



Resource Adequacy

DIMENSIONS
& OPTIONS

Steven Corneli
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California regulators plan post-mortem to examine cause of rolling blackouts



California's Shift From Natural Gas to Solar Is Playing a Role in Rolling Blackouts

California's grid operator warns that the state has become overly reliant on power imports: "The rest of the West is hot too."

JEFF ST. JOHN | AUGUST 17, 2020

Pacific Northwest looks to avoid California-style blackouts through more regional coordination

Climate change, load growth and the replacement of fossil fuels with renewables are pushing the region to take big steps toward a new model.



Global Power Sector Embracing Renewables but Ditching Fossil Fuels Too Slowly

A new study of 3,000 power companies around the world shows even those leading on renewables are still locking in more carbon.

JOHN PARNELL | AUGUST 31, 2020

Three key dimensions of RA :

1. What

2. Who

3. How

First dimension: What?

- a. **Sufficient resources for an electric system to avoid an excessive need for load-shedding to preserve system operating integrity¹.**
- b. **A target loss of load metric which, if met, implies sufficient resources.**
- c. **A methodology for determining that loss of load metric.**

1. The electric system associated with this aspect of RA is *usually bigger than a single state*. States in such a system need a way to allocate system-wide RA among themselves for state-level RA approaches to be effective.

Second dimension: Who?

- a. Who establishes the target levels?**
- b. Who allocates it amongst power system members?**
- c. Who among these members face consequences for failure to meet target levels?**
- d. Who decides on the consequences and designs the mechanism to create them?**

Third dimension: How?

- a. How are responsible members exposed to consequences and motivated to meet standard?**
 - i. Vertically integrated utility regulatory requirement**
 - ii. Capacity market (with or without self-supply option)**
 - iii. Exposure to scarcity prices in spot energy market**
- b. The specific policy designs intended to effectively motivate meeting the standard**

	PJM	MISO	ERCOT
What? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Target LOLE /reserve margin • UCAP for VRE 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mandatory reserve margin • On-peak CF 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mandatory reserve margin • ELCC for wind, with UCAP allocated by location 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Non-mandatory targets • Energy market prices & bilaterals
Who? <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Sets target & margins 2. Allocates 3. Sees consequence 4. Designs mechanisms 5. Approves “ 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. RFC 2. PJM 3. Capacity market participants 4. PJM 5. FERC 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. MISO (states can also) 2. MISO 3. Load-serving entities, owners of excess capacity 4. MISO 5. FERC 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. ERCOT 2. NA 3. Energy-market participants 4. ERCOT 5. PUCT
How? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Financial incentives • Key policy details 	<p>LSE choice of self-supply (via FRR) or capacity market</p> <p>“Demand curve” & 3-year forward capacity market</p>	<p>LSE choice of bilateral/self supply, prompt capacity auction, or deficiency charge.</p> <p>Vertical demand curve & most investments paid for through regulated rates</p>	<p>Scarcity revenue (resource owners) or charges (buyers)</p> <p>ORDC to support effective scarcity price levels</p>

One more important issue:

Will RTO Tariff provisions (e.g., MOPR) continue to be used in ways that increase the costs for states to achieve their clean energy policy goals?

- **If *yes*, states will increasingly look to ways to meet RA needs *without* using federally-regulated markets. (FRR, FRAP)**
- **If *no*, then states have a broader set of RA options, including clean energy deployment approaches that work alongside today's capacity markets or evolving versions of them.**

Examples

“MOPR-land”

- **FRR / FRAP (minimal change in What and Who dimension)**

Adds a self-supply “How” option to the RTO tariff

Requires development of UCAP procurement and market power mitigation policies at the state level

Could be combined with several sustainable state-level policies from RH column.

“Sustainable markets land”

- **CES**
- **Carbon price (where leakage isn’t a problem)**
- **Collaborative multi-state planning to develop incentive policies for evolving least-cost, best-fit (& perhaps adequate) clean energy resource portfolios.**
- **Early retirement incentives and limited operation options for existing fossil resources**

These incentives would co-exist with a regional RA construct and a FERC RA-relevant market.

The bigger picture is changing, too

In both worlds, new approaches will be needed to key “what,” “who” and “how” issues as clean energy technologies gain market share:

- What counts toward RA, and how much?
- What if it takes a specific mix of clean technologies to provide the equivalent of a fossil MW in terms of balancing generation and consumption?
- What if only some of these specific mixes result in much lower total costs for reliable & clean electricity?