 20, 2021.

**Comments.** Comments on the RTO filing and on the FERC's Hybrid Resources White Paper were submitted by the American Council on Renewable Energy ("ACRE"), Clean Grid Alliance, EEI, the City of New York, Hybrid Resource Coalition, NRECA, Pine Gate Renewables, PJM IMM, and UCS. On October 20, 2021, NYISO submitted comments in response to issues raised by those comments. These matters remain pending before the FERC.

- **Order 882: 2022 Civil Monetary Penalty Inflation Adjustments (RM22-6)**

On January 14, 2022, the FERC issued *Order 882*<sup>117</sup> to amend its regulations governing the maximum civil monetary penalties assessable for violations of statutes, rules, and orders within FERC's jurisdiction. The FERC is required to update each such civil monetary penalty on an annual basis every January 15.<sup>118</sup> Of particular interest is the increase in potential civil penalties for market manipulation, which were increased from \$1,307,164 to \$1,388,496 per violation, per day. *Order 882* became effective January 13, 2022.<sup>119</sup>

- **NOI: Rate Recovery, Reporting, and Accounting Treatment of Industry Association Dues and Certain Civic, Political, and Related Expenses (RM22-5)**

On December 16, 2021, the FERC issued a notice of inquiry ("NOI")<sup>120</sup> seeking comments on (i) the rate recovery, reporting, and accounting treatment of industry association dues and certain civic, political, and related expenses; (ii) the ratemaking implications of potential accounting and reporting changes; (iii) whether additional transparency or guidance is needed with respect to defining donations for charitable, social, or community welfare purposes; and (iv) a framework for guidance should the FERC determine action is necessary to further define the recoverability of industry association dues charged to utilities and/or utilities' expenses from civic, political, and related activities. Initial comments are due February 22, 2022; reply comments, March 23, 2022. Thus far, one set of comments from M. Mabee have been submitted.

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<sup>116</sup> Public comments were initially due Aug. 18, 2021. However, in response to a request by the Energy Storage Association ("ESA"), the American Clean Power Association ("ACP"), and SEIA, the FERC granted a 30-day extension of time, to Sep. 20, 2021, to file comments in response to the ISO/RTO reports.

<sup>117</sup> *Civil Monetary Penalty Inflation Adjustments*, Order No. 882, 178 FERC ¶ 61,008 (Jan. 7, 2022) ("*Order 882*").

<sup>118</sup> See Federal Civil Penalties Inflation Adjustment Act Improvements Act of 2015, Sec. 701, Pub. L. 114-74, 129 Stat. 584, 599. The FERC made its first adjustment under the Act in July 2016. See *Civil Monetary Penalty Inflation Adjustments*, Order No. 826, 81 FR 43937 (July 6, 2016), FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,386 (2016). The second adjustment was made January 9, 2017. *Civil Monetary Penalty Inflation Adjustments*, Order No. 834, 158 FERC ¶ 61, 170 (Jan. 9, 2017). The third adjustment was made January 8, 2018. *Civil Monetary Penalty Inflation Adjustments*, Order No. 839, 162 FERC ¶ 61,010 (Jan. 8, 2018). The fourth adjustment was made January 9, 2019. *Civil Monetary Penalty Inflation Adjustments*, Order No. 853, 166 FERC ¶ 61,041 (Jan. 8, 2019). The fifth adjustment was made January 14, 2020. *Civil Monetary Penalty Inflation Adjustments*, Order No. 865, 170 FERC ¶ 61,001 (Jan. 2, 2020). The sixth adjustment was made January 8, 2021. *Civil Monetary Penalty Inflation Adjustments*, Order No. 875, 174 FERC ¶ 61,015 (Jan. 8, 2021).

<sup>119</sup> *Order 882* was published in the *Fed. Reg.* on Jan. 13, 2022 (Vol. 87, No. 9) pp. 2,036-2,037.

<sup>120</sup> *Rate Recovery, Reporting, and Accounting Treatment of Industry Association Dues and Certain Civic, Political, and Related Expenses*, 177 FERC ¶ 61,180 (Dec. 16, 2021) ("*Dues & Expenses NOI*").

- **ANOPR: Transmission Planning and Allocation and Generator Interconnection (RM21-17)**

On July 15, 2021, the FERC issued an advanced notice of proposed rulemaking (“ANOPR”)<sup>121</sup> to consider whether there should be changes in the regional transmission planning and cost allocation and generator interconnection processes and, if so, which changes are necessary to ensure that transmission rates remain just and reasonable and not unduly discriminatory or preferential and that reliability is maintained. Specifically, the ANOPR discusses proposals or concepts for changes to existing processes in several broad categories: regional transmission planning, regional cost allocation, generator interconnection funding, generator interconnection queueing processes and consumer protection, and in several instances the ANOPR also offers a potential rationale or argument for potential proposals. The FERC seeks comments from the public on these proposals and welcomes commenters to offer additional or alternative proposals for consideration.

Pre-technical conference comments were submitted by over 175 parties, including by: [NEPOOL](#), [ISO-NE](#), [AEE](#), [Anbaric](#), [Avangrid](#), [BP](#), [CPV](#), [Dominion](#), [EDF](#), [EDP](#), [Enel](#), [EPSA](#), [Eversource](#), [Exelon](#), [LS Power](#), [MA AG](#), [MMWEC](#), [National Grid](#), [NECOS](#), [NESCOE](#), [NextEra](#), [NRDC](#), [Orsted](#), [Shell](#), [UCS](#), [VELCO](#), [Vistra](#), [Potomac Economics](#), [ACORE](#), [ACPA/ESA](#), [APPA](#), [EEI](#), [ELCON](#), [Industrial Customer Orgs](#), [LPPC](#), [MA DOER](#), [NARUC](#), [NASUCA](#), [NASEO](#), [NERC](#), [NRECA](#), [SEIA](#), [State Agencies](#), [TAPS](#), [WIRES](#), [Harvard Electric Law Initiative](#); [NYU Institute for Policy Integrity](#), [New England for Offshore Wind Coalition](#), and the [R Street Institute](#).

**November 15, 2021 Tech Conf.** On November 15, 2021, the FERC convened a technical conference to examine in detail issues and potential reforms related to regional transmission planning as described in the July 15, 2021 ANOPR. Specifically, the technical conference examined issues related to incorporating sufficiently long-term and comprehensive forecasts of future transmission needs during regional transmission planning processes, including considering the needs of anticipated future generation in identifying needed transmission facilities. Speaker materials were posted to eLibrary on November 16, 2021.

**Reply and Post-Tech Conf Comments.** ANOPR Reply Comments and Post-November 15 technical conference comments were due on or before **November 30, 2021** and were filed by over 100 parties, including by: [CT AG](#), [Acadia Center/CLF](#), [CT AG](#), [Dominion](#), [Enel](#), [Eversource](#), [LS Power](#), [MA AG](#), [MMWEC](#), [NESCOE](#), [NextEra](#), [Shell](#), [UCS](#), [Vistra](#), [ACPA/ESA](#), [AEE](#), [APPA](#), [EEI](#), [ELCON](#), [Environmental and Renewable Energy Advocates](#), [EPSA](#), [Harvard ELI](#), [NRECA](#), [Potomac Economics](#), and [SEIA](#). Since the last Report, supplemental reply comments were filed by [WIRES](#) and a group of [former military leaders and former Department of Defense officials](#) filed a statement. This matter is pending before the FERC.

- **NOI: Removing the DR Opt-Out in ISO/RTO Markets (RM21-14)**

On March 18, 2021, the FERC issued a NOI<sup>122</sup> seeking comments on whether to revise its Demand Response (“DR”) Opt-Out regulations established in *Orders 719 and 719-A*. Those regulations require an ISO/RTO not to accept bids from an aggregator of retail customers (“ARC”) that aggregates DR of the customers of utilities that distributed more than 4 million MWh in the previous fiscal year, where the relevant electric retail regulatory authority prohibits such customers’ DR to be bid into ISO/RTO markets by an ARC. The FERC now seek information to help it examine the potential costs/burdens and benefits, both quantitative and qualitative, of removing the DR Opt-Out, as well as other changes relating to DR since the FERC issued *Orders 719 and 719-A*. The FERC is not seeking comment on the Small Utility Opt-In. Comments on the NOI, following an extension, were due on or before July 23, 2021 and were filed by nearly 30 parties, including by [AEE](#), [Votus](#), [AEMA](#), [APPA/NRECA](#), [EEI](#), and [NARUC](#). Reply comments were due on or before August 23, 2021, and were filed by [AEP](#), [Armada Power](#), [Entergy](#), [Southern Pioneer Electric](#), [Votus](#), State Commissions from [LA/MS](#), [MI](#), [MO](#), [NC](#), [APPA/NRECA](#), Assoc. of Bus. Advocating Tariff Equity (“[ABATE](#)”), and [PIOs](#). This matter is pending before the FERC.

<sup>121</sup> *Building for the Future Through Electric Regional Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation and Generator Interconnection*, 176 FERC ¶ 61,024 (July 15, 2021) (“Transmission Planning & Allocation/Generation Interconnection ANOPR”).

<sup>122</sup> *Participation of Aggregators of Retail Demand Response Customers in Markets Operated by Regional Transmission Organizations and Independent System Operators*, 174 FERC ¶ 61,198 (March 18, 2021) (“DR Aggregator NOI”).

- **NOPR: Cybersecurity Incentives (RM21-3)**

On December 17, 2020, the FERC issued a NOPR<sup>123</sup> proposing to establish rules for incentive-based rate treatment for voluntary cybersecurity investments by a public utility for or in connection with the transmission or sale of electric energy subject to FERC jurisdiction, and rates or practices affecting or pertaining to such rates for the purpose of ensuring the reliability of the BPS.

Comments on the *Cyber security Incentives NOPR* were due on or before April 6, 2021. Comments were filed by: [NECPUC](#), [APPA](#), [EEI](#), [EPSA](#), [LPPC](#), [NERC](#), [NRECA](#), [TAPS](#), [Accenture](#), [aDolus Inc. et al.](#),<sup>124</sup> [Alliant](#), [Anterix](#), [Bureau of Reclamation](#), [CA Dept of Water Resources State Water Project/CPUC](#), [George Cotter](#), [FRS](#), [Hitachi ABB Power Grids](#), [IECA](#), [ITC](#), [Joint Consumer Advocates](#), [MI PUC](#), [Org of MISO States](#), [MISO TOs](#), [PJM TOs](#), and [Public Citizen](#). Reply comments were due May 6, 2021<sup>125</sup> and were filed by [APPA/TAPS](#), [EEI](#), [SEIA](#), California Public Utilities Commission and California Department of Water Resources (“[CA PUC/DWR](#)”), and the Office of the Ohio Federal Energy Advocate (“[Ohio FEA](#)”). This matter remains pending before the FERC.

- **Order 881: Managing Transmission Line Ratings (RM20-16)**

On December 16, 2021, the FERC issued its final rule, *Order 881*, on Managing Transmission Line Ratings.<sup>126</sup> In *Order 881*, the FERC reforms both the *pro forma* OATT and its regulations to improve the accuracy and transparency of transmission line ratings. Specifically, *Order 881* requires:

- (i) transmission providers to implement ambient-adjusted ratings on the transmission lines over which they provide transmission service;
- (ii) ISO/RTOSs to establish and implement the systems and procedures necessary to allow transmission owners to electronically update transmission line ratings at least hourly;
- (iii) transmission owners to share transmission line ratings and transmission line rating methodologies with their respective transmission provider(s) and, in ISO/RTOs, with their respective market monitor(s); and
- (iv) transmission providers to maintain a database of transmission owners’ transmission line ratings and transmission line rating methodologies on the transmission provider’s Open Access Same-Time Information System (“OASIS”) site or other password-protected website.

*Order 881* will become effective March 14, 2022.<sup>127</sup> Since the last Report, requests for rehearing and/or clarification of *Order 881* were filed by ATC, EEI, ITC Holdings, MISO IMM, and the MISO TOs on January 18, 2022. The requests for rehearing and/or clarification are pending, with FERC action required on or before February 17, 2022, or the requests will be deemed denied by operation of law.

- **NOPR: Electric Transmission Incentives Policy (RM20-10)**

**Supplemental NOPR.** In light of comments already received in this proceeding,<sup>128</sup> the FERC issued on April 15, 2021 a *Supplemental NOPR*<sup>129</sup> to propose and seek comment on a revised incentive for transmitting and

<sup>123</sup> *Cybersecurity Incentives*, 173 FERC ¶ 61,240 (Dec. 17, 2020) (“*Cybersecurity Incentives NOPR*”).

<sup>124</sup> These joint comments were filed by aDolus Inc., Fortress Information Security, GMO GlobalSign Inc., Ion Channel, ReFirm Labs and Reliable Energy Analytics LLC.

<sup>125</sup> The *Cybersecurity Incentives NOPR* was published in the *Fed. Reg.* on Feb. 5, 2021 (Vol. 86, No. 23) pp. 8,309-8,325.

<sup>126</sup> *Managing Transmission Line Ratings*, Order No. 881, 177 FERC ¶ 61,179 (Dec. 16, 2021) (“*Order 881*”).

<sup>127</sup> *Order 881* was published in the *Fed. Reg.* on Jan. 13, 2022 (Vol. 87, No. 9) pp. 2,244-2,307.

<sup>128</sup> Over 80 sets of comments on the *March NOPR* were filed on or before the July 1, 2020 comment date, including comments by: Avangrid, EDF Renewables, EMCOS, Eversource, Exelon, LS Power, MMWEC/NHEC/CMEEC, National Grid, NESOCE, NextEra, UCS, CT PURA, and Potomac Economics. Reply comments were filed by AEP, ITC Holding, the N. California Transmission Agency, and WIRES.

<sup>129</sup> *Electric Transmission Incentives Policy Under Section 219 of the Federal Power Act*, 175 FERC ¶ 61,035 (Apr. 15, 2021) (“*Supplemental NOPR*”).



electric utilities that join Transmission Organizations (“Transmission Organization Incentive”). The Incentive would be reduced from 100 to 50 basis points and would be available only for three years. The FERC seeks comment on whether voluntary participation should be a requirement, and if so, how “voluntary” should be determined. In addition, the FERC now proposes to require each utility that has received a Transmission Organization Incentive for three or more years to submit a compliance filing revising its tariff to remove the incentive from its transmission tariff. The *Supplemental NOPR* did not address the other proposals contained in the *March NOPR*.<sup>130</sup> A more detailed summary of the NOPR was distributed to the Transmission Committee and discussed at the TC’s March 25, 2020 meeting.

Comments on the *Supplemental NOPR* were due on or before June 25, 2021. Over 60 sets of comments were filed, including by the New England TOs, MMWEC/NHEC/CMMEC, NECOS, NESCOE, Potomac Economics, and CT PURA. Reply comments were due on or before July 26, 2021, with 28 sets of comments received, including by the [New England TOs](#), [NECOS](#), [NESCOE](#), [CT PURA/CT DEEP/MA AG](#), [CT AG](#), and [Public Interest Groups](#).<sup>131</sup> Since the last Report, reply comments were posted from New England State Parties,<sup>132</sup> Alliant/Consumers/DTE, AEP, Pacific Gas & Electric, Joint Consumer Advocates, and the American Clean Power Association.

**September 10, 2021 Workshop.** The FERC convened a workshop on September 10, 2021<sup>133</sup> to discuss certain performance-based ratemaking approaches, particularly shared savings, that may foster deployment of transmission technologies. The notice states that the workshop will explore: the maturity of the modeling approaches for various transmission technologies; the data needed to study the benefits/costs of such technologies; issues pertaining to access to or confidentiality of this data; the time horizons that should be considered for such studies; and other issues related to verifying forecasted benefits. The workshop also discussed whether and how to account for circumstances in which benefits do not materialize as anticipated and may explore other performance-based ratemaking approaches for transmission technologies seeking incentives under FPA section 219, particularly market-based incentives. The FERC issued an agenda for the workshop, which

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<sup>130</sup> As previously reported, the *March NOPR* proposed revisions to the FERCs existing transmission incentives policy and corresponding regulations, including the following:

- ◆ A shift from risks and challenges to a **consumers’ benefits test** that focuses on ensuring reliability and reducing the cost of delivered power by reducing transmission congestion.
- ◆ **ROEs incentive for Economic Benefits.** A 50-basis-point adder for transmission projects that meet an economic benefit-to-cost ratio in the top 75th percentile of transmission projects examined over a sample period and an additional 50-basis-point adder for transmission projects that demonstrate *ex post* cost savings that fall in the 90th percentile of transmission projects studied over the same sample period, as measured at the end of construction.
- ◆ **ROE for Reliability Benefits.** A 50-basis-point adder for transmission projects that can demonstrate potential reliability benefits by providing quantitative analysis, where possible, as well as qualitative analysis.
- ◆ **Abandoned Plant Incentive.** 100 percent of prudently incurred costs of transmission facilities selected in a regional transmission planning process that are cancelled or abandoned due to factors that are beyond the control of the applicant. Recovery from the date that the project is selected in the regional transmission planning process.
- ◆ **Eliminate Transco Incentives.**
- ◆ **Transmission Organization Incentive.** A 50-basis-point increase for transmitting utilities that turn over their wholesale facilities to a Transmission Organization and *only for the first three years after transferring operational control of its facilities*. The FERC seeks comment as to whether participation must be voluntary to receive the incentive, and if so, how the CFERC should determine whether the decision to join is voluntary.
- ◆ **Transmission Technologies Incentives.** Eligible for both a stand-alone, 100-basis-point ROE incentive on the costs of the specified transmission technology project and specialized regulatory asset treatment. Pilot programs presumptively eligible (though rebuttable).
- ◆ **250-Basis-Point Cap.** Total ROE incentives capped at 250 basis points in place of current “zone of reasonableness” limit.
- ◆ **Updated Date Reporting Processes.** Information to be obtained on a project-by-project basis, information collection expanded, updated reporting process.

<sup>131</sup> “Public Interest Groups” are NRDC, Sierra Club, Sustainable FERC Project, and Western Grid Group.

<sup>132</sup> “New England State Parties” are CT PURA, CT DEEP and the MA AG.

<sup>133</sup> Notice of Workshop, *Electric Transmission Incentives Policy Under Section 219 of the Federal Power Act*, Docket Nos. RM20-10 and AD19-19 (Apr. 15, 2021).

included the final workshop program and expected speakers, on August 23, 2021. The FERC supplemented that notice on September 9, 2021. On October 13, 2021, the FERC posted a transcript of the workshop in eLibrary.

**Notice Inviting Post-Workshop Comments.** On October 18, 2021, the FERC issued a notice inviting those interested to file post-workshop comments to address the issues raised during the workshop concerning incentives and shared savings. Comments were due on or before January 14, 2022 and were filed by APPA, CAISO, Clean Energy Parties,<sup>134</sup> EDF Renewables, EEI, the Industrial Energy Consumers of America (“IECA”), National Grid, PJM IMM, TAPS.

These matters are pending before the FERC. If you have any questions concerning these matters, please contact Eric Runge (617-345-4735; [ekrunge@daypitney.com](mailto:ekrunge@daypitney.com)).

- **Order 860/860-A: Data Collection for Analytics & Surveillance and MBR Purposes (RM16-17)**

As previously reported, *Order 860*,<sup>135</sup> issued three years after the FERC’s *Data Collection NOPR*,<sup>136</sup> (i) revises the FERC’s MBR regulations by establishing a relational database of ownership and affiliate information for MBR Sellers (which, among other uses, will be used to create asset appendices and indicative screens), (ii) reduces the scope of information that must be provided in MBR filings, modifies the information required in, and format of, a MBR Seller’s asset appendix, (iii) changes the process and timing of the requirements to advise the FERC of changes in status and affiliate information, and (iv) eliminates the requirement adopted in *Order 816* that MBR Sellers submit corporate organization charts. In addition, the FERC stated that it will not adopt the *Data Collection NOPR* proposal to collect Connected Entity data from MBR Sellers and entities trading virtuals or holding FTRs. The FERC has posted on its website high-level instructions that describe the mechanics of the relational database submission process and how to prepare filings that incorporate information that is submitted to the relational database. As recently extended (*see below*), *Order 860* became effective July 1, 2021, and submitters have until close of business on November 2, 2021 to make their initial baseline submissions. Submitters will be required to obtain FERC-generated IDs for reportable entities that do not have CIDs or LEIs, as well as Asset IDs for reportable generation assets without an EIA code so that every ultimate upstream affiliate or other reportable entity has a FERC-assigned company identifiers (“CID”), Legal Entity Identifier,<sup>137</sup> or FERC-generated ID and that all reportable generation assets have an code from the Energy Information Agency (“EIA”) Form EIA-860 database or a FERC-assigned Asset ID. Requests for rehearing and/or clarification of *Order 860* were denied,<sup>138</sup> other than TAPS’ request that the FERC clarify that the public will be able to access the relational database. On that point, the FERC clarified “that we will make available services through which the public will be able to access organizational charts, asset appendices, and other reports, as well as have access to the same historical data as Sellers, including all market-based rate information submitted into the database. We also clarify that the database will retain information submitted by Sellers and that historical data can be accessed by the public.”

<sup>134</sup> The “Clean Energy Parties” are: Working for Advanced Transmission Technologies (“WATT Coalition”), the American Clean Power Association (“ACP”), AEE, American Council on Renewable Energy (“ACORE”), Natural Resources Defense Council (“NRDC”), and the Sustainable FERC Project.

<sup>135</sup> *Data Collection for Analytics and Surveillance and Market-Based Rate Purposes*, 168 FERC ¶ 61,039 (July 18, 2019) (“*Order 860*”), *order on reh’g and clarif.*, 170 FERC ¶ 61,129 (Feb. 20, 2020).

<sup>136</sup> *Data Collection for Analytics and Surveillance and Market-Based Rate Purposes*, 156 FERC ¶ 61,045 (July 21, 2016) (“*Data Collection NOPR*”).

<sup>137</sup> An LEI is a unique 20-digit alpha-numeric code assigned to a single entity. They are issued by the Local Operating Units of the Global LEI System.

<sup>138</sup> *Data Collection for Analytics and Surveillance and Market-Based Rate Purposes*, Order No. 860-A, 170 FERC ¶ 61,129 (Feb. 20, 2020) (“*Order 860-A*”).

**MBR Database.** On January 10, 2020, the FERC issued a notice that updated versions of the XML, XSD, and MBR Data Dictionary are available on the FERC's [website](#) and that the test environment for the MBR Database is now available and can be accessed on the [MBR Database webpage](#).

**March 18 Notice.** On March 18, 2021, the FERC issued a notice seeking comments on proposed changes to the MBR Data Dictionary to reflect the affiliations, or lack of affiliation, among Sellers for which their ultimate upstream affiliate is an institutional investor who acquired their securities pursuant to a section 203(a)(2) blanket authorization.<sup>139</sup> Specifically, the FERC proposes to update the MBR Data Dictionary and add the following three new attributes to the Entities table: the blanket authorization docket number, and the utility ID types and the utility IDs of the utilities whose securities were purchased under the corresponding blanket authorization docket number. Appropriate Sellers would be required to submit the docket number of the proceeding in which the FERC granted the section 203(a)(2) blanket authorization and the upstream affiliate whose securities were acquired pursuant to the section 203(a)(2) blanket authorization. Comments on the Notice were due on or before June 7, 2021,<sup>140</sup> and were filed by [EEI](#), [the Global LEI Foundation](#), [TAPS](#), and [XBRL US](#). In light of the proposed changes, the FERC deferred by three months the effective date of *Order 860* and its associated deadlines.

**Effective Date: July 1, 2021; Baseline Submissions March 3, 2022; First change in Status Filings, April 29, 2022.** On October 22, 2021, the FERC issued a second notice extending the effective and associated implementation dates of *Order 860* by an additional *three* months. The deadline for baseline submissions will be February 1, 2022. First change in status filings under these new timelines will be due March 3, 2022; second change in status filings, April 29, 2022.

**Order Adopting Changes to MBR Database.** On August 19, 2021, the FERC issued an order revising the MBR Data Dictionary as proposed in the March 18 Notice.<sup>141</sup> Specifically, Sellers whose ultimate upstream affiliate(s) own their voting securities pursuant to a section 203(a)(2) blanket authorization must provide, in the MBR Database, three additional data fields: (1) the docket number of the section 203(a)(2) blanket authorization, (2) the Utility\_ID\_Type\_CD of the utility whose securities were acquired under the corresponding section 203(a)(2) blanket authorization docket number, and (3) the Utility ID of that utility.

- **Order 676-J: Incorporation of NAESB WEQ Standards v. 003.3 into FERC Regs (RM05-5-029, -030)**

On May 20, 2021, the FERC issued Order 676-J,<sup>142</sup> which revises FERC regulations to incorporate by reference the latest version (Version 003.3) of the Standards for Business Practices and Communication Protocols for Public Utilities adopted by the Wholesale Electric Quadrant ("WEQ") of the North American Energy Standards Board ("NAESB"). The WEQ Version 003.3 Standards include, in their entirety, the WEQ-023 Modeling Business Practice Standards contained in the WEQ Version 003.1 Standards, which address the technical issues affecting Available Transfer Capability ("ATC") and Available Flowgate Capability ("AFC") calculation for wholesale electric transmission services, with the addition of certain revisions and corrections. The FERC also revised its regulations to provide that transmission providers must avoid unduly discriminatory and preferential treatment in the calculation of ATC. *Order 676-J* became effective August 2, 2021.<sup>143</sup> Public utilities must make a compliance filing to comply with the requirements of this final rule through eTariff 12

<sup>139</sup> *Data Collection for Analytics and Surveillance and Market-Based Rate Purposes*, 174 FERC ¶ 61,214 (Mar. 18, 2021).

<sup>140</sup> The Notice was published in the *Fed. Reg.* on Apr. 6, 2021 (Vol. 86, No. 64) pp. 17,823-17,828.

<sup>141</sup> *Data Collection for Analytics and Surveillance and Market-Based Rate Purposes*, 176 FERC ¶ 61,109 (Aug. 19, 2021).

<sup>142</sup> *Standards for Business Practices and Communication Protocols for Public Utilities*, Order No. 676-J, 175 FERC ¶ 61,139 (May 20, 2021) ("*Order 676-J*").

<sup>143</sup> *Order 676-J* was published *Fed. Reg.* on June 2, 2021 (Vol. 86, No. 104) pp. 29,491-29,503.



months after implementation of the WEQ Version 003.2 Standards. Compliance filings for cybersecurity and Parallel Flow Visualization standards are due March 2, 2022.

### XIII. FERC Enforcement Proceedings

#### Electric-Related Enforcement Actions

- **PacifiCorp (IN21-6)**

On April 15, 2021, in the FERC's first-ever Show Cause Order addressing alleged violations of NERC Reliability Standards,<sup>144</sup> the FERC directed PacifiCorp to show cause why it should not be found to have violated FPA section 215(b)(1) and section 39.2 of the FERC's regulations by failing to comply with Reliability Standard FAC 009-1 (Establish and Communicate Facility Ratings), Requirement R1, and the successor Reliability Standard FAC-008-3 (Facility Ratings), Requirement R6 (collectively, "FAC-009-1 R1"), which requires a transmission owner to establish and have facility ratings that are consistent with its Facility Ratings Methodology ("FRM"). An Enforcement investigation found that clearance measurements on a majority of PacifiCorp's transmission lines were incorrect under the National Electric Safety Code, which were used to calculate PacifiCorp's facility ratings, thus making PacifiCorp's facility ratings inconsistent with its FRM. Enforcement alleges that PacifiCorp was aware of incorrect clearances on its system since at least 2007 when FAC-009-1 R1 became mandatory, but failed to identify and remedy them in a timely manner, and PacifiCorp's violations began on August 31, 2009, when it implemented its FRM policy, and at least some of the violations continued until August 2017 when PacifiCorp completed remediation of all of its incorrect clearances to make them consistent with its FRM. Enforcement also pointed to the role of the violations in the Wood Hollow, Utah wildfire that lasted from June 23 to July 1, 2012. In light of these alleged violations, the FERC directed PacifiCorp to show cause why it should not be assessed civil penalties in the amount of **\$42 million**.

On July 16, 2021, PacifiCorp answered the PacifiCorp Show Cause Order, denying the alleged violations of FAC-009. Enforcement filed its reply on September 14, 2021. Should the FERC choose to pursue a civil penalty against PacifiCorp for the alleged violations, PacifiCorp has already exercised its right to adjudicate these allegations in federal district court. If you have any questions concerning this matter, please contact Pat Gerity (860-275-0533; [pmgerity@daypitney.com](mailto:pmgerity@daypitney.com)).

- **GreenHat (IN18-9)**

On November 5, 2021, the FERC issued its order assessing civil penalties against GreenHat Energy, LLC ("GreenHat"), John Bartholomew, Kevin Ziegenhorn, and [Luan Troxel as the Executor for] the Estate of Andrew Kittell ("Kittell Estate") (collectively, "Respondents").<sup>145</sup> The FERC found that Respondents violated FPA section 222, along with section 1c.2 of the FERC's regulations, PJM Tariff Attachment Q, Section B and section 15.1.3 of PJM's Operating Agreement, by engaging in a manipulative scheme in PJM's Financial Transmission Rights ("FTR") market which generated more than \$13 million in unjust profits for Respondents and imposed approximately \$179 million in losses on PJM Members. The FERC assessed civil penalties of **\$179 million, \$25 million, and \$25 million** against GreenHat, Bartholomew, and Ziegenhorn, respectively. The FERC ordered Respondents, including the Kittell Estate, to disgorge unjust profits of just **over \$13 million**, plus interest. Each of Respondents is jointly and severally liable for payment of that disgorgement amount.<sup>146</sup> Since the last Report, the FERC issued an order denying<sup>147</sup> the Kittell Estate's October 5, 2021 motion on which it had deferred action pending the outcome of a referral to the Department of Energy's Office of the Inspector

<sup>144</sup> *PacifiCorp*, 175 FERC ¶ 61,039 (Apr. 15, 2021) ("*PacifiCorp Show Cause Order*").

<sup>145</sup> *GreenHat Energy, LLC et al.*, 177 FERC ¶ 61,073 (Nov. 5, 2021) ("*GreenHat Penalties Order*").

<sup>146</sup> *Id.* at P1.

<sup>147</sup> *GreenHat Energy, LLC et al.*, 178 FERC ¶ 61,002 (Jan. 5, 2022) ("*Kittell Estate Order*").

General (“OIG”).<sup>148</sup> As previously reported, Respondents have already exercised their right to adjudicate these allegations in federal district court,<sup>149</sup> and the *GreenHat Penalties Order* will not be subject to rehearing. If you have any questions concerning this matter, please contact Pat Gerity (860-275-0533; [pmgerity@daypitney.com](mailto:pmgerity@daypitney.com)).

### Natural Gas-Related Enforcement Actions

- **Rover Pipeline, LLC and Energy Transfer Partners, L.P. (CPCN Show Cause Order) (IN19-4)**

On January 20, 2022, the FERC issued an order establishing a hearing to determine whether Rover Pipeline, LLC (“Rover”) and its parent company Energy Transfer Partners, L.P. (“ETP” and collectively with Rover, “Respondents”) violated section 157.5 of the FERC’s regulations and to ascertain certain facts relevant for any application of the FERC’s Penalty Guidelines.<sup>150</sup>

As previously reported, on March 18, 2021, the FERC issued a show cause order<sup>151</sup> in which it directed Rover Pipeline, LLC (“Rover”) and Energy Transfer Partners, L.P. (“ETP” and together with Rover, “Respondents”) to show cause why they should not be found to have violated Section 157.5 of the FERC’s regulations by misleading the FERC in its Application for Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity (“CPCN”) under NGA section 7(c).<sup>152</sup> The FERC directed Respondents to show cause why they should not be assessed civil penalties in the amount of **\$20.16 million**. On April 5, 2021, the FERC extended by 60 days, to June 18, 2021, the deadline for Respondents’ answer. On June 18, 2021, Rover and ETP answered the *Rover/ETP Show CPCN Cause Order*, asserting that the FERC should dismiss this matter and decline to initiate an enforcement action. On July 21, 2021, Enforcement Staff answered Rover/ETP’s answer, stating the evidence supports a finding that Rover violated the FERC’s Regulations and should be assessed the civil penalty identified in the *Rover/ETP Show Cause Order*. Rover answered the July 21 answer on September 15.

**Hearings.** On January 25, 2022, Chief ALJ Cintron designated Deputy Chief ALJ Andrew Satten as the Presiding Judge for the purpose of conducting a hearing and issuing an initial decision in this case. Track II procedural time standards were established for this hearing, calling for the hearing to be convened by September 6, 2022 and an initial decision to be issued on or before December 20, 2022. On February 1, 2022, Respondents requested a stay of the ALJ proceedings, which would remain in place until the completion of the Declaratory

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<sup>148</sup> The Kittell Estate’s October Motion requested that the FERC “drop all enforcement action against the estate of Andrew Kittell, ban Messrs. Tabackman and Olson from any future involvement, and order other offices within the Commission to investigate what happened” following an October 1 notice disclosing that an OE litigation attorney, Thomas Olson, had reported to OE management that he had an email exchange with a member of the FERC’s decisional staff, which Olson realized may constitute a violation of the FERC’s Separation of Functions regulation. In the *Kittell Estate Order*, without deciding whether or not there was a violation of FERC regulations, the FERC concluded that the conduct at issue in this proceeding would not warrant the extraordinary remedy of dismissal.

<sup>149</sup> If the penalty is unpaid within 60 days, the FERC will institute a proceeding in the appropriate district court seeking an order affirming the assessment of a civil penalty. The district court will have the authority to review *de novo* the law and facts involved and the jurisdiction to enforce, modify, or set aside, in whole or in part, the penalty assessment, subject to review by the appropriate U.S. Court of Appeals.

<sup>150</sup> Rover Pipeline, LLC, and Energy Transfer Partners, L.P., 178 FERC ¶ 61,028 (Jan. 20, 2022) (“*Rover/ETP Hearings Order*”).

<sup>151</sup> *Rover Pipeline, LLC, and Energy Transfer Partners, L.P.*, 174 FERC ¶ 61,208 (Mar. 18, 2021) (“*Rover/ETP CPCN Show Cause Order*”).

<sup>152</sup> Specifically, Rover stated that it was “committed to a solution that results in no adverse effects” to the Stoneman House, an 1843 farmstead located near Rover’s largest proposed compressor station. In truth, the OE Staff Report alleges, Rover was simultaneously planning to purchase the house with the intent to demolish it, if necessary, to complete its pipeline. The OE Staff Report alleges that Rover purchased the house in May 2015 and demolished the house in May 2016. The OE Staff Report further finds that despite taking these actions during the year and a half that Rover’s application was pending before the FERC, Rover did not notify the FERC that it purchased the Stoneman House, intended to destroy the Stoneman House, and did destroy the Stoneman House. The OE Staff Report therefore concludes that Rover violated section 157.5’s requirement for full, complete and forthright applications, through its misrepresentations and omissions, when it decided not to tell FERC that it had purchased the house and was considering demolishing it, and when Rover demolished it in May 2016 without notifying FERC.

Judgment Act action that Respondents filed also on February 1, 2022 in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas challenging the legality of the pending ALJ proceedings.

- **Rover and ETP (Tuscarawas River HDD Show Cause Order) (IN17-4)**

On December 16, 2021, the FERC issued a show cause order<sup>153</sup> in which it directed Rover and ETP (together, “Respondents”) to show cause why they should not be found to have violated NGA section 7(e), FERC Regulations (18 C.F.R. § 157.20); and the FERC’s Certificate Order,<sup>154</sup> by: (i) intentionally including diesel fuel and other toxic substances and unapproved additives in the drilling mud during its horizontal directional drilling (“HDD”) operations under the Tuscarawas River in Stark County, Ohio, in connection with the Rover Pipeline Project;<sup>155</sup> (ii) failing to adequately monitor the right-of-way at the site of the Tuscarawas River HDD operation; and (iii) improperly disposing of inadvertently released drilling mud that was contaminated with diesel fuel and hydraulic oil. The FERC directed Respondents to show why they should not be assessed civil penalties in the amount of **\$40 million**. Following a request from Respondents, the answer period was extended to and including March 21, 2022.

- **BP (IN13-15)**

On December 17, 2020, the FERC issued *Opinion 549-A*,<sup>156</sup> a 159-page decision addressing arguments raised on rehearing requested of *Opinion 549*.<sup>157</sup> *Opinion 549-A* modifies the discussion in *Opinion 549*, but reaches the same the result (ultimately requiring BP to pay a **\$20.16 million civil penalty (roughly \$24.4 million with accrued interest) and disgorge \$207,169**). Of note, *Opinion 549-A* denied BP’s motion to dismiss this enforcement action as time barred (by the five-year statute of limitations set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2462), finding BP waived any statute of limitations defense by failing to raise it earlier in this proceeding.<sup>158</sup> *Opinion 549-A* revised Ordering Paragraph (C) to direct the disgorged profits to non-profits that disburse the Low Income Home Energy Assistance Program of Texas funds, rather than to the Texas Department of Housing.<sup>159</sup>

On December 29, 2020, BP filed a notice that it intends to appeal *Opinion 549-A* to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals and paid the civil penalty amount on December 28, 2020, under protest and with full reservation of rights pending the outcome of judicial review of that Opinion. On January 19, BP filed a notice that it disgorged \$250,295 (\$207,169 principal plus interest), divided equally (\$83,431.67) among the following 3 entities identified in the “2016 Comprehensive Energy Assistance Program Subrecipient List”: Dallas County Dept. of Health and Human Services (serving Dallas); El Paso Community Action, Project Bravo (Serving El Paso); and Panhandle Community Services (serving Armstrong and numerous other counties), again under protest and with full reservation of rights pending the outcome of judicial review of *Opinion 549/549-A*.

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<sup>153</sup> *Rover Pipeline, LLC, and Energy Transfer Partners, L.P.*, 177 FERC ¶ 61,182 (Dec. 16, 2021) (“*Rover/ETP Tuscarawas River HDD Show Cause Order*”).

<sup>154</sup> *Rover Pipeline LLC*, 158 FERC ¶ 61,109 (2017), *order on clarification & reh’g*, 161 FERC ¶ 61,244 (2017), *Petition for Rev., Rover Pipeline LLC v. FERC*, No. 18-1032 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 29, 2018) (“*Certificate or Certificate Order*”).

<sup>155</sup> The Rover Pipeline Project is an approximately 711 mile long interstate natural gas pipeline designed to transport gas from the Marcellus and Utica shale supply areas through West Virginia, Pennsylvania, Ohio, and Michigan to outlets in the Midwest and elsewhere.

<sup>156</sup> *BP America Inc. et al.*, Opinion No. 549-A, 173 FERC ¶ 61,239 (Dec. 17, 2020) (“*BP Penalties Allegheny Order*”).

<sup>157</sup> *BP America Inc.*, Opinion No. 549, 156 FERC ¶ 61,031 (July 11, 2016) (“*BP Penalties Order*”) (affirming Judge Cintron’s Aug. 13, 2015 Initial Decision finding that BP America Inc., BP Corporation North America Inc., BP America Production Company, and BP Energy Company (collectively, “BP”) violated Section 1c.1 of the FERC’s regulations (“Anti-Manipulation Rule”) and NGA Section 4A (*BP America Inc. et al.*, 152 FERC ¶ 63,016 (Aug. 13, 2015) (“*BP Initial Decision*”))).

<sup>158</sup> *BP Penalties Allegheny Order* at P 1.

<sup>159</sup> *Id.* at P 319.

- **Total Gas & Power North America, Inc. et al. (IN12-17)**

On April 28, 2016, the FERC issued a show cause order<sup>160</sup> in which it directed Total Gas & Power North America, Inc. (“TGPNA”) and its West Desk traders and supervisors, Therese Tran f/k/a Nguyen (“Tran”) and Aaron Hall (collectively, “Respondents”) to show cause why Respondents should not be found to have violated NGA Section 4A and the FERC’s Anti-Manipulation Rule through a scheme to manipulate the price of natural gas at four locations in the southwest United States between June 2009 and June 2012.<sup>161</sup>

The FERC also directed TGPNA to show cause why it should not be required to disgorge unjust profits of **\$9.18 million**, plus interest; TGPNA, Tran and Hall to show cause why they should not be assessed civil penalties (TGPNA - **\$213.6 million**; Hall - **\$1 million** (jointly and severally with TGPNA); and Tran - **\$2 million** (jointly and severally with TGPNA)). In addition, the FERC directed TGPNA’s parent company, Total, S.A. (“Total”), and TGPNA’s affiliate, Total Gas & Power, Ltd. (“TGPL”), to show cause why they should not be held liable for TGPNA’s, Hall’s, and Tran’s conduct, and be held jointly and severally liable for their disgorgement and civil penalties based on Total’s and TGPL’s significant control and authority over TGPNA’s daily operations. Respondents filed their answer on July 12, 2016. OE Staff replied to Respondents’ answer on September 23, 2016. Respondents answered OE’s September 23 answer on January 17, 2017, and OE Staff responded to that answer on January 27, 2017.

**Hearing Procedures.** On July 15, 2021, the FERC issued an order establishing hearing procedures to determine whether Respondents violated the FERC’s Anti-Manipulation Rule, and to ascertain certain facts relevant for any application of the FERC’s Penalty Guidelines.<sup>162</sup> On July 27, Chief Judge Cintron designated Judge Suzanne Krolikowski as the Presiding ALJ and established an extended Track III Schedule<sup>163</sup> for the proceeding. Judge Krolikowski scheduled and convened on August 26, 2021 a prehearing conference. Judge Krolikowski issued an order confirming her rulings from the August 26 prehearing conference and establishing a procedural schedule that calls for, among other dates, pre-hearing briefs by July 25, 2022, hearings (estimated to take 2-3 weeks) to begin on August 15, 2022, and an initial decision on January 9, 2023. In light of the settlement judge procedures undertaken, Chief Judge Cintron extended the hearing commencement and initial decision deadlines to September 26, 2022, and February 20, 2023, respectively. Since the last Report, the Presiding ALJ granted Respondents’ request to extend the deadline to file a consolidated motion to compel production of documents and other materials to January 25, 2022, and the corresponding answering deadline to February 8, 2022. That motion was filed on January 25, 2022 and OE replied to that brief on February 1, 2022. The motion related to discovery matters is pending before the Presiding ALJ.

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<sup>160</sup> *Total Gas & Power North America, Inc.*, 155 FERC ¶ 61,105 (Apr. 28, 2016) (“TGPNA Show Cause Order”).

<sup>161</sup> The allegations giving rise to the Total Show Cause Order were laid out in a September 21, 2015 FERC Staff Notice of Alleged Violations which summarized OE’s case against the Respondents. Staff determined that the Respondents violated NGA section 4A and the Commission’s Anti-Manipulation Rule by devising and executing a scheme to manipulate the price of natural gas in the southwest United States between June 2009 and June 2012. Specifically, Staff alleged that the scheme involved making largely uneconomic trades for physical natural gas during bid-week designed to move indexed market prices in a way that benefited the company’s related positions. Staff alleged that the West Desk implemented the bid-week scheme on at least 38 occasions during the period of interest, and that Tran and Hall each implemented the scheme and supervised and directed other traders in implementing the scheme.

<sup>162</sup> *Total Gas & Power North America, Inc. et al.*, 176 FERC ¶ 61,026 (July 15, 2021).

<sup>163</sup> The hearing in this proceeding will be convened within 55 weeks (Aug. 15, 2022) and the initial decision issued within 76 weeks (January 9, 2023) of the issuance of the Chief Judge’s order.

**XIV. Natural Gas Proceedings**

For further information on any of the natural gas proceedings, please contact Joe Fagan (202-218-3901; [jfagan@daypitney.com](mailto:jfagan@daypitney.com)).

### **New England Pipeline Proceedings**

The following New England pipeline projects are currently under construction or before the FERC:

- **Iroquois ExC Project (CP20-48)**
  - 125,000 Dth/d of incremental firm transportation service to ConEd and KeySpan by building and operating new natural gas compression and cooling facilities at the sites of four existing Iroquois compressor stations in Connecticut (Brookfield and Milford) and New York (Athens and Dover).
  - Three-year construction project; service request by November 1, 2023.
  - February 2, 2020 application for a certificate of public convenience and necessity pending; Iroquois requests on January 26, 2021 that the FERC act promptly and issue the certificate; National Grid and ConEd submit comments supporting Iroquois' application and request for action.
  - On May 27, 2021, FERC staff issued a notice that it will prepare an environmental impact statement ("EIS") for this Project, which will respond to comments filed on the Environmental Assessment, and plans to release that EIS on September 3, 2021.
  - On June 11, 2021, FERC staff issued a notice that it has prepared a draft EIS for this Project, which responds to comments on the September 30, 2020 Environmental Assessment, and with the exception of greenhouse gas ("GHG") emissions, concludes that approval of the proposed Project, with the mitigation measures recommended in the EIS, would not result in significant environmental impacts. FERC staff did not come to a determination of significance with regards to GHG emissions. Comments on the draft EIS were due on or before August 9, 2021. Since the last Report, 93 sets of individual comments were filed, bring to nearly 300 the number of individual comments have been filed. Algonquin responded to those comments on August 24, 2021.
  - On September 2, 2021, FERC staff modified the issuance date of its final EIS for the Project, due to the "complexity of comments received on the draft EIS". Issuance of a final EIS is now expected on November 12, 2021; the 90-day Federal Authorization Decision Deadline, February 9, 2022.
  - On September 3, 2021, FERC staff issued environmental information request #4, to which Iroquois responded on September 13, 2021.
  - On October 15, 2021, Iroquois submitted a supplemental Life Cycle Greenhouse Gas Analysis Report.
  - On November 12, 2021, FERC staff issued the final EIS for the Project, which responds to comments that were received on the September 30, 2020 Environmental Assessment and June 11, 2021 draft EIS and discloses downstream GHG emissions for the Project. "With the exception of climate change impacts, FERC staff concluded that approval of the proposed Project, with the mitigation measures recommended in this EIS, would not result in significant environmental impacts."
  - Since the last Report, Iroquois, ConEd and National Grid answered/replied to the December 20, 2021 comments on the final EIS by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA").
- **Atlantic Bridge Project (CP16-9)**
  - On February 24, 2020, the FERC authorized Algonquin Gas Transmission, LLC ("Algonquin") and Maritimes & Northeast Pipeline, LLC ("Maritimes") to place facilities associated with the Atlantic Bridge Project into service.<sup>164</sup> Rehearing of the *Authorization Order* was timely requested, but denied by operation of law.

<sup>164</sup> *Algonquin Gas Transmission, LLC*, Docket No. CP16-9 at 1 (Sep. 24, 2020) (delegated order) ("*Authorization Order*").

- ▶ *Briefing Order*. In a fairly unprecedented order issued February 18, 2021,<sup>165</sup> the FERC, expressing concerns regarding operation of the project, established briefing on the following matters:
  - In light of the concerns expressed regarding public safety, is it consistent with the FERC's responsibilities under the NGA to allow the Weymouth Compressor Station to enter and remain in service?
  - Should the Commission reconsider the current operation of the Weymouth Compressor Station in light of any changed circumstances since the project was authorized? For example, are there changes in the Weymouth Compressor Station's projected air emissions impacts or public safety impacts the Commission should consider? We encourage parties to address how any such changes affect the surrounding communities, including environmental justice communities.
  - Are there any additional mitigation measures the Commission should impose in response to air emissions or public safety concerns?
  - What would the consequences be if the Commission were to stay or reverse the *Authorization Order*?
- ▶ Requests for rehearing of the *Briefing Order* were filed by Algonquin, NGSA and Center for Liquefied Natural Gas, and by America and Energy Infrastructure Council. Cheniere Energy submitted comments in support of the requests for rehearing. On April 19, 2021, the FERC issued a "Notice of Denial of Rehearings by Operation of Law and Providing for Further Consideration".<sup>166</sup> The Notice confirmed that the 60-day period during which a petition for review of its *Briefing Order* can be filed with an appropriate federal court was triggered when the FERC did not act on the requests for rehearing of the *Briefing Order*. The Notice also indicated that the FERC would address, as is its right, the rehearing requests in a future order, and may modify or set aside its orders, in whole or in part, "in such manner as it shall deem proper." On May 19, the FERC issued that order,<sup>167</sup> dismissing the requests for rehearing of the *Briefing Order*, noting, over the objection of Commissioner Danly, that the *Briefing Order* was an exercise of the FERC's continuing oversight of the Project (meaning the claimed harms would be speculative and premature) and Algonquin and Trade Associations will have an opportunity to submit, if they choose, in requests for rehearing of any final decision by the Commission in this proceeding. Algonquin petitioned the DC Circuit for review of the *Briefing Order* and the notice of denial by operation of law on May 3, 2021 (see Section XVI below).
- ▶ Requests for rehearing of the *May 19 Order* were filed by Algonquin and INGAA. On July 16, 2021, the FERC issued a Notice of Denial of Rehearings by Operation of Law of the requests for rehearing of the *May 19 Order*.
- ▶ Algonquin also petitioned the DC Circuit for review of the *Briefing Order*, *April 19 Notice of Denial of Rehearings by Operation of Law*, and the *May 19 Order*.<sup>168</sup>
- ▶ On January 20, 2022, the FERC addressed the arguments raised on rehearing and in the briefs and sustained<sup>169</sup> the *Authorization Order*.
- ▶ This matter is before the DC Circuit (see Section XVI below).

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<sup>165</sup> *Algonquin Gas Transmission, LLC and Maritimes & Northeast Pipeline, LLC*, 174 FERC ¶ 61,126 (Feb. 18, 2021) ("*Briefing Order*").

<sup>166</sup> *Algonquin Gas Transmission, LLC and Maritimes & Northeast Pipeline, LLC*, 175 FERC ¶ 62,022 (Apr. 19, 2021) ("*April 19 Notice of Denial of Rehearings by Operation of Law*").

<sup>167</sup> *Algonquin Gas Transmission, LLC and Maritimes & Northeast Pipeline, LLC*, 175 FERC ¶ 61,150 (May 19, 2021) ("*May 19 Order*").

<sup>168</sup> *Algonquin Gas Transmission, LLC and Maritimes & Northeast Pipeline, LLC*, 176 FERC ¶ 62,029 (July 16, 2021) ("*July 16 Notice of Denial of Rehearings by Operation of Law*").

<sup>169</sup> *Algonquin Gas Transmission, LLC and Maritimes & Northeast Pipeline, LLC*, 178 FERC ¶ 61,029 (Jan. 20, 2022) ("*Order Sustaining*").

**Non-New England Pipeline Proceedings**

The following pipeline projects could affect ongoing pipeline proceedings in New England and elsewhere:

- **Northern Access Project (CP15-115)**

- ▶ The New York State Department of Environmental Conservation (“NY DEC”) and the Sierra Club requested rehearing of the *Northern Access Certificate Rehearing Order* on August 14 and September 5, 2018, respectively. On August 29, National Fuel Gas Supply Corporation and Empire Pipeline (“Applicants”) answered the NY DEC’s August 14 rehearing request and request for stay. On April 2, 2019, the FERC denied the NY DEC and Sierra Club requests for rehearing.<sup>170</sup> Those orders have been challenged on appeal to the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (19-1610).
- ▶ As previously reported, the August 6, 2018 *Northern Access Certificate Rehearing Order* dismissed or denied the requests for rehearing of the *Northern Access Certificate Order*.<sup>171</sup> Further, in an interesting twist, the FERC found that a December 5, 2017 “Renewed Motion for Expedited Action” filed by National Fuel Gas Supply Corporation and Empire Pipeline, Inc. (the “Companies”), in which the Companies asserted a separate basis for their claim that the NY DEC waived its authority under section 401 of the Clean Water Act (“CWA”) to issue or deny a water quality certification for the Northern Access Project, served as a motion requesting a waiver determination by the FERC,<sup>172</sup> and proceeded to find that the NY DEC was obligated to act on the application within one year, failed to do so, and so waived its authority under section 401 of the CWA.
- ▶ The FERC authorized the Companies to construct and operate pipeline, compression, and ancillary facilities in McKean County, Pennsylvania, and Allegany, Cattaraugus, Erie, and Niagara Counties, New York (“Northern Access Project”) in an order issued February 3, 2017.<sup>173</sup> The Allegheny Defense Project and Sierra Club (collectively, “Allegheny”) requested rehearing of the *Northern Access Certificate Order*.
- ▶ Despite the FERC’s *Northern Access Certificate Order*, the project remained halted pending the outcome of National Fuel’s fight with the NY DEC’s April denial of a Clean Water Act permit. NY DEC found National Fuel’s application for a water quality certification under Section 401 of the Clean Water Act, as well as for stream and wetlands disturbance permits, failed to comply with water regulations aimed at protecting wetlands and wildlife and that the pipeline failed to explore construction alternatives. National Fuel appealed the NY DEC’s decision to the 2nd Circuit on the grounds that the denial was improper.<sup>174</sup> On February 2, 2019, the 2nd Circuit vacated the decision of the NY DEC and remanded the case with instructions for the NY DEC to more clearly articulate its basis for the denial and how that basis is connected to information in the existing administrative record. The matter is again before the NY DEC.
- ▶ On November 26, 2018, the Applicants filed a request at FERC for a 3-year extension of time, until February 3, 2022, to complete construction and to place the certificated facilities into service. The Applicants cited the fact that they “do not anticipate commencement of Project construction until early 2021 due to New York’s continued legal actions and to time lines required for procurement of necessary pipe and compressor facility materials.” The extension request was granted on January 31, 2019.

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<sup>170</sup> *Nat’l Fuel Gas Supply Corp. and Empire Pipeline, Inc.*, 167 FERC ¶ 61,007 (Apr. 2, 2019).

<sup>171</sup> *Nat’l Fuel Gas Supply Corp. and Empire Pipeline, Inc.*, 164 FERC ¶ 61,084 (Aug. 6, 2018) (“*Northern Access Rehearing & Waiver Determination Order*”), *reh’g denied*, 167 FERC ¶ 61,007 (Apr. 2, 2019).

<sup>172</sup> The DC Circuit has indicated that project applicants who believe that a state certifying agency has waived its authority under CWA section 401 to act on an application for a water quality certification must present evidence of waiver to the FERC. *Millennium Pipeline Co., L.L.C. v. Seggos*, 860 F.3d 696, 701 (D.C. Cir. 2017).

<sup>173</sup> *Nat’l Fuel Gas Supply Corp.*, 158 FERC ¶ 61,145 (2017) (“*Northern Access Certificate Order*”), *reh’g denied*, 164 FERC ¶ 61,084 (Aug 6, 2018) (“*Northern Access Certificate Rehearing Order*”).

<sup>174</sup> *Nat’l Fuel Gas Supply Corp. v. NYSDEC et al.* (2d Cir., Case No. 17-1164).



- ▶ On August 8, 2019, the NY DEC again denied Applicants request for a Water Quality Certification, and as directed by the Second Circuit,<sup>175</sup> provided a “more clearly articulate[d] basis for denial.”
- ▶ On August 27, 2019, Applicants requested an additional order finding on additional grounds that the NY DEC waived its authority over the Northern Access 2016 Project under Section 401 of the CWA, even if the NY DEC and Sierra Club prevail in their currently pending court petitions challenging the basis for the Commission’s Waiver Order.<sup>176</sup>
- ▶ On October 16, 2020, Applicants requested, due to ongoing legal and regulatory delays, an additional 2-year extension of time, until December 1, 2024, to complete construction of the Project and enter service. More than 50 sets of comments on the requested extension were filed and on December 1, 2020, the FERC dismissed, without prejudice, Applicants’ request for an extension of time,<sup>177</sup> finding the request premature. The FERC reiterated its encouragement that pipeline applicants requesting extensions “file their requests no more than 120 days before the deadline to complete construction”, so that the FERC has the relevant information available to determine whether good cause exists to grant an extension of time and whether the FERC’s prior findings remain valid.<sup>178</sup>
- ▶ On January 28, 2022, Applicants again requested an additional extension of time, this time until December 31, 2024, to complete construction of the Project and enter service. Comments on that request are due on or before February 16, 2022.

## XV. State Proceedings & Federal Legislative Proceedings

- **New England States’ Vision Statement**

In October 2020, the six New England states released their “[Vision Statement](#)”, outlining their vision for “a clean, affordable, and reliable 21st century regional electric grid” and committing to engage in a collaborative and open process, supported by NESCOE, intended to advance the principles discussed in the Vision Statement. As part of that effort, the following series of online technical forums to discuss the issues presented in the Vision Statement were held:

Jan 13, 2021	Wholesale Market Reform
Jan 25, 2021	Wholesale Market Reform
Feb 2, 2021	Transmission Planning
Feb 25, 2021	Governance Reform
Mar 18, 2021	Equity and Environmental Justice

Written comments on the topics and discussions addressed in the on the equity and environmental justice topics and discussions were, following an extension, due by May 13, 2021. Comments submitted are posted on [NewEnglandEnergyVision.com](https://newenglandenergyvision.com). Recordings of the technical forums, as well as draft notices, agendas, and additional information on these sessions, are also available on the New England States’ Vision Statement website (<https://newenglandenergyvision.com/>).

<sup>175</sup> Summary Order, *Nat’l Fuel Gas Supply Corp. v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Env’tl. Conservation*, Case 17-1164 (2d. Cir., issued Feb. 5, 2019).

<sup>176</sup> See *Sierra Club v. FERC*, No. 19-01618 (2d Cir. filed May 30, 2019); *NYSDEC v. FERC*, No. 19-1610 (2d. Cir., filed May 28, 2019) (consolidated).

<sup>177</sup> *National Fuel Gas Supply Corp. and Empire Pipeline, Inc.*, 173 FERC ¶ 61,197 (Dec. 1, 2020).

<sup>178</sup> *Id.* at P 10.



**Report to the Governors.** On June 29, 2021, the NESCOE Managers published their Progress Report to the New England Governors Regarding “Advancing the New England Energy Vision”. The Report was further discussed at the August 5, 2021 Participants Committee meeting. View Report [here](#).

**ISO-NE Board Response.** On September 23, 2021, the ISO-NE Board responded to the New England States’ Vision Statement and Advancing the Vision Report. A copy of that response was included with the materials for the October 7, 2021 Participants Committee meeting and is posted on the ISO-NE website [here](#).

## XVI. Federal Courts

The following are matters of interest, including petitions for review of FERC decisions in NEPOOL-related proceedings, that are currently pending before the federal courts (unless otherwise noted, the cases are before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (“DC Circuit”). An “\*\*\*” following the Case No. indicates that NEPOOL has intervened or is a litigant in the appeal. The remaining matters are appeals as to which NEPOOL has no organizational interest but that may be of interest to Participants. For further information on any of these proceedings, please contact Pat Gerity (860-275-0533; [pmgerity@daypitney.com](mailto:pmgerity@daypitney.com)).

- **NTE CT Petition for Writ of Mandamus for Stay of FERC Order Accepting the Killingly Energy Center CSO Termination (21-1011)**  
Underlying FERC Proceeding: ER22-355<sup>179</sup>  
Petitioner: NTE CT  
**Status: Awaiting Decision**

On January 20, 2022, NTE CT petitioned the DC Circuit Court of Appeals for a Writ of Mandamus to stay the *Killingly CSO Termination Order*. On January 21, the Court ordered the FERC to respond by noon on January 31, 2022. ISO-NE moved to intervene on January 24, which the Court granted on January 28, and ISO-NE supplemented the record on January 27. As directed, the FERC responded to the Petition on January 31. NTE CT responded to the FERC’s response on February 1. This matter is pending before the Court.

- **CSC Request for Regulatory Asset Recovery of Previously-Incurred CIP IROL Costs (21-1275)**  
Underlying FERC Proceeding: ER21-2334<sup>180</sup>  
Petitioner: CSC  
**Status: Filing of Initial Submissions Underway**

On December 30, 2021, CSC petitioned the DC Circuit Court of Appeals for review of the FERC’s orders denying it authorization to establish a regulatory asset that would include all CIP-IROL Costs prudently incurred between January 1, 2016 and May 31, 2021 and to recover those costs under Schedule 17 over a five-year period. Appearances are due February 2, 2022. CSC must file a Docketing Statement, Statement of Issues, any Procedural Motions, and the underlying decision from which the appeal arises by February 2, 2022. Dispositive motions, if any, and a Certified Index to the Record must be filed by February 17, 2022.

Since the last Report, NESCOE intervened on January 28, 2022. On February 2, 2022, CSC filed a docketing statement and statement of issues. Also on February 2, the FERC asked that the Court hold the petition for review in abeyance, including suspending the initial filing schedule, until the Commission issues an order addressing Petitioner’s request for rehearing. That request is pending before the Court.

<sup>179</sup> *ISO New England Inc.*, 178 FERC ¶ 61,001 (Jan. 3, 2022), *reh’g pending*.

<sup>180</sup> *Cross-Sound Cable Co., LLC*, 176 FERC ¶ 61,073 (Aug. 31, 2021) (“August 31 Order”); *Cross-Sound Cable Co., LLC*, 177 FERC ¶ 62,064 (Nov. 1, 2021) (Notice of Denial By Operation of Law of Rehearings of *August 31 Order*).

- **Mystic ROE (21-1198; 21-1222, 21-1223, 21-1224, 22-1001, 22-1008) (consolidated)**  
Underlying FERC Proceeding: EL18-1639-010, -011<sup>181</sup>  
Petitioners: Mystic, CT Parties,<sup>182</sup> MA AG, ENECOS  
**Status: Filing of Initial Submissions Underway**

As previously reported, on October 8, 2021, Mystic petitioned the DC Circuit Court of Appeals for review of the FERC's orders setting the base ROE for the Mystic COS Agreement at 9.33%. On October 14, 2021, the Court ordered Mystic to file, and Mystic filed on October 29, a Docketing Statement Form, a Statement of Intent to Utilize Deferred Joint Appendix, a Statement of Issues to be Raised, and the Underlying Decision from which the appeal arises. The Court granted the MA AG's motion to intervene and the FERC's motion to extend the deadline for filing certified index to the record to January 28, 2022 (allowing for inclusion of all activity following the *Mystic ROE Allegheny Order*). Statements of Issues and Docketing Statements were filed by CT Parties, ENECOS and the MA AG in mid-December.

Since the last Report, CT Parties' (22-1001) and Mystic's (22-1008) appeals of the *Mystic ROE Allegheny Order* were consolidated under 21-1198. CT Parties were directed to file a Docketing Statement Form and Statement of Issues to be Raised by February 11, 2022; Mystic, by February 22, 2022. On January 13, 2022, the Clerk ordered that the petitions for review in 21-1223 and 21-1224 could be amended, without prejudice to a determination by the merits panel whether a new petition for review, rather than an amended petition, was required. ENECOS and MA AG filed their amended petitions on February 17, 2022. On January 26, the FERC asked for a further 60-day extension of time, to March 29, 2022, to file the Certified Index to the Record. Mystic opposed that request the next day and on January 28, the FERC answered Mystic's January 27 opposition. The FERC's motion is pending before the Court.

- **ISO-NE Implementation of Order 1000 Exemptions for Immediate Need Reliability Projects (20-1422)**  
Underlying FERC Proceeding: EL19-90<sup>183</sup>  
Petitioner: LS Power  
**Status: Briefing Complete; Oral Argument Held Jan 27, 2022; Awaiting Decision**

As previously reported, On October 16, 2020, LSP Transmission Holdings II, LLC ("LS Power") petitioned the DC Circuit Court of Appeals for review of the FERC's orders addressing ISO-NE's implementation of the Order 1000 exemptions for immediate need reliability projects. Following completion of briefing, oral argument before Judges Rogers, Pillard and Randolph was held on January 27, 2022. This matter is pending before the Court.

<sup>181</sup> *Constellation Mystic Power, LLC*, 176 FERC ¶ 61,019 (July 15, 2021) ("Mystic ROE Order"); *Constellation Mystic Power, LLC*, 176 FERC ¶ 62,127 (Sep. 13, 2021) ("September 13 Notice") (Notice of Denial By Operation of Law of Rehearings of Mystic ROE Order).

<sup>182</sup> In this appeal, "CT Parties" are the Connecticut Public Utilities Regulatory Authority ("CT PURA"), Connecticut Department of Energy and Environmental Protection ("CT DEEP"), and the Connecticut Office of Consumer Counsel ("CT OCC").

<sup>183</sup> *ISO New England Inc.*, 171 FERC ¶ 61,211 (June 18, 2020) ("Order Terminating Proceeding") (finding (i) "insufficient evidence in the record to find under FPA section 206 that [ISO-NE's] implementation of the exemption for immediate need reliability projects is unjust, unreasonable, or unduly discriminatory or preferential; (ii) "insufficient evidence in the record to find that ISO-NE implemented the immediate need reliability project exemption in a manner that is inconsistent with or more expansive than [the FERC] directed"; and (iii) that ISO-NE complies with the five criteria established for the immediate need reliability project exemption); and *ISO New England Inc.*, 172 FERC ¶ 61,293 (Sep. 29, 2020) ("Order 1000 Exemptions Allegheny Order") (addressing arguments raised by request for rehearing denied by operation of law, modifying discussion in *Order Terminating Proceeding*, but reaching same result).

- **CIP IROL Cost Recovery Rules (20-1389)**  
**Underlying FERC Proceeding: ER20-739<sup>184</sup>**  
**Petitioner: Cogentrix, Vistra**

**Status: Petition for Review DENIED on January 28, 2022.**

On January 28, 2022, the Court (Judges Srinivasan, Katsas and Randolph) denied the petition by Cogentrix and Vistra for review of the FERC's orders allowing for recovery of expenditures to comply with the IROL-CIP requirements, but only those costs incurred on or after the effective date of the relevant individual FPA section 205 filing, including undepreciated costs of any such past capital expenditures to comply with the IROL-CIP requirements. In denying the petition, the Court agreed with the FERC that Schedule 17 does not expressly permit recovery of previously paid costs to comply with mandatory reliability standards prior to an individual facility's Section 205 filing. The Court found that the FERC's application of the filed rate doctrine and rule against retroactive rulemaking was consistent with FPA Section 219. And the Court explained why it concluded that the FERC's application of those was not arbitrary or capricious. Reporting on this matter is now concluded.

- **Mystic 8/9 Cost of Service Agreement (20-1343; 20-1361, 20-1362; 20-1365, 20-1368; 21-1067; 21-1070)(consolidated)**  
**Underlying FERC Proceeding: EL18-1639<sup>185</sup>**  
**Petitioners: Mystic (20-1343), NESCOE (20-1361, 21-1067), MA AG (20-1362), CT Parties (20-1365, 20-1368, 21-1070)**  
**Status: Briefing Underway**

Mystic, NESCOE, MA AG, and CT Parties have separately petitioned the DC Circuit Court of Appeals for review of the FERC's orders addressing the COS Agreement among Mystic, ExGen and ISO-NE.<sup>186</sup> The cases have been consolidated into Case No. 20-1343. On February 17 and 24, 2021, the Court consolidated with 20-1343 the most recent appeals in cases 21-1067 (NESCOE) and 21-1070 (CT Parties), respectively. On March 25, 2021, the Court issued an order returning this case to its active docket. On March 26, the Court granted the interventions by MMWEC/NHEC, NESCOE, and ENECOS. On April 16, 2021, the Court ordered the parties to file, and the parties did file, by May 17, 2021, proposed formats for the briefing of these cases.

On June 23, 2021, the Court established a briefing schedule. Thus far, FERC filed a Certified Index to the Record (on July 12, 2021); Mystic and State Petitioners filed Opening Briefs (September 7, 2021); and Intervenor for State Petitioners filed their Brief (September 21, 2021). Since the last Report, Respondent's (FERC's) Brief was filed on December 6, 2021; and Intervenor for Respondents' (ISO-NE and ENECOS) Briefs were filed December 20, 2021). Next up are Reply Briefs (February 3, 2022); Joint Appendix (February 17, 2022); and Final Briefs (February 24, 2022). The date for oral argument and the composition of the merits panel will be identified at a later time.

- **CASPR (20-1333, 20-1331) (consolidated)\*\***  
**Underlying FERC Proceeding: ER18-619<sup>187</sup>**  
**Petitioners: Sierra Club, NRDC, RENEW Northeast, and CLF**  
**Status: Being Held in Abeyance (until June 1, 2022)**

On August 31, 2020, the Sierra Club, NRDC, RENEW Northeast, and CLF petitioned the DC Circuit Court of Appeals for review of the FERC's order accepting ISO-NE's CASPR revisions (which, under *Allegheny*, is ripe for review). On October 2, 2020, appearances, docketing statements, a statement of issues to be raised, and a statement of intent to utilize deferred joint appendix were filed. On October 19, 2020, the FERC moved to dismiss

<sup>184</sup> *ISO New England Inc.*, 171 FERC ¶ 61,160 (May 26, 2020) ("CIP IROL Cost Recovery Order") and *ISO New England Inc.*, 172 FERC ¶ 61,251 (Sep. 17, 2020) ("CIP IROL Allegheny Order", and together with the CIP IROL Cost Recover Order, the "CIP IROL Orders").

<sup>185</sup> *July 2018 Order; July 2018 Rehearing Order; Dec 2018 Order; Dec 2018 Rehearing Order; Jul 17 Compliance Order.*

<sup>186</sup> The COS Agreement is to provide compensation for the continued operation of the Mystic 8 & 9 units from June 1, 2022 through May 31, 2024.

<sup>187</sup> *ISO New England Inc.*, 162 FERC ¶ 61,205 (Mar. 9, 2018) ("CASPR Order").

the case for a lack of jurisdiction (arguing that Petitioners missed their opportunity to timely file their Petition for review in 2018, and filing within 60 days of *Allegheny* did not make their Petition timely). Alternatively, the FERC asked that the case be held in abeyance for 60 days pending issuance of a further FERC order on this matter. On October 29, Petitioners opposed the FERC's motion. On November 5, 2020, the FERC filed a reply, indicated that an order on rehearing would be issued imminently and suggested that, if the Court declines to dismiss the petition, it should be held in abeyance until the Commission issues an order on rehearing. As noted above, the FERC issued the *CASPR Allegheny Order* on November 19, modifying the discussion in the *CASPR Order*, but reaching the same the result. The Sierra Club, NRDC and CLF also requested rehearing of the November 19 order.

On January 12, 2021, the Court dismissed as moot the FERC's October 19 motion to hold this proceeding in abeyance and ordered that the motion to dismiss be referred to the merits panel (Judges Pillard, Katsas and Walker) and addressed by the parties in their briefs. On January 25 and 26, 2021, CT Parties and MMWEC and NHEC filed statements of issues and notices that they intend to participate in support of Petitioners. On January 27, 2021, the Court ordered the parties to submit by February 26, 2021, proposed formats for the briefing of these cases. On March 24, 2021, the Court granted NEPOOL's intervention and established a briefing schedule that, as explained just below, has since been superseded.

On April 7, 2021, the Court granted Petitioners' motion to hold this matter in abeyance, pending further order of the Court. The parties were directed to file motions to govern future proceedings in these cases on or before October 22, 2021. On October 22, 2021, Petitioners Sierra Club, NRDC, Renew Northeast, Inc., and CLF moved the Court to hold this matter in abeyance until June 1, 2022. On October 25, 2021, the Court granted Petitioners' second motion to hold this matter in abeyance. The parties were directed to file motions to govern future proceedings in these cases on or before June 1, 2022.

- **Opinion 531-A Compliance Filing Undo (20-1329)**  
Underlying FERC Proceeding: ER15-414<sup>188</sup>  
Petitioners: TOs' (CMP et al.)  
**Status: Being Held in Abeyance**

On August 28, 2020, the TOs<sup>189</sup> petitioned the DC Circuit Court of Appeals for review of the FERC's October 6, 2017 order rejecting the TOs' filing that sought to reinstate their transmission rates to those in place prior to the FERC's orders later vacated by the DC Circuit's *Emera Maine*<sup>190</sup> decision. On September 22, 2020, the FERC submitted an unopposed motion to hold this proceeding in abeyance for four months to allow for the Commission to "a future order on petitioners' request for rehearing of the order challenged in this appeal, and the rate proceeding in which the challenged order was issued remains ongoing before the Commission." On October 2, 2020, the Court granted the FERC's motion, and directed the parties to file motions to govern future proceedings in this case by February 2, 2021. On January 25, 2021, the FERC requested that the Court continue to hold this petition for review in abeyance for an additional three months, with parties to file motions to govern future proceedings at the end of that period. The FERC requested continued abeyance because of its intention to issue a future order on petitioners' request for rehearing of the order challenged in this appeal, and the rate proceeding in which the challenged order was issued remains ongoing before the FERC. Petitioners consented to the requested abeyance. On February 11, 2021, the Court issued an order that that this case remain in abeyance pending further order of the court. On April 21, 2021, the FERC filed an unopposed motion for continued abeyance of this case *because* the Commission intends to issue a future order on Petitioners' request for rehearing

<sup>188</sup> *ISO New England Inc.*, 161 FERC ¶ 61,031 (Oct. 6, 2017) ("Order Rejecting Filing").

<sup>189</sup> The "TOs" are CMP; Eversource Energy Service Co., on behalf of its affiliates CL&P, NSTAR and PSNH; National Grid; New Hampshire Transmission; UI; Unitil and Fitchburg; VTransco; and Versant Power.

<sup>190</sup> *Emera Maine v. FERC*, 854 F.3d 9 (D.C. Cir. 2017) ("*Emera Maine*").

of the challenged Order Rejecting Compliance Filing, and because the remand proceeding in which the challenged order was issued remains ongoing.

On May 4, 2021, the Court ordered that this case remain in abeyance pending further order of the Court, directing the FERC to file a status report by September 1, 2021 and at 120-day intervals thereafter. The parties were directed to file motions to govern future proceedings in this case within 30 days of the completion of agency proceedings. On December 15, 2021, the FERC submitted a status report indicating that the proceedings before the Commission remain ongoing and that this appeal should continue to remain in abeyance.

- **ISO-NE's Inventoried Energy Program (Chapter 2B) Proposal (19-1224\*\*\*; 19-1247; 19-1252; 19-1253)(consolidated); Underlying FERC Proceeding: ER19-1428<sup>191</sup>**  
**Petitioners: ENECOS (Belmont et al.) (19-1224); MA AG (19-1247); NH PUC/NH OCA (19-1252); Sierra Club/UCS (19-1253)**  
**Status: Briefing Complete; Oral Argument Held Oct 21, 2021; Awaiting Decision**

As previously reported, at the unopposed request of the FERC, the Court issued an order suspending the previous briefing schedule and remanding the record back to the FERC. Subsequently, the FERC issued its *IEP Remand Order* (June 18, 2020) and its Notice of Denial by Operation of Law of the requests for rehearing of its *IEP Remand Order* (August 20, 2020). As previously reported, each of the Petitioners filed amended petitions for review in the consolidated proceeding in order to bring the FERC's *IEP Remand Order* and the post-remand FERC record before the DC Circuit. Following completion of briefing, oral argument was held October 21, 2021 before Judges Wilkins, Katsas and Jackson. This matter is pending before the Court

#### Other Federal Court Activity of Interest

- **Order 872 (20-72788,\* 21-70113; 20-73375, 21-70113) (consol.) (9<sup>th</sup> Cir.)**  
**Underlying FERC Proceeding: RM19-15<sup>192</sup>**  
**Petitioners: SEIA et al.**

**Status: Briefing Complete; Oral Argument Scheduled for March 8, 2022**

On September 17, 2020, SEIA petitioned the 9<sup>th</sup> Circuit Court of Appeals for review of *Order 872*.<sup>193</sup> Briefing is now complete and oral argument has been scheduled for March 8, 2022, though the Court stated that panel to be assigned could decide to submit the case on the briefs instead. The composition of the argument panel will be identified roughly 30 days prior to oral argument.

- **PennEast Project (18-1128)**  
**Underlying FERC Proceeding: CP15-558<sup>194</sup>**  
**Petitioners: NJ DEP, DE and Raritan Canal Commission, NJ Div. of Rate Counsel**  
**Status: Being Held in Abeyance**

The Supreme Court proceedings up on which abeyance in this proceeding had been based ended on August 2, 2021. The parties filed a motion to govern future proceedings on September 1, 2021, suggesting that supplemental briefing was in order. On September 13, 2021, the Court ordered that Petitioners and Respondents file supplemental briefs on November 12, 2021. However, on October 29, the FERC and Petitioners NJ DEP, DE and Raritan Canal Commission, NJ Conservation Foundation and The Watershed Institute, NJ Division of Rate Counsel, Township of Hopewell, NJ and ConEd (collectively, "Movants") requested that the Court suspend the

<sup>191</sup> 162 FERC ¶ 61,127 (Feb. 15, 2018) ("*Order 841*"); 167 FERC ¶ 61,154 (May 16, 2019) ("*Order 841-A*").

<sup>192</sup> *Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Co., LLC*, 159 FERC ¶ 62,181 (Feb. 3, 2017); *Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Co., LLC*, 161 FERC ¶ 61,250 (Dec. 6, 2017).

<sup>193</sup> *Order 872* approved pricing and eligibility revisions to the FERC's long-standing regulations implementing sections 201 and 210 of the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 ("PURPA"), including: state flexibility in setting QF rates; a decrease (to 5 MW) to the threshold for a rebuttable presumption of access to nondiscriminatory, competitive markets; updates to the "One-Mile Rule"; clarifications to when a QF establishes its entitlement to a purchase obligation; and provision for certification challenges.

<sup>194</sup> *PennEast Pipeline Co., LLC*, 162 FERC ¶ 61,053 (Jan. 19, 2018), *reh'g denied*, 163 FERC ¶ 61,159 (May 30, 2018).



supplemental briefing schedule entered on September 13, 2021 and hold this consolidated case in abeyance. The Court granted that motion on November 12, 2021 and directed the parties to file motions to govern future proceedings by February 18, 2022.

- **Opinion 569/569-A: FERC's Base ROE Methodology (16-1325, 20-1182, 20-1240, 20-1241, 20-1248, 20-1251, 20-1267, 20-1513) (consol.)**

**Underlying FERC Proceeding: EL14-12; EL15-45<sup>195</sup>**

**Petitioners: MISO TOs, Transource Energy, Dec 23 Petitioners et al.**

**Status: Oral Argument Held Nov 18, 2021; Awaiting Decision**

The MISO TOs, Transource and "Dec 23 Petitioners",<sup>196</sup> among others, have appealed *Opinion 569/569-A*. The MISO TOs' case has been consolidated with previous appeals that had been held in abeyance, with the lead case number assigned as 16-1325. Following completion of briefing, oral argument was held on November 18, 2021 before Judges Srinivasan, Katsas and Walker. This matter is pending before the Court.

- **Algonquin Atlantic Bridge Project Briefing Order (21-1115\*, 21-1138, 21-1153, 21-1155) (consol.);**

**Underlying FERC Proceeding: CP16-9-012<sup>197</sup>**

**Petitioners: LS Power, Algonquin, INGA**

**Status: Case Being Held in Abeyance**

On May 3, 2021, Algonquin petitioned the DC Circuit Court of Appeals for review of the *Briefing Order* and the *April 19 Notice of Denial of Rehearings by Operation of Law*. Appearances, docketing statements and a statement of issues were due and filed June 4, 2021. Also on June 4, 2021, the FERC filed an unopposed motion to hold this proceeding in temporary abeyance, until August 2, 2021, including the filing of the certified index to the record, because "the May 3 petition for review no longer reflects the [FERC]'s latest determination in this matter." The Court granted the first abeyance motion. On November 15, 2021, the Court granted a third abeyance motion by the FERC, directing the parties to file motions to govern future proceedings by January 31, 2022.

<sup>195</sup> *Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Co., LLC*, 159 FERC ¶ 62,181 (Feb. 3, 2017); *Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Co., LLC*, 161 FERC ¶ 61,250 (Dec. 6, 2017).

<sup>196</sup> "Dec 23 Petitioners" are: Assoc. of Bus. Advocating Tariff Equity; Coalition of MISO Transmission Customers: IL Industrial Energy Consumers; IN Industrial Energy Consumers, Inc.; MN Large Industrial Group; WI Industrial Energy Group; AMP; Cooperative Energy; Hoosier Energy Rural Elec. Coop.; MS Public Service Comm.; MO Public Service Comm.; MO Joint Municipal Electric Utility Comm.; Organization of MISO States, Inc.; Southwestern Elec. Coop., Inc.; and Wabash Valley Power Assoc.

<sup>197</sup> *Briefing Order*; *April 19 Notice of Denial of Rehearings by Operation of Law*.

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